Copyrighted material List of Figures and Tables. Preface and Acknowledgements

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1 Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface and Acknowledgements vi ix 1 Introduction 1 2 Labour Market Change in Europe: Determinants and Effects of Temporary Employment Contracts 18 3 Theoretical Perspectives on the Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers 33 4 The Policy Preferences of Temporary Workers 59 5 The Party Preferences of Temporary Workers 71 6 The Voting Behaviour of Temporary Workers 82 7 Are Temporary Workers Politically Alienated? Conclusions 114 Appendix Appendix Notes 142 References 148 Index 164 v

2 1 Introduction European labour markets are in a process of profound change. The decades following World War II witnessed the institutionalization of secure employment. Against the background of high growth rates, labour market regulation and welfare states were expanded so that the risk of unemployment became less salient to a majority of workers. Stable careers, often within only one firm, became a social norm that governments and employers were expected to implement. At the core of political attempts to secure long-term employment was the establishment of rules restricting the managerial prerogative to dismiss workers at will. This was achieved either through individual labour law, for instance by restricting circumstances under which dismissals are allowed, or by granting representatives of the workforce a say in firms staffing policies. Such legal changes reflected a fundamental reappraisal of how market risks should be distributed between capital and labour. In the 1970s at the very latest, it seemed to be the consensual view in most democratic societies that employers cannot treat workers as a commodity; that law should restrict involuntary job loss; that states should avert the risk of unemployment and the material hardship ensuing from it. In that sense, the post-war years were a historical singularity. Secure employment, as defined in those years, was largely unknown hitherto. Shelter from economic fluctuation was a privilege confined to a small elite throughout history. Most pre-modern forms of labour were of course highly insecure or in other ways precarious, and this remained true for most forms of modern wage labour well into the 1

3 2 The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers 20th century. It was only when the lower classes had won equal political rights that the project of defining workers social rights could succeed (Marshall, 1950). The process of institutionalizing job security did not progress in a continuous fashion, and there certainly was no automatism or functionalist logic at play. More often than not, advancements in dismissal regulation, collective bargaining, co-determination, and welfare-state expansion were met with fierce resistance by business (Korpi, 2006), even if political struggles were greatly attenuated by rapid economic growth and concerns about the legitimacy of the capitalist system. After World War II, the working class in Western countries had been strengthened and radicalized, while employers found themselves in a defensive position. Against the background of system competition, employers were eager to forestall demands for a socialist organization of the economy by agreeing to submit themselves to restrictions of their managerial freedoms. Hence, consenting to job security regulations can be seen as part of business s effort to extend and renew its social franchise (Streeck, 2014, p. 24). In hindsight, this period appears less as a pacification of the conflict over job security than as a short-lived truce. This became obvious during the strike waves of the late 1960s and the 1970s in which radicalized unions in many countries pushed for even stricter job security regulations and union influence in staffing policies. Although (or because) these attempts were at least partly successful (Emmenegger, 2014; Piore, 1980), they brought the old antagonism between unions and management to the forefront. And so it does not come as a surprise that the seeming consensus built around the secure employment relationship did not last. As global business practices became oriented towards flexibility, institutionalized job security turned into (or was framed as) a competitive disadvantage. In virtually all countries with strict regulation of dismissals, political discourses started to turn around the question of whether and to what extent labour market institutions contribute to structural unemployment. Allowing for more flexibility in employment relationships appeared as a natural solution (OECD, 1994). Indeed, many academic contributions have argued that employment insecurity has grown over the past 20 or 30 years (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Beck, 2000; Blossfeld et al., 2011; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009; Bosch et al., 2009; Breen, 1997; Guest et al., 2010; Hacker et al., 2013; Kalleberg, 2000, 2009). 1 The underlying reasons

