So it s time to take stock, reflect on our achievements and look ahead.

Transcription

1 It is my great pleasure to welcome you, on behalf of both the Netherlands and our co-chair the Kingdom of Morocco, to the plenary meeting of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). I had the honour of welcoming you to our second meeting back in June 2015, here in The Hague. Today, two years later, we are gathered for the last meeting under Dutch and Moroccan leadership. So it s time to take stock, reflect on our achievements and look ahead. According to last month s edition of the journal Foreign Affairs, Good Foreign Policy is invisible. Most diplomats would agree, I m sure. But there s a difficult paradox here: we live in a time when politicians and diplomats alike are held accountable for visible results. Especially after a terrorist attack. The same article goes on to say that good foreign policy often means paying up front for benefits that are hard to see until you lose them, or that will only be obvious when you really need them. I think we can all agree that this paradox applies to the fight against terrorism and the work of the GCTF. What kind of visible impact have we had? Are we really making the world a safer place? And can we prove it to the world in concrete terms? As we all know, our results and solutions are extremely necessary, and they re more concrete than many think. But they are rarely acknowledged. Paradoxically, the more successful we are at preventing radicalisation and terrorism, the less attention our efforts receive. Preventing attacks through capacity building Well, it s not exactly headlinegrabbing news. It s a bit like healthcare: the paramedic who saves the stroke victim gets more credit than the doctor who advocates a healthy diet. The work of the GCTF is just like the work of diplomacy. It rarely gets media coverage, yet it contributes directly to making us and society safer, every day. By preventing attacks, your work has a direct impact on people s lives. 1

2 And in this working group, over the past few years, we ve achieved a great deal to be proud of. The core challenge of this working group is addressing the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. These are often young people, travelling abroad to Syria and Iraq to join the so-called Caliphate. They ve left their parents, their friends, their jobs and schools. To seek adventure, or to find a sense of belonging. Some may indeed find what they re looking for. But most find only death and destruction. And hardship from which there is little escape. A lot has happened in the past three years. We ve been shaken by attacks close to home and further afield. Highly visible attacks that have been covered extensively in the media. It s sobering to realise that almost all the countries here have been hit hard by terrorism in the past three years: Islamabad, Istanbul, Paris, London, Stockholm, Berlin, Abuja, Brussels, Jakarta. And of course, the recent attack, on Palm Sunday, in Egypt, which killed 47 and wounded more than a hundred. These attacks strike at the very heart of our societies. You understand better than most the importance of our invisible work. The work that goes on behind the scenes, aimed at preventing attacks. Today I want to focus on the vital role played by the GCTF, and specifically the FTF working group, in preventing even worse atrocities. I can t list all the group s achievements. But I will highlight a few, following the thematic lines I ve used before: Share, Stop and Secure. And say a few words about how to extend our work into the future. Share, Stop and Secure: these were the themes of the unique FTF joint meeting between the GCTF and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, which was held in The Hague on 11 January We decided we needed to Share information, Stop fighters from travelling to conflict zones or returning from them, and work to Secure our societies. Here are some measures of the progress we ve made: 2

3 Share: At least 60 countries now contribute foreign terrorist fighter profiles to INTERPOL, and so does the United Nations. Currently, there are over 16,000 such profiles in the INTERPOL case analysis file. That s quite an achievement: at the start of our working group, there were fewer than one thousand. Stop: The flow of foreign terrorist fighters worldwide has slowed considerably. The estimated number still in Syria and Iraq has dropped from 30,000 at its highest point to around 10,000 today: the lowest level in more than two-and-a-half years. This is due to fewer people joining up and more fighters being killed in the military campaign against ISIS. We have targeted the sources of funding for FTFs. ISIS s Caliphate is losing its appeal. We are also beating ISIS when it comes to counter messaging: the ratio of anti-isis to pro-isis content online is 6 to 1. I d like to thank Turkey in particular for stepping up its efforts to fight terrorism, stop fighters from crossing borders and cut off key financial channels. Secure: At least 60 countries have drafted or improved legislation to prosecute and arrest FTFs. 65 countries have arrested and prosecuted foreign fighters. We need to use our criminal justice systems and the rule of law to keep our societies safe. This working group is a great source of information to that end. The importance of sharing information cannot be over emphasised. My own country has benefited greatly from increased information sharing. Collectively we re doing a good job. And we need to get the message out there. Fortunately, more and more news outlets are reporting on plots that have been prevented and terrorist cells that have been rolled up. Without the GCTF, all these efforts would never have been coordinated in the efficient and practical way we have jointly established. That s why I call on you all to continue contributing to this shared wealth of experience, information and expertise. So that we can continue learning from each other. We will have to if we want to stay ahead of the curve. If we want to beat this ever-changing, many-headed monster. We ve seen that monster mutate over the past few years. 3

