Rapid Protection Assessment, November 2018: South West Cameroon

Transcription

1 Contents Rapid Protection Assessment, November 2018: South West Cameroon INTRODUCTION... 1 Scope... 1 Methodology... 2 Limitations Key findings Security Basic services Documentation Freedom of movement Housing, land and property Host community tensions Support from NGOs Durable solutions: intentions CONCLUSION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS Introduction Following a period of intensified conflict between state forces and a proliferation of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the South West region of Cameroon, civilians have been displaced into areas of more stability. These are often termed as the bush although they vary between urban centers, peri-urban locales and more rural areas. The Danish Refugee Council set out to identify protection risks, threats, vulnerabilities and capacities in more detail in areas where a response program might be feasible. These included: Tiko, Muyuka and Buea. Given the access constraints, teams attempted to reach Tiko and Muyuka but were turned back by local authorities and so instead focused assessments in Mutengene, half way between Buea and Muyuka in an area where IDPs were concentrated. Scope The assessment was designed to gather community level data in order to better ascertain key protection risks faced by those who were displaced, returned or hosting displaced communities in the South West region. Following a brief review of limited secondary data, a series of protection concerns were identified as most likely to be identified in targeted communities such as protection of civilians, securitization of civilian areas, movement restrictions and loss of documentation. On the basis of this review, a questionnaire was developed, and teams carried out the assessment on November 22, A total of 36 key informants (25 male, 11 female) were interviewed across three sub-divisions all located within the Fako Division of the South West. 1

2 Methodology Key informant interviews were conducted in person or over the phone where access was constrained. This methodology was chosen to avoid any grouping of individuals that might cause safety concerns for participants and to allow for maximum possible comfort in discussions over sensitive information. Where necessary, codes were used to identify particularly sensitive options such as labelling of perpetrators. Key informants were chosen based on their technical specialties, such as teachers knowledge of the education system, or area specific knowledge, such as community leaders. A mix of ages and genders made up the total number of key informants although there was an overrepresentation of male KIs overall. Assessors used a mixture of mobile data collection through SurveyCTO apps on phones and hard copy assessments. Limitations Access was blocked from Muyuka due to ongoing security operations and from Tiko due to additional documentation requirements, meaning Tiko interviews were conducted by phone. While participants were given the options of both don t know and don t want to say, in some cases they did not feel comfortable to give either answer. Assessors were trained on how to approach community members and in how to explain the activities of the Danish Refugee Council. However, the humanitarian crisis in the South West is fairly recent and the presence of INGOs very limited, meaning community members could have misunderstood the purpose of the assessment or their participation. 1. Key findings In each chart, the number of key informants (KIs) is detailed on one axis: up to 36 in total, with the data collected on the other. Locations where the assessment was conducted: 2

3 67% of key informants were in the Tiko sub-division, 28% in Buea and 5% from Muyuka Number of KIs per location Chart: Types of people at the location: Number of KIs vs civil status of persons at their location Most sites reported a mix of all three: host community (HC), IDPs and IDP returnees (IR). 2. Security Perceived presence of security forces pre-crisis and currently 3

4 Chart: Number of KIs vs reported presence of different types of security forces Key Informants reported big increases in the presence of BIR, Marines, and Gendarmerie in their locales compared to before the crisis. According to their information, non-state armed groups were not present at all prior to the conflict. In this case, others was typically labelled as vigilante groups. There was a slight increase in police presence reported overall. Types of insecurity Chart: Number of KIs vs reported types of insecurity incidents in their area 4

5 The highest incidents of perceived insecurity were recorded as threats/extortion with theft a close second. However, nearly half the key informants interviewed reported incidents of physical assault and abductions/disappearances. Presence of armed groups Most key informants reported that armed groups sometimes moved through the area where they were located with 42% of KIs stating that NSAGs were often passing through. This is marked contrast from before the crisis began and underlines the proliferation of groups and their presence in the South West. Hazards experienced by individuals Chart: Number of KIs vs reported hazards experienced by individuals in their area Arbitrary arrests were the hazard reported most often by key informants, with abductions/disappearances a close second. Physical violence and arbitrary executions were also reported by 47% and 39% respondents respectively. Perpetrators of hazards Chart: Number of KIs vs reported perpetrators of hazards against individuals using coding 5

6 Key Informants reported that police and/or gendarmerie were most likely to be perpetrators of hazards (as detailed above). The BIR was also reported by over half of respondents as a key perpetrator. 3. Basic services Chart: Reported access to primary school before the crisis and currently 6

7 Key informants were most likely to report that primary schools were no longer accessible because people in their community were afraid to access state-run services (31% of KIs), with others reporting schools were now damaged/abandoned (25% of KIs). Chart: Reported access to a health clinic before the crisis and currently Key Informants reported that in some cases the clinic was now damaged or abandoned or that people were scared to access state-run services. However, in general the difference was not as pronounced as for primary school access. Similarly, while key informants did not report that market access was a constraint, nearly all key informants reported that not enough was available at the market they could get to. Given the limited time frame, more detailed follow up questions were not rolled out. In all locations covered by the assessment, key informants reported that there was both a functioning water point and functioning latrines. Further investigation may be required to assess the systems in place and accessibility on a gender-age breakdown. 4. Documentation Ownership of birth registration/land ownership documents Chart: Number of KIs reporting ownership of birth registration documents/land ownership documents as being widespread (1), half-half (2), very limited (3), don t know (4), don t want to say (5) 7

