LIBERIA. Population: 3.3 million inhabitants (2005) GDP: 548 million dollars (2005) GNI per capita: 130 dollars (2005)

Transcription

1 Population: 3.3 million inhabitants (2005) GDP: 548 million dollars (2005) GNI per capita: 130 dollars (2005) The civil war in Liberia has passed through many phases. It has cost the lives of 200,000 people (between 1990 and 2003), mostly civilians, and a further 850,000 have had to flee the country (80% of the population is displaced). The last phase of the conflict began in July 2000 and lasted for 3 years, with C. Taylor s government fighting the LURD, a group supported by Guinea which exploited the country s diamonds in order to buy weapons. March 2003 saw the emergence of a new armed group, the MODEL. In any case, it should be particularly noted that 13 peace agreements failed between 1990 and 1997, due mainly to the failure to resolve political and security problems. In 1997, the United Nations opened a Support Office in the country (UNOL), and in July 2003 the Security Council authorised the deployment of a peace-keeping mission (UNMIL). A few days later, President Taylor fled the country and went into exile. In August 2003, the Accra Peace Agreement was signed by all the warring parties (government forces, LURD, MODEL, militias and paramilitary groups) within the framework of a peace process led by ECOWAS. The head of the United Nations mission called on the Liberian government to turn the country into the first African nation without an army. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was created in September 2003 with the aim, among other things, of creating a DDRR programme and destroying any weapons collected. In December 2006, UNMIL had 15,638 military troops, 1,097 civilian police and 521 internationally contracted operatives. Its annual budget is million dollars and it coordinates 200 rehabilitation and reintegration projects for a total of 60,000 former combatants, with assistance from a number of other organisations. It has been extended until March Furthermore, the September 2006 UN Security Council resolution included a plan for the progressive withdrawal of UN troops from the country, coinciding with the advances in the pacification and rehabilitation process, as well as the preparation of the Armed forces and the national police force. The UN Security Council resolution 1750 has extended the UNMIL mandate until 30 September

2 Since March 2004, the UNDP has been providing technical support for the coordination of the DDRR programme, making use of a special fund for this purposes. The UNDP works closely with the DDRR programme s Joint Implementation Unit, which brings together a variety of international organisations and agencies. Background to the DDR process: Article II of the Accra Peace Agreement, which was signed on 18 August 2003, provided that ECOWAS would set up a Multinational Intervention Force which, among other objectives, would establish the necessary conditions for introducing a DDR programme and collecting weapons. Article IV referred to the necessity of deploying an International Stabilisation Force which would take charge of the quartering of troops and provide security in the quartering and disarmament zones, as well as being responsible for the collection and safekeeping of weapons. Article VI referred exclusively to the implementation, with immediate effect, of a DDRR programme (with rehabilitation). In September 2003, UNMIL and the UNDP began to design a DDRR programme. UNDP took overall responsibility, launching a preliminary awareness campaign that involved musicians, comedians and traditional dancers. A working group was set up that included OCHA, USAID, UNICEF and World Vision, and a programme was designed that would last 5 months and benefit around 53,000 former combatants. A National Commission for DDRR was subsequently established and charged with coordinating all the different activities. 7 December 2003 saw the official start of the DDRR process at the Schieffelin quartering camp, where 1,000 members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were disarmed. A number of infrastructure problems arose and the process had to be temporarily suspended just a few days later, both due to poor conditions at the camp and as a result of the late arrival of UNMIL troops. The process was restarted in April after four new camps had been opened, and this stage was completed at the end of 2004, with more than 100,000 combatants signing up. Type of DDR: Multiple, in mass numbers, dealing with child soldiers and offering the opportunity to participate in political power. Enforcing bodies: The National Commission for DDRR (NCDDRR), with support from UNMIL s DDRR Unit, the UNDP and the government, which takes political responsibility for the process. It has a work force of around 400 people and was decisive during the awareness programme during the first months of The Commission includes representatives from the government, armed groups, ECOWAS, the United Nations, the AU and the International Contact Group. The Commission has its own radio programme A Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) has also been created, with responsibility for operational planning and coordination duties. The JIU is in constant contact with the Technical Coordination Committee, which comprises a number of UN organisations. Executive and operational responsibility for DDRR is held by the JIU, which is running four programmes: 1. Disarmament and Demobilisation, entrusted to UNMIL. 2. Information and Awareness, entrusted to OCHA. 3. Monitoring and Assessment, entrusted to the UNDP. 4. Rehabilitation and Reintegration, entrusted to the UNDP. 2

