Inna Hakobyan University of Leicester

Transcription

1 Inna Hakobyan University of Leicester "Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the process of democratization in Armenia: why is Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?" Working paper Paper prepared for the conference on The European Neighbourhood Policy: Aims and Impact, University of Leicester, 18 June,

2 "Peculiarities of Russian-Armenian relations in the process of democratization in Armenia: why is Russian influence so strong in Armenia and what are the limitations of EU influence in Armenia?" Introduction Like many other countries of ex Soviet Union, Armenia had little experience with democracy prior to the 1990s. It has experienced many identity problems relating to its frequently changing boundaries over the centuries and to its relationships with other states. As Offe (1991) has argued, creating a new political system is much more difficult for a country whose boundaries are still contested. Due to its strategic significance, Armenia was constantly fought over and constantly passed back and forth by many empires throughout history. Armenia lies in the highlands surrounding the Biblical mountains of Ararat. The name Armenia was given to the country by the surrounding states, and it is traditionally derived from Armenak or Aram. In 301, Armenia became the first nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion. It established a church that still exists independently of both the Catholic and the eastern Orthodox churches, having become so in 451 after having rejected the Council of Chalcedon. Due to its adopted religion Armenia became the playground for neighbouring countries and was conquered at various stages during centuries. However the most significant invasion was in 1915, when the Ottoman Empire systematically carried out the Armenian Genocide. This genocide was preceded by a wave of massacres in the years 1894 to In 1915, with World War 1 in progress, the Ottoman Turks accused the (Christian) Armenians as liable to ally with Russia and treated the entire Armenian population as an enemy within their 2

3 empire in a wave of ethnic cleansing. The events of 1915 to 1923 are regarded by Armenians and the vast majority of Western historians to have been state-sponsored mass killings. Turkish authorities, however, maintain that the deaths were the result of a civil war coupled with disease and famine, with casualties incurred by both sides. The exact number of deaths is hard to establish, however, it is estimated that close to a million and a half Armenians perished in camps, which excludes Armenians who may have died in other ways. Thus between the 4th and 19th centuries, the traditional Armenia was conquered and ruled by Persians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols and Turks, among others. In 1922, Armenia became part of the Soviet Union as one of the three republics comprising the Transcaucasian SFSR however this was dissolved in 1936 and as a result Armenia became a constituent republic of the Soviet Union as the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. The transition to communism was very difficult for Armenia, and for most of the other republics in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities placed Armenians under strict surveillance. There was no freedom of speech, even less so under Joseph Stalin. Any individual who was suspected of using or introducing nationalist rhetoric or elements in their works were labelled traitors or propagandists, and were sent to Siberia during Stalinist rule. Soviet Armenia participated in the World War 2 by sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the frontline in order to defend the Soviet Motherland. However, Soviet rule had some positive aspects, as Armenia benefited from the Soviet economy, especially when it was at its peak. Provincial villages gradually became towns and towns became cities. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was reached, albeit temporarily. During this period, Armenia was populated by a sizeable Azeri minority, mostly centred in Yerevan. Likewise, Azerbaijan had an Armenian minority, concentrated in Baku, Kirovabad and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this demographic would change dramatically during and after Nagorno-Karabakh war. In the late 1980s, Armenia was suffering from pollution. With Mikhail Gorbachev s introduction of Glasnost and Perestroyka, public demonstrations became more common. Thousand of Armenians demonstrated in Yerevan because of the USSR s inability to address simple ecological concerns. Later on, with the conflict in Karabakh, the demonstrations obtained a more nationalistic movement. Many Armenians began to demand statehood and independence. Armenia declared its sovereignty from the Soviet Union on August 23, In the wake of the August Coup, a referendum was held on the question of secession. 3

4 Following an overwhelming vote in favour, full independence was declared on September 21, On October 16, 1991, Armenians elected Levon Ter-Petrossian as their first president. Ter-Petrossian was faced with many challenges, including economic difficulties caused mainly by the Turkish and Azeri blockade. His controversial banning of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, one of the main organised political entities in the Armenian Diaspora, and his apathy toward the pursuit of recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the Nagorno- Karabakh Republic made him unpopular with the general public and Diaspora Armenians during his final years as president. He was forced to resign in February Armenia faced many challenges during its first years as a sovereign state. In 1988, the Spitak Earthquake killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed multiple towns in northern Armenia, such as Leninakan (modern day Gyumri) and Spitak. Many families were displaced and were left without basic commodities. The harsh situation caused by the earthquake and subsequent events made hundreds of thousands of Armenians leave the country and settle in North America, Western Europe and Russia. These conditions were made worse when on February 20, 1989, interethnic fighting between the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region in Azerbaijan, voted to unify the region with Armenia. Subsequently this became a long lasting war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia closed their borders and imposed a blockade which they retain to this day, though in October 2009 Turkey and Armenia signed a treaty to normalise the relations. These events severely affected the economy of the fledging republic, and closed off its main routes to Europe. It is therefore evident, that Armenia s road to establishing itself as an independent nation with democratic values and ambitions, has been full of obstacles. It is not to say though that other ex-soviet Republics have had an easier journey towards democracy. Despite these problems, when it comes to conditions generally thought to be conducive to democratization, Armenia has many positive aspects as well as negative. Thus, the post-communist transition of the former-soviet republics has been as differentiated process as the heterogeneity of the former Soviet empire itself. Moving at different paces and in divergent directions, the transition course of these republics has been mixed. The processes of democratisation have neither been linear nor irreversible. Situated between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran in the Caucasus 4

