Military Intervention for Human Protection

Transcription

1 CHAPTER 7 Military Intervention for Human Protection This chapter presents four different theoretical perspectives on armed intervention for the protection of people under threat, especially the threat of the most serious crimes, namely war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The ICISS sets the bar of intervention very high by limiting criteria for humanitarian intervention to large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, either current or anticipated. Scholars disagree on whether to support this form of intervention. Different perspectives offer different views about calls for military action to stop the crimes being committed. States have reached some consensus on this issue, but have not been able to translate this into consistent and effective action. Global legalists remain optimistic about the R2P norm s potential to be implemented on the ground, but realists continue to see its various limitations, including the lack of political will among states. Critical theorists also point to the limitations of armed intervention, viewing it as superficial and disregarding structural challenges. Feminists are critical of liberal thinking on the issue of armed intervention, arguing that more needs to be done before human security in general and the security of women in particular can be ensured. This chapter concludes that armed humanitarian intervention can help protect people if its proponents take into account some of the criticisms leveled against it, but that expectation should be limited by the existing reality that the international role in protecting people against the most serious crimes everywhere remains ad hoc and inadequate. 225

2 226 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes Liberal Perspectives Liberals advocate the need to intervene militarily for the purpose of human protection, but they do not necessarily see this method as always effective. Some even admit that the sun of humanitarian intervention may be about to set now that we have seen the beginning of the 21st century. Thomas Weiss writes: The political will for humanitarian intervention has evaporated at the outset of the new millennium. 1 According to James Kurth, 2 humanitarian intervention received attention during the 1990s when the United States became the world s sole superpower. However, such intervention has since been in decline. In his words, [s]o far, the 2000s have not seen effective humanitarian intervention by anyone. 3 Still, liberals have taken heart from recent military interventions such as those in Libya in Liberal legalists are not oblivious to the challenges that have confronted humanitarian missions. The UN failed in countries like Somalia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. In Somalia, the UN could not stop the violence and the country remains in chaos today. The United States also failed in Somalia. In Bosnia, the UN force failed to stop the massacres that claimed the lives of 7,000 men and boys in Srebrenica in The UN failure in Rwanda, resulting from lack of leadership within the UN system, led to the genocide of almost one million Tutsis. The UN has done better in more recent years, but its successes in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo are limited. Even military interventions that appeared to be successful often came too late to save human lives. The humanitarian military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were not conducted on time, and were far from effective enough to 1 Thomas Weiss (2004) The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, p James Kurth (2006) Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities, pp Ibid., p. 88.

3 Military Intervention for Human Protection 227 save lives. 4 Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and hundreds of thousands ran for their lives as they fled to neighboring countries such as Albania and Macedonia. The humanitarian intervention in East Timor stopped the killing of civilians, but this success came only after members of the Indonesian army and its Timorese supporters had been on a killing spree. 5 The reactions of UN member states to the widespread violence inside Sudan have been ineffective. 6 In spite of past tragedies such as the one in Rwanda, the UN Security Council is still hesitant over what should be done in Darfur. On 30 July 2004, for instance, it passed Resolution 1556 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but chose not to assume responsibility for alleviating human suffering in Darfur by authorizing a humanitarian intervention. 7 The deployment of troops to protect the African Union s Observer Mission, which was deployed to Darfur in June 2004, did not come fast enough. By October 2004, only some 597 out of the envisaged 3,300 African Union (AU) peacekeepers had been deployed. As of December 2005, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had deployed almost 7,000 personnel and a civilian police component of about 1,320. The AU mission had remained the only international force in Sudan until 2007, 8 when the hybrid UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was put in 4 David Rieff (2002) A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis; Gary T. Dempsey and Roger W. Fontaine (2001) Fool s Errands: America s Recent Encounters with Nation Building. 5 Fen Osler Hampson et al. (2002) Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder, p Christina G. Badescu and Linnea Bergholm (2009) The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down, pp ; Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy (2005) The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur ; Alex de Waal (2007) Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect, pp ; Gill Lusk (2008) False Premise and False Response to the Darfur Crisis, pp Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy (2005) The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, p Musifiky Mwanasali (2010) The African Union, the United Nations, and the Responsibility to Protect: Towards an African Intervention Doctrine.

