Océane Crabbé. Strategy and Global Security Analysis (S0B73a) Professor Arnim Langer

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1 Océane Crabbé Strategy and Global Security Analysis (S0B73a) Professor Arnim Langer January 2017

2 Table of Contents Introduction Description of security threat Children used in armed conflict The LRA Northern Uganda and the rise of a movement Situation today Role of children in the LRA Children in armed conflict as a threat to security Human security Economic security Security threat management Legal framework Military operations Non-military solutions Policy recommendations Defeating the LRA Protecting children victim of the LRA Protecting children worldwide Notes Bibliography Official documents Books Articles Reports Working papers Ph.D Theses Press statements Websites Figures

3 Introduction Over the years, armed conflicts have changed in nature: from international, they have increasingly become intra-national, opposing independent entities rather than sovereign States. Along with this change came a whole new range of unconventional warfare with the objective of destabilizing entire regions, thereby blurring the line that used to separate civilians and military. In fact, contemporary strategies of warfare ( ) victimize civilians more than ever before (Verelst: 2014, p.4). While all civilians suffer from armed conflicts, one category emerges as being particularly vulnerable, and by extension also a target of choice: children. Apart from being victims of attacks and violence committed throughout the conflict, children can also become an integral part of the latter by fighting alongside the belligerents. This is made possible by the fact that children are easily influenced and easier to kidnap (War Child: 2007, p. 10). This practice has become recurrent in modern warfare, and although it is often associated with rebel or terrorist organizations, national armies have also been accused of this crime. It is estimated that 300,000 children worldwide are actively deployed in wars, whether to directly take part in combat or to provide other services that might be of use to the armed group. Cases of child soldiers have been reported around the world, but Vautravers estimates that one third of these children are active in Africa, where a majority of contemporary armed conflicts are raging (Vautravers: 2009, p.96). Wartorn regions constitute the perfect theater of operations for rebel groups that take advantage of the instability and perpetrate it by literally stealing entire generations of children. The focus of this paper will be on one of these groups in particular: the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been operating in Central Africa for nearly 30 years, and whose armed forces are made up mostly of abducted children. One of the LRA s former commanders, Dominic Ongwen, is currently in trial at the ICC facing 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity (International Criminal Court). This 3

4 case perfectly illustrates the challenges that arise when attempting to address the issue of child soldiers: Ongwen was one himself, abducted by the LRA where he spent 30 years. Although the LRA is a security threat in itself, the focus of this paper will be exclusively on the use of children by this rebel group, which constitutes a different security threat. In the first section, the security threat will be conceptualized and the link between the concepts LRA and children used in armed conflict will be established through an analysis of the LRA s modus operandi regarding children. In the second section, the use of children by the LRA will be analyzed as a threat to both human and economic security. The third section will present an overview of the three different ways in which the security threat was managed, and their reasons for success and failure. Finally, this will allow for the formulation of policy recommendations to better address the issue of the use of children in armed conflict, not only by the LRA but also by armed groups in the rest of the world. 4

5 1. Description of security threat The security threat that will be addressed in this paper is the use of children by the LRA. In order to better apprehend this threat, it is necessary to define the main two concepts implied, namely children used in armed conflict and the LRA. 1.1 Children used in armed conflict The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups defines such children as any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict: 2007, p.7). The Principles insist on the fact that this definition is not limited to children who are taking a direct part in hostilities. Indeed, children can serve a wide range of purposes: espionage activities, as cooks, guards, porters, and messengers, among others. Last but not least, children, often girls, are subject to sexual abuse by group members (War Child: 2007, p.6). The definition offered by the Paris Principles makes the distinction between armed forces and armed groups, where the former refers to military institutions of a State, and the latter to any group that doesn t fall into that category. The distinction is important because, to this day, children continue to be used in the armed forces of countries around the world. The UN Security Council listed the countries that were still known to use children in their armed forces in 2016, half of which are African countries 1 (United Nations: 2016). However, it is highly probable that the list is not exhaustive, considering that army recruits in some countries may simply lie about their age or not have the paperwork to prove it. All these States are in clear violation of international law, but proving it can be a complex issue. The use of children in armed conflict is not new, but what has changed is the extent to which they are used. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including the following. First, contemporary conflicts can in some cases last several decades, 5