5 region, Armenian policies have reflected its search for a place in what it considers to be a hostile regional environment. Overcoming domestic constraints and reinventing power structures to accommodate democratic and development needs is, however, a difficult task. This paper looks at the Armenian transition towards democracy, focusing on these internal and external dimensions of the process. Internally, consider the decisionmaking structures, with particular emphasis on the role of leadership, the development of political parties, changes in civil society and most importantly the Russian influence during this process. Externally, the attention is focused on neighbourly relations and external parties, including the role of international organisations, particularly the European Union (EU) and its privileged instrument, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and most recently the European Partnership (EaP). The duration of the transition process and its differentiated phases are also considered of relevance to understanding the choices of the political actors and the outcomes of foreign and domestic policies. This analysis is framed within a conceptualisation of democracy, which includes the holding of multi-party elections (the minimal understanding of democracy according to Schumpeter), political and institutional accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the development of a strong civil society. How does the relationship between Brussels and Yerevan affect the transition process? Does the ENP function as a catalyst, or does it generate opposition? And how does the regional context affect this process? By seeking answers to these and other questions, this paper aims to clarify the democratisation process in Armenia, and the role of Russia and EU in this complex process. Peculiarities of Russian- Armenian relations on the road to democracy and the role of neighbouring countries Russia and Armenia have long shared a close relationship, with defence as a critical dimension. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were Soviet bases in all three countries of the Caucasus, but Azerbaijan and Georgia subsequently 5

6 engineered the departure of the Russian military presence. Armenia, though, wanted to keep Russian boots on Armenian territory. Russia currently maintains a base with several thousand troops in the city of Gyumri. This agreement has now been extended until Russian and Armenian forces are jointly responsible for the defence of Armenia's borders. In the bigger picture, the Russian presence has been a critical source of support for Armenia against the possible threat of any heightened tension with Turkey and, in particular, with Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains a source of continued contention, and Armenia s relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan are still fragile. So Armenia has long been in a tenuous position geopolitically, economically and militarily and has looked to Russia for support. The most recent deal highlights Russian commitment to Armenia, and solidifies Russia's role as Armenia's big brother. That said Russia has long tried to walk a fine line, as it is not in Russia's interest to alienate Azerbaijan -- which is economically far more important to Russia than Armenia because of its oil resources. Critics of the deal question whether -- if push came to shove -- Russia would go to the wall for Armenia against Turkey and/or Azerbaijan, and whether the agreement may give Armenia a false sense of security. (This is highlighted by the rumoured sale by Russia of antiaircraft rocket launchers to Azerbaijan.) Also, the extension of the base deal limits Armenia's scope for manoeuvre; it in effect further reduces the chances of Armenia joining NATO, for example. Any change in heart, or policy, on the part of Russia visà-vis its objectives in the Caucasus, or the broader region, could be dangerous for Armenia. However, there is unlikely to be any real impact on the regional balance of power. The deal further strengthens Russia's position in Armenia -- and the region in general -- but it doesn t represent a significant shift in the balance of power. The level of Russian military commitment is unchanged, and there is no shift in Russia's position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, or Armenia's relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenian- Turkish Relations 6