4 228 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes place. But neither the AMIS nor the UNAMID proved effective enough to provide succor to victims of violence. 9 By the mid- 2000s, between 30,000 and 50,000 civilians had been killed and 200,000 people had crossed into Chad. Darfur remains home to roving militias, burned-down villages, and almost three million internally displaced people. 10 Liberals, however, think they can explain why military interventions after the mid-1990s proved less successful than expected. If humanitarian intervention has any limitations, it is because the root causes of social conflict are based on illiberal values and corrupt governments. For some, the United States wars in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003) have diminished or constrained its political will, its military capability, and its diplomatic credibility to conduct further military interventions, and have even precluded a US intervention in the genocide in Darfur. According to Kurth, Washington has officially criticized human rights violations as genocide, but has done nothing else, and the disaster continues. 11 When the United States withdraws its troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington can do more and prospects for military intervention may look much brighter. In spite of the early setbacks, liberals still argue that the international community has over recent years become increasingly inclined to use military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Recent evidence suggests that the UN and other regional organizations, notably the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and NATO, have enhanced their coordinated and collaborative 9 Christina G. Badescu and Linnea Bergholm (2009) The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down, pp ; Musifiky Mwanasali (2010) The African Union, the United Nations, and the Responsibility to Protect: Towards an African Intervention Doctrine, p Jeffrey Gettleman (2010) Regional Shift Helps Darfur, Amid Doubts, p. 5; see also Touko Piiparinen (2007) The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, p James Kurth (2006) Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities, p. 94.

5 Military Intervention for Human Protection 229 action. They have established a new division of labor among them and have made a positive turn in international peacekeeping. 12 The role of transnational advocacy groups in countries like Sudan has become positive. Progress in the protection of civilians has also been made through recent efforts. Although challenges in Darfur remain, the R2P has made it possible for the international community to deploy into the area the largest international peacekeeping mission in the world. 13 Recent success stories include the military interventions in the Ivory Coast and in Libya, where states and international organizations more effectively coordinated their efforts and responded quickly to crises as they unfolded. The overwhelming French military intervention alongside the UN peacekeepers in the Ivory Coast put the legitimate winner of a presidential election into power. The NATO intervention in Libya saved civilians in Benghazi from imminent slaughter by stopping the tanks and artillery of Muammar Gaddafi s armed forces and dismantling the dictatorial regime. The case of Libya thus offers evidence that the R2P norm of protection has been implemented successfully. 14 The question is whether there will be more armed intervention for human protection. Even among liberal scholars, there is no consensus on whether military action to protect people under threat is an effective strategy. For instance, Michael Doyle considers the UN authorization of a no-fly zone in Libya foolish, despite the fact that it gave teeth to the much-heralded responsibility to protect. NATO intervention would further pose legal and ethical dilemmas that would plague policymakers in the months to come. 15 States remain 12 Touko Piiparinen (2007) The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, pp On a positive note regarding the impact of R2P, see David Lanz (2011) Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups. 14 Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein (2011) Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia to Libya, pp ; Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins (2011) Libya and the State of Intervention, pp Michael Doyle (2011) The Folly of Protection: Is Intervention in Qaddafi s Regime Legal and Legitimate?

6 230 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes suspicious of armed interventions for human protection. They tend to regard this course of action as eroding their sovereignty. All this helps explain why the ICISS s R2P criteria have not been adopted in full. Military intervention for human protection purposes has numerous dilemmas and raises difficult questions. 16 First, states remain suspicious of the R2P point on right authority. Developing countries see the Security Council as dominated by major powers which can act against weak states. Whether states have overcome this obstacle is difficult to assess, but failure to reform the council by making it more democratic is unlikely to make it representative of interests within the UN system. This failure helps explain why there have been so few effective humanitarian interventions. The permanent members of the council still differ on the need for armed intervention. As noted, the United States, also bogged down in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has not been solely able to intervene militarily elsewhere. The few cases of limited success tend to be those that resulted from unilateral actions by one power. More international legitimacy does not translate into more effectiveness, and more effectiveness does not always mean more humanitarian actions. Second, UN members may in principle agree on the need to intervene militarily for human protection based on a just cause, but almost always disagree on what it means. A cause that is seen by some as just may be regarded by others as unjust. Authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, may not view large-scale loss of life or the imminent threat of this taking place as a just cause for armed intervention. The two permanent members, for instance, vetoed two resolutions on the humanitarian crisis in Syria because they agreed with the latter that it was in fact a victim of terrorism and violence. Other Western powers, especially the permanent 16 For various other dilemmas and difficult questions, see Amitav Acharya (2002) Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention, pp ; W. Andy Knight (2011) The Development of the Responsibility to Protect From Evolving Norm to Practice, pp. 3 36; S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong (2006) Human Security and the UN: A Critical History, pp