4 Introduction 3 are manifold. Globalization and tougher international competition have increased insecurity among workers in exposed sectors and occupations (Buchholz et al., 2011; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Swank, 2002). Others argue that sectoral change has made the workforce on average more insecure, in particular workers with assetspecific skills in declining industries (Iversen and Cusack, 2000). This process is linked to technological changes that have contributed to eroding routine jobs in industry as well as in the middle of the occupational hierarchy. Automation (in industry) and computerization (in clerical service occupations) have made redundant many of the secure and relatively well-paid jobs that formed the backbone of the post-war employment model. It has been followed by a more polarized occupational structure. While skilled-biased technological change went along with a major upskilling of the workforce (Oesch, 2015), in many countries it has also contributed to a growing relative importance of low-skilled personal services (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009). And this is precisely the occupational segment in which we find the bulk of insecure and otherwise precarious jobs (Bosch and Lehndorff, 2005; Esping-Andersen, 1999a; Eichhorst and Marx, 2012, 2015; Gautié and Schmitt, 2010; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Palier and Thelen, 2010). Probably the most intuitive explanation for the increase in insecurity is linked to the macro economy. Unsurprisingly, workers feel insecure when the economy is going badly, in particular when unemployment is high (Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Cusack et al., 2006; Erlinghagen, 2008). The growth (or return) of mass unemployment in the 1970s and the 1980s meant a profound break with the booming post-war years and is likely to have contributed to growing feelings of insecurity. Whether or not declining welfare-state generosity has facilitated this trend is more difficult to show empirically. Whatever its underlying reasons are, one notable characteristic of this increase in employment insecurity is its asymmetry. Insecurity and flexibility are far from being universal characteristics. When asked directly, most European workers, in fact, still feel rather confident about the stability of their jobs and about their general employment prospects (Marx, 2014a), and the traditional standard employment relationship has not disappeared (Auer and Cazes, 2003; Eichhorst and Marx, 2015). Also, a look at institutional developments suggests that there are hardly cases of advanced capitalist countries that have turned back the clock by dismantling job security

5 4 The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers regulations for the entire labour market (see Chapter 2). Neither have many firms ceased to rely on a stable core of highly skilled workers. Rather, policymakers and firms have chosen a strategy of dumping the uncertainty burden on different sections of the population (Crouch and Keune, 2012, p. 49), so that the protection offered to privileged groups, or, more generally, to insiders is partly dependent on outsiders bearing the brunt of any difficulty encountered in maintaining the stability guarantee given major market fluctuations (idem, p. 60). In many European countries, this strategy has been based on the deregulation and utilization of workers with temporary employment contracts (Barbieri, 2009; Berton et al., 2012; DiPrete et al., 2006; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Guest et al., 2010; Kalleberg, 2009; Rueda, 2007). It is this group of workers the present book is concerned with. More precisely, this book is an attempt to better understand how the experience of insecure temporary employment affects political preferences and behaviour. Although there is a vast literature in labour economics and labour market sociology on the determinants and socio-economic consequences of holding temporary contracts (which will be reviewed in Chapter 2), there is surprisingly less research about the repercussions on political behaviour. This is all the more surprising as academic and public discourses frequently point to the possibility that labour market exclusion might go hand in hand with political disenchantment or radicalization among the young in crisis-stricken countries. A recent quote from the New York Times captures these concerns: many in the troubled south are carving out a simple existence for themselves in a new European reality. They must decide whether to stay home, with the protection of family but a dearth of jobs. Or they can travel to Europe s north, where work is possible to find but where they are likely to be treated as outsiders. There, young people say, they compete for low-paying, temporary jobs but are sometimes excluded from the cocoon of full employment. For the European Union, addressing the issue has become a political as well as an economic challenge at a time of expanding populist discontent with the leadership in Brussels and national capitals. 2 (my emphasis)