7 Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in Despite this, for most of the 20th century and early 21st century, relations remain tense and there are no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries for numerous reasons. Some bones of contention include the unresolved Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the treatment of Armenians in Turkey, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Armenian claim of Turkey's holding of historic Armenian lands (ceded to them in the Treaty of Kars, a treaty which Armenia refuses to recognize to this day since it was signed between the Soviet Union and Turkey, and not between Armenia and Turkey proper). At the forefront of all disputes, however, is the issue surrounding the Armenian Genocide. The killing and deportation of between one and one-and-a-half million Armenians from eastern Anatolian lands of the Ottoman Empire orchestrated by the Young Turks is a taboo subject in Turkey itself as the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge that a genocide ever happened. However, since Turkey has become a candidate to join the European Union, limited discussion of the event is now taking place in Turkey. Some in the European Parliament have even suggested that one of the provisions for Turkey to join the E.U. should be the full recognition of the event as genocide. On June 5, 2005, Armenian President Robert Kocharian announced that he was ready to continue dialogue with Azerbaijan for the settlement of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict and with Turkey on establishing relations without any preconditions." Armenia has also stated that as a legal successor to the Armenian SSR, it is loyal to the Treaty of Kars and all agreements inherited by the former Soviet Armenian government. Yet Turkey continues to lay preconditions on relations, insisting that Armenia abandon its efforts to have the Genocide recognized, which official Yerevan is not willing to do. In the wake of the 2008 South Ossetia war between Russia and Georgia, Armenia and Turkey have shown signs of an inclination to reconsider their relationship. According to The Economist magazine, 70% of Armenia's imports enter via Georgia. Because of the apparently belligerent posture of the Russian state, economic ties with Turkey appear especially attractive. However, during this conflict Turkey was expected to take a side with the majority of Western countries that condemned Russia s actions in South Ossetia. Surprisingly, Turkey has suggested the establishment of the Caucasus Alliance or the so-called Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Some 7

8 sources argue that Turkey s sharp entry into the Caucasian arena was planned in detail and Turkey used the aggravation of the situation in the South Caucasus to launch the implementation of its old plan of penetration into the region that had been a tough nut to crack for the Turkish elite for a long time. The idea of the platform is to bring together the three south Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Russia and to enable them to mediate and solve their conflicts among themselves. In the words of Recep Tayyip Erdogan the purpose and content of the Caucasus Alliance is the following: Its main objective is to establish permanent peace and security in the region by bringing all regional states together in a joint formation. To this end, it envisages a structure in which regional states together are expected once again to reassure each other of respect and state sovereignty, restraint from the use and threat of force, the inviolability of state borders and non-harmful economic and energy security in their common space of Caucasus: principles such as state sovereignty, inviolability of borders and so on in the formation will take the main references from the charter of the OSCE, of which Russia, Turkey and all other Caucasus states are members. Erdogan believes that lasting peace and security is the principal aim here and this can be achieved through the increase of economic operation among regional states. In order to better present this idea, he gave examples of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku- Tbilisi-Erzrum and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars projects as economic necessity to develop more such projects and to expand them in such a way that would connect all peoples of the Caucasus. The idea of creating an alliance is based on the idea of complex interdependence, which assumes that improved trade relations and joint economic projects in a particular region will eventually decrease the use of military force in the region. Guner Ozkan goes on to introduce the realist perspective of that issue, contending that complex interdependence can only work so long all parties are satisfied, and yet this is often impossible to succeed in situations when there is competition for power and domination over scarce resources. Thus, she concludes that intergovernmental organisations, for the realists, are not more than instruments in the hands of states to promote their national and security interests. Indeed, looking realistically, the proposed Caucasus platform primarily requires a restoration of some sort of dialogue between both Armenia and Turkey and Armenia 8

9 and Azerbaijan. Turkey realises this and that is one of the reasons that Turkish officials had hoped that Armenia would definitely become a part of the proposed platform and the and formalities of the dialogue with Yerevan would be decided after further talks with Moscow thus raising expectations that Moscow could foster and/or mediate that dialogue. Moreover, the Turkish side is particularly hopeful that the Caucasus Alliance in the offing will resolve the other most important regional security issue, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Baku and Yerevan. The normalisation of ties with Armenia accordingly depend on Armenia accepting the fact that policy of recognition of Armenian genocide will not take place also the unilateral concessions on the Karabakh issue and the recognition of Turkey s territorial integrity with reconfirmation of the Kars Treaty to which Armenia is not prepared. The Armenian side on the other hand has been pursuing the delinking Armenian- Turkish normalisation from the NK peace process; keeping the question of Genocide away from the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic agenda, and relying more on practical rather than legal solutions while addressing border issues. However, Russia s positive approach to SCP is only of a tactical character as it is difficult to imagine that country s geostrategic perspective involving another active player in South Caucasus beside itself. This circumstance makes a ground to characterise the SCP as hardly ever accomplishable. Recently Armenian-Turkish relations have been directly connected to the Russian- Georgian conflict and to the changes that resulted from the conflict in South Caucasian geopolitical region. To review the issue comprehensively it is necessary to present the fundamental factual basis, official position and echoes of the analytic and public political scopes concerning the matter. Certainly, the development dynamics of mutual relations mostly fall to the second half of 2008 and first half of 2009, but it must be mentioned that Armenia had put forward the principal provisions of its official position on regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations back in 2007 in the National Security Strategy. It was prescribed in the strategy that Armenia addresses Turkey without any preconditions in hope to establish diplomatic relations and is going to undertake appropriate steps to overcome the problems to improve the mutual relations. 9