7 Military Intervention for Human Protection 231 members, however, considered the conflict as the Syrian state s violent repression of protesters and mass violation of human rights. These different interpretations of the situation, writes Jess Gifkins, have made it difficult for the UN Security Council to find consensus on condemning the violence. 17 Third, how exactly do we know that there is a right intention? States, especially those in the developing world, are concerned or even obsessed about threats to their sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism, especially in the form of external interference in their domestic affairs. 18 It remains difficult for states to accept that major powers intervene on behalf of humanity, which has little or nothing to do with their national interests. As long as the permanent members of the UN Security Council can exercise their power of veto, the prospects of greater trust in the rightness of their humanitarian intentions are likely to remain low. A leading proponent of human security, Michael Ignatieff, acknowledges that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was aimed at the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and at the core of Arab rejectionism. In his words, Its aim is to break the logjam that has frustrated Middle East peace for fifty-odd years and then to reorder the map of an entire area to serve the strategic interests of the United States. 19 Also in the case of Syria, the Chinese and Russian objections to any armed intervention in the country were based on the grounds that regime change driven by strategic ambitions, not human protection, was the intention of Western powers. Fourth, another empirical challenge to R2P norms is whether armed humanitarian intervention as a last resort can ever be implemented effectively. As long as the United Nations does not have its own independent armed force equipped and ready for swift and 17 See Jess Gifkins (2012) The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis, p See, for instance, Kai Michael Kenkel (2012) Brazil and R2P: Does Taking Responsibility Mean Using Force? pp. 5 32; Jonas Claes (2012) Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenge of R2P Rejectionism, pp Michael Ignatieff (2003) The Challenges of American Imperial Power, p. 55.

8 232 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes effective military action, and as long as the major powers, especially those in the Security Council, continue to put their national interests over human security as noted earlier, it would be too idealistic to expect them to agree on humanitarian intervention and take quick collective action in time to avoid large-scale loss of life. This challenge may help explain why the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia (before Srebrenica), Darfur, and Syria are stories of abject failure. Regarding Syria, the UN Security Council showed an inability to reach consensus on effective measures to address the armed violence, and the country was subsequently plunged into a civil war. 20 All that the Council s members could agree on was to send unarmed UN military observers to Syria, but the mission was suspended when the observers were met with violence and as the conflict escalated. As recently as late in 2012, only a few hundred M23 armed rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo advanced to the city of Goma, but the 17,000-member UN force could not do anything to stop this dangerous development, thus leaving the security and humanitarian situation in precarious condition. Some 140,000 unarmed civilians reportedly fled in panic. Fifth, another question is: at what point are the military means used to protect people collectively judged as proportionate? It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for states with different security interests to agree on just how much force can be used proportionately. What is proportionate to some states may be disproportionate to others. This explains why NATO intervention has generated so much controversy and made it difficult for states to reach consensus on the need for military intervention in Syria. Sixth, any policy means that are considered proportionate by all UN member states, if at all possible, may also turn out to be inadequate to meet the criterion of reasonable prospects for success. Prospects that look reasonable to some states may look unreasonable to others. It is thus extremely difficult, if 20 Jess Gifkins (2012) The UN Security Council Divided: Syria in Crisis, pp

9 Military Intervention for Human Protection 233 not impossible, to get UN members to agree on what reasonable prospects are. The R2P criterion of reasonable prospects for success is difficult to meet, because the situation in the target location is often unpredictable. The case of NATO military action in Libya is exceptional: Western powers now seem to have little appetite for military intervention in other countries like Syria, despite the fact that more than 30,000 civilians had died by late It came as no surprise then that the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) issued in 2005 watered down the ICISS s R2P framework. The Summit adopted the four most serious crimes but did not adopt the ICISS s criteria. The WSOD instead made four commitments: (1) States agree to take responsibility to protect their citizens from the four most serious crimes; (2) they agree to help other states with assistance to build the capacity they need in order to protect their citizens; (3) if a state is manifestly failing to discharge the responsibility to protect its citizens, other states agree to use all peaceful means to protect them; and (4) the Security Council stands ready to use all necessary means, including nonconsensual force, if peaceful measures fail or are deemed inappropriate. 21 Up to now, states have not succeeded in what UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon has urged them to do, namely in translating from words into deeds. Global legalists would agree with the assessments that the legal norm of R2P has not generated sufficient compliance pull to produce timely and coordinated international action. Indeed, during most of these crises [such as Darfur, Kenya, Gaza, Sri Lanka, and Burma] there was significant contestation as to whether R2P should be invoked at all. 22 The fact that the UN has experienced financial shortfalls, 23 together with disagreement on an armed intervention to stop recent armed conflicts in 21 See Alex J. Bellamy (2008) The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, p Jennifer M. Welsh and Maria Banda (2010) International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States Responsibilities? p. 231 (Italics original). 23 Paul F. Diehl and Elijah Pharaoh Khan (2010) Financing UN Peacekeeping: A Review and Assessment of Proposals.