3 NCDDRR (AU, ECOWAS, Government, LURD, MODEL, UNMIL, Government agencies) Disarmament & Demobilisation (UNMIL) Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) Information & Awareness (OCHA) Programmes Monitoring & Evaluation (PNUD) Rehabilitation & Reintegration (UNDP) Technical Coordination Committee (WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, MoD, UN, WHO) Basic principles: Massive and multiple DDRR aimed to different groups of combatants and support to childsoldiers. Planned political power-sharing. Groups to be demobilised: Around 107,000 former combatants from various armed groups and militias, including some 35,000 members of the LURD, 14,000 members of the MODEL, 16,000 people belonging to militias or pro-government paramilitaries and 12,000 members of the country s official armed forces. Vulnerable groups: Between 2004 and 2005, around 11,000 children were demobilised. Of these, 8,523 were boys and 2,440 girls. UNICEF took charge of coordinating this work with support from other local and international bodies, and it also donated 1.3 million dollars. The criteria for inclusion under this programme were not the usual ones, i.e. regarding a child as a soldier only if he or she had carried arms. Any child who had formed part of an armed group was included. This is particularly important as these programmes are aimed at everyone who has been involved on the logistical and service side, particularly women and children. The Government of Japan contributed in March 2006 with 6.7 million dollars to UNICEF on the aid provision for 5,000 demobilised child soldiers. This aid is in terms of basic education or vocational training. Budget: Due to the 100% increase in the number of people eventually demobilised, the initial cost estimates have little meaning. In the middle of 2004, the UNDP calculated that it would require around 75 million dollars for the demobilisation and reintegration of 48,000 former combatants, at an average of $1,550 per person. This estimate, which is clearly insufficient for the number of people eventually demobilised, was based on the following cost breakdown: 3

4 Estimated cost, mid-2004, (in millions of dollars) Stage TOTAL % Demobilisation Reintegration of 48,000 people Child soldiers Others TOTAL If the average cost per demobilised person remains the same, around 160 million dollars will be required in order to take care of all the people who have signed up for the programme. The disarmament and demobilisation stages are paid for out of UNMIL s ordinary budget, while rehabilitation and reintegration activities depend entirely on voluntary contributions. The UNDP has a DDRR Trust Fund for Liberia, administered by UNMIL. USAID and the European Commission also contribute to the reintegration of former combatants. The former provides aid to 20,000 people and the latter to around 3,000. The Government of Japan contributed in March 2006 with 6.7 million dollars to UNICEF on the aid provision for 5,000 demobilised child soldiers. This aid was converted into either basic school education or professional training. At the end of May, the EU donated an additional 10.9 million dollars, controlled by the UNDP, to be earmarked for activities for reintegrating ex-combatants. The final budget amounted to 71 million dollars, with a total contribution by the EU of 21.9 million dollars (31% of the total). Timetable: Three years, beginning in December 2003 and ending in December 2006 (36 months). Other issues: Justice: The UNDP, working in conjunction with OCHA, is supporting the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as provided for in Article XIII of the Accra Agreement. Article XXI of this Agreement, however, indicates that there will be no restriction whatsoever on any former combatant becoming a politician and taking part in the Transitional Government. Finally, Article XXXIV provides that the new Transitional Government may recommend a general amnesty for all combatants. At the end of June the TRC was opened, with the aim of finding out the truth about the past and establishing firm bases for conciliation, peace and development in the country. At the beginning of October, the process of calling in witnesses from all over the country began. In this connection, the NGO Human Rights Watch has hailed the beginning of the TRC's work, reminding that this body has the capacity to recommend the indictment of those found responsible for serious violations of human rights. In addition, the civil organisation Forum for the Establishment of a Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in Liberia, has asked for the warlords currently forming a part of the Parliament and the Government of the country to also be made to appear before the TRC. An International Crisis Group (ICG) report considers that the justice reform system must be a maximum priority to the new Government and donors. ICG assumes that during last 14 years of armed conflict has divulgate an impunity and corruption culture, which impeded a peace building process in the country. The report recommends some measures to adopt by the different actors involved at short, medium and large period, in order to enhance the judicial mechanism and to create community based justice programs. Security Sector Reform: UNMIL s mission is to assist in the establishment of a new police and military structure for the country, in compliance with the Accra Agreement. It is planned that during 2005 and 2006 UNMIL will train 2,000 soldiers for the country s 4

