The Impact of Licensing Decentralization on Firm Location Choice: the Case of Indonesia

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "The Impact of Licensing Decentralization on Firm Location Choice: the Case of Indonesia"

Transcription

1 The Impact of Licensing Decentralization on Firm Location Choice: the Case of Indonesia Ari Kuncoro 1 I. Introduction Spatial centralization of resources and spatial concentration of manufacturing in a country s largest metropolitan areas are issues that many developing countries have been struggling with for two or more decades. The typical problems are unbalanced urban hierarchies and congestion, crime and social inequality in very large metro areas. We focus on one issue. In certain situation, will decentralization of some power to regulate from the central government to local governments lower significantly the degree of centralization and concentration. In earlier work (Henderson and Kuncoro (1996)), it was found that the early economic liberalization in Indonesia which started with the 1983 Banking Deregulation was associated with increased centralization of unincorporated manufacturing firms. Although the liberalization gave unincorporated manufacturing firms better access to government and other centralized services, firms needed to centralize to take advantage of these opportunities because the bureaucratic process is centralized. The second economic liberalization was launched in Some part of the program was an attempt by the central government to revert the centralization process by decentralizing some bureaucratic process to regional government (province and municipalities). We examine this issue in the context of Indonesia. Among several important reforms in the 1986 liberalization package was the decision of central government to give provincial and district (kabupaten) planning agency (BAPPEDA) more power in several aspect of administrative licensing system such as the choice of local site, environmental feasibility, property tax etc. Admittedly, the central government still held considerable power in licensing system. From the point of view of a firm there is not so much interest in such decentralization. What most important is whether such 1 Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia 1

2 decentralization to regional government reduce or even increase the transaction cost. In Indonesian context, cynics said that transferring the power to give license to local governments only transferred corruption from center to provinces. In this paper we try to assess the impact of decentralizing administrative licensing system to local government. Such decentralization itself may reduce or increase transaction cost on firm. A firm chooses a location, which gives a highest level of (potential) profit. If a firm has to pay fee (legal or in the form of bribe) to local government they will choose a location, which given the level of bribe still yields the highest profit. II. Data 1. Manufacturing Survey Due to the data availability, we only examine the impact of decentralization of licensing regime in Indonesia on the location decision of firms in manufacturing sector. There are two major categories of manufacturing firms in the Indonesian census: government firm and nongovernment firms namely incorporated and unincorporated firms. In this study we focus on nongovernment firms. 2. Other Data Base For the 1986 firm sample we use the 1980 base information to construct independent variable at each location (kabupaten=district), while for the 1991 sample we use the 1986 base information. In particular we need data on spatial distribution of infrastructure and industrial environment. All of these information comes from the past i.e. the 1980 and the 1986 survey of large and medium manufacturing firms, aggregated into the district level data. Besides manufacturing surveys we also used the 1980 Population Census of Indonesia and the 1985 Intercensal Survey to provide information on population size. 2

3 III. The Model In this section, we present a model of locational choices by non-government firms for new manufacturing plants. A new firm is defined as the one, which is about to enter market in 1986 (for the 1986 sample), and in 1991 (for the 1991 sample). A firm is defined as a new thus a new entrant if its age its 1 year old in 1986 or for the case of the 1991 sample, it is 1 year old in For the firm choice of location, firm j chooses location k from among M possible locations, if (1) * jk = max [ j1, j2,.., jm ] j= 1,.N where jk are the log of long-run profits associated with location k for plant j. In turn, (2) jk = βx k + ε jk where X k are locational attributes in linier, log or dummy variable form at location k such as infrastructure reliability, population size, wage level and so on, and ε jk is an error drawing. In other words, the optimal profit in location k is a function of the prices of variable inputs prevailing in location k and other non-priced location characteristics. Firm j chooses location k if (3) βx k + ε jk βx l + ε jl for all l k. If the error terms are independent and identically distributed (iid) and followed the extreme value distribution, then the probability P jk that plant j locates in k is given by P jk (4) = M exp( βx s= 1 k exp( βx ) s ) In the estimation, parameters of the model are only identified by imposing the normalization that the constant term to be zero. 3

4 IV. The List of Independent Variables 1. Bribery Cost The main interest of this paper is to investigate the impact of some license decentralization to local governments on firm location. The decentralization itself may reduce or increase transaction costs depending on the honesty of local official. Transaction cost might be more conveniently termed as bribery cost. Bribery cost is proxied by the cost needed to smooth business operation not necessarily related to production cost. Regarding manufacturing firms, Central Bureau of Statistics officials off the record hinted that considerable amount of bribery cost is hidden under other costs. Included in this category is management fee and royalty fee. Admittedly there is a problem with this proxy. The data may not include the initial sum of bribe that has to be paid to various government agencies to set up a new business. The data only cover rather crudely bribery cost that needs to be paid to government officials at province and district level. Other Independent Variables 2. Cost Variables There are variables that directly affect firm cost. Given the same amenities, a firm will choose a location with a lower wage. A firm however, may accept higher wage in return for a better quality of labor skill, infrastructure service and access to market. From manufacturing firms point of view, the successive yearly increase of the regional minimum wages in Indonesia is only recent phenomenon. The burden of high wage cost is more felt in many small and medium scale firms, which employ labor intensive production method. For these firms the degree of substitutability between capital and labor may be very low simply because they could not afford the cost of capital investment. Since the level of minimum wage is imposed differently from one province to another, a firm will choose location where the combination of wage cost and other factor that is an optimal for a firm. We employ nominal wage instead of real wage since in the estimation we use structural profit function. In other words we assume that an individual firm in choosing location try to maximize nominal profit. 4