10 234 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes countries like Syria and Congo, suggests that the liberal optimism has its limitations. The responsibility to react is limited by the fact that the UN does not have its own armed forces for rapid deployment and timely action and often has to rely on the willingness and ability of some powerful states. But this again raises questions about the right authority, right intention, just causes, proportional means, and prospects for success. The norm of R2P is still evolving and may eventually be on the road to widespread acceptance in the not too distant future, 24 or it may not. Understandably realists, critical theorists and feminists remain skeptical about armed intervention aimed at protecting people. Realist Perspectives Realist perspectives help shed light on the ineffectiveness of humanitarian intervention for humanitarian or human protection purposes. They also see such intervention efforts as dangerous, harmful to national security interests and even counterproductive. For realists, state sovereignty has not conceded defeat. Some scholars point to the challenge of states pursuit of their national interests on the basis of sovereignty. 25 Even Lloyd Axworthy still acknowledges that there is a resurgence of national sovereignty assertions, especially from China, India and Russia and that [m]any of the earlier champions [of R2P] have fallen by the wayside (in particular, alas, Canada). 26 Although the concept of sovereignty is defined differently, states in the so-called global South tend to defend their sovereignty in Westphalian terms, namely territorial integrity, which refers to the exclusion of external actors 24 W. Andy Knight (2011) The Development of the Responsibility to Protect From Evolving Norm to Practice, p Simon Chesterman (2001) Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. 26 Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock (2009) R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda, pp. 54, 68.

11 Military Intervention for Human Protection 235 from domestic configuration. States in the global North, however, tend to defend their decision-making sovereignty. 27 Edward C. Luck notes that one of the things that unites states in their approach to R2P is that they are all concerned about preserving their national sovereignty, just in different ways. 28 States may be under normative pressure to intervene on behalf of humanity where suffering occurs, but they often do something in order to be perceived as caring. Realists would agree with Kurt Mills [t]hat states exhibited callous indifference to human life and manipulative, hypocritical behavior is not surprising. He then goes on to argue that [w]hat is surprising is the extent to which they now depend on non-state actors to implement elements of their foreign policy. 29 This does not mean non-state actors have taken over the role states play in international politics. In reality, non-state actors are instruments of state policies. As Mills points out, One might argue that IHOs [international humanitarian organizations] and the norms they embody have actually decreased in power and salience as they become coopted both willingly and unwillingly into state agendas. 30 This co-option, in fact, strengthens realism. States may offer rhetorical support for armed humanitarian action, but implementation always falls short. States have not effectively coordinated their activities and collaborated with one another. Only a small group of middle powers have been willing to intervene militarily for humanitarian purposes, and they include a few Western states which also pursue their own national interests in their humanitarian agendas. The Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan, for instance, has been justified on moral grounds, but Canada is a member of NATO led by the United States, which intervened to overthrow the Taliban government for the ultimate 27 Edward C. Luck (2009) Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, pp Ibid., p Kurt Mills (2005) Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict, p Ibid., p. 179.

12 236 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes purpose of ensuring its national security interests. Realists even point out that Canada s close military alliance with the global hegemon might thus detract from its ability to use its enhanced military capabilities to address more urgent but less strategic situation of humanitarian crisis. 31 Realists would further contend that states and their leaders support the need for humanitarian intervention only if and when it does not hurt their national interests. In the case of Libya, for instance, the intervening states might not have had any vital interest at stake, but the intervention on humanitarian grounds was limited and thus did not hurt their interests. 32 Removing Gaddafi from power would also benefit NATO in that it may gain a new ally in the Arab world. In the case of Rwanda, the major powers had foreseen the possibility of genocide but did not do anything to prevent it or did not intervene effectively because it was not perceived to be in their strategic interest to prevent the slaughter. 33 The case of Darfur, where the permanent members of the Security Council have failed to take effective collaborative action on R2P, further reveals this uncomfortable truth. Prospects for armed intervention based on the idea of responsibility to protect also remain slim when it comes to violence within the national boundaries of major powers. No one has intervened in Chechnya in Russia where people have suffered. The ICISS concedes this point. Ramesh Thakur also notes that under no conceivable circumstances would humanitarian goals be advanced by launching an external military intervention against Russia in order to protect, say, the people of Chechnya Catherine Lu (2007) Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints, p Henry Kissinger and James Baker III (2011) Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention. 33 Kurt Mills (2005) Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict, p Ramesh Thakur (2006) The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, p. 258.

