MENA countries and climate negotiations. History and future perspectives. Valeria Barbi CMCC, ICCG

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1 MENA countries and climate negotiations. History and future perspectives. Valeria Barbi CMCC, ICCG ICCG-CMCC Summer School Climate change impacts and policy in the Mediterranean basin Venice, 20th 25th May 2013

2 Summary 1. UNFCCC process: a brief overview 2. Negotiations groups: OAPEC; League of Arab States; G77; OPEC. 3. The Maghreb 4. Case studies: Egypt; Tunisia; Libya.

3 UNFCCC process: a brief overview

4 The IPCC. How the negotiation process started 1988: establishment of the IPCC by the UNEP and the WMO (UN GA Res. 45/53) 1990: IPCC First Assessment Report existing scientific evidence for global climate change reflected the views of 400 scientists primary message: global warming was happening and something had to be done about it. December 1990: UN GA Res. 45/212 starts the negotiation treaty for a framework on climate change

5 The UNFCCC 1992: the UNFCCC is adopted at the Rio Earth Summit. 1994: the Convention entered into force on March parties of the Convention.

6 UNFCCC Ultimate Objective The UNFCCC sets an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to avoid risks of humaninduced climate change. Art.2: stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystem to adapt naturally to climate-change to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

7 Main principles of the UNFCCC

8 Main principles of the UNFCCC Precautionary Principle: the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as an excuse to postpone action when there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage; Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsabilities and respective capabilities: the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and their adverse effect Principle of Sustainable Development: Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Policies and measure to protect the climate system should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each party.

9 The COP Parties: States that signed the UNFCCC. Since the 1995 the Parties have been meeting annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change. Main purposes of the COP: to review the implementation of the Convention to adopt decisions to further the Convention's implementation to negotiate substantive new commitments

10 The Berlin Mandate 1995: the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) takes place in Berlin. Countries realized that emission reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate. They launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change (Berlin Mandate). Two years later they adopted the Kyoto Protocol.

11 The Kyoto Protocol (COP3) Adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December Entered into force on 16 February 2005, due to a complex ratification process. Main characteristic of the KP: It operationalizes the Convention. It commits industrialized countries to stabilize GHG emissions respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Why developed countries? Because the Protocol recognizes that they are largely responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere, which are the result of more than 150 years of industrial activity.

12 Parties of the UNFCCC Each Party to the Convention is represented at sessions of the Convention bodies by a national delegation consisting of one or more officials empowered to represent and negotiate on behalf of their government. Based on the tradition of the United Nations, Parties are organized into five regional groups: 1. African States, 2. Asian States, 3. Eastern European States, 4. Latin American and the Caribbean States, 5. Western European and Other States (Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States of America, but not Japan, which is in the Asian Group). The five regional groups, however, are not usually used to present the substantive interests of Parties and several other groupings are more important for climate negotiations.

13 Parties of the UNFCCC a) Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): is a coalition of some 43 low-lying and small island countries, most of which are members of the G-77, that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise. AOSIS countries are united by the threat that climate change poses to their survival and frequently adopt a common stance in negotiations. They were the first to propose a draft text during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations calling for cuts in carbon dioxide emissions of 20% from 1990 levels by b) Least Developed Countries: 50 countries as defined by the UN regularly work together in the wider UN system. They have become increasingly active in the climate change process, often working together to defend their particular interests, for example with regard to vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. c) EU: meet in private to agree on common negotiating positions. The country that holds the EU Presidency, a position that rotates every six months, then speaks for the EU and its 27 member states. As a regional economic integration organization, the EU itself can be, and is, a Party to the Convention. However, it does not have a separate vote from its members.

14 Parties of the UNFCCC d) Umbrella Group: is a loose coalition of non-eu developed countries which formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal list, the Group is usually made up of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US. e) Environmental Integrity Group (EIG): formed in 2000, comprises Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. Several other groups also work together in the climate change process, including countries from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a group of countries of Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM), and countries that are members of organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Agence intergouvernementale de la francophonie. Developing countries generally work through the Group of 77 to establish common negotiating positions.