5 new armed forces (although the original plans were for 4,000 troops), working in conjunction with ECOWAS and other organisations and states. At present, 1,800 police officers had been trained as of 1 December 2005, including 300 riot police trained in Nigeria, the country which has undertaken to equip this unit. The USA has donated 1.6 million dollars for a Police Academy, enough to finance it for a year so that it can reach its target of training 3,500 police officers (though the programme is showing a deficit of 600,000 dollars, and 4 million dollars more is needed to rehabilitate police infrastructure). The Special Security Forces have been restructured and reduced in number from 1,287 to 395, though 0.9 million dollars is still required in order to finance the demobilisation of these people. According to the UN Secretary General, a further 3.9 million dollars is also required urgently for the demobilisation of police officers who are not eligible to join the restructured National Liberian Police. On 10 September 2005, the first stage of the demobilisation of members of the country s official armed forces was concluded. This had involved 9,400 participants, each of whom received compensation of 540 dollars. The second stage, which involves 4,273 soldiers, should begin on 17 October, but a lack of funds has caused it to be delayed. South Africa and the USA have donated 4 and 2 million dollars, respectively, for this stage, though a further 3 million dollars is required if all the costs of the programme are to be covered. The minimum wage will be 125 dollars for the lowest ranks, while higher ranking soldiers have obtained 20 weeks training. The reforms of the Armed Forces have had financing from the US government, implementation by the private company DynCorp International, and aid from the governments of China and Nigeria. However, the Special Representative for the UN General Secretary, A. Doss, warned on the necessity of a security sector reform, being one of the main priorities for the Government and the international community. Moreover, guaranteed that a possible reduction of the UNMIL forces Hill depend on the development capacity of the national security. For its part, the United Nations has taken on the responsibility of training the 3,500 members of the police force, at a cost of 8.5 million dollars. The UN Security Council decided in July 2006 to reduce by 125 the troops deployed by UNMIL, compensating for this with an increase in the same number of police officers. With regard to this, the new Armed Forces training period were begun, with the final aim of being able to replace the UNMIL troops. Disarmament: The disarmament process is the responsibility of UNMIL, responsible to finance all the military aspects in the arms collection and destruction stages, construction of cantonment camps, allowance payments and logistical support. It lasts for a maximum of five days (the original plan was for it to last 3 weeks, but this was shortened in view of the huge number of combatants) and was organised in groups in a number of different zones. The number of weapons collected came to a total of 28,364 small arms, 33,604 heavy shells and around 6.5 million small arms cartridges, an extremely low figure when seen alongside the number of combatants demobilised. Since the end of the formal DDR programme there has been a voluntary arms handover programme and a system for enforced confiscation, though neither have had much success. 400 weapons, 52,236 rounds of ammunition and 410 undetonated explosive units have been collected. The UNDP is therefore planning to introduce 5