13 Military Intervention for Human Protection 237 The problem of selective intervention can still be understood in realist terms. States often intervene when they come under threat or when they see the need to defend their national security interests. When US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for instance, stated that one of the United States six objectives for its invasion of Afghanistan was to provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime, 35 the question is: Was this truly the case? Realists would say that the United States also made the claim that the military intervention was about national survival. Whether humanitarian norms primarily drove the United States to intervene militarily is a subject of debate, but one could make the case that such norms can be instrumental of other national security interests. Realists like Henry Kissinger raise the question of why Bill Clinton s administration s policy of humanitarian intervention was inconsistent. The United States launched two military campaigns against Serbia but ignored the greater scale of atrocities in other African countries such as Rwanda. 36 The lesson of Rwanda galvanized the world into action, but there has been no effective action in Sudan and the DRC since then. NATO and other states have not intervened in Syria despite the growing casualties in the conflict there. The selective nature of the military actions of major powers has to do with their national security interests. Russia s commercial interests in Sudan, for instance, were substantial. Moscow sold military equipment to the African country amounting to the tune of approximately $150 million, and had reason to fear that economic sanctions against Sudan would make Khartoum choose to default on its payments. 37 Syria remains one of the few geo- strategic allies Russia still has, and this explains its fears about losing it to Western powers if there is a regime change. China also remains 35 Cited in Kurt Mills (2005) Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict, p Henry Kissinger (2001) Does America Need a Foreign Policy? 37 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy (2005) The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, p. 33.

14 238 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes reluctant about coercive humanitarian intervention in Sudan. For example, China abstained on Resolution 1556, adopted by the UN Council in 2005, having rejected the calls for mandatory measures against the government of Sudan. In 1999, Beijing vetoed a continued UN peacekeeping presence in Macedonia. Beijing has also been critical of Western military attempts to change political regimes in other countries, such as NATO s campaign in Kosovo. 38 Even liberal democratic states in the West still place emphasis on opposing regimes or on national security and interests. One could point out that the United States did intervene in Somalia, where Washington had little or no strategic interest, or that NATO intervened in Libya to prevent the regime from massacring its own people, but realists think they can explain these military interventions. Domestic opinion may have prompted the United States to intervene in Somalia, 39 but domestic opinion has not prompted the same state to intervene in Rwanda, Sudan, the DRC or Syria. Thomas Weiss makes an insightful observation: No US administration will permit the [Security] Council to stand in the way of pursuing perceived national security interests. 40 The US-led UN military intervention that restored the international status quo after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had little to do with the US policy to defend international law. The United States has often violated such law: For example, it led the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Moreover, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq with the aim of advancing its national interests to overthrow the regimes that threatened its national security by attacking another country (Iraq invaded Kuwait, which was a US ally and a major supplier of strategic resources such as oil to the United States) and by harboring terrorists (Afghanistan was accused of helping Al-Qaeda to launch its terrorist attacks on American soil). Realists would not find it surprising when France s 38 Yunling Zhang (2000) China: Whither the World Order After Kosovo? pp David Rieff (2002) A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, pp Thomas Weiss (2004) The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, p. 147.

15 Military Intervention for Human Protection 239 President, François Hollande, responded to the growing humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic as rebels advanced toward the capital and as thousands of civilians fled cities and towns. He was reported to have said the following: If we have a [military] presence, it s not to protect a regime; it s to protect our nationals and our interests and in no way to intervene in the internal business of a country. He went on to assert that, Those days are over. 41 Western powers, however, saw the need to intervene in Syria and Mali, and realists would point to the fact that this type of intervention would help them advance their geostrategic interests in competition with China s growing influence in Africa and Russia s interests in the Middle East (including its last remaining military base outside the former Soviet Union in Syria). Realists would further point to the fact that international humanitarianism has also become an extremely valuable public relations tool. Thus, a US secretary of defense finds it useful to use humanitarianism to justify waging war in a remote corner of the world and, in fact, may have felt normative pressure to do so. 42 Mills further argues that states may be pushed by international norms and institutions, but they can also push back and appropriate them for their own ends in the guise of humanitarianism. 43 Moreover, the norm of intervention has been used by some states against other states. As David Kennedy puts it, Far from being a defense of the individual against the state, human rights has become a standard part of the justification for the external use of force by the state against other states and individuals. 44 Realists remain skeptical about humanitarian intervention not only about its purposes but also about its consequences, although they do not always oppose this course of action. Others 41 Lydia Polgreen and Josh Kron (2012) Rebels Advance Toward African Capital, The Globe and Mail, p. A Kurt Mills (2005) Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict, p Ibid., p David Kennedy (2004) The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism, p. 25.