6 Introduction 5 The Observer takes the same line by diagnosing a growing anarchic radicalism expressed, for instance, in the Italian Five Star Movement, the Spanish Indignados, or the Occupy protests, movements that thrive on a feeling of anger that is representative of a generation of young Europeans who face lower living standards than their parents and little chance of finding a meaningful job. 3 And the Guardian adds: Sporadically, this overwhelming frustration boils over into anger on the streets [...]. But in between times, young people are just as likely to respond to their predicament with a mixture of gloom and resignation. 4 What these commentaries suggest is that the trend towards insecure employment might have negative repercussions for European democracies in the form of lower participation and legitimacy and growing alienation from politics. In the academic literature, equally gloomy scenarios abound. In his Brave New World of Work, Ulrich Beck (2000, pp ) warns that: In the circle of informal and insecure work [...], which compels those affected to work more for less, there is no time or air left for democracy. [...] The Fordist deal, which promised increasing prosperity for all, has been turned around into a policy for the break-up of the middle layers. The centre of society is being crushed to bits. The social capital which alone makes economic and democratic actions possible is falling apart. King and Rueda (2008, pp ) argue along similar lines: One significant conjecture is that the structure of the labor market might be expected to turn those in the most marginally nonstandard categories away from democracy by eroding its legitimacy as a mechanism associated with economic protection, declining income inequality, and political inclusion. [...] We might call this the political alienation problem posed by the expansion of nonstandard cheap labor. Standing (2011) even sees temporary workers as part of a new precariat or dangerous class, a growing mass of people [...]insituations that can only be described as alienated, anomic, anxious and prone to anger. The warning sign is political disengagement (p. 24).

7 6 The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers As expressed in the newspaper articles cited above, the ongoing labour market crisis in many European countries lends some face validity to the conjectured link between labour market exclusion and insecurity on the one hand and political protest or disengagement on the other. It appears quite plausible that the 2008 Great Recession has reinforced the populist challenge (Kriesi, 2014), namely the growth of anti-establishment parties (on the right and the left), growing popular resentment of established party systems, and the emergence of more or less radical protest movements. These trends certainly reflect complex changes in the social structure and political culture, but it is not far-fetched to also relate them to economic frustration: those who lose out in the competition for good jobs in a global economy (the losers of globalization ) are arguably particularly susceptible to populism (idem). Hence, if there is a link between labour market disadvantage and political alienation, radicalization, or apathy, Europe s persistent labour market crisis gives reason to worry. It should be added that, although these concerns are somewhat speculative, they do build on a long tradition in political sociology to connect labour market experiences with political behaviour. For instance, there is a prominent literature showing that unemployment depresses social and political participation (Anderson, 2001; Jahoda et al., 1972; Rosenstone, 1982; Verba et al., 1995). Conversely, employment is seen as an important site of socialization in which civic skills are practised and political preferences are formed (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Pateman, 1970; Sobel, 1993). Exclusion from stable employment might undermine this socialization process. In sum, it is fair to say that temporary employment, along with the higher unemployment risk it engenders, has turned into a major societal concern and that this concern is shared by prominent academic observers of European labour markets and politics. Particularly given its prevalence among young citizens (Emmenegger et al., 2012), potential repercussions such as political disenchantment or radicalization are causes for concern. So far, these potential consequences have rather been assumed than shown to exist empirically. One goal of this book is to fill this lacuna. However, the alienation hypothesis is not the only possible perspective on the political behaviour of temporary workers and maybe not even the most prominent one. There is a growing literature in political economy that interprets employment risks in a