15 Divisions among our countries of interest (1) G77 (2) League of Arab States (3) OPEC (4) OAPEC Algeria (1) (2) (3) (4) Egypt (1) (2) (4) Tunis (2) (4) Morocco (1) (2) Lybia (1) (2) (3) (4) Lebanon (1) (2) Palestine (1) (2) Jordan (1) (2) Syria (1) (2) (4)

16 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC ) Regional inter-governmental organization established in Beirut on January 9, Signatory members: Kuwait, Libyan (Kingdom of Libya at that time) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Perceived as the leader of OPEC and OAPEC because it has the most to lose from changes on oil market. Main objectives: recognizing the role of petroleum as a principal and basic source of its members' income fight for the development and prosperity of the world petroleum industry by fostering close and fruitful cooperation among its members. How? Building an integrated petroleum industry as a cornerstone for future economic integration amongst Arab countries and contributes to the effective use of the resources of member countries through sponsoring joint ventures.

17 OAPEC position on the UNFCCC negotiations OAPEC countries have a history of engaged involvement in the negotiations. Fossil fuels are the primary cause of climate change. The fight against climate change is a direct threat to their oil trade and strategic political power as reducing GHG emissions is mainly focused on introducing RES and increasing energy efficiency. OAPEC position on the current climate negotiations is completely in line with the Saudi position, adopted in full by the League of Arab States (Saudi Arabia ranked last by the Climate Change Performance Index). Leading this campaign for OAPEC countries at each round of negotiations has been the Saudi delegation, headed by Saudi Ministry of Petroleum official Mohammad El-Sabban, head of delegation since the 1990s.

18 OAPEC position on the UNFCCC negotiations a) Egypt has increased its engagement after realizing the national security effects of climate change b) Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and others do not consider climate change a priority, and have not developed or submitted any national position on the different topics under negotiation before Copenhagen.

19 League of Arab States A regional organization of Arab states formed in Cairo on 22 March 1945 Signatory members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan in 1949), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Yemen joined as a member on 5 May Currently, the League has 22 members. The League fully adopts the position of the OAPEC countries which is completely in line with the Saudi position.

20 G77: history and positions

21 G77 The Group of 77 (G77 and China) was established on the 15th of June 1964 during a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Geneva. G77 aims to discuss the most relevant issues concerning the development agenda at the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Now it brings together 132 developing countries to discuss the most relevant issues concerning the development agenda at the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is not a policymaking body but it coordinates and aggregates the viewpoints of its members in order to enhance the group's influence in international negotiations.

22 G77 OBJECTIVES The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the UN. Objectives: - to provide the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests - to enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system - to promote South-South cooperation for development.

23 G77 main characteristic Highly heterogeneous composition of the G77. This could in itself be expected to make it more difficult to reach a common position when dealing with the climate issue. Why the G77 sticks together at all as a group both in the climate negotiations and at a more general level?

24 G77 divisions - Large and most rapidly developing states => oil importing countries (China) - Oil producing and exporting countries (Saudi Arabia) - Least Development Countries (LCDs) focused on: Low GDP and Low emissions per capita High GDP and High emissions per capita Are becoming much more importat both for the global climate and global energy market. They are increasingly developing profitable strategies for bilateral agreements on climate and energy outside the official negotiation process Economic development (sometimes related with the concept of sustainability) Fighting energy poverty

25 G77's arguments in the climate change negotiation It is based on the concept of the principle of common but differentiated responsabilities (UNFCCC art.3.1). - Developed countries: tend to emphasise that responsabilites to combat climate change are common - Developing countries: first and foremost consider the problem of mitigating climate change to be the responsability of the industrialised countries as they are historically the main cause of the climate change problem.

26 G77: three main groups of countries BRIC (Brazil, India and China) OPEC AOSIS LDCs

27 OPEC The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries is a permanent, intergovernmental Organization, created at the Baghdad Conference on September 10 14, Founding members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Main objectives: to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry.

28 OPEC in the UNFCCC negotiations process Between 1998 and 2004 the chair of G77 has been covered 5 times by an OPEC member. OPEC has been a very active group in the climate change negotiations from the beginning: COP1 (Berlin, 1995): the majority of the G77 supported emissions reductions by developed countries and the decisionmaking process was paralysed for a while by oil exporting nations; the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF): established by the Marrakech Accords to support adaptation and technology transfer in all developing country parties to the UNFCCC has been manipulated by OPEC insistence that it also finance activities to assist oil-exporting countries diversify their economies.