16 240 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes argue along the lines of Hedley Bull on the need to preserve international society, 45 saying that humanitarian intervention is a form of neo- imperialism and is thus dangerous. 46 Robert Jackson points to evidence showing the negative consequences of humanitarian wars against states like Serbia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 47 Kissinger warns that any intervention in Syria could upset the global order, raising questions associated with the experiences of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. In his words, In reacting to one human tragedy, we must be careful not to facilitate another. In the absence of a clearly articulated strategic concept, a world order that erodes borders and merges international and civil wars can never catch its breath. 48 In certain circumstances of severe security crisis, intervention is required to end massive human rights violations, when no other solutions are available and if the costs involved are small and the purposes of protecting national security interests are not served. For some realists, ending genocides like those in Cambodia and Rwanda may justify the use of force, but intervening in less severe cases does not. Military intervention, especially in the form of proxy war, tends to take a huge human toll resulting in civilian casualties, refugees, and violations of human rights. Fewer interventions are better than more. 49 The Thirty Years War that ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 resulted from competing dynasties sending armies across political borders to impose their conflicting religious norms. According to Henry Kissinger, This seventeenth-century version of regime change killed perhaps a third of the population of Central Europe Hedley Bull (1984) Intervention in World Politics, p Mohammed Ayoob (2002) Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, pp Robert Jackson (2010) War Perils in the Responsibility to Protect, pp Henry Kissinger (2012) Syrian Intervention Risks Upsetting Global Order. 49 Stephen Van Evera (1991) American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better. 50 Henry Kissinger (2012) Syrian Intervention Risks Upsetting Global Order, and Henry Kissinger (1992) Humanitarian Intervention Has its Hazards ; Daniel Byman and Taylor Seybolt (2003) Humanitarian Intervention and Communal

17 Military Intervention for Human Protection 241 Recent humanitarian interventions also often prove even to be counterproductive, making things worse rather than better. Humanitarian interventions create more problems than solutions problems such as new grounds for resentment, disillusionment and rebellion. For others, they even lead to chaos and civil war. 51 Henry Kissinger writes: When moral principles are applied without regard to historical conditions, the result is usually an increase in suffering rather than its amelioration. 52 Even humanitarian work carried out by the UNHCR to protect refugees can result in more conflict that leads to human insecurity. The agency set up camps to provide bases for rebels to regroup and from which they could launch military attacks on their enemies. The UNHCR that set up refugee camps in Zaire, for instance, indirectly provided support to Hutu militants, making them refugee warriors who attacked the new government dominated by the Tutsi. 53 Realists would warn that it may be too early to argue that the military intervention by NATO in Libya is a success for human security. 54 The negative consequences of military intervention might lead to war and human rights abuses. Gaddafi, who ruled the country for more than 40 years, has been driven out of power by NATO forces, but Civil Wars: Problems and Alternative Approaches, pp ; Alan J. Kuperman (2008) The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans, pp Stephen Van Evera (1991) American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better ; Rabia Aslam (2010) US Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict, pp Henry Kissinger (2001) Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21 st Century, p. 258; Samuel Huntington (1993) The Clash of Civilizations? ; Mohammed Ayoob (2002) Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, pp ; Robert Jackson (2000) The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. For an earlier critique of international moralism and legalism in relation to UN peace operations, see Sorpong Peou (1997) Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battle-field to Ballot-box. 53 Kurt Mills (2005) Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict, pp. 170, 173, Henry Kissinger and James Baker III (2011) Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention.