8 Introduction 7 rational-choice framework and, by doing so, arrives at less-pessimistic predictions. In this literature, employment insecurity is seen as something affected workers respond to pragmatically. As Cusack and colleagues (2006, p. 366) explain: Job loss and the risk of job loss have important effects. The first is that such exposure reduces income and adds to the ranks of those at the bottom end of the income distribution, who have a selfinterest in redistribution. Second, it raises the demand for redistribution among employed workers, since redistributive spending serves as an insurance against the risk of future income loss. Put more simply, if a person expects to be poor in the future (i.e. that person s risk exposure is high), that person should support policies and parties for the poor (Rehm, 2011b, p. 366). Instead of abstaining or supporting radical parties, the economically instrumental insecure worker then votes for parties that offer the best remedies against insecurity. 5 This argument invites the question of which parties offer such remedies. While the political economy literature typically assumes that these are left parties in general, Rueda (2005) has forcefully rejected this notion. He argues that social democratic parties do exactly the opposite: they erect mobility barriers between labour market segments to protect their core voters (industrial workers) from competition and unemployment risk. This comes at the expense of outsiders, who are excluded from stable employment and thus circulate between unemployment and temporary jobs. This insider outsider model flips the power-resource theory on its head (Thelen, 2012, p. 149): social democratic parties and unions do not fight inequality they create it. Accordingly, the distinction between insiders and outsiders is said to have fundamentally changed politics in advanced capitalist countries, so that the conflict line now does not run between capital and labour anymore, but through the working class. And as insiders are backed by unions and social democratic parties and as they can form powerful coalitions with their employers (Hassel, 2014; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 2012, 2014), it is rather unclear which political actors are left to effectively represent outsiders. As Emmenegger and colleagues (2012, p. 14) note, the precise links between lacking integration in the labor market, insufficient social rights, and the political articulation of the insider outsider divide have yet to be explored.

9 8 The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers Hence, the seemingly simple question of how temporary workers can be expected to behave at the ballot box is fraught with theoretical ambiguity. In Chapter 3, I will try to disentangle the partly contradictory theories and add my own arguments about how temporary employment contracts influence party support and voting decisions. As will become clear from this discussion, the question ultimately has to be treated as an empirical one. This is why a large (but hopefully not too tedious) part of this book is dedicated to reporting findings from survey data analyses. I have tried to compile and collect sufficient data to allow for a meaningful analysis of the political preferences and behaviour of temporary workers. Without doubt, these data sets have considerable gaps and limitations. This concerns the dependent and moderator variables, which often are only available in the form of proxies for the actual concepts we would ideally be studying. It also concerns the possibility of breaking down the analysis by countries, which is hampered by the low number of temporary workers we observe in some countries. This means that the analysis will often be based on a pooled sample of European workers. As a consequence, this book is mainly concerned with effects of temporary employment that are relatively uniform across countries. The underlying claim is not that temporary employment has exactly the same implications in every context, but that their implications are similar enough to justify a broad analysis as a first step to advance our empirical knowledge. This is not to deny that there are important idiosyncrasies in national labour markets and party systems; and I agree that pooling countries risks underestimating effects in some cases. However, I think that the breadth and generalizability of my findings will compensate for these shortcomings. Ideally, they will serve as a starting and reference point for more contextualized studies into the political behaviour of temporary workers. As a first step in this direction, I will complement the pooled approach with analyses of data from a handful of selected national cases with different macro contexts. Why temporary workers...and not outsiders? In the literatures on outsiders and on labour market risk, it is common to pool different forms of risky labour market situations. Rueda (2005, 2007) combines, for instance, involuntary part-time and

10 Introduction 9 temporary workers with the unemployed into his outsider category. Alternatively, scholars try to calculate continuous risk measures, such as Rehm s (2009) occupational unemployment rate (see Schwander and Häusermann [2013] for a combination of both approaches and Marx and Picot [2015] for a critical discussion). This book, in contrast, focusses on one specific form of labour market risk: temporary employment contracts. Admittedly, this makes the book s contribution narrower than the literature based on the two cited approaches. However, focussing on temporary workers also brings advantages. Most importantly, restricting the discussion to one risk (or outsider) group allows theorizing more explicitly how its specific characteristics affect upon political behaviour. If one considers the very different nature of labour market experiences such as working part-time, holding a fixed-term contract, or being out of work, it probably does not come as a surprise that affected groups differ significantly in their preferences and behaviours (as has been shown, for instance, by Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Corbetta and Colloca, 2013; Emmenegger, 2009a; Gallego, 2007; Guillaud and Marx, 2014; Marx, 2015; Marx and Picot, 2013; Schur, 2003). Concretely, I would expect that the effects of temporary employment are underestimated if pooled with part-time workers and that they are overestimated if pooled with the unemployed. 6 I focus on temporary employment in this book because (as opposed to the unemployed) it is a relatively new and under-researched outsider category and because (as opposed to part-time employment) it creates a clear disadvantage in terms of employment security and is predominantly performed involuntarily (see Chapter 2). 7 I hence share the intuition by Guest et al. (2010, p. 2) that [f]rom a worker s perspective, temporary employment, with its implied uncertainties about continuity of employment, is perhaps the most precarious form of employment flexibility. Another, and in my view crucial, difference between temporary and part-time workers is the extent to which both groups can link their labour market experiences to government (non-)decisions. Beyond doubt, involuntary part-time employment can be precarious. But it is not always straightforward whom to blame for the situation: the state of the labour market, one s employer, family obligations, or bad labour market and family policies. The question of whom to blame is easier to answer for temporary workers, because they fall under a