6 which deteriorates existing social and economic structures, leaving an increasing amount of children orphans or in very unfavorable living conditions (Kaplan: 2005). Children in such conditions make for easier recruits, whether on a voluntary basis or not. Second, warfare has evolved and become much lighter and easier to manipulate (AK-47s for instance can be assembled by a 10-year old). Reasons for recruiting children can be attributed to the very features of a child s personality: they are trusting, vulnerable and easily manipulated. They are often depicted as valuable combatants as they follow orders without question and are less aware of the impact of their actions. Moreover, children who have grown up in conflict areas may simply see violence as a permanent way of life. In countries where military service is mandatory, children may simply be the only manpower left available to rebel groups (Vautravers: 2009, p.101). Finally, children are less costly and are often seen as being available as [youth labor] is nearly unlimited ( ), and expendable (Vautravers: 2009, p.103). 1.2 The LRA The LRA falls under the definition of a rebel group, seeing as one of its primary motives was to overthrow the government in place 2 (namely Museveni s NRM), and was also listed as a terrorist group by the United States after 9/11 (Reeker: 2001). The LRA s activities have resulted in more than 100,000 casualties over the course of the conflict (The Resolve). The LRA has also been engaging in illicit trade of diamonds, gold and ivory, thereby threatening both the economic and environmental security. According to a report by the UN Secretary General, the group survived by exploiting the absence of State authority, poor infrastructure, porous borders and lack of inter-state coordination (United Nations: 2015, p.6). The LRA can therefore also be accounted responsible for aggravating the political security of the affected countries. Finally, LRA members share poor living conditions where prevalence of HIV/AIDS, among other infections and diseases, is high, and where access to medical care is low. This threatens the health security of group members themselves but also of local populations that escapees may eventually return to. 6

7 These threats are important and must be taken into consideration. However, this paper will address exclusively the issue of the use of children by the LRA rather than the threats posed by the LRA in itself Northern Uganda and the rise of a movement The LRA operated in Northern Uganda from 1988 to 2005 under the leadership of Joseph Kony. Understanding how a single man with an army mainly composed of children could have such a devastating impact on an entire region, and ultimately, an entire country, requires a brief overview of the historical context which gave birth to this movement. Under British colonial rule, Northern Uganda was already at a disadvantage compared with the rest of the country. For years, this region was used as a reservoir for manual laborers and military recruits, thereby deliberately excluding it from education and employment programs implemented in the South. After the country gained independence in 1962, the successive Ugandan presidents resorted to continued discrimination against the Northern populations, particularly against the Acholi who by the 1980s constituted approximately 30-40% of the armed forces (Ofcansky: 1999) (see Figure 1). The first Acholi to come to power, Tito Okello, became the 8 th President of Uganda only to be toppled six months later by the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by current President Yoweri Museveni. The NRA had been fighting a guerrilla war against the Ugandan government from 1981 to 1986, in which countless atrocities were committed on both sides. When Museveni took power in 1986, many Acholi soldiers fled North in the fear of reprisal, particularly for the massive civilian killings that took place in the Luwero Triangle (area located North of Kampala). Feeling betrayed and defeated, these soldiers failed to reintegrate back into their communities and needed only a leader to materialize their ideals. It is in such a context of ethnic divisions and power shuffling that an Acholi woman named Alice Auma emerged and started a rebellion named the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). Claimed to be possessed by the Lakwena spirit that protected her against evil, she assembled an army composed of men that had once fought in the national army. This movement quickly gained popular support, mainly because people feared 7

8 being punished for having opposed the NRA during the war (De Temmerman: 2001, p.108). Quickly defeated by government troops (now UPDF, Uganda s People Defence Forces), the HSM was the basis for the creation of the LRA by Kony in However, by then, most popular support for the movement was lost, and Kony resorted to forced conscription to build his army. His fight was directed not only at the Ugandan government, but also at his own Acholi people, who in his eyes were traitors and had to be purified (De Temmerman: 2001, p.108). Figure 1: approximate distribution of the Acholi tribe in Uganda and South Sudan. This territory was the LRA s main theater of operations until