8 There were gaps reported in community ownership of birth registration papers and land ownership documents across the sites where key informants were interviewed. In a number of cases (6 and 5 respectively), KIs reported that documentation of birth certificates and land registration was very limited among their communities. This was not disaggregated by IDPs and host communities. However, when asked if access to documentation had changed since the crisis, 36% of KIs reported that it had decreased, with a few (3) claiming that now there is no access at all. Barriers to documentation Chart: Number of KIs vs. key barriers to accessing documentation 8

9 Document fees and fear over accessing government run services were the most prevalent reasons reported by KIs as blocking people in their communities from accessing documentation. From secondary data reporting, fees, may include both official and non-official costs associated with accessing services. Risks of not having documentation Chart: Number of KIs vs. risks associated with not having documentation Both restrictions on freedom of movement and harassment by security forces were listed by key informants as the most regular risks for community members who did not have identification papers. Movement restrictions may refer to those imposed by either state or non-state actors, while harassment by security forces indicated state actors only. Most (21) KIs reported that either the frequency of issues faced had increased or that the impact had worsened since the crisis. The exact impact was not detailed within the scope of this assessment. 5. Freedom of movement Chart: Barriers to freedom of movement for IDPs 9

10 Most key informants listed state run checkpoints and lack of documentation as the biggest barriers for IDP movement. Curfews were also relatively prevalent in reporting, with smaller numbers of KIs (9) listing sexual harassment and exploitation, direct armed conflict and NSAG checkpoints as obstacles for IDPs moving freely. 6. Housing, land and property Destruction of property and/or theft and confiscation of property were listed by key informants as the most pervasive types of land and property insecurity in their area. 12 of the KIs also reported that armed groups or armed forces were occupying civilian property in their area. This would warrant further exploration in future assessments. As with incidents affecting individuals, perpetrators of property incidents were most likely to be reported by KIs as either the police or the gendarmerie. Property hazards Chart: Number of KIs vs. types of property hazards prevalent in their area 10

11 IDPs were currently listed as most likely to be staying with the host community (11 KIs) or in a rented accommodation (8 KIs) with very few listed as either in a collective informal shelter or tent (5 total). 7. Host community tensions From the key informants interviewed, 44% (16) reported that there were some tensions between IDPs and host communities, typically listing conflicts over rental prices (1), food allocation (2) or non-food items (3) as the most important sources of tension. However, the types of people listed by KIs seems to indicate IDPs and host communities mixing freely in most areas of displacement. 8. Support from NGOs Most key informants (32) reported that no assistance had been provided to their community by NGOs (either local or international). 9. Durable solutions: intentions Chart: Number of KIs vs. intentions of IDPs: most don t want to return (1), some don t want to return (2), all want to return (3), don t know (4) 11

12 Key informants reported that some IDPs did not want to return. However, when triangulated with the information from the question: if they want to stay here and not return, why? Respondents almost universally reported that it was due to the better security situation in their current location, indicating that IDPs would likely want to return home given a stabilization in the conflict. Conclusion From the limited scope of assessment so far, we can conclude that the militarization of civilian areas has had a serious impact on the safety of both IDPs and host communities. The types of hazards reportedly experienced by affected people are severe and the uptick in violence correlates with an increased presence of military forces alongside Gendarmerie and police. In addition, a lack of personal and property documentation among displaced persons appears to be putting them at greater risk of interactions with these same forces with consequences such as harassment and restrictions on movement. At present, key informants did not report that IDPs face pressure to return. However, the tensions mentioned over rental prices and food/non-food items may increase with a protracted displacement if humanitarian aid is perceived as only going to displaced populations. Most key informants reported that the main barrier to return was the level of insecurity in areas of origin, indicating that IDPs would likely return if the situation stabilized. In the meantime, a conflict-sensitive approach to interventions would be warranted. Recommendations for further analysis Key informants reported that people in their areas had not received assistance, but this is likely to change, meaning that further analysis on the situation following distributions (postdistribution monitoring etc.) would be needed to more accurately assess the situation of social cohesion. Nearly all key informants reported that not enough was available at the market they could get to. A further breakdown would provide better evidence on what specific items were no longer available and the impact on communities. 12

13 In all locations covered by the assessment, key informants reported that there were both a functioning water point and functioning latrines. Further investigation may be required to assess the systems in place and accessibility on a gender-age breakdown. There were gaps reported in community ownership of birth registration papers and land ownership documents across the sites where key informants were interviewed. However, this was not disaggregated by IDPs and host communities. Further exploration on this would give a better idea of whether documents were lost during flight or if communities never had them. A third of the KIs interview reported that armed groups or armed forces were occupying civilian property in their area. This would warrant further exploration in future assessments. 13