11 10 The Political Behaviour of Temporary Workers distinct regulatory framework with the explicit goal to concentrate employment risks in their group. Moreover, in most European dual labour markets, such as France, Germany, or Spain, the differential treatment of permanent and temporary workers is at least to some extent politicized. Expanding temporary work is typically seen as the consequence of a deliberate political strategy to sustain strict job security regulation for workers with permanent contracts (Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2013; Ochel, 2009). All this, I would argue, makes it more likely for temporary workers to feel like the victims of an unfair treatment by political actors. The theoretical argument I will develop in Chapter 3 is based on this mechanism of blame attribution and it therefore applies specifically to temporary workers, but not to part-time workers, the unemployed, workers in high-risk occupations, or any other group that might be labelled outsiders. Again, while the range of this argument is clearly limited, the goal is to provide a theoretical model that does justice to the specific experience of holding a temporary contract in a dual labour market regime. Hence, heterogeneity across different forms of non-standard employment lets me focus on temporary workers. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that temporary workers themselves are a rather heterogeneous group. The most straightforward source of heterogeneity is anticipated mobility. Not every temporary worker can be considered an outsider in the sense of being persistently excluded from permanent employment (Booth et al., 2002; Gash, 2008). In reality, temporary workers can be expected to differ greatly in their prospects of upward mobility. Some contributions have argued that this heterogeneity prevents temporary employment from being a meaningful category to explain political behaviour (Emmenegger, 2009a). While I agree on the importance of anticipated employment trajectories, I argue that they should not keep us from studying the political behaviour effects of temporary work. Rather, they should be integrated in our theoretical models and be measured empirically. Preview of the argument(s) In this book I will partly derive testable predictions from existing theories and approaches, such as insider outsider theory or riskbased explanations of political behaviour. But I will also add to these

12 Index abstention, 89 91, alienation, political, 5 6, 42, 72, 80, , , 147 apathy, political, 6, 42, 72, 104 6, 114 attribution, see responsibility attribution basic income, see citizens income blame attribution, see responsibility attribution citizens income, 44, 115, 144 class, 2 7, 35, 40 6, 70, , 121, 146 conservatives, see right, centre crisis, see Great Recession; labour market crisis democracy, satisfaction, 17, 105 8, 117, 124, 137, 147 compare alienation; apathy see also efficacy, political; trust, political deprivation, see relative deprivation deregulation, 4, 12, 21 4, 36 41, 82 3, 114, 124 5, 128 9, 146 preferences, 36 41, 44, 59 70, , 143, 146 disadvantage, 6, 9, 14, 28 9, 48 54, 57, 84 5, 116, 119, 122 6, 132 discontent, 4, 11, 42, 48 see also government satisfaction disinterest, see interest, political dissatisfaction, government, see government satisfaction Dolado, Juan J., 20, 36 8, 138 Downs, Anthony, 45 6, 120, 132 see also voting, spatial dualism, 12, 18 20, 24, 28, 38 40, 55, 64 7, 82 3, , 123 7, , 144, 147 dualization, 21 4, 83, 125 6, 128 earnings, 44, 67 efficacy, political, 17, 47, 103 6, 117, 147 compare alienation; apathy see also trust, political Emmenegger, Patrick, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 21, 23, 26, 30, 31, 34, 36 8, 42, 55, 121, 126, 129, 144 employment flexible, see flexibility insecurity, see employment, risks non-standard, 10, 23, 31, 41, 77, 131, part-time, 8 10, 50, 62, 77, 134, 137, , 142 precarious, 1 3, 9, 36, 57, 125, 132, protection, 21 2, 35 42, 59, 62 70, 83, 124, , 144 regulation, see employment, protection risks, 6, 10, 16, 28, 33 41, 60 2, 71, 84, , , 114, , 125 6, 138 sector, see public sector, service economy secure, 1 9, 23, 114, stable, see employment, secure temporart, see temporary contracts Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 3, 21, 46 European Labour Force Survey, 19, 25 7, 84, 128, 131, 142 European Social Survey, 12 15, 51, 61 9, 71 83, 91 4, 104 9, 115,