9 1.2.2 Situation today Today, the LRA is still active but is no longer operating in Northern Uganda. In 2005, following military pressures from the government forces, the group fled westwards and has become scattered across Northeastern DRC, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, thereby exporting the security threat onto the international scene (see Figure 2). The LRA remains mainly led by Northern Ugandans, although Kony reportedly no longer has complete and direct command over each unit. This dispersion makes the LRA s objectives rather unclear, although reports indicate that it remains committed to its original goal of overthrowing the government (Cakaj: 2010, p.20). In 2015, the LRA was estimated to have approximately 200 combatants left, which clearly sets it far from its objective. However, in an unstable region, the possibility of backup by other rebel groups or by governments forces themselves is not to be excluded. LRA attacks continue to take place on a regular basis. Since September 2016, civilian abductions were reported mainly around the town of Zemio in the CAR (LRA Crisis Tracker: 2016). In 2005, the ICC issued public arrest warrants for five senior leaders of the LRA. Of the five, Kony remains the only one at large, and is believed to be hiding in Kafia Kingi, a Sudanese-controlled enclave at the border between the CAR and South Sudan. 9

10 Figure 2: approximate territorial spread of the LRA from Northern Uganda. The highlighted area corresponds to the territories where LRA attacks have been reported. LRA troops are scattered all over the highlighted area and exercise no effective control over it. 1.3 Role of children in the LRA Over its nearly 30 years of existence, it is estimated that the LRA recruited more than 70,000 children. The insecurity prevailing in Northern Uganda combined with the LRA s constant movement in and out of the country makes exact numbers difficult to estimate, but abducted children are clearly the LRA s main manpower (GlobalSecurity.org). Securing the issue of child soldiers therefore becomes not only about the child him or herself but about putting an end to the LRA as a whole, thereby gaining security in all territories where the LRA is active. Reasons for recruiting children were outlined in section 1.1. When it comes to the LRA, four main reasons for their use of children stand out. First, children were the only available resource to the group. By 1988, populations in Northern Uganda had 10

11 grown tired of conflict and many former government soldiers accepted Museveni s offer of amnesty. Abducting children was a means to overcome this lack of support. Second, children were considered an unlimited resource for the LRA in the sense that some were simply born into the movement. These children knew no other living conditions than the ones they had in the LRA, so they were highly unlikely to want to escape or even question the intentions of the group. In the same vein, the third reason is that children were simply perceived as an expendable resource. In a very utilitarian perspective, children were used in trenches because of their small height, or as sex slaves because they were less likely to already be infected with HIV/AIDS. Finally, when it comes to children being trusting, vulnerable, and easily manipulated, the LRA has come to master four psychological techniques to keep children in its ranks (Invisible Children: 2013): 1) Spreading a double fear of escape. Children are told that if they attempt to escape and fail, they will be killed by the LRA, and if they succeed, they will be killed by the communities they escape to. By using fear as warfare, the LRA is able to control populations rather than territory, which is a key strategic objective (Van Acker: 2004, p.350). 2) Performing specific rituals to foster a unique LRA identity. For example, religion is cleverly used to portray abductions as an act of purification of sinful people (Cakaj: 2010, p.5). Through these techniques, which often involve the use of violence among its members, the LRA falls into Van Acker s definition of religious terrorists, who regard violence not only as a necessary expedient for the attainment of their goals, [ ], but as divinely decreed, and hence morally justified (Van Acker: 2004, p.349). 3) Depicting Kony as a superior being through religious and traditional Acholi beliefs, which makes children both fear and respect him. 4) Promising future political power and wealth. Children are encouraged to kill in order to get promoted to officer ranks, where they receive preferential treatment. Moreover, the widespread message remains that LRA members will be granted high military positions once the Ugandan government is overthrown. 11

12 2. Children in armed conflict as a threat to security The use of children in armed conflict constitutes a threat to security in at least two theoretical approaches: human security and economic security. The effects of this threat can be analyzed at three levels: individual, community and national (see Table 1 for an overview). 2.1 Human security From a human security point of view, the referent object is people rather than the State. This perspective argues that massive insecurity and destruction can be caused by conflicts other than the ones traditionally opposing sovereign States (Collins: 2016, p.140). In our case study, LRA commanders, and ultimately all group members, are directly responsible for human insecurity. At the individual level, the children used in armed conflict are directly threatened, both physically and psychologically. The UN, in its Human Development Report of 1994, placed personal security and human dignity at the same level of importance as economic, health, or food security (Collins: 2016, p.140). By exposing children to violence, both their personal security and human dignity are being threatened. The atrocities that children are forced to commit leads to long-term psychological consequences. Moreover, using them in armed conflict exposes them directly to physical injuries or even death. As the manager of the Gusco reception center in Gulu describes at the sight of LRA escapees: There were not only the visible wounds: the swollen feet, the scars of bullets and cuts, the mutilations, the skin diseases and germ infections, the malnutrition which had sometimes hampered their growth and development, the back pains from carrying heavy loads, the venereal diseases and pregnancies. Worse, and more difficult to heal, were the inner scars: the fear and mistrust, the feelings of guilt and self-contempt, and the anger towards a society that had failed to protect them (De Temmerman: 2001, p.107). Finally, children that manage to escape face the burden of being tagged as rebels by their communities and therefore be rejected for having contributed to the conflict. 12