5 3. Distance to the nearest business center Another important consideration to reduce operating cost is the availability of business facilities. Business services are most likely to be better in the old industrial centers, so the distance to the nearest business center will affect the location decision. In this study there are two business centers; Jakarta and Surabaya. The coefficient of distance is expected to be negative. The distance variable also captures the need to cut transportation costs, particularly if most customers are in urban areas. The same consideration also applies if a reliable supply of direct inputs can only be obtained in the business center. 4. Infrastructure One thing that deters a new firm from choosing a particular location is the lack of infrastructure service. In the modern world it is almost impossible for a firm to operate without electricity. The lack of electricity provision may force a firm to generate electricity by itself, which is an additional cost. Even if a public or private provision is available, the question is still how reliable it is. The impact of infrastructure provision on the location decision is represented by the reliability of the public provision of electricity. To capture the reliability of electricity we use the average percentage of electricity consumption in kwh originated from the state power company (PLN). The lower the number means the higher percentage of power generated by firm itself, which indicates the low degree of reliability. 5. Demand Variable Local population could be regarded as one measure of the size of local market. A bigger population size is always associated wit urban areas. New firms are likely to locate in urban areas because local demand is high so they can sell some their products without incurring transport cost. 5

6 6. Industrial Environment Romer (1986) and Jacobs (1984) have argued that a concentration of individual firm sinto cities will generate a type of externalities, which comes from the knowledge spillovers. For a new firm facing a market uncertainty, it is beneficial to choose location around other firms particularly because of the benefits of information spillovers. Overtime, the interaction among many firms in a particular location will lead to the development of a location specific knowledge which is unique to that location. The existence of such a network will enable firm to avoid the high cost of creating it. With regard to knowledge spillovers that emerge from such information network, there are two opposing views on how ideas and innovation are transmitted from firm to firm. Romer (1986) argued that knowledge spillovers take place between firms within a specific industry. Accordingly, a less diverse or a more specialized region is good for growth in the location. On the contrary, Jacobs (1984) suggests that technological spillovers come not from within the industry but from other industries. Consequently, diversity in industrial environment is very important for learning process and innovation. To measure industrial diversity we use Hirschman-Herfindahl index, where for any two digit manufacturing industry we sum the employment shares of other two-digit manufacturing industries. For the manufacturing diversity in industry j in location k, the index is dim (5) jk = i= 1, i j ( Emp ik ) 2 ( i= 1, i j Emp ik ) 2 where Emp refers to employment. An increase in index reflects higher concentration or less diversity in a particular location. V. Econometric Results We estimate the model for every two digit (ISIC code) manufacturing industry (textile=32, wood=33, paper=34, chemical=35, non-metallic mineral=36, machinery (38) and miscellaneous (39). Industries excluded are food (31) and basic metal (37). The reason for food is that it is too 6

7 ubiquitous, while for basic there are only very few observation. Table 1 and table 2 present the results of econometric estimation. Generally, variables that are more likely to be significant are distance to the nearest business center and population. As expected, the coefficient of distance is negative, while for population is positive. The infrastructure variable is rather disappointing since it always has wrong sign. Wage Cost Since the information on the regional minimum wages is only available from 1985 onward we can use regional minimum wage only in the 1991 regression. For the 1986 sample, we experiment with the actual wage. The result is not too encouraging since. The wage coefficients for some industries are positive, while for wood products, paper products and miscellaneous the coefficients are negative as expected but they are insignificant. Obviously, there is a problem of endogeneity in using the actual wage. The use of regional minimum wage (RMW) as independent variable in the 1991 sample gives more plausible result. The coefficient of RMW is negative and significant at 5 percent level for wood products (ISIC 33), chemical (ISIC 35), and machinery (ISIC38). The coefficients are negative and significant at 10 percent level for non-metallic mineral and miscellaneous industry (ISIC 39). For these industries, the negative effect of regional minimum wage in discouraging firms from locating in one particular location is quite apparent. In several instances in Indonesia, the imposition of minimum wage policy will increase workers expectation. Many small and medium size enterprises have complained a lot that they are less able to meet demand for higher wages since it is often proceeds without regard to workers productivity. Refusal to meet demand for higher pay, as proved in many industrial areas in Java is also dangerous. Since it may end up with worker strike that is often combined with the act of violence that destroy considerable part of plant and equipment. The above regression result suggest that at lest for some industries are not only looking for a region with lower minimum wage but also perhaps a region where the imposition of minimum wage is less strict. 7

8 Distance to Nearest Business Center Unlike in the previous works for Industrialized countries where much longer distances are involved (Brazil and USA) and the impact of access to major national metro areas or regional capital is very little, this study finds that access to major business centers is very important. Judging from the coefficient of distance from the Indonesian sample, firms in textiles (ISIC 32), wood products (ISIC33), paper products (ISIC34), non-metallic mineral (ISIC36) and machinery (ISIC38) are more clustered near major business centers in the 1991 sample compared to the 1986 sample. This suggests that after the 1986 economic liberalization, some trend of industrial centralization take place in Indonesia. This happened despite some efforts on the part of the central government to decentralize some licensing power to local governments. The trend of industrial centralization after the 1986 economic liberalization however is understandable given the fact that most of power to grant license is still at the hand of the central government particularly for medium and large scale projects. Even for smaller projects there is also tendency to locate close to the center. One plausible explanation is the centralization of banking service. Since mid 1983, the most dramatic reforms were in the banking sector. Public sector loans were made competitively available at market interest rates instead of being rationed and subsidized. In addition, in 1988 restrictions on the private part of the banking industry were lifted, permitting rapid growth in this sector. The banking liberalization however has not removed the administrative and spatial hierarchy in the loan process of or the interpersonal nature of granting larger loans. To take advantage of liberalization in terms of obtaining significant size loans for capital expansion, firms would need to pursue loan applications and personal contract in a few large metro areas. It seems that for a single firm effective access to large loans in the capital markets would be greatly enhanced by centralized location. Industrial Diversity 8