10 The new development of Armenian-Turkish relations in 2008 can be marked by 3 important events; the visit of Turkish President to Armenia, The Football diplomacy initiated by the visit of A. Gyul, and the joint statement on the road map. The Road Map initiated negative reaction in Azerbaijan and rumours started to spread in Turkey that the Road Map did not only improve the Armenian-Turkish relations but instead seriously damaged the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. In response to such accusations the president of Turkey said that each country builds its politics independently and at the moment Turkey s diplomacy towards Armenia is both for Turkey and Azerbaijan. It is also very important to take into account the view points of other political players that may have a definite influence on the territorial procedure. So, according to M. Brayse, even though the meeting of S. Sargsyan and A. Gyul did not solve the issues at hand, it formed a new atmosphere in the relations of the two countries. The USA also praised the statement about the Road map, insisting that The relations between Armenia and Turkey should be affirmed without any preconditions and in a sensible time span. The normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations is thought to continue but we should not expect any global changes in the diplomacy between the two countries in the near future. Armenia- Iran strategic partnership The Armenian Republic today has a lot of important strategic and political decisions to make. It is currently contemplating the impact of its relationship with its allies, particularly its close multilateral alliance with Russia and Iran. Armenia and Iran enjoy cultural and historical ties that go back thousands of years. There are no border disputes between the two countries and the Christian Armenian minority in Iran enjoys official recognition.many politicians and ordinary people see it as a way of mitigating the effects of the continuing Turkish and Azeri blockades. Stepan Safaryan of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies has said "Given this geopolitical environment, Armenia has the legitimate right to cooperate with Iran for ensuring its security...besides, Armenia has an energy surplus and its only major export market at present is Iran...So there is also a lot of economic interest involved." 10

11 Of special importance is the cooperation in the field of energy security which lowers Armenia's dependence on Russia and can in the future also supply Iranian gas to Europe through Georgia and the Black Sea. In addition to a pipeline that will bring Iranian natural gas into Armenia, the two nations have also implemented other multimillion dollar energy projects. These include the construction of two hydro-electric plants on the Arax River that marks the Armenian-Iranian border, a third high-voltage transmission line linking their power grids and dams, among other projects. In July, 2007, a memorandum was signed on the start of feasibility studies on the ideas of building an Armenian-Iranian railway and a Russian-owned oil refinery that would process Iranian crude. In addition, the Armenian and Iranian governments have been working on a bilateral free trade agreement. The Armenian government is building a second, bigger highway leading to the Iranian border in the hope of boosting trade with Iran. In 2009, Armenia s trade with Iran totalled a modest $105 million. However, this has increased dramatically in the past year or so. Having a warm rapport with Iran has always been a matter of virtual national consensus in Armenia. President Ahmadinejad of Iran has been quoted as saying "The Islamic Republic of Iran welcomes and supports the development of ties with Armenia in various areas, particularly in energy as well as transportation, sports, and tourism." Obviously, Armenia also needs to maintain close ties with the West. However, when it comes to the West, Armenians should 'never' think that Armenia's national prosperity, or national existence for that matter, is a subject of concern for Brussels or Washington. In this regard, it is no secret that many within Russia's political and military elite realize that Armenia's existence as an independent pro-russian nation within the south Caucasus is crucially important for Russia's long-term national interests. For the foreseeable future, Armenia will be a vulnerable state. Russia and Iran have both had a long history of rivalry against regional Turks. Even today, Moscow and Tehran do not wish to see the rise of Azeri and/or Turkish power in the Caucasus region. Thus, Armenia can serve as a natural buffer against Turks and their western supporters. This is precisely how Armenia has become a geostrategically pivotal nation for Moscow and Tehran. Nevertheless, it is firmly believed that without the Russian/Soviet factor in Armenia's national historiography there 11

12 would not have been an Armenian Republic today. A point to emphasize here is that as long as true Russian (Slav/Orthodox) nationalists are in power in Moscow the Armenian Republic has not much to be concerned about. Although relations between Russia and Armenia today are close and strategic in nature, Moscow s relations with Yerevan were not always so cohesive. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow were not very stable during the 1990s. There was a real threat back then that Armenia would break away from Moscow's orbit. Some have even claimed that the parliamentary assassinations in Armenia secured Russia's dominance in Armenia's internal affairs. Reality is that Moscow can make or break nations in the Caucasus, especially now that they have been roaring back to life - with a vengeance. Let's take a close look at Georgia and Azerbaijan; they have both essentially become hostages to Moscow. Neither Baku nor Tbilisi is able to resist Russian pressure even though they both have direct access to the outside world, and very close alliances/relations with Turkey, EU, USA and Israel. How an impoverished and landlocked Armenia would have fared had official Yerevan opposed Moscow's overtures in Armenia? Is it because Armenia was forced to compliance due to poverty and economic reliance on Moscow? Armenia today is in no position to call the shots with Moscow. In other words, Moscow does not want to place hope in Armenian politicians making the right decisions every few years. By controlling a nation's infrastructure, its lifeline, you secure its allegiance. At this stage in our national development, especially in the Caucasus, Armenia can't allow its citizenry to decide sensitive geopolitical matters. Consequently, due to the geopolitical nature of the region in question the Armenian Republic has no other choice but to remain firmly by Moscow s side. In many experts opinion, in this day in age, when battle-lines are already being drawn within various geopolitical theatres around the world, the Armenian Republic 'must' seek to become a Russian outpost, mainly due to the fact that Armenia is seeking economic and political reassurance from Russia. Armenia's best bet, its only option today, is to remain as close as possible to the Russian Federation and their regional apparatus according to Hanrapetutyun Political Party with Armenian President Serj Sarkissian as its leader. This is the main political party in Armenia and has so far been successful in convincing its people about the importance of strong Russian Armenian relations. They believe that ideologically and geopolitically Armenia's rightful place 12