29 Main reasons for OPEC opposition to the UNFCCC Desire to prevent developed countries from using mitigation policies (carbon taxes) to increase the rent they receive on imported fuels; climate mitigation policies and measures that target oil comsumption will slow growth in thei revenues from oil exports. Reducing emissions through the imposition of carbon taxes in developed countries will reduce demand for oil. As developed countries account for more than 60% of world oil consumption this may cause a decline in the global price of oil. Developed countries MUST minimise these impacts, demanding compensation for their expected losses on oil revenues.

30 OPEC s requests Funds for financing losses from mitigation measures implemented worldwide; technological assistance from developed countries; more direct investments to diversify their economies. KYOTO PROTOCOL Art.3 Par.14 Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments mentioned in par.1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Art.4, par.8 and 9, of the UNFCC. [ ] the COP [ ] shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology UNFCCC Art.4 Par. 8 and 9 In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of res ponse measures, especially on: h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products [...]

31 OPEC tactics Obstruction of progress; exercising the de facto power of veto that arises because the negotiation process seeks consensus; refusal to agree; insisting on linking progress on the compensation issue with progress on other issues (i.e assistance for adaptation); blocking discussion of ideas and issues; stressing scientific uncertainty and contesting the validity of the IPCC reports; wasting of time; fomenting mistrust among parties; mispresenting the G77 position; introducing meaningless text or text clearly to be unacceptable to other parties.

32 The great paradox OPEC's action undermine sustainable development in developing countries. Minor OPEC (Nigeria) and Major OPEC (Saudi Arabia). The Climate Action Network s award Fossil of the Day has regularly been given the prize to Saudi Arabia since : a series of anonymous interviews to G77 delegates highlighted that Saudi Arabia was seen as an obstuctionist body. So... Why is G77+China frequently tacitly supporting OPEC in its efforts to obstruct the climate regime?

33 Main reasons for G77 unity Common consideration for economic underdevelopment; sensation to be stronger if they act all together in trying to gain development and sovereignity advantages from the international community; development-centered approach to climate change; recognition of common but differentiated responsability as a guiding principle; equal voice in all aspect of international affairs; techonolgy transfer; additional resources for environmental programs; common feeling of vulnerability to political and economic power in the international system and to the negotiating power of developed countries.

34 Main reasons for G77 unity high degree of internal work to negotiate and coordinate the G77's efforts at times when the group has begun fragmenting; a value to be preserved in and on itself; a shared sense of weakness among developing countries that makes countries like Saudi Arabia, that take the fight up, seem like champions of a sort; OPEC's capacity to successfully manage negotiations: almost all G77 countries have small delegations. The logic and rules of the climate negotiations are arcane and require the kind of fulltime staffing that only the wealthiest developing countries can afford. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FIND SECURITY WITHIN THE G77 BLOC OPEC IS A NEGOTIATING SUPERPOWER

35 A greener OPEC? 2010: 50 years after its foundation, OPEC released a long-term strategy wich included emphasis on improving the environmental performance of oil, benefits coming from CCS and the need for projects that would fall under the CDM. Since 2009 a number of OPEC members started to implement environmental-friendly technologies and systems. January 2012: Saudi Minister for Petroleum and Mineral Resources GHG and global warming are among humanity s most pressing concerns. DRASTIC U TURN! December 2012: an OPEC bulletin highlighted that oil extraction and production could no longer be the sole focus of the organisation. The need to deal with climate change and to conserve the environment could not be ignored. Are they starting to take the threat of climate change seriously?

36 A greener OPEC? Qatar s last actions suggests a positive answer. (COP18, Qatar s National Vision 2030). BUT It is important that OPEC member states are not pushed too hard towards an agreement with wich they are not confortable as an air of antagonism could risk OPEC reverting to its previous stance.

37 Maghreb

38 The Union of the Arab Maghreb UMA (1989) trade agreement aiming for the economic and future political unity among Arab countries of the Maghreb. Members: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. No agreement in the field of energy, drinking water or food autonomy that binds the UMA nations in a collaborative framework with common goals. Exception: Convention for the Conservation of the Environment (1994). Why? Dictatorial regimes. Which perspectives in the aftermath of the Arab Spring?