13 At the community level, it is clear that the families of these children are directly affected and suffer the psychological trauma of having lost a family member. In the case of the LRA, family members are also physically threatened because they run the risk of being killed if their child attempts to escape (see section 1.3). Child abductions ultimately lead to an element that applies to both the community and the national level: fear. The UN Human Development Report of 1994 defines human security as freedom from fear, freedom from want (United Nations: 1994, p.3), meaning that fear is a direct threat to human security. Vinci argues that abductions are one of the LRA s main methods of spreading fear, along with mutilations and surprise attacks (Vinci: 2015). This fear led to the internal displacement of approximately 2 million people at the height of the conflict and the appearance of night commuting : children spending the nights in urban centers instead of their villages by fear of being abducted (Enough Project). Ultimately, the LRA s actions in Uganda left an entire society psychologically scarred, which made the prospect of a lasting peace even more difficult (Kaplan: 2005). 2.2 Economic security The UN, in its World Economic and Social Survey of 2008, states that economic insecurity arises from the exposure of individuals, communities and countries to adverse events, and from their inability to cope with and recover from the costly consequences of those events (United Nations: 2008, p.vi). In this regard, the use of children in armed conflict can be considered an adverse event and has consequences on the three mentioned levels. At the individual level, children used in armed conflict are children that don t go to school and don t receive the necessary education to be financially independent once they reach adulthood. According to Blattman and Annan, the average length of education in abducted children in Northern Uganda is nine months, and they are half as likely to be engaged in skilled work and earn a third lower wages (Blattman and Annan: 2007, p. 4). This ultimately leads to poverty and exacerbates the difficulties for former abductees to reintegrate society. 13

14 At the community level, there is an impact on education, household incomes, and land use. First, education is affected because the proportion of children going to school may simply drop by fear of abductions. Children in schools constitute easy targets and there is often a lack of police or military presence. As a consequence of this exposure, there is a propensity for schools to close, thereby impeding the remaining child population of the affected area to pursue an education. Second, in developing countries, children who don t go to school are an important source of income for the family. The absence of these children can therefore constitute an income shock to the household. Third, the displacement of entire populations mentioned in section 2.1 coupled with the fear of being exposed to LRA attacks means that entire patches of land are left uncultivated. Displaced populations are vulnerable long after the physical threat is gone because of the absence of official land titles and home ownership. In Northern Uganda, where agriculture is the main source of employment and the most important source of income (United Nations: 2015), insecurity greatly adds to the economic vulnerability of affected communities. Finally, using children in armed conflict means that a significant part of a young generation is simply absent from society. At the national level, this translates into a human capital loss. Moreover, the physical and psychological trauma carried by children who manage to escape has to be addressed for appropriate rehabilitation into society. This constitutes a financial burden for NGOs and government programs. In both the human and economic security approaches, the source of the threat was interpreted as being the LRA and its members, given that they are directly responsible for the use of children in armed conflict. However, as the historical overview of the conflict made clear (see section 1.2.1), the LRA should not to be reduced to the handiwork of a religious fanatic (Van Acker: 2004, p.335). The LRA was able to gain momentum and cause regional insecurity because of the fact that Northern Uganda had been to a large extent abandoned by national authorities. In this perspective, one may understand the source of the threat as being the State, or rather the absence of State, because it failed to consolidate a peaceful nation. According to Van Acker, one of the root causes for the conflict is the militarization of Ugandan society in its post-colonial development, where the consecutive governments frequently changed the composition of the military, leading to a regular 14