9 There is no uniformity regarding the impact of industrial diversity on firm location. In the 1991 sample for example, the coefficients for textiles, wood products, chemical, and non-metallic mineral are positive and significant. For these industries knowledge spillovers from within industry is more important than from outside industry. New firms tend to concentrate close to the location of older firms from the same industry. Thus it reinforces the concentration trend. Only, the coefficient of wood products switches sign from negative in the 1986 sample to positive in the 1991 sample suggesting also the trend of concentration. The Impact of Bribery Cost The regression result suggests that the negative impact of bribery cost is more apparent in the 1991 sample compared to the 1986 sample. In the 1991 sample the coefficient of bribery cost is negative and significant for textiles, wood products, paper products and machinery. While in the 1986 sample it is only negative and significant for textiles. This suggests that the decentralization of some power to administrate license, to local governments has created locational preference on the part of individual firms to choose to choose region with lower or optimal bribe. In other words, firms after controlling for other factors, prefer to choose a region with less corrupt local government. The decentralization of some administrative power to grant license to local officials has actually make one region competes with one another in attracting manufacturing firms or business firms in general. This pattern of choosing location with a lower bribe or less corruption is less apparent in the 1986 sample, when the license system was very centralized. This result points to the situation where after some period of rigid centralization, decentralizing administrative license system may increase transaction cost in some local areas due to various reasons such as the temptation of short-sighted local officials to extract excessive rent (legal or illegal) from the existing and entering firms. 2 In doing so, they may not maximize their revenues. 2 Businessmen in Indonesia often complain at the behavior of local officials. What they complain the most is the lack of transparency and guarantee that their business will not be bothered by various incursion of local government into their business once the business start. Businessmen do not mind to pay bribe provided that it is reasonable and no further delay imposed on them after they pay bribe. 9

10 Some learning periods are needed before they are aware that they need to compete with other locations to attract new firms as potential tax base. It is also interesting to observe that the coefficient of distance variable is in general more negative in the 1991 sample compared to the 1986 sample. Thus, firms are more clustered near major business centers. This indicates that manufacturing firms are more centralized after the 1986 economic liberalization. This is exactly the opposite of what the central government intended to do, namely, to revert the centralization of manufacturing industry by decentralizing licensing regime. One possible explanation is that after controlling for other factors, local officials in locations close the business centers may be smarter in determining the optimal level of bribe thus are able to attract more new firms to locate. Another explanation is also possible. Perhaps there was not enough decentralization. It is true that after the 1986 liberalization the central government still holds a considerable power in approving new investments including their locations, particularly if the scale of the projects are big enough. In this respect other centralizing factors are too strong. Several centralizing factors can be named for example the banking system and the existence of agglomeration of old industry. As mentioned above, the spatial hierarchy of the national banking system in granting loans still exists, thus attract new firms to locate near major business centers, where most bank headquarters located. Also the sign of the coefficients of industrial diversity suggests that firms in most industries prefer regional specialization and tend to locate close to older firms from the same industry. It is not clear whether in the most recent industrial surveys, the pattern of choosing location with low or optimal bribe still exist. There is a need to estimate the model for more recent data set. It would be possible, after allowing local officials some learning periods, they may more aware that in fact they compete with other locations in attracting business, thus induces them to determine more reasonable bribe level with more security guarantee to businessmen. There is no guarantee that the process of industrial centralization will be reversed 10

11 since other agglomeration factors such as population size and cluster of mature industry will still exert strong influence on the trend of centralization. Conclusion In certain situations, economic liberalization policies can increase the degree of spatial centralization. In the case of Indonesia the 1983 Banking Deregulation was associated with increased centralization of unincorporated manufacturing firms. Although the liberalization gave unincorporated manufacturing firms better access to government and other centralized services, firms needed to centralize to take advantage of these opportunities because the bureaucratic process is centralized. The Indonesian government was intent to reverse this process or at least to slow it down. The second package of economic liberalization in 1986 contained steps in this direction. One important step was the decision of central government to give provincial and district (kabupaten) planning agency (BAPPEDA) more power in several aspect of administrative licensing system such as the choice of local site, environmental feasibility, property tax etc. We then examine, whether regional government abused their new power. The immediate impact of license decentralization was that manufacturing firms started to show locational preference for region with lower bribe. From the point of view of decentralization, more and more new firms are clustered in the old business centers. In this respect other centralizing factors are too strong. Several centralizing factors can be named for example the banking system and the existence of agglomeration of old industry. 11

12 References: Henderson, J.V., A. Kuncoro, M. Turner, 1995, Industrial Development in Cities, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103(5): and A. Kuncoro, 1996 Industrial Centralization in Indonesia, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 10(3) Jacobs, Jane, 1984, Cities and the Wealth of Nations, Vintage Book, New York. Kittiprapas, S., P. McCann, 1999, Industrial Location Behavior and Regional Restructuring within the Fifth Tiger Economy: Evidence from the Thai Electronic Industry, Applied Economics, vol. 31:37-51 Lee, K.S., 1981, Location Jobs in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, New York. Romer, Paul, 1986, Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94(October), p

13 Table 1: Conditional Logit Estimation Factors Affecting Firm Location 1986 Sample WAGES INFRAS. BRIBE LPOP DST DIV Textiles [6.119] [0.428] [-2.074] [6.433] [-9.878] [12.175] Wood products [0.397] [-1.904] [-0.777] [-0.610] [-4.120] [-2.867] Paper products [-0.002] [-1.535] [0.979] [1.138] [-5.453] [-0.797] Chemical [4.813] [-3.122] [-0.696] [7.493] [-9.002] [0.114] Non-metallic Mineral [1.090] [0.946] [3.057] [6.659] [-2.246] [12.615] Machinery [2.126] [-5.403] [-1.695] [3.826] [-8.497] [8.061] Miscellaneous F = [-1.194] [-0.922] [-0.922] [0.950] [-0.795] [-0.047] Notes: for the 1986 sample, wages are the actual wages paid on workers Figures between parentheses are t-ratio WAGES: log of wages INFRAS: percentage of electricity from the state power company BRIBE: proxy of bribery costs LPOP: log of population DST: distance DIV: locational diversity 13