13 Index 165 Eurostat, see European Labour Force Survey exclusion, 6, 40, 57, 114, 123, 126 external attribution, see responsibility attribution financial crisis, see Great Recession financial situation, personal, 47 8, 82, 85 9, 94, 98, 117, 139 flexibility, 2 3, 9, 18 27, 38 40, 55, 67, 124 8, 131, 144 flexible buffer, see flexibility flexicurity, 140 German Longitudinal Election Study, 13 15, 83 91, Germany, 21, 79 80, 83 91, 101, globalization, 3, 6 government satisfaction, 91 9, 136, 138 Great Recession, 6, 17, 84, 114 see also labour market, crisis greens, 16, 73 80, 136, 144 see also left, new income interaction, 35 8, 57, 62 3, 67 8 subjective, 50 2, 116, 135 see also financial situation, personal inequality, 5 7, 12, 42, 48, 53 5, 111, 120, 131 insecurity, see employment, risks insider bias, 11, 42 3, 83, 104, 118, insider-outsider approach, see insider-outsider, theory conflict, 36, 41, 45, 70, 114, 118 dilemma, 41, 75, 121 divide, 144 model, see insider-outsider, theory theory, 7, 10 11, 16, 21 4, 33 46, 56 8, 62 73, 104 5, , 144, 147 insiders, 4, 36 41, 44, 58, 64, 67, 104, 118, 126 see also insider-outsider institutional change, 21, 23 interest, political, 92 3, 103 6, 117, 136 compare apathy internal attribution, see responsibility attribution International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), 26, 77, 134 Iversen, Torben, 3, 21, 33 4, job satisfaction, 30 job security, see employment, secure; employment protection compare employment risks Kitschelt, Herbert, 6, 43, 46, 56, 75, 120, 146 labour law, preferences, see deregulation, preferences labour market change, 1 4, crisis, 4 6, 102, 107 8, 122, see also Great Recession dualism, see dualism flexibility, see flexibility inequality, see inequality institutions, 2, 20, 23, see also employment, protection policies, 9, 11, 16, 35, 40 4, 55, 58 62, 82, 110, 118, , 146 reform, 21 4, 37 8, 55, 62, 82 3, risks, see employment, risks segmentation, 24, 55, 128 left far, see left, radical libertarian, see left, new new, 11, 16, 43 5, 73 80, , 126, 136, 145 6, see also greens