15 rotation in and out of civilian life (Van Acker: 2004, p.338). Regarding the issue of the use of children in armed conflict more specifically, it can be argued that a more important military presence and stronger State legitimacy in the affected regions could have offered these children more protection. As Vautravers puts it: the lack of State sovereignty is the cornerstone of the child soldier problem (Vautravers: 2009, p.105). In short, the absence of State structures in Northern Uganda had two major consequences: local populations were left in a state of resentment and abandonment, which is fertile ground for rebellion, and they were left unprotected, easily exposed to violence. The LRA was able to use both to its advantage and gain power. Individual Human security Children threatened physically (wounds, malnutrition, etc.) and psychologically (exposure to violence) Rejected by society Economic security Lack of education and of work opportunities More vulnerable to poverty Levels Community Families suffering loss and physically threatened by abductors of their children Spread of fear in towns and villages where abductions are taking place Lack of education and closing of schools Lower household incomes Agricultural deprivation National Spread of fear throughout the country Exit of youth from labor force Financial burden on NGOs and rehabilitation programs Table 1: effects of the use of children in armed conflict on human and economic security at three levels 15

16 3. Security threat management The security threat was addressed through three different strategies. States can only address a threat if there exists the legal framework to do so. Therefore, the first subsection will present a brief overview of the international and national (Ugandan) law that bans or limits the use of children in armed conflict. Kaplan points out that the most effective way to stop the use of child soldiers is to end the conflicts in which they fight (Kaplan: 2005). The second and third subsections will therefore review the actions that were undertaken to fight the LRA, both in military terms (section 3.2) and through non-military solutions (section 3.3). The success and/or failure of these actions will also be assessed in each subsection, which will allow for the formulation of policy recommendations in the final section. 3.1 Legal framework The use of children in armed conflict is banned under international law since 1977, with the ratification of Protocols Additional 1 and 2 to the Fourth Geneva Convention of Article 77 of Protocol 1 states that parties should refrain from recruiting children under fifteen years of age. The prohibition of the use of children under fifteen in armed conflict was reaffirmed in the International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, and the Rome Statute of the ICC considers the recruitment of such children to be a war crime (Child Soldiers International). It is not until the year 2000 that the minimum age for taking part in armed conflict was raised to 18 in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which is only ratified by 123 States. The Ugandan government ratified this Optional Protocol in 2002 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). The minimum age of 18 is also stated in the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces Act of 2005 (article 52(2)(c)). In 1986, when Museveni took power, it was estimated that 3,000 children, known as Kadogos were part of his NRA (Unicef: 1996). In 2003, violations of the legal framework were reported as Kadogos were supposedly still used, especially in Local Defense Units, intended to provide security to villages and camps (Human Rights Watch: 2003, p.2). 16

17 Whether there are still violations today is difficult to assess, as authorities can easily claim that they were unaware of the real age of recruits. However, it is important to keep in mind that fighting against the LRA s use of children might be a double-edged sword for the Ugandan government, as they would have to recognize their own violations. In fact, it was reported that children that managed to escape the LRA were sometimes asked to join the UPDF, considering that they knew LRA tactics and whereabouts. In any case, the international legal framework that exists is useful in setting a precedent for future recruitment of children in armed conflict, and for regulating the application of international humanitarian law. However, despite this framework, sill 80% of children used in armed conflict today are reported to be younger than 15 (War Child: 2007, p.6). Indeed, international law is often difficult to implement as most cases of child recruitment happen in the context of failed states, internal conflicts, or non-state actors (Vautravers: 2009, p. 96). 3.2 Military operations The UPDF launched a series of military operations against the LRA over the course of the conflict. In 1991, Operation North urged local populations to take up arms against the LRA, which only resulted in more retaliation against Acholi communities on the part of the LRA. By 1994, the LRA was used as a proxy by the Sudanese government in its fight against the Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA), another rebel group operating in what is now South Sudan. The LRA was almost entirely equipped by Sudanese armed forces: from weapons and uniforms to their own base camp near Juba. With this base, the LRA could easily retreat into Sudan when they came under too much military pressure in Uganda. In 2002, the Sudanese government authorized the UPDF to launch Operation Iron Fist and to pursue the LRA into Sudanese territory. This operation is said to have greatly reduced LRA military resources but ultimately failed and only exacerbated the humanitarian situation. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in 2005 marked the end of the 17