14 Table 2: Conditional Logit Estimation Factors Affecting Firm Location 1991 Sample WAGES INFRAS. BRIBE LPOP DST DIV Textiles [2.713] [-0.362] [-4.663] [4.655] [ ] [14.929] Wood products [-4.528] [-4.428] [-2.184] [3.362] [ ] [6.550] Paper products [-0.562] [-2.418] [-1.781] [1.811] [-3.132] [0.114] Chemical [-4.610] [-8.537] [-0.213] [3.523] [ ] [2.301] Non-metallic Mineral [-1.391] [-0.580] [0.973] [4.080] [-0.323] [12.615] Machinery [-4.733] [-9.154] [-2.650] [-0.411] [-9.775] [0.349] Miscellaneous [-1.146] [-3.844] [0.215] [-0.020] [-1.894] [0.869] Notes: for the 1991 sample, wages are the regional minimum wages Figures between parentheses are t-ratio WAGES: log of wages INFRAS: percentage of electricity from the state power company BRIBE: proxy of bribery costs LPOP: log of population DST: distance DIV: locational diversity 14

FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA

FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA by Robert E. Lipsey & Fredrik Sjöholm Working Paper 166 December 2002 Postal address: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden.

More information

Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing

Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing Robert E. Lipsey, National Bureau of Economic Research and City University of New York and Fredrik Sjöholm, National University of Singapore

More information

Residential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes When did ghettos go bad?

Residential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes When did ghettos go bad? Economics Letters 69 (2000) 239 243 www.elsevier.com/ locate/ econbase Residential segregation and socioeconomic outcomes When did ghettos go bad? * William J. Collins, Robert A. Margo Vanderbilt University

More information

Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions. Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University. August 2018

Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions. Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University. August 2018 Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University August 2018 Abstract In this paper I use South Asian firm-level data to examine whether the impact of corruption

More information

The effect of residential land use regulations on urban welfare. J. Vernon Henderson. Brown University May 2007

The effect of residential land use regulations on urban welfare. J. Vernon Henderson. Brown University May 2007 The effect of residential land use regulations on urban welfare J. Vernon Henderson Brown University May 2007 Introduction Two types of regulatory environments: Formal sector housing market: Developed

More information

PROGRAM ON HOUSING AND URBAN POLICY

PROGRAM ON HOUSING AND URBAN POLICY Institute of Business and Economic Research Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics PROGRAM ON HOUSING AND URBAN POLICY PROFESSIONAL REPORT SERIES PROFESSIONAL REPORT NO. P07-001 URBANIZATION

More information

Determinants of Highly-Skilled Migration Taiwan s Experiences

Determinants of Highly-Skilled Migration Taiwan s Experiences Working Paper Series No.2007-1 Determinants of Highly-Skilled Migration Taiwan s Experiences by Lee-in Chen Chiu and Jen-yi Hou July 2007 Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research 75 Chang-Hsing Street,

More information

Asia-Pacific to comprise two-thirds of global middle class by 2030, Report says

Asia-Pacific to comprise two-thirds of global middle class by 2030, Report says Strictly embargoed until 14 March 2013, 12:00 PM EDT (New York), 4:00 PM GMT (London) Asia-Pacific to comprise two-thirds of global middle class by 2030, Report says 2013 Human Development Report says

More information

Kiriya Kulkolkarn. Abstract This study provides a picture of immigrant employment in manufacturing of Thailand.

Kiriya Kulkolkarn. Abstract This study provides a picture of immigrant employment in manufacturing of Thailand. Chulalongkorn Journal of Economics 23, 2011: Kiriya 95-132 K.: Immigrant-employing Firms in Thai Manufacturing 95 Immigrant-employing Firms in Thai Manufacturing Kiriya Kulkolkarn Abstract This study provides

More information

Commuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island. Raden M Purnagunawan

Commuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island. Raden M Purnagunawan Commuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island Raden M Purnagunawan Outline 1. Introduction 2. Brief Literature review 3. Data Source and Construction 4. The aggregate commuting

More information

Trade And Inequality With Limited Labor Mobility: Theory And Evidence From China Muqun Li and Ian Coxhead APPENDIX

Trade And Inequality With Limited Labor Mobility: Theory And Evidence From China Muqun Li and Ian Coxhead APPENDIX A-1 Trade And Inequality With Limited Labor Mobility: Theory And Evidence From China Muqun Li Ian Coxhead Contents: APPENDIX A.1. Proof of lemma 1... 1 A.2. Relative labor dem... 2 A.3. Trade balance conditions...