18 242 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes this military victory may prove to be a threat to human security in another way. This time, pro-gaddafi civilians came under threat. The new transitional authority was still fighting pro-gaddafi forces, some of whom had been captured but were unprotected, and it appeared to be institutionally weak. Such military intervention may also result in failed states. For example, the post-gaddafi state seems to be failing. Although the NATO airstrikes destroyed many of the 20,000 missiles Libya had under Gaddafi s rule, thousands of them were also left unguarded, and some may have been taken across the borders and possibly fallen into terrorist hands. Critical Theory Perspectives Like political realists, critical scholars are seriously concerned about the negative consequences of imperialist interventions, especially when carried out by the West. 55 Critical scholars tend to emphasize Western capitalist interests as the driving force. Critical security scholars regard armed humanitarian intervention as dangerous and potentially counterproductive. There is ample empirical evidence for this: the American and British military intervention in Yugoslavia, for instance, left some 10,000 innocent civilians dead or maimed. Before the NATO offensive, only 2,000 people had been killed. By bombing Serbia, NATO exacerbated the armed conflict and the atrocities. While the absence of military intervention might embolden ethnic-nationalist bullies to crackdown on armed rebellions against their political rule, more interventions may also encourage the ambitions of separatist, sovereignty-seeking nationalists and thus lead to more violence. Military intervention does not have a history of leaving target states in good shape and it does not have a good success record. The 1992 US military intervention in Somalia provides a good example. Military campaigns without the sustainable public 55 Ken Booth (1994) Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence.

19 Military Intervention for Human Protection 243 support of the intervening states may leave the states under attack in a precarious condition. The US military intervention in Iraq, for instance, has been justified by Western political leaders as the need to promote human security, but the armed intervention resulted in chaos, anarchy and sectarian violence, which serves to legitimize an occupation that shows no signs of ending. 56 Unlike liberal optimists, critical scholars criticize the NATO military campaign in Libya, which included arming local resistance forces and institutionalizing the hegemonic liberal world order. A study on the Ivory Coast and Libya presents other unresolved challenges. First, UN Security Council resolutions are still subject to interpretation, and this makes it difficult for member states to find common ground on human security mandates. The case of Darfur and Syria also shows that the R2P norm has not persuaded states to act consistently with the aim of helping save civilians in danger, as NATO members did in Libya. Critical scholars view the limitations of military intervention for humanitarian purposes as deeply embedded in international norms that constrain effective action. For instance, the UN had its own norms, such as non-interference, impartiality, neutrality, and peaceful settlement of conflict. UN officials may regard killings as an internal affair of states and think that UN peacekeepers should not overstep their authority. The case of the Rwandan genocide sheds light on the normative limits of UN military intervention. 57 Second, it is difficult for Security Council members to agree that military intervention has no agendas other than civilian protection. Third, it is difficult to strike a balance between the Security Council s legitimate role, and the norms and interests of regional organizations. Fourth, it is difficult to resolve the tension between civilian protection and the push for regime change because the latter is not 56 Giorgio Shani (2007) Democratic Imperialism, Neo-liberal Globalization and Human In/Security in the Global South, p Michael N. Barnett (2003) Eyewitnesses to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999) The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations ; Michael N. Barnett (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics.

20 244 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes legal. 58 This tension helps explain why China and Russia opposed Western states calls for armed intervention in countries like Syria, especially when they were demanding regime change. Liberal imperialism is the concern of critical scholars who think that the causes of armed conflict and political violence are structural and can be traced back to colonial rule and legacies. The case of the Rwandan genocide can be explained in the light of what critical theorists think about the colonial legacy of socio-economic exploitation and political oppression. 59 Colonial legacies perpetuated ethnic hatred. Rwanda was a Belgian colony which only gained its independence in Belgium favored the Tutsis and treated the Hutus unfairly; the latter took power in 1961 following the death of the Tutsi king in Racial hatred and poverty were the subsequent root causes of the genocide. The UN and other organizations were part of the problem. The security agenda was dominated by Belgium and other Western powers with no economic interests in Rwanda. Other studies show the limitations of military intervention for humanitarian purposes or for human protection. Angola and Mozambique are among the examples. 60 Moreover, imperialist states military offensive against states like Yugoslavia may give impetus to a new global arms race and to militarism. States like North Korea and Iran, judged to be rogue by the West, are likely to build nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves against Western imperialism. Iran s nuclear program serves as a good example. Moreover, new arms races have also allowed Western powers to export arms to countries seeking to acquire more of them. The British government in the 1990s, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, approved 500 licenses for the export of weapons to mutually hostile states such as India and Pakistan, and 58 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2001) The New Politics of Protection? Côte d Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, pp Mahmood Mamdani (2001) When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. 60 Chris Alden (2007) Human Security and the Limits of International Intervention: A Comparison of Post-Conflict Angola and Mozambique.