6 an experimental project at community level for the collection and destruction of small arms, though 7.5 million dollars is required to finance this initiative. Part of this programme is the organisation of a number of workshops for the education and training of 291 community heads and local leaders. The aim is to introduce an Arms for Development programme similar to the one in place in Sierra Leone. Number of people disarmed, Groups Stage I Stage II Stage III TOTAL AFL 4,164 6,830 1,260 12,254 LURD 48 19,721 14,504 34,273 MODEL 11 2,854 10,283 13,148 Government//Militias 12 5,107 10,476 15,595 Others 8,890 16,957 1,902 27,749 TOTAL 13,125 51,469 38, ,019 Demobilised Weapons combatants collected Ratio Stage 1 13,125 8, Stages ,894 14, TOTAL 103,019 23,364* 0.22 * A subsequent recount put the official figure at 28,364 weapons collected (ratio: 0.27) Demobilisation: Both disarmament and demobilisation have taken place in 10 quartering zones with 5 field offices processing 250 people per day. Women and children are separated from the rest of the group from the outset and demobilised within 3 days. Once quartered, combatants receive their first orientation sessions and are given a medical examination, food, education in peace and human rights and professional training, though during this time they cannot be with their families. The disarmament and demobilisation stage was taken to have ended at the end of The following bodies were involved: UNMIL/NCDDRR (management of the quartering process), the WFP (food management), the UNDP (preliminary orientation and transport), the WHO (medical examination), the UNFPA (reproduction and gender violence), UNICEF (children), and PNUD/FITTEST (communications). The UNDP Trust Fund covered the costs of the WFP, the WHO and the UNFPA. Men Women Total Adults 69,266 67% 22,400 22% 91,666 89% Children 8,792 9% 2,561 2% 11,353 11% TOTAL 78,058 76% 24,961 24% 103, % Each person who is demobilised receives $300 in two equal instalments, paid by UNMIL. Reintegration and rehabilitation: Once they have left the quartering camp, each demobilised person must go to one of the Joint Implementation Offices within two months, where they will receive information on the reintegration programmes and two separate $150 dollar payments to cover their basic needs, as well as transition and social services. Reinsertion is the responsibility of the NCDDRR and the process lasts 3 months. The reintegration stage began in June 2004 and is supposed to last two and a half years (to the end of 2006), as well as reinsertion support programs and social services. This is also the responsibility of the NCDDRR and the process for each individual lasts between 6 and 12 months. Once the social and economic data for each individual has been recorded, they are given preliminary information regarding potential opportunities in a variety of areas, such as jobs, professional training, formal education, microloans, work in the public sector, business initiatives, etc. As far as preferences in reintegration go, 54% have chosen professional training, 41% have opted for educational programmes and 4% have taken up agricultural projects. 6