More information

Chapter 7. Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration: Theory and Policy 7-1. Copyright 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Chapter 7. Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration: Theory and Policy 7-1. Copyright 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 7 Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration: Theory and Policy Copyright 2012 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 7-1 The Migration and Urbanization Dilemma As a pattern of development, the

More information

The Effect of ICT Investment on the Relative Compensation of High-, Medium-, and Low-Skilled Workers: Industry versus Country Analysis

The Effect of ICT Investment on the Relative Compensation of High-, Medium-, and Low-Skilled Workers: Industry versus Country Analysis The Effect of ICT Investment on the Relative Compensation of High-, Medium-, and Low-Skilled Workers: Industry versus Country Analysis Very preliminary version Dorothee Schneider September 13, 2009 In

More information

Corruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation

Corruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation Corruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation S. Roy*, Department of Economics, High Point University, High Point, NC - 27262, USA. Email: sroy@highpoint.edu Abstract We implement OLS,

More information

The Effects of Housing Prices, Wages, and Commuting Time on Joint Residential and Job Location Choices

The Effects of Housing Prices, Wages, and Commuting Time on Joint Residential and Job Location Choices The Effects of Housing Prices, Wages, and Commuting Time on Joint Residential and Job Location Choices Kim S. So, Peter F. Orazem, and Daniel M. Otto a May 1998 American Agricultural Economics Association

More information

Policy brief ARE WE RECOVERING YET? JOBS AND WAGES IN CALIFORNIA OVER THE PERIOD ARINDRAJIT DUBE, PH.D. Executive Summary AUGUST 31, 2005

Policy brief ARE WE RECOVERING YET? JOBS AND WAGES IN CALIFORNIA OVER THE PERIOD ARINDRAJIT DUBE, PH.D. Executive Summary AUGUST 31, 2005 Policy brief ARE WE RECOVERING YET? JOBS AND WAGES IN CALIFORNIA OVER THE 2000-2005 PERIOD ARINDRAJIT DUBE, PH.D. AUGUST 31, 2005 Executive Summary This study uses household survey data and payroll data

More information

Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B. Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results

Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B. Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B by Michel Beine and Serge Coulombe This version: February 2016 Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results

More information

Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr

Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr Abstract. The Asian experience of poverty reduction has varied widely. Over recent decades the economies of East and Southeast Asia

More information

Remittances and Poverty. in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group (DECRG) MSN MC World Bank.

Remittances and Poverty. in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group (DECRG) MSN MC World Bank. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group

More information

Working Paper No. 98. Do foreign-owned firms pay more? Evidence from the Indonesian manufacturing sector International Labour Office Geneva

Working Paper No. 98. Do foreign-owned firms pay more? Evidence from the Indonesian manufacturing sector International Labour Office Geneva Working Paper No. 98 Do foreign-owned firms pay more? Evidence from the Indonesian manufacturing sector 1990-99 Ann E. Harrison University of California, Berkeley Jason Scorse University of California,

More information

5A. Wage Structures in the Electronics Industry. Benjamin A. Campbell and Vincent M. Valvano

5A. Wage Structures in the Electronics Industry. Benjamin A. Campbell and Vincent M. Valvano 5A.1 Introduction 5A. Wage Structures in the Electronics Industry Benjamin A. Campbell and Vincent M. Valvano Over the past 2 years, wage inequality in the U.S. economy has increased rapidly. In this chapter,

More information

Competitiveness: A Blessing or a Curse for Gender Equality? Yana van der Muelen Rodgers

Competitiveness: A Blessing or a Curse for Gender Equality? Yana van der Muelen Rodgers Competitiveness: A Blessing or a Curse for Gender Equality? Yana van der Muelen Rodgers Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium s (IATRC s)

More information

Determinants of Outward FDI for Thai Firms

Determinants of Outward FDI for Thai Firms Southeast Asian Journal of Economics 3(2), December 2015: 43-59 Determinants of Outward FDI for Thai Firms Tanapong Potipiti Assistant professor, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok,

More information

Gender Gap of Immigrant Groups in the United States

Gender Gap of Immigrant Groups in the United States The Park Place Economist Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 14 2003 Gender Gap of Immigrant Groups in the United States Desislava Hristova '03 Illinois Wesleyan University Recommended Citation Hristova '03, Desislava

More information

The impact of Chinese import competition on the local structure of employment and wages in France

The impact of Chinese import competition on the local structure of employment and wages in France No. 57 February 218 The impact of Chinese import competition on the local structure of employment and wages in France Clément Malgouyres External Trade and Structural Policies Research Division This Rue

More information

Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China

Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China Ye Chen Hongbin Li Li-An Zhou May 1, 2005 Abstract Using data from China, this paper examines the role of relative performance

More information

High Technology Agglomeration and Gender Inequalities

High Technology Agglomeration and Gender Inequalities High Technology Agglomeration and Gender Inequalities By Elsie Echeverri-Carroll and Sofia G Ayala * The high-tech boom of the last two decades overlapped with increasing wage inequalities between men

More information

Ethnic networks and trade: Intensive vs. extensive margins

Ethnic networks and trade: Intensive vs. extensive margins MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Ethnic networks and trade: Intensive vs. extensive margins Cletus C Coughlin and Howard J. Wall 13. January 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30758/ MPRA

More information

Cai et al. Chap.9: The Lewisian Turning Point 183. Chapter 9:

Cai et al. Chap.9: The Lewisian Turning Point 183. Chapter 9: Cai et al. Chap.9: The Lewisian Turning Point 183 Chapter 9: Wage Increases, Labor Market Integration, and the Lewisian Turning Point: Evidence from Migrant Workers FANG CAI 1 YANG DU 1 CHANGBAO ZHAO 2

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION. George J. Borjas. Working Paper

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION. George J. Borjas. Working Paper NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION George J. Borjas Working Paper 8945 http://www.nber.org/papers/w8945 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge,

More information

The Costs of Remoteness, Evidence From German Division and Reunification by Redding and Sturm (AER, 2008)

The Costs of Remoteness, Evidence From German Division and Reunification by Redding and Sturm (AER, 2008) The Costs of Remoteness, Evidence From German Division and Reunification by Redding and Sturm (AER, 2008) MIT Spatial Economics Reading Group Presentation Adam Guren May 13, 2010 Testing the New Economic

More information

Returns to Education in the Albanian Labor Market

Returns to Education in the Albanian Labor Market Returns to Education in the Albanian Labor Market Dr. Juna Miluka Department of Economics and Finance, University of New York Tirana, Albania Abstract The issue of private returns to education has received