14 166 Index left continued old, 11, 41, 73, 121, 136, 146 parties, 7, 40 5, 71 80, 95, , 136, radical, 11, 16, 42 3, 73 80, , 136, liberalization, 83 see also deregulation; dualization liberals, see right, centre Lindbeck, Assar, 35, 39 see also insider-outsider Manifesto Project, 73, 145 mobility barrier, 7, 36 7, 41, 57, 114, 146 expectations, 10 16, 29 32, 39 40, 56, 81, 85 90, 98, 101 2, 109, , 121 3, see also employment, risks prospects, see mobility, expectations upward, see mobility, expectations nationalists, see right, radical Netherlands, 14, 31 2, 49, 63 70, 78, , , 130, 143, 147 occupation, 5, 9, 25 6, 34, 46, 50, 75 8, 134, 143 see also International Standard Classification of Occupations; socio-cultural specialists Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2, 20 4, 28 9, 36, 84, 131 outsiders, 4, 7 10, 23, 32, 36 8, 41 6, 57 8, 70, 82, 103 4, 112, 121 4, see also insider-outsider parites, see left; right party choice, see voting pensions, preferences, 60 3, 68 9, 135 Piore, Michael J., 2, 18, 20 Pocketbook, see financial situation Poland, 14, 24, 31 2, 49, 63 70, , , 122, 130 2, 142, 146 populism, 4 6 see also left, radical; right, radical precarious jobs, see employment, precarious preferences party, 11, 40 5, 71 81, 114, 121 policy, 11, 33 8, 59 70, 114, 116, 121, see also under individual policies protest, 5 6, 41, 48, 73, 115, 145 public sector, 26, 50, 60, 95, 134 rational choice, 7, 11, 45, 73, 142 see also Downs, Anthony; voting, spatial redistribution, preferences, 7, 33 6, 42, 59 63, 68 9, , 145 Rehm, Philipp, 6 9, 33 5, 40, 72, 75 relative deprivation, 11 12, 33, 48 58, 101, , 123, 142 responsibility attribution, 10 12, 47 58, , 119, 138, 140, 145 right centre, 41, 73 5, 95, 98, 115, 117, 136, 146 radical, 42, 73 5, 136 risk, see employment, risks Rueda, David, 4 8, 23 4, 35 45, 60, 70, 75, 82, 104, 121, 123, 144 see also insider-outsider Saint-Paul, Gilles, 21 3, 35 7, 55, 70 see also insider-outsider service economy, 3, 21, 25 see also occupation skill level, 3 4, 24 7, 35, 50 2, 60 2, 105, 124 5, 133, 139, 143 specificity, 3, 34, 143 Snower, Dennis, 35, 39 see also insider-outsider

15 Index 167 social democracts, see left, old socialists, see left, old social protection, preferences, see welfare-state, preferences socio-cultural specialists, 76 8, 136 see also occupation Spain, 10, 14, 21, 24, 31 2, 37, 49, 63 70, 80, , 107, , 122, 125, , 142 Stokes, Donald E., 11, 46 see also valence model Sweden, 14, 24, 28, 31 2, 41, 49, 63 70, 79, , , 122, 129, 142, 146 technological change, 3 see also skill level temporary contracts determinants, involuntary, 8 9, 27 8, 48, 64 motives, 27 8 regulation, 21 4, 38 40, socio-economic and psychological effects, 28 32, temporary employment, see temporary contracts Thelen, Kathleen, 3, 7, 21, 23, 45, 82 3, 126 trust, political, , 117, 124 5, 137, 139, 147 compare alienation; apathy see also efficacy, political turnover costs, 20, 35 6, 39, 126 see also employment protection; mobility barrier unemployment, 2, 6, 14, 21, 84, 124, 142 unemployment risks, see employment, risks unions, 2, 7, 42 3, 46, 60, 67, 83, 95, 104, 134, 138 9, 146 valence model, 11, 46 7, 56 8, 82, 120 compare voting, spatial see also responsibility attribution; voting, economic voting economic, 47, 56, , performance, see valence model proximity, see voting, spatial spatial, 11, 45 7, 58, 73, 81, 120 wages, 27 9, 34 9, 67, 84, 126, 144 welfare state, 1 3, 11 14, 23, 44, 107, , 123, 125 7, , 144 preferences, 33 5, 41 4, 59 61, see also redistribution, preferences YouGov, 14, 31 2, 48 9, 63 9, 83, , , 137 9