7 Around 20,000 former combatants have registered in a total of 353 educational centres, with programmes financed by Denmark, the EU, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the UNDP and the USA. The cost for each beneficiary of these educational projects is $512 per year. Aid for formal education can last up to three years. The UNDP, through its DDRR Trust Fund, is responsible for more than 7,200 students and to this end has signed agreements with 103 private centres for one year, at a cost of 3.7 million dollars. In addition, around 4,500 demobilised former combatants have recently signed up to agricultural training programmes in the Grand Cedeh, Lofa and Nimba regions, financed by the African Development Agency (ADA) with support from the UNDP. With regard to the reintegration operations, 56% of the demobilised combatants chose vocational training, 42% formal education and only 2% showed an interest in the agricultural sector. This lack of interest in agriculture reflects the difficulties that these projects are encountering (implemented by various organisations: PMA, ADA, World Vision, AFRICARE, GBAG, New Era, Synergies and LUSH) for different reasons: low participation in the process, non-availability of food in the project s initial period, lack of commitment for cultivating land that does not belong to them. The 15 reintegration projects that were operational in February involved 16,562 demobilised combatants at an average cost of $850 per person, with amounts distributed ranging from $646 for house building to $1,012 for community development work. The type of work carried out includes the construction of roads, bridges, schools and quartering zones and agricultural projects. Nine of these programmes are paid for with UNDP funds and involved 7,000 former combatants in January Other programmes financed by the EU and USAID support a further 8,200 former combatants. By 24 August, 37,500 former combatants were involved in rehabilitation and reintegration projects financed by bilateral donors, a further 35,448 were taking part in projects financed by the DDRR Trust Fund administered by the UNDP and another 12,200 were enrolled in educational programmes. Despite that, it is estimated that some 26,000 former combatants have not been able to join the rehabilitation and reintegration programme, which is currently showing a financial deficit of 18.5 million dollars. 612 former combatants who were identified as foreign nationals during the disarmament and demobilisation process have not yet been repatriated to their countries of origin. At the beginning 2006, the protest of 75 former combatants caused the meeting between PMA and UNDP, which mutually blamed on this unpaid, in order to solve the situation. The process was initially supposed to have involved three weeks in the quartering camps, though this was subsequently reduced to five days. Stage by stage, the structure was as follows: Stage 1 (7 December 2003): pilot programme at Camp Schieffelin (Monrovia), where conditions were not ideal due to the excessive number of former combatants. 13,123 former combatants were demobilised and 8,679 weapons were collected along with more than 2.7 million rounds of ammunition. The programme was subsequently suspended for 4 months in order to be redesigned. Stage 2 (15 April 2004): opening of 4 quartering sites: Gbarnga, Buchanan, Tubmanburg and Monrovia. People who were not carrying weapons were taken in during this period. However, the reintegration programmes did not grow in line with the increasing number of former 7

8 combatants, which meant that many of them had to wait. 51,466 people were demobilised, and 9,417 small arms were collected, along with 2.29 million rounds of ammunition. Stage 3 (July 2004): opening of camps in Zwedru, Ganta and Vonjama. This stage should have been completed by 31 October 2004, but the deadline was extended for three weeks due to logistical problems in the disarmament process in the north-west and south-east of the country. During this entire process, rumours persisted that the leaders of armed groups were handing out weapons to civilians so that they could join the programme and subsequently enjoy the financial benefits (300 dollars in cash). Another regular practice involved filling bullets with sand to pass them off as live ammunition. Attention should also be paid to the 350,000 people who have been internally displaced, along with the former combatants who have remained in the capital in order to avoid returning to their places of origin. By the beginning of 2005, some 103,000 former combatants had been disarmed and a total of 101,500 demobilised. A third of these were members of the LURD, while 12.8% had belonged to the MODEL and a further 12% had been members of the Liberian Armed Forces (AFL). Incomprehensibly, 27% of those demobilised were classified as others, since they could not show that they had belonged to any group or they had not handed over any weapons, leading to suspicions that they were not actually linked with any of the armed groups and were merely attempting to benefit from the advantages of the DDRR process. This in part explains why women represent 24.2% and child soldiers 11% of the total. 33,600 weapons have been collected (a very low proportion in view of the number of people demobilised) along with 6.4 million rounds of ammunition. The average age of those being demobilised is % of them have hardly any schooling while 38% have family responsibilities. The failure to predict the number of combatants to be demobilised has meant that the programme has been left without funds and no further programmes will take place, a situation mirrored by the problems in increasing the number of reintegration projects and their size. This has led to protests from armed groups, and there have even been outbreaks of violence in protest against the failure to meet payment commitments. The armed groups have said that they feel abandoned by UNMIL, which in turn has asked the international community for a further 10 million dollars. In addition, a large number of the reintegrated former combatants have stayed in the capital, either because they are frightened of returning to their homes or because they believe they have a better chance of finding a job there. Protests intensified as a result of the elections, particularly among supporters of the Congress for Democratic Change, who were unhappy with the result. In any case, both former combatants who are waiting to join reintegration programmes and those who have already benefited from these programmes have complained and demonstrated about the lack of speed of reintegration and the delays in the process. Finally, the Ministry of Defence announced the formation of new armed forces comprising around 2,000 troops, an idea that would become a reality once all the necessary funding had arrived from the US government. Initially, the future Liberian armed forces were to number around 4,000, but financial problems have made it necessary for this decision to be reviewed. It should be remembered that this new army will be trained by the private company DynCorp International, which will introduced a private enterprise element into this type of programme and the duties involved. There have been violent protests among members of the armed forces, who have been alleging that their salaries have not been paid. Financing for the rehabilitation and reintegration stages remains a decisive issue, in spite of the arrival of new donations in August 2005 from the USA (15 million dollars), the EU (9.5 million dollars) and Sweden (3.4 million dollars). 8