39 The protection of the environment in the Maghreb Earth Summit (1992): Maghreb countries have been the first to insert the notion of sustainable development in their national legislations. G. Pace, Environmental protection in the Maghreb: problems and perspectives, in Maghreb. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia towards a sustainable development, 1997, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

40 Major conventions signed by Maghreb countries Algiers Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1968); Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (1976); Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat (1971) Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas (1982); Rio Convention on biological diversity (1992); UNFCCC (1992); Kyoto Protocol (1997).

41 RES policies in the Maghreb: a brief overview Climate policies are mainly connected to the promotion of RES. Main drivers: energy security issues; national economic and social development needs; industrial diversification; electricity exports; better environmental and carbon footprints; need to mitigate GHG emissions.

42 Locations of the projects Interest in RES is particularly strong in the net oil importing countries such as Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon, where price exposure is highest. The highest current use of RES in electricity production is found in countries with access to lower cost, base-load hydro power sources (Turkey and Egypt). The fall in other RE technology costs has quickly brought new resources into consideration: wind and solar. Morocco and Egypt have the greatest projected growth in RES capacity over the coming years. Morocco: mixed wind-solar programme. Egypt: new wind energy capacity installations in El-Zeit and Suez areas.

43 RES policy landscape 16 of the 24 countries have RES targets: Morocco: 42% of RES by 2020; $9bn for solar. Algeria: 40% of RES by 2030; $60bn budget. few have established RES support policies (feed-in tariffs or investment incentives); GAP: absence of RES policies relating to the transport sector.

44 Case studies Egypt Tunisia Lybia

45 Egypt Egypt is one of the most vulnerable countries to the potential impacts and risks of climate change. It produces less than 1% of the world total GHG emissions Egypt s main concern is adaptation. Adaptation measures have been integrated into national policy and investment frameworks (CDM). However, mitigation measures contained in national plans and governmental studies are in progress. Objective: to create a national GHG mitigation portfolio to support the process of sustainable development in Egypt (technology transfer, donor funding, capacity building and financing from CDM).

46 Egypt: environmental policy framework The Environmental Law (Law no ): regulates max emissions permitted to enterprises but it does not regulate emissions on national level; Amended by Law no.9 (2009): governs data collection on the environment and the integration of the information on national plans; regulates the enforcement of environmental laws and rules; assigns roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and the Egypt's Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA); MSEA prepares and submits the National Communications to the UNFCCC and the first baseline assessment regarding GHGs in Egypt, covering different sectors, in 2007.

47 Egypt: environmental policy framework 1997: inter-ministerial National Climate Change Committee (NCCC), restructured in 2007; 1999: establishment of the Egypt s s Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) and the Initial National Communication on Climate Change; 2009: three-year Climate Change Risk Management Programme (CCRMP), which addresses national climate change adaptation and mitigation issues involving multiple ministries and sectors.

48 Arab Spring: improvements to the Egyptian environmental legislation Egyptian Constitution: no explicit Articles dealing with climate change or the right to a healthy and safe environment Art.59 of the Constitution was amended by the State: the protection of the environment is a national duty and the law shall regulate the necessary measures to preserve a healthy environment. No explicit reference to a State obligation to preserve a healthy environment New Constitution: Art.69 explicitly foreseen that all individuals have the right to a healthy environment. The State shall safeguard the environment against pollution, and promote the use of natural resources in a manner that prevents damage to the environment and preserves the rights of future generations.

49 Egypt: status under the international Climate Change framework UNFCCC: signature and ratification (5 Dec 1994); KP: signature and ratification (12 Jan 2005); Vienna Convention: signature and ratification (9 May 1988); Montreal Protocol: signature and ratification (2 Aug 1988); Energy Charter: observer; Energy Efficiency Protocol: observer.

50 Egypt in the UNFCCC negotiation process Non-annex I country: Egypt is not required to meet any specific emission reduction or limitation targets in terms of commitments under the UNFCCC, or the Kyoto protocol; it is following the trend of developing countries in climate change negotiations through international meetings and conferences; it covers a leading position among the region, both respect to Arab and African countries. Egypt is a member of G77 and China, the African group and OAPEC.