13 is with the Russian Federation. However, Armenia should appreciate Mother Russia for practical reasons as well. In their opinion, the future potentially belongs to Russia. Russia controls the largest oil and gas reserves on earth; Russia controls the largest landmass on earth; Russia controls the largest amounts of natural resources on earth; Russia has managed to monopolize virtually the entire gas/oil distribution of central Asia; Russia has finally been able to brake the shackles of their western antagonists; Russians are now on a fast pace resurgence militarily, politically and economically; Russia controls the politics of the Caucasus; Russia controls the politics of Central Asia; Russia controls the politics of eastern Europe to a large extent. What's more, Russia is Armenia's largest and most lucrative trading partner. Annual trade between Moscow and Yerevan is currently over $500 million and it will most probably reach somewhere around one billion in the near future. What's more, Armenia's most affordable source for gas and oil is Russia. Armenia's only source for affordable and modern military hardware is Russia. What's more, Armenia's only source for nuclear fuel is Russia. And Armenia's only hope in fending off Turkish and/or Azeri aggression in the Caucasus is Yerevan's continuing alliance with the Russian Federation. The only other strategically vital nation for Armenia is Iran. The ruling administration in Yerevan, for various reasons, personal and political, has decided that the best way for Armenia is by continuing friendly relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the Armenian Republic is not able to utilize its industry effectively. The fact of the matter is, Armenia does not have the resources, it does not have unhindered access routes, it does not have the money, nor does it have the international contacts for its industry to operate independently and efficiently. What's more, Armenia needs to import its energy - gas, oil and nuclear fuel. As I highlighted above, the Russian Federation has more-or-less a monopoly of the region's energy resources and its distribution. As a result, if not Russia, who is Armenia going to rely on for its domestic energy needs? Yes, Armenia has begun dealing with Iran regarding energy, but Iran has serious problems. As we can see, Iran is virtually under siege and if the West could have its way they would cut off Yerevan from Iran in a heartbeat. What's more, due to Russia's strategic concerns, Moscow does not want to see Yerevan relying on anyone else but Russia. As a result, they are forcing Armenia to allow Moscow to get in on the deal with Iran. So, what can Armenia do at this stage? What options does Yerevan have? Play hardball with Russia by dealing with Azerbaijan and Turkey? 13

14 For better example of pragmatic vision on Russian foreign policy, we may quote a commonly used expression by Lenin - "We can ignore the interests of small states for the sake of interests of the large ones". Some experts think that Russia is a state with a truly positive attitude towards Armenia. Armenian experts suppose that in the nearest future the new geopolitical distribution in the South Caucasus will look like this: politically unstable Georgia will be weakened by the consequences of the Russian armed invasion, confused Azerbaijan will be projected on the existing situation in Karabakh of the results of the hostilities at the separatist regions of Georgia and Armenia, which will attempt to establish its place within the existing situation in the way not to get injured from this regional political processes. Dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations Let's consider the dynamics of Russian-Armenian relations upon the background of the latest historical transformation: collapse of the Soviet Union and appearance of three independent Transcaucasian states - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan has created a cardinally new military and political situation in the South Caucasus. Countries of the region have faced totally new challenges in the process of ensuring their own security. Ensuing from that, all the aforesaid countries have, in their own ways, defined their level of participation in various regional and international organizations, including the military and political ones, as well as in the process of settling the relations with the leading states. Armenia started to build the policy of securing their national safety in a different way than Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, immediately after gaining their independence, have taken a maximally distant course from Russia and are trying to cooperate mainly with western countries in the military and political fields, particularly with the US, and also with Turkey. Whereas for Armenia, Russia has become the main partner within the military and political field, and we may estimate the level of bilateral relations existing between these two countries, as quite an established strategic cooperation. From the very beginning the process of military and political cooperation between Russia and Armenia was not confined by bilateral relations solely. This can be explained by the multi- level integration processes created at the territory of the 14