More information

Research Report. How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa

Research Report. How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa International Affairs Program Research Report How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa Report Prepared by Bilge Erten Assistant

More information

Impacts of International Migration on the Labor Market in Japan

Impacts of International Migration on the Labor Market in Japan Impacts of International Migration on the Labor Market in Japan Jiro Nakamura Nihon University This paper introduces an empirical analysis on three key points: (i) whether the introduction of foreign workers

More information

INDONESIA AND THE LEWIS TURNING POINT: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS

INDONESIA AND THE LEWIS TURNING POINT: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS INDONESIA AND THE LEWIS TURNING POINT: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS 1 Chris Manning (Adjunct Fellow, Indonesian Project, ANU) and R. Muhamad Purnagunawan (Center for Economics and Development Studies, UNPAD,

More information

Volume 35, Issue 1. An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach

Volume 35, Issue 1. An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach Volume 35, Issue 1 An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach Brian Hibbs Indiana University South Bend Gihoon Hong Indiana University South Bend Abstract This

More information

Online Appendix. Capital Account Opening and Wage Inequality. Mauricio Larrain Columbia University. October 2014

Online Appendix. Capital Account Opening and Wage Inequality. Mauricio Larrain Columbia University. October 2014 Online Appendix Capital Account Opening and Wage Inequality Mauricio Larrain Columbia University October 2014 A.1 Additional summary statistics Tables 1 and 2 in the main text report summary statistics

More information

WhyHasUrbanInequalityIncreased?

WhyHasUrbanInequalityIncreased? WhyHasUrbanInequalityIncreased? Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Brown University Matthew Freedman, Cornell University Ronni Pavan, Royal Holloway-University of London June, 2014 Abstract The increase in wage inequality

More information

Wage Differentials among Ownership Groups and Worker Quality in Vietnamese Manufacturing

Wage Differentials among Ownership Groups and Worker Quality in Vietnamese Manufacturing Wage Differentials among Ownership Groups and Worker Quality in Vietnamese Manufacturing Kien Trung Nguyen The University of Danang, School of Economics, Vietnam and Eric D. Ramstetter Asian Growth Research

More information

Provincial Review 2016: Western Cape

Provincial Review 2016: Western Cape Provincial Review 2016: Western Cape The Western Cape s real economy is dominated by manufacturing and commercial agriculture. As a result, while it did not benefit directly from the commodity boom, it

More information

The Value of Centralization: Evidence from a Political Hierarchy Reform in China

The Value of Centralization: Evidence from a Political Hierarchy Reform in China The Value of Centralization: Evidence from a Political Hierarchy Reform in China Shiyu Bo This Version: July 12, 2015 Abstract Is regional development better under a reform that centralizes governments?

More information

Dirk Pilat:

Dirk Pilat: Note: This presentation reflects my personal views and not necessarily those of the OECD or its member countries. Research Institute for Economy Trade and Industry, 28 March 2006 The Globalisation of Value

More information

Agglomeration and Manufacturing Activities in Indonesia

Agglomeration and Manufacturing Activities in Indonesia Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized POLICY NOTE 6 73127 Agglomeration and Manufacturing Activities in Indonesia THE WORLD

More information

Schooling and Cohort Size: Evidence from Vietnam, Thailand, Iran and Cambodia. Evangelos M. Falaris University of Delaware. and

Schooling and Cohort Size: Evidence from Vietnam, Thailand, Iran and Cambodia. Evangelos M. Falaris University of Delaware. and Schooling and Cohort Size: Evidence from Vietnam, Thailand, Iran and Cambodia by Evangelos M. Falaris University of Delaware and Thuan Q. Thai Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research March 2012 2

More information

Rising inequality in China

Rising inequality in China Page 1 of 6 Date:03/01/2006 URL: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2006/01/03/stories/2006010300981100.htm Rising inequality in China C. P. Chandrasekhar Jayati Ghosh Spectacular economic growth in China

More information

Remittance and Household Expenditures in Kenya

Remittance and Household Expenditures in Kenya Remittance and Household Expenditures in Kenya Christine Nanjala Simiyu KCA University, Nairobi, Kenya. Email: csimiyu@kca.ac.ke Abstract Remittances constitute an important source of income for majority

More information

Part II: Research Features

Part II: Research Features Part II: Research Features Chapter 5 Provincial Profile Focus on the Free State Provincial Profile: Focus on the Free State 1. Introduction During 2003 to 2004, the Free State Province commissioned a

More information

Unequal Recovery, Labor Market Polarization, Race, and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Maoyong Fan and Anita Alves Pena 1

Unequal Recovery, Labor Market Polarization, Race, and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Maoyong Fan and Anita Alves Pena 1 Unequal Recovery, Labor Market Polarization, Race, and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Maoyong Fan and Anita Alves Pena 1 Abstract: Growing income inequality and labor market polarization and increasing

More information

Wage Inequality in the Region

Wage Inequality in the Region Wage Inequality in the Region Jaison R. Abel, Research Officer Community Advisory Group Meeting November 15, 2017 The views expressed here are those of the presenter and do not necessarily represent those

More information

Foreign Direct Investment and Wage Inequality: Is Skill Upgrading the Culprit?