18 second Sudanese civil war as well as the end of Sudanese support for the LRA. The LRA fled the area and dispersed in Garamba National Park in the DRC, where Operation Lightning Thunder unfolded in This operation also failed due to poor coordination, bad weather and leaky intelligence (Downie: 2011). The following year, the African Union created the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), combining DRC, South Sudanese, CAR and Ugandan forces into a Regional Task Force. It is under this umbrella that military operations against the LRA have been taking place ever since. The AU-led initiative received the support of the EU, who provided it with nearly 2 million in 2014 in the African Peace Facility framework (European Commission: 2014). Militarily, the Task Force is also being backed by US troops since Despite reports of very little commitment and cooperation between troops of the RCI- LRA, the AU estimates that the operations are making steady progress against the LRA (African Union Peace and Security: 2015). According to Enough Project, LRA attacks dropped by 53% from 2011 to 2013, the number of killings between 2011 and 2012 decreased by 67%, and the number of defections in 2013 exceeded those in 2011 and 2012 combined (Agger: 2013, p.1). However, military operations have resulted in a greater dispersal of LRA members, which although some would consider a success, ultimately makes them more difficult to track. The LRA has proved particularly resilient to military operations and has often resorted to timeouts to reorganize and come back stronger. Moreover, failed military operations have always resulted in strong reprisals on civilians on the part of the LRA, thereby increasing the number of casualties in the short-term. Through military operations, the UPDF managed to successfully eradicate the threat posed by the LRA in Uganda, thereby also securing the threat faced by children. However, military operations were unsuccessful in the sense that they only pushed the problem into weaker and already unstable neighboring countries. Historical tensions and poor cooperation between RCI-LRA members lead to restricted military access in areas where the LRA has free rein (Benner: 2012, p.1). 18

19 Most importantly, military operations are a failure in addressing the issue of the use of children in armed conflict. Fighting the LRA means fighting children, seeing as the distinction between adult and child combatants is difficult to establish in the midst of an operation. In the rare cases where that distinction is made, it may prove fatal to professional armies who hesitate out of sympathy (Kaplan: 2005). Intervening militarily against the LRA can only be successful if it results in a complete eradication of the group. This would ensure that no more children can be recruited. However, it would also imply eliminating all the children that are already in LRA ranks. As parents of abducted LRA children explained: the situation is very complex. If the army doesn t intervene, they are accused of doing nothing. But if they do intervene, they are accused of killing our children. The rebels don t fight in the front line. So when the army attacks and claims victories, in reality, for us, the parents, they are defeats. (De Temmerman: 2001, p. 68). 3.3 Non-military solutions Aside from military operations, other solutions have been implemented to try and address the issue of both the LRA and their use of children. In the early 1990s, the governments of Uganda and Sudan underwent negotiations to recognize the LRA as a security threat and to stop supporting rebel groups operating in Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan (present-day South Sudan). Mediated by third parties such as Kenya and South Africa, these talks were at least successful in authorizing Ugandan troops to cross the border into Sudan to launch Operation Iron Fist against the LRA. Peace talks were also orchestrated with LRA commanders themselves, like the Juba Peace Talks in 2006, but these ultimately failed when Kony dropped out in 2008 (Enough Project). These negotiations addressed the threat of the LRA rather than the issue of the use of children, although the latter clearly played a role in raising international awareness and creating political pressures on the two parties to resolve the conflict. These pressures can be exemplified by the 1998 resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all LRA-abducted children (Commission on Human Rights: 1998), or the Angelus Address of Pope John Paul II of 20 th October 1996 asking for 19

20 the release of 30 abducted schoolgirls in Aboke, Northern Uganda (Christus Rex Information Service: 1996). Another important player in threat management are local NGOs. They offer rehabilitation programs, promote education, and offer psychological support for children who are released or manage to escape. These organizations are successful in making sure that the consequences of the security threat are efficiently addressed: children are reintegrated back into society. As far as children still under LRA-control are concerned, other programs have been developed to encourage defection by spreading come-home messages through fliers, radio, or helicopter-mounted speaker systems (Agger: 2013, p.8). A radio network was also implemented to diffuse early warning messages and improve communication between targeted areas. The role of local actors is definitely successful in working directly with communities and specifically addressing the issue of children. However, it can also be argued that spurring defection among LRA members might only encourage further abductions to compensate losses. Actions to spur defection among LRA members are also implemented through the UN s Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) programs, included in the Regional Strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord s Resistance Army adopted by the UNSC in 2012 (Crisis Action: 2012, p.4). According to Crisis Action, effective DDRRR programs are a cost-effective means of weakening the LRA by persuading combatants to leave the bush voluntarily, and without risking the lives of abducted combatants and soldiers (Crisis Action: 2012, p.12). However, the report also acknowledges that progress in achieving the Regional Strategy goals has been slow because it requires crossborder cooperation and full political commitment. 20