15 former Soviet Union. The process of the military integration of the CIS member states has gradually turned into a three-level structure: within the borders of the Commonwealth, within the frames of the collective security format and on the grounds of the bilateral relations. The given multilevel integration system marked peculiarities for each post-soviet state to influence over the South Caucasus regional security problems, both through the bilateral aspect as well as the multilateral level. On February 14, 1992 decision was made to establish the Council of Ministers of Defence and Central Management of Joint Armed Forces of CIS, and on March 20, 1992 treaty on the joint Armed Forces in the period of transition was signed and the above mentioned Collective Security Agreement was signed on March 15, 1992, in Tashkent with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined them later. From the very beginning, this agreement was aimed as a military constituent of Commonwealth of Independent States, also it was meant to become a part of security system of Europe and Asia. However, due to different reasons, not every CIS State joined it and it appeared impossible to retain joint Armed Forces on the base of transformation of the existing Soviet Army. As it is evident from the above, all the attempts made by Russia to retain its grasp on most ex Soviet countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has proven impossible. Therefore, Russia has had to resort to establishing close allies in various regions; one of these allies in the Caucasus is Armenia. The limitations of EU influence on the democratization process in Armenia The EU is broadly engaged with the South Caucasus states through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). These regional initiatives are aimed at economic development, trade, fostering democracy and strengthening human rights credentials but, aside from a few border control initiatives, mostly overlook security dimension and this is one of the reasons that 15

16 Armenia is still reluctant to break away from Russia. The most recent addition to EU engagement in the South Caucasus region was the launch of the EaP on the 7th of May, This unprecedented Summit assembled the Heads of the State or Heads of Government of all EU countries and of the EU s Eastern Neighbours : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. According to the Summit declaration, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is to bring the relationship between the EU and partner countries to a new level and aims to accelerate political association between them and to deepen the integration of partner countries into the EU. The EaP is explicitly not a roadmap for EU accession however, and is developed without prejudice to individual countries aspirations for their future relationship with the EU. Among other innovations, the EaP proposes to bring about deep free-trade areas, combining open borders and regulatory approximation, through bilateral agreements at first, and through multilateral frameworks later on. It will also aim to increase mobility between EU and partner countries by introducing visa facilitation agreements. These, and other measures envisaged by the EaP, could provide the tangible and demonstrable benefits that would help build political momentum in favour of further EU integration and EU-inspired reform in Armenia. The EaP also introduces a novel multilateral framework at governmental level to promote dialogue and cooperation among Eastern partner countries and to develop common initiatives. Four platforms will focus on democracy and governance issues, economic cooperation and convergence with EU law, contacts between people and energy security. This multilateral framework should not be restricted to governmental dialogue alone however. The Summit also proposed to develop a Civil Society Forum and an EU Parliamentary Assembly to accompany this process. The EaP is complementary to the European Neighbourhood Policy in existence since 2003, whose geographical coverage is broader and which has more modest goals. Like the EaP however, it seeks a balance between the regional approach and individual treatment of partner countries, and remains non-committal on the issue of eventual EU membership. A conference of officials and political analysts convened at the initiative of the EU s Czech Presidency acknowledged that hopes and expectations had been unreasonably high following the revolutions in the Ukraine and Georgia, and that the EaP marked a new beginning and was an ambitious project. 16

17 From Armenia s point of view, the EaP was undoubtedly a significant step forward. Armenia had been seeking to maximize the EU s contribution to political and economic reforms in the country. EU integration is furthermore overwhelmingly popular in the country, but successive governments have taken a pragmatic, gradualist approach to European integration due to its strategic partnership with Russia as mentioned above. All the above developments had been welcomed by all and it had been hoped that new changes were to take place. However, the EU has failed to use either the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to leverage reform in Armenia. Armenia saw its inclusion in the EaP as a path to gaining EU membership and a way of resolving ongoing problems with its neighbours. However the EU is still neither actively involved in conflict resolution nor strongly committed to closer political integration with its Eastern partners. Its vague policy stipulations have done little to shore up its own position in the South Caucasus. Armenia is often over-looked, compared to Georgia s more dramatic events in recent years and Azerbaijan s pivotal energy role. But the country is also important to South Caucasus security. Relations with Turkey continue to be uneasy. The frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is on the verge of becoming more active. Blocked democratic reforms breed social frustration. Given Armenia s landlocked position, the closed border with Turkey, the recently closed Russian-Georgian border, and the ongoing half-frozen conflict with Azerbaijan, regional cooperation focused on reconciliation is essential to EU interests. The EU needs to upgrade its political engagement in order to head off probable instability in all these areas of Armenian politics. PROGRESS AND CRISIS According to the EaP Ministerial Council of December 2010, EU-Armenia relations have intensified considerably in the EaP s bilateral and multilateral tracks. The first meeting of the EU-Armenia Human Rights dialogue took place in December The Commission is working on draft visa facilitation and readmission agreements. 17