Foreign Direct Investment and Wage Inequality: Is Skill Upgrading the Culprit? Foreign Direct Investment and Wage Inequality: Is Skill Upgrading the Culprit? Akinori Tomohara Department of Economics, University of Kitakyushu and Kazuhiko Yokota The International Centre for the Study

More information

Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration (Theory and Policy)

Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration (Theory and Policy) Chapter 6 Urbanization and Rural-Urban Migration (Theory and Policy) Problems and Policies: Domestic 1 The Migration and Urbanization Dilemma As a pattern of development, the more developed the economy,

More information

vi. rising InequalIty with high growth and falling Poverty

vi. rising InequalIty with high growth and falling Poverty 43 vi. rising InequalIty with high growth and falling Poverty Inequality is on the rise in several countries in East Asia, most notably in China. The good news is that poverty declined rapidly at the same

More information

CENTRO STUDI LUCA D AGLIANO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES WORKING PAPERS N April Export Growth and Firm Survival

CENTRO STUDI LUCA D AGLIANO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES WORKING PAPERS N April Export Growth and Firm Survival WWW.DAGLIANO.UNIMI.IT CENTRO STUDI LUCA D AGLIANO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES WORKING PAPERS N. 350 April 2013 Export Growth and Firm Survival Julian Emami Namini* Giovanni Facchini** Ricardo A. López*** * Erasmus

More information

Presentation of Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China by Martinez-Bravo, Miguel, Qian and Yao

Presentation of Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China by Martinez-Bravo, Miguel, Qian and Yao Presentation of Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China by Martinez-Bravo, Miguel, Qian and Yao M. Martinez-Bravo, P. Miguel, N. Qian and Y. Yao Ec721, Boston University Dec 3, 2018 DM (BU) China: Martinez

More information

The Determinants of Low-Intensity Intergroup Violence: The Case of Northern Ireland. Online Appendix

The Determinants of Low-Intensity Intergroup Violence: The Case of Northern Ireland. Online Appendix The Determinants of Low-Intensity Intergroup Violence: The Case of Northern Ireland Online Appendix Laia Balcells (Duke University), Lesley-Ann Daniels (Institut Barcelona d Estudis Internacionals & Universitat

More information

China s Rise and Leaving the Middle- Income Trap in Latin America A New Structural Economics Approach

China s Rise and Leaving the Middle- Income Trap in Latin America A New Structural Economics Approach China s Rise and Leaving the Middle- Income Trap in Latin America A New Structural Economics Approach Justin Yifu Lin National School of Development Peking University China s Growth Performance China started

More information

FOREIGN TRADE CHANGES AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATVIA: COMPARISON OF THE BALTIC STATES

FOREIGN TRADE CHANGES AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATVIA: COMPARISON OF THE BALTIC STATES FOREIGN TRADE CHANGES AND SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATVIA: COMPARISON OF THE BALTIC STATES Velga Ozoliņa Astra Auziņa-Emsiņa, Riga Technical University, Latvia The 20th INFORUM World Conference Florence,

More information

The Demography of the Labor Force in Emerging Markets

The Demography of the Labor Force in Emerging Markets The Demography of the Labor Force in Emerging Markets David Lam I. Introduction This paper discusses how demographic changes are affecting the labor force in emerging markets. As will be shown below, the

More information

ARTNeT Trade Economists Conference Trade in the Asian century - delivering on the promise of economic prosperity rd September 2014

ARTNeT Trade Economists Conference Trade in the Asian century - delivering on the promise of economic prosperity rd September 2014 ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE ARTNeT CONFERENCE ARTNeT Trade Economists Conference Trade in the Asian century - delivering on the promise of economic prosperity 22-23 rd September

More information

Cities and product variety: evidence from restaurants

Cities and product variety: evidence from restaurants 1 / 20 Cities and product variety: evidence from restaurants Nathan Schiff School of Economics Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Urban Land Institute Award Ceremony March 22, 2016 2 / 20 Quality

More information

Immigrant-native wage gaps in time series: Complementarities or composition effects?

Immigrant-native wage gaps in time series: Complementarities or composition effects? Immigrant-native wage gaps in time series: Complementarities or composition effects? Joakim Ruist Department of Economics University of Gothenburg Box 640 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden joakim.ruist@economics.gu.se

More information

Determinants of Violent Crime in the U.S: Evidence from State Level Data

Determinants of Violent Crime in the U.S: Evidence from State Level Data 12 Journal Student Research Determinants of Violent Crime in the U.S: Evidence from State Level Data Grace Piggott Sophomore, Applied Social Science: Concentration Economics ABSTRACT This study examines

More information

Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions

Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions Protection for Free? The Political Economy of U.S. Tariff Suspensions Rodney Ludema, Georgetown University Anna Maria Mayda, Georgetown University and CEPR Prachi Mishra, International Monetary Fund Tariff

More information

Has China Lost Its Edge? Todd C. Lee Managing Director, Greater China Country Intelligence Global Insight

Has China Lost Its Edge? Todd C. Lee Managing Director, Greater China Country Intelligence Global Insight Has China Lost Its Edge? Todd C. Lee Managing Director, Greater China Country Intelligence Global Insight China s Export Powerhouse Guangdong Province Reported Large Scale Factory Shutdowns More than 1,000

More information

Moving Up or Moving Out? Anti-Sweatshop Activists and Labor Market Outcomes

Moving Up or Moving Out? Anti-Sweatshop Activists and Labor Market Outcomes Moving Up or Moving Out? Anti-Sweatshop Activists and Labor Market Outcomes Ann Harrison (UC Berkeley and NBER) and Jason Scorse (UC Berkeley)* April 2004 During the 1990s, human rights and anti-sweatshop

More information

How Important Are Labor Markets to the Welfare of Indonesia's Poor?

How Important Are Labor Markets to the Welfare of Indonesia's Poor? Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized S /4 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1665 How Important Are Labor Markets to the Welfare

More information

Maori/Non-Maori Income Gaps: Do Differences in Worker Mobility Play a Role?