4 First, there was FTF 1.0: people travelling from their home country to Syria or Iraq. In the early phases it was mainly young men searching for adventure, seeking a purpose in life or wanting to fight for a Caliphate they believed was worth committing gruesome acts for. Once they arrived, we saw images of them on Facebook, Twitter and Telegram. They posed waving flags and guns, sometimes burning their passports. They received intensive military training and committed horrific attacks in the fight to defend the crumbling caliphate. No continent was immune from the threat. I don t need to remind you of the foreign fighters who joined al Shabaab in Africa, for instance, or the FTF threat in Southeast Asia. Then we saw FTF 2.0: a threat posed by returnees and the spread of foreign terrorist ideologies. Fewer people were moving now, but violent ideologies were still crossing borders and couldn t easily be stopped. Today these ideas are influencing our own citizens. And further radicalising those jihadists who ve already fought and returned or stayed behind at home. This phase presented its own dilemmas. What should the role of our embassies be in facilitating return? How far are we willing to go to get people back? Have these extremists changed their views or do they pose a real risk to society? Are they working for ISIS? Or can they be reintegrated into society, once they ve been tried and served their sentence? Increasingly in the future, we will face the dilemma of what to do about our FTF nationals being held by ISIS or other factions against their will. They will seek consular assistance, and we will be under mounting pressure to help or even extract them. We need to make sure we coordinate our approach. We recently facilitated the return of one of our nationals, Reda N., but only after he reached the Turkish border. I would like to thank the Turkish authorities for their cooperation. This highlights the need for timely information-sharing at the borders. FTF 3.0. Now we re seeing a third iteration of the threat: more and more small-scale attacks on our own soil, using everyday items like cars and kitchen knives. The recent attacks in Paris, London and Berlin were carried out by lone attackers inspired by terrorist ideologies. These are reminders that we need to remain vigilant and active. ISIS is quick to claim responsibility for such attacks, in order to sow fear and bolster the myth of 4

5 their omnipotence. These attackers may not fit the strict FTF label (they stayed at home), but they tapped into FTF networks and benefited from their skills and resources. Perhaps most alarmingly, more and more attacks are designed to drive a wedge between different segments of society. Or even to influence elections by polarising the political debate. We have to ensure that political terrorism doesn t become the next manifestation of violent extremism. These of course are just a few examples. As I ve said before, terrorism is like a virus. We will probably never wipe it out entirely. We need to stay ahead of the curve and anticipate its evolution. Here, again, cooperation and information-sharing are essential. ISIS keeps innovating, and so must we. Let me stress something: terror and innovation are a very dangerous combination of aims and means. We need to prevent the nightmare scenario of terrorists using chemical and biological weapons, possibly with the help of commercial drones. Terrorists may possess low-grade forms of chemical or biological agents. Even if they can t kill large numbers of people, they could successfully spread fear throughout our societies. We have to be realistic: the issue of returning fighters is here to stay. We have to be prepared for yet another season of terrorism. And these trends will remain complex and dynamic: First: Lower numbers of foreign terrorist fighters do not necessarily mean a lower risk. In a recent public report, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service argued that, in the future, returning fighters are likely to pose an even greater threat. They will have been in the combat zone longer. They will be more battle-hardened and traumatised. They will have developed extremist networks. They pose a serious risk, and their activities could range from radicalising and recruiting others to planning and carrying out attacks. Our national authorities are gravely concerned about these FTFs on the move. We need to stay vigilant and keep investing in stronger border security and effective information-sharing mechanisms. 5

6 Second: Although we ve successfully prevented potential foreign fighters from reaching their destinations, it turns out there s another group we need to deal with: home-grown terrorists. They re already at their destinations: our cities, which are also their cities. So we now need to broaden our focus. Where we used to concentrate on stopping terrorists at the border, we now also need to spot and support vulnerable young people in our cities. We need to give them and their families the support they need to resist extremist ideology. We need to invest in the social fabric and the resilience of our societies that is extremely important. Third: Networks. We need our own network to beat their network. The nexus between terrorism and organised crime is growing and this is an alarming development. We ve seen this in many attacks. Several of the perpetrators in Brussels and also the attacker in Nice had a criminal record. This is an area we ll need to focus on more in the coming period. The more we succeed in taking back territory from ISIS, cutting off its funds from the sale of oil and artefacts and preventing weapons from reaching them, the more they will seek cooperation with criminal networks. ISIS is now embracing the criminals they once despised, because they can deliver the weapons, money, drugs and personnel that ISIS needs. This is a toxic partnership that we need to detect early and stop in its tracks. In closing, let me repeat that the power of our collaboration lies in sharing experiences, expertise and information on highly sensitive issues - in a professional, consistent and coherent manner. And making clear to the public what we re doing. Before the GCTF, this kind of collaboration was inconceivable. That s a big achievement in itself. And all the more reason to keep information-sharing at the top of the agenda. That s the only way we will be able to stay ahead of the curve. The only way our Stop, Share and Secure approach will continue to be effective. And the only way we will stay on top of the new trends I ve described. Let s get as 6

7 far ahead of the curve as we can: it s impossible to overstate the importance of prevention at the source. We need to address the root causes of radicalisation and seek political solutions in countries mired in conflict, like Syria and Libya. It s cheaper and more sustainable in the long run. In a counterterrorism environment where the emphasis seems to be shifting towards a harder approach from countering to combating; from extremists to jihadists we need to strive for a balanced, whole-of-government approach, ensuring sufficient focus on prevention. Otherwise we ll just be cutting off another head of the Hydra. When the Netherlands takes its seat on the UN Security Council in 2018, this will be the core of our approach to counterterrorism. My country remains committed to working within the GCTF towards this goal. And so, together with Morocco, we ve launched the ambitious five Rs agenda: results, resources, relations, reinforcement and renewal. We will continue working to share and publicise the results we achieve. We will also work to shape the new themes of Spot and Support, to help the GCTF stay ahead of the curve and counter the ever-evolving terrorist threat. And that s why I m glad to announce that, together with our Moroccan colleagues, we intend to pursue a second term as Co-Chairs of the GCTF. We hope we can count on your support. Thank you. 7