51 Egypt in the UNFCCC negotiation process It totally refuses any negotiations that could lead to any commitment on developing countries, including Egypt, regarding reduction in GHGs according with the convention and the Kyoto protocol; It supports commitments by developed countries towards developing countries according with the convention and the protocol including GHGs reduction, technology transfer, adaptation fund, research and observation systems; Egypt supports further negotiations with developed countries to agree on acceptable and scheduled GHG reduction amount for the second commitment period; Egypt believes that the developed countries should fulfil their obligations towards developing countries, with major attention to those particularly exposed to the risks of climate change.

52 Tunisia Main environmental laws: Forest Code (1966, revised in 1988); Water Code (1975); Town-Planning Code (1979, revised in 1994). Institutions: National Agency for Environment Protection (ANPE): the first public institution in charge of environmental protection in Tunisia. laws and regulations on the protection of the environment increased Ministry for the Environment

53 Tunisia: the green 90s A more powerful legislative and regulatory framework related to environmental protection and the fight against pollution are implemented: Law No (July 24, 1995), relating to the maritime public domain; Law No (July, ) on the conservation of water and soil; Law No (April 3, 1996), establishing a national plan of urgent action to fight against marine pollution incidents; Law No (June 10, 1996), on waste control, management and disposal, and its implementing regulations; Law No (June 4, 2007) on air quality. These texts are largely influenced by international conventions ratified by Tunisia.

54 Tunisia: the post-arab Spring environment Transition from a purely environmental management to deeper approaches. In the aftermath of the 2011 Civil Revolution, the Tunisian Minister of the Agriculture and the Enrivonment committed to promote an economic development which has to be environmentally and socially responsable: la Tunisie envisage de s engager d une matière résolue dans la voie du développement durable. Consultation Nationale sur la Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable ( )

55 Tunisia: Stratégie Nationale de Développement Durable ( ) The ten strategic pillars of the sustainable development strategy in Tunisia:

56 Libya: the new government s challanges Libyan opposition toppled the brutal 40- year reign of former President Moammar Qaddafi The new government continue to face the problem of reconciling the many different free Libyas envisioned by different publics and addressing the allegations of some not-so-free practices. Climate change and water resources management may hold the key to building unity.

57 The Libyan Climate Change Initiative Proactive approach: December the interim Libyan government sent representatives to the UN climate conference in Durban, to promote The Libyan Climate Change Initiative. Proposal: to finance solar and wind power projects with oil revenues. However, some critical natural-resource challenges that Libya faces may fall by the wayside during this period of instability and uncertainty. Two critically important questions: how will a new Libyan government manage the country s water resources? will the effects of climate change be incorporated into how it does so?

58 Libya: the water issue Libya is 93% arid: its primary source of water is a finite cache of fossilized groundwater, the remnants of a more verdant Pleistoceneera past. It is necessary to correct the unsustainable excesses of the Qaddafi regime. The regime implemented massive and unsustainable projects to extract the country s water resources: Qaddafi s oil-financed Great Man-Made River Project is one of the largest water-engineering projects in the world and continues to function. But it is unclear how long this project can be sustained. A new Libyan government will, for the sake of its legitimacy and viability, need to address the fundamental issues of delivering a sustainable supply of water to its growing population, and of managing the complex problems associated with sharing such a supply with other nations. This can help bring the country together.

59 Libya: future perspectives Libya is not the country most vulnerable to climate change in North Africa BUT climate change-induced impacts on drought patterns in Libya and much of the Mediterranean littoral are projected to be some of the most dramatic. Some of the wettest and most populated areas of Libya along the Mediterranean coast will likely experience increases in drought days from the current 101 days to a whopping 224 days (Joshua basby, University of Austin, Texas, 2012). Given the uncertainties about the stability of a new government, Libya will need to prepare for the possibility of greater vulnerability to its infrastructure in the future..

60 Libya: water and cooperation Unique opportunity to create a political tradition of good governance in the country: transparent; respects human rights; free and fair elections; equal economic policies. Not just a transition to a post-qaddafi era but also to a new era of resilience that uses its finite resources wisely and adapts itself to a changing climate.

61 Conclusions The potentially destabilizing impacts of this unprecedented shift in the global climate, particularly for countries and regions in transition that share essential natural resources, should not be underestimated. Climate change may not be concretely high on the agenda in Mediterranean countries today, but it should not remain off the table for too long: doing something about climate change and facing the challenges it presents (water availability, agriculture, forced migration flows ) can potentially help North African and Middle East countries in their search for unity.

62 Conclusions THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION! Contacts: Phone: