The Office of the Auditor General s investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance

Transcription

1 Document 3-series Office of the Auditor General of Norway The Office of the Auditor General s investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance Document no. 3:2 ( )

2 This document is available at ISBN Illustration: Lobo Media AS Photo: Eli Skartlien, Kjell Kristian Dørum and Aleksander Åsheim

3 Document 3-series The Office of the Auditor General's investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance Document no. 3:2 ( )

4

5 To the Storting The Office of the Auditor General hereby submits Document no. 3:2 ( ) The Offi ce of the Auditor General's investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The Office of the Auditor General, 4. November 2008 For the Board of Auditors General Jørgen Kosmo Auditor General

6

7 Contents 1 Introduction 7 2 Summary of the investigation The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocation of humanitarian funds To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs follow-up of humanitarian assistance 13 3 The Office of the Auditor General s observations 15 4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs response 16 5 The Office of the Auditor General s statement 17 Appendix: Report 1 Introduction 23 2 Methodological approach and implementation 27 3 Audit criteria 31 4 The distribution and allocation of humanitarian funds 38 5 To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? 59 6 The Ministry of Foreign Affair s follow-up of humanitarian assistance Overall assessments 119 Abbreviations 122 References 123

8

9 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Office of the Auditor General s investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance 1 Introduction Norwegian humanitarian aid totalled approximately NOK 2.6 billion in The humanitarian assistance shall be timely, effective and of good quality, cf. Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period Humanitarian assistance includes providing protection, food, water and sanitary equipment, health services and other forms of help to refugees, internally displaced people and other people affected by emergencies resulting from war, conflicts and natural disasters. Pursuant to the principles for good humanitarian donorship, funds shall be allocated on the basis of the needs present and of needs assessments. The humanitarian efforts shall be based on the humanitarian principles enshrined in international humanitarian law and confirmed by the UN General Assembly on several occasions: humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. Norwegian humanitarian assistance is administered in its entirety by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but is largely implemented by NGOs and UN agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that humanitarian assistance complies with the goals set out in the decisions and premises of the Storting. This includes ensuring that the performance requirements are met, that the use of resources is efficient and that sufficient management information and an adequate decision basis are ensured. Besides allocating grants to implementing organisations in connection with humanitarian crises, the Ministry also works on humanitarian policy issues and thematic initiatives in Norway and internationally. In Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs endorses the principle that humanitarian assistance must be an integrated part of development and foreign policy. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs also points out that it is important that endeavours are made to achieve optimal efficiency and goal achievement in emergency aid and aid work. The Committee therefore believes that it is important that the division of labour between the UN and other participants in the aid and emergency aid field is such that the maximum impact is achieved, and thereby the best possible results, cf. Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting for and Humanitarian assistance is often given under pressure of time, in an unstable and unclear situation and to countries with weak or lacking institutions and, in part, poorly developed infrastructures. In Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ), it is emphasised that the fundamental risk associated with humanitarian assistance means that the Ministry must ensure that its administrative system is as robust as possible. The objective of the Office of the Auditor General s investigation has been to assess the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The investigation includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of the humanitarian aid allocated under Chapter 163 Emergency aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights, and sheds light on the following audit questions: To what extent does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration contribute to effective humanitarian assistance? To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? The Office of the Auditor General s investigation report is enclosed as a printed appendix. A draft report was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a letter of 13 June In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry has made a statement about the report. The comments are incorporated into the report and this document. 2 Summary of the investigation The audit criteria that form the basis for this investigation derive from propositions and reports to the Storting and the Storting s consideration of them, and from the Appropriation Regulations and the Regulations on Financial Management in the Central Government. Central international standards and principles are also sources for the audit criteria, where they are in Document no. 3:2 ( ) 7

10 accordance with and clarify the objectives for Norwegian humanitarian assistance stipulated by the Storting. The investigation is not a review of assistance given to individual countries, organisations or projects, but of Norwegian humanitarian assistance overall. A holistic methodological approach has therefore been chosen that is wide-ranging in terms of humanitarian crises included in the sample and the players interviewed and projects visited. Emphasis is placed on identifying trends in the data across countries and projects in order to provide answers to the investigation s main audit questions. The investigation is based on approximately 100 interviews with Norwegian and international humanitarian players at various levels: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian foreign service missions, Norwegian NGOs, UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The interviews were carried out in Oslo, Stockholm, Geneva, New York, the Palestinian Territory, Uganda and Sudan. A number of projects supported under Chapter 163 were visited in Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory. The audit questions have also been studied through document analysis of, among other things, documents from the Storting, activity plans, departmental plans, guidelines, strategies and other documents relating to the Ministry s administration. In addition, case folders for approximately 250 grants have been analysed. Together, the data answer the investigation s main audit questions. The investigation covers the years from 2004 to 2008, and data collection was concluded in April The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocation of humanitarian funds The humanitarian grants allocated under Chapter 163 are largely given as support for concrete programmes and projects based on applications from UN agencies, the Red Cross system and NGOs. Allocations to humanitarian assistance have increased from approximately NOK 1.3 billion in 2003 to nearly NOK 2.6 billion in In 2007, Norway gave humanitarian aid to 60 countries and 186 recipients, and the total number of grants/agreements was 736. The grants are one-off contributions and are given for 12 months from the grant date. The awarding of grants takes place throughout the year. Priorities During the investigation period there was no overall, overriding strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance collected in one document. Taken together, a number of governing documents at different levels constituted the basis for the Ministry s prioritisation, focus areas and decisions. The OECD Development Assistance Committee s (DAC) peer review of Norwegian aid from 2005 confirms that the absence of an overriding strategy makes it difficult to assess how Norway prioritises and ensures that its humanitarian assistance complies with the humanitarian principles. However, the Ministry has realised that it is necessary to draw up a humanitarian strategy, and it started work on such a strategy during the investigation period. This strategy was presented in autumn The investigation shows that, in the experience of several Norwegian NGOs, the priorities on which the humanitarian assistance are based change and the Ministry is not always sufficiently clear in communicating the priorities to the organisations. This can result in unpredictability for the organisations and for the foreign service s own work. Moreover, examples were uncovered showing that it can be unclear what the strategic priorities are in Norwegian humanitarian assistance in the countries that receive aid, and what role the Norwegian organisations are intended to have. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its part maintains that the overriding priorities have largely remained the same throughout the investigation period, but that prioritisation between countries and within relevant countries is subject to considerable change as a result of developments in the individual countries. According to the Ministry, information is given about these changes at joint meetings with the organisations at the turn of the year. The Ministry states that priorities at country level are to a large extent decided by the situation in the country in question. It can be difficult for the organisations to translate overriding political goals into concrete measures, for example in connection with integration of the gender perspective, which is a main focus area for Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its letter of response that the Norwegian endeavours to integrate the gender perspective have had considerable impact on the organisations, but it also stresses that it is up to the organisations to put the perspective into practice. 8 Document no. 3:2 ( )

11 Norway is also regarded as a good humanitarian donor in comparison with other countries by various humanitarian players. The investigation also shows that Norway receives recognition both nationally and internationally for standing firmly on the humanitarian principles, for its work in connection with the UN reform, for its efforts against landmines and cluster munitions, for civil-military coordination and for integration of the gender perspective. The international organisations point out that Norway plays an active role in the international humanitarian system. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs processing when allocating funds to humanitarian crises When allocating grants to aid projects, Norway has a responsibility as a donor to assess whether the proposals for projects prepared by the recipient are in accordance with Norwegian development policy, including whether they satisfy fundamental quality requirements, are realistic and contain clear and measurable performance goals. The applications for grants received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs form a central part of the Ministry s decision basis when allocating funds in connection with humanitarian crises. In addition, information from other areas of the dialogue with the organisations and from the UN, Norad and the foreign service missions, as well as the Ministry s experience of the organisations, also forms part of the basis for decisions. Both the project review and the interview survey show weaknesses in applications for grants. The investigation finds that some applications lack adequate performance indicators and descriptions of how the concrete activities will contribute to achieving the goals defined for the projects. It is also shown that, in some cases, the projects goals are overly ambitious in relation to the limits on the projects. The investigation also shows that only to a small extent do the applications contain a description of the risk factors involved in the humanitarian efforts and how the organisations plan to handle them. The weaknesses found make quality assurance difficult both during and after completion of the projects because the results are difficult to measure. In Document No 1 ( ), the Office of the Auditor General pointed out that the applications from the organisations varied greatly in quality and that, in several cases, they did not contain satisfactory goals and performance indicators. It can be questioned whether the Ministry takes adequate steps to ensure that the applications and the projects have realistic goals and performance requirements. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees with the Office of the Auditor General s assessment of weaknesses in the applications. However, according to the Ministry, this must be seen in light of the fact that not all organisations are equally professional in this area, and that some applications are drafted under substantial pressure of time. The Ministry points out that the work on improving the quality of the organisations application is a continuous process that will continue, and that the Office of the Auditor General s report contains many observations that are useful and relevant in this context. According to the Ministry, the measures carried out have resulted in an improvement in the quality of applications, although it is expected to take some time before the improvements are fully translated into practice. In connection with all applications for funds for humanitarian efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall carry out an individual assessment of the project in question. A very large number of applications for grants are considered every year, and the Ministry emphasises that the qualitative assessments are less thorough than desirable. The investigation shows that scarcity of time and resources in case processing has consequences for how thoroughly applications are assessed by the Ministry and for its quality assurance. The investigation shows that the Ministry sends applications to foreign service missions and Norad for their opinion to an increasing extent. However, the investigation shows that it varies to what extent the foreign service missions and Norad respond or are qualified to submit a response. The foreign service missions have few resources to carry out a thorough assessment of the applications, and work on humanitarian assistance is not given priority since the missions have no administrative responsibility for this kind of assistance. The Ministry does not use Norad systematically in its case processing. In light of the findings of the investigation, it can be questioned whether, in its allocation of humanitarian funds, the Ministry ensures adequate quality assurance of the applications and obtains statements from foreign service missions. The Ministry points out that time is the scarcest resource for executive officers with country responsibility in application processing. According to the Ministry, it will therefore always have to strike a balance between how thorough it Document no. 3:2 ( ) 9

12 wishes to be in the case processing and how quickly funds can be allocated. In light of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers its decision basis for awarding of applications to be adequate. According to the Ministry, more systematic involvement of the foreign service missions has helped to improve the basis for decisionmaking, and also helped to ensure that humanitarian aid is seen in conjunction with other aid to a greater extent. The Ministry also states that this has increased the capacity problems facing affected foreign service missions. 2.2 To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? The Norwegian contributions to humanitarian assistance help to produce positive results and effects for a great number of people. This is shown, among other things, in performance reports at project level, performance reports from NGOs and the annual reports of the UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It was also observed during the Office of the Auditor General s field and project visits in Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory. The investigation did however find weaknesses as regards realising the goals of timely and effective assistance of high quality. Case processing times are sometimes long, and there are challenges relating to the one-year financing time frames, weaknesses in the coordination and follow-up of the assistance, and weaknesses in how local players are involved and how the long-term perspective is taken into account in humanitarian assistance. The goals of timely and effective assistance are important sub-goals in terms of achieving the main goals of saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity during and after humanitarian crises. The weaknesses found have consequences for the final outcome of concrete humanitarian projects, including help being given too late. The investigation questions whether the humanitarian assistance is fully in line with the goal of providing timely, effective and qualitatively good assistance. The Ministry points out that the investigation largely focuses on challenges in connection with the administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, while there is little mention of the positive effects actually achieved for a large number of people as a result of Norwegian political and financial contributions. The Ministry also points out that the requirements for a long-term perspective and for local involvement are subgoals of humanitarian assistance, and are secondary to the main goal of saving lives, alleviating suffering and ensuring protection. In this context, the Ministry refers to proposition No 1 to the Storting and the pertaining budget recommendations for the years in question. The Ministry also states that it has emphasised both the long-term perspective and the involvement of local players, among other things, by establishing a separate allocation for transitional assistance, by preparing a report to the Storting on the prevention of humanitarian crises and by exercising flexibility in its definition of humanitarian needs. In the Ministry s opinion, Norway has contributed substantially to concrete solutions to the challenges and issues pointed out by the Office of the Auditor General. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs financing of humanitarian assistance Pursuant to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which Norway has acceded to, it is a fundamental goal that the financing of humanitarian assistance is predictable, flexible and timely. These conditions influence the organisations freedom of action and the goal achievement and efficiency of humanitarian efforts. Norway is among the countries in the world that give most humanitarian aid in relation to their gross national income. The investigation shows that Norway is considered to be a major donor in the humanitarian aid context, and that it is largely perceived as a predictable and flexible donor. At the same time, however, there are aspects of Norwegian financing that give rise to unpredictability for humanitarian players and reduce their flexibility. The Ministry sometimes take a long time to process applications for grants for enduring humanitarian crises. In acute crises, however, the ministry is quick to respond, even though the investigation has also found examples of long case processing times for this type of crises. Long case-processing times in the Ministry result in late financing of the humanitarian projects, which creates challenges for the organisations planning and implementation. It also leads to delays and changes to projects. This, in turn, has consequences for beneficiaries in humanitarian crises, including assistance arriving too late and being organised in another way than originally planned. The investigation questions whether the 10 Document no. 3:2 ( )

13 Ministry s use of time meets the goal of efficient financing of humanitarian assistance. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges that case processing capacity in the Ministry and the foreign service missions is a scarce resource and that prioritisation is therefore required, which can create challenges for the organisations in the form of long case processing times. At the same time, however, the Ministry points out that the causes of long caseprocessing times are complex and varying. The Ministry gives priority to acute situations. In connection with enduring crises, the Ministry prioritises applications and allocates contributions throughout the year. Case processing times are also influenced by variation in the quality of the applications and the Ministry s quality assurance work, including informal consultation rounds. The Ministry endeavours to strike the best possible balance between the time factor and the need for thorough case processing. The grants for humanitarian efforts and programmes are one-off grants, given for 12 months at a time. The investigation shows that a high percentage of the humanitarian funds go to projects that last for more than one year. This applies to projects in connection with enduring crises, humanitarian efforts in countries in a reconstruction phase and projects incorporating a long-term perspective as well as short-term considerations. The humanitarian players see it as positive that Norwegian assistance is channelled into projects of this kind, since it can be difficult to obtain support for them from other donor countries. At the same time, the investigation also shows that one-year agreements cause unpredictability and reduce flexibility for both Norwegian and international organisations in relation to projects and programmes that run over several years. It was found that one-year grants are generally poorly suited to humanitarian efforts in countries in a transitional situation or in enduring crises, where the humanitarian effort requires a longer planning perspective than the one-year grants allow. This entails a risk of the projects not being satisfactorily designed and implemented with a view to meeting the humanitarian needs present. The investigation also shows that oneyear agreements make it more difficult for the organisations to enter into contracts with local employees. It also leads to a lot of time being spent preparing annual applications and final reports from the projects. The investigation questions whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken sufficient steps to ensure predictable financing of humanitarian efforts in enduring crises. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the main reason for basing humanitarian assistance on one-year allocations is that humanitarian efforts by their nature require great flexibility in order to be able to deal with unpredicted crises. According to the Ministry, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs has agreed to this model as set out in the budget recommendations for the investigation period (Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( )). The Ministry also points out that the one-year framework provides the organisations with sufficient predictability. The Ministry also refers to the extensive changes made to the structure of grants whereby a large proportion of the assistance is channelled through the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and common humanitarian funds. Still, the Ministry is aware of the challenges that the Norwegian model can entail for its partners in relation to planning. As a supplement to the present model and subject to the Storting s approval, trial schemes are being considered as part of work on the humanitarian strategy that would entail entering into cooperation agreements over several years with some organisations in some fields. Coordination of humanitarian assistance Coordination is important in order to ensure as holistic a response as possible to humanitarian crises and prevent duplication of assistance. It is therefore an overriding goal for the Norwegian authorities to support the UN s coordinator role and the work of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to reform the international humanitarian response system. This is expressed both through Norway s contribution to, among other things, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the common humanitarian funds, and through Norway s work on humanitarian policy. The investigation shows that there are challenges relating to coordination in the international humanitarian system, within the UN system, between donors and between the UN system and the NGOs. The challenges appear to be greatest in the field. Measures have been implemented to improve coordination, but the investigation shows that challenges still remain in this area. Limited capacity limits both the foreign service missions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document no. 3:2 ( ) 11

14 opportunities to contribute to and follow up the UN system s coordination in the countries that receive humanitarian assistance, and to coordinate with other donor countries. On the basis on Norway s considerable support for the UN s coordinator role in the humanitarian field and the extent of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, the investigation questions whether follow-up of coordination and participation in the field have been given sufficient priority by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admits that there are challenges relating to the international coordination of humanitarian efforts. At the same time, however, the Ministry points out that the international humanitarian system has made significant progress in this field. The Ministry also confirms that capacity-related challenges limit how closely Norwegian foreign service missions can follow up coordination at country level. However, the Ministry points out that its own and the foreign service missions follow-up capacity in the humanitarian field is under continuous evaluation by the Ministry, among other things as part of the preparation of a humanitarian strategy. Involvement of local players The involvement of local players is an important precondition for effective humanitarian assistance. It is a goal for all humanitarian efforts that they should be based on local capacity whenever possible. In addition to short-term effectiveness, this is also an important aspect of ensuring longterm reconstruction and sustainable development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that the humanitarian players who receive grants involve local players in their operations. The investigation shows that the involvement of local players in several humanitarian crises is inadequate, and that neither the donor countries, the UN agencies nor the NGOs have sufficient focus on involving affected local communities, users or local authorities in their humanitarian efforts. Together, these factors constitute a risk that the humanitarian efforts will be less effective and qualitatively poorer. OECD-DAC s peer review from 2005 pointed out that it is unclear whether Norway ensures that the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance are involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of the humanitarian efforts. The peer review recommended that Norway work to introduce measures to ensure user involvement, and that user involvement should also be included in an overall humanitarian strategy. In this light, the investigation questions whether the involvement of local players is ensured to an adequate degree. Such involvement will contribute to ensuring effective distribution of the assistance. The link between humanitarian assistance and the long-term perspective There are weaknesses in how the humanitarian assistance takes the long-term perspective and transition to development into consideration. The investigation shows that there is too little focus on expected long-term results in the organisations applications and in follow-up of the projects. It is also found that only to a relatively small extent do the humanitarian players plan for the phasing out of humanitarian projects and programmes, and, if applicable, for their continuation in the form of more long-term aid. It is also demanding for the organisations to follow up results in the long run. The investigation shows that there are few criteria for measuring and documenting these effects, that it is resource-intensive, and that it is not emphasised to any great extent. Humanitarian assistance, transitional assistance and long-term aid are administered by different departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and grants are allocated under different budget chapters. The interview survey shows that Norwegian NGOs see the Ministry s emphasis on the long-term perspective as varying, among other things, because of inadequate coordination between the different parts of the administration. It was emphasised in report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters that the coordination between emergency aid efforts and long-term development cooperation is poor, and that the coordination of short-term and long-term aid in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be improved. The Ministry confirms this in an interview, but it also points out that it is moving in the right direction in terms of ensuring a holistic approach to aid in individual countries. On the basis of these findings, the investigation questions whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes adequate steps to facilitate a good transition from humanitarian crises to more long-term forms of aid. 12 Document no. 3:2 ( )

15 In this context, the Ministry in its letter of response points to Norwegian transitional assistance, the high degree of flexibility in humanitarian assistance and its international involvement as examples of measures aimed at improving the link between prevention, humanitarian response and transition. The Ministry admits that it is challenging to measure long-term results of humanitarian assistance, but refers to the extensive material available on the results of assistance. According to the Ministry, it is in the nature of humanitarian assistance that it often focuses on short-term results and activities. 2.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs follow-up of humanitarian assistance Pursuant to Report no. 35 to the Storting ( ), Fighting Poverty Together, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibility to follow up the grants given, and to report on the use of funds and the results. Following up humanitarian organisations and individual projects in order to ensure the quality of the efforts and to assess goal achievement and results is important in this context. The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs has pointed out that the main rule for the follow-up of funds allocated under Chapter 163 must be that reporting from the individual project is done in such a way that it provides a sufficient basis for the controlling authority s evaluation. Follow-up of humanitarian assistance at country level The Norwegian foreign service missions play an important role in the follow-up of humanitarian assistance in individual countries to which Norway gives assistance, even though the missions have no formal administrative responsibility for humanitarian assistance. The investigation shows that the foreign service missions dialogue with the NGOs at country level is regarded as relatively good, although the missions also underline that the tight resource situation prevents them from following up work on the humanitarian arena in a satisfactory manner. The Ministry and the foreign service missions only to a limited extent follow up projects in countries that Norway assists. The project review also shows that there is little documentation of follow-up of humanitarian projects by the foreign service in the form of project visits or other forms of dialogue. Both the Ministry and the foreign service missions point out that they would like closer follow-up of humanitarian assistance at country level. On the basis of its findings, the investigation questions whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adequately follows up overall Norwegian humanitarian assistance in the individual countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that the resource situation does not allow follow-up of overall Norwegian assistance to individual countries. It is not a realistic ambition to visit all projects in all countries. Project visits will be included as part of the foreign service s follow-up mechanisms, together with evaluations, final reports from grant recipients and continuous dialogue with the organisations on different levels. The Ministry does, however, emphasise that, even though the foreign service missions are more and more involved in follow-up, it is impossible to base the humanitarian assistance entirely on follow-up by foreign service missions, among other things because many humanitarian crises take place in areas where Norway has no foreign service missions. The Ministry also states that the distinctive character of humanitarian assistance is the reason why an international humanitarian system has been established independently of the foreign service missions. Final reports Pursuant to the Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government, the grant administrator must obtain reports from the grant recipient that make it possible to assess the degree of goal achievement. The Ministry receives final reports from the projects under the auspices of NGOs that are funded under Chapter 163. The NGOs are responsible for following up their projects in terms of implementation, results and impacts. Most of the final reports that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives from the organisations use a quantitative approach and are limited to a description of the activities carried out. Less successful elements are normally not mentioned. This makes it difficult to learn from the projects. There is also little focus on qualitative results and long-term impacts. The Ministry points out that it has requested more problematising reports from the organisations, but that it is a challenge to achieve this. The Ministry also emphasises that the new final report template in effect from autumn 2007 contains clearer requirements for final reporting in accordance with the goals set out in the application. Document no. 3:2 ( ) 13

16 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews and approves the final reports, and grant recipients shall be informed about the result in writing. The investigation uncoveres that feedback from the Ministry on the organisations final reports is predominantly financial and technical, and rarely contains professional assessments of the humanitarian efforts. This raises the question of whether final reports provide sufficient information about goal achievement and results. It can also be questioned whether the Ministry s feedback to the organisations on the final reports facilitates learning and improvement in the organisations. In its letter of response, the Ministry states that its use of final reports should be improved, and that it is a challenge to draw on final reports in case processing, but that work has been done on this issue during the investigation period. The Ministry points out that the follow-up of final reports from organisations has improved significantly in recent years, and that this work will continue. The improved quality of final reports will make it easier for the Ministry to make use of them. Evaluations In Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs emphasises the necessity of evaluations and of systemising experience with aid. Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together and the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government state that evaluations must be carried out in order to obtain information about efficiency, goal achievement and results in the whole or part of the agency s area of responsibility and activities. The investigation shows that relatively few evaluations have been carried out of organisations or projects that have received funding under Chapter 163. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it should initiate more evaluations that can contribute to learning, and that increased focus on results and impacts is necessary on both the Ministry and the organisations part. In addition, the Ministry states that it would be desirable to carry out investigations/spot checks of countries, themes, projects and organisations in order to obtain a better basis for evaluating goal achievement. However, the Ministry points out that the resource situation does not permit the Ministry to do this itself. The investigation therefore questions whether the evaluations and reviews of Norwegian humanitarian assistance are sufficient to provide the Ministry and humanitarian players with information about the goal achievement and results of the efforts information that could help to improve the humanitarian efforts. The Ministry states in a letter that Norway, in addition to carrying out its own evaluations and reviews, participates in multi-donor evaluations that review, among other things, the performance of the multilateral organisations. Stronger coordination of evaluation is in line with the principles of good humanitarian donorship, to which Norway has acceded. The Ministry also points out that Norad s work on evaluation will continue, and that a number of such initiatives are being planned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs use of information about assistance results The use of relevant and correct information from humanitarian players about goal achievement and results is important for the Ministry to be able to learn from humanitarian efforts, thereby enabling it to improve future humanitarian operations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs information about goal achievement and results is based on several different sources. UN reports, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs, as well as evaluations, are key sources. In an interview, the Ministry underlines that it is a challenging task to systemise relevant information about results and goal achievement and aggregate it to an expedient level in order to use it in case processing. The investigation gives reason to question whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes sufficient use of the information to target and organise humanitarian assistance. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees that there is room for improvement in its work on structuring and processing information about results and impacts. At the same time, however, the Ministry points out that work on performance reporting has been significantly improved in recent years. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the report from the Office of the Auditor General s investigation succeeds in describing the complexity and scope of the international humanitarian 14 Document no. 3:2 ( )

17 challenges and the role of Norwegian humanitarian policy and aid in the overall international effort. The Ministry agrees with many of the descriptions of the facts and many of the Office of the Auditor General s assessments. In its letter of response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that, as a result of the excellent dialogue with the Office of the Auditor General about the performance audit during the whole process, the report will form a good basis for further development of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The Ministry also points to the ongoing work on several of the issues raised in the Office of the Auditor General s investigation, and that several of the issues are key elements in the Norwegian humanitarian strategy that was presented in September 2008 and will be followed up in an action plan. 3 The Office of the Auditor General s observations The main goal of humanitarian assistance is to contribute to saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity during and after humanitarian crises. The objective of the Office of the Auditor General s investigation has been to assess whether Norwegian humanitarian assistance is timely, effective and of good quality. The investigation shows that Norwegian humanitarian assistance achieves positive results and effects for a large number of people. This is shown, among other things, in performance reports at project level, performance reports from NGOs, the annual reports of the UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Office of the Auditor General s field visits. However, the Office of the Auditor General s investigation finds a number of weaknesses in the administration of humanitarian assistance that weaken the achievement of the goal of timely, effective assistance of good quality. These weaknesses are found in financing, coordination, the involvement of local players and consideration of the long-term perspective, and in the Ministry s quality assurance in connection with allocating and following up assistance. Weaknesses in these areas will also have consequences for the final outcomes of concrete humanitarian projects. In this context, the Office of the Auditor General would like to point out that the scope and organisation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, whereby grants are given to a large number of individual projects, countries and recipients, require a robust administration, cf. Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ). It is, among other things, important to have sufficient case processing capacity to administer both the allocation and follow-up of the funds in order to achieve the goal of timely and effective humanitarian assistance. Here, reference is made, among other things, to the varying degree to which foreign service missions are included in case processing and follow-up, and the fact that case processing capacity in the Ministry is a significant risk factor. The Office of the Auditor General therefore expects the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give sufficient priority and devote sufficient resources to administering these aid funds in order to ensure improved goal achievement. The Office of the Auditor General would also like to stress the importance of close follow-up of humanitarian assistance, based on risk and materiality assessments. Norway is a significant humanitarian donor. This demands a great deal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs follow-up of humanitarian assistance, for example in terms of contributions to and follow-up of the UN system s coordination in individual countries. The findings of the investigation show that there is a discrepancy between the large financial contributions and the resources devoted to follow-up and participation in individual countries. The Ministry points out that the foreign service missions and Norad are closely involved in the administration of humanitarian assistance, both in connection with allocations and follow-up. Given the complexity of humanitarian assistance, the Office of the Auditor General sees this as positive. The Office of the Auditor General wishes to emphasise that it is important to make greater use of the foreign service missions advantage of being present in the relevant countries. The Office of the Auditor General would also like to comment that it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibility to ensure that the required information about implementation, results and goal achievement in humanitarian assistance is obtained, processed and used. The Office of the Auditor General has noted that the Ministry agrees that there is room for improvement in its work on structuring and processing information about goal achievement and results, and it would like to comment that inadequate information about results and impacts and inadequate use of this information in the Ministry s administration Document no. 3:2 ( ) 15

18 may result in humanitarian assistance not being as targeted and effective as it could be. As regards financing, Norway largely contributes predictable and flexible financing, but there are still circumstances relating to the financing that cause unpredictability for the humanitarian players. The Ministry s case processing times for enduring crises can be so long that this results in delayed implementation and has consequences for the beneficiaries of the humanitarian assistance. The Office of the Auditor General acknowledges that the Ministry must weigh the time spent against the need for thorough case processing. However, the Office of the Auditor General notes that the Ministry acknowledges the fact that limited case processing capacity results in long processing times in some cases, which in turn leads to challenges for the implementation of the projects. The Office of the Auditor General also acknowledges that the Ministry needs flexibility in its financing of humanitarian assistance, among other things in order to be able to deal with unforeseen crises. The Office of the Auditor General would like to point out, however, that a large percentage of the humanitarian assistance is given to projects with a long-term focus, to countries in enduring crises or countries in a transitional phase. A one-year time frame is not well suited to this type of assistance. It makes it more demanding to take adequate account of the longterm perspective in humanitarian assistance, among other things because it makes it more difficult to plan projects in a multi-year perspective. At the same time, the Office of the Auditor General sees it as positive that the Ministry displays flexibility in connection with support for countries in a transitional and reconstruction phase. The Office of the Auditor General notes that the Ministry is considering multi-year cooperation agreements in some areas. The Office of the Auditor General wishes to emphasise that giving due consideration to the long-term perspective and local involvement is an important goal for humanitarian assistance, both in acute and enduring crises. This ensures that the assistance given is adapted to the needs, and that it underpins reconstruction and ensures sustainable development. Coordination of shortterm and long-term aid in the foreign service is therefore important. The Office of the Auditor General notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agrees with many of the Office of the Auditor General s assessments of the Ministry s work on humanitarian assistance, including weaknesses in relation to the allocation and follow-up of grants. The Office of the Auditor General takes a positive view of the measures implemented by the Ministry during the investigation period to improve the administration of humanitarian assistance, and of the Ministry s preparation of a humanitarian strategy. In the Ministry s opinion, however, it is unclear in certain places whether the Office of the Auditor General s investigation questions the goal achievement of the Ministry, the international humanitarian system, the grant recipients or all of these. The Office of the Auditor General wishes to stress that it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs areas of responsibilities that are evaluated in the investigation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for humanitarian assistance, and it gives grants to humanitarian organisations that implement humanitarian measures. The Ministry is therefore responsible for ensuring that the assistance implemented by its partners is in compliance with the decisions and premises of the Storting. 4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs response The report was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in a letter of 11 September 2008, the Minister replied as follows: I refer to the Offi ce of the Auditor General s letter of 27 August this year and the enclosed Document No 3:X ( ) to the Storting concerning the Offi ce of the Auditor General s investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. I would fi rst like to express the Ministry s satisfaction with the dialogue with the Offi ce of the Auditor General during the work on the performance audit. The report succeeds in describing the complexity and scope of the international humanitarian challenges, and how Norwegian humanitarian policy and assistance forms part of the overall international efforts. The Ministry agrees with many of the descriptions of facts and many of the Offi ce of the Auditor General s assessments in this report. The investigation forms a good basis 16 Document no. 3:2 ( )

19 for further development and rationalisation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. I note that the Offi ce of the Auditor General states in the report that various humanitarian players consider Norway to be a good humanitarian donor, and that Norway receives recognition both nationally and internationally for standing fi rmly on the fundamental humanitarian principles, for its contributions to the UN reform, for its efforts against landmines and cluster munitions, for civil-military coordination and for strengthening and integrating the gender perspective in all humanitarian assistance. As the report points out, Norway was praised as a humanitarian donor country (ranked second) in an independent international evaluation in 2007 based on internationally recognised principles of good donorship. I note in particular that the Offi ce of the Auditor General in its comments confi rms that the Norwegian contribution to humanitarian assistance produces positive results and effects for very many people. However, as stated by the Offi ce of the Auditor General, there is clear room for improvement in the administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The Office of the Auditor General s investigation points out weaknesses in fi nancing, coordination, the involvement of local players and consideration of the long-term perspective, and in the Ministry s quality assurance in connection with allocating and following up assistance. The Offi ce of the Auditor General also points out that weaknesses in these areas will have consequences for the fi nal outcomes of concrete humanitarian projects. In its letter of 8 August, the Ministry commented on the Offi ce of the Auditor General s assessments in these areas, including the relationship between the Ministry s requirement for fl exibility and the organisations wish for predictability, and the necessity of weighing the need for a swift response to humanitarian crises against considerations of thoroughness in the administration. The comments are reproduced in the summary of the investigation and are therefore not repeated here. In its comments, the Offi ce of the Auditor General emphasises the following administrative factors: the large number of individual projects, countries and recipients requires robust administration and requires the Ministry to give suffi cient priority and resources to the administration of these funds, the need to have suffi cient case processing capacity to ensure effi cient allocation and followup of the funds, the discrepancy between the large fi nancial contributions and the resources devoted to follow-up and participation in individual countries, the need for improved reporting and processing of information about results, the challenges that grant recipients face in relation to one-year grants. Several of the weaknesses pointed out by the Offi ce of the Auditor General are challenges that the Ministry recognises and works on continuously. This includes increased concentration in the form of fewer individual decisions and more strategic cooperation with partners, the need for suffi cient case processing capacity to ensure effi - cient allocation and follow-up of funds by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in foreign service missions, improved grant administration tools, improved performance reporting and improved follow-up of grant recipients. The Offi ce of the Auditor General points out that the Ministry has implemented measures during the investigation period with a view to improving many of the weaknesses identifi ed, and that the Ministry will present a humanitarian strategy on 15 September Several of the issues raised by the Offi ce of the Auditor General are key elements of this strategy, and I will attach great importance to the comments of the Offi ce of the Auditor General in follow-up in this context. The investigation covers Chapter 163 Emergency Aid, Humanitarian assistance and Human Rights of the Ministry s budget proposition. I have constitutional responsibility for Item 71 Humanitarian assistance and Human Rights under this chapter. This item accounts for approximately 85 per cent of the overall humanitarian aid in The Minister of the Environment and International Development has constitutional responsibility for Item 70 Natural Disasters under the same chapter. 5 The Office of the Auditor General s statement Humanitarian assistance is a key element of Norwegian foreign policy and Norwegian aid, and it Document no. 3:2 ( ) 17

20 has long been a priority area for Norwegian governments. The Office of the Auditor General s investigation finds weaknesses in the Ministry s administration that undermines the achievement of the goal of timely, effective assistance of good quality. The Office of the Auditor General finds that the Ministry agrees that there is clear room for improvement in the administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, and that the Ministry acknowledges a number of the weaknesses pointed out. The Office of the Auditor General also notes that the Ministry is working, among other things, to increase concentration in the form of fewer individual decisions and have more strategic cooperation with partners. There is also a need for sufficient case processing capacity in order to ensure efficient allocation and follow-up of funds by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign service missions, improved performance reporting and improved follow-up of grant recipients. The Office of the Auditor General sees it as positive that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a strategy for humanitarian assistance on 15 September The Office of the Auditor General wishes to point out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers both the policy and measures elements of humanitarian assistance, and that the scope and organisation of the assistance, whereby one-year grants are given to a large number of countries, recipients and projects, are a challenge for the Ministry s administration and management of this field. In addition, allocations for humanitarian assistance have increased significantly in recent years and will probably continue to grow in the years ahead. This will intensify the challenges that the Office of the Auditor General s investigation finds the foreign service to be facing in this field, including quality assurance in connection with the allocation of humanitarian funds and follow-up of the UN, the NGOs, projects and programmes. The Office of the Auditor General therefore expects the Ministry to give sufficient priority and devote sufficient resources to the administration of humanitarian assistance in order to ensure timely and effective humanitarian assistance of good quality. The report will be submitted to the Storting. Adopted at the meeting of the Office of the Auditor General on 24 September 2008 Geir-Ketil Hansen Jørgen Kosmo Jan L. Stub Ranveig Frøiland Helge Strand Østtveiten 18 Document no. 3:2 ( )

21 Report: The effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance Appendix to Document no. 3:2 ( )

22

23 Contents 1 Introduction Objectives and audit questions Audit questions Limitation The structure of the report 26 2 Methodological approach and implementation The use of data sources in the investigation Selection of humanitarian crises / countries Document analysis The project/grant review Interview surveys Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs The interview survey among Norwegian NGOs Interview surveys in Stockholm, Geneva and New York Field surveys More about interviews in the field More about the project visits Statistics 30 3 Audit criteria Overriding objectives and principles for humanitarian assistance Requirements for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of humanitarian assistance Case processing of grants The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsi bility for follow-up Audit criteria for goal achievement in projects that receive grants under Chapter The distribution and allocation of humanitarian funds The administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance The duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs The distribution of humanitarian funds Focus areas, guiding principles and priorities in Norwegian humanitarian assistance Overview of governing documents and the basis for decisions Views on guiding principles, priorities and focus areas The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocation of funds to humanitarian crises Applications for humanitarian grants The Ministry s processing when allocating funds to humanitarian crises Assessments 57 5 To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? Financing of humanitarian assistance Global financing of humanitarian assistance Norway as a donor Timing of funding is humanitarian assistance given at the right time? One-year financial frameworks Financing of humanitarian assistance via funds (the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund and common humanitarian funds) Coordination of the humanitarian efforts UN reforms and the role of OCHA Challenges relating to coordination in the field More about the cluster approach Norwegian contributions to coordination in the field / at country level Local involvement To what degree are local players involved? More about the organisations use of local partners Connection between humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and long-term development 86

24 5.4.1 The emphasis on long-term development and transition in humanitarian assistance Humanitarian assistance adapted to needs Knowledge about the impact of humanitarian assistance Assessments The Ministry of Foreign Affair s follow-up of humanitarian assistance Follow-up of projects and organisations at country level Project follow-up Follow-up of organisations at country level Follow-up of NGOs in Norway Follow-up of the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at head office level Reporting and evaluation The quality of final reports from the projects Feedback from the Ministry on the organisations final reports on humanitarian assistance More about the reports from UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Evaluations of humanitarian assistance The Ministry of Foreign Affairs use of information The Ministry s reporting and evaluation of goal achievement in concrete humanitarian efforts Capacity and resources in the foreign service Assessments Overall assessments 119 Abbreviations 122 References 123 Appendix 1: Interviews carried out 125 2: Projects visited 127

25 1 Introduction The global need for humanitarian assistance is growing as a result of an increase in the number of humanitarian crises. More and more funding is allocated to humanitarian efforts, by both Norway and the rest of the world. In addition to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the UN agencies and the EU, among others, do an important job in crisis areas. However, there are major challenges associated with the global humanitarian effort, for example with respect to coordination of the assistance and the humanitarian organisations involved. There are still millions of people every year who do not receive the help they need. A main principle underlying humanitarian assistance is the humanitarian imperative. By this is meant the moral duty to save the lives of individuals, alleviate suffering and protect human dignity, irrespective of race, gender, religion or political affiliation. To achieve this, humanitarian efforts must be based on the international principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality, which are based, among other things, on the Geneva Conventions. 1 Providing assistance to people in need is an ancient principle that is enshrined in international humanitarian law. Humanitarian assistance includes providing protection, food supplies, water and sanitary equipment, health services and other forms of help to people affected by crises, and taking steps to ensure that normal life and subsistence can be resumed. It is normal to distinguish between two types of humanitarian crisis: complex crises (the result of human actions) that are caused by fighting and conflict, and major disasters (natural disasters) that may be due to earthquakes or drought, among other things. Another important distinction is between acute and predicted (slow) crises. Moreover, several of the humanitarian crises persist over a period of years. Humanitarian assistance has been a priority area for Norwegian governments for a long time, and the allocations have increased considerably in recent years (see Table 1). In 2002, the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) allocated more than NOK 1.3 billion to humanitarian assistance. In 2008, this amount has increased to NOK 2.6 billion. Humanitarian aid s share of total Norwegian aid has increased from 10.2 per cent in 2002 to 11.9 per cent in Norwegian humanitarian assistance aims to help, prevent and alleviate suffering in connection with conflict situations and natural disasters. 2 According to Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, humanitarian efforts will be concentrated on countries with major unmet humanitarian needs where Norway is particularly qualified to contribute or where the measures underpin peace and reconciliation processes. Humanitarian assistance of high quality shall be provided speedily and effectively. General criteria for such efforts are the choice of good and expedient channels, coordination, goal achievement, efficient use of contingency goods and personnel, and coordination of the instruments employed. Humanitarian assistance shall be an integrated part of Norwegian foreign and development Table 1 Total aid allocated under Chapter 163 Emergency aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights, (NOK thousands) Item * Item 70 Natural disasters Item 71 Humanitarian assistance and human rights Total Share of total aid Source: Norad *The figures for 2008 are from the balanced budget. 1) 2) See, among other things, Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 23

26 Text Box 1 Parties involved in humanitarian assistance The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that humanitarian assistance complies with the goals set out in the decisions and premises of the Storting. The Ministry administers both the policy and measures elements of humanitarian assistance, and, as grant administrator (and donor), it is responsible for the allocation and follow-up of funds given as grants under Chapter 163. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) has no formal administrative responsibility for humanitarian aid funds. As an expert agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad shall contribute to efficient administration of aid funds and ensure that development cooperation is quality assured and evaluated. Norad shall also advise the Ministry on aid matters. Norad is involved from case to case by the Ministry in humanitarian aid matters. Nor do foreign service missions in the countries to which Norway gives humanitarian assistance have formal administrative responsibility for humanitarian aid funds. However, the missions do help with reporting and information about the situation in the countries in question, and they are involved in the processing of applications. The Norwegian missions in Geneva and New York represent Norway in relation to UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Humanitarian work is one the most important fields in which the two missions work. The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) is a collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, Norwegian humanitarian organisations and selected Norwegian suppliers of emergency assistance equipment. NOREPS is administered by Innovation Norway and it responds to humanitarian crises by supplying a combination of personnel and emergency aid equipment to the UN and other organisations. NOREPS also includes NORSTAFF, which is a contingency force consisting of experienced personnel who can be flown out to the field within 72 hours. Combined, Norwegian NGOs receive a large proportion of the funds channelled under Chapter 163. The Norwegian organisations are to varying degrees themselves operational organisations, and some of them are part of international networks. The international Red Cross system consists of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which works in war zones and conflict areas, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which has a key role in connection with natural disasters. The UN system receives more than half the funds allocated under Chapter 163. A number of UN agencies are involved in humanitarian assistance work, and the biggest recipients of Norwegian humanitarian assistance are the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food programme (WFP). policy. In addition to saving lives, alleviating suffering and ensuring protection, great emphasis is therefore placed on taking a holistic approach to humanitarian assistance in relation to other foreign policy goals and instruments, among other things by taking steps to prevent conflicts and natural disasters, and promote peace, reconciliation and human rights and development. 3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for humanitarian assistance and it is also grant administrator for the funds made available for humanitarian assistance. (See Text Box 1 for information about the various parties involved in humanitarian assistance.) The grants 3) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. are given as one-off grants, mainly to specific programmes and projects. The grants are largely channelled through the UN system, Norwegian NGOs and the international Red Cross system. Norwegian humanitarian efforts are wide-ranging as regards geographical distribution, partners and type of aid. Norway gives funding to many measures in connection with complex crises and natural disasters relating to water, sanitary conditions, landmines, food, shelter, refugee camps, health and internally displaced persons. Geographically, the efforts are spread between Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. The Norwegian humanitarian efforts are characterised by extensive cooperation between Norwe- 24 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

27 gian authorities, NGOs and the UN. The Norwegian organisations that receive most funds are the Norwegian Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian People s Aid, Norwegian Church Aid and Save the Children. Norway endeavours to strengthen the UN s role on the international humanitarian stage, and it supported the UN Central Emergency Response Fund in the amount of NOK 350 million in It is a main goal for the UN s humanitarian reform measures to ensure effective cooperation between donor countries, the UN and NGOs. Norway works, among other things, to improve coordination between international humanitarian efforts through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Humanitarian assistance is often given under pressure of time in an unstable and unclear situation and to countries or regions with weak institutions or no relevant institutions and, in part, poorly developed infrastructure. Norway gives a large number of grants to many organisations and institutions every year. In 2007, funding was given to 186 agreement partners. The large number of partners and projects, and the challenges involved in project implementation, place great demands on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of humanitarian assistance. In Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ), it is emphasised that the fundamental risk associated with humanitarian assistance means that the Ministry must ensure that its administrative system is as robust as possible. 1.1 Objectives and audit questions The objective of the investigation has been to assess the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. In order to examine this, the investigation has considered whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of humanitarian assistance is satisfactory, and the degree to which the goal of timely and effective assistance of good quality is achieved Audit questions The following audit questions were clarified in the investigation: 1 To what extent does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration contribute to effective humanitarian assistance? 1.1 How does Norwegian humanitarian assistance break down? 1.2 How does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs work within the international humanitarian system? 1.3 Is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs case processing satisfactory in connection with the allocation of funds to humanitarian crises? 1.4 Is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followup of humanitarian assistance satisfactory? 2 To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? 2.1 Are the humanitarian efforts adapted to needs? 2.2 Are the goals set for the humanitarian efforts achieved? 2.3 What are the effects of the humanitarian efforts? Limitation Audit question 1 Audit question 1 includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of the total humanitarian aid allocated under Chapter 163 Emergency aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights, with particular emphasis on the Ministry s processing of the allocation of grants and follow-up of assistance, irrespective of whether the aid is channelled through Norwegian NGOs or UN agencies. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a greater opportunity to control, manage and follow up funds channelled through Norwegian organisations than funds channelled through multilateral organisations. The greater the extent of earmarking and degree of Norwegian financing, the greater the Ministry s opportunity to control funds channelled through multilateral organisations. 4 Audit question 2 Since the objective of the investigation is to assess the effectiveness of the Norwegian humanitarian assistance overall, goal achievement is not assessed for Norway s humanitarian assistance to individual countries, organisations or projects. Nor, therefore, will the results at this level be assessed. Audit question 2 concerning whether the humanitarian assistance is timely, effective and of good quality is investigated by assessing 4) This also has a bearing on the Office of the Auditor General s right to exercise control. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 25

28 whether the goals stipulated for the humanitarian assistance as regards financing, coordination, local involvement and the link between humanitarian assistance and long-term development are achieved (audit question 2.2). These are important preconditions for achieving the main goals of saving lives, alleviating suffering and ensuring protection of people in need. It will also be investigated whether the humanitarian assistance is adapted to the needs (audit question 2.1). The impacts of humanitarian assistance are also examined in this investigation, primarily by looking at knowledge about and follow-up of impacts (audit question 2.3). 1.2 The structure of the report In Chapter 2, the methodological approach employed in the investigation is presented, while Chapter 3 presents the audit criteria on which the investigation is based. They are based on the decisions and premises of the Storting and have been presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 shed light on the two main audit questions. Chapter 4 presents the guidelines and prioritisations that apply to the Ministry s administration and the Ministry s allocation of humanitarian grants. Chapter 5 examines implementation and goal achievement in humanitarian assistance in more detail. Chapter 6 deals with the Ministry s follow-up of humanitarian assistance. In Chapter 7, the overall assessments in the investigation are presented on the basis of the audit criteria and the part-assessments in Chapters 4, 5 and Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

29 2 Methodological approach and implementation The investigation is based on document analysis, project / grant reviews, statistics, interviews with Norwegian and international humanitarian players and field surveys in three countries. This chapter begins with a presentation of how, taken together, the different data sources shed light on the audit questions that form the basis for the investigation. This is followed by a presentation of the sample of humanitarian crises, i.e. countries that have received humanitarian assistance. Finally, the chapter contains a presentation of the individual methods used. 2.1 The use of data sources in the investigation The objective of the investigation is to assess the overall effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. The investigation is not a review of assistance to individual countries, organisations or projects. In the choice of methodological approach, emphasis has therefore been placed on adopting a holistic approach to humanitarian assistance, given the wide range of humanitarian crises that are included in the investigation, the players interviewed and projects visited. This limits how deep it is possible to delve in assessing the results of individual projects and aid to individual countries. The examples in the sample used in the investigation are therefore not used as traditional case studies. On the contrary, emphasis is placed on indentifying tendencies in the data across countries and projects in order to provide answers to the investigation s main audit questions into the Ministry s administration and the effectiveness of the assistance. Together, the three factual chapters in the report shed light on the two main audit questions in the investigation. Several data sources have been used for both audit questions in order to ensure a relevant and reliable data basis. Audit question 1 concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration is primarily studied through information from interviews with the Ministry, Norwegian NGOs, analysis of project documentation and interviews with the UN agencies. Norway s role as a donor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also emphasised in the interviews conducted in the field. Audit question 2, which concerns whether the humanitarian assistance is timely, effective and of good quality, is also based on most of the data sources used in the investigation. The field surveys are particularly central in this section. Interviews are the most important data source in the investigation. Approximately 100 interviews were conducted with many humanitarian players in Oslo, New York, Geneva, Stockholm, Sudan, Uganda and in the Palestinian Territory. 5 Data from the interviews are used in combination with data from the other sources included in the investigation. Emphasis has been placed on collating the data from the different interviews. Conducting such a large number of interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign service missions and different levels in the multilateral organisations and NGOs ensures a reliable data basis for the investigation. Moreover, many of the interviewees have extensive experience of work in the field of humanitarian assistance, and thus have a good basis on which to answer questions relating to humanitarian assistance and Norway as a donor. The answers in the interviews with the different sources show a high degree of consistency. In addition to shedding light on the selected topics, the interviews have also contributed to an understanding of the context and the framework within which humanitarian aid is given. 2.2 Selection of humanitarian crises / countries Two samples of humanitarian crises / countries have been used in the investigation: first one for the project review and thereafter one for the field surveys. Emphasis has been placed on achieving as great variation and breadth as possible, among other things as regards economic materiality, type of humanitarian crisis and geographical spread. Emphasis has been placed on a considerable proportion of the funding having been given to Norwegian organisations. 5) This also includes interviews conducted in connection with visits to projects. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 27

30 The project review includes projects in Sudan, Uganda, the Palestinian Territory, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Niger, Ethiopia and DR Congo. The sample thereby covers Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and includes various types of humanitarian crisis. Afghanistan and DR Congo are examples of enduring complex crises. Pakistan represents an acute humanitarian crisis through the earthquake of Several of the countries also have combinations of natural disasters and complex crises. With the exception of Niger, all the countries are among the biggest recipients of Norwegian humanitarian aid (see Table 3 in Chapter 4). Furthermore, three countries have been selected for field surveys: Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory. All three are major recipients of Norwegian humanitarian aid. The Palestinian Territory and Sudan have been the biggest recipients of Norwegian humanitarian aid in recent years. Ethiopia was originally chosen for a field visit, but it had to be excluded because of the deterioration in diplomatic relations between Norway and Ethiopia in autumn The security situation and whether Norway had an embassy in the country were also important factors in the selection of countries for field visits. The three countries in the sample do not include acute humanitarian crises. All three have enduring crises. Both Sudan and Uganda are currently in transition from humanitarian crisis to a more stable situation. 2.3 Document analysis Key documents from the Storting, activity plans for the foreign service missions in the countries included in the sample, departmental plans for the Department for the UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the guidelines for the Ministry s administration of grants, strategies and other documents relating to the Ministry s administration of humanitarian assistance have been reviewed. A sample of evaluations and reports relating to relevant humanitarian crises and humanitarian assistance in general have also been reviewed in order to shed light on the issues The project/grant review An analysis has been conducted of case folders for grants awarded under Chapter 163 during the period 2004 to 2007 to humanitarian operations in the eight selected countries. In the selection of cases in each country, emphasis has been placed on variation in the sectors to which the humanitarian aid is given and in type of organisation (the UN, the International Red Cross system and NGOs). Only grants/projects that have received more than NOK 1 million in support have been chosen. The sample was made on the basis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists of grants awarded. Roughly 250 grants have been reviewed in order to shed light on the Ministry s case processing and follow-up of humanitarian assistance. The analysis is based on the documents in the case folders. All the documents in the case folders have been reviewed, with the emphasis on applications/requests for grants, letters of grant commitment and final reports. The purpose of this review was to shed light on the Ministry s case processing in its allocation of grants to and follow-up of humanitarian assistance. The quality of the applications and final reports was analysed on the basis of the requirements set out in the audit criteria. The Ministry s case processing times were also registered during the project review. Questions relating to the Ministry s dialogue with the organisations, other parts of the Ministry, Norad and the foreign service missions were also investigated. The review was also used to select projects for field visits. 2.4 Interview surveys Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A total of nine interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The executive officers with country responsibility (in the Section for Humanitarian Affairs) for Afghanistan, Pakistan, DR Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Palestinian Territory were interviewed. At these meetings, emphasis was placed on humanitarian assistance to these countries, including the objective of Norwegian aid, goal achievement and any challenges relating to the individual countries. The Ministry s administration of humanitarian assistance was emphasised in all the interviews. Interviews were also conducted with the Section for Humanitarian Affairs and the Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs in the Ministry at the start and conclusion of the investigation. Together, the interviews with the Ministry help to shed light on a large part of the Ministry s work 28 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

31 on humanitarian assistance. Minutes from all meetings with the Ministry have been verified The interview survey among Norwegian NGOs Seven NGOs in Norway were interviewed: Médicins Sans Frontières Norway, the Norwegian Red Cross, CARE Norway, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, the Norwegian Refugee Council, NORWAC 6 and Norwegian People s Aid. These organisations were chosen because they are the Norwegian organisations that receive most funding under Chapter 163. The organisations have different models for how they work and which areas of humanitarian assistance they focus on. This was emphasised in the interviews. Furthermore, the purpose of the interviews was to shed light on the organisations work on planning and carrying out humanitarian operations and the organisations dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minutes from all the interviews have been verified. All the organisations were also included in the field surveys, through interviews and/or project visits. The interviews with the organisations were therefore also important preparation for the field surveys Interview surveys in Stockholm, Geneva and New York Interviews were conducted with a number of international organisations. In Geneva, meetings were held with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) / the Norwegian Refugee Council. 7 The Norwegian mission was also interviewed. In New York, meetings were held with OCHA, UNICEF, The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Norwegian mission to the UN. Minutes from the meetings have been verified. 8 Representatives from several of the organisations areas of activity took part in all the interviews. 6) The interview with NORWAC was conducted in Jerusalem. 7) The Internal Displacement Monitoring centre (IDMC) in Geneva, which is run by the Norwegian Refugee Council, monitors the situation for internally displaced persons on assignment for the UN. Its duties include advocacy, operation of a database containing information about internally displaced persons, the training of national and international players in protection and help, and cooperation with and support for civil society. 8) This does not apply to the meeting with UNDP. No information from this meeting is used in the report. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain information about the organisations activities, challenges in relation to humanitarian assistance and views on Norway s work as a donor and its efforts in the international humanitarian arena. In order to obtain information about Swedish humanitarian assistance and how it is organised, interviews were conducted with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish aid authorities (Sida). The summaries from these two meetings have been verified. 2.5 Field surveys The field surveys were carried out to shed light on the implementation and results of humanitarian assistance. In addition, it was also important to obtain points of view about Norway as a donor. The field visits in Sudan and Uganda each lasted for two weeks, while the visit to the Palestinian territory lasted one week. Emphasis was placed on conducting interviews with various humanitarian players and visiting projects in different sectors. Moreover, priority was given to spending as much time as possible in the field, i.e. on meetings with organisation and organisations outside the capital cities. Large geographical areas were therefore covered in the field surveys. The field survey in Sudan included interviews in the capital Khartoum, interviews and project visits in Southern Sudan based in Juba and a visit to the UN in Malakal. In the Palestinian Territory, the visits took place in Jerusalem and over large areas of the West Bank. In Uganda, the visit consisted of interviews in Kampala and interviews and project visits in Northern Uganda, including in Gulu, Kitgum and Kalongo. The visits to the three countries were facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant foreign service missions. A representative of the foreign service participated on the trips and projects visits, but not in the interviews with UN agencies and NGOs More about interviews in the field During the three field visits, interviews were conducted with the foreign service missions in Khartoum and Juba in Sudan, Kampala in Uganda and Al Ram in the Palestinian Territory. Meetings were held at all the missions as an introduction to and conclusion of the field visits. Interviews were Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 29

32 food distribution, agriculture and food security, vocational training and mine clearing. Some of the projects have lasted for several years, while several had started recently. The projects are run under the auspices of UN agencies, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international and Norwegian NGOs. The Office of the Auditor General selected the projects, but the detailed programme was drawn up in dialogue between the Office of the Auditor General, the Foreign Service and the responsible organisations. Which activities and which parts of individual projects were visited was decided to a greater extent by the organisations, after input from the Office of the Auditor General. One of the visited projects: The Norwegian Refugee Council's food distribution in Northern Uganda (Kitgum). Photo: Aleksander Åsheim also conducted with UN agencies, Norwegian NGOs, international NGOs and the authorities. A full overview of all the interviews conducted is provided in Appendix 1. Several of the UN agencies and NGOs were interviewed both at the national level (country offices) and at the regional/ local level. At all the meetings, emphasis was placed on the humanitarian situation in the country, the organisations activities, challenges involved in the work, views about humanitarian assistance in general and about Norwegian humanitarian assistance in particular. At the meetings with the foreign service missions, emphasis was also put on the mission s role and duties in the humanitarian assistance context and cooperation with the Ministry. Only the minutes from the meetings with the foreign service missions have been verified. In the investigation, information from the other interviews will be consistently referred to as data from the field surveys More about the project visits More than 20 projects that have received funding under Chapter 163 were visited during the investigation (see Appendix 2). The security situation and geographical distances placed limitations on which projects it was possible to visit. In selecting projects, emphasis was placed on variation with respect to implementing organisations and sectors. Projects were visited in different areas and themes, such as health and hospitals, the running of camps for internally displaced persons, During the project visits, meetings and conversations were held as far as possible with the implementing organisation and local partners. Moreover, priority was given to speaking to beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, for example internally displaced persons in Northern Uganda who receive food from the Norwegian Refugee council s food distribution service. During the project visits, emphasis was put on obtaining as good a picture as possible of the project, its achievement of goals and the challenges encountered. Information from the field visits used in the report therefore consists of data from the various meetings held, conversations with beneficiaries and the observations made. This is compared with data from the document analysis and other interviews in order to reveal tendencies in the data. 2.6 Statistics Norad has produced statistics for use in the investigation. The statistics show the extent of Norwegian humanitarian aid during the period 2002 to 2007, broken down by channel, partners and countries. In addition, statistical material was obtained from the Financial Tracking Service 9 database in order to shed light on the degree to which UN appeals are covered financially and the timing of Norwegian financial responses to appeals from the UN. 9) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), which is administered by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a global database that continuously registers all international humanitarian aid reported to OCHA. This includes aid given to the UN, voluntary organisations and the Red Cross / Red Crescent movement, bilateral aid, goods and services and private donations. The database receives all its data from donors or from the organisations that receive the aid. 30 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

33 3 Audit criteria The audit criteria derive from propositions and reports to the Storting and the Storting s consideration of them, the Appropriation Regulations and the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government. Central international standards and principles are also sources for the audit criteria, where they are in accordance with and clarify the objectives for Norwegian humanitarian assistance stipulated by the Storting. Among other things, this includes the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which are the result of an initiative taken by Norway together with several other donor countries in the OECD in The aim was to ensure that donors who are involved in humanitarian assistance exercise their role as donors in a good manner. 10 As regards requirements for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration, the audit criteria have for certain items been operationalised using the Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants allocated under Chapter 163. The guidelines largely consist of clarifying the overriding goals in the area, including the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government. The audit criteria for assessing the results of humanitarian aid projects are based on overriding national and international objectives in the area, which are operationalised using the OECD-DAC criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian action. 11 In addition, the goals and performance requirements for the individual projects are also used. 3.1 Overriding objectives and principles for humanitarian assistance Humanitarian assistance is intended to help save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and natural disasters. The prevention of humanitarian 10) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship were signed by 15 donors in Stockholm on 17 June More than 22 donors have endorsed the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. 11) OECD (1999): Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, cf. ALNAP (2006): Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria. An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies. The criteria are a further development of the OECD/DAC criteria for the evaluation of development measures. These criteria are reproduced in Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. crises is also part of humanitarian aid. Pursuant to the principles for good humanitarian donorship, funds should be allocated on the basis of the needs present and of an assessment of the needs. Humanitarian efforts shall be based on the humanitarian principles enshrined in international humanitarian law and confirmed by the UN General Assembly on several occasions: humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. 12 The humanitarian principles also form the basis for Norway s humanitarian effort. 13 Humanity means saving human lives and alleviating suffering where it occurs. Impartiality means that operational humanitarian efforts shall be exclusively based on needs, without discriminating between or among those affected. Independence means that the humanitarian goals shall be independent of political, economic, military or other objectives. Neutrality means not favouring one of the sides in a conflict in connection with humanitarian efforts. Norwegian humanitarian aid is allocated under Chapter 163 Emergency Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights. It shall provide protection and timely, effective and qualitatively good humanitarian assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons and others affected by emergency situations as a result of war and conflicts. The allocations shall also be used to provide timely, effective and qualitatively good humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters in various parts of the world, and to contribute to preparedness for dealing with crises. 14 Norway s humanitarian effort shall be concentrated on countries where there are extensive unmet humanitarian needs and where Norway is specially qualified to contribute or where the initiatives underpin peace and reconciliation processes. Emphasis shall be placed on contributing to better 12) Cf. the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ratified by Norway in 1951) and the supplementary protocols of 1977 (ratified by Norway in 1981). The principles have been confirmed by the UN General Assembly, among other things in Resolution 6/134 of 14 December 2006: Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and Resolution 46/182 of 19 December The principles are also enshrined in the Principles and Good practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 13) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2002 to ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2001 to Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 31

34 coordination of humanitarian and political initiatives to ensure that humanitarian assistance is a supplement to and not a substitute for political action. 15 Emphasis is placed on assessing Norway s total humanitarian assistance in relation to other foreign policy goals and instruments, including the prevention of conflicts and natural disasters, the promotion of peace and reconciliation work and work for human rights and development. 16 In Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs endorsed the principle that humanitarian assistance must be an integrated part of development and foreign policy. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs pointed out that it is important that endeavours are made to achieve optimal efficiency and goal achievement in emergency aid and aid work. The Committee therefore believes that it is important that the division of labour between the UN and other participants in the aid and emergency aid field is such that the maximum impact is achieved, and thereby the best possible results. 17 The protection of vulnerable groups in complex emergency situations is an important consideration in Norwegian humanitarian assistance. It is a central objective to extend and strengthen the protection of civilians in accordance with humanitarian principles. Women and children are particularly vulnerable in humanitarian crises and they are, for example, particularly at risk of violence and sexual abuse. Women and children have a special need for protection and are therefore priority groups. 18 Where possible, the humanitarian effort should be based on local capacity that can be boosted by recruiting local personnel, buying local materials and dealing with local enterprises. Where possible, the organisations shall cooperate with local organisations and local authorities ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2001 to ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 17) Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting for and ) Cf. UN Resolution 1325 from 2006 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Action Plan for Women s Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation ( ). 19) Code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. These principles are also emphasised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among other things in Proposition No 81 to the Storting ( ) On changes in certain chapters in the central government budget for 2006 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Police, and the Ministry of Health and Care Services as a result of the situation in the Middle East, and Proposition No 3 to the Storting ( ) On aid in connection with natural disasters. As far as possible, the humanitarian effort shall underpin reconstruction and long-term development, endeavour to support the maintenance and restoration of sustainable subsistence systems and the transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and long-term development. The donors shall strengthen the capacity of the countries affected to prevent, prepare for and deal with future humanitarian crises. 20 The organisations shall endeavour to implement emergency aid programmes that actively reduce the beneficiaries vulnerability to future crises and contribute to sustainable subsistence systems. Particular weight shall be placed on environmental factors. The negative impact must be kept to a minimum. 21 As regards the division of roles between humanitarian and military efforts in international operations, emphasis is placed on the division being as clear as possible and on the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality being respected during ongoing coordination of the civilian and military efforts. 22 In the same way, the military effort in large, acute natural disasters must be based on a clear division of roles and understanding Requirements for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration of humanitarian assistance The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that the humanitarian assistance is in accordance with the objectives set out in the decisions and premises of the Storting. 24 Grant arrangements under Chapter 163 are intended to meet humanitarian needs. The funds are channelled through UN agencies and general UN appeals, other international organisations and Norwegian NGOs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is grant administrator and is responsible for awarding and following up the grants. In autumn 2000, the UN s member states endorsed eight development goals, the so-called 20) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 21) The Red Cross Code of Conduct and the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 22) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2004 to ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24) Pursuant to the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 1, central government funds shall be used in accordance with the decisions and premises of the Storting. 32 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

35 millennium goals. These goals serve as guidelines for the whole of Norway s development policy, including humanitarian assistance. The guidelines and priorities in development policy, for example concerning ownership, coordination, contributions to institution-building in cooperating countries, the integration of gender equality and environmental considerations and administrative requirements concerning, for example, reporting, shall as far as possible also be complied with in humanitarian assistance. 25 General criteria for Norway s humanitarian efforts are the choice of good, expedient channels, coordination, goal achievement, effective use of contingency goods and personnel, and coordination of the instruments. 26 It is emphasised that cooperation with Norwegian NGOs and the UN must be strengthened in order to ensure the most timely, flexible and robust system possible for acute emergency aid. 27 It is also emphasised that the fundamental risk involved in humanitarian assistance means that the Ministry must ensure that the administrative system is as robust as possible. 28 The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, which Norway has endorsed, outline good practice for donors funding. The donors shall: Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises Recognise the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, and strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other key humanitarian organisations While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) appeals, and actively support the 25) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2003 to ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2003 to ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and coordination in complex emergencies Case processing of grants The principle of goal and performance management was set out through the Storting s consideration of Proposition No 52 to the Storting ( ) On reforms of the state s budget system and changes to its Appropriation Regulations, cf. Recommendation no 53 ( ). The Storting reaffirmed its endorsement of this principle in its consideration of Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) On the state s administrative and personnel policy, cf. Recommendation No 63 to the Storting ( ). The concrete requirements for goal and performance management are set out in the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government (1997 and 2004). 30 Pursuant to section 4 of the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government, all agencies shall ensure that stipulated objectives and performance requirements are achieved, that the use of resources is efficient, and that the entity is run in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, including the requirements relating to good administrative practice, impartiality and ethical behaviour. All agencies shall also ensure sufficient management information and an adequate basis for decisions. Management, monitoring, control and administration shall be adjusted to the agency s distinctive characteristics, risk profile and significance. As regards grants, the Ministry shall adopt a specific set of regulations for each grant scheme, describing the objectives, criteria for the achievement of objectives and award criteria, and it shall stipulate rules for monitoring and control. 31 The grant administrator must comply with the provisions in the regulations for the grant scheme. 32 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has adopted regulations for grants for humanitarian aid purposes. The regulations specify to a large extent the general requirements in the Regulations on Financial Management. The regulations are used in this investigation to operationalise the requirements for the Ministry s administration. 29) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 30) The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government were adopted by the Crown Prince Regent s decree of 12 December ) The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 8. 32) The Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government section Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 33

36 When granting funds to aid projects, Norway has a responsibility as a donor to assess whether the proposals for projects prepared by the recipient are in accordance with Norwegian development policy, including whether they satisfy fundamental quality requirements, are realistic and contain clear and measurable performance goals. 33 An important part of the work of quality assuring Norwegian aid consists of the Ministry evaluating partners and engaging in a dialogue with partners on the quality and realism of project proposals. It is also important in this context to assess the goals and expected results as well as clarifying the reporting requirements. 34 The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs has emphasised the importance of documenting the decision basis for individual grants for emergency aid, humanitarian assistance, human rights, peace and reconciliation, and democracy. 35 For all applications for funds for humanitarian efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall carry out an individual assessment of the project/ measure in question. 36 Pursuant to the Ministry s guidelines, when processing applications, the Ministry shall assess the concrete humanitarian needs in the geographical area, the connection between humanitarian assistance and peace and reconciliation processes, whether the project fits with the coordinated efforts in the area in question and whether it is in accordance with the overall goal for what Norway wishes to achieve. The Ministry s experience and knowledge of the organisation, the costs of the project and the organisation s implementation capability shall also be assessed. Particular weight shall be placed on the use of local resources (personnel and goods). 37 Risk management is an important part of the management and quality assurance of the assistance and the projects that receive funding. This is done by identifying risk factors, analysing effects and planning measures to be instigated. It is important that the recipient and donor emphasise 33) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together, cf. Recommendation No 93 to the Storting ( ). 34) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 35) Recommendation No 145 to the Storting ( ), cf. Document No 1 ( ) and Recommendation no 114 to the Storting ( ). cf. Document No 1 ( ). 36) The basis for the Ministry s consideration of applications is proposition No 1 to the Storting, the annual allocation memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the strategy or policy for humanitarian efforts in the geographical area in question. 37) Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants under Chapter 163 and Chapter item planned and achieved results and consider limitations and obstacles to achieving the planned goals. The scope must be proportionate in terms of cost-efficiency. 38 The Provisions on Financial Management section set out the requirements that apply to the contents of the letter of commitment. This letter shall describe the purpose and kind of measure which the grant is assumed to be used towards, the grant amount, the payment arrangements, any conditions relating to use of the funds and, if applicable, the deadline set for the recipient to accept the conditions, reporting requirements, control measures that may be implemented with reference to the Appropriation Regulations section 10 second paragraph, and possible sanctions if the recipient fails to comply with the conditions for the grant The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibility for follow-up Pursuant to Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together, those responsible for administering Norwegian aid are responsible for following up the grants allocated and for reporting on the use of the funds and the development results where funds have been allocated. Regular project and programme reviews and evaluations carried out by independent consultants are important elements of quality assurance and the learning process. 39 The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs points out in Recommendation No 145 to the Storting ( ), cf. Document No 1 ( ) that the main rule for the follow-up of funds allocated under Chapters 163 and 164 must be that reporting from the individual project is done is such a way that it provides a sufficient basis for the controlling authority s evaluation. A majority of the Committee assumes that the Government will review its procedures with a view to improving follow-up on the part of the grant recipient. 40 As grant administrator, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall control whether the recipients of grants satisfy the conditions on which the grant was awarded. 41 This requirement is specified in 38) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 39) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 40) Recommendation No 145 to the Storting ( ). 41) The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 15, cf. the Appropriation Regulations section 10: Grant administrators are entitled to check that funds are used in accordance with the conditions set. 34 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

37 the Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government. 42 The grant administrator shall obtain reports from grant recipients that enable it to assess the degree to which goals have been achieved. The criteria for the achievement of goals shall be so specific and precisely worded that follow-up can be carried out without incurring disproportionately large costs. Moreover, recipients of grants must be required to submit reports in accordance with these criteria. The reporting requirements shall not be greater in scope than is reasonable in relation to the benefit the recipient derives from the grant. Consideration shall also be given to the practical possibilities available to each recipient to obtain information. In accordance with the conditions for grants, the Ministry shall receive descriptive final reports and audited accounts for the grant/project no later than six months after the conclusion of the project. 43 The final report shall describe the results and goal achievement. The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government require all agencies to have established internal control. In order to ensure correct case processing in connection with the awarding and disbursement of grants, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as grant administrator shall have established systems, procedures and measures to, among other things, prevent, uncover and correct errors and deficiencies in the case processing. 44 The grant administrator shall check information submitted by the recipient that has a bearing on the grant administrator s calculation of the amount and allocation of the grant. Moreover, checks carried out of information from the recipient are required to be documented in a satisfactory manner, and the grant administrator is also required to check reports submitted by the grant recipient about its achievement of goals. 45 Such control shall be adapted to suit the individual grant arrangement and should be assessed in relation to the benefit of the arrangement. The control shall be of reasonable scope from a costefficiency perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines specify the requirements for follow-up of the 42) Section ) Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants under Chapter 163 and Chapter item ) Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 14, Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government sections 2.4 and ) The Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government section concrete projects that receive grants: Project follow-up should include regular service trips to areas to which humanitarian aid is given, including project visits as an important component. Moreover, there should be an active dialogue with the relevant foreign service missions on project follow-up (including project visits). The dialogue with the aid recipient about follow-up of the project should be documented. In the case of large/difficult projects, a debriefing of the grant recipient should be included on conclusion of the project. Grant recipients are encouraged to keep the Ministry regularly informed about the progress of the projects, and any substantial changes shall be approved in advance by the Ministry. This also applies to requests for an extension of the project period. Evaluations of selected organisations and projects will be part of ongoing project follow-up. 46 As regards follow-up of implementing organisations, pursuant to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, the donors shall ensure that the organisations involve the beneficiaries and users of the assistance as far as possible in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the humanitarian efforts. 47 The donors shall ensure that the organisations follow good practice and undertake to promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The Ministry shall also promote the use of relevant guidelines. Evaluation of humanitarian assistance The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs has emphasised the necessity of evaluations and of experiences being systemised in the aid field in general. The Committee has also underlined the importance of regular evaluations of the work of NGOs. 48 Evaluations are also an important part of quality assurance and the learning process 49 Pursuant to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, the donor must encourage regular evaluations of the humanitarian response. All agencies must carry out regular evaluations in order to obtain information about efficiency, goal achievement and results in the whole or part of the agency s area of responsibility and activities. However, the frequency and scope of the evaluations shall be decided on the basis of the agency s 46) Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants under Chapter 163 and Chapter item ) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 48) Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ). 49) See, among other things, Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 35

38 distinctive characteristics, risk profile and significance. 50 In order to obtain information about whether the grant arrangements are efficient in relation to resource use, organisation and the stipulated goals, the Ministry shall ensure that evaluations are carried out. The evaluations shall be based on an assessment of the risk and materiality of the individual grant arrangement, including how extensive and important the grant arrangement is, the quality and scope of other reporting and the degree to which it is possible to describe the annual results. Evaluations must be seen in conjunction with the requirements for reporting. 51 The resources spent on the evaluations must be reasonable in scope in relation to the benefit gained from the information obtained. On the follow-up of multilateral organisations The requirements concerning advertising, applications and the contents of the letter of grant commitment do not apply to funds that the state allocates as a member of an international organisation, under agreements with other countries on cooperative measures or under agreements with international NGOs. 52 Since the right to control aid given through multilateral organisations is regulated by the organisations audit and control rules, Norway cannot demand a general right of control. The member countries control responsibility is attended to through participation in the organisations governing bodies, consultation meetings and by other means. 53 For individual donors, the possibilities for follow-up and control depend on the degree of earmarking of the funds. In the case of funds channelled through a multilateral organisation to individual Norwegian-financed projects in individual countries, it is possible to require separate reporting and control while still respecting the organisation s exclusive auditing right. 3.3 Audit criteria for goal achievement in projects that receive grants under Chapter 163 State funds shall be used in accordance with the decisions and premises of the Storting. 54 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for stipulated goals and performance requirements for the humanitarian efforts being achieved, and for ensuring that the projects that receive grants are implemented accordingly. The Office of the Auditor General assumes that the results of the humanitarian efforts shall be in accordance with the currently applicable overriding objectives for Norwegian humanitarian assistance and applicable international principles. Furthermore, the goals and performance requirements stipulated for concrete projects and humanitarian efforts that receive Norwegian funding shall be met. OECD-DAC has adopted criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian action in connection with complex crises. 55 These criteria are in accordance with the principles and goals that apply to Norwegian humanitarian assistance (see above). The criteria specify the requirements for the implementation and effectiveness of humanitarian efforts, and they therefore supplement the other audit criteria: 56 Relevance and appropriateness mean that the project shall be in accordance with local needs and priorities. This also applies to the concrete activities. An important element in this context is whether good needs assessments have been carried out and whether the planning and implementation has taken the local context and the different needs of different groups into account. Effectiveness (goal achievement) in the humanitarian efforts means whether the activity achieves its purpose, or whether it can be expected to do so on the basis of the outputs of the activity. The activity shall have clear performance requirements. They shall be based on the goals defined for the efforts. The assistance shall be timely. Coordination of the humanitarian efforts can also be seen as being part of its goal achievement. Coverage means reaching large population 50) The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government Administration section ) The Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government section ) The Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government section ) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 54) The Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 1. 55) OECD (1999): Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, cf. ALNAP (2006): Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria. An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies. The criteria are a further development of the OECD/DAC criteria for the evaluation of development measures. These criteria are reproduced in Report No 35 to the Storting Fighting Poverty Together. 56) Coherence, which is also one of the criteria, is omitted in this investigation. 36 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

39 groups who are facing life-threatening suffering, regardless of where they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their needs. An important question here is whether the aid given is proportionate to the needs in different areas at both the national and local level. Effi ciency means choosing the best method of reaching the stipulated goals. Impact refers to the more long-term effects of the project, such as social, economic, technical, environmental and individual goals. Connectedness between short-term and longterm considerations, is about the necessity of short-term activities being carried out in a manner that takes long-term problems into consideration. A connection should be established between emergency aid, reconstruction and development. Emphasis is also placed on cross-sector themes being taken into account: the environment, gender equality, protection, understanding for the local context and that important stakeholders have an opportunity to take part in the work. The Office of the Auditor General assumes that general principles for good project implementation must be followed in order for the goals to be achieved. The projects must have clearly defined goals that form the basis for the management and monitoring of goal achievement. The projects shall be planned to include activities and resources in such a manner that the goals can be achieved. Project implementation and effectiveness shall be monitored during projects. An important part of this consists of identifying nonconformities and initiating corrective measures. 57 It follows from the above audit criteria that it is important, as part of a learning process, to review and evaluate completed projects in order to assess the achievement of goals and the reasons for any discrepancies. 57) See, among other things, Bjørn Johs. Kolltveit and Torger Reve (2002): Prosjekt organisering, ledelse og gjennomføring. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 37

40 4 The distribution and allocation of humanitarian funds The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that the humanitarian assistance is in accordance with the decisions and premises of the Storting. This includes ensuring that the goals and performance requirements are achieved, that the use of resources is efficient, and that sufficient management information and an adequate decision basis are ensured. 58 Through its administration, the Ministry shall ensure effective humanitarian assistance, and, as grant administrator, it is responsible for allocating and following up the humanitarian grants. In this chapter, the emphasis is on the Ministry s administration relating to the allocation of funds to humanitarian crises. Firstly, the administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance is described and how the Norwegian humanitarian funds are distributed. Chapter 4.2 deals with target areas, guiding principles and priorities for Norwegian humanitarian assistance. At the end of the chapter (4.3), the Ministry s work on the allocation of funds to humanitarian crises is examined. Humanitarian assistance takes the form of grants that are largely based on applications from NGOs and UN agencies. The final part of the chapter therefore deals with the organisations drafting of applications, the quality of the applications and the Ministry s processing of them. 4.1 The administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance The duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norwegian humanitarian assistance is administered in its entirety by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Section for Humanitarian Affairs in the Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs administers humanitarian assistance totalling NOK 2.6 billion (2008). Humanitarian work includes natural disasters, complex humanitarian crises, peace and reconciliation efforts, refugee issues, internally displaced persons, relations with humanitarian organisations, contingency arrangements and other thematic issues. Besides allocating grants to implementing organisa- 58) This is in accordance with the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 1. tions in connection with humanitarian crises, the Ministry also works on humanitarian policy issues and thematic initiatives in Norway and internationally. Humanitarian assistance is intended to be part of Norway s foreign and development policy, and, according to the Ministry, there is close contact with the Ministry s political leadership in connection with the administration of the funds. Two Ministers are responsible for humanitarian assistance: The Minister of the Environment and International Development is responsible for assistance in connection with natural disasters, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for other humanitarian assistance. 59 In an interview, the Ministry states that most individual decisions concerning grant commitments are made by the Section for Humanitarian Affairs, while others are cleared with the department or at political level. The Ministry also states that, because of the unpredictability associated with humanitarian disasters, it has been decided to administer all the funds combined in the Ministry. In order to ensure flexibility, emphasis is placed on having efficient decision-making procedures without too many different levels. Rapid changes in priorities between countries and themes may be necessary when acute disasters occur or if rapid changes take place that make it desirable to change priorities The distribution of humanitarian funds The humanitarian grants allocated under Chapter 163 are largely given as support for concrete programmes and projects on the basis of applications from Norwegian and international NGOs, UN agencies, other multilateral organisations, research institutes and individuals. All the grants are one-off contributions and are given for 12 months from the grant date, although they can also be given for shorter periods. In reality, many of the concrete projects run for several years with Norwegian support, but they are financed for one year at a time. The awarding of grants takes place throughout the year. Since 2007, part of the humanitarian budget has been set aside for use in unforeseen/acute humanitarian crises during the year (15 per cent in 2007 and 10 per cent in 2008). 59) Item Natural disasters and item Humanitarian assistance and human rights, respectively. 38 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

41 In the following, an overview is provided of how the aid breaks down between countries and channels. Distribution by country and channel As shown in Chapter 1, the funds allocated to humanitarian assistance have increased considerably in recent years. Norwegian humanitarian aid breaks down between a large number of countries, agreement partners / recipients and individual grants/agreements. Table 2 shows that Norway gave humanitarian aid to 60 countries in There were 186 recipients of grants, and the total number of grants/agreements was 736. Most of the humanitarian aid goes to Africa. Table 3 shows the ten countries that received most humanitarian aid from Norway in 2007, in NOK. The Palestinian Territory was the largest recipient, with NOK 239 million. Distribution between Norwegian NGOs Approximately 40 per cent of the humanitarian aid is channelled through Norwegian organisations. Table 4 shows the breakdown between the ten largest Norwegian organisations. The organisations have differing profiles for their activities and are to a varying degree themselves the imple- Table 2 Total aid allocated under Chapter 163 broken down by country, agreements and agreement partners, Number of recipient countries Number of agreement partners Number of agreements/grants Source: Norad Table 3 Bilateral and multilateral aid under Chapter 163 broken down by the ten largest recipient countries (NOK thousands) Recipient country The Palestinian Territory Sudan Somalia Afghanistan DR Congo Uganda Sri Lanka Iraq Lebanon Colombia Source: Norad Table 4 Aid allocated under Chapter 163 broken down by the ten largest Norwegian NGOs, (NOK thousands) Organisation Norwegian Red Cross Norwegian Refugee Council Norwegian People s Aid Norwegian Church Aid Médicins Sans Frontières Norway NORWAC CARE Norway Caritas Norway Save the Children Christian Relief Network Others Total Source: Norad Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 39

42 Table 5 Aid allocated under Chapter 163 broken down by the ten largest UN agencies, (NOK thousands) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) UN Development Programme (UNDP) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) UN Children s Fund (UNICEF) UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) World Food Programme (WFP) Source: Norad menting organisation. The Norwegian Red Cross is the biggest recipient among the Norwegian organisations. These funds largely consist of funds for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Distribution between UN agencies The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises in an interview that Norway is a strong supporter of the UN s efforts and coordinating role in the humanitarian field. According to the Ministry, Norwegian humanitarian assistance is an important part of the international humanitarian effort and must be seen in conjunction with it. Table 5 shows how the humanitarian aid breaks down between the largest UN agencies. These agencies also receive funds via other chapters in the budget, such as general contributions under Chapter 170 to the UN agencies. The Norwegian grants to the UN s humanitarian work are as a rule made in response to humanitarian appeals. The largest recipient among the UN agencies is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), with just over NOK 528 million in This includes Norway s support for the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in the amount of NOK 350 million. Norway supports CERF in order to strengthen its response capacity and to create better financing arrangements. 60 After OCHA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is the second biggest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian aid among UN agencies. One of UNDP s focus areas is crisis prevention and reconstruction. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is also an important player in the humanitarian field as regards the 60) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period 2005 to protection of refugees. Norway is working to get the UNHCR to increase its efforts in relation to internally displaced persons. 61 Other important UN agencies are the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). 4.2 Focus areas, guiding principles and priorities in Norwegian humanitarian assistance Overview of governing documents and the basis for decisions There is no overall, overriding strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance collected in one document. Taken together, a number of governing documents at different levels constitute the basis for the Ministry s prioritisation, focus areas and decisions. The overriding basis for decisions for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handling of grants allocated under Chapter 163 Emergency aid, humanitarian assistance and human rights is Proposition No 1 to the Storting, activity plans for the Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, the annual allocation memorandum that is cleared with the Ministry s political leadership and any strategy documents relating to the Norwegian efforts in the individual geographical areas. 62 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to the following guiding documents for Norwegian humanitarian assistance: other budget propositions and recommendations to the Storting, the Soria Moria declaration, ad hoc memorandums 61) Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 62) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants allocated under Chapter 163 and item , revised on 12 December These guidelines form the basis for the Ministry s administration of grants. There are also separate guidelines for grant recipients, a template for letters of grant commitment and a template for final reports. 40 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

43 that are cleared with the Ministry s political leadership, international guiding documents (the Geneva conventions, UN resolutions, the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, UN reforms), other central policy documents such as the Government s Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, and speeches and contributions by the political leadership in international forums. The main principles for rights-based humanitarian assistance set out in proposition No 21 to the Storting ( ) Human dignity in focus. Action plan for Human Rights still apply as Norwegian policy in the humanitarian field. 63 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prioritisations are expressed in the allocation of funds to humanitarian crises in the form of concrete operations and projects, but also in contributions to thematic focus areas. The latter include landmine measures, including support for victims of mines, and measures aimed at preventing humanitarian consequences of cluster munitions. Follow-up of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and integration of the gender perspective into humanitarian efforts are also an important priority in the Ministry s humanitarian work. Moreover, a large proportion of Norwegian humanitarian assistance is aimed at internally displaced persons. As part of these efforts, Norway is an active driving force behind the humanitarian reform processes aimed at the protection of internally displaced persons, including the so-called cluster approach under the auspices of the UN. 64 In light of the international recognition that it is at least as important to prevent humanitarian disasters as it is to be able to provide the victims of such disasters with assistance, the Ministry has also produced a report to the Storting in this area. 65 Other thematic focus areas are peace and reconciliation, civil-military 63) This was made clear in the interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian mission to the UN in Geneva. 64) The cluster approach was established in 2005 in order to better meet humanitarian needs in defined areas and to ensure a more efficient humanitarian response. A cluster is a group of humanitarian organisations and other relevant players for deployment in humanitarian crises where their sector expertise is required. This is intended to ensure a better division of labour and a clearer understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different organisations in a humanitarian crisis. Eleven clusters have been established so far: 1. Agriculture, 2. Camp coordination and management, 3. Reconstruction, 4. Education, 5. Shelter, 6. Telecommunications, 7. Health, 8. Logistics, 9. Nutrition, 10. Protection, 11. Water/sanitary facilities/hygiene. The clusters are organised both at field level and at global level and are led by one or more organisations appointed in advance. 65) Proposition No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian policy for the prevention of humanitarian disasters. coordination, health, HIV/AIDS, human rights and the protection of vulnerable groups. 66 The annual geographical and thematic priorities in relation to humanitarian assistance are set out in an allocation memorandum which the Section for Humanitarian Affairs draws up in February/ March and which is approved by the political leadership. The memorandum provides a short description of how it is planned to allocate the humanitarian aid between countries and thematic areas. The section submits a six-monthly report in early autumn. The memorandum describes the situation for the year so far, and contains proposals for the reallocation of funds and the allocation of remaining funds. From 2008, a separate performance report is also prepared for the humanitarian efforts (for 2007). The funds set aside for unforeseen humanitarian crises (15 per cent in 2007 and 10 per cent in 2008) are not included in the geographical and thematic allocation in the allocation memorandum. If any of these funds remain, they are allocated in the six-monthly report in the autumn. In 2007, the reserves amounted to NOK 370 million. NOK 105 million of this amount was allocated to acute humanitarian crises during the year, while the remaining NOK 265 million was allocated in the six-monthly report. 67 The Ministry stated in an interview that a consultation process takes place between the Ministry and Norwegian NGOs in connection with the allocation of humanitarian funds. A meeting is held at executive officer / civil servant level in December and a meeting at political level is held once the allocation memorandum has been cleared. At the meetings, information is given about the Ministry s main priorities for humanitarian assistance. As regards strategy and the goals for humanitarian assistance at country level, the executive officers with country responsibility in the Section for Humanitarian Affairs largely refer to the overriding governing documents mentioned above. In addition to the overriding allocation memorandum, which briefly describes the main distribution between the countries, country-specific allocation memorandums are prepared for some of 66) This emerged during the interview survey at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in interviews with the Norwegian missions in Geneva and New York. 67) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Peace and reconciliation, humanitarian efforts and human rights. Six-monthly report 2007 and reallocation proposals. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 41

44 the countries that Norway gives particular priority (for 2008, this applies to Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory and Iraq). The memorandums provide an overview of the planned distribution of funds to the organisations. The prioritisation of areas/countries is done on the basis of general guidelines and other political assessments. In interviews, the ministry emphasises that it is the concrete conditions and needs in the field that form the basis for the humanitarian assistance. On this basis, the extent of the aid and the channel for the crisis in question are chosen. Norwegian humanitarian assistance does not use quantitative criteria when allocating funding to the individual organisations. The main criteria or choice of channel is the organisation s effectiveness in the field. When selecting individual projects, the project s relevance in relation to needs is assessed as well as other players in the area and the applicant s expertise, experience and presence in the area in question. The selection is also based on the Ministry s previous experience of the applicant and the organisation s special expertise. In connection with the assistance provided by the Ministry following the tsunami in 2005, criteria were developed for the selection of Norwegian organisations as channels for humanitarian aid. These criteria are explained in Proposition No 36 to the Storting ( ) On aid in connection with the tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean. The criteria are that: the organisation is already present in the country, and it is an advantage if it has been so for a long time the Ministry knows the organisation from before the organisation can refer to previous results the organisation has the required network, not least among authorities locally and other local players the organisation is familiar with the local conditions and has the required understanding of the context In interviews, the Ministry stated that it is more willing to consider supporting new players or the establishment of new offices for known organisations in connection with complex crises than in connection with acute natural disasters. The Ministry has little opportunity or capacity to examine the individual organisations in detail, but, according to the Ministry, the foreign service missions are in many cases an important source of information about the organisations activities at country level. The Ministry realises that it is useful to have close contact with the organisations. The Ministry states that it does not apply the same explicit requirements as regards choice of UN agencies as a channel for Norwegian humanitarian aid. The relevance of the UN agencies is decisive, and emphasis is placed on experience of the organisation. According to the Ministry, the UN has personnel in the field who carry out good assessments, and the appeals are based on good needs assessments. On this basis, it is easy for the Ministry to give money to the UN system. Norway has great confidence in the work done by the UN and it has confidence that the money is administered in a good manner. Moreover, the UN s goals and priorities are largely in harmony with Norwegian policy. In its letters of grant commitment, Norway sets less stringent requirements for the UN agencies than for Norwegian organisations Views on guiding principles, priorities and focus areas Overriding guiding principles and priorities As shown, the various governing signals are not gathered in one overall, overriding strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance. This was pointed out in the peer review of Norwegian development aid and humanitarian aid by the OECD s Development Assistance Committee DAC in According to the peer review, as long as there is no such overriding strategy document, it is also more difficult to assess how Norway prioritises and whether it ensures that Norwegian humanitarian assistance complies with the fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in situations where there are conflicts of interest. 68 In Humanitarian Response Index for 2007, moreover, Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA) point out that the lack of a strategy document makes it difficult to assess how prioritisations are made in Norwegian humanitarian assistance. 69 During the investigation period, the Ministry has worked on a strategy for humanitarian assistance that is scheduled for completion in autumn In interviews, the Ministry states that the reason it wishes to produce a separate strategy is that major changes have occurred in the humanitarian field in recent years, including the UN reform and more clear thematic initiatives such as cluster 68) OECD (2005): DAC Peer Review. Norway, pp ) Development Assistance Research Associates DARA (2007): The Humanitarian Response Index Measuring Commitment to Best Practices, p Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

45 munitions / landmines, prevention and the gender perspective. In addition, the humanitarian crises have increased in complexity, number and scope. The Ministry also refers to the fact that a strong Norwegian humanitarian policy has emerged over a period of several years, and that it sees the strategy as being the result of a maturation process in the Ministry. The strategy is also seen in light of the process that has taken place between the Ministry and the Office of the Auditor General in connection with the performance audit The effectiveness of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance. The Ministry recognises the need for a politically grounded strategy document in order to make Norway and the international community better equipped to meet future humanitarian challenges. With respect to which crises Norway chooses to support, the Ministry states that this is not exclusively based on global needs but also on political evaluations, including evaluations of where Norwegian efforts can make the most effective contribution. Whether Norway can contribute through various means, including political ones, is also decisive for deciding the priorities. Sudan is an example of how humanitarian aid works in conjunction with other contributions on Norway s part. It is not a goal that Norway should contribute humanitarian assistance to all countries with humanitarian needs. Globally, certain humanitarian crises are disregarded by the humanitarian players, while others receive a relatively large amount of help (see also Chapter 5.1). A review of the evaluations of humanitarian efforts in connection with natural disasters found that needs assessments and humanitarian response in general takes place in a political context and that the humanitarian efforts are decided as much on a political basis as on the basis of facts. 70 In an interview, Médicins Sans Frontières points out that the political steering of Norwegian humanitarian funds can be a challenge since the political priorities are not always identical with the greatest humanitarian needs, and they refer in this context to the many humanitarian crises that do not attract international attention. Some organisations point out in the interview survey in Norway that it is not sufficiently clear what needs assessments form the basis for the annual allocations. 70) Norad, Synthesis Report No 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. An important part of the international reform efforts in the humanitarian area consists of ensuring speedier humanitarian assistance and a better distribution of the assistance, among other things in order to prevent crises that fail to attract media coverage receiving too little help. The UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a key tool. (CERF is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.1.5). In 2007, Norway was the second biggest donor to the fund and, in interviews, the Ministry emphasises that Norway is concerned with ensuring that the international community has sufficient breadth in its humanitarian assistance, among other things to counteract the socalled CNN effect. In the interview survey of the Norwegian organisations, some challenges are emphasised that relate to the Ministry s priorities and how they are communicated. Rapid changes in priorities are seen as a problem by some organisations. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, points out in an interview that it is good that the Ministry is clear when presenting its political priorities but that rapid changes are unfortunate. Norwegian Church Aid points to Liberia as an example where the support was reduced from one year to the next, which, according to the organisation, had consequences for the work of Norwegian organisations and their local and international partners. According to Norwegian Church Aid, the arrangement whereby the Ministry withheld 15 per cent for unforeseen crises was given as one of the reasons why it was nonetheless not possible to realise previous priorities. Based on its dialogue with the Ministry, the organisation had expected a larger allocation and planned on that basis. The Norwegian Refugee Council also points out in an interview that the Ministry s priorities often change, but it believes at the same time that the organisation gets a fairly good picture of what the thematic focus areas will be through meetings and ongoing contact throughout the year. The Refugee Council believes that the delays and the unpredictability which they experience must be seen in connection with shifting priorities by the political leadership in the Ministry. In addition to the challenges relating to rapid changes of priorities, several Norwegian organisations also point out in interviews that the Ministry s priorities are insufficiently clear, and that they are not well enough communicated. In that connection, the organisations would like a better dialogue with the Ministry. The Ministry holds Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 43

46 meetings with the organisations at the start of the year and in the autumn in order to inform them about the allocation and reallocation, respectively, of the budget. CARE Norway states in an interview that the meetings are at a general level and that their information value is relatively limited. The organisation is not familiar with the strategies and guidelines on which the Ministry bases its prioritisations in the humanitarian area. Openness about the background to the Ministry s focus and priorities will result in greater predictability, which is an advantage when the workload is great in both the Ministry and the organisations. Certain organisations point to the absence of an overall strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, states in an interview that there may be a need for an overall strategy even though there are already strategies, action plans and governing documents in a number of fields in aid cooperation. The advantage of an overall strategy is that the field could be managed on the basis of a more longterm perspective and be less dependent on changing governments. In addition, it would help to clarify the basis for decisions that underlies the priorities in the area. In the interview survey, however, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Médicins Sans Frontières state that they see no need for an overall strategy, although the latter would like a broader dialogue with the Ministry. The Norwegian Refugee Council emphasises that predictability as a result of an overall strategy must under no circumstances be at the expense of flexibility. It emerges in the interview survey in the Ministry that the Ministry believes that the goals and criteria that form the basis for the Ministry s work on humanitarian assistance are robust, but it emphasises at the same time that they should not be so rigid that they are detrimental to flexibility. It will vary how acute the various crises are, and the Ministry must be in a position to consider each individual case. The Ministry has therefore been cautious with respect to formalising work procedures and guidelines to too great an extent and turning them into rigid requirements for executive officers. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry states that priorities between countries and within relevant countries are subject to continuous change on the basis of developments in the country in question. This is communicated to the organisations at joint meetings, according to the Ministry. Furthermore, the Ministry points to the fact that the downscaling of humanitarian aid to West Africa and Burundi in particular after 2005 took place over a relatively short period of time and that it may have entailed challenges for some organisations. The reason for the downscaling was the changed situation in the countries in question and an increase in Norwegian transitional assistance. Priorities at country level and the choice of channels As regards goals and priorities at country level, as mentioned above, those with country responsibility in the Section for Humanitarian Affairs refer in interviews to the overriding guiding principles and goals for humanitarian assistance and any countryspecific allocation memorandums. No challenges or problems at country level are pointed to in this context. In an interview, however, the Norwegian Embassy in Sudan calls for an overriding strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance to Sudan. According to the embassy, such a strategy would have made it possible to see the humanitarian efforts in Sudan in conjunction with transitional aid and long-term aid. Moreover, a strategy would have clarified the criteria on the basis of which applications from NGOs and UN agencies are assessed, and thus make case processing easier for the embassy. The embassy states that a strategy could also have clarified the embassy s role and comparative advantages and specified how the embassy and the Ministry can supplement each other. Finally, a clear strategy would have made it easier to influence other humanitarian players within the UN system, among organisations and other countries embassies. The Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory also states in an interview that it feels there is a need for clearer guidelines in certain areas. With reference to the fact that it handles several different budget lines, the representative office points out that it is a challenge that there are different guidelines for the different budget lines. It is a challenge for the NGOs to maintain an overview of the different funds and their purposes. As part of the work on dealing with these challenges, the representative office has therefore drawn up a strategy plan for the Palestinian Territory for the period 2008 to 2010, in which it endeavours to adopt a holistic approach to the territory. Like the Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory, the embassy in Uganda has drawn up a strategy plan for its long- 44 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

47 IDP camp outside Khartoum, Sudan. Photo: Aleksander Åsheim term and short-term aid work in the country. This comes in addition to the embassy s activity plan which, according to the embassy, sets out important guiding principles for this work. 71 In the interview survey of Norwegian NGOs and in the field surveys, several organisations state that they would like a clearer profile for Norwegian humanitarian efforts in the country, including clear signals as regards the choice of channels and what kind of roles the different players should have. Save the Children, for example, states in an interview that, except for the goal of focusing on the UN, it is unclear what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to achieve with its current humanitarian profile. Save the Children therefore calls for clearer signals from the Ministry about how it wishes to use the Norwegian organisations in Norwegian humanitarian assistance. In the interview survey, the Ministry points out that the distribution between the different channels is not fixed, but dependent on the situation. The Ministry underlines that it is important for Norway to have several legs to stand on in its humanitarian efforts, and it therefore chooses to give funds through different channels. For example, the Ministry sees the added value of the 71) In its letter to the Office of the Auditor General of 8 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that all foreign service missions that themselves administer aid funds are required to draw up strategy plans for the period 2008 to 2010 for the funds administered by the missions themselves. work of the Norwegian NGOs and the Red Cross system, among other things because they often implement the projects themselves and venture further out into the field than UN agencies. The Ministry also emphasises that when prioritising and choosing sectors for Norwegian humanitarian assistance, it has to a large extent to choose between the channels at its disposal in the country in question. The choice of channels and provisions can be changed, however, as a result of unforeseen events, such as floods and drought. Because the situation in the affected areas is often complex, the planning of humanitarian efforts to ensure that the humanitarian assistance is organised as effectively and holistically as possible can be challenging at times. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry states that, where the UN system has prepared consolidated appeals, the Norwegian humanitarian priorities in the country in question will largely concur with the appeal. The criteria on which the Ministry s choice of organisations is based are partly set out in writing in supplementary propositions and government memorandums. However, the Ministry points out in an interview that the criteria are only to a small extent formalised as criteria, even though they are communicated to the organisations. The Ministry nonetheless believes that the criteria contribute to raising the awareness of recipients. The criteria clarify what is required for organisations to receive funds. The use of the criteria result in Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 45

48 some organisations receiving rejections, and it is easier for the Ministry to state clear grounds for rejections. The criteria contribute to a more holistic policy in the Section for Humanitarian Affairs and a more uniform practice among executive officers in the processing of applications. The work procedures and guidelines used should be formalised to a greater extent even though they are used actively today. This is important, not least, with respect to institutional learning. The criteria are relatively clear and, according to the Ministry, they could therefore be better communicated externally and internally. As shown above, there are a large number of recipients (organisations) of Norwegian humanitarian aid. The Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory states in interviews that it would like a more critical review of the support given to the Norwegian organisations in the area, both in short-term and long-term aid. Large sums are involved in humanitarian assistance and interest from humanitarian organisations is great. The risk of duplicating the humanitarian effort is therefore high. Norad plans to instigate a review of this kind during According to the embassy in Uganda, a review will also be carried out there to assess whether support should be given to as many organisations as at present and whether the support that is given to the different organisations is in accordance with Norwegian goals and priorities. The thematic focus areas and work on humanitarian policy The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises humanitarian policy work and work within the international humanitarian system (see also Text Box 2). Norway takes part in various forums, and, according to the missions in Geneva and New York, these forums are used to further Norwegian priorities. The missions take part in various processes, forums and coordination meetings in addition to being represented on boards and formal and informal groups in the UN agencies. Examples of such groups are OCHA s donor support groups in New York and Geneva, the executive committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross s (ICRC) donor support group. The Ministry also participates in various annual forums and meetings. Text Box 2 Themes in humanitarian policy work Resolution 1325 / the gender perspective: The Government has adopted a separate action plan in order to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, which, among other things, entails contributing to greater integration of the gender perspective into humanitarian efforts. 72 As part of the implementation of this plan, the Section for Humanitarian Affairs has set requirements for the organisations for integration of the gender perspective in all projects and for reporting on this issue. The gender perspective is also incorporated into the guidelines for project support. 73 The Ministry states that the requirement is reflected in all follow-up on the Ministry s part. Moreover, the requirement will often be emphasised at meetings and during field visits. Landmines / cluster munitions: Norway and Norwegian authorities played an active role in the negotiation of the Landmine Convention that was signed in Since its signing, Norway has been a driving force in the work on implementing the convention. In addition to supporting landmine clearance and measures to help the victims of landmines, Norway has also continued the work to create global acceptance for the provisions of the Landmine Convention. 74 Since 2001, Norway has also worked actively internationally to develop effective measures against cluster munitions. Until 2006, this work was conducted within the framework of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW), but, since then, Norway has started a new process that aims to arrive at an international agreement prohibiting the use of the kind of cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences. As a first step, Norwegian authorities organised an international conference in Oslo in 2007 that resulted in the Oslo Declaration on Cluster Munitions. 75 In Dublin on 30 May 2008, 111 states acceded to an agreement that totally prohibits cluster munitions that have unacceptable humanitarian consequences. Humanitarian reform: In recent years, the UN has started a process that aims to reform the international humanitarian system. Central measures in the reform include strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator s role, ensuring more predictable financing, ensuring a swifter response and better coordination in the field, and strengthening partnerships with NGOs and other external players. The Norwegian mission to the UN in Geneva states in an interview that the mission s work on the humanitarian reform has been very important to the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and that a large part of Norway s humanitarian effort concerns reform work. In that connection, Norway contributes both financially and with expertise in specific areas. 46 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

49 The mission in New York points out that, in the financial context, Norway was, among other things, actively involved in the establishment of the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Civil-military coordination: Norway wishes to ensure as clear a division of roles as possible between humanitarian and military efforts in international operations. It is assumed that the fundamental principles of neutrality and impartiality will be respected in ongoing civil-military coordination. 76 Norway s efforts in this area have been reflected, among other things, in its hosting of the two Oslo conferences in 1994 and 2006 at which the so-called Oslo guidelines for the use of military and civil defence materiel in connection with natural disasters were adopted for the first time and later updated, respectively. Prevention: Prevention has not been specifically mentioned as a focus area in the interviews with players outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters was presented in autumn The aim of the report is to outline an overall policy for how Norway shall contribute to the prevention of humanitarian disasters In interviews, the international organisations in Geneva and New York largely describe their relationship to Norway as good, and they point to good cooperation with the Norwegian missions. They also refer to the fact that Norway plays an active role in the international humanitarian system. UNICEF points out the same in an interview, but it says at the same time that the scope of Norwegian activity varies from country to country, depending on the personal commitment of the executive officers responsible and the embassy in question. Follow-up of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and the integration of the gender perspective is a main focus area in Norwegian humanitarian assistance (see Text Box 3 for examples). It is also this theme that was most often mentioned in 72) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006): The Government s action plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. 73) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): The progress report on the Government s action plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. 74) Norway and the Mine Ban Convention, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75) The Norwegian Government's initiative for a ban on cluster munitions Questions and answers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 76) Humanitære kriser: bakgrunn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the field and interview surveys as an important Norwegian focus area. In addition, in the interview survey, the international organisations point to several examples of Norway s humanitarian work: Norway s role with respect to supporting and strengthening peace efforts, Norwegian support for the work on international humanitarian law, Norway as one of the biggest financial contributors to the cluster approach and the Norwegian efforts relating to civil-military coordination. Text Box 3 Examples of Norway s emphasis on the gender perspective According to OCHA, the gender perspective and implementation of resolution 1325 are among the thematic focus areas in which the Norwegian authorities have maintained the highest profile in recent years, and where Norway has been an important supporter of the organisation. This has been manifested, among other things, in earmarked allocations for OCHA s work in this area. IASC s Gender Standby Capacity GenCap which is administered by the Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, is largely financed by the Norwegian authorities. GenCap consists of a number of senior experts who are posted to humanitarian crises in order to assist IASC s country teams in integrating gender equality and measures against gender-based violence into all areas of the humanitarian effort. As another example in this context, OCHA points to the interactive learning programme for humanitarian aid workers about integration of the gender perspective in humanitarian organisations, for whose development the Norwegian authorities provided financial support. Norway has also contributed to integrating the gender perspective in the UNDAC system, i.e. OCHA s standby scheme whereby teams can be sent at short notice during the initial phase of humanitarian disasters to analyse the situation and map needs. There has been a lack of focus on the gender perspective in this context. Norway receives general recognition for its thematic initiatives, both among Norwegian NGOs and among international humanitarian organisations. However, some of the humanitarian players emphasise at the same time that it can sometimes be challenging to translate and integrate the Norwegian goals into concrete measures. In interviews, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that a gap sometimes arises between what is desirable and what is possible in practice as regards operationalising the gender Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 47

50 perspective and other focus areas in concrete activities. The following are examples of corresponding views that emerged during the interview surveys: As regards promoting cross-sector considerations such as the gender and environmental perspectives, developments so far have progressed most at the general level. So far, the view is that sufficient support has not been given by the donors to implement such considerations in practice, i.e. at project level. There is a gap between the needs of the recipients and the donor countries emphasis on the gender perspective, good governance and sustainability. The emphasis on these considerations results in applications often being characterised by fine words, and in the goals being too lofty and unrealistic. Moreover, this can lead to reporting being pro forma. It is not always easy to implement the gender perspective in practice. Many organisations deliberately word both applications and reports in such a manner that the gender perspective appears to be more in focus than it actually is. As regards the UN in particular, the mission to the UN in New York, for example, points out in an interview that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) still has problems integrating the gender perspective into its work, despite the efforts made in recent years. This applies in particular to work in the field. UNICEF also confirms in an interview that there are challenges in this area. On a general basis, UNICEF believes that the gender perspective is being ignored by most UN agencies and NGOs in their humanitarian efforts. According to UNICEF, the absence of focus on this perspective, for example during the humanitarian effort in connection with the earthquake in Pakistan, was striking, and its own organisation was no exception. In the progress report on the government s action plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, it is pointed out that measuring the effect of the measures is a major challenge and that it is difficult to assess the degree to which the efforts contribute to better living conditions for people in war and conflict. At the same time, however, it is pointed out that there are some individual examples that have made a difference and there is a more conscious overall approach to the situation of women and men, boys and girls in war, conflicts and peace processes. 77 In the interview survey at the Ministry, it also emerges that it can be difficult to operationalise the overriding and cross-sector goals for the humanitarian efforts. This makes it generally difficult to measure concrete results at project level. The cross-sector goals are seldom specifically linked to the projects, and it is only with respect to the gender perspective that the Ministry requires concrete reporting. Nonetheless, the Ministry believes that the work on these issues at overriding level produces results at field level. A great deal of the Norwegian effort in this area is about contributing to raising awareness. As regards integration of the gender perspective, the Ministry refers in its letter to the fact that the Norwegian efforts have had considerable impact. The Ministry does not find it surprising that this has created challenges for the organisations with respect to follow-up in practice. The Ministry points out that it is in continuous dialogue with a number of organisations about how this can be implemented, but it also states that it will largely be up to the organisations to put it into practice. 4.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocation of funds to humanitarian crises This sub-chapter deals with the Ministry s processing of applications when allocating funds to humanitarian crises. Firstly, applications for humanitarian funds are described, thereafter the Ministry s work in that connection. When awarding grants to aid projects, Norway as donor is responsible for assessing whether the project proposals prepared by the recipient are in accordance with Norwegian development policy, including whether they satisfy fundamental quality requirements, are realistic and have clear and measurable goals. 78 For all applications for funds for humanitarian efforts, the Ministry shall carry out an individual assessment of the individual initiative which funding is applied for. 79 Pursuant to the Ministry s guidelines, when processing applications, the Ministry shall assess the 77) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007): The progress report on the Government s action plan for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, p ) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together, p. 191, cf. Recommendation No 93 to the Storting ( ). 79) The basis for the Ministry s consideration of applications is proposition No 1 to the Storting, the annual allocation memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the strategy or policy for humanitarian efforts in the geographical area in question. 48 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

51 specific humanitarian needs in the geographical area, the connection between humanitarian efforts and peace and reconciliation processes, whether the project fits the coordinated effort in the area in question, and whether it is in accordance with Norway s overall goal for what it wishes to achieve. The Ministry s experience and knowledge of the organisation, the costs of the project and the organisation s implementation capability shall also be assessed Applications for humanitarian grants Preparing applications The guidelines for the Ministry s processing of application for grants under Chapter 163 stipulate requirements for what the application should contain (see Text Box 4). The guidelines were updated in autumn Text Box 4 Requirements for the contents of applications The humanitarian / political / human rights situation in the area in question. A description of the goal for the project. A description of the target group or groups for the project. A description of the planned results of the project. A description of the planned activities and schedule for implementation. A description of external and internal risk factors that could influence the project s goal and planned results, and how these risk factors will be dealt with. A description and assessment of local partners, where relevant. Plans for coordination with other players, including UN agencies and cooperation with local players. A description of how the project includes a gender perspective (cf. for example Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and IASC s action plan (Gender handbook in Humanitarian Action)) and how the project takes account of children and young people s needs (cf. Security Council Resolution 1612 on the role of children and young people in conflicts). Other contributions to the project or related projects must also be reflected in the application (transparency). A budget for the activities for which support is being applied for. Most Norwegian humanitarian aid is awarded as grants based on applications prepared by UN agencies and NGOs. The applications are based 80) Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for handling of grants under Chapter 163 and Chapter item on planning by the organisations. The foundations of good effectiveness in humanitarian aid, as with other kinds of aid, are laid in the planning. Time for planning can be scarce in humanitarian aid, but the foundation for how successful the efforts will be is laid during the first phase of the crisis. This applies to both acute and enduring humanitarian crises. In the planning, the humanitarian needs are identified, goals are set for the efforts, planned results are stipulated, means and activities identified, and performance goals and indicators are defined that can be monitored underway and after the conclusion of the efforts. Norwegian grants to UN agencies are largely given in response to humanitarian appeals coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These appeals are also deemed to be requests for funds. However, UN agencies and other multilateral organisations also submit applications for support for individual projects, parts of programmes and for food, materials, equipment etc. These individual applications contain less information than applications from NGOs as regards the project, goals and planned results. Most of the grants given to NGOs are awarded to Norwegian organisations. Most of the organisations have their headquarters in Oslo, and all the big organisations have one or more offices in the countries in which they run humanitarian activities. In addition, grants are given to partners on whose behalf the organisations in Norway often submit applications. Moreover, several of the Norwegian organisations are also part of international alliances, and they may submit applications on behalf of the alliance or sister organisations in other countries. All the organisations emphasise that their applications are based on assessments and analyses of needs. It emerges from the interviews with the organisations that how they work on preparing applications varies, based on each organisation s distinctive characteristics and whether it is a member of an alliance etc. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council is usually the implementing organisation and it therefore normally prepares applications itself. The Norwegian Refugee Council states in an interview that it endeavours as far as possible to ensure that applications are prepared in the areas where the people in need actually are, while the head office in Oslo has a support and control function. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 49

52 CARE Norway is an example of an organisation that is part of a larger alliance. CARE therefore receives applications and appeals from other parts of the CARE organisation. CARE states in interviews that these applications and appeals are quality assured by CARE Norway before being submitted to the Ministry, among other things by assessing applications received in relation to Norwegian goals. Norwegian Church Aid is also part of an alliance 81 and it often applies for funds from the Ministry on behalf of its local partners and/or for actions in which it is operational itself. Norwegian Church Aid states in an interview that all applications are reviewed at the office in Oslo before being forwarded to the Ministry. Cooperation with the Ministry is based on trust in the quality assurance carried out by the organisation of the local partners applications, and on the Ministry s experience of the parties. In the interview survey, the Ministry points out that it is important, in cases where they cooperate with partner organisations, that the Norwegian organisations do not just become mail boxes for applications that are forwarded to the Ministry. It is stressed that cooperation with local players is important, but the Ministry does find on occasion that the organisations merely rubber stamp applications before forwarding them to the Ministry. If the Ministry requests more information about applications, the organisations are often unable to provide it. The Ministry states that it has a dialogue with the organisations about this and that it will tighten its requirements in this respect. Contents of applications Applications and projects are designed to meet fundamental needs in humanitarian crises based on the organisations assessment of the humanitarian situation and actual needs. However, it is demanding to carry out good needs assessments that identify all humanitarian needs among different groups in large geographical areas. Chapter 5.5 provides examples of this. The project review shows that the applications from the organisations only address the problem of lack of overview of the situation and needs to a small extent. The question of how to deal with such a lack of overview in projects is also only raised to a small extent. The projects goals and performance indicators Based on the identified needs, the projects shall have clearly defined goals that form the basis for the management and monitoring of goal achieve- 81) Action of Churches Together (ACT). ment. The projects shall be planned to include activities and resources in such a manner that the goals can be achieved. This means that the goals must be realistic within the existing framework. In Document No 1 ( ), the Office of the Auditor General pointed out that the applications from the organisations for funds under Chapter 163 varied greatly in quality and that in several cases they did not contain satisfactory goals and performance indicators. The Ministry did not disagree with this and referred in its answer to the fact that the work on improving the quality of applications is a continuous process. 82 The project review also shows that, in many cases, the applications lack performance indicators and information about which specific activities will contribute to achieving the goals set for the projects (see the example in Text Box 5). In the interview survey of Norwegian organisations, some of the organisations emphasise that the applications can be too focused on measures and that it can be a challenge to identify goal definitions that are easy to measure, enabling the results to be subsequently reported. Text Box 5 Example of the lack of performance indicators in an application Norwegian People s Aid: Mine clearance programme in Southern Sudan The goals for the programme are the opening of roads and other infrastructure, the safe return and integration of internally displaced persons and refugees, a reduction in the number of accidents resulting from landmines, access to cultivable land and the securing of a sustainable subsistence system for the local population. The application describes the expected goal achievement in the short and long term, and general effects of the programme. The indicators used include: The national authorities must be able to tackle the country s problems with landmines. Previously assumed landmine-infested areas shall be freed up. Improved conditions for the UN to coordinate landmine operations and structured and purposeful cooperation between road builders and NGOs on various tasks in Southern Sudan. The development of new methods for reducing the risk in order to improve the impact and cost-efficiency. Monthly reports. Meetings with stakeholders. 82) Document No 1 for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( ). 50 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

53 In the interview survey at the Ministry, it was stated that application for humanitarian funds under Chapter 163 can contain omissions, and that the Ministry finds it necessary in many cases to request more information about the project from the applicant. The Ministry also points out that the applications are often poor as regards performance indicators. According to the Ministry, in some cases, a large proportion of an application consists of a general description of the situation, while concrete measures to be initiated by the applicant can be more diffuse. Another challenge mentioned by the Ministry in the interview survey is that the projects and goals are often overly ambitious. Some of the organisations should be more realistic in their planning. It is also stated in the interview survey of the Norwegian organisations and in the field surveys that the goals set for the projects are ambitious and that it is not always realistic to achieve them within the applicable framework or through the planned activities. As shown above, it is pointed out that the applications often contain fine words and that the applicants know what is required to obtain support for the projects. For example, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) / Norwegian Refugee Council in Geneva states in an interview that unrealistic requirements are set at times that all the applicable goals shall be integrated into projects that receive Norwegian support. Applications, letters of grant commitment and reports are therefore often written in a way that reflects the overriding goals in the area. However, these descriptions do not necessarily provide a correct picture of the realities, which contributes to reducing the learning effect. The project review confirms that several of the projects have ambitiously formulated goals relating to overriding objectives, such as peace and reconciliation, human rights etc. given the limits defined by the grant and the framework within which the project is to be implemented (see the example in Text Box 6). In several cases, it is not clearly described how the concrete activities will contribute to achievement of the goals. Norwegian People's Aid's Mine Action Programme in Southern Sudan. Photo: Kjell Kristian Dørum Text Box 6 Ambitiously formulated goals in relation to the framework for the project The goal of CARE s project Empowerment of women for lasting peace and reconciliation in Uganda is to build capacity among women leaders at the local, regional and national levels to enable them to take part in the peace and reconciliation process. The goal is to raise 110 women s competence and capacity to enable them to participate actively in conflict resolution processes and peace work at the local, regional and national levels. The activities include mobilising women and men around UN Security resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, training in peace-building and advocacy work, and information campaigns aimed at increased participation by women in the peace process. According to the application, the activities will be carried out and the goals achieved in a 12-month period. In the field survey, it emerged that CARE believes that a time horizon of several years and several similar projects are necessary if the goals for capacity-building, raising awareness and changing attitudes in Ugandan society are to be attained. Moreover, it emerged that CARE regards the project as a pilot, and that it wishes to test the sustainability of the various sub-activities with a view to continuing the activities that work in future NORAD-supported aid projects. The above factors were not mentioned in the application. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 51

54 In the interview survey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that an improvement in the organisations applications, reporting and focus on results, and the Ministry s own work, can help to improve goal achievement. A greater degree of detail and a more result-oriented project description in applications will make it easier to assess the concrete results of the projects, according to the Ministry. Moreover, it points to the fact that problems relating to follow-up of final reports can in part be explained by the applications not being good enough. The contents of applications partly decide the contents of the letters of grant commitment and what is to be measured in the reporting, which can often be imprecise. According to the Ministry, it is difficult to follow up the results if the needs assessments and performance indicators are insufficiently described in the applications. Quantitative goals are often sufficient in an early phase of an acute crisis, but a more qualitative focus is required in later phases. In acute situations, allocations can be granted by phone. The Ministry accepts that everything is not in place right away, but changes to projects must be documented underway if the nature of the projects changes. The Ministry states that work is being done on specifying the requirements made of the organisations. Improvement of the application process has been emphasised in recent years, but there are still challenges. The Ministry points to the fact that written guides have been produced for grant recipients about what applications should contain, that information meetings have been held with the organisations about administrative matters and that a continuous dialogue is maintained with the individual organisations. The Ministry also points out that the adjusted guidelines from autumn 2007 and the pertaining guide for grant recipients contain requirements for the contents of applications, including a description of the goals of the project, and planned results and activities. The Ministry also states that it is a requirement that more details are provided in budgets, that there is a clear connection between budgets and accounts, clear risk assessments and integration of the gender perspective. According to the Ministry, however, there is also a dilemma involved in making too stringent requirements of the organisations, and that it is a question of the extent to which the organisations should be subject to review. Risk factors that can influence a project In Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ), it is emphasised that the fundamental risk associated with humanitarian assistance means that the Ministry must ensure that its administrative system is as robust as possible. The risk is related, among other things, to the fact that assistance is often given in unclear acute situations and to unstable states. The management of risk is an important part of the management and quality assurance of the assistance. This is done by identifying risk factors, analysing effects and planning the implementation of measures. When designing a project, the recipient and donor must assess the limitations and obstacles to achieving the planned goals. 83 The project review shows that risk factors that can influence the implementation of a project and its results are only described to a small extent in applications for humanitarian funds. In cases in which the applications mention risk factors, this is often related to external factors, such as the political and military situation in the country in question. Only to a small extent do the applications describe internal risk factors, i.e. risk factors relating to the organisation s activities and the project s design, that can prevent planned goals being achieved. An example of an application in which relevant risk factors are not described is the Norwegian Refugee Council s application from 2007 for a grant for the organisation s project relating to camp management in Northern Uganda. The goal of the project is to contribute to improving protection and humanitarian conditions in camps for internally displaced persons by collecting data about the situation and coordinating activities in the camps. Achieving the goals of the project is dependent on other organisations being able to provide the services needed. An interview with the Norwegian Refugee Council in Uganda and a project visit to one of the camps showed that it is a major challenge for the project that other humanitarian players do not have the capacity to provide the help needed, or that the assistance comes too late. Neither this matter nor the unwillingness of other players to be coordinated are mentioned in the Norwegian Refugee Council s application. 84 Moreover, the project review shows that, in those cases where the risk factors are mentioned, the 83) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 84) Norwegian Refugee Council Application for support for The Norwegian Refugee Council s projects for food distribution and camp management and return monitoring in Northern Uganda in 2007, 19 January Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

55 applications very rarely contain a description of how these risks are to be handled by the project organisations. There is no evidence in the project review that the Ministry has called for an analysis of the risk factors. Several of the organisations state in the interview survey that the Ministry has not been concerned with or called for risk assessments with respect to implementation of the projects. In the interview survey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges that the applications are often not good enough as regards risk assessment. The Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory points out in an interview that it varies how much risk in connection with project implementation and results is mentioned in applications. In connection with statements on applications, there are therefore some applications that the office does not recommend supporting because potential challenges and difficulties are insufficiently described. The Ministry states in an interview that it is aware that risk assessments are important and that the Ministry also wishes the organisations to be aware of this. The organisations are therefore requested to carry out risk assessments if this is necessary and it is not mentioned in the application. During the investigation period, the Ministry has signalled at the meetings with the organisations that risk factors must be highlighted more. The Ministry states that, here, it has based itself on information that has emerged in work on the performance audit of The Effectiveness of Humanitarian Assistance to the effect that the organisations only mention risk factors to a small extent, and that in the cases where they are mentioned it is largely external risk factors that are referred to. Pursuant to the updated guidelines from 2007 and the guide for grant recipients, applications should contain a description of external and internal risk factors that could influence the project s goals and planned results, and how they are to be dealt with. The new template for final reports contains a requirement that a description be provided of how internal and external risk factors have affected the project s goals and planned results, and how this has been dealt with. In an interview, the Ministry points out that it is a dilemma how much risk should be taken in humanitarian operations. The Ministry carries out risk assessments where relevant, for example political risk assessments. The Ministry must be willing to take risks to save human lives and alleviate humanitarian suffering in connection with wars, conflicts and natural disasters. According to the Ministry, it will have a more explicit focus on risk in the time ahead. According to the Ministry, the organisations are interested in discussing a sharing of risk with the Ministry and whether it is the organisations alone that must cover any losses. In an interview, Norwegian Church Aid points out that the organisation wishes to have a greater degree of risk sharing, which could help to better highlight problems in connection with the projects. This, in turn, could result in more learning which, in the long term, can improve goal achievement in high-risk projects. Other requirements for the contents of applications In addition to a description of the needs assessments, goals, planned results and risk factors, the applications should include plans for coordination with other players, including UN agencies. Roughly two-thirds of the applications reviewed contain a description of coordination with other players. The applications shall also contain a description and assessment of local partners where this is relevant. The organisations cooperate to a large extent with local partners in various ways in their humanitarian efforts. Roughly two-thirds of the applications reviewed describe how it is planned to involve local players in the implementation phase, while only one-third mention whether local players take part in the planning phase. Only to a very small extent do applications contain information about how the beneficiaries are involved in designing the projects (see also Chapter 5.3). Moreover, the project review shows that the applications only describe to a small extent what can be expected to be the long-term results of the projects. The same applies to how the project or programme in question is to be phased out. Few projects have an exit strategy from their inception The Ministry s processing when allocating funds to humanitarian crises As already mentioned, the allocation memorandums set out the overriding guidelines for the allocation of funds. The concrete allocation to projects and organisations takes place through continuous case processing. In the interview survey, the Ministry states that time is the scarcest resource for the executive officer responsible for the country in this process. The Ministry points out that it can therefore face a difficult balance between how thorough it wishes to be in Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 53

56 the case processing and how quickly the funds can be allocated. Because it is desirable to work quickly and allocate funds swiftly, the qualitative assessments are less thorough than the Ministry would ideally like. In order to satisfy the need for speed and flexibility, the administrative procedures for the humanitarian funds have been simplified compared with other grant schemes. As shown above, Norwegian humanitarian aid is channelled to a great number of projects. The project review and field surveys show that the projects that receive support are often of limited scope. Coordination is a requirement, and the projects are required to form part of a whole. When allocating funds, the Ministry largely limits itself to the applications received, and it seldom takes the initiative in relation to the organisations with a view to instigating projects and operations. It is stated in the interview survey with the Ministry that it is rare for the thematic focus areas not to be covered by the applications. The Ministry is to a large extent dependent on the contents of the applications and the needs assessments on which they are based being correct, and in interviews it states that the system is based on trust and a continuous dialogue about humanitarian priorities and grant administration. In addition to the applications, the Ministry uses reports from foreign service missions and information from the UN. The section s and executive officers experience of the organisation is also emphasised. According to the Ministry, the quality assurance of applications is adequate, and if the Ministry notes that the needs assessments on which the applications are based are not good enough, the organisations are requested to provide additional information. The Ministry points to the fact that it is a goal to obtain the best possible assessment of the humanitarian needs within the limited time and with the limited resources available. In connection with ensuring that assistance to individual countries is part of a whole, the Ministry points to the foreign service missions role in the humanitarian area, formal and informal country teams internally in the foreign service and Norway s commitment to contributing to improved response capacity, including the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), common humanitarian funds and the cluster approach. Dialogue with the organisations during processing of the applications The interview survey shows that the organisations experiences of the Ministry as regards the processing of applications vary. It is pointed out that there is often a dialogue between the Ministry and the organisations before an application is sent. Médicins Sans Frontières states in an interview that the Ministry does not provide feedback on the applications themselves, but that there is often an informal dialogue between the Ministry and the organisations in advance of applications being submitted in order to establish whether it is possible to receive support for the project in question. Norwegian Church Aid states in an interview that, in the case of enduring crises, the organisation may have a lengthy dialogue with the Ministry about how the assistance will be organised in order to ensure good results. However, some organisations point to the fact that this varies from one executive officer to another as regards the assessment of applications. CARE, for example, states in an interview that the executive officer in the Ministry sometimes follows up an application, for example by asking questions about how results are to be measured, and sometimes by requesting further information. CARE also states that, when an application is rejected, the financial priorities are often referred to and that a more detailed explanation is rarely given for why the application is not given priority. At the same time, however, CARE points out that the Ministry s assessments are better today than they were a few years ago. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms in an interview that there is a dialogue between the organisations and the Ministry before applications are submitted and during case processing. According to the Ministry, this close and informal contact means that the organisations are an important source of information and discussion partner. The dialogue in advance of applications is used, among other things, to clarify what may be worthy of support. Most applications that are actually submitted will therefore be granted. However, the volume of applications exceeds the available funds, and the projects often do not receive as much support as they apply for. In such case, the organisations must adjust their applications, prioritise within the new limits and send a revised budget. There are examples of the Ministry, for instance as regards support for Afghanistan, withholding funds until a revised application and budget have been received from 54 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

57 the organisation. This does not happen in acute crises. In a letter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that there may be many natural reasons for why the organisations experience varies in connection with the Ministry s processing of applications and executive officers assessments of applications, including variation in the quality of the organisations applications. Dialogue within the foreign service during processing of the applications Norwegian humanitarian assistance covers very many sectors, for example health, education, agriculture, operation of refugee camps, food, repatriation, water and sanitary facilities, and each project must be assessed separately. This work often concerns large and complex issues that involve several departments in the Ministry. The Ministry states in an interview that coordination is demanding. In an interview, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that applications for funds from Chapter 163 are distributed for informal consultation to the foreign service missions, Norad and involved departments in the Ministry. The project review shows that it is documented for roughly one-third of the projects that the Ministry has a dialogue with the foreign service missions, other departments in the Ministry and/or Norad. However, the review shows that no reply is received to queries in many cases. As regards Norad, the Ministry points out in an interview that Norad does not have a system for handling case processing. Norad is therefore not used systematically when processing humanitarian projects, but is used as required. The Ministry states that Norad can supplement the section s executive officers in connection certain professional issues. Norad will be able to assist in professional and system questions. In some cases, Norad will also be relevant as regards participation in the different country teams. The Ministry states that it has more and more extensive contacts with Norad about humanitarian issues. These include work on evaluations and project reviews, and work on the humanitarian strategy. Moreover, it is mentioned that Norad wishes to make a greater contribution to the humanitarian field and that it needs to develop its expertise in this area. The project review also shows that the degree to which the foreign service missions are involved varies from country to country, which means that the degree to which executive officers obtain assessments from the foreign service missions also varies. This is confirmed in the interview survey of the organisations. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry points out that there can be many natural reasons for the variation in the foreign service missions involvement, including factors relating to the situation in the country and the foreign service mission. At the same time, however, the Ministry points out that the foreign service missions are becoming more and more closely involved in the administration of humanitarian assistance, and that this helps to provide the Ministry with a better basis for its decisions. In an interview, the Ministry states that it finds it useful to receive feedback from members of staff who are in close contact with projects for which funds are applied for, although the extent to which those who receive applications for consultation actually respond varies. The foreign service missions act as listening stations for the Ministry. The Ministry therefore wishes to continue sending applications for consultation, even though this is not formally required. In more acute situations, the applications are not sent for consultation for reasons of time. All the foreign service missions interviewed confirm in the interview survey that they are involved in the processing of applications for support for humanitarian projects and programmes through the Ministry presenting applications and appeals to the missions for assessment and an opinion. It is emphasised, however, that the missions do not have administrative responsibility for humanitarian assistance and that they therefore have to give less priority to this work because of the resource situation. For Southern Sudan, it is the Consulate General in Juba that receives applications for humanitarian funds for consultation, while the embassy in Sudan (Khartoum) receives them for other parts of the country. The Norwegian Consulate General states that it responds to consultation requests if it has the capacity to do so. According to the embassy, there is no communication between the embassy and the Consulate General on humanitarian matters. In an interview, the embassy in Sudan states that it has a relatively peripheral role as regards the overriding goals and priorities of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to Sudan. The embassy Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 55

58 states that it has good cooperation with the Section for Humanitarian Affairs, but it believes that the requests could be more limited and precise with respect to what the section wishes feedback on. Moreover, the deadlines for responding are often short. This makes it difficult to carry out a thorough and well thought-out assessment of the applications. The feedback to the Ministry is often based on second-hand information. It is demanding in terms of resources to obtain the views and assessments of other players about applications that are to be processed. In the embassy s view, the solution to the problem could be to increase case processing capacity. In the embassy s view, receiving several applications for assessment at one time could also make it easier to carry out an overall assessment and prioritise between different projects, and it would simplify case processing. At present, the embassy receives each application individually as they are processed by the Ministry. The Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory states in an interview that is has good, ongoing contact with the Ministry by and telephone and that the contact with the Ministry in connection with the processing of specific applications for humanitarian projects is good. In that connection, the office believes that the Section for Humanitarian Affairs is better than several other sections in the Ministry at clarifying its views and priorities. The embassy in Uganda maintains in an interview that it sees it as an advantage that it administers its own portfolio of aid projects when providing the Ministry with input and assessments in connection with applications for funds under Chapter 163. When obtaining information about these projects, it will to a certain extent also be able to obtain information about humanitarian projects. However, this is only the case to a limited extent because of the resource situation at the embassy. According to the embassy, its comparative advantages, i.e. presence and proximity, are therefore not utilised in the humanitarian assistance context. The embassy tells the Ministry in cases where it has an insufficient overview to be able to state an opinion or if it does not have information about whether there are risks associated with various aspects of the projects applied for. The embassy does not receive final reports from humanitarian projects. The embassy cannot, therefore, make use of such reports when new applications are to be assessed. Moreover, it would require a lot of work to review them. In the interview survey, the missions in Geneva and New York also emphasise that they are consultative bodies in connection with Ministry s allocations. This applies to projects and appeals from the organisations in the two cities. The mission in New York emphasises that the flow of cash and the work on UN appeals primarily takes place in Geneva. The mission in New York is not very involved in this work and it seldom carries out assessments of appeals because of a lack of resources. In an interview, the Ministry states that the foreign service missions have a key role in the administration that also involves assessing applications. The degree to which the missions are involved varies, however, with local conditions and the embassy s capacity. The foreign service missions specific country expertise is important to the Ministry. Clarification of the assessments of the applications Previously, in Document No 1, the Office of the Auditor General has pointed out deficiencies in the Ministry s documentation of the basis for decisions in connection with the allocation of grants under Chapter The Storting found this to be deserving of criticism and pointed out that the controlling authority must be able to assess the transactions carried out. 86 The project review shows that, in 15 per cent of the grants investigated, there is a separate document showing the basis for the decision to award a grant in addition to the letter of grant commitment (see table 6). Table 6 Proportion of grants where a separate document exists containing the basis for the decision (N=233) Document containing decision basis exists Document containing decision basis does not exist Proportion of grants 15% 85% Source: The project / grant review 85) Document No 1 ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ). 86) Recommendation No 145 to the Storting ( ) and Recommendation No 114 to the Storting ( ). 56 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

59 However, the project review shows that, to a somewhat greater extent than previously, the letters of grant commitment clarify the basis for the decision. The letters only refer to a small extent to the Ministry s own assessments and largely refer to the wording in the applications. The letters are used to point out that account must be taken of the gender perspective and that it must be reported on. The importance of coordinating efforts with other organisations is also often emphasised. Furthermore, the project review shows that the Ministry to a somewhat greater extent presents the grounds for its decisions in its endorsements of the letters of grant commitment. The project review also shows that there are deficiencies as regards documents in the project folders. Central documents are lacking from some project folders, such as applications and letters of grant commitment. In an interview, the Ministry states that it endeavours to document in writing the most important milestones in its contact with the organisations, but it also points to the fact that the large amount of information involved and close contact with the organisations and the rest of the foreign service place clear limits on this. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the degree of documentation and written procedures must be weighed against the need to act quickly. 4.4 Assessments The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for humanitarian assistance being in accordance with the goals set out in the decisions and premises of the Storting, which means, among other things, that goals and performance requirements must be met, that the use of resources must be efficient and that sufficient management information and an adequate decision basis must be ensured. 87 Guiding principles and priorities Norwegian humanitarian aid is spread between a large number of countries, recipients and focus areas. However, there is no overall, overriding strategy for Norwegian humanitarian assistance collected in one document. The OECD s peer review of Norwegian aid from 2005 confirms that the absence of an overriding strategy makes it difficult to assess how Norway prioritises human- 87) This is in accordance with the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 1. itarian assistance and ensure that it complies with the humanitarian principles. However, the Ministry has realised that it is necessary to draw up a humanitarian strategy, and it started work on such a strategy during the investigation period. The investigation shows that several Norwegian NGOs experience that the priorities on which Norwegian humanitarian assistance are based change and that the Ministry is not always sufficiently clear in communicating the priorities to the organisations. This can result in unpredictability for the organisations and for the foreign service s own work. Moreover, examples were uncovered in which it may be unclear what the strategic priorities are in Norwegian humanitarian assistance in the countries that receive assistance, and what role the Norwegian organisations are intended to have. Work on humanitarian policy is emphasised in Norwegian humanitarian assistance in order to contribute to effective humanitarian assistance. Norway receives recognition for this work from the UN, Red Cross and the NGOs. This applies, among other things, to Norway s efforts in the work on humanitarian reform, landmines and cluster munitions, civi-military coordination and integration of the gender perspective. These have been important focus areas for Norway. However, the investigation shows that it can be difficult for the organisations to translate overriding political goals into concrete measures, for example integration of the gender perspective. The Ministry s case processing when allocating funds to humanitarian crises In the case of grants to aid projects, Norway as a donor has a responsibility for assessing whether project proposals are in accordance with Norwegian humanitarian policy, including whether they satisfy fundamental quality requirements, are realistic and have clear and measurable performance requirements. 88 The applications for grants from the NGOs form a central part of the decision basis when allocating funds in connection with humanitarian crises. In addition, information from other areas of the dialogue with the organisations, from dialogue with the UN, Norad and the foreign service missions and the Ministry s experience of the organisations are also part of the basis for decisions. The investigation shows that the Ministry has initiated measures to improve the quality of applications. 88) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together, cf. Recommendation No 93 to the Storting ( ). Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 57

60 Both the project review and the interview survey show weaknesses in applications for grants, and thus in the basis for the Ministry s decisions. The humanitarian projects must have clearly defined realistic goals that form the basis for management and follow-up. However, both the project review and the interviews show that, in some cases, applications lack adequate performance indicators and descriptions of how the concrete activities will contribute to achieving the goals defined for the projects. The investigation also shows that, in some cases, the projects goals are overly ambitious and not always realistic in relation to the limits on the projects. The weaknesses found make quality assurance difficult both during and after completion of the projects because the results are difficult to measure. It can be questioned whether the Ministry takes adequate steps to ensure that the applications and the projects have realistic goals and performance requirements, given the limited resources available. Risk management is an important part of the management and quality assurance of the assistance and the projects that receive funding. When designing projects, the recipients (the organisations) and the donor (the Ministry) shall consider the limitations and obstacles to achieving the planned goals. 89 However, the investigation shows that only to a small extent do the applications contain a description of the risk factors involved in the humanitarian efforts and how the organisations plan to handle them, which can entail a risk of reduced goal achievement and efficiency. In light of this, it can be questioned whether the Ministry has made the importance of this sufficiently clear to the organisations. The scope of the humanitarian assistance and the complexity involved as regards geography, recipients and sectors mean that great competence is required in the case processing and in the expert assessments of the applications. The investigation shows that the Ministry has sent applications to the foreign service missions and Norad for their opinion to an increasing extent. However, the investigation shows that it varies to what extent the foreign service missions or Norad respond or are qualified to submit a response. The foreign service missions have few resources to carry out a thorough assessment of the applications, and work on humanitarian assistance is not given priority. The Ministry does not use Norad systematically in its case processing. In light of the findings of the investigation, it can be questioned whether the Ministry in its allocation of humanitarian funds ensures an adequate basis for its decisions by quality assuring the applications and obtaining statements from foreign service missions. Moreover, it can also be questioned whether the Ministry gives adequate consideration to whether the projects fit in with the overall coordinated efforts in the country in question. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall carry out an individual assessment of all projects which apply for a grant, assessing, among other things, the humanitarian needs, whether the project fits in with the coordinated efforts and whether it is in accordance with Norwegian objectives. A large number of applications for grants are considered every year, and the Ministry emphasises that the qualitative assessments are less thorough than desirable. The investigation shows that scarcity of time and resources has consequences for how thoroughly applications are assessed by the Ministry and for its quality assurance. Moreover, the Ministry must weigh the thoroughness of its case processing against the desire for speedy case processing in that connection and the allocation of grants. 89) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 58 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

61 5 To what extent is Norwegian humanitarian assistance timely, effective and of good quality? Humanitarian assistance is intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and natural disasters. Norwegian humanitarian assistance shall be timely, effective and of good quality. This chapter sheds light on this by assessing whether the goals for Norwegian humanitarian assistance are achieved as regards financing, coordination, local involvement and the link between humanitarian assistance and more long-term assistance. These are important preconditions for achieving the main goal of saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity. Concrete examples are included throughout the chapter to illustrate how these factors influence the final outcome of humanitarian efforts. As previously explained, this chapter will not examine goal achievement and the efficiency of Norwegian humanitarian assistance in relation to individual countries, organisations or projects. Nor, therefore, will this chapter elaborate on the results of Norwegian humanitarian assistance at this level. The introduction to the chapter discusses the financing of humanitarian assistance. Chapters 5.2 and 5.3 shed light on the coordination of humanitarian efforts and the involvement of local players, respectively. Chapter 5.4 deals with the link between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development. Finally, we look into how humanitarian assistance is adapted to the needs, and what information is available on the impact of humanitarian efforts. 5.1 Financing of humanitarian assistance The humanitarian organisations, both NGOs and UN agencies, are dependent on donor funding in order to run their activities. According to the principles of good humanitarian donorship, financing must be predictable, flexible and timely. This is important to the organisations and to the efficiency and goal achievement of humanitarian efforts. In the following, the emphasis will be on the Norwegian financing model for humanitarian assistance and how UN agencies and NGOs perceive it. The timing of financing and the one-year time frame for humanitarian efforts are discussed. Thereafter, certain financing mechanisms that Norway helps to fund via the UN are reviewed: the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the UN Common Humanitarian Fund. Firstly, however, an overview of the global financing of humanitarian assistance Global financing of humanitarian assistance Humanitarian aid has increased considerably in recent years. In 2006, the total humanitarian aid from the 23 countries that are members of OECD s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 90 amounted to approx. USD 8.9 billion, which was nine per cent of the total official development assistance. 91 Total global humanitarian aid in 2006 is estimated at approx. USD 14 billion. This includes aid from private donors and countries that are not members of OECD-DAC. Africa received most humanitarian aid in 2006 (46 per cent), while Sudan was the individual country that received most aid (USD 1.2 billion). The Palestinian Territory and Pakistan came second. 92 Many players are involved in humanitarian work, and the humanitarian funds can be channelled through several organisations before the assistance reaches its beneficiaries. Funds from donor countries are mainly channelled through the UN agencies, the Red Cross system and NGOs. A large proportion of the funds that are channelled via the UN are passed on to NGOs, which are often those who actually implement activities. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has particular responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian players and for humanitarian financing. The UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was established in 1992 as part of the efforts to improve the humanitarian system. The system was developed by the humanitarian community to plan, raise funds, implement and monitor the activities. Every year, the UN launches appeals for some of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. These are both enduring crises and acute crises that arise. An appeal (CAP) consists of both a strategy for humanitarian response in a country or a region 93 90) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 91) Official Development Assistance (ODA). 92) Development Initatives (2008): Global Humanitarian Assistance. 93) CHAP: the Common Humanitarian Action Plan. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 59

62 and an overview of humanitarian projects. The appeal acts as a planning and coordination mechanism, and is managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Many countries receive humanitarian assistance in connection with acute natural disasters or enduring complex humanitarian crises. The degree to which a humanitarian crisis attracts the attention of the media, donors or humanitarian players varies. OCHA states in an interview that, despite the increase in humanitarian aid, there is not enough global funding to cover all humanitarian needs. The NGOs and the UN therefore rarely have sufficient funds to carry out all planned activities and efforts. There is no one recognised way of measuring the humanitarian needs that can be used as the basis for humanitarian work and the allocation of funds. The financial coverage of the UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) can illustrate this. The total financial coverage of projects included in the UN appeals gives an impression of the situation. The appeals are not 100 per cent covered, which means that not all projects and activities can be implemented. There is a relatively high degree of variation between different appeals in terms of their degree of financial coverage (see Text Box 7). The coverage varies between 56 and 99 per cent. The total coverage for all the appeals was 72 per cent. 94 Text Box 7 Financial coverage of UN appeals (CAP) in 2007 The five appeals with highest coverage 1. Chad: 99% 2. Sudan: 82% 3. Somalia: 81% 4. Uganda: 80% Burundi: 80% Source: Financial Tracking Service 95 The five appeals with lowest coverage 1. West Africa: 56% 2. Ivory Coast: 57% 3. Zimbabwe: 58% 4. Republic of Congo: 60% 5. DR Congo 66% The degree of coverage of humanitarian needs also varies between clusters. The needs in connection with humanitarian crises are very complex, and change from phase to phase of crises. Table 7 shows how the clusters were covered in the UN appeals for Figures are also presented for the three countries where field visits were carried out. The table shows significant variation between clusters in terms of the degree to which they are financially covered by donor countries. The figures also show significant variation between Uganda, Sudan and the Palestinian Territory in the different clusters. In the global context, food aid is by far the largest cluster in financial terms and among the clusters with the best coverage (88 per cent). Mine action achieved more than 100 per cent coverage. Economic reconstruction and infrastructure, however, is among the clusters Table 7 Financial coverage of the UN appeals (CAP) in 2007 by cluster Cluster Total Uganda Sudan The Pal. Territory Agriculture 49% 74% - 47% Coordination and support services 73% 56% 96% 109% Economic recovery and infrastructure 29% 36% 14% 35% Education 38% 24% 54% 84% Food 88% 104% 79% 101% Health 47% 45% 47% 70% Mine action 109% 34% 105% - Multi-sector humanitarian efforts 80% 100% 29% 100% Protection, human rights, rule of law 36% 74% 35% 66% Safety and security of staff and operations 21% Sector not yet specified 5,6% Shelter and non-food items 40% 71% 32% 18% Water and sanitation 42% 67% 52% 15% Total 72% 80% 82% 64% Source: Financial Tracking Service 94) The flash appeals issued during the year in connection with acute natural disasters achieve less financial coverage than the ordinary appeals. Source of the figures: FTS. 95) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), which is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is a global database that continuously registers all international humanitarian aid reported to OCHA. This includes aid given to the UN, voluntary organisations and the Red Cross / Red Crescent movement, bilateral aid, goods and services and private donations. The database receives all its data from donors or from the organisations that receive the aid. 60 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

63 Figure 1 Total humanitarian aid broken down by the ten largest donors (2006), in USD million USA EU United Kingdom Germany Sweden Norway Spain Canada France Denmark with the poorest global coverage, also in the three selected countries. Reconstruction and infrastructure are particularly important in countries in a transitional phase between humanitarian crisis and more long-term development, such as Sudan and Uganda. In Sudan, for example, the coverage for this cluster is only 14 per cent. It is confirmed in the interview and field surveys that it is difficult for the organisations to obtain funds for these activities (cf. Chapter 5.4) Norway as a donor USA is by far the largest donor country in terms of humanitarian aid. As shown in figure 1, Norway was the sixth largest donor country, with approx. USD 380 million in Norway is among the countries that give the largest proportion of their official development assistance as humanitarian aid, with 13 per cent in Only Luxemburg and Finland give more. In addition, Norway is number three on the list of countries that give most humanitarian aid in relation to their gross national income; only Luxemburg and Sweden give more. In addition to allocating funds to various humanitarian players as operating support for the organisations, projects, coordination activities and work on priority areas, as described in Chapter 4, some of the Norwegian humanitarian aid is also given in the form of direct deliveries (in kind). The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) is an important part of this form of humanitarian assistance. In 2008, Norad presented an evaluation of NOREPS. Text Box 8 contains a summary of this evaluation. Text Box 8 Evaluation of NOREPS 97 The evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) concludes that this cooperation network between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, suppliers of emergency equipment, the major Norwegian humanitarian organisations and Innovation Norway has contributed to a more efficient and well-coordinated humanitarian response in disaster situations. The evaluation shows that the quality of the goods, services and personnel has been high, and that the response is perceived as swift and effective. However, the evaluation shows that, in light of the significant changes in the humanitarian field since NOREPS was set up in 1991, both within the UN system and Norwegian humanitarian policy, the direct delivery of goods (in kind) instead of money has become a less suitable form of aid. It is therefore proposed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should phase out this type of humanitarian aid over a five-year period. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also recommended to finance the various parts of NOREPS through framework agreements instead of via the present individual grants and ad hoc contributions. In its administration of this system, the Ministry should focus more on the actual use and results of the various parts of the system, and less on administrative details. It is also recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the other players in the network, should establish a clearer strategic framework for NOREPS. According to the evaluation, the Ministry should integrate a strategy for NOREPS in a future Norwegian humanitarian strategy ) Development Initiatives (2008): Global Humanitarian Assistance. 97) Norad Evaluation Report 1/2008: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS). Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 61

64 The interview and field surveys show that Norway is largely deemed to be a good and flexible donor that adheres firmly to the humanitarian principles. This means that Norway funds projects for which it can be difficult for the organisations to obtain funding from other donors, for example for less visible activities. The organisations feel that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demonstrates understanding of the humanitarian field and humanitarian needs. An evaluation carried out by Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA) of how the members of OECD-DAC meet the requirements set out in the principles for good humanitarian donorship also takes a positive view of Norway as a donor country. 98 In the interview survey, all the UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emphasise that Norway is one of the largest and most important contributors to the organisations. For example, Norway was the second, third and second largest financial contributor to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. Norway is also among the largest donors to several other UN agencies. The humanitarian organisations state in the interview survey that they wish as little earmarking of funds as possible. It is OCHA s impression that Norway is gradually becoming a more flexible donor. The ratio between general and earmarked contributions from Norway to OCHA s annual appeals in the period , for example, shows a trend towards less earmarking. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), on the other hand, states that, of the agency s largest donors in the period 2004 to 2006, Norway is close to the average in terms of earmarking. The percentage of non-earmarked contributions from Norway to the agency for these three years was 29, 26 and 27 per cent, respectively. UNICEF stated that Norway is a flexible donor with few provisos attached to its contributions. For example, Norway is flexible when it comes to the financing of the consolidated appeals. Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2005, 2006 and 2007, as well as considerable sums to common humanitarian funds in Sudan and DR Congo, among others. The Ministry also points out that the UN agencies have different budget structures and use different criteria to define earmarking, which, according to the Ministry, means that similar contributions from Norway are assessed differently by the different agencies Timing of funding is humanitarian assistance given at the right time? Norwegian humanitarian assistance shall be timely, effective and of good quality. Timely humanitarian assistance means that the funding and assistance is given at the right time. This means that the organisations and authorities in the relevant countries and donor countries must have systems that ensure a timely and efficient response. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that timeliness and flexibility are important if the humanitarian assistance is to be characterised as being of high quality. Flexibility means that the Ministry can give aid at short notice. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry points out that flexibility is also about the ability to respond to political and humanitarian changes, to take its partners priorities into consideration, support a wide range of humanitarian activities, As regards the reduction in the degree of earmarking, in its letter to the Office of the Auditor General of 8 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that Norway has donated a total of NOK 850 million to the United 98) Development Assistance Research Associates DARA (2007): The Humanitarian Response Index Measuring Commitment to Best Practice. The Norwegian Refugee Council in Juba, Southern Sudan. Photo: Aleksander Åsheim 62 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

65 give the organisations freedom to adapt implementation to the conditions on the ground, have funds available throughout the year and avoid excessive concentration at country level. The time factor is particularly critical in acute humanitarian crisis in terms of saving lives and alleviating suffering through emergency aid. Time, however, is also an important factor in enduring crises, among other things, because of natural conditions. For example, in some countries the rainy season imposes limitations on when it is possible to transport food and equipment, when construction activities can be carried out etc. Time is also an important factor in the organisations planning, hiring of local personnel and signing of contracts with local players etc. Delayed financing can also result in delays and changes in the projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs case processing times The project review shows that the time it takes for the Ministry to process applications for funds from the UN, the Red Cross system and NGOs varies greatly. This means that the time it takes before the humanitarian organisations are paid Norwegian grants will vary. Table 8 shows the Ministry s case processing times for applications for funds from NGOs for humanitarian crises, from the application date until the date when the grant was awarded / the letter of grant commitment dated. The table shows an average processing time in the Ministry for applications from NGOs of 88 days for the 136 projects included in the analysis. 99 It also shows, however, that processing times vary greatly, from 12 days for Pakistan (the 2005 earthquake) to 136 days for Uganda. The table also shows that the case processing times vary from one day to almost a year. Afghanistan stands out with a minimum time of 52 days. The median is 80 days. This means that as many grants have had case processing times of more than 80 days as less than 80 days. In table 9, the Ministry s case processing time in days is broken down by type of humanitarian crisis: item 70 Natural disasters and item 71 Humanitarian assistance mainly cover complex crises. However, the acuteness of the humanitarian crises varies within these groups. Table 9 shows that the Ministry processes applications for grants in relation to natural disasters significantly more quickly than for other crises, an average of 28 and 99 days, respectively. The maximum time for item 70 is 149 days, while for item 71 it is 332 days. Table 10, which shows case processing times in time intervals, shows that Table 8 Processing time in days for grant applications from NGOs, by country, (N = 136) Average Median Minimum Maximum N Afghanistan Ethiopia DR Congo Niger Pakistan The Pal. Terr Sudan Uganda All Source: The project / grant review Table 9 Case processing time (number of days) for grant applications from NGOs, broken down by chapter item 70 and 71, (N = 136) Average Median Minimum Maximum N Item 70 Natural disasters Item 71 Humanitarian assistance Source: The project / grant review 99) Only applications for which dated applications and letters of commitment are available are included in the analysis. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 63

66 processing times are shorter for natural disasters. This table shows that 53 grants were processed up to 50 days from their application dates, while the Ministry took more than 150 days for 25 grants. The UN Consolidated appeals (issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA) consist of a large number of projects that will be implemented by UN agencies or NGOs. Table 11 shows the Norwegian response to the consolidated appeals through the UN agencies. It shows when the Norwegian grants to UN agencies have been paid, by quarter. The appeals are normally launched in December or January. The table shows that the Norwegian contributions are relatively evenly distributed over the year. The UN also launches acute appeals (flash appeals) in connection with acute crises. These appeals also include a number of projects under the auspices of UN agencies or NGOs. Table 12 shows the number of months from the launch of an appeal until Norway has financed projects under that appeal. It shows that most allocations are made in the same month or during the following month. However, the table also shows that some months may elapse before allocations are made. All the Norwegian NGOs emphasise the Ministry s long case processing times in the interview survey. Several of the UN agencies share this opinion. The Norwegian Red Cross, for example, pointed out in an interview that, as of 6 November 2007, the organisation was still awaiting replies to applications submitted to the Ministry for a total of approx. NOK 90 million. More than half of these applications were submitted during the first quarter of There is substantial variation in the extent to which the organisations perceive that they receive signals during processing about whether or not they will be awarded grants. In interviews, the organisations point to staffing and resource problems in the Ministry as the main reason for what they see as too long case processing times. The organisations also emphasise that case processing times vary depending on the type of crisis. The Ministry is largely seen as speedy and flexible in connection with acute humanitarian crises. An evaluation of Norwegian assistance in connection with the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan shows that the response was swift. 100 The following examples of short response times in acute crises were mentioned in the interview survey: Médicins Sans Frontières Ebola project in DR Congo, for which the funds were paid by the Ministry in the space of a few days. Norwegian People s Aid s activities in connection with the conflict in Southern Lebanon in summer Norwegian People s Aid also found case processing to be quick and flexible when mine Table 10 Case processing time for grant applications from NGOs, by category and chapter item 70 and 71, (N = 136) 1 50 days days days More than 150 days Item 70 Natural disasters Item 71 Humanitarian assistance Total Source: The project / grant review Table 11 Timing of the allocation of grants for UN appeals for selected countries, (percentage) First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter Total Number of grants Percentage 22% 33% 19% 26% 100% Source: Financial Tracking Service. Table 12 Case processing time for allocation of grants to UN agencies during acute crises on the basis of appeals (flash appeals), More than 5 Number of grants Source: Financial Tracking Service 100) Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2006: 18: Review of Norwegian Earthquake Assistance to Pakistan 2005 and Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

67 clearing personnel in Sri Lanka were redeployed to emergency aid work in connection with the tsunami in South East Asia at Christmas The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a binding commitment within 24 hours when NORWAC contacted the Ministry in connection with the Israeli bombing of Lebanon and Gaza in summer Save the Children received NOK 5 million from the Ministry after two and a half hours in connection with the tsunami in South East Asia. However, the interview survey also found examples of long case processing times in connection with acute natural disasters, for example the floods in Sudan and Uganda in autumn As of 19 October 2007, Norwegian Church Aid, for example, had three applications under consideration by the Ministry. One of them was an application for support for acute humanitarian efforts for local communities affected by flooding in Northern Kordofan in Sudan. The application was dated 14 August, and the letter of grant commitment was dated 12 November. 101 The Norwegian mission to the UN in Geneva states in an interview that, for the organisations, the most important factor relating to financing is predictability. Today, this is a major problem for the organisations. According to the mission, Norway is one of the more predictable countries. Norway communicates the amount of contributions that are planned, but often not when the contributions can be expected to arrive. The mission sees that it may take some time before a final decision is made and funds disbursed. This is due to thorough case processing at the mission and in the Ministry and requirements from the Ministry of Finance. According to the mission, however, there is a potential for improvement as regards the work in connection with and the timing of financing of appeals; the Norwegian authorities could work more quickly. It was also pointed out that the Norwegian Red Cross may be a delaying intermediary in connection with appeals from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In the interview survey of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it also emerged that the Ministry believes that it could be speedier in awarding grants. The Ministry will therefore implement measures in 2008 to ensure that more allocations can be made early in the year, particularly UN contributions. It is also pointed out that the desire for swiftness 101) Application for support for humanitarian efforts for local communities affected by flooding in Northern Kordofan, Norwegian Church Aid, 14 August Letter of commitment from the Ministry of 12 November 2007 (SDN ). must be weighed against the considerations of adequate processing of cases and political signals. Internal processes in the Ministry relating to the allocation memorandum also take time. Executive officers need, among other things, to obtain an overview of the applications, needs and the different players involved. It is also pointed out that consultations in the Ministry, Norad and with foreign service missions take time. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that it must give priority to the most urgent applications at all times, and that cases are processed throughout the year. The Ministry emphasises the importance of being able to allocate funds throughout the year because this contributes to flexibility. According to the Ministry, some players will see this financing scheme as unpredictable. The Ministry stresses in its communication with the organisations that it looks at the year as a whole, and that all funds cannot be allocated without earmarking in the beginning of the year. In the Ministry s opinion, a maybe is normally better for the organisations than a no. Moreover, the organisations could be more persistent in relation to the Ministry if case processing is slow, particularly when an application is especially urgent. The Ministry also states in an interview that, in some cases, the quality of applications is not good enough, and a dialogue with the organisations is required. Some applications take a disproportionately long time to process, for example because the budgets are too general. This can necessitate a time-consuming dialogue with the organisations. The work of rationalising grant administration, by, among other things, updating templates and guidelines, and maintaining a dialogue with recipients to improve the quality of applications and budgets, is therefore important if grants are to be awarded more quickly. In an interview, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it is probably less problematic for the UN agencies than for the Norwegian organisations that funds are allocated throughout the year. The Norwegian organisations are given priority because they are more dependent on Norwegian funds. As regards UN appeals, the Ministry must consider the degree of coverage before it decides to grant funds. The appeals are therefore financed later in the year than support for projects via the Norwegian organisations. The grants for the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are, however, awarded earlier in the year. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 65

68 Challenges facing activities run by UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a result of late financing The interview survey of the ICRC and the UN agencies in Geneva and New York shows that the lack of early financing is a general problem in their humanitarian work. It is also pointed out that this is also a problem with Norwegian financing. The organisations want more predictable and timely Norwegian financing of their humanitarian activities. The field survey uncovered examples of the potential consequences of late financing of UN programmes, and this is discussed in more detail below. UNICEF has experienced that a few months may elapse before Norway allocates funds. In an interview, UNICEF refers to the fact that in 2005, the organisation received NOK 20 million in December to spend on projects covered by the appeal for This was not possible. It is UNICEF s opinion that, at the end of the year, Norway should forecast how much funds the organisations can expect to receive in the following year in order to ensure the required predictability. UNICEF points to the floods in Uganda in August/September 2007 as an example of a late Norwegian response. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) also points out in an interview that the donors, including Norway, should endeavour to be more predictable in their financing and give contributions over several years. OCHA refers to the fact that, even though Norwegian contributions seem to be coming earlier and earlier, Norway is still one of the donors that give a significant proportion of their contributions very late in the year. However, in a consultation process between OCHA and the Nordic countries, signals are given about the size of the core contribution that OCHA can expect the following year. OCHA therefore considers Norway to be a relatively predictable donor. OCHA also underlines that Norway is generally very quick to respond to appeals in connection with acute crises, not least in connection with high-profile crises such as the tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sees the procedure whereby part of the funds is withheld in order to cover unforeseen crises as a challenge in relation to the Norwegian contributions. It is difficult for UNHCR to know how much it can expect to receive from this reserve, thus reducing predictability and complicating planning. Even though Norway is a predictable donor, it is a challenge that a large part of the Norwegian contribution comes so late in the year. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emphasises that Norway is one of its most generous donor countries, but it also points out that if all the donors followed the Norwegian example for timing its transfers of funds, the ICRC would find itself in a very difficult financial situation. At the beginning of each year, the ICRC receives a list from the Norwegian Red Cross of all the applications it has planned to submit to the Ministry (based on the ICRC s appeal). While this provides the ICRC with an indication of what they can expect from Norway, it cannot be seen as a guarantee, and this makes planning difficult and increases the risk. Sweden, on the other hand, informs the ICRC about the level of financing for the appeal (non-earmarked) as early as December. Most of the Norwegian funds come in two rounds, usually in May and in the autumn. The ICRC does not know what this delay is due to, but it believes that it is caused by the project approach in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In ICRC s opinion, this approach gives rise to an extra administrative workload for the Norwegian Red Cross as well as for the Ministry. However, Norway is quick to respond when the ICRC launches its separate supplementary appeals, not least in connection with high-profile crises such as the tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan. Challenges facing the activities of NGOs as a result of late financing Both in the interview survey in Norway and the field survey, the organisations point to the challenges their activities face as a result of the Ministry s case processing times. Several of the organisations interviewed point out that Norway is particularly late, and that, if all donors were to follow the same practice, the organisations would find themselves in a difficult financial situation. The Norad-initiated organisational review of Norwegian Church Aid also points to delayed financing as a problem that could have consequences for beneficiaries. 102 The interview survey also shows that the organisations are forced to use funds from their own reserves, thereby taking a financial risk, in order to be able to start projects while waiting for funds. The organisations opportunities to do so vary, however. Several of the organisations, for 102) Norad report 1/2007 Review: Partnership for a just world. Organisational Performance Review Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). 66 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

69 example the Norwegian Refugee Council and Médecins Sans Frontières, have reserves that allow them to operate using their own funds for a period of time. The Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, can commit funds in advance for 15 to 20 per cent of the project costs, which is enough for the first three or four months of implementation. In the field survey, however, it is pointed out that it usually has consequences for the initiating of activities. The organisations also state that the unpredictability resulting from late financing creates problems for their planning. On a visit to a camp in Northern Uganda, where the Norwegian Refugee Council manages camps, it was pointed out that the payment from Norway was not received until six months after the organisation had applied for funds. It was emphasised that this was a major problem in terms of planning, implementation and contracts with local employees. 103 NORWAC also points to consequences for planning. The organisation does not know whether it will be awarded the funds it has applied for until May/June. If the organisation receives significantly less than it applied for, then it will have to review its project portfolio and re-budget. This entails some extra work and delays for NORWAC and its Palestinian partners. Late financing from the Ministry was also pointed out as problem during the project visit to the Norwegian Refugee Council s vocational training for internally displaced persons in Northern Uganda (Youth Education Pack). 104 Late financing resulted, among other things, in some time elapsing before employees could begin their work, and this affected their motivation. Oral commitments had been made, but it took time for the funds to arrive. Delays and changes to projects and humanitarian operations as a result of late financing As mentioned above, the organisations point to challenges relating to planning, increased costs and unpredictability. Both the interview and field surveys contain examples of projects that have been delayed or had their goal achievement reduced due to late financing. The Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, states in an interview that it did not receive the funding for its work in DR Congo in 2007 (NOK 103) Camp Management project visit, NRC, Pabbo. Project number UGA ) Project number UGA million) until late in the year. The application was submitted on 31 January, and the letter of grant commitment is dated 13 September. 105 Even though it was in dialogue with the Ministry during this time about priorities and the size of the grant, it is the Norwegian Refugee Council s opinion that late financing resulted in less assistance being provided for refugees than would have been possible had the grant been awarded sooner. In the field survey, CARE in Gulu, Uganda pointed to two projects in which they have experienced delays in financing: According to the organisation, the project Empowerment of women for durable Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda has been delayed due to late financing from the Ministry. It states that this will make it difficult to carry out the project in accordance with the original plan. The application to the Ministry is dated 11 June, and the letter of grant commitment came on 11 December. CARE can apply for an extension of the project (without additional financing) because of delays in implementation due, among other things, to difficulties in recruiting personnel. It was pointed out that delayed payment is a challenge for the project. In October 2007, CARE Uganda applied for funds for a project to combat gender-based and sexual violence, and the organisation had received no reply to the application as of 13 February The project start-up was scheduled for January, but the project has not yet started. This means that the duration of the project will not be 12 months as planned, but somewhat shorter. The project application of 15 November shows that there was communication between CARE and the Ministry about this project before the application was submitted. The Norwegian Refugee Council has a food security project in Northern Uganda. The project includes training and financial support for agriculture and income-generating activities for internally displaced persons. Seed distribution is one of these activities. The Norwegian Refugee Council s application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for funding for this project was dated 19 January The Ministry s letter of grant commitment was sent on 25 June. During the project 105) Application for support for the Norwegian Refugee Council s activities in education, house and school building, and information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007, 31 January Ministry of Foreign Affair s letter of commitment of 13 September 2007 (ZAR ). 106) Application for support for combating gender-based violence in northern Uganda, CARE, 15 November Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 67

70 visit, the Norwegian Refugee Council in Northern Uganda pointed out that this resulted in the project being unable to purchase seed as planned. The consequence was that seeds could not be sown in time, and the second agricultural season could therefore not be utilised. The Norwegian Refugee Council emphasises that goal achievement depends on financing arriving in time for the seeds to be purchased at the right time. Moreover, in the field survey in Uganda it was pointed out that seeds often arrive late at the World Food Programme (WFP) in Gulu, partly because of late financing, but also because the organisations generally take a long time. For several humanitarian operations in Sudan, the organisations depend on carrying out their activities during the dry season. During the rainy season, the roads are difficult to use, and construction activity comes to a halt. Several of the UN agencies and NGOs in Sudan stress that they are dependent on the timing of funds in relation to the dry season. It is a general problem that funds do not arrive in time. This applies to both funds from donor countries and funds from the UN Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan (see Chapter for further discussion of CHF). The field survey refers to examples where humanitarian efforts have become more expensive because financing has arrived too late in relation to the rainy season in Sudan. In interviews, several of the organisations point out that the donors budget cycles and the organisations programme cycles do not correspond to the needs in Southern Sudan. It is pointed out in the field survey that financing should be linked to the humanitarian needs, cf. the principles for good humanitarian donorship. According to the organisations, the EU (ECHO) and the USA (USAID) do so to a greater extent than Norway does. The Norwegian system and the budget cycle of one-year grants limit the efficiency of the efforts. Financial contributions for education, for example, should follow the academic year, and contributions for agriculture should follow the agricultural year. The focus must be on the beneficiaries and on what benefits them the most One-year financial frameworks According to OECD-DAC s peer review of Norwegian aid from 2005, Norway should, given its large contribution to humanitarian activities, aim to improve transparency about financing decisions and improve predictability in the long-term financing of enduring crises. A more flexible use of such long-term financing was recommended. 107 Allocations of grants under Chapter 163 are made for 12 months from the date of commitment. The allocations take the form of one-off financial support for the projects and organisations in question, and the Ministry stresses this in its letters of grant commitment. However, many of the humanitarian projects last for several years and receive support from Norway. This applies to the enduring crises in particular. In these cases, the organisations have to submit applications every year and final reports to the Ministry at the end of each grant period. The field survey and the interviews with Norwegian organisations and UN agencies show that the short-term financing mechanisms are perceived as problematic, a fact which is also pointed out in the organisational reviews of Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwegian Refugee Council from Short-term financing entails a number of challenges for the organisations efforts, challenges that can be directly related to the Norwegian financing: Plans have a short-term perspective, and this makes it difficult to consider long-term development and sustainability. One-year time frames mean less freedom of action and predictability. The one-year perspective is a problem as regards reporting to the Ministry on overriding goals and impact of projects. It is limited what can be achieved in a year, and it can therefore be difficult to demonstrate results after only one year. One-year time frames can make it difficult to contract local employees. It is important to the organisations to secure personnel who can work on the projects over several years in order to ensure sufficient expertise and continuity. The organisations put a lot of effort and resources into writing annual applications and annual final reports. These resources could have been spent on professional activities, follow-up and reporting instead. It was shown above that the organisations experience challenges related to the Ministry s case processing times. It was pointed out in the field survey that the challenges resulting from oneyear time frames are intensified by long case processing times and the fact that different 107) OECD (2005): DAC Peer Review Norway. 108) Norad report 1/2007 Review: Partnership for a just world. Organisational Performance Review Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Norad report 2/2007 Review: Durable Management for Durable Solutions. Organisational Performance Review Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). 68 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

71 donors have different budget cycles. Unpredictability as a result of not knowing whether the organisation will receive funds the following year is intensified by not knowing when the funds will arrive. It was stated that this results in constant financial arrears and organisations having to borrow funds from their own programmes. The organisation is then in principle using money that it does not know whether it will actually receive. Interviews with the organisations show that the challenges resulting from the system of one-year grants are related to sustainability and the lack of a long-term perspective, in particular. CARE, for example, states in an interview that there is reason to question whether humanitarian assistance is sustainable under the current one-year financing model. According to CARE, many crises are of such a nature that one-year projects are inexpedient. Evaluations show that the shortterm focus in humanitarian financing makes it difficult to focus on the long-term considerations in humanitarian assistance. 109 The field survey and the project review showed that many of the projects that receive support last for more than one year, a fact which the organisations also confirm in interviews. The enduring crises in the Palestinian Territory, Sudan and Uganda are examples. For instance, Norway has supported two hospitals in Jerusalem for several years, and it was stated during the project visit that support given for several years at a time would result in more predictable operation and a longer planning horizon. In light of the challenges the interviewed organisations experience in connection with one-year financing, they see it as desirable that projects be given humanitarian support for more than one year at a time (see Text Box 9). Text Box 9 Some organisations proposals for alternative forms of financing Norwegian People s Aid emphasises in an interview that it would be an advantage if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could make framework allocations over several years in accordance with the Dutch model, where support is given for four-year periods. The quality assurance of applications from new projects would be thorough, but once the application is granted, Norwegian People s Aid would be given freedom with responsibility for the four-year period. Norwegian People s Aid believes that, given the longstanding relationship of trust between the organisation and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, time frames of several years should be unproblematic, particularly in countries where the organisations have run projects for several years. Save the Children emphasises in an interview that the introduction of a formal prequalification system for humanitarian organisations should be considered. The Norwegian Refugee Council also points out that the Ministry should consider introducing such a system for humanitarian organisations, something similar to an ISO certification scheme guaranteeing that the individual organisations have all the systems and procedures in place that are required to deliver qualitatively good aid accounting, reporting etc. The Norwegian Refugee Council emphasises that, in light of the considerable trust the Ministry of Foreign Affairs places in the Norwegian Refugee Council through its annual allocations to the organisation, there should also be room for a more flexible system in which control should be based more on spot checks and external evaluations. CARE emphasises in an interview that a separate Norwegian emergency aid fund, allocated as a block grant to each Norwegian organisation along the same lines as a cooperation agreement with Norad, would solve the organisation s planning and staffing challenges and ensure more long-term strategies for implementation of its programme activities. CARE therefore wants a framework agreement specifying priority areas within each theme and country. CARE and other organisations can adjust their efforts and report on the use of funds afterwards. It is important to CARE that the increased predictability that such a fund would provide must not be at the expense of the flexibility in the Norwegian model. NORWAC argues in an interview that a more long-term financing guarantee would be an advantage, for example in areas where the organisation is involved in more long-term capacity building. It would be a considerable advantage for NORWAC if the Ministry could, for example, commit to strategic funding of Makassed Hospital in Jerusalem over the next three years, since that would allow the organisation to start thinking along more visionary and long-term lines. NORWAC is in dialogue with the Ministry about this. In a longer perspective, however, NORWAC feels that the organisation and the Ministry lack a shared understanding that health is a strategic priority area in the Palestinian Territory. In general, therefore, NORWAC would like a form of memorandum of understanding / framework agreement in which the parties clarify their priority areas in the Palestinian Territory for the next few years. 109) UK National Audit Office (2002): Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General , Session 5. November Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 69

72 Both the embassy in Uganda and the Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory state in interviews that one-year grants represent a challenge for the organisations. According to the embassy, humanitarian grants over several years for the major NGOs and the UN agencies could help increase flexibility and predictability. This opinion is also supported in the report Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet ( New roles for NGOs in development cooperation ), in which it is emphasised that grants over several years would improve the possibility for capacity building in the organisations and preparations for new crises. 110 The embassy in Uganda points out that one-year grants are particularly inexpedient for the organisations as regards personnel recruitment, since recruitment processes are time-consuming and can delay the implementation of projects. Grants over several years could also result in less administration in the form of the processing of applications, for both the Ministry and the foreign service missions, thereby freeing up resources for spot checks, control and the evaluation of projects. Such grants would enable both the embassy and the Ministry to focus more on the quality of the projects, and they would also provide a better basis for reporting and the assessment of long-term effects once the projects have been completed. In connection with longterm aid to Uganda, five-year agreements have been signed with some organisations. Similar arrangements can also be considered for certain humanitarian projects, particularly projects running over several years. In such cases, the embassy claims, grants over several years could result in more efficient use of resources. As regards the one-year framework for financing, the Ministry pointed out in an interview that this has been decided by the Storting. Having the flexibility required to meet changing political priorities and humanitarian needs is of decisive importance to the Ministry. It is the Ministry s opinion, therefore, that one-year financing is the most expedient system, even though it realises that it creates problems for the grant recipients. The Ministry sees that one-year grants can be a problem for the organisations in the cash flow context in the sense that funds could arrive later the next year, and that the organisations will have to keep the planned activities running for a longer period than they had originally planned. Entering 110) Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet. Report from committee appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). into local contracts for more than one year could also be problematic for the organisations when financing is not guaranteed for more than one year at a time. However, the Ministry doubts whether financing over several years would be more cost efficient. Experience shows that framework agreements are not necessarily labour-saving, since annual follow-up will still be required. Projects would have to be followed up during their implementation even if humanitarian grants were allocated for several years. It is also the Ministry s opinion that one-year frameworks ensure a greater degree of management and control of the funds. According to the Ministry, many of the projects supported under Chapter 163 have a multi-year time frame and receive grants for several years at a time. In the Ministry s opinion, the organisations have as much predictability as is possible in connection with enduring crises, and it has the impression that the organisations appreciate the flexibility of the present scheme. Experience shows that no successful humanitarian project has ever been shut down as a result of one-year grants. However, the Ministry informs us in an interview that alternative grant administration models are being considered in connection with the work on a humanitarian strategy. As part of this work, it is also being considered whether to test a system of multi-year commitments to certain organisations in certain priority areas, subject to approval by the Storting. The Ministry also emphasises that the present administration regime is subject to continuous evaluation. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry also refers to an important reason for changing the grant structure in Norwegian humanitarian aid, namely that the predictability of total international humanitarian financing can be improved by channelling a significant proportion of these funds through the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and common humanitarian funds without earmarking them Financing of humanitarian assistance via funds (the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund and common humanitarian funds) New financing mechanisms have been developed to help solve financing problems relating to unequal distribution between humanitarian crises 70 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

73 and between clusters within the crises, donor coordination, late financing and reporting requirements that are very demanding in terms of resources. 111 The new mechanisms primarily consist of various funds in which the donors cooperate on financing. Two of them, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and common humanitarian funds, are discussed here. In an interview, the Ministry points out that using many channels for humanitarian aid is a political choice, and that this is a way of ensuring that the various needs are met to a greater extent. According to the Ministry, there are significant administrative savings to be made by using such funds as a channel. It is also pointed out that CERF and the common humanitarian funds help to improve coordination. United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) A new emergency aid fund (Central Emergency Relief Fund CERF) was established by the UN in 2005 to ensure swifter help and more secure financing of emergency aid in humanitarian crises, including financing for so-called forgotten crises. 112 CERF is meant to complement, not replace, existing financial mechanisms, such as the UN consolidated appeals. CERF will contribute start-up capital in the first critical phase of humanitarian operations and finance life-saving efforts not yet covered by other donors, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states in an interview. As part of the international humanitarian reform efforts, it is an important goal for the Norwegian authorities to support CERF in order to ensure speedier and better distributed humanitarian aid. 113 In an interview, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the Norwegian contribution to the fund is mainly motivated by a desire to ensure that the forgotten crises receive sufficient attention from the international community. In 2007, Norway was the second largest donor to CERF, donating approx. NOK 350 million. Table 13 shows CERF s top ten recipient countries. 111) UN/OCHA: Humanitarian Appeal ) This new fund was an upgrading of the existing emergency aid fund established in CERF is far bigger than the previous fund, and most of its funding will be in the form of grants. 113) Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the missions in Geneva and New York. Table 13 Countries that received funds from CERF in 2007, in NOK million Country NOK million DR Congo Bangladesh Sudan Somalia 79.4 Uganda 65.8 Ethiopia 62.7 Mozambique 61.7 Zimbabwe 60.7 North Korea 56.2 Sri Lanka 55.2 Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs An external preliminary review of CERF initiated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows that the UN agencies are largely satisfied with the fund as a quick, reliable and efficient mechanism for responding to humanitarian crises in a timely fashion. This applies both at the global level and in the field. The review also shows that the NGOs appreciate the fund insofar as they have received funds from it. The donors also see CERF as a useful mechanism for the financing of humanitarian assistance, although the review also indicates that future funding will to a certain extent depend on the concrete results achieved through the use of CERF. 114 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms in an interview that CERF functions very well in many ways, and it points out that the fund has, among other things, helped to ensure speedy financing in acute emergencies and also to secure financing for forgotten crises. However, the above-mentioned review, interviews and field studies also show that there are a number of challenges relating to the use of CERF. The most important of these challenges are presented below. Increased transaction costs: As mentioned above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees opportunities for savings on administrative costs when such funds are used to channel aid. The preliminary review of CERF confirms that several donors share this opinion, particularly those who have limited administration capacity for humanitarian aid on a bilateral basis. At the same time, the review shows that several of the 114) Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review, Sheila Dohoo Faure and Max Glaser, 19 September 2007, pp. 23 and 56. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 71

74 players have the impression that transaction costs may have increased in the UN system, both in OCHA and individual UN agencies. 115 This is confirmed by UNICEF, which in an interview points out that one of the purposes of establishing CERF was actually to reduce total transaction costs. In the interview, UNICEF questions whether this has been achieved, or whether the costs have simply been transferred from the donors to the UN agencies and/or their partners who implement the activities. Even though the fund is a good tool for improving partner cooperation, it has also necessitated a large organisation to administer the system. In UNICEF s opinion, therefore, the total transaction costs related to CERF should be studied in more detail. UNHCR also confirms in an interview that its transaction costs have increased as a result of CERF. Reduced direct financing: According to UNICEF, another aspect of the establishment of CERF and other similar funds is that the direct financing of the organisation has been reduced. This is in conflict with CERF s purpose, which is to supplement, not replace, existing humanitarian financing mechanisms. This is confirmed by UNHCR in an interview. It is the organisation s impression that a significant proportion of the grants that used to be channelled directly to the organisation are now going to CERF and similar funds. True, UNHCR budgets have grown in recent years, but not to the same extent as for CERF, and not in line with the needs. Among NGOs, Save the Children states in an interview that the donor countries in some cases allocate funds to CERF instead of directly to the organisation. The organisation has experienced that the UK Department for International Development (DFID) rejected an application with reference to the fact that the budget funds in question had already been allocated to CERF. The preliminary review of CERF also shows that NGOs have been referred to CERF when applying for financing directly from donors. 116 No direct access for NGOs: Several NGOs have expressed concern that they have no direct access to CERF, and that they lack systematic information about payments from the fund. This emerges in the CERF review. 117 Save the Children also points out that it is problematic that NGOs cannot receive funds directly from the fund when, in 115) Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review, Sheila Dohoo Faure and Max Glaser, 19 September 2007, pp ) Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review, Sheila Dohoo Faure and Max Glaser, 19 September 2007, p ) Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review, Sheila Dohoo Faure and Max Glaser, 19 September 2007, pp many cases, they are the ones actually doing the work in the field. Under the present arrangement, CERF funds must be channelled via the UN agencies, which is both time-consuming and unpredictable. Both UNICEF and CARE confirm in interviews that this is a challenge. OCHA, which is responsible for the administration of the fund, points out for its part that there is never sufficient financing to meet all humanitarian needs on a global scale, and as regards CERF in particular, OCHA is increasingly concerned about whether the current level of financing can be maintained. Another challenge has been that most donors, at least in the past, have wanted to control their contributions, which has also led to dissatisfaction with CERF among the UN agencies. It has therefore been difficult for OCHA to prioritise between different crises in connection with payments from the fund, the organisation states in an interview. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms in an interview that there is room for improvement of CERF in a number of areas, but it also points out that work in this issue is underway in various forums. Key issues in this context include how allocation processes can be improved and decision-making processes streamlined, while at the same time taking into consideration the necessary control and reporting requirements, and the extent to which NGOs are involved. The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) in Sudan CERF is supplemented by, among other things, common humanitarian funds such as the CHF. CHF is intended to increase the Humanitarian Coordinator s opportunity to steer funds to where needs are most critical, to receive aid from donors, and to respond swiftly to unforeseen needs. This financing mechanism is used in Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that the UN s Work Plan (appeal) and CHF are the primary instruments for ensuring an overall, coordinated strategic effort in Sudan (more details in Chapter 5.2.4). In 2007, Norway gave NOK 105 million to this fund. A separate evaluation of CHF, initiated by OCHA, also concludes that the fund has had a positive effect in Sudan. In this context, reference is made, among other things, to the fact that the fund has strengthened the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator, supported coordination and contributed to cover- 72 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

75 ing humanitarian needs both as regards clusters, geography and the timing of assistance. 118 However, the investigation shows that there are still some challenges relating to CHF. The Norwegian embassy in Sudan states that one of these challenges is that there are no mechanisms allowing funds to be released quickly and efficiently in response to crises. This was evident in connection with the floods in Sudan. The field survey shows that some of the CHF funds reach the UN agencies too late, and that this is due to delays in case processing. The humanitarian organisations operating in Sudan are dependent on the funds arriving at the right time, i.e. during the dry season. It is during this period that transport and construction is possible. It is also pointed out that the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which has technical and administrative responsibility for the administration of CHF, has had problems paying funds quickly because UNDP did not originally have an organisation geared to disbursing funds to humanitarian projects. This created a great deal of frustration, particularly in the NGOs. However, it is pointed out that this process has become more streamlined with time. The above-mentioned evaluation confirms that the UNDP system for funding NGOs in a humanitarian context is still not adequate, even though the UNDP has done what it can to adjust its contractual terms. It is therefore recommended that OCHA plays a more active role in the administration of the fund. 119 Another problematic aspect of CHF is that the UNDP s administration costs are high, while the administrative costs of the implementing NGOs are not covered. The Norwegian Embassy in Sudan states that this has resulted in Norwegian NGOs finding it difficult to take on tasks and projects for the UN. Experience also shows that one of the most common objections to the cluster managers in Sudan is that a substantial proportion of the funds received from CHF is actually used to run the national office instead of covering project costs. In the evaluation this is seen as being connected to the lack of overview and transparency as regards how much of the funds go directly to projects and how much goes to cover overheads such as operating expenses. The evaluation therefore calls for clarification of what 118) OCHA (2007): Evaluation of Common / Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan, Barnaby Willitts-King / Tasneem Mowjee (Development Initiatives) and Jane Barham. 119) OCHA (2007): Evaluation of Common / Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan, Barnaby Willitts-King / Tasneem Mowjee (Development Initiatives) / Jane Barham, p. 3. the UN s value added is in relation to the administration of CHF. 120 The Norwegian Embassy in Sudan points out in an interview that, despite its weaknesses, CHF is functioning better and better. Among other things, the NGOs possibilities of gaining access to money from the fund have improved significantly. According to the embassy, the UN now realises that it is dependent on these organisations to solve the challenges in Sudan. 5.2 Coordination of the humanitarian efforts Coordination is part of goal achievement in humanitarian assistance, and it is an important element in effective humanitarian assistance. The goal of coordination is, among other things, to ensure as holistic a response as possible to humanitarian crises. Coordination contributes to a more even distribution of assistance, while also reducing the risk of duplication of efforts. Coordination also helps make efforts more cost-efficient by clarifying the division of responsibility between the different humanitarian players. This means that more humanitarian needs can be met. It is a central goal for the Norwegian authorities to strengthen the UN s ability to coordinate efforts in humanitarian crises and its opportunities for doing so. That is why Norway contributes to the UN s efforts and coordinating role in the humanitarian field UN reforms and the role of OCHA In the UN system, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays a central part in coordination, and Norway has supported OCHA s efforts for more efficient and better coordinated international humanitarian assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that Norway has contributed to a number of measures to improve this system. The Ministry also points out that it requires Norwegian NGOs to coordinate their activities in the field with other humanitarian players. While the UN is considered to be crucial as regards achieving improved coordination of international humanitarian assistance, several of the NGOs point out in the interview and field surveys that the UN system is often seen as being cum- 120) OCHA (2007): Evaluation of Common / Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan, Barnaby Willitts-King / Tasneem Mowjee (Development Initiatives) / Jane Barham, December 2007, p. 14. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 73

76 bersome and bureaucratic in the humanitarian field. In recent years, the UN has started a process that aims to reform the international humanitarian apparatus. This was in response to challenges related to coordination, and partly because of experience from international efforts in connection with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the tsunami disaster in South Asia. The work is led by OCHA, and key measures include: strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator s role ensuring more predictable financing ensuring swifter response and better coordination through the so-called cluster approach strengthening partnerships with NGOs and other external players General challenges for OCHA and the Norwegian contribution The Norwegian mission to the UN in New York points out in an interview that OCHA is a relatively small organisation. The mission states that it is a challenge for the organisation that it is at the mercy of short-term financing by donors. This results in a lack of predictability that leads, among other things, to many employees only having one-year contracts. The resource situation in OCHA is therefore difficult, and this affects its ability to perform the role of coordinator in an expedient manner. Raising operating funds takes a lot of time and, in the mission s opinion, OCHA is too much at the mercy of the major donors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that OCHA functions relatively well, but it also points out that the UN/OCHA needs to become more effective as a coordinating body, particularly in the field. The humanitarian reform process must continue, therefore. According to the Ministry, large and active donors like Norway have a key part to play in this process. OCHA points out in an interview that Norway is one of the major financial contributors to the clusters. This is seen in direct conjunction with the Norwegian authorities general political and financial support for the humanitarian reform process. OCHA also feels that it receives valuable feedback and input from Norway, both directly and via the group of Nordic countries, on how OCHA can improve various aspects of the cluster approach. As regards the coordination of financing in particular, OCHA points to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) database 121 as an important tool for continuously monitoring the degree of correspondence between humanitarian needs and the funds disbursed in connection with various crises. Norwegian authorities have been relatively good at reporting Norwegian payments to humanitarian assistance to FTS, according to OCHA. However, OCHA would like Norway to play a more active role in certain areas. Firstly, OCHA wants Norway to contribute more to incorporating the NGOs activities in the consolidated appeals. Today, many of these activities are planned, financed and implemented outside the framework of the appeals. In OCHA s opinion, the more these activities are included in the appeals, the better the coordination of the different activities will be. The UN and the rest of the humanitarian community will have a better overview of who does what and where. Secondly, OCHA wants Norway to play a more active role in the improvement of donor coordination in connection with the financing of the appeals. In addition to the problem of the UN receiving too little funds too late, there are also challenges relating to imbalances within and between appeals in terms of over and underfinancing or the timing of payments. Better coordination of who finances what, where and when will, in OCHA s view, improve this balance. 122 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms in the interview survey that donor coordination is difficult and could be better. According to the Ministry, Norway contributes to improving this situation in various ways. Norway contributes through financing mechanisms with the important subgoal of promoting coordination, for example CERF and the common humanitarian funds (see Chapter 5.1.5), and through support for the cluster approach (see Chapter 5.2.3). In its letter of 8 August, the Ministry also refers to the fact that Norway contributes at least as much through its commitment to humanitarian policy in the UN system, its participation in various donor support groups and through special initiatives. 121) FTS, which is administered by OCHA, is a global database that continuously registers all international humanitarian aid reported to OCHA. This also includes aid given to voluntary organisations and the Red Cross / Red Crescent movement, bilateral aid, goods and services (in kind) and private donations. FTS receives all its data from donors or from the organisations that receive the aid. 122) See also Chapter 5.1 on financing through UN appeals. 74 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

77 UN agencies in Gulu, Northern Uganda. Photo: Aleksander Åsheim Challenges relating to coordination in the field The field surveys contain several examples of well-functioning coordination, particularly at the local level. As regards OCHA s work in particular, several organisations state in the field survey and foreign service missions in interviews that OCHA s work is satisfactory in both the Palestinian Territory and in Uganda. As far as Sudan is concerned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that OCHA functions differently in different parts of the country, since the organisation has relatively few employees and cannot be present throughout Sudan. In the Ministry s opinion, however, OCHA does a relatively good job in Darfur under the circumstances. However, the field surveys and other interviews show that achieving efficient coordination in the field can be a challenge. In the following, three factors that have been highlighted will be discussed: fragmentation and inadequate cooperation within the UN system an increasing number of humanitarian players outside the UN system and varying degrees of cooperation between them and the UN system management of coordination efforts Fragmentation and inadequate cooperation within the UN system Several UN agencies and NGOs stated in the field survey that it is a fundamental challenge for the UN agencies that they often do not share the same goals, but act as individual organisations, each with its own remit. This results in a lot of box thinking, i.e. one-sided focus on the individual organisation s own role and own tasks, and insufficient focus on the big picture. The organisations coordinate with each other, but each organisation s focus varies when they operate in the field. In addition, the organisations have different administrative regulations. Even though it is an overriding goal for the UN to act as one, it is pointed out that there is still a long way to go before this goal is achieved. One example of this problem emerged in the field survey in Uganda, in which it was said that UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) all make acceptable efforts in the country individually, but that it is a common trait of these organisations that none of them wants to be told what to do. Another example is Sudan and the UN s Work Plan for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development in Sudan. It emerged in interviews that the Work Plan is considered a good idea, but it is also pointed out that it lacks a set of goals on which the players have agreed. The plan therefore largely reflects the organisations different goals and, as such, serves more as an overview of the different project applications. It is emphasised that the success of this plan depends on the UN fulfilling its ambition to act as one, but that this is demanding in Sudan. Moreover, the plan does not just cover the UN, but also the NGOs and national authorities. In addition, the UN agencies receive funds from many different donors, and its operations are donor-driven. The organisations have to accept this. Coordination meetings are therefore non-binding, and further progress has yet to be made. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 75

78 Another aspect of this situation is that the usefulness of participating in coordination meetings cannot always justify the resources used. In interviews with UN agencies in Sudan, the opinion was voiced that coordination in the UN too often just means holding meetings. It is pointed out that what is primarily required in order to coordinate efforts with others is knowing who does what, where and when, but experience shows that this is not achieved by holding many meetings. Save the Children points out in an interview in this context that the trouble with coordination is not always that there is too little of it, but that there is too much. Sometimes, there are so many coordination meetings and forums in connection with a humanitarian crisis that if one were to attend them all, there would be no time left for anything else. This experience is confirmed by one of the NGOs that operate in Sudan. The field surveys also show that the UN agencies are often not present in the same areas. This contributes to less harmonisation and coordination of the overall UN effort, and means that each organisation often has to take responsibility for tasks outside its core activities. In the field survey in Uganda, it emerged that such fragmentary and uncoordinated efforts have resulted in the UN and other NGOs supplying goods and services on a small scale and as individual elements rather than contributing to holistic solutions. This makes it more difficult to meet all needs and thereby more difficult to achieve lasting effects through humanitarian efforts. The Norwegian Refugee Council s camp management project in Northern Uganda illustrates these challenges (also discussed in Chapter 4.3). 123 The Norwegian Refugee Council cooperates with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which finances part of the project relating to the follow-up of groups who return home from the camps. Norway finances the camp management part of the project. The Norwegian Refugee Council identifies the needs that exist in the camps and endeavours to get other aid organisations and the UN to contribute assistance and services. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council in Uganda, the needs in the camps are known, but the humanitarian organisations are unable to supply the services required. The Norwegian Refugee Council s mapping of needs raises expectations 123) Camp Management and return monitoring, UGA The Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted support for this project in the amount of NOK 22,797,000 on 25 June among camp residents, expectations that other organisations are unable to fulfil. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva also points out these challenges in an interview. On a general basis, the organisation is aware that it is only involved in part of the overall humanitarian situation. According to the organisation, there has therefore been growing recognition that their programmes must be seen in the context of the overall needs of a country or region, as well as in conjunction with other players contributions. The field survey in Southern Sudan contained a concrete example of the consequences of the lack of overall solutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed NOK 2.2 million in the form of agricultural and building materials on 30 March 2006 based on an application from the World Food Programme (WFP). The project description states that these materials would contribute to the reconstruction of infrastructure in local communities. The target group for the support consisted of internally displaced persons returning to their homes and inhabitants of local communities. However, most of the equipment was still in the organisation s warehouse in Juba in November According to WFP, the explanation for this is that there were no clear plans for how to distribute and utilise the equipment. The materials have not been part of a larger programme, which would have increased their usefulness. In other countries, for example, such equipment has been distributed to internally displaced persons as part of a start-up package together with blankets, seed corn etc. Growing numbers of humanitarian players outside the UN system and a varying degree of cooperation between them and the UN system OCHA points out in an interview that the number of humanitarian players outside the UN system has increased significantly in recent years, and that this is making coordination more and more demanding. The Norwegian mission in Geneva states in an interview that the big challenges relating to the coordination of humanitarian efforts lie outside the UN system, i.e. the coordination of NGOs and other players. This is confirmed by the Norwegian mission to the UN in New York, which also points out that the increasing number of players outside the UN system puts the UN s coordination to the test. The field surveys also confirm these challenges. 76 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

79 Another issue that has emerged during interviews with UN agencies in Sudan is that much of the NGOs work is directly and bilaterally financed outside the UN system. The NGOs are under no obligation to inform the UN of this, which means that the UN does not have a full overview of the activities and what needs to be coordinated. It was also pointed out that some donors do not wish to participate in the Work Plan process or contribute financially to CHF and Work Plan. This weakens coordination of the humanitarian efforts and entails a certain risk of duplication of work and financing. The UN does not have the capacity to check whether this is actually the case. If this is to be discovered, it must be in connection with audits of the individual organisations with which the UN cooperates. It is also stated in interviews that not all NGOs wish to be coordinated, and that they may be prevented from participating fully in such coordination by considerations of neutrality and autonomy. It is primarily Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that are mentioned in this context during the interview surveys. Management of coordination efforts As regards the management of coordination efforts, UNICEF states in an interview that one of the challenges is related to the position of UN Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) 124 and recruitment to this position. The UN has usually appointed Resident Coordinators as Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in countries that do not already have a Humani tarian Coordinator. The result of this procedure, however, has been that the Humanitarian Coordinators have often not had the appropriate background, abilities or qualifications to do a good job in connection with humanitarian crises. As part of the humanitarian reform and in recognition of the key role played by the Humanitarian Coordinators in the success of humanitarian operations, the Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 125 adopted an 124) Resident Coordinators,(RC) who are funded and managed by UNDP, are the designated representatives of the UN Secretary General in the development aid field in the countries in question. In this capacity, the Resident Coordinators lead UN country teams in more than 130 countries. In situations in which there is a high risk of a major humanitarian crisis, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) can, in consultation with IASC, decide to appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for the crisis in question. This is particularly relevant in cases requiring continuous coordination of humanitarian efforts and cases requiring humanitarian efforts over a prolonged period. 125) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the UN s supreme committee for the coordination of international efforts in humanitarian crises. The committee includes all humanitarian players, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross and other voluntary organisations, and it is chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. action plan to strengthen the HC system in April This was intended to contribute to the best possible recruitment of personnel to these positions, and to their training. In UNICEF s opinion, however, this part of the humanitarian reform has only been partially successful so far. As far as the UN s management role is concerned, the Norwegian Consulate General in Juba points out in an interview that some UN agencies seem to function well in Southern Sudan, while others function less well. The Consulate General points to the many critical opinions voiced about how the UN operates in Southern Sudan, but it also emphasises that it is generally a great challenge for the UN to find enough personnel in this part of the country. Whether the organisations are run efficiently and achieve their goals depend on the persons in leading positions, according to the Consulate General. Weak management of coordination efforts is also an important challenge for the cluster system (see Chapter 5.2.3). This is pointed out both by OCHA in an interview and in the most recent evaluation of the cluster approach carried out on assignment for OCHA. The weak management is related to unclear and varying understanding of the role among cluster managers, unwillingness to accept leadership responsibility and great differences in quality between the managers. The problems relating to differences in quality were also pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council in the interview survey. The Norwegian Refugee Council emphasises in an interview that a well-functioning Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and, if relevant, also an OCHA manager, is critical if the clusters are to function as expected. One example of a country/crisis in which weak UN management has weakened the cluster approach is the handling of Iraqi refugees in Syria. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Resident Coordinator and the heads of the various UN agencies in Syria were appointed with development work in mind, not to handle a refugee situation. It is also important at cluster level to have a wellfunctioning cluster manager. This is emphasised by one of the UN agencies operating in Uganda. One of the most important factors is that the person in charge is able to bring everyone together in a combined effort. A strong cluster manager means a strong cluster. The experience Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 77

80 from Uganda is that the degree of management and involvement varies from cluster to cluster More about the cluster approach As mentioned above, the cluster approach is one of the main elements in the UN s humanitarian reform, and the purpose of this approach is to ensure a more rapid response and better coordination of humanitarian efforts in the field. Norway also supports the implementation of the cluster approach as part of its support of OCHA s work on the humanitarian reform. Experience of the cluster approach so far OCHA states in an interview that the general impression among the humanitarian players so far is that the cluster approach has a general potential to improve the efficiency of international humanitarian assistance. In this context, OCHA points in particular to the increased possibilities for covering different needs, strengthening the general response capacity and increasing predictability in the management of efforts in different fields. These factors are also emphasised in the abovementioned evaluation of the cluster approach. 126 In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasises as a positive aspect of the cluster approach that it has led to the different players knowing more about each other s work. This statement was based on experience from the earthquake disaster in Pakistan. This increased knowledge has helped create better coordination and less overlapping. The sharing of information, improved mapping and less duplication of humanitarian efforts are also pointed out as positive elements by several UN agencies operating in Uganda. On the basis of the above-mentioned experiences, OCHA has therefore decided to make the cluster approach a permanent model that will be used in all new crises where expedient. The Norwegian Refugee Council, referring to the organisation s generally close cooperation with the UN and active participation in such coordination, also states that it sees no alternative to the cluster approach, even if this approach can sometimes be both demanding and difficult to implement. The Norwegian Refugee Council therefore sees it as positive that the Norwegian authorities have generally supported the cluster approach, politically as well as financially. However, the field surveys and other interviews and evaluations show that the cluster approach also faces significant challenges in terms of coordination. Several of these challenges resemble the more general challenges mentioned above. The most important of them are discussed below. Weak cluster management: As mentioned above, weak management is also a major challenge for the cluster approach. An example of weak cluster management that emerged during the investigation is the UN Development Programme s (UNDP) management of the cluster for early reconstruction in Uganda. In broad terms, it came to light that the UNDP, in spite of its long-standing presence in Uganda, is weak, that the organisation is not very visible, that it is not doing its job and does not achieve results in the area. This is also detrimental to other clusters. In addition, it has led to OCHA, UNHCR, CARE and the Norwegian Refugee Council, among others, having to do part of the UNDP s job. 127 The Norwegian Embassy in Uganda points out in an interview that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been informed about these problems, which the Ministry confirmed. In this context, the Ministry points out that Norway has challenged the UNDP about this on several occasions. Meetings for the sake of meetings : OCHA points out that participation in clusters has often been synonymous with participating in many meetings that are demanding in terms of resources, and that have also often been poorly chaired. This is confirmed in the investigation by both UN agencies and NGOs. It is said that, while it is positive to meet, talk together and share information, too little action results. The cluster approach is very process-focused, and there is often no goal for the work. These meetings are therefore often not very productive. The cluster model is bureaucratic and demanding in terms of resources: This is confirmed by several of the international organisations operating in Uganda. They refer to the model being very bureaucratic and very time-consuming, and that a large organisation is therefore needed to be able to attend as many meetings as the clusters demand. This is not least a problem for the NGOs. It is therefore also emphasised that the model is very demanding in terms of resources. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that 126) OCHA (2007): Cluster Approach Evaluation. Final Draft, Dr Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, Katherine Haver, Dr Dirk Salomon, p ) This was pointed out during the field survey in Uganda, the interview survey in the Ministry and interviews with UNICEF in New York and the Norwegian Embassy in Uganda. 78 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

81 there are high costs in connection with transfers of funds between the UN and the NGOs, which the Ministry considers to be unreasonable if these costs relate just to the actual transfer of funds. One of the UN agencies in Uganda also questioned whether it is necessary to establish a whole new coordination system such as the cluster approach, and believes that it would have been a good alternative to strengthen OCHA s role. Diffi cult for the NGOs to receive funds via the clusters: In an interview, OCHA points out that some humanitarian players are under the impression that the cluster managers are primarily interested in their own organisations programmes and financial interests. There is therefore an impression that the cluster managers do not always put all their cards on the table. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of its experience with the cluster approach in Pakistan. According to the Ministry, several of the cluster managers in Pakistan were unprofessional. In the Ministry s opinion, this must be seen in connection with the fact that these managers were often recruited from the NGOs, and that they were in several capacities at the same time. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated funds directly to the UN agencies with cluster manager responsibility in Pakistan. However, the assumption was that the UN agencies would pass on funds to other NGOs and ensure good and well-coordinated collaboration. This did not function satisfactorily. The field survey also shows that it can be particularly problematic for the NGOs in cases where they have problems obtaining funds from the clusters, at the same time as the donors insist that that is where they are to obtain their funding. There are, however, also positive experiences of financing via clusters. The Norwegian Refugee Council points to DR Congo as such an example in an interview. In the Norwegian Refugee Council s opinion, the international players in DR Congo have come far in terms of coordination and the establishment of clusters, which it believes must also be seen in connection with the availability of emergency aid funds via a separate emergency aid fund. As the Norwegian Refugee Council sees it, participation in clusters and coordination will naturally be more attractive if this participation is accompanied by resources Norwegian contributions to coordination in the field / at country level The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in the interview survey that it is demanding for Norway to be an active donor in the field and to participate in donor coordination in individual countries, particularly in countries in which Norway has no foreign service mission. In this context, the Ministry refers to the fact that other donors, for example the UK (DFID) and the EU (ECHO), have much higher staffing levels in the recipient countries than Norway does, and that these donors can therefore follow up their donations in the field much more closely. Norway therefore tries to follow up via donor country visits organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). According to the Ministry, these visits provide a good picture of the organisations efforts in the field. In addition, in its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry also states that, in the countries in which Norway has a presence, greater involvement by the embassies has resulted in greater Norwegian efforts to follow up humanitarian issues, including coordination at country level. UNHCR refers in an interview to the general close cooperation and regular contact between the agency s offices and the relevant Norwegian foreign service missions in the field, as well as regular donor meetings. However, the UNHCR adds that these contacts vary from country to country, depending on the degree of Norwegian presence in the country in question. The UNHCR points out that, in parallel with cooperation in the field, there is also regular contact between its head office and the Norwegian mission to the UN in Geneva about operations of common interest. The UNHCR points to countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan in particular as examples of countries where the agency has experienced good cooperation with Norwegian authorities. As regards the Norwegian contribution to coordination in the field, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that the Ministry is not the implementing party, nor is it in a position to ensure that all projects are coordinated and part of a whole. According to the Ministry, responsibility for coordination in the field therefore lies with the humanitarian players present, i.e. at the operational level, and it is assumed that the organisations will contribute to such coordination. The Ministry informs that it endeavours to ensure a holistic perspective through the various forums in Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 79

82 which Norway is represented, and through direct dialogue with the organisations that receive funds under Chapter 163. The Ministry points out that it supports the efforts to develop good systems in the implementing organisations in order to ensure that uncovered needs are met as far as possible and to avoid overlapping. It assumes that the organisations view their efforts in the larger context in the country in question. Examples of how Norway contributes to coordination at country level in the three countries visited are presented in the following. Sudan The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that cooperation between the donor countries in Sudan is good, and that the Ministry is not aware of any disagreement about the UN Work Plan for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development in Sudan. The Ministry states that Norway contributes to donor coordination through political support for the UN s Humanitarian Coordinator and, more concretely, through use of the Work Plan as a financing tool, support for CHF (see Chapter 5.1.5) and by participating in humanitarian update meetings. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees it, the UN Work Plan and CHF are the most important measures in terms of achieving the goal of an overall, coordinated strategic effort in Sudan, and the Ministry therefore considers the Work Plan to be part of the Norwegian humanitarian strategy for the country. According to the Ministry, Norway also works to strengthen international coordination of the efforts in Sudan. The Norwegian Embassy in Sudan, however, states that it has no knowledge of how other donors prioritise their efforts in relation to the Work Plan, and it points out that there is little coordination between donors in terms of what should be given support and priority. A separate advisory group consisting of representatives of the UN/CHF and various donors, including Norway, has been set up in connection with the CHF. The embassy states that the potential for coordination in this group has not been utilised, and that its meetings appear to be ad hoc and not very structured. The Ministry confirms that the embassy in Sudan does not have sufficient capacity to participate in all the relevant meetings concerning the Common Humanitarian Fund. In addition, the embassy states that OCHA holds regular meetings in Khartoum every two weeks about the situation in Darfur, and that UN agencies, donors and NGOs participate. The embassy participates in these meetings. While no decisions are made at these meetings, information is shared and the participants bring each other up to date. According to the embassy, the meetings function well as information exchange meetings. UN representatives in Sudan, for their part, emphasise that the Norwegian humanitarian efforts are important in several fields. They also point to Norway as being relatively good at informing OCHA about its planned donations, and at making donations to organisations and projects in Sudan not covered by the Work Plan. This is important in order for OCHA to have an overview of what is covered / not covered in different regions and clusters in Sudan at any given time. At the same time, however, it points out that more involvement from the donors, including Norway, would be welcomed in the processes relating to the formulation and marketing of the Work Plan. This would help to make the plan a tool for all humanitarian players in Sudan. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) was mentioned as an organisation that operates differently from Norway and other major donors. DFID is in a class of its own ; it is active in most forums and processes, often plays a leading role in the CHF advisory group and also often take initiatives in other areas, as well. Norway and other donors generally play a less active role. UN representatives, however, see this in connection with the small staff and limited resources of the Norwegian Embassy. Regarding Southern Sudan in particular, the Norwegian Consulate General refers in an interview to the monthly meetings it holds with Norwegian organisations at which different issues are considered. These meetings are informal and without a very rigid agenda, enabling topical issues to be discussed at all times. One of the Norwegian NGOs that operate in this area points to these meetings as an important forum for the exchange of information between the organisations and the Consulate General. Uganda The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that the embassy in Uganda holds regular meetings with the Norwegian organisations, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, both in Kampala and locally. The embassy also participates in coordination meetings for donors and, according to the Ministry, 80 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

83 plays a central role in these meetings. The Ministry also states that Norway has been a driving force in the work to establish a Humanitarian Coordinator in Uganda, but so far without success. The embassy has also put pressure on organisations that have not functioned satisfactorily in Uganda. The UNDP is one of them. Another example of the Norwegian efforts to get players to improve their performance is the work to get the UNHCR to send more of its people out into the field so that the agency can take on coordinator responsibility in Northern Uganda. This has not been successful, however. However, the Norwegian Embassy in Uganda points out that its resources are relatively small in relation to its tasks, and that the level of ambition must therefore continuously be seen in the context of the available resources. If the embassy had had more resources or been able to change its priorities, it would have devoted more resources to strategic thinking and to influencing the humanitarian processes in Uganda. Follow-up and work on the cluster approach would also have been given higher priority had more resources been available. According to the embassy, the Ministry expects the embassy to work with the clusters in the cluster approach, but the embassy does not have the capacity required for this. Nor is there room for change given the embassy s other areas of responsibility and limited resources. Several UN agencies in Uganda express a high opinion of Norway and the Norwegian authorities. They point out that Norway is a good donor, and that they have good and regular contact with the Norwegian Embassy. The embassy is also seen as being clear in its communication. At the same time, however, the agencies also point out that Norway has a small embassy. The Palestinian Territory The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that Norway chairs the ad hoc liaison committee (AHLC), which is an international donor forum / coordinating body for aid to the Palestinian Territory. Norway also chairs the local donor group, which is an administrative body for donor coordination in the Palestinian Territory. As regards humanitarian assistance in particular, Norway works through multilateral channels such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other UN agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also plays an important role. According to the Ministry, Norway also has good contact with the World Bank concerning matters relating to Norwegian budgetary support. According to the Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory, the office tries to monitor all the most important political, developmental and humanitarian processes in the Palestinian Territory, multilateral as well as bilateral, and to participate in all relevant forums. This is demanding in terms of resources, but the Representative Office points out that it has relatively plentiful resources for this work. UN representatives in the Palestinian Territory speak highly of Norway as chair of the donor country committee. They point out that Norway, by taking on this leading role, contributes to better coordination between donors, so that their contributions do not come with too many different demands. In addition, Norway always involves the Palestinian National Authority. The same representatives also state that the situation depends on Norway s ability to maintain relationships with everybody: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU etc. In relation to humanitarian assistance in particular, however, they would like Norway to take the initiative to improve donor coordination, both in terms of assessment of needs and financing of the consolidated appeal. It is also pointed out that so far Norway has not made it a regular practice to give the UN an overview of its bilateral support in the Palestinian Territory. Such information would be highly appreciated. It could be entered in the Financial Tracking Service database, thereby improving the overview of humanitarian activities in the area. 5.3 Local involvement As shown above, coordination is a goal in effective humanitarian assistance. Local involvement is another important goal. Any humanitarian effort should, if possible, be based on local capacity. 128 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that the humanitarian players must cooperate as far as possible with local organisations and local authorities. Local involvement is crucial in order 128) Local capacity refers to local voluntary organisations, networks and/or authority structures that have the knowledge and capacity to identify vulnerable groups, humanitarian needs, necessary preventive measures etc. in an emergency situation, and that will themselves play a role in the implementation of the efforts. Report No 9 to the Storting ( ). Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 81

84 to ensure as effective humanitarian assistance as possible in the short term and support reconstruction and sustainable development in the long term. Donors shall strengthen the capacity of the countries affected to prevent, prepare for and deal with future humanitarian crises. 129 The humanitarian projects must be in line with local needs and priorities. This also applies to the concrete activities. One important element in this context is that humanitarian players must carry out good needs assessments. It is also important that the planning and implementation take the local context into consideration, that key stakeholders participate, and that the different needs of different sections of the population are taken into account. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that these considerations are taken into account. Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian NGOs, foreign service missions, Red Cross and UN agencies have shown that they all consider close cooperation with local resources, both at official level and in the local community, to be an essential part of humanitarian efforts. For example, both Médecins Sans Frontières and Norwegian People s Aid stress in interviews that the reason for their close collaboration with national and local authorities is to ensure coordination and legitimacy in the countries in which the organisations operate. The organisations also want to facilitate the practical implementation of the operations and contribute to building capacity through this collaboration. The recruitment and training of local personnel is particularly important in relation to building capacity. NORWAC, which primarily works in the Palestinian Territory, states in an interview that part of the organisation s local involvement policy has been to deal with what are considered to be the official Palestinian health authorities at all times. One of the most important motives for pursuing this policy is a desire to contribute to the development of a public Palestinian health service and the building of health institutions. Challenges relating to local involvement will be discussed in more detail below. The opportunities for local involvement are limited in cases where local partners lack the interest, ability or expertise to contribute. 129) Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship To what degree are local players involved? The extent to which the humanitarian players actually involve local resources in their efforts varies in many humanitarian crises. In many contexts, local communities and local and national authorities feel set aside by international organisations. This applies to both the planning and the implementation phase. The evaluation following the tsunami in Southeast Asia uncovered many examples of this, and many humanitarian players did not take local capacity into account. It is the general experience from many humanitarian crises that humanitarian help undermines rather than strengthens local capacity. Many evaluation reports also find that those affected are not given sufficient information. This lack of information causes a lot of frustration and a feeling of powerlessness, which could undermine future development. The lack of information about reconstruction plans limits the capacity of those affected to continue their own efforts for development. It has also been pointed out that, during the tsunami, the NGOs did not involve different representatives of the local communities, but focused on village leaders alone. 130 Opinions about and examples of lack of local involvement are also found in both the field and interview surveys. Challenges relating to local involvement were confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry emphasises in an interview that both the foreign service missions and the Ministry could improve their efforts to involve and use local players in humanitarian crises. This was also the case during the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Greater focus on local resources would probably have produced better results, in both the short and the long term. The Ministry points out that both the NGOs and the UN system should have been more attentive to local needs and points of view during the earthquake, although the embassy s decision to support a local NGO was evaluated positively in an evaluation of the Norwegian efforts during the earthquake. The organisation had the necessary expertise and a large network, which helped to ensure that the humanitarian efforts were implemented quickly. 131 According to the Ministry, however, local resources and organisations are often set aside in humanitarian crises, which is negative since they often have more knowledge 130) Norad, Synthesis Report No 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings, 131) Chr. Michelsen Institute, R 2006: 18: Review of Norwegian Earthquake Assistance to Pakistan 2005 and Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

85 and awareness of the reasons for the scope of the crises than the central authorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses in its letter of 8 August 2008 that it is often easier to base humanitarian efforts on cooperation with local resources in natural disasters than in complex crises, since social structures often remain intact after natural disasters, but that this of course varies from situation to situation. The Ministry points to cooperation with local players on the prevention of natural disasters as an area with particular potential. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) and the organisations must become better at achieving a good dialogue with local people about how resources can be obtained locally. Local competence development is also not given sufficient focus. It was stated that NOREPS has a strong desire to involve local resources to a greater extent. However, an evaluation of NOREPS shows that this system is probably not the most expedient mechanism for increasing local capacity in connection with natural disasters. The evaluation also points out that both the Ministry of Foreign Affair and the Norwegian NGOs have a potential for improvement in relation to strengthening local capacity. 132 As regards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs efforts to promote local involvement, OECD- DAC s peer review in 2005 points out that it is unclear whether Norway ensures that the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance are involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian efforts. The peer review emphasises that Norway works to promote local involvement by encouraging its implementing organisations to cooperate with local organisations and involve the beneficiaries in the projects. However, the OECD-DAC recommends Norway to consider measures to ensure user involvement, and that user involvement should also be addressed in an overall humanitarian strategy. 133 UNICEF, for example, expresses concern in an interview that the donor countries, including Norway, do not give priority to capacity development at the national or local level. The donors appear to expect these activities to be covered by the organisations administrative budgets, but according to UNICEF this is not possible. In UNICEF s opinion, the donors do not give priority 132) Norad Evaluation Report 1/2008: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS). 133) OECD (2005): DAC Peer Review Norway to capacity building because support for capacitybuilding activities does not make donors sufficiently visible, unlike direct support in humanitarian crises. UNICEF also states that Norway has no clear policy for integrating capacity building in humanitarian assistance. Capacity building should be integrated in strategies and goals for Norwegian humanitarian assistance to a much greater extent than is the case today. Norway can also play a more active role in relation to other donors, NGOs and UN agencies in terms of emphasising the importance of capacity building. It is pointed out in the field surveys that both the humanitarian players and the donor countries have a potential for improvement as regards ensuring local involvement. For example, the embassy in Uganda points out in an interview that several humanitarian organisations in the country are not good enough at involving local and national authorities in their work. The field survey shows that the consequences of this lack of involvement may be that the organisations define the terms for development too much, with the result that the authorities do not become the genuine participants they must be in order to take responsibility for their own development and take over the tasks when the international organisations leave. It is emphasised that in order to facilitate development in the country, the international players must attempt to increase the authorities capacity by collaborating closely with them. It was pointed out that the donor countries, including Norway, must put pressure on the humanitarian organisations to involve the local Ugandan authorities to a greater extent. Another challenge pointed out relates to the cultural differences and differences in competence between employees of the international aid system on the one hand and the local population on the other. In an interview, Norwegian People s Aid refers to this problem in Southern Sudan. As Norwegian People s Aid sees it, many of the international players seem to be insensitive to and have limited understanding of and insufficient competence to deal with the local population s particular qualifications and needs. When the Sudanese apply for work or to become subcontractors for the international organisations, for example, they are presented with complicated forms and documentation requirements that the majority of them are not qualified to deal with. Norwegian People s Aid sees that local capacity building will of course suffer as a result. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 83

86 As regards the UN s involvement of local people, several of the players in the field survey point out that the UN does not involve local resources enough in its work. Opinions were voiced during the field survey in Uganda that it is typical of how some UN agencies work, and of their view of the local authorities, that the UN invites UN agencies to take part in working groups to discuss the topic of good governance without inviting the authorities in the country. It is also pointed out that the UN invites international organisations to weekly information meetings in Southern Sudan, but that these meetings are not open to national organisations. Norwegian People s Aid states in an interview that it is problematic that, so far, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Southern Sudan has not placed much emphasis on coordinating with national authorities or contributing to training and capacity building in Southern Sudan. The result is that the UN and the Sudanese authorities have established parallel coordination units for mine clearance work, units that do not cooperate or communicate to any great extent. The national authorities are often completely sidelined. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that it is less clear in the case of the UN system than for the NGOs how it involves local players in operations and projects. The lack of involvement is confirmed by an evaluation report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which found that the development of response capacity at the national and local level has never been a priority area in humanitarian efforts. The report also points out that the UN has not succeeded in giving this sufficient priority through the cluster approach either. 134 At the same time, however, the field and interview surveys show that the local authorities and cooperation with these authorities can be a challenge for the humanitarian players (see Text Box 10 for examples): it varies how willing and interested the countries authorities are in cooperation lack of capacity and resources to deliver services to the population authorities sceptical of the international efforts corruption 134) Cluster Evaluation Report, Final Draft, November 2007, p. 13. OCHA Evaluation and Studies Section. Text Box 10 Examples of challenges related to local authorities In Sudan, it is pointed out that the authorities are unwilling to face the fact that the country is facing humanitarian problems. This makes the humanitarian organisations' work difficult. The Norwegian Refugee Council s work in Darfur is one example. The Norwegian Refugee Council emphasises in an interview that it cooperated with village chiefs and other local players in various refugee camps in Darfur in order to, among other things, obtain information about the population s need for humanitarian assistance. However, the organisation s work was not popular with the Sudanese authorities, and the Norwegian Refugee Council was accused of espionage and thrown out of Darfur in The Israeli blockade of the Palestinian Territory is an example of another challenge faced by humanitarian players. Checkpoints, control of people s movements and requirements for permits and identification papers places constraints on how the humanitarian players can operate in the area. For example, Norway supports the Palestinian Red Crescent and its ambulance service via the Norwegian Red Cross. The ambulance service often has problems obtaining the permits required to drive. Often, ambulances are not allowed to pass Israeli roadblocks any faster than ordinary cars, with all the potential consequences for the patients of such delays. The field survey also shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the organisations to pass the wall. The administrative costs relating to access problems increase as the Israeli authorities introduce stricter security regulations. Corruption is also a problem for humanitarian players. Several of the players in the field surveys in Uganda and Sudan point to corruption as a major problem. Money channelled into the government system tends to disappear en route, including funds intended for transfer from the central government to the districts. The Norwegian Representative Office and key humanitarian players in the Palestinian Territory claim that there is a certain risk of corruption there, and that the systems for channelling funds to projects are not perfect. At the same time, the Office emphasises that corruption was not a major problem in the Palestinian Territory compared with many other countries More about the organisations use of local partners The collaboration between many humanitarian organisations and local partners will be discussed in more detail in the following. In the field survey 135) This emerged in interviews with the Norwegian Representative Office in Al Ram, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 84 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

87 in Sudan, it was pointed out as one of the advantages of working via local partners that they have a proximity to the local population that international players lack. It is often easier for local partners to gain access to affected local communities, because they know the local conditions and culture and speak the same language. Another advantage emphasised is that local partners can deliver services that no one else can deliver, and that they can easily mobilise their own employees and volunteers. Decisions made at the local level by local organisations can help increase credibility among the users. However, it emerges in the field surveys that there are certain weaknesses in relation to some local partners, for example limited capacity, insufficient competence, unsatisfactory assessment of needs, weak organisational structures, little capacity for, and understanding of the necessity of, reporting and auditing, little followup of projects and high turnover of employees because of low pay. It also emerges that follow-up of local partners can be demanding for the organisations. The more local partners NGO works through, the more demanding the follow-up. A representative of one of the Norwegian organisations in the Palestinian Territory points out that it can be highly demanding to follow up different organisations of varying size in a satisfactory manner. Both Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People s Aid are organisations that do a lot of their work through local partners worldwide. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, has more than 500 partners, ranging from small local organisations to large international church networks. 136 The Norad-initiated organisational reviews from 2007 recommends that the organisations reduce the number of partners. The reviews points out that fewer partners would make the organisations more capable of achieving quality and consistency in their work, reduce administrative costs and improve the quality of cooperation. 137 The field surveys in Sudan and the Palestinian Territory have shown that it can be demanding for some of the Norwegian organisations to get 136) Norad, report 1 /2007: Review: Partnership for a Just World. Organisational Performance Review Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). 137) Norad, report 4/2007 Review: Organisational Performance Review of Norwegian People s Aid: Synthesis Report and Norad, report 1/2007 Review: Partnership for a Just World. Organisational Performance Review Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The Israeli barrier in the West Bank, the Palestinian Territory. Photo: Glenn Roer their local partners to report satisfactorily on their activities. Norwegian Church Aid in Sudan emphasises that it can be a challenge to get local church organisations to report because many of these organisations see no point in reporting and see their partnership with Norwegian Church Aid as a relationship based on trust. Requiring formal reporting can be seen as an insult and as casting suspicion on their work. Norwegian People s Aid in the Palestinian Territory emphasises that it is demanding for many of the local partners to report on the challenges and difficulties they face. Another challenge relating to the partnership between Norwegian Church Aid and local churches is ensuring that the churches have the same agenda for the humanitarian efforts. Norwegian Church Aid has experienced cases in which its partners have had a private agenda for their work. Some churches may have a separate church agenda in addition to the humanitarian one. It can be a challenge to make churches understand that the health services they operate must be available to everyone, and that the church s own members should not be given priority. Tribal loyalty can be very strong in Africa, and to many people it is self-evident that their own people should take precedence. In order to help meet the challenges relating to follow-up, assessment of needs, project implementation, capacity and reporting, the Norwegian NGOs follow up their local partners through courses, regular partner meetings and training in, among other things, accounting systems, pro- Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 85

88 gramme development and reporting procedures. For example, Norwegian People s Aid in the Palestinian Territory points to the importance of being able to draw on its good network in the local communities in follow-up of new and old partners. When choosing new partners, Norwegian People s Aid is concerned that the organisation in question must be open to everyone and not discriminate on the basis of, for example, political views and religion. The Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory states in an interview that it is a challenge that the organisations spread their efforts too much, both in terms of the number of partners and the number of projects. The Representative Office s clear advice to the organisations is therefore to consolidate their portfolios, reduce the number of partners and projects, focus on fewer clusters, and utilise their comparative advantages. The Representative Office has also communicated the advice to limit the number of partners and be critical in choosing new ones to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 2007 activity plan for the Norwegian Embassy in Uganda emphasises that a review of the Norwegian organisations present in the country was desirable. The embassy points to the upcoming assessment of whether support will be given to as many organisations as at present and whether the support that is given to the different organisations is in accordance with Norwegian goals and priorities. Norad carried out such a review in early 2008, and the embassy will follow up the results in cooperation with the organisations. The project review shows that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recommended that Norwegian Church Aid in Southern Sudan and Norwegian People s Aid in the Palestinian Territory reduce the number of their local partners. 5.4 Connection between humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and long-term development In addition to helping to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after crises, humanitarian efforts should as far as possible support reconstruction and long-term development, endeavour to support the maintenance and re-establishment of sustainable subsistence systems and the transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and long-term development. 138 Adopting a long-term perspective in humanitarian assistance means that short-term activities must be carried out in a way that takes long-term problems into account. Good goal achievement in humanitarian assistance also includes long-term impacts, such as social, financial, technical, environmental and individual effects. 139 There is increasing focus on the link between short-term and long-term aid among humanitarian organisations and those involved in development, but the distinction between short-term and long-term aid is still emphasised as problematic in several evaluations of humanitarian efforts. 140 The distinction between the two types of aid is unclear, and there is disagreement about where to draw the line. 141 The challenges relate to the phase after acute humanitarian needs have more or less been met, and reconstruction after a natural disaster or complex crisis can begin, also called the transitional phase. Tasks of a long-term nature should ideally be taken over by development players when a humanitarian crisis enters a less acute phase, but these players often lack the capacity to move in quickly and take on such tasks. Therefore, situations have arisen in several conflict situations where there has been a gap between short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development aid. Sierra Leone and Liberia after the wars in the 1990s, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan were all mentioned in the interview survey as examples of countries where the transitional phase was not successful. Needs should govern what aid is given. 142 More than one type of aid will often be required at the same time in a situation in which both humanitarian needs and reconstruction needs are present. A connection must be established between emergency aid, reconstruction and development in order to cover the overall needs. Two key questions in this context are whether the framework for humanitarian aid facilitates a long-term perspective and sustainability in the humanitarian 138) Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 139) OECD (1999): Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, cf. ALNAP (2006): Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria. An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies. 140) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. 141) UK National Audit Office (2002): Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General , Session 5 November ) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 86 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

89 efforts, and whether the aid given is adequate and expedient in relation to the transitional phase. The prevention of humanitarian crises and strengthening of local capacity to improve preparedness are also important issues in the discussion about humanitarian assistance. 143 According to the principles of good humanitarian donorship, donors should strengthen the ability of local organisations and authorities in affected countries to prevent, prepare for and deal with future humanitarian crises. The organisations are expected to endeavour to implement emergency aid programmes that actively reduce the beneficiaries vulnerability to future crises and contribute to sustainable subsistence systems. 144 This chapter presents points of view on the established framework conditions and how they influence the humanitarian players ability and opportunity to consider long-term perspectives and sustainability in the implementation of humanitarian projects. It also deals with coordination between the different types of aid in the Norwegian government administration The emphasis on long-term development and transition in humanitarian assistance Organisations and donors priorities and emphasis on long-term development and transition in humanitarian assistance The report Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings shows that the gap between humanitarian assistance and long-term development assistance is a challenge despite growing international awareness of the need to reduce this gap. The report shows, for example, that the response to drought and famine disasters is often dealt with as a question of food shortage, at the expense of the necessary focus on subsistence and self-sufficiency. Instead, the efforts are directed at the distribution of food and medicines, which does not contribute to reducing vulnerability to new crises in the long term. The need for better linkage between humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development is one of the most important experiences to which the report draws attention. 145 This is confirmed in Report No 9 to the Storting 143) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship and Proposition No 1 to the Storting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ) The Red Cross Code of Conduct and the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 145) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. ( ) Norwegian policy for the prevention of humanitarian disasters. The review of evaluations also shows that it is difficult to mobilise sufficient financing for reconstruction in situations in which acute humanitarian needs remain in focus. The present system is based on the players assessments of what should be given priority and which channels are most expedient. This results in fragmentary efforts without the required planned and strategic approach, and weakens the opportunities for good dialogue with local and national authorities. 146 According to Report No 9 to the Storting ( ), the international aid system is better at providing first aid than at rebuilding robust communities after a crisis. The reports state that the same weaknesses characterise Norwegian aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms in an interview that there are major challenges relating to achieving good interaction between humanitarian efforts and long-term development measures. This must be solved by the long-term efforts also taking the short-term perspective into consideration, and vice versa. All the players; NGOs, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the donors, like Norway, have problems taking long-term perspectives into consideration in short-term efforts, according to the Ministry. Reference is made to the system problem of not enough attention and resources being invested in the transitional phase. For this reason, the Ministry has, as one of few donors to do so, chosen to establish a separate budget line for transitional assistance (see below for more details). As shown in Chapter 5.1, the cluster economic reconstruction and infrastructure was one of the clusters with the lowest proportion of financial coverage (29 per cent) from the donor countries in UN appeals. Several UN agencies and NGOs state in the interview survey that donors do not give sufficient priority to long-term perspectives and sustainability. This is confirmed by the field surveys. One of the organisations interviewed in the field survey felt that it was easier to get donors to support food aid and food distribution projects than programmes intended to increase the income basis for families, and that the donors are generally not very interested in reconstruction. Some organisations also point out that Norway as a donor does not sufficiently empha- 146) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 87

90 sise the long-term aspect of humanitarian assistance. UNICEF confirms in an interview that there is a lack of financing schemes that can ensure an effective transition from short-term to long-term aid, even though the aid organisations are often able to identify what the needs will be in a transitional phase. The field survey in Sudan contains an example of how the lack of expedient financing schemes limits an efficient transition from short-term to long-term financing. The Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan (CHF) was set up to channel funds to areas and clusters with the most critical needs (discussed in 5.1.5). 147 However, the field survey shows that it is a challenge to the organisations that the fund has a short-term focus and lacks mechanisms to bridge the gap between short-term and long-term aid. The Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 148 has also proven not to be effective enough in the early reconstruction phase. 149 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its letter of 8 August 2008 that most humanitarian operations draw a conceptual as well as an operational distinction between humanitarian efforts and long-term development aid. The investigation shows, however, that it is not always expedient for organisations working in the field that donors draw a sharp distinction between short-term and long-term development aid. The World Food Programme (WFP) in Uganda, for example, has experienced that financing for the food for education programme, which distributes food to school children, is in danger of being discontinued because the donors consider it to be a development measure rather than humanitarian assistance. No financing mechanisms have been established for projects and programmes of this type. According to the WFP, this is an example of the unfortunate consequences of the lack of financing mechanisms and donors lack of flexibility. The field survey in Uganda also shows that the challenge of linking humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and long-term development is particularly relevant there (see Text Box 11). 147) Supported by Norway in the amount of NOK 105 million in ) Not supported under Chapter 163, but under Chapter 162 Transitional aid. 149) Proposition No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian policy for the prevention of humanitarian disasters. Text Box 11 Challenges relating to linking humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and long-term development in Uganda There are still extensive humanitarian needs in Uganda, but the country is in a phase in which there is a growing need for aid aimed at reconstruction and long-term development. It has, however, proved to be a challenge to achieve a successful link between humanitarian assistance and long-term development. Most organisations interviewed during the field survey in Uganda state that the international community has been unable to ensure a successful transition from short-term humanitarian aid to transitional aid and long-term aid in Uganda. Explanations given for this lack of success include the lack of financing mechanisms, the donors lack of prioritisation of reconstruction and transitional phases, and lack of flexibility among aid organisations that would allow them exceed their remits. Several of the UN agencies and NGOs interviewed are clearly sceptical about whether the international donor community and the organisations working in Uganda will be able to create a successful transition from shortterm humanitarian aid to long-term development assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also states that, as far as possible, humanitarian aid to Uganda, transitional measures and long-term development aid must be seen as a whole and pull in the same direction in order to improve the goal achievement of the overall efforts in Uganda. International awareness of crisis prevention as an important element in ensuring the long-term impact of aid has increased. The Ministry of Foreign Affair points out in an interview that there is growing international recognition of the importance of prevention. Disasters that occur can have profound consequences for a country s development and limit many years investment in both humanitarian assistance and more longterm development assistance. According to Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian policy for the prevention of humanitarian disasters, it is a general weakness of inter national aid that it is better at providing first aid than at prevention. Several organisations states in the interview survey that the Norwegian authorities do not emphasise prevention and preparedness for future crises and enduring crises enough, and that there is not enough understanding of the importance of having emergency reserves for prevention purposes. Building local capacity 88 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

91 and cooperation with local players are also important aspects in relation to the long-term perspective and prevention. As shown in Chapter 5.3, there are challenges in relation to involving local people and capacity building in connection with humanitarian assistance. Even though it is an explicit goal for many humanitarian players to promote local involvement, interviews with Norwegian organisations and the field survey have shown that there is room for improvement as regards the organisations and the UN system s ability and willingness to involve local resources in both the planning and the implementation phase. Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) states that there is a need for a more holistic policy with respect to how Norway should contribute to the prevention of humanitarian disasters. This will be achieved through improved internal coordination between short-term and long-term aid across budget lines and areas of responsibility in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry will also contribute to increasing understanding for and knowledge about the need to prevent humanitarian disasters through increased support for south-south cooperation and the exchange of experience. The organisations ability to deal with transition and emphasise the long-term perspective Humanitarian aid and development aid have traditionally been seen as two different spheres. This distinction is institutionalised in the division of labour between humanitarian players and development organisations within the international aid system. 150 In the same way as many donor countries want a clear distinction between short-term emergency aid and development aid, many NGOs and UN agencies are also specialised in either the humanitarian field or as development organisations. Both the international Red Cross system and Médecins Sans Frontières are first and foremost specialists in short-term humanitarian aid. Other organisations have a more long-term focus, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which is mainly involved in reconstruction and development work. Norwegian Church Aid is one of the few organisations with an approach which attempts to combine short-term and long-term aid in its country programme plans. 150) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. During the field survey in Uganda, several players stated that it is a challenge that organisations often take a long time to switch from a humanitarian approach to a more long-term approach, and that they are too focused on working on the basis of their own remits and are not sufficiently capable of focusing on the humanitarian aspect, reconstruction and development at the same time. A consequence of this is that the needs that arise during the period following a crisis are not met, and that therefore no basis is laid for long-term development. These factors will influence the success of the transition from short-term aid to long-term development. The Norwegian Embassy in Uganda states in an interview that it plans to gather all relevant Norwegian NGOs in Uganda for a seminar focusing on the role the organisations can play in civil society and how the transition from humanit arian aid to development aid should be planned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that it is rational for different players to work in the fields of humanitarian and longterm aid because they are different fields, but it is a problem that no structures exist to achieve good cooperation and a good transition between the two. The UN has implemented measures to improve transitions by using a separate cluster for early reconstruction after humanitarian crises in the cluster approach, and, according to the Ministry, Norway has contributed important earmarked funds for such measures. The Ministry believes that this has contributed to increasing the focus on the transitional phase, but it emphasises that this must be an issue in all clusters. In the Ministry s opinion, however, these efforts have yet to succeed and many challenges remain in this field, for example relating to the development players capacity. More about the organisation of humanitarian efforts and projects phasing-out and exit strategies The project review, interviews with the organisations in Oslo and the field surveys all show that there is little planning for how humanitarian projects and programmes should be concluded. Plans for how to progress from humanitarian assistance to more long-term assistance are important in terms of preventing situations in which humanitarian assistance is given for many years after the end of a crisis. This requires the Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 89

92 inclusion of phasing out and discontinuation of humanitarian assistance in the planning of humanitarian programmes and projects. Ideally, all organisations should develop strategies for discontinuation of their humanitarian efforts the moment they enter a crisis (exit strategies). The continuation of projects often depends on local players who are capable of taking over. According to Report No 9 to the Storting ( ), poor capacity in recipient countries is one of the explanations for why the transitional phase can prove difficult. Several of the organisations interviewed in Norway and in the field confirm that insufficient capacity in terms of resources and expertise on the part of the local authorities is an obstacle to activities being taken over and continued following a phase-out. It is also often the case that there are no development players with a more long-term profile that can take over. Without these factors in place, a phase-out will have major consequences for those affected by a crisis, and new humanitarian crises can easily arise. Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, referred to several examples of the health situation deteriorating significantly when projects and activities were discontinued. In practice, the consequence is often that the projects last longer than planned. The discussion on phasing out and discontinuation of humanitarian assistance is relevant to Northern Uganda, but the field survey shows that few organisations have drawn up plans for this process. The embassy in Uganda states in an interview that the lack of plans for discontinuation and phasing out is a general weakness of many NGOs and UN agencies in the country. According to the embassy, the emphasis on a long-term perspective in humanitarian work requires greater focus on whether the measures will be relevant in the future, i.e. an approach that goes beyond mere survival. In the embassy s opinion, however, it is important to adopt a pragmatic approach to the requirements for sustainability and a long-term perspective in humanitarian assistance. Sometimes, desperate needs mean that decisions to implement projects must be taken without knowing whether the investment will prove as useful in a few years. Such projects can still be valuable learning experiences. Text Box 12 Examples of challenges relating to phasing out The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Sudan has chosen to withdraw from Juba Teaching Hospital from the turn of the year 2007/2008 after 14 years there, and to hand over the running of the hospital to the Southern Sudanese authorities. Even though the actual phasingout has been a three-year process in cooperation with the authorities, several of the humanitarian players in Southern Sudan are unsure about whether the authorities have sufficient capacity and finances to take over the running of the hospital. It will be a challenge for the authorities to recruit and pay health personnel. The ICRC confirms this, but believes that it will be possible to continue to run the hospital at an acceptable level. The ICRC also points out that the phase-out is in line with the organisation s remit. According to the embassy in Uganda, plans for phasing out and discontinuation will primarily serve as a framework for efforts and activities. There is always the question of how long to continue humanitarian assistance in a crisis. Norway should let this be governed by the actual needs in the area in question, which means that the traditional distinction between short-term and longterm aid will often be misleading, particularly in prolonged or chronic conflicts. In an interview, the Ministry points out that it endeavours to ensure that Norway provides humanitarian assistance for a longer period before withdrawing in order not to create a vacuum. Norway tries to let the humanitarian imperative govern its efforts as far as possible. The Ministry points out that it has a flexible approach to what can be supported by humanitarian funds. The focus should not just be on protecting the population and keeping it alive, but also on providing a basis for the population to become self-sufficient. If humanitarian players withdraw too soon, this could give rise to new humanitarian situations. In Sudan, for example, it is a problem that the humanitarian players are withdrawing before the development players have set up their systems. The organisation of financing It was pointed out above that it is problematic to raise sufficient financing for reconstruction, among other things, and that there is a lack of adapted financing mechanisms. It was pointed out in Chapter 5.1 that the interview survey and field surveys show that one-year grants entail challenges relating to the organisations possibility of planning for and facilitating a long-term perspec- 90 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

93 Table 14 Aid under Chapter 162, (NOK thousand) Transitional assistance Source: Norad tive in humanitarian assistance. Particular reference is made to the unpredictability of one-year grants for projects in countries that are in transition from a humanitarian situation to a long-term development phase. Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, states in an interview that the degree to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises the long-term aspect of humanitarian assistance varies, which the organisation believe can be explained by the one-year grants. Humanitarian assistance, transitional assistance and long-term development assistance are often given simultaneously to the same crises or countries. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Palestinian Territory, Pakistan and Sudan are all examples of countries in receipt of all of the above-mentioned types of aid. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is particularly important to begin reconstruction quickly and in parallel with humanitarian assistance in crises. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that it has endeavoured to become more systematic in its work on transitional situations. As part of this work, the Ministry has established a separate category of transitional assistance in order to bridge the gap between emergency aid and longterm development. The allocation was established in connection with the 2002 national budget. Text Box 13 Transitional assistance (Chapter 162) The purpose of this allocation is to contribute as early as possible to reconstruction and development in countries affected by particularly extensive and serious natural disasters, or to countries that attempt to work their way out of deep-seated violent conflicts. In this context, the transitional assistance will help to: improve the international community s competence and capacity to contribute in such contexts develop/reconstruct infrastructure and basic public functions and civil structures (political and administrative) create lasting solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons and ex-soldiers, and support demobilisation and reintegration measures promote reconciliation, democracy and respect for human rights Table 14 shows that transitional assistance has increased substantially since Transitional assistance is intended to bridge the gap between short-term and long-term development aid, but according to the report Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet ( New roles for NGOs in developmental cooperation ), criticism has been raised that transitional assistance is not sufficient to bridge this gap. Transitional assistance is primarily a measure aimed at covering a gap in financing during the transition from emergency aid to longterm aid. The allocation contributes little in terms of ensuring consistency between the implementation of humanitarian tasks and long-term aid. 151 The interview survey shows that this Norwegian initiative of establishing a separate allocation for the transitional phase has been welcomed by international humanitarian organisations. The interview survey of Norwegian NGOs, however, shows that they have varying experience and views of the transitional assistance. The Norwegian Refugee Council states that the grant is unpredictable both as regards its amount, what it is intended to cover and who administers it. The reason for this is assumed to be changing political priorities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Norwegian Red Cross is also under the impression that more stringent political guidelines apply to transitional assistance than to humanitarian grants. Norwegian Church Aid refers to a three-year transitional assistance programme in Sudan financed by transitional assistance and is satisfied with the scheme. However, the organisational review of Norwegian Church Aid shows that it has been a challenge that the transitional assistance funds have been allocated late. This has had consequences for the organisation s implementation of school projects in Sudan. 152 As mentioned, the Ministry still sees considerable challenges for the humanitarian community in 151) Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet. Report from a committee appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, submitted on 15 June 2006, pp ) Norad report 1/2007 Review: Partnership for a just world. Organisational Performance Review. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), p. 47. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 91

94 achieving a successful transition from humanitarian aid to development aid, and it also states that Norway has problems taking the long-term perspective sufficiently into account in short-term efforts, and in achieving a good transitional phase. However, the Ministry points out in its letter of 8 August 2008 that transitional assistance combined with a high degree of flexibility in the definition of humanitarian needs, particularly in complex crises, has resulted in Norway contributing more than other donor countries to creating linkage between types of aid. The Ministry points out that Norway has contributed important earmarked funds to measures for early reconstruction under the UN cluster approach. The Ministry also points out that a country that receives humanitarian assistancewill not automatically be granted transitional aid. The Ministry considers it important to concentrate transitional assistance on a few countries in order to ensure efficient use of funds for, among other things, peace-building measures, while such concentration is not a goal for humanitarian assistance. Coordination between humanitarian assistance, transitional assistance and long-term assistance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs According to Report No 1 to the Storting ( ), emphasis is placed on assessing Norway s total humanitarian assistance in an overall perspective related to other foreign policy goals and instruments. In budget recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ), the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs endorses the principle that humanitarian assistance must be an integrated part of development and foreign policy. Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters states that it is an overriding objective of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to create an overall approach that emphasises efficiency and swift results. This is important in order to secure the transitional phase and provide the basis for long-term development. Humanitarian assistance, transitional assistance and long-term development assistance are administered by different parts of the Ministry, Norad and the foreign service missions. Allocations to the different types of aid are also made via different budget lines. Humanitarian aid allocated under Chapter 163 is administered by the Section for Humanitarian Affairs in the Department for the UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs. The same department is responsible for cooperation with and follow-up of the UN. Responsibility for developmental policy and follow-up of individual countries and regions rests with the Department of Regional Affairs and Development. Transitional assistance is also administered by this department. The administration of humanitarian assistance is organised differently from country to country. Text Box 14 describes the Swedish administration system as presented in interviews with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Text Box 14 Administration of humanitarian assistance in Sweden In Sweden, the administration of humanitarian assistance is divided between the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The Ministry handles Sweden s international humanitarian political dialogue and is responsible for the overriding work of formulating policy in the humanitarian field and allocating funds to multilateral organisations. The Ministry also has administrative responsibility for Sida. Sida primarily works bilaterally, and it has operational responsibility for humanitarian operations, finances individual allocations, block grants and appeals for NGOs, among others. Sida also administers long-term aid. Both the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida emphasise that this administrative model ensures the necessary distance between the political system and the implementing organisation. This division of labour ensures a dynamic relationship between the political system and the humanitarian principles, and that as much as possible of the aid is governed by need. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlines that too close ties between the Ministry and humanitarian issues could result in too much detailed management. The Swedish model also ensures continuity in aid in connection with changes in the political leadership. According to OECD-DAC s 2005 peer review of Norway, the complex administrative structures and procedures that apply to humanitarian assistance require highly effective coordination. The administration of Norwegian humanitarian assistance and transitional assistance entails challenges as regards optimisation of intradepartmental and interdepartmental coordination in order to ensure efficiency and consistency. 153 OECD recommends that Norway ensures such coordination in order to optimise the humanitarian response and decision-making in connection with the financing of 153) OECD (2005): DAC Peer Review Norway. 92 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

95 humanitarian efforts. A successful transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and development often requires coordination between players who focus on emergency aid and players with a more long-term development focus. 154 The interview survey shows that, in the experience of several Norwegian NGOs, the Ministry s emphasis on long-term perspectives in humanitarian assistance varies. One of the reasons pointed to is the lack of coordination between different parts of the administration. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, states in an interview that better cooperation between the Ministry and Norad could help to achieve a longer-term perspective in the humanitarian assistance context. A more coordinated administrative regime in the Ministry as a whole combined with a more longterm strategic approach to aid as a whole would be ideal. The organisations point to the use of humanitarian funds in enduring crises and/or post-conflict situations as examples of particular challenges relating to the internal division of labour in the Ministry. The reason is that the involvement of and cooperation with the Department of Regional Affairs vary from case to case. This also applies to the relationship with Norad. The transitional phase between humanitarian assistance and long-term assistance, and projects that exist in the grey area between these two types of aid, is an area that is not given sufficient priority by the Ministry. According to Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian Policy for the Prevention of Humanitarian Disasters, the coordination of emergency assistance with long-term development cooperation is poor. The report stresses that coordination between short-term and long-term aid within the Ministry of Foreign Affair must be improved. This applies to reconstruction in particular, across budget lines and areas of responsibility. 155 As described above, the Norwegian Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory states that the lack of coordination between the different parts of the Norwegian aid administration represents a challenge. The office has therefore drawn up a strategy of its own for the period in order to ensure a holistic approach to the area. 154) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. EU (2007): The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. 155) Report No 9 to the Storting ( ) Norwegian policy for the prevention of humanitarian disasters, p. 6 The report Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet ( New roles for NGOs in developmental cooperation ) states that one possible solution to the lack of a long-term perspective in humanitarian assistance is to ensure greater integration between the public institutions that allocate funds to humanitarian and long-term aid. This could be done either by both these types of tasks being administered by the same institution or by formalising structures and procedures for cooperation between the institutions that administer the funds. 156 In the interview survey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that transitional measures and long-term development aid must be seen in context and pull in the same direction to ensure good goal achievement in humanitarian aid. The Ministry confirms that internal coordination is a challenge, and that there is a clear potential for improvement in terms of linking the different types of aid. According to the Ministry, it is a complicating factor that the aid budget consists of different items administered by different departments. At the same time, however, the Ministry points out that things are moving in the right direction as regards seeing the different types of aid as a whole. According to the Ministry, there is good internal cooperation in the Ministry as well as good cooperation with Norad and relevant foreign service mission with a view to ensuring a holistic approach to aid in individual countries. For example, separate teams consisting of representatives from different departments in the Ministry, Norad and other relevant ministries have been established for several countries, and this helps to create a more holistic approach. 5.5 Humanitarian assistance adapted to needs The final goal of humanitarian assistance is that it should contribute to covering humanitarian needs, thereby saving lives and alleviating suffering. The above sections describe the goals related to financing, coordination, local involvement and the connection with a long-term perspective. This section deals with the adaptation of humanitarian assistance to meet humanitarian needs. Pursuant to the principles for good humanitarian donorship, funds should be allocated on the basis 156) Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet. Report from a committee appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, submitted on 15 June Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 93

96 of the needs present and of an assessment of the needs. Humanitarian projects must be in line with local needs and priorities. Another central goal concerns coverage, which means reaching large population groups who are facing life-threatening suffering, regardless of where they are, and providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their needs. An important question here is whether the assistance given is proportionate to the needs in different areas at both the national and local level. Overview of unmet needs and the humanitarian situation Needs assessments are largely carried out by UN agencies and NGOs. Unmet needs are identified and an overview of the humanitarian situation obtained through needs assessments and monitoring of the situation in all phases of a humanitarian crisis and in the transition to reconstruction and development. Monitoring during humanitarian crises is important in order to quality assure that the help given is adequate in relation to the needs. The goal of achieving effective and fair humanitarian assistance and a good transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and development cannot be achieved without up-to-date and complete needs assessments and monitoring. 157 Evaluations of international humanitarian assistance reveal problems relating to obtaining an overview of needs in humanitarian crises and to whether needs are the basis for the aid given. It has also been shown that needs assessments are not sufficiently documented. There are many examples of poor practice in needs assessments and monitoring. In many cases, basic data on the humanitarian situation in an area are missing. It also emerges that it is demanding to coordinate needs assessments, and that there is too little capacity to carry out needs assessments. 158 The field surveys confirm that the organisations often have an inadequate overview of the humanitarian situation at all times during crises. The organisations therefore work on the basis of estimates or assumptions about the situation. The field surveys in Uganda and Sudan show inade- quate registration of internally displaced refugees. This makes it difficult to assess the existing needs and where the people in need are at any given time. One example mentioned is the unclear situation relating to the state of health of and health services for refugees who leave camps and move to areas closer to their original homes. Many humanitarian players carry out needs assessments. The field surveys show that the coordination of needs assessments and monitoring is demanding. It is pointed out that this is still demanding for the UN agencies, even though the cluster approach was intended, among other things, to improve this situation. See also Chapter 5.2 on coordination. It is also pointed out that it is a challenge for the UN agencies, NGOs, local and regional authorities and local organisations to reorient themselves from an acute emergency to a situation requiring extensive needs assessment and monitoring relating to long-term aid. It is pointed out that work is being done to raise competence in order to ensure that all players improve in this area, particularly after the first phase of the crisis is over. It is emphasised that constant assessments and monitoring are required in order to assess which measures to implement. Several players stress that it is difficult to decide whether the aid is effective if needs assessments and monitoring are inadequate and the status of a number of indicators is unknown. The basic principle in humanitarian assistance is that all groups needs shall be met. The protection of vulnerable groups in complex emergency situations is a key consideration. Women and children are particularly vulnerable groups in humanitarian crises, and they therefore have special needs. 159 Evaluations show that the needs of vulnerable groups are not identified to a sufficient degree. 160 One example referred to is that the gender dimension is not taken into account in humanitarian operations. The gender dimension has been identified as one of the weakest points in humanitarian activities, even though examples of good practice are also pointed out ) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. Overseas Development Institute (2003), Humanitarian Policy Group: Briefing paper number 13, According to Need? Needs Assessments and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector, James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 158) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. Overseas Development Institute (2003), Humanitarian Policy Group: Briefing paper number 13, According to Need? Needs Assessments and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector, James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 159) Cf. UN Resolution 1325 from 2006 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Action Plan for Women s Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation ( ). 160) Overseas Development Institute (2003), Humanitarian Policy Group: Briefing paper number 13, According to Need? Needs Assessments and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector, James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 161) Norad, Synthesis Report 1 /2007: Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: A synthesis of Evaluation Findings. 94 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

97 The organisations in Oslo and in the countries visited state that they focus on uncovering the needs of all groups, and that groups with special needs are given special attention. However, they point out that this as a demanding task in many cases. Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, points out in an interview that input from different groups and from more/larger areas is important in terms of arriving at the best possible needs assessment. Médecins Sans Frontières also states that it is sometimes a challenge to achieve an overview of needs in a large geographical area, and that there is a risk that some areas of great need will not be discovered by the organisations and/or the authorities. It is important that all sections of the population in an area benefit from the assistance given. Uneven involvement and distribution can reinforce any existing conflicts, and this can make the area less safe for the aid organisations. Médecins Sans Frontières also states that identifying and meeting the needs of all groups is a major challenge, for example the needs of women, children and the elderly. Unmet humanitarian needs The challenges relating to obtaining an overview of needs in humanitarian crises were discussed above. Without an overview of the needs, it will be difficult to have an overview of whether the needs are met. Below is a more detailed description of unmet humanitarian needs found in the field surveys. the rest of the world than Darfur and Southern Sudan. The authorities are very restrictive when it comes to allowing the organisations access to the area. 162 In Uganda, too, there are areas that do not receive enough attention (Karamoja in the north east). The field surveys show that households humanitarian needs are only partly met in Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory, and that there is a large gap between the actual needs and what is offered by the international humanitarian system. Examples include the following: A Norwegian Church Aid project visit to Isoke in Southern Sudan uncovered examples of basic needs not being met, and also that it is difficult to reach the weakest groups because the needs of the community as a whole are so great. Undernourishment and malnutrition are a big problem, for example. There are very few health service and educational facilities in the camps for internally displaced persons outside Khartoum in Sudan. The schools that do exist are run by the community itself. Several humanitarian players in Sudan point out that the humanitarian community is unable to meet the needs in the country: shelter, water and subsistence, basic health services and an educational sector with poor-quality buildings and poorly qualified teachers. The humanitarian needs are complex and require a holistic and broad-based effort from the authorities in the country in question and the humanitarian system. Meeting all existing needs is a challenge. The needs are usually greater than the UN, the NGOs and the authorities are able to meet. Chapter 5.1 showed that the financing of the international humanitarian system is inadequate. The field surveys show significant variation in the degree to which the humanitarian needs are met, both between geographical areas and clusters. The organisations interviewed in Sudan, for example, point out that it is a problem that the coverage of humanitarian needs varies between different parts of the country. Several of the organisations state that the crisis in Darfur has contributed to a reduction in grants to other parts of Sudan, and that this could have negative consequences for the implementation of the peace agreement. The Ministry states in an interview that Eastern Sudan is a marginalised area that has received much less attention from Norway and Return area in Northern Uganda, cf. text box 15. Poto: Berthe Blakstvedt 162) Norway gave funds to a health project under the auspices of Médecins Sans Frontières in Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 95

98 NGOs and UN agencies in Uganda point out that the population s basic needs in terms of education, health, water and sanitary facilities etc. are not met. Text Box 15 presents an example of the challenges people face when they go back to their return areas. Text Box 15 Examples from a return area in Northern Uganda (Pabbo, Gulu) The residents of the return area have moved out of an original camp. They feel that it is home, they have more space and they can farm their own land. People therefore wish to stay in this area despite experiencing a number of problems. Moreover, it was also pointed out that in spite of food shortages, the availability of food is better than it was in the camp. But many needs remain unmet: There is no school in the area. All school-age children therefore remain in the camp. However, the settlement has started building a school, hoping that NGOs will run it, but they have not been promised anything. There are also no health services in the area. A clinic was passed on the way to the return area. It had been restored, but was not staffed. A school established by an aid organisation near the return area was also passed. However, the school could not be used because the roof was so poorly built that it was feared it might fall in. It is very difficult to recruit health and teaching personnel. The residents have not received any help for farming, and they lack equipment. It was said that supplies from the World Food Programme (WFP) are unstable; they have received three-month rations twice. Part of these rations consisted of maize, which the residents said that they would have had to transport far to mill. They therefore sold the maize to buy other goods. It was also said that both seed corn and the 2007 harvest were ruined by the flood in August/September. Many of the children in the settlement were obviously malnourished. Both men and women stated that there was a shortage of various household articles such as pots and pans. There is also serious shortage of malaria nets, medicines and blankets. Access to water is a major problem. Water is fetched from a stream because the one water pump in the area is far away. The transition from an emergency aid situation / refugee situation to a reconstruction phase is a difficult period for a country. New service infrastructure must be established or re-established. This phase is very demanding in both Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, since the basic service infrastructure in the return areas is very limited. Several of the organisations in Sudan point out that the lack of service infrastructure in the return areas makes in difficult to get refugees and internally displaced persons to return in these two countries. In Sudan, for example, the service infrastructure is after all better in the north than in the south, which contributes to people not returning. When refugees and internally displaced persons actually do return home, the organisations face a situation with humanitarian needs in a large geographical area. In Uganda, the organisations must therefore work in both the camps and the return areas. This requires extensive monitoring and adaptation of the efforts. Unrest in the areas that people return to in Sudan was mentioned as a potential problem because the service infrastructure is inadequate for the number of returnees. It was emphasised that the international community has not succeeded in its reconstruction work in Southern Sudan. Population groups not reached by the humanitarian efforts According to Médecins Sans Frontières and Norwegian Church Aid, among others, it is often a challenge in humanitarian projects to reach the most vulnerable groups. The field visits also uncovered examples of humanitarian efforts and projects not reaching particular sections of the population. Very many people depend on humanitarian assistance in both Sudan and Uganda. It is therefore difficult for the organisations to reach all sections of the population. Large parts of Sudan are difficult to reach because of the size of the country and the rainy season. This applies, for example, to the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for people returning to their home areas. It is a challenge for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Uganda that, as the internally displaced persons move out of the camps, the number of sites at which the WFP distributes food increases. The organisation has therefore set a limit of minimum 500 internally displaced persons coming to a distribution site before a new one is established. This means that some people will have a relatively long way to travel from their homes to the food distribution site, and it will be difficult for the most vulnerable people to reach it. The following examples also illustrate the organisations challenges in reaching all groups: Médecins Sans Frontières states in an interview that, in one vaccination programme for internally displaced persons in Darfur, the organisation travelled around to reach the different groups. 96 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

99 However, the internally displaced persons were continually on the move, and it proved impossible to reach all the people the organisation had wanted to reach. Médecins Sans Frontières in Uganda pointed out that HIV treatment in Kitgum in Northern Uganda, for example, is completely neglected, and that treatment of those infected with HIV is more or less non-existent. During a project visit to the Augusta Victoria hospital in Jerusalem (supported by Norway via Norwegian Church Aid), it was emphasised that it is a challenge to reach women in the community. It was said that the hospital is not good enough at reaching the local communities with information and screening programmes and empowering women in health matters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to DR Congo as an example of the problem of reaching the weakest groups. There, it is a geographical problem. There are local initiatives that attract people from larger areas, but it is difficult (or impossible) to reach everybody. In an interview, the Ministry states that the goal of reaching the weakest groups is included in most applications and in the individual projects. The Ministry emphasises that even though, in its dealings with the organisations, it endeavours to ensure that the selection criteria in the applications are clearly identified, the Ministry has to trust its partners. Who the weakest groups are varies from situation to situation, but internally displaced persons, women and children are often the weakest. The Ministry is not aware of any information indicating systematic differences between the organisations when it comes to reaching the weakest groups. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry refers to Norway s active work to also improve international cooperation in the field. The reason given for the Norwegian contributions to the UN Common Humanitarian Funds in Sudan and DR Congo is that they will help to improve coordination. According to the Ministry, crises that have received grants from the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) are also better coordinated than they would be without this incentive. The Ministry also states that UN humanitarian appeals have improved. In the Ministry s opinion, therefore, Norwegian humanitarian assistance is based on thorough assessments. 5.6 Knowledge about the impact of humanitarian assistance Project implementation and goal achievement must be monitored by the organisations during projects. The humanitarian organisations monitoring forms the basis for the organisations reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on results and goal achievement. The Ministry s monitoring is described in more detail in Chapter 6. As shown above, it is an important goal for the humanitarian efforts to support reconstruction and long-term development, to endeavour to support the maintenance and re-establishment of sustainable subsistence systems and the transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and longterm development. 163 Results in a more long-term perspective are therefore part of the goal achievement of projects, operations and humanitarian assistance. The field surveys and interview surveys among the organisations in Norway show that monitoring, reporting and evaluation are often a challenge for humanitarian projects. Many of the NGOs and UN agencies acknowledge that this is something they need to become better at. One of the challenges in connection with monitoring is the organisations cooperation with local organisations and their use of local employees, see Chapter 5.3. The field surveys contain examples of a complete absence of reporting, late reporting and poor-quality reporting. Moreover, monitoring projects and programmes is very resource-intensive for both the NGOs and UN agencies. Norwegian Church Aid, for example, states in an interview that when the resources available to a project are limited, the focus will be on implementation, potentially at the expense of monitoring and qualitative reporting. Long distances, for example as a result of many food distribution sites, also make monitoring and reporting difficult. The field surveys show that the organisations consider it a challenge that there is no common reporting system for the donors. Different donors have different reporting requirements. This is demanding for the organisations implementing the activities. Result reports at project level, aggregate result reports from the organisations and the annual reports of the UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) all show that Norwegian humanitarian assistance contributions produce positive results. However, these 163) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 97

100 assistance, the embassy in Uganda states in an interview that long-term impacts should be monitored to a much greater degree than is the case at present. The Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, points out in an interview that it is difficult to document the impact of the projects, and the organisation believes that there is a potential for improvement in terms of documenting actual effects of the work. The field surveys emphasise, among other things, that there is a lack of good criteria on which to base the measurement and documentation of impacts. As shown above, the field survey also shows that the one-year financing frameworks under which they work makes it difficult to report on impacts and overriding goals. It is also claimed that there is too much focus on individual projects, activities and details instead of on the overall picture. The Norwegian Refugee Council's food distribution in Northern Uganda (Kitgum), implemented in collaboration with World Food Programme (WFP). Photo: Eli Skartlien reports contain little in the way of evaluations and descriptions of lack of goal achievement, challenges, weaknesses etc. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to the fact that Norwegian humanitarian assistance achieves positive results and effects for a large number of people based on Norwegian political and financial contributions made via partners. According to the Ministry, it is in the nature of humanitarian assistance that results and activities are often of a short-term nature. The Ministry also acknowledges the fact that it is a challenge to measure the results of humanitarian assistance in a long-term perspective. The organisations monitoring and measurement of results in the long term The field and interview surveys show that the organisations find it particularly challenging to measure long-term impacts. Since measuring long-term results and impacts is important in terms of assessing the quality of humanitarian For a number of the projects visited in connection with the investigation it emerges that too little emphasis is placed on long-term impacts or that it is difficult to monitor such impacts. Work on changing attitudes and activities aimed at improving protection are areas in which it is difficult to measure long-term results. One example of this is the Accompaniment Programme in the Palestinian Territory, which is supported by Norwegian Church Aid. The objectives of the project include protection of civilians through presence, solidarity and advocacy work in relation to the authorities. CARE s project on women s participation in the peace process in Northern Uganda is another example. A third example is the Norwegian Refugee Council s ICLA programme in Sudan and Uganda, where projects visits have been carried out both in Khartoum and in Juba. It was pointed out that it is more difficult to measure the results of the ICLA programme than many other projects, particularly in a long-term perspective. How many are protected and how many are empowered are difficult questions to answer. It was also pointed out that ICLA is dependent on context, and that the challenges are particularly great in Sudan due to the infrastructure and lack of basis data. A survey was recently carried out in which 360 internally displaced persons were interviewed about the quality of the services offered. This is a relatively new field for the Norwegian Refugee Council. Such evaluations are expensive, and it is not easy to obtain funds from donors to carry them out. It was also emphasised that it is neces- 98 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

101 sary to start early in order to measure effects it is difficult to evaluate once the people you are to evaluate have left. The challenges experienced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in relation to evaluating the effects of projects for internally displaced persons and refugees in Southern Sudan are another example of how demanding it can be to monitor at the individual level. Refugees are given food for three months on their return, but it is unclear how long UNHCR is supposed to follow them up. There is a capacity problem in connection with individual follow-up. Moreover, the returnees return to many different places within a large area. It is also a challenge for UNHCR in Southern Sudan that it has to work in areas outside its core areas. Even though UNHCR does not build schools itself, for example, it still has to monitor the activity. But it does not have the experts this requires. The project visits to various centres for vocational training in Uganda and Sudan that have received funding under Chapter 163 show that the organisations know little about what becomes of the students once they have completed their training: A resource centre run by the organisation St Vincent de Paul in a camp outside Khartoum is partly funded by Norway through Save the Children / Save the Children UK. 164 Vocational training is one of the services offered at the centre. All the vocational courses last for six months and result in a course certificate approved by the authorities. It was stated that it is relatively simple to find employment after the course with such a certificate. It was stated during the project visit that registration of the number of students offered vocational training and taking the certificates is good. However, it is more difficult to measure how many of them find jobs afterwards because, among other things, many disappear once they have obtained the certificate. Christian Relief Network (CRN) carries out repatriation of former child soldiers in Northern Uganda. During a project visit to a centre that offers vocational training in the town of Kalongo, it was found that the project has no explicit goal of following up the participants after completion of their training. The final report on a similar project in Western Uganda (Kasese) shows that the funding for a team 164) Assistance and protection to IDP children (Save the Children UK). intended to follow up participants after completion of their training was substantially reduced due to a budget cut. However, it is pointed out that most of the participants have found work. In its report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CRN proposes setting aside resources in future in order to further document the success of the reintegration. 165 The Norwegian Refugee Council runs a training programme for youth in Northern Uganda (Youth Education Pack). The organisation follows up the participants for six months. It was stated during the project visit that this is not long enough. It varies from sector to sector how easy it is to assess impacts. For example, it can be more difficult to measure impacts in the form of increased income in an agricultural training project than it is to measure whether the population has received water and sanitary facilities as expected. But it is also difficult to measure the long-term impact of these projects. Food security projects, for example, take a long time (several seasons) for the long-term impact to become evident. Therefore, it is also particularly important that the long-term suitability of these projects is carefully assessed before they are implemented. One example of this is Norwegian People s Aid s emergency aid for the agricultural sector in Gaza and on the West Bank, where it cooperates with local organisations. This aid includes support for inhabitants to start farming. One activity from such a project was visited: a Bedouin family that had been given a water cistern and support to start growing olives, among other things. The effect of this measure and the overall project, however, can only be seen in the long term, when production is up and running. The final reports on a previous grant mentions the activities carried out, but only to a small extent reports on longterm results. 166 The Ministry stated in its feedback on a previous final report from a similar allocation that more detailed feedback on results is desirable. 167 Several organisations point out in the interview survey in Norway and in the field surveys that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not focus 165) Final report on vocational training for former child soldiers in Kasese, Uganda, CRN (March 2006). 166) Emergency Support to Agricultural Sector in Gaza and West Bank (PSE ), Norwegian People s Aid (submitted to the Ministry on 15 February 2008). 167) Pal Final report, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 12 September Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 99

102 Food production in the West Bank, a part of Norwegian People's Aid's emergency support to agricultural sector. Photo: Kjell Kristian Dørum enough on the effects and consequences of humanitarian assistance (see also Chapter 6). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its part states in an interview that the Ministry will encourage the organisations to evaluate goal achievement in the field more thoroughly and to focus more on, for example, long-term effects. However, the Ministry believes that it could be a challenge to get the organisations to provide a more qualitative assessment of goal achievement than they do at present. At the same time, however, it is emphasised that measuring the long-term impact of humanitarian assistance is a challenge. The only possible evaluation is often a counterfactual analysis: what would have happened had we done nothing? 168 This is because of the nature of humanitarian assistance, and the often uncertain framework conditions. The Ministry refers to processes started in Norway as well as internationally to improve the impact and performance indicators for humanitarian assistance. 5.7 Assessments Norwegian humanitarian assistance is intended to contribute to saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity during and after humanitarian crises. Humanitarian assistance 168) UK National Audit Office (2002): Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General , Session 5 November should be timely, effective and of good quality. The investigation assesses this by evaluating whether the goals have been achieved for financing, coordination, local involvement and the connection between humanitarian assistance and long-term development. These are important preconditions for achieving the main goals of saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity. The Norwegian contribution to humanitarian assistance helps to achieve positive results and effects. However, the investigation finds weaknesses in goal achievement in the fields of financing, coordination, the involvement of local people and the adoption of a long-term perspective in humanitarian assistance. The investigation also finds cases in which these weaknesses have consequences for the final outcome of concrete humanitarian efforts. In addition, the investigation finds variations in the quality of needs assessments and, in part, an inadequate overview of the situation in humanitarian crises. Overall, this investigation gives grounds for asking whether the humanitarian assistance is fully in line with the goal of providing assistance that is timely, effective and of good quality. Financing of humanitarian assistance The humanitarian players largely depend on donor financing to carry out their activities. The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian 100 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

103 Donorship outline good practice for donors funding. Fundamental goals include funding being predictable, flexible and given at the right time for humanitarian assistance to be timely, effective and of good quality. The investigation shows that Norway is a major donor in the field of humanitarian assistance, and it is largely perceived as giving predictable and flexible funding. However, there are circumstances relating to Norwegian financing that create unpredictability for humanitarian players and reduce their flexibility. This reduces the efficiency of humanitarian efforts. The investigation shows that the Ministry sometimes takes a long time to process applications for grants for enduring humanitarian crises. All the NGOs and UN agencies in Oslo, New York, Geneva, Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory called attention to this. It is also confirmed by the quantitative analysis of case processing times for grants in the Ministry and the timing of financing. In acute crises, the Ministry is quick to respond, however, even though the investigation also finds examples of long case processing times for this type of crisis. Long case processing times in the Ministry result in late financing of the humanitarian efforts. The investigation shows that late financing entails challenges for the organisations planning and implementation and leads to delays and changes to projects. This will have consequences for the beneficiaries in humanitarian crises. These findings raise questions about whether the Ministry s use of time realises the goal of rapid financing of humanitarian assistance. The grants for humanitarian efforts under Chapter 163 are one-off grants, given for 12 months at a time. The investigation also shows that a high percentage of the humanitarian funds go to projects that last for more than a year. This applies to enduring crises, humanitarian efforts in countries in a reconstruction phase and projects that have a more long-term perspective in addition to short-term goals. The humanitarian organisations see it as positive that Norwegian aid is also used for this type of project, which it could be difficult to obtain support for from other donor countries. However, the investigation shows that the one-year agreements and frameworks create unpredictability and reduce flexibility for both Norwegian and international organisations. The investigation shows that this makes long-term planning of humanitarian projects more difficult. The investigation also shows that one-year contracts make it more difficult for the organisations to enter into contracts with local employees, among other things. It also means that a lot of time is spent preparing annual applications and final reports from the projects. It was shown that one-year grants are generally poorly adapted to humanitarian efforts in countries in a transitional situation or in enduring crises, where the humanitarian effort requires a longer planning horizon than the one-year grants allow. This entails a risk of the projects not being well enough designed and implemented to meet the humanitarian needs in question. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opinion, the one-year grants give the Ministry flexibility and control, and the scheme gives the organisations the predictability they require. However, the principles for good humanitarian donorship state that donors should consider introducing more longterm forms of financing. The 2005 OECD-DAC peer review of Norwegian aid also pointed out that Norway should improve predictability in financing of enduring humanitarian crises. It questions whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken adequate steps to ensure predictable financing of humanitarian efforts in enduring crises. Coordination of humanitarian assistance Coordination is a key part of goal achievement in Norwegian humanitarian assistance. It is important to ensure as holistic a response as possible to humanitarian crises and prevent duplication of assistance. Insufficient coordination reduces efficiency and contributes to the fragmentation of humanitarian efforts. This can in turn make it more difficult to meet humanitarian needs. It is therefore an overall goal for the Norwegian authorities to support the UN s coordinator role and the work of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to reform the international humanitarian response system. This is expressed both through Norwegian contributions to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), common humanitarian funds and the cluster approach, and through Norway s work on humanitarian policy. The investigation shows that there are challenges relating to coordination in the international humanitarian system. These challenges relate to coordination within the UN system, between Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 101

104 donors and between the UN system and the humanitarian NGOs. The challenges appear to be greater in the field. Through the UN humanitarian reform and the cluster approach, steps have been taken to improve coordination, but the investigation shows that there are still challenges in this field. These challenges are related, among other things, to the perception of the cluster approach as bureaucratic and resource-intensive, and in many cases inadequately managed by the UN. As regards the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the UN Common Humanitarian Fund CHF, the investigation shows that there are positive experiences of the funds in several areas. The funds were found to have weaknesses relating to cost efficiency, for example relating to transaction costs. The investigation also shows that limited capacity limits the opportunities the foreign service missions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to contribute to and monitor coordination within the UN system in the countries that receive humanitarian assistance, and to coordinate with other donor countries. On the basis of the substantial Norwegian support for the UN s coordinator role in the humanitarian field and the extent of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, it is questioned whether monitoring and participation in the field have been given sufficient priority by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Local involvement The involvement of local players is an important part of effective humanitarian assistance that is important, among other things, in terms of ensuring sustainable development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overriding responsibility for ensuring that humanitarian players who receive grants involve local players in their operations. OECD-DAC s peer review in 2005 points out that it is difficult to see whether Norway ensures that the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance are involved in the humanitarian efforts. The peer review recommends Norway to work on measures to ensure user involvement, and that user involvement should also be addressed in an overall humanitarian strategy. The investigation shows that the involvement of local players is inadequate in several humanitarian efforts. The investigation also shows that neither the donor countries nor the UN agencies and NGOs have sufficient focus on involving affected local communities, users or local authorities in humanitarian efforts. Local resources and local organisations are sometimes sidelined, and capacity building is inadequate, even though there are some challenges relating to cooperation with local authorities and organisations. Together, these factors result in a risk of less effective and qualitatively poorer humanitarian efforts. The findings of this investigation raise questions about whether the involvement of local players is ensured to an adequate extent. The link between humanitarian assistance and the long-term perspective Humanitarian assistance should as far as possible endeavour to support the maintenance and reestablishment of sustainable subsistence systems and the transition from emergency aid to reconstruction and long-term development. 169 In order to take adequate account of long-term considerations and sustainability, both long-term and shortterm results, as well as the phasing out and discontinuation of projects, should be planned for in an early phase of projects. The investigation finds weaknesses in the way the humanitarian system takes account of the longterm perspective and the transition from emergency aid to development aid. The investigation shows that the organisations applications and project follow-up place little emphasis on longterm results. It also shows that the humanitarian players only plan for phasing-out and discontinuation of projects to a small extent. Opinions are also voiced that the Ministry does not emphasise a long-term perspective in humanitarian assistance. At the same time, however, the investigation also shows that the Norwegian initiative to establish a separate allocation for the transitional phase has been welcomed by international humanitarian organisations. The investigation also finds weaknesses in the internal coordination of short-term and long-term aid within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as between the Ministry and the rest of the aid administration. Based on these findings, it is questioned whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are sufficiently good at ensuring a good transition from humanitarian crises and at ensuring that long-term considerations are adequately attended to in humanitarian assistance. 169) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. 102 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

105 Humanitarian assistance adapted to needs Pursuant to the principles for good humanitarian donorship, funds should be allocated on the basis of the needs present and be based on assessments of the needs. The investigation shows that the international humanitarian community is unable to meet the global humanitarian needs, and that there is significant variation in the coverage of needs, both between humanitarian crises and clusters. Cases where the humanitarian needs in some sections of the population are not sufficiently met were also found. It is particularly challenging to meet the humanitarian needs in countries in a transitional phase between a humanitarian crisis and reconstruction and development. Humanitarian assistance should as far as possible support reconstruction and long-term development, including support for sustainable subsistence systems. 170 The long-term impact of humanitarian efforts is therefore part of their goal achievement. The investigation shows that longterm monitoring of results is demanding. The investigation also shows that there are no criteria for measuring and documenting these effects, that it is a resource-intensive process, and that little emphasis is placed on it. The findings in this investigation therefore give reason to question whether the knowledge about the long-term results of humanitarian assistance is good enough. The investigation shows that this is due, among other things, to international humanitarian funding being insufficient. Weaknesses were also found in the humanitarian players needs assessments and monitoring of the situation during humanitarian crises. Inadequate needs assessments and monitoring can lead to humanitarian assistance not being well enough adapted to the needs, and therefore not qualitatively good enough. Knowledge about the impact of humanitarian assistance The organisations are responsible for monitoring the implementation, results and impact of their projects. This is important in order to enable the organisations and the Ministry to target and improve their humanitarian work. Reports at project level, aggregate result reports from the organisations and the annual reports of the UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) all show that the Norwegian contributions to humanitarian assistance produce positive results and effects. The investigation shows that there are challenges relating to the organisations monitoring, reporting and evaluation of humanitarian efforts. Among other things, the investigation finds that it is demanding for the Norwegian organisations to monitor a large number of local partners satisfactorily. There is therefore a risk that the Norwegian organisations do not have sufficient information about goal achievement and results. This information forms the basis for reporting on the grant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 170) The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 103

106 6 The Ministry of Foreign Affair s follow-up of humanitarian assistance It follows from Report no. 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together, that it is the Ministry of Foreign Affair s responsibility to follow up the grants awarded, and to report on the use of funds and results. 171 The follow-up of humanitarian organisations and the individual projects is a central element in assuring the quality of the efforts and assessing goal achievement and results. The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs has pointed out that the main rule for the follow-up of funds granted under Chapter 163 must be that reporting from the individual projects provides a sufficient basis for the controlling authority s evaluation. 172 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs follow-up of humanitarian assistance takes place in a variety of ways, one of which is through reports from the parties who have received funds. These reports shall enable the Ministry to assess the degree of goal achievement, and whether the funds have been used in accordance with the requirements relating to the grant. 173 As part of this work, the Ministry shall travel to areas that receive humanitarian assistance in order to visit projects. In addition, regular project and programme reviews and evaluations shall be carried out to ensure quality and learning. 174 The dialogue between the Ministry and foreign service missions, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other, is an important part of the follow-up. As a donor, Norway shall, among other things, check that the organisations comply with good practice. The international humanitarian organisations of which Norway is a member have their own control arrangements for follow-up and reporting on the use of grant funds. Some of the items on reporting in the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government will therefore not apply. 175 In accordance with the principles for good humanitarian donorship, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore assumes that access to and follow-up of the results of UN agencies is covered by its work on boards etc. in accordance with the statutes of the individual organisation and through joint reviews and multi-donor evaluations. This chapter begins by describing the foreign service s follow-up of projects and organisations in the individual countries that receive humanitarian assistance. Chapters 6.2 and 6.3 deal with the follow-up of Norwegian NGOs and the multilateral organisations in Geneva and New York, respectively. Thereafter, reporting from humanitarian efforts is explained, as well as how the Ministry uses the information obtained and reports on results. Finally, this chapter examines the foreign service s capacity and resources in relation to work on humanitarian assistance. 6.1 Follow-up of projects and organisations at country level The Ministry is responsible for following up the humanitarian assistance in individual recipient countries. Both the guidelines for granting funds under Chapter 163 and the Ministry in the interview survey point out that project visits are a central part of the follow-up work, because these visits give the Ministry a good impression of the projects as well as the local communities and situation on the ground. Project visits are important for the Ministry to be able to assess how the organisations and projects work, and whether results are attained. Norwegian foreign service missions have no formal responsibility for the administration of humanitarian assistance, but, according to the 171) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 172) Recommendation No 145 to the Storting from the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs ( ), cf. document No 1 ( ). 173) Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government section 15, cf. the Approriation Regulations section 10: Grant administrators are entitled to check that funds are used in accordance with the conditions set. 174) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. 175) This is clear from Proposition No 1 to the Storting ( ) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2004, there has also been a standard wording in letters of commitment to a number of UN agencies that is intended to entitle both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Auditor General to check that the funds are used in accordance with the conditions set, cf. the Apropriation Regulations section 10 (formerly section 17). As far as the Ministry of Foreign knows, this right of control has not yet been exercised by either the Ministry or the Office of the Auditor General. Source: from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 May Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

107 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they nevertheless play an important part in the quality assurance of humanitarian assistance through their first-hand knowledge of the situation in the country. The Ministry sees the foreign services missions as Norway s barometer in the country in question. Pursuant to the guidelines, there should be an active dialogue between the Ministry and the foreign service missions involved about project follow-up, including project visits. The dialogue with the aid recipient about follow-up of the project should be documented. However, the Ministry points out that the resource situation influences both the Ministry s and the foreign services missions opportunity to follow up humanitarian assistance. Less than five per cent of the Ministry s aid budget is spent on administration of aid, and the operating budget is tight. As a result, neither the foreign service missions nor the Ministry are able to carry out as many field visits as they would wish. At the same time, the Ministry emphasises that absences from ordinary service must always be weighed against the need to be present at the Ministry or at foreign service missions. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs view, it is desirable to spend more time on field visits than is the case today. Ideally, a project visit should be carried out once every six months, but this is difficult to achieve. The Ministry states that more follow-up of concrete projects through field trips and project visits is particularly important, but that closer general follow-up at country level and follow-up of the different partners is also desirable. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry states that the foreign service missions are more and more closely involved in work on humanitarian assistance. The Ministry points out, however, that it would be impossible to base humanitarian assistance entirely on follow-up by foreign service missions because, among other things, many humanitarian crises occur in areas where Norway have no foreign service missions. The distinctive nature of humanitarian assistance is also, according to the Ministry, a reason why an international system has been established independently of the foreign service missions. According to Norad s evaluation report Evaluation of the Effects of Using M-621 Military Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has very little capacity for following up results and impacts. It recommends that the Norwegian authorities should find ways of triangulating information received from the large organisations. The Ministry is also recommended to develop its capacity for active follow-up of how projects financed by the Ministry are actually carried out. The conclusion is that [e]ven experienced and highly professional organisations need the support of a critical, pragmatic, external pair of eyes from time to time Project follow-up As shown above, Norwegian humanitarian aid to a large number of concrete projects is given as annual grants, but many of the projects run for more than a year. The project review also shows that there is little documentation of project follow-up by the Ministry or foreign service missions in the form of project visits or other dialogue. As table 15 shows, project visits are documented for 3.3 per cent of the cases. The guidelines for grants encourage grant recipients to inform the Ministry about the progress of projects on a regular basis. In the interview survey, the Ministry states that the ideal is to have a good overview of each project at all times, but that this is not always possible in practice. In the Ministry s opinion, it would be desirable if the organisations were to provide more information about progress and changes to ongoing projects than they do today. The document analysis shows that the Ministry receives written information about progress in just over 10 per cent of the cases. Table 15 The percentage of grants under Chapter 163 for which there is documentation of Ministry follow-up during the projects (N=241) Documentation of project visit carried out 3.3% Documentation of dialogue between foreign service missions involved and the Ministry 4.7% Documentation of dialogue about progress between the Ministry and the organisations 10.4% Source: The project / grant review 176) Norad Evaluation Report 3/2007: Evaluation of the effects of using M-621 Military Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 105

108 In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that it is not possible to document all relevant project follow-up carried out by the Ministry and the foreign service missions. If, for example, the follow-up takes place within the framework of a major political visit to a country, the follow-up cannot be documented in the project s case folder. Similarly, the Ministry states that not all the dialogue about the projects between foreign service missions, grant recipients and the Ministry is documented. However, many of the humanitarian players interviewed in Norway, Sudan, Uganda and the Palestinian Territory confirm the result of the project review, and emphasise that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign service missions only follow up projects in the field to a small degree. This is true both for the implementation phase and after projects have been completed. The Norwegian Red Cross, for example, states in an interview that the organisation would like the foreign service missions and the Ministry to play a more operative role in the field. Today, the Ministry s quality assurance of the projects is mostly done in Oslo, and not in the field / in the individual country. This contrasts with, for example, ECHO 177, which has a much larger administration staff in the field who, among other things, verify needs and provide feedback on the results achieved. In addition, the Norwegian Red Cross has the impression that the foreign service missions follow up long-term assistance to a much greater extent than humanitarian assistance. Norwegian Church Aid states in an interview that there are differences between Norwegian foreign service mission in terms of their expertise in and understanding of humanitarian assistance. A lack of resources and high personnel turnover in foreign service missions are factors that are mentioned as explanations for the varying level of follow-up. The impression of the follow-up varies somewhat between players, however. The field study in the Palestinian Territory refers to examples where Norway has involved itself in follow-up of UN projects by providing feedback on reports and participating in field visits. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the foreign service missions in the Palestinian Territory, Uganda and Sudan confirm in the interview survey that they are unable to follow up projects 177) European Commission Humanitarian Aid, in the field to the desired extent. The foreign service missions state that they must give priority to projects for which they have administrative responsibility, which means that humanitarian projects must be given lower priority. The missions emphasise that the resource situation limits their opportunities to follow up humanitarian projects. The embassy in Uganda states in an interview that, overall, the humanitarian projects receive little follow-up by the foreign service as things stand at present. Moreover, the embassy emphasises using the Development Cooperation Manual, which does not apply to humanitarian assistance, as a guide for the administration of all funds allocated via the embassy s budget, including projects of a more humanitarian nature. In the embassy s opinion, some of the elements in the manual could also have been successfully applied to the Ministry s administration of humanitarian assistance, since many of the projects last for several years. Regular annual meetings could possibly be introduced, as is the case for longterm aid, in order to increase follow-up of ongoing projects. The embassy states that it could do more to follow up the humanitarian efforts if this system were introduced Follow-up of organisations at country level It is pointed out in Chapter 4 that the Ministry often bases its processing of grant applications on the information it receives from the organisations, and that this information often comes from the organisations in the country in question. Norwegian and international organisations and the UN agencies usually have national and local offices in the countries in which they operate. Most organisations interviewed in the field survey consider their cooperation with Norwegian foreign service missions to be informal and good. Several organisations in the Palestinian Territory and in Uganda have emphasised that the foreign service missions are generally flexible and interested in the organisations work, and that they show understanding for the situation. However, it was pointed out that, in some cases, cooperation could be closer. The Norwegian representative Office organises quarterly meetings between the office and the Norwegian organisations in the Palestinian Territory. Some of the organisations emphasise that this is a useful opportunity to discuss various 106 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

109 Area in Southern Sudan with returned refugees. Photo: Aleksander Åsheim topics relating to concrete projects and the general situation in the Palestinian Territory with the representative office. The foreign service missions in Uganda and in the Palestinian Territory both state in interviews that they regard their dialogue with the NGOs as good. Both missions believe that they have a relatively good overview of the humanitarian situation through continuous contact with the UN, other donors and relevant Norwegian NGOs. The embassy in Uganda has entered into a strategic partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council in the area, and therefore monitors the organisation s activities in particular. As mentioned in Chapter 5.2.4, however, both the embassy in Uganda and the embassy in Sudan emphasise that the resource situation prevents them from being proactive in relation to the various humanitarian processes in the country. In addition to the lack of coordination with other donors with respect to what to support and give priority, the embassy in Sudan stresses that it is not in a position to play an active role in relation to humanitarian organisations, the authorities or other countries foreign service missions. The embassy also states that it is unable to sufficiently follow up developments in the UN reform process or influence important processes. According to the embassy, its workload does not give it much opportunity to quality assure, follow-up and report in practice. The embassy in Uganda also states that it would like to devote more resources to strategic thinking and influencing the humanitarian processes in the country. As mentioned above, follow-up and work on UN s cluster approach in Uganda would also be given higher priority if the embassy had more resources. In an interview, the Ministry states that it is aware of the foreign service missions limited resources in terms of following up the humanitarian field, both as regards the UN and follow-up of projects in the field. Concerning the foreign service missions opportunities for follow-up, both at the overall level and at project level, it is the Ministry s view that the tight resource situation is an obstacle to optimum follow-up. However, the Ministry points out that the foreign service missions have played a more active role in the humanitarian field during the last five years. 6.2 Follow-up of NGOs in Norway The head offices of the Norwegian organisations are in Oslo. All the organisations emphasise in interviews that professional cooperation between Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 107

110 them and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is close and informal. Both the Ministry and the organisations state in interviews that the exchange of information and learning is an important part of their ongoing dialogue. CARE, for example, focuses on contributing good professional input in the humanitarian field to the Ministry, so that a professional dialogue can be established and to ensure that the dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not just about finance. The Norwegian Red Cross believes it is important to have extensive informal and ongoing contact between the organisation and the persons responsible for relevant countries in the Ministry. In the Norwegian Refugee Council s experience, there is a high level of tolerance and openness to different points of view. Executive officers in the Ministry are also seen as being very serviceminded. Norwegian People s Aid appreciates that the Ministry does not interfere in how the organisation carries out its mine clearing, only where it is done. In an interview, the Ministry states that clearer requirements have been set for the organisations as regards administration in recent years. According to the Ministry, this helps make the organisations more efficient. Among other things, guides have been produced for the organisations and, since 2005, regular meetings have been held on topics relating to grant administration. According to the Ministry, its experience of reporting from the organisations has been an important part of this dialogue. The Ministry considers the dialogue on grant administration to be at least as important as final reporting from the projects and dialogue about individual projects. The Ministry regards it as important that the guidelines for grant administration strike a balance between requirements for clarity, control and follow-up and the need for the system and requirements not to be too rigid, thereby reducing the flexibility and efficiency required to meet changing humanitarian needs. In autumn 2007, the Ministry introduced a system of strategic meetings with the major NGOs. In the Ministry s opinion, it can be better at gathering information about the challenges facing the organisations in given areas. Strategic meetings can be a valuable contribution to this work. 6.3 Follow-up of the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at head office level The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that Norwegian interests in relation to the UN are mainly looked after through participation in, among other things, the boards of the UN agencies. The Ministry also points out that executive officers and the management of the Section of Humanitarian Affairs and the foreign service missions have regular meetings with relevant UN agencies in Oslo, New York and Geneva, and in the field. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises the importance of formalised donor country visits to check and evaluate the goal achievement of the UN agencies. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) organise such trips, which Norway participates in, every year. In an interview, the Norwegian mission to the UN in New York points out that there has been a positive development in the administration of aid funds. The restructuring of aid administration, whereby, among other things, foreign service missions were delegated greater responsibility for aid funds, has improved the mission s ability to follow up UN agencies, and it has increased the opportunities for following up Norwegian funds allocated to UN agencies. Because of increased focus on goal achievement by the Storting, among others, the mission will have to put greater emphasis on following up Norwegian funds in the multilateral system, be more forceful and monitor the political processes even more closely. In an interview, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also points out that such follow-up is demanding in terms of resources. Ideally, therefore, the Ministry would like to have executive officers with sole responsibility for following up, for example, UN agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on a full-time basis in order to further Norwegian points of view. 108 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

111 6.4 Reporting and evaluation Pursuant to the Provisions on Financial Management in Central Government, the grant administrator must obtain reports from the grant recipient that enables it to assess the degree of goal achievement. The Ministry receives final reports from the projects implemented by NGOs that are funded under Chapter 163. The Ministry also receives reports from the international organisations in the form of annual reports from the ICRC and the relevant UN agencies. In an interview, the Ministry points out that this is an important element of its follow-up of humanitarian assistance. In that connection, the Ministry has become more aware of the importance of formulating UN results as Norwegian results. The guidelines for grants to humanitarian assistance state that the Ministry shall receive a descriptive final report and audited accounts for the grant/project no more than six months after completion of the project (this does not apply to UN agencies). 178 Text Box 16 Template for descriptive final report The Ministry s template for final reports was revised in The template includes requirements for the organisations to report on goal achievement and results in relation to the information presented in the application and in the conditions in the Ministry s letter of grant commitment. There is also a requirement for a description of how internal and external risk factors have influenced the goals and planned results of the project, and how this has been dealt with. Reporting on how the project integrates the gender perspective and takes the interests of children and young people into account is also a requirement. In interviews, the Ministry underlines the importance of final reports as an evaluation tool in the assessment of whether the goals of the project have been achieved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the final reports have a control function in relation to budgets and accounts, and a potential for substantial learning The quality of final reports from the projects Challenges relating to organisations follow-up of implementation, goal achievement and long-term results are pointed out in Chapter 5.6. However, this forms the basis for reporting to the Ministry 178) Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the handling of grants via Chapter 163 and Chapter item of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry states in an interview that both the organisations and the Ministry itself have a potential for improvement with respect to performance reporting. According to the Ministry, final reports currently focus too much on the activities that have been carried out. The organisations largely report the number of emergency aid items delivered and measures implemented. The organisations are supposed to achieve both overriding and concrete goals in their projects, but the information provided is often very quantitative. Reporting on the running of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons is one example of quantitative reporting. The document analysis confirms that the final reports predominantly focus on achieving the quantitative goals set and do not attach much importance to qualitative effects and impacts. The Ministry also refers to the fact that reports rarely mention less successful elements of the projects, and that, if they are mentioned at all, the applicants mainly point to external factors to explain their lack of goal achievement. Internal explanatory factors are not identified to the same extent. This is also confirmed by the project review. According to the final reports reviewed, the goals set for the projects are nearly always achieved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses, however, that it is desirable that the reports are as clear as possible, both with regard to external and internal factors that affect goal achievement. The Ministry has raised this issue explicitly with the organisations (cf. also Chapter 4 on the lack of information about risk factors in the applications). The Ministry s experience is that the quality of final reports varies. Generally, if the application is good, then the final report is often good as well. In an interview, the Ministry refers to the fact that some final reports are narrative and documenting in form, while others are more analytic, and therefore more interesting. The differences in the quality of performance reporting between organisations are something which the Ministry follows up in its continuous dialogue with the organisations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will in the time ahead set stricter requirements for focus on results in final reports. Increased focus on long-term impacts, for example, is also desirable. However, the Ministry finds it challenging to get the organisations to provide a more qualita- Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 109

112 tive assessment of their goal achievement than they do at present. In the interview survey, several of the NGOs state that they do not problematise and discuss things that went less well in the projects as much as they should in their final reports with a view to improving their efforts in the next humanitarian operation. At the same time, however, some of the organisations feel that the present final report template is not ideal as regards promoting learning and reflection. Moreover, most of the organisations point out that the final reports give an adequate picture of the activities carried out. The Norwegian Refugee Council, for example, believes that the lack of interest in describing failures to achieve goals in the reports must be seen in light of the relationship that arises between the organisation as a recipient and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an important donor. Médecins Sans Frontières, for its part, sees that the organisation could do a better job of problematising matters that did not go particularly well in projects. Norwegian Church Aid also recognises that a greater degree of reflection and learning from project experiences, both positive and negative, may be needed. Several of the organisations explain the lack of attention paid to the failure to achieve goals by referring to the fact that, until now, the Ministry has not followed up individual project reports to find out what can be learned from them and where the improvement potential, if any, lies. Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, states in an interview that the increased general focus on performance reporting is not reflected in increased focus on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Norwegian Church Aid, the Ministry seems to emphasise activity reporting more than knowledge about the overall effects and impact of aid. In Médecins Sans Frontières s opinion, the Ministry could have required that final reports problematise the less successful elements of projects. It is emphasised that the current reporting template is not optimal with respect to learning effects, and that the reports are very detailed Feedback from the Ministry on the organisations final reports on humanitarian assistance The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reviews and approves the final reports. The grant recipients are informed about the outcome in writing. The Ministry states in an interview that the feedback on final reports is primarily of a financial and technical nature. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, little substantial and professional feedback is given on the results of the assistance, even though this is done more than before. The Ministry recognises that the qualitative follow-up of the results could be better, but it also points out in its letter of 8 August 2008 that it is difficult for the Ministry to provide qualitative feedback in cases where the final reports contain few qualitative evaluations. The NGOs confirm during the interview survey that the Ministry s feedback on final reports is predominantly of a formal and technical nature. According to the organisations, the Ministry gives little qualitative professional feedback on the efforts that could facilitate learning. Any weaknesses and faults in the projects are not pointed out by the Ministry. However, some organisations have received more substantial feedback recently, and they have also experienced that the Ministry requests more problematising and analytical reports. In Norwegian People s Aid s experience, for example, there is variation between individual executive officers in the Ministry and between individual foreign service missions in terms of the assessment and processing of applications, how projects are followed up, and what reporting is required. Norwegian Church Aid confirms that the degree of feedback varies from executive officer to executive officer. Save the Children states in an interview that it has recently noted an increasing focus on the Ministry s part on specification, both of money spent and in relation to the narrative part of the report. This is a demanding job for Save the Children, since several national organisations often cooperate on the same operations/project. CARE states that questions can be raised about how detailed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to be in relation to activity reporting. In CARE s opinion, the Ministry should base its administration more on the overall, qualitative goals of humanitarian assistance than they do at present. While the feedback on reporting from the Ministry appears to be improving in quality, it often ends up in quantitative corrections. CARE questions why the Ministry needs to know how many nails the organisation has purchased, when 110 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

113 it ought to be more concerned with results and impacts More about the reports from UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the international humanitarian organisations of which Norway is a member have their own control arrangements for following up and reporting on the use of grant funds, and some or the items on reporting in the Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government points will therefore not apply. Moreover, the reports from these organisations are largely at an aggregate level, and it is therefore generally difficult for donors to trace their funds all the way down to individual projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out in an interview that the organisations in question have also limited the opportunity for donors to stipulate special requirements for reporting, and the relationship with the individual organisations is therefore largely based on trust. At the same time, the Ministry emphasises that the UN probably has more people following up during humanitarian operations. In addition to the UN s own control arrangements, many donors also follow up. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, another aspect of UN reports is that they do not adequately describe the results and impacts of the humanitarian efforts. The Ministry feels that the Norwegian NGOs are better in this respect than the UN. In this context, the Ministry points out that it is difficult to find good indicators. Reporting is also discussed in various donor forums, for example Good Humanitarian Donorship, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) and the donor support group of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but so far without reaching agreement on common reporting guidelines Evaluations of humanitarian assistance As part of its management of this field, the Ministry shall ensure that evaluations are carried out. 179 Regular evaluations by independent consultants are key elements in quality assurance and learning. 180 The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs has stressed the importance of evaluations 179) Cf. Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government, section ) Report No 35 to the Storting ( ) Fighting Poverty Together. and of systemising experience in the aid field in general. The committee also underlined the importance of regular evaluations of the work of NGOs. 181 According to the principles of good humanitarian donorship, a donor must encourage regular evaluations of the humanitarian response. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs guidelines for the allocation of grants under Chapter 163 stress that evaluations of selected organisations and projects will be included in the continuous follow-up of projects. In the review by Development Assistance Research Associates of the humanitarian response of 23 countries and players in The humanitarian response index 2007, Norway scores below average in terms of promoting initiatives for evaluation, learning and accountability. 182 The project review shows that few evaluations of organisations or projects supported under Chapter 163 have been carried out. In an interview, the Ministry emphasises that too few evaluations that can contribute to learning are carried out, and that the Ministry should initiate more evaluations. The Ministry considers evaluations to be very important, and increased focus on results and impacts is necessary in the Ministry as well as in the organisations. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva states in an interview that it would welcome a more active Norwegian role in the evaluation phase, i.e. after projects have been completed, since this would help to improve learning. The Ministry of Foreign Affair underlines in an interview that it is important to focus on the fact that results are not the same as initiated projects. It also refers to an initiative to strengthen cooperation with Norad s Evaluation Department. The Ministry states that the recent organisational reviews of Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwegian Refugee Council provided valuable learning for both the Ministry and organisations, but that these reviews had been highly demanding in terms of resources because the Ministry participated in these reviews itself. For this reason, corresponding reviews with the participation of the responsible executive officers from the Ministry will not be carried out in future. 181) Budget Recommendation No 3 to the Storting ( ). 182) Development Assistance Research Associates DARA (2007): The Humanitarian Response Index Measuring Commitment to Best Practices. Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 111

114 As regards evaluations of the UN s humanitarian efforts, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers, among other things, to the evaluation of the humanitarian efforts, including the UN system, in connection with the earthquake disaster in Pakistan in 2005 carried out by the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) on assignment for the Ministry. In its letter of 8 August 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Norway participates in joint multi-donor evaluations and in the evaluation collaboration Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). According to the Ministry, increased international coordination in the field of evaluation is in line with the principles of good humanitarian donorship. Examples of such evaluations and reviews include the tsunami evaluation (TEC, 2006), in which Norad participated; the Humanitarian Response Review (2005), which Norway co-financed; evaluations by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): the cluster approach (2007), the UN Humanitarian Response Fund (2007 and 2008), the UN system of humanitarian coordinators and resident coordinators and the common humanitarian funds in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (annual evaluations). The Ministry also states that, within the framework of the good humanitarian donorship, annual overviews of humanitarian assistance have been published by the analysis company Development Initiatives (DI) as well as reports on various aspects of humanitarian assistance by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). In addition, the Ministry states that Norway s requirement for evaluation and control is also met through the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner s Programme (ExCom) established by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which is under the authority of the United Nations General Assembly. The Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) also contributes knowledge about and evaluations of Norway s most important multilateral partners. UNICEF was evaluated by MOPAN in 2006, and WHO and UNDP were evaluated in The Ministry points out that, even though the humanitarian work carried out by these organisations has not been especially evaluated, the evaluations of partnership, policy and harmonisation that have been carried out provide valuable knowledge in connection with collaboration with these organisations. The evaluation functions of the multilateral organisations are reviewed by the evaluation group of OECD s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the same way as individual donor countries are evaluated in DAC s peer reviews. These are international processes that ensure that the donors, including Norway, receive information and an overview and have an opportunity to control the UN system. In addition to the desirability of more project visits, both the Ministry and the embassy in Uganda point out in interviews that reviews or spot checks should be carried out in order to strengthen follow-up of the humanitarian projects and increase the administration s knowledge about the quality and goal achievement. This is not done today. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that it would be advantageous to carry out more reviews / spot checks at the project, theme, country and organisational levels in order to obtain a better basis for assessing the probability of good goal achievement when the Ministry carries out its assessments. According to the Ministry, it would be particularly interesting to use spot checks as a means of reviewing measures that receive funding over a period of several years. However, the Ministry has insufficient time and resources to do this itself. 6.5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs use of information Relevant and correct information from humanitarian players about goal achievement and results is important in terms of enabling the Ministry to learn from the efforts and to improve efforts in future humanitarian operations. A broad information basis would enable the Ministry to discuss the organisation and usefulness of relevant projects with the responsible parties. Internal transfer of experience within the Ministry would also benefit from good and accessible information. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that information about results and goal achievement is based on several sources. Information about results and goal achievement at the organisational level is primarily based on selfreporting from the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the NGOs. This reporting is followed up by Norway in formal and informal meetings with the organisations. 112 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report

115 The Ministry sees it as a challenge to systemise all available information, aggregate it to an expedient level and use it in case processing. This applies to information from NGOs as well as from the UN and ICRC. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to the limited resources it has available for a thorough review of UN and ICRC reporting, and it also points out that the amount of information the Ministry can absorb will always be limited. The Norwegian mission to the UN in Geneva confirms in an interview that this is a challenge. As a donor, Norway receives very many reports from the ICRC and UN, but, with the exception of the human rights field, the mission does not have sufficient resources to thoroughly review these reports or reports from individual projects. Today, the results are aggregated in the budget propositions and in Norad s annual reports. The Ministry emphasises in an interview that several processes have been initiated with a view to systemising information about goal achievement and using this information, for example in work on allocation memorandums, in order to ensure a closer link in the long term between the aid goals and allocations, on the one hand, and the reporting of results, on the other. As already mentioned, an internal report on the results of humanitarian assistance will be prepared from As regards final reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that it varies how much the final reports are used for learning purposes in the Ministry, and it believes that the use of final reports should be improved. The Ministry emphasises that a quality assurance process is carried out when final reports are reviewed, but there is still room for improvement in this context. Because of the resource situation, it is limited how thoroughly executive officers can review each report. It has been necessary to use external consultants on long-term contracts in order to strengthen the Ministry s work and capacity in connection with following up final reports from the organisations. The consultants reviews have improved followup of the final reports: the backlog has been cleared, and processing times have been reduced. The ongoing review of final reports is important in terms of enabling the Ministry to incorporate what is learned from final reports and reporting of results from completed projects in new projects and application processing. The Ministry emphasises that including experience and results from final reports in case processing is a challenge, but that it is being done more and more. As far as the overriding priorities and considerations of Norwegian humanitarian assistance are concerned, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not see it as expedient to require the organisations to report explicitly on such overriding criteria. An exception is made for the integration of the gender perspective / Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which is particularly emphasised because it is a main priority, as well as for the requirement for explicit reporting on children and young people. The Ministry has just begun to receive reports written after the introduction of these requirements. It is still too early to say much about how this will function, but experience so far indicates that the organisations are taking them seriously. One aspect of requiring special reporting for particular priority areas is that it can increase the workload for international organisations. ICRC points out in an interview that this has been one of the challenges relating to the Norwegian focus on the gender perspective in humanitarian assistance. Norwegian foreign service missions do not receive final reports from organisations about grants allocated under Chapter 163. The Norwegian embassy in Uganda and the Representative Office in the Palestinian Territory state in interviews that since they do not receive final reports from the projects, they cannot draw on them when new applications are assessed. The Norwegian embassy in Sudan states that it does not have sufficient information to be able to make concrete evaluations of goal achievement for humanitarian projects in Sudan funded under Chapter 163. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in an interview that it would be an advantage if the missions received the final reports from individual projects, thereby keeping more up to date. According to the Ministry, however, the resource situation sets limits on how extensive follow-up can be. In the interview survey, the organisations state that they doubt whether the Ministry has the capacity required to review the final reports properly with a view to learning from them. Save the Children has the impression that it is often a case of reporting for the sake of reporting. In the Norwegian Red Cross s opinion, the fact that the Ministry has never raised specific topics, such as the long-term perspective or Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report 113

116 Distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs), Norwegian Church Aid in Southern Sudan. Photo: Glenn Roer involving local people, in its feedback shows that the Ministry sometimes take final report processing too lightly. 6.6 The Ministry s reporting and evaluation of goal achievement in concrete humanitarian efforts As shown above, the Ministry s information about results and goal achievement is based on the organisations reporting and feedback, which largely consists of quantitative reporting from the UN and ICRC and project visits. The results and goal achievement in Norwegian humanitarian assistance are reported in Norad s annual report on results and in the annual budget propositions. In the interview survey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that Norwegian humanitarian funds have helped to cover humanitarian needs in the countries in question. It points out that projects funded by Norway have contributed to results in various cluster areas in the individual countries. Several executive officers in the Ministry with country responsibility state that they are not aware of concrete weaknesses or failures to achieve goals at project or organisation level in the countries, and they refer to results in the individual countries. Examples of this are provided in Text Box 17. Text Box 17 Examples of the Ministry of Foreign Affair s description of goal achievement in the interview survey For Sudan, the Ministry points out that the humanitarian indicators have developed in the right direction, and that Norwegian funds have helped save lives and provide education for refugees and internally displaced persons in camps, improved access to health services and contributed to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Southern Sudan. For the Palestinian Territory, the Ministry states that, even though the development indicators do not show a positive trend, the Ministry is convinced that the Norwegian contribution makes a difference, and that the situation would have been even more precarious had Norway not given humanitarian assistance. According to the Ministry, the political situation is an obstacle to goal achievement overall, although the Norwegian effort has produced good results at project level. In the Ministry s opinion, Norwegian humanitarian assistance has improved the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, and good results have been achieved as regards refugees, mine clearing and health. The Ministry also emphasises the Norwegian effort to achieve a clarification of roles between the civilian and military efforts in the country and the country s contribution to coordination. However, international efforts have been fragmentary. 114 Document no. 3:2 ( ) Report