18 Negotiations for an EU-Armenia Association Agreement began in July 2010 with the third and latest plenary round on 15 December This accord includes the possibility to start negotiating a deep and comprehensive free trade area. But Armenia has been hit hard by the economic crisis. The global financial crisis reduced state revenues, harming the economic and social reform process in Armenia, including implementation of the ENP Action Plan. After years of double-digit economic growth, Armenia s GDP fell by a dramatic 15 per cent in In the same year, EU exports to Armenia fell by 20 per cent, while exports of Armenian products to the EU fell by a remarkable 50 per cent. The EaP is supposed to alleviate economic problems and foster commercial relations however these figures suggest its impotence. To help lessen the impact of the financial crisis, in November 2009 the Council agreed to provide macro-financial assistance to Armenia, in the form of a loan of EUR 65 million and a grant of EUR 35 million. Yet, the question remains of whether the injection of such funding into the state budget can contribute to the desired stability and prosperity while some of the borders are closed and an adjacent conflict persists. It certainly does not seem to have had any tangible impact. The plethora of European loans and grants are unlikely to secure the EU s position in the Russian dominated Armenian economy. Russian capital dominates Armenian telecommunications, electricity networks, banking and gas distribution. In the latter sector Russia provides a de facto subsidy and prevents the price of gas from doubling: an offer that the EU cannot match. Thus, a primarily economic led policy does not play to the EU s comparative advantage. Armenians look to the EU more for a role in promoting democratic progress, conflict resolution and support for civil society. POLITICAL TURMOIL Association Agreements are supposed to be signed with functioning electoral democracies only. However, the EU seems not to have applied this condition in Armenia or other South Caucasus countries which are part of the EaP. The binding nature of these agreements should increase the likelihood of a successful implementation. But the EU s inconsistency regarding political conditions reduces its credibility and future bargaining power. 18

19 The May 2010 report on Armenia s progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan states that Armenia has made progress in several areas. It has launched a regular human rights dialogue with the EU, improved its legislative framework in the area of anti-corruption and strengthened the role of the Human Rights Defender. The report also insists that it has taken positive steps to address the internal political crisis following the violence-marred presidential elections in February It additionally mentions further reforms in justice and rule of law. In fact, democracy indices show that democracy has not progressed since the launch of the ENP in Armenia, and has even deteriorated in several areas. In 2008, the outgoing president Kocharyan was expected to emulate Putin s conversion to being prime-minister; however, mired in scandal he left politics. In an orchestrated handover the prime minister ship went instead to the technocratic head of the central bank, Tigran Sargsyan. Violent protests erupted. Ten days of demonstrations ensued against regime-orchestrated ballot box stuffing, the attacks suffered by local observers and the patent bias of the electoral commission. The protests ended with the violent dispersal of the protesters. This was followed by a 20-day state of emergency. Since 2008 dissent has grown over the nondemocratic transfer of power. The Armenian opposition is far from united. The most visible opposition factions are the Heritage party and the Communist party; but the latter did not pass the electoral threshold in 2008 and its support base is dwindling. The leader of the 2008 protests, former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, is currently calling for Armenians to emulate the events in Tunisia and Egypt. However, his post-2008 silence and association with the country s problems of the 1990s undermine his ability to inspire the masses. Meanwhile, the coalitional government is trying to secure the 2013 presidential bid for the incumbent Serzh Sargsyan, with others predicting the comeback of Kocharyan as his main rival. Armenians remain bitterly disappointed with the nepotism of politics and predict an unstable period ahead. The post-elections crisis of 2008 has received little critical attention from the EU, which preferred to distance itself and take a wait and see approach. The EU deemed the 2008 elections broadly democratic - despite all the evidence to the contrary and the anger of democratic opposition parties. The EU urged the Armenian authorities to end the state of emergency, launch an independent investigation on the violence and release political prisoners. However, the regime ignored these requests and the state of emergency was not lifted before the planned date of 20 March. 19