9 On the other hand, from the River Gee province (300 Km. far away from the capital, frontier with Côte d Ivoire) it is accused not to having implemented any DDR program, so several former combatants must survive digging on the gold mines. On another hand, in March 2006, citizens near Guthrie rubber plantation asked to the new Government to evacuate the former combatants that remain since These former combatants belonged to the LURD opposition armed group, which denounced not to receive any DDR compensation payment. In response to that, the Government announced the adoption of measures to avoid repeating this kind of situations. In the middle of October 2006, the National DDR Commission put forward a new agenda for the DDR process in the country. This new agenda was based on strengthening community reintegration and a process of national recovery that would cover development needs. A report from ECOWAS in December 2006 denounced the former President, C. Taylor, for having appropriated 375,000 dollars for the funds aimed at ex-combatants. UNMIL expressed its preoccupation at the beginning of 2007 regarding the 39,000 excombatants who had still not participated in any training programme two years after the disarmament process had been carried out, thereby endangering their effective reintegration. Especially, it was feared that these ex-combatants would be recruited as mercenaries in neighbouring countries such as the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Sierra Leone, since many of the former are to be found in an unemployed condition close to the borders with these countries. Nonetheless, UNMIL itself felt confident that by the middle of this year all of these will have joined some educational programme. Of the 101,500 combatants demobilised in November 2004, 60,000 have already signed up for professional training programmes or enrolled in schools. Planning: - Unknown number of combatants to be disarmed. - Confusion in the timetable originally planned for the programme. - Serious infrastructure and overcrowding problems at the first quartering camps. - Very small numbers of weapons collected in comparison with the number of combatants demobilised. - Failure of the reintegration programmes to expand. - Lack of strict controls on who is really a combatant and who is just taking advantage of the programme. Financing: - Changes in amounts and methods of payment. - Disagreement among combatants as to how amounts should be paid. - Budget restrictions: need for more money than expected, and receipt of only some of the contributions promised. - Problems in financing educational programmes. Reinsertion: - Excessive concentration of reinserted people around the country s capital. - Poor planning for the implementation of reinsertion programmes. Other issues: - Delay in deploying UNMIL forces. - Excessive differences in the quality of service provided by the different agencies. - Delay in weapons handovers by members of the MODEL, due to a belief that they will receive three times the amount if they hand their weapons over in Côte d Ivoire. - Internal divisions in the LURD. 9

10 International: - UNMIL, at < and < - Humanitarian Information Centre for Liberia, at < - ICG: Liberia: Security Challenges, ICG: Liberia: Resurrecting the justice system, Africa Report 107, International Alert: DDR. Supporting Security and Development. The EU s Added Value, September 2006, at < - IRIN News, at < - Paes, W.C.: The Challenges of DDR in Liberia, FINP, UNDDR: Liberia Country Programme, at < - UNICEF, at < - UNDP: Liberia DDRR Activity Report (December 2003 August 2004), 2004, at < - Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2005/560), 1 September Governmental: - National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) Joint Implementation Unit: Liberian DDRR Programme. Strategy and Implementation Framework, 2003, at < This briefing has been prepared by Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas and Eneko Sanz.