21 4. Policy recommendations A major element that was brought to light through the analysis of the security threat management is that addressing the issue of the use of child soldiers by the LRA and fighting the LRA itself are complementary approaches. Indeed, although this paper was limited to the threat posed by the use of children, the composition and tactics of the LRA have shown that both issues are intertwined. The first policy recommendations will therefore be aimed at putting an end to the LRA as a rebel group operating in Central Africa. Other methods targeting specifically LRA-children have also proven effective in weakening the LRA and protecting children. The second set of recommendations will therefore go in the direction of children-specific policies. Finally, it is clear that the use of children in armed conflict is not limited to the LRA, hence the last set of policy recommendations that will aim to address the security threat as a worldwide issue. 4.1 Defeating the LRA Negotiation techniques have proven ineffective with LRA leaders. This can probably be attributed to the lack of understanding of the LRA s political objectives. Indeed, it seems overtly difficult to engage a group of fighters, whether militarily or peacefully, without knowing what they stand for (Cakaj: 2010, p.1). It is therefore more likely that the LRA will be defeated through military means, although not through traditional military offensives. These have shown to only disperse LRA members and risk killing children in the process. The most effective solution is to track down and take out top LRA commanders, as they seem to be the only reason the LRA is still active. However, this solution requires technologically advanced weapon systems and experienced teams. In this regard, two recommendations can be made. First, the US should continue sending troops and supporting national armies through the provision of necessary military technology and expertise. Second, under the RCI-LRA umbrella, regional cooperation between Uganda, the DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, and the CAR should be enhanced. The LRA is very mobile and resilient, and if it continues to be under 21

22 military pressure it could simply continue moving northwestwards towards Chad. It should therefore be emphasized that the LRA poses a threat that is not limited to political borders. 4.2 Protecting children victim of the LRA Rehabilitation and defection programs in the affected areas should be pursued and reinforced, as they have had positive results. Once and if LRA commanders are taken out, it is crucial to ensure that the rest of LRA members are not abandoned, because they could simply decide to continue the rebellion: for some of them who have grown in LRA ranks, it is the only way they know how to survive. These former rebels should be included in the rehabilitation programs and their homes and families should be identified for better chances of reintegration. In the longer term, an important solution is creating regional stability and reducing poverty. The history of the rise of the LRA has shown that a population feeling abandoned by its government constitutes fertile soil for a rebellious movement. Moreover, the absence of security structures for children in Northern Uganda left them at greater risk of abduction and reduced their chances of being rescued. In this regard, the development of impoverished regions in Central Africa should be a priority in addressing the security threat. This security threat leads to both human and economic insecurity. The former can be tackled through increasing police and military presence in the region, and through the continued action of NGOs. The latter can be tackled through accelerated adult literacy programs, support for vocational training, access to psychological support, and expanded access to land and agricultural improvement services (United Nations: 2015). Another important long-term recommendation is to ensure positive diplomatic relations between governments in the region affected. This includes ensuring that no outside support reaches the LRA, whether by government institutions themselves or other institutions. According to Vautravers, long-term cooperation and development are more effective approaches than DDRRR programs, and should therefore not be overlooked (Vautravers: 2009, p.96). 22

23 4.3 Protecting children worldwide The two above-mentioned long-term policy recommendations (creating regional stability and ensuring positive diplomatic relations) can be applied to other regions or countries affected by the use of children in armed conflict. First, the study of the case of the LRA has shown the role that development indicators and political segmentation can play in the rise of rebel groups that could be inclined to resort to the use of children to reach their political objectives. Second, cooperation and coordination between all relevant actors, both infra-nationally and internationally, is necessary to address the problem effectively and prevent it from dragging on for decades, as is the case with the LRA. Finally, the legal framework remains a valuable tool to pressure governments into implementing policies against the recruitment of children in armed groups. At the very least, international legislation allows for war criminals to be held responsible for their actions. The last recommendation is therefore to re-voice the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and create better awareness within governments and societies around the world of the issues that still need to be tackled. Notes 1. These countries are Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. 2. The motives of the LRA have been largely questioned and changed by Kony multiple times. The political motive (overthrowing the government) was used alternatively with the motive of spreading the Ten Commandments and the motive of starting a new pure Acholi people. Using children was seen as the ideal way to reach the latter motive because Kony considered them to be pure by nature. 3. Between the 1 st September 2016 and the 11 th of January