20 The broadcast media has been under constant pressure from the government since the elections. Restrictions have been placed on the freedom of assembly and the opposition has been denied permission to hold demonstrations. A June 2009 amnesty freed 30 protesters from jail and many more activists were released in another June amnesty in The police officers accused of brutality during the post-election events have not been charged. Despite all these negative trends and the Armenian government s rejection of EU strictures, no policy change occurred under the rubric of the ENP Action Plan and Armenia was safely granted a place within the EaP. Armenians struggle to understand how the EU can classify their country as democratic. Europe has turned a blind-eye to Armenia s authoritarian clampdown. REGIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT The EU has retained its efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a separate priority. The EU prefers to distance itself on Nagorno- Karabakh and channel its limited activities through promoting the OSCE Minsk Group. EU governments have been largely reactive in the face of Russian diplomacy and influence. The unresolved conflict compounds Russia s military and economic pre-eminence in the region and reduces the chances of EU access to Azerbaijan s energy supplies. Instead of merely morally supporting the OSCE Minsk Group, which includes seven different EU governments, the Union should substitute these representatives with its own. These should be the heads of EU delegations to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The creation of the External Action Service and EU ambition to project a united front renders this step both urgent and logical. It also has the potential to improve the image of the OSCE Mink Group itself which is regarded as of little use by both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides. Progress on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is essential to ground the EU s position in the region. Given its economic and security interests, it would be problematic for the EU explicitly to take sides in the conflict. However, insisting on stricter arms control, and even an arms embargo, would help to diminish the possibility of a renewed war. Higher level political and economic involvement from the EU should be combined with the setting of a deadline for resolution of the dispute and pressure on both sides to avoid low level skirmishes. The EU s focus on nonconflictive issues will keep the spotlight on Russia as the regional player. To 20

21 safeguard its security, Armenia signed a new defence agreement with Russia in August 2010, extending Russia s military base lease until 2044, further increasing Russian influence in the region. But skirting difficult political questions will only harm the EU s longer term role and interests. The EU has had clear opportunities to contribute to resolving Armenia s conflictive relations with its two neighbours and win over more EU enthusiasts, given the pro-european aspirations of the government and the high level of public support for the Union. However, Armenia s parallel foreign policies complicate the EU s agenda, as it has to deal with Armenia s close security and economic relationship with Russia and developmental ties with the United States. The long-awaited rapprochement in Armenian- Turkish relations resulted in the signing of the Zurich accord. The EU played virtually no role in this advance. Shortly afterwards the Turkish government reiterated that ratification would depend on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia responded by officially suspending the accord s ratification process. The most publicised of occasional hostilities, resulted in Armenia and Azerbaijan blaming each other and demonstrated the lack of security in the region. Though the incident directly undermined its conflict resolution commitments, the EU delegation in Armenia did not officially react. Given the close relations of the South Caucasus countries with some of their out-of-region neighbours, there is also a need for increased engagement with regional players such as Turkey and Russia in the development of cooperation policies. Though these states cannot be regarded as neutral, neither can they be ignored. The EU should particularly encourage and contribute to incipient civil society links between Armenia and Turkey. However, when encouraging civil society links, the EU should be careful with the influential Armenian Diaspora, which pursues a hard-line opposition to the rapprochement with Turkey. Civil society links have the potential to transcend the historical baggage of the Armenian population and encourage the latter to focus more pragmatically on the future and the need for prosperity. To increase the effectiveness of its policies in the region, the EU needs to address both the region s and Russia s interests. At the same time, the EU should not underestimate Russia s great power ambitions. The EU needs to tie its further economic engagement with Russia to the latter s acceptance of the sovereignty of South Caucasus states. An EU-funded opinion poll shows that 96 per cent of Armenian respondents want the EU to be more active in developing regional cooperation. The ineffectiveness of ENP 21

22 regional cooperation in military-security issues is explained not only by the divergent interests of the regional players but also by the EU s reluctance to take specific, concrete actions as opposed to vague propositions and encouragements. The respondents bear analogy coincides with the European Parliament s view which acknowledges the need for a comprehensive strategy for the South Caucasus that would combine soft power with a firm approach. The neglect of conflicts in the South Caucasus will jeopardise the EU s attempts to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. The outstanding conflicts will continue to be used to justify the concentrating of power in the hands of a small elite group when facing criticism on the state of democracy. Currently, the EU s approach to Armenia and other EaP members is an accumulation of overlapping policies, which do not fully address the needs of the partner country and hinder the proclaimed goals of the EU. The EU should end its tendency to treat countries in the region with simplistic uniformity. Though some differences are acknowledged on paper, the politically diverse countries of the South Caucasus are included in the same policies and have similar priority areas in the ENP Action Plans. Such an approach renders its policies less efficient as it fails to reward its best aspirants and over-rewards the worst intractable offers the EU an opportunity to act rather than react, given the US s declining interest in the region and over-stretched involvement in other conflicts. The upgrading of the EU s policies towards Armenia should be connected to progress in the implementation of previous and current projects. Otherwise, the EU will end up with a pile of expensive but eventually ineffective initiatives. Conclusion This paper has looked at the Armenian road to democracy, understanding it as a tortuous process defined by internal and external dynamics. These two dimensions internal policies and external factors have both fostered and hampered the process, which from its very beginning has been defined in terms of the Western liberal democracy model. Understanding democracy in its broader formulation, the Armenian transition course has revealed many difficulties in implementation. 22