21 Military Intervention for Human Protection 245 also approved 92 licenses for arms shipments to Indonesia where the military were violating human rights. 61 Military interventions are also dangerous because they reinforce imperialisms that cannot be overcome in the age of liberal globalization. Not only are the Western powers hypocritical and practice double standards, but they continue to assault the principle of state sovereignty that protects the weak and poor. Liberal states intervene militarily only when they can also implement their imperial policies such as promoting their economic and political interests. According to Noam Chomsky, the real reason for the bombing was that Yugoslavia was a lone holdout in Europe to the political and economic programs of the Clinton administration and its allies. 62 After US President Bill Clinton sent the Marines to topple the junta and restore the elected government in Haiti, the United States compelled the restored government to adopt a neoliberal economic program with no barriers to American export and investment. This policy also allowed US conglomerates to dump products that were unwanted at home on countries like Haiti. As a result, Haitian rice farmers cannot compete with highly subsidized US agribusiness, leading to the anticipated collapse. 63 Based on the general assumption that capitalist states pursue their own economic interests, critical theorists, especially Marxists, ask the following question: Why do Western capitalist states tend to intervene militarily, claiming to protect human rights by emphasizing only political and civil rights to the exclusion of social and economic rights? In their view, people in developing countries around the world are dying of poverty while Western capitalist states usually do nothing to prevent it. For them, this agenda means rejecting the liberal internationalist and developmentalist 61 John Pilger (1999) Humanitarian Intervention is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability, p Noam Chomsky (2008) Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right, p Ibid., p. 38.

22 246 Human Security Studies: Theories, Methods and Themes policy instruments, which are viewed as a combined form of Western hegemony and cultural imperialism. 64 Libertarian socialists or anarchists have sought to expose the myth of humanitarian intervention by questioning the motives of states that intervene in others national or domestic affairs. Noam Chomsky, for instance, questions military interventions by major powers such as the United States and Britain and seeks to show that their actions essentially aim to serve their own imperialist interests by punishing disobedient states. 65 He is critical of liberal discourse on security policy and norms such as R2P because of their blind faith in the goodness of liberal states and their tendency to ignore the historical record of human rights violations and terrorist acts committed by liberal states. Instead of seeking to protect humans against threats to their security, liberal powers like the United States and Britain seek to dominate the world by projecting their power worldwide, thus tolerating no challengers to their global rule and seeking to bring them under their hegemonic control. Powerful states intervene militarily in countries where crimes are allegedly committed, but they do not subject themselves to the same rule of law when committing similar crimes. The end of the Cold War has seen this pattern of behavior, since liberal powers can no longer be deterred by others, such as the Soviet Union. Moreover, liberal states are not democratic in that their governments represent popular or human interests; they are dominated by corporate interests working in collaboration with political and economic elites in developing countries in order to enrich and empower themselves at the expense of poor and weak people. Britain and France are former colonial powers with their own interests. Besides risk-averse EU members, 66 the United States implicitly 64 Ikechi Mgbeoji (2006) The Civilized Self and the Barbaric Other: Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Security, pp Noam Chomsky (2008) Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right. 66 Two scholars observe the following: Like the Security Council, the EU threatened sanctions against the government of Sudan but showed no interest in

23 Military Intervention for Human Protection 247 supports the responsibility to protect, but only in a way that is secondary to its national security. Western imperialism is the driving force behind contemporary humanitarian interventionism. After the terrorist attacks on US soil on 11 September 2001, Washington waged war on terrorism but showed reluctance toward military intervention in countries like Sudan and Syria. The US government did not want to add fuel to the fire of Islamic radicalism that could thwart its national security strategy, afraid as it was of being perceived as masking neo-imperial ambitions. 67 Other critical observers argue that what NATO did in Libya was just another example of how humanitarian adventurism is a mere smokescreen for Western imperialism and not a sign of Western altruism. 68 As David Rieff puts it, Somehow the interveners are almost always the United States and the former European colonial powers and the intervened-upon [have been] the countries of the previously colonized world plus the former Yugoslavia. For the global South, 1990s-style intervention was worryingly reminiscent of humanitarian imperialism, 1880s-style. 69 Marxist-inclined writers also view this global form of interventionism as part of the grand neoliberal agenda designed to protect and extend the capitalist world order, enriching and empowering it but impoverishing the poor and weak. 70 Other critical theorists see neodeploying its own peacekeepers in Darfur. Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy (2005) The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, p. 34. The UN withdrew its troops after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by Hutu extremists on 7 April As Piiparinen notes, According to the calculations of the Belgian and French governments, even infinitesimal risk was not worth taking to save thousands of civilian lives. Touko Piiparinen (2007) The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, p Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy (2005) The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, pp ; Thomas Weiss (2004) The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, p. 147; Touko Piiparinen (2007) The Lessons of Darfur for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, p David Rieff (2011) Saints Go Marching In, pp Ibid., p John Pilger (1999) Humanitarian Intervention is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins a Return to Respectability, p. 15.