24 Bibliography Official documents Commission on Human Rights, Abduction of Children from northern Uganda, CHR. res. 1998/75, New York: United Nations, 22 April 1998, available at European Commission, Commission Decision of on an allocation of funds under the African Peace Facility from the 10 th European Development Fund Support to the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), C(2014) 1810 final, Brussels: European Commission, 24 March 2014, 3 p. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The Paris Principles: The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, New York: United Nations, February 2007, 48 p. United Nations, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (General Assembly 70 th session, agenda item 68), A/70/836-S/2016/360, New York: United Nations, 20 April 2016, 40 p. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (Security Council), S/2015/914, New York: United Nations, 30 November 2015, 18 p. Books COLLINS Alan, Contemporary Security Studies, 4 th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 544 p. DE TEMMERMAN Els, Aboke Girls: Children abducted in northern Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001, 160 p. Articles OFCANSKY Thomas P., Museveni s War and the Ugandan Conflict, Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. XIX, n 1, July 1999, available at VAN ACKER Frank, Uganda and the Lord s Resistance Army: the new order no one ordered, African Affairs 103/412, 2004, pp VAUTRAVERS Alexandre J., Why Child Soldiers Are Such a Complex Issue, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. XXVII, n 4, 11 May 2009, pp

25 VINCI Anthony, The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord s Resistance Army, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. XVI, n 3, 2005, pp Reports AGGER Kasper, Completing the Mission: U.S. Special Forces Are Essential for Ending the LRA, Washington D.C.: Enough Project, October 2013, 18 p. BENNER Ashley, Ending the LRA, Washington D.C.: Enough Project, August 2012, 2 p. CAKAJ Ledio, The Lord s Resistance Army of Today, Washington D.C.: Enough Project, November 2010, 25 p. Crisis Action, Getting Back on Track: Implementing the UN Regional Strategy on the Lord s Resistance Army, London: Crisis Action, December 2012, 42 p. Human Rights Watch, Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda, vol. XV, n 7(A), New York: Human Rights Watch, March 2003, 31 p. United Nations, Human Development Report 1994, New York: United Nations (United Nations Development Program), 1994, 136 p. United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 2008: Overcoming Economic Insecurity, New York: United Nations (Department of Economic and Social Affairs), 2008, 234 p. United Nations, Uganda Human Development Report 2015, New York: United Nations (United Nations Development Program), 2015, 180 p. War Child, Child Soldiers: The shadow of their existence, London: War Child, March 2007, 44 p. Working papers BLATTMAN Christopher, ANNAN Jeannie, The Consequences of Child Soldiering, Brighton: The Institute of Development Studies, Households in Conflict Network, n 22, August 2007, 48 p. Ph.D Theses VERELST An, Psychosocial well-being of adolescent victims of sexual violence in eastern Congo, Ph.D, Universiteit Gent, 2014, 336 p. 25

26 Press statements REEKER Philip T. (Deputy Spokesman), Statement on the Designation of 39 Organizations on the USA Patriot Act s Terrorist Exclusion List, Washington D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 6 December 2001, available at Websites African Union Peace and Security, The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the LRA, Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 23 November 2015, Child Soldiers International, Child Soldiers Info, London: Child Soldiers International, Christus Rex Information Service, Appeal to Release Students in Uganda, Vatican City: Christus Rex, 20 October 1996, DOWNIE Richard, The Lord s Resistance Army, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 18 October 2011, Enough Project, Beginnings in Uganda, Washigton D.C.: Enough Project, GlobalSecurity.org, The Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), Alexandria: GlobalSecurity.org, International Criminal Court, Alleged crimes (non-exhaustive list), The Hague: International Criminal Court (ICC), Invisible Children, How Joseph Kony brainwashes child soldiers, Washington D.C.: Invisible Children, 4 November 2013, KAPLAN Eben, Child Soldiers Around the World, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2005, LRA Crisis Tracker, Washington DC: The Resolve, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties (Interactive Dashboard), Geneva: OHCHR, 26

27 The Resolve, Key Statistics, Washington D.C.: The Resolve, Unicef, Children as soldiers, New York: United Nations, 1996, Figures Figure 1: DINGEMANSE Mark, Acholiland, San Francisco: Wikimedia Foundation, 19 September 2014, Figure 2: Counter Terrorism Guide, Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), Washington D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 27