Maori/Non-Maori Income Gaps: Do Differences in Worker Mobility Play a Role? Maori/Non-Maori Income Gaps: Do Differences in Worker Mobility Play a Role? Mitch Renkow Dept. of Ag. and Resource Economics North Carolina State University Raleigh, North Carolina mitch_renkow@ncsu.edu

More information

Does government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test

Does government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test Does government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test Axel Dreher a Justina A. V. Fischer b November 2010 Economics Letters, forthcoming Abstract Using a country panel of domestic

More information

The Determinants of Rural Urban Migration: Evidence from NLSY Data

The Determinants of Rural Urban Migration: Evidence from NLSY Data The Determinants of Rural Urban Migration: Evidence from NLSY Data Jeffrey Jordan Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics University of Georgia 1109 Experiment Street 206 Stuckey Building Griffin,

More information

Spatial Concentration of the Informal Small and Cottage Industry in Indonesia

Spatial Concentration of the Informal Small and Cottage Industry in Indonesia MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Spatial Concentration of the Informal Small and Cottage Industry in Indonesia Brata Aloysius Gunadi Faculty of Economics, Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University 2007 Online

More information

Statistical Analysis of Corruption Perception Index across countries

Statistical Analysis of Corruption Perception Index across countries Statistical Analysis of Corruption Perception Index across countries AMDA Project Summary Report (Under the guidance of Prof Malay Bhattacharya) Group 3 Anit Suri 1511007 Avishek Biswas 1511013 Diwakar

More information

Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia

Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia Rema Hanna, Harvard Kennedy School Joint with: Vivi Alatas, World Bank; Abhijit Banerjee, MIT ; Benjamin A. Olken, MIT

More information

Changes in Wage Inequality in Canada: An Interprovincial Perspective

Changes in Wage Inequality in Canada: An Interprovincial Perspective s u m m a r y Changes in Wage Inequality in Canada: An Interprovincial Perspective Nicole M. Fortin and Thomas Lemieux t the national level, Canada, like many industrialized countries, has Aexperienced

More information

Do high-skill immigrants raise productivity? Evidence from Israeli manufacturing firms,

Do high-skill immigrants raise productivity? Evidence from Israeli manufacturing firms, Paserman IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:6 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access Do high-skill immigrants raise productivity? Evidence from Israeli manufacturing firms, 1990-1999 M Daniele Paserman 1,2,3,4,5 Correspondence:

More information

Urbanization and Rural- Urban Migration: Theory. AEB 4906 Development Economics

Urbanization and Rural- Urban Migration: Theory. AEB 4906 Development Economics Urbanization and Rural- Urban Migration: Theory and Policy AEB 4906 Development Economics http://danielsolis.webs.com/aeb4906.htm The Migration and Urbanization Dilemma Urbanization and city growth are

More information

The Quest for Prosperity

The Quest for Prosperity The Quest for Prosperity How Developing Economies Can Take Off Justin Yifu Lin National School of Development Peking University Overview of Presentation The needs for rethinking development economics The

More information

B 3. THE PROPER ECONOMIC ROLES OF GOVERNMENT

B 3. THE PROPER ECONOMIC ROLES OF GOVERNMENT B 3. THE PROPER ECONOMIC ROLES OF GOVERNMENT 1. Government, through a political process, is the agency through which public policy is determined and in part carried out. a) It is one of the means employed

More information

Chapter 5: Internationalization & Industrialization

Chapter 5: Internationalization & Industrialization Chapter 5: Internationalization & Industrialization Chapter 5: Internationalization & Industrialization... 1 5.1 THEORY OF INVESTMENT... 4 5.2 AN OPEN ECONOMY: IMPORT-EXPORT-LED GROWTH MODEL... 6 5.3 FOREIGN

More information

Welfare State and Local Government: the Impact of Decentralization on Well-Being

Welfare State and Local Government: the Impact of Decentralization on Well-Being Welfare State and Local Government: the Impact of Decentralization on Well-Being Paolo Addis, Alessandra Coli, and Barbara Pacini (University of Pisa) Discussant Anindita Sengupta Associate Professor of

More information

Labor Market Adjustments to Trade with China: The Case of Brazil

Labor Market Adjustments to Trade with China: The Case of Brazil Labor Market Adjustments to Trade with China: The Case of Brazil Peter Brummund Laura Connolly University of Alabama July 26, 2018 Abstract Many countries continue to integrate into the world economy,

More information

Trade Facilitation and Exports Evidence from African Manufacturing Firms. Ruth Hoekstra Ruhr-University Bochum. July 2012

Trade Facilitation and Exports Evidence from African Manufacturing Firms. Ruth Hoekstra Ruhr-University Bochum. July 2012 Trade Facilitation and Exports Evidence from African Manufacturing Firms Ruth Hoekstra Ruhr-University Bochum July 2012 Draft Please do not cite or quote Abstract: Facilitating trade is essential for Africa

More information

Family Ties, Labor Mobility and Interregional Wage Differentials*

Family Ties, Labor Mobility and Interregional Wage Differentials* Family Ties, Labor Mobility and Interregional Wage Differentials* TODD L. CHERRY, Ph.D.** Department of Economics and Finance University of Wyoming Laramie WY 82071-3985 PETE T. TSOURNOS, Ph.D. Pacific

More information

Investment Climate Survey in Cambodia

Investment Climate Survey in Cambodia Chapter 6 Investment Climate Survey in Cambodia Sau Sisovanna Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace March 2009 This chapter should be cited as Sisovanna, S. (2009), Investment Climate Survey in

More information

Globalisation and Open Markets

Globalisation and Open Markets Wolfgang LEHMACHER Globalisation and Open Markets July 2009 What is Globalisation? Globalisation is a process of increasing global integration, which has had a large number of positive effects for nations

More information

CDE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CDE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CDE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY March 2014 CITIES OF HOPE Cities have never been more important for human well-being and economic prosperity. Half of the world s population lives in urban areas, while about 80 per

More information

Trade Liberalization and the Wage Skill Premium: Evidence from Indonesia * Mary Amiti Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR

Trade Liberalization and the Wage Skill Premium: Evidence from Indonesia * Mary Amiti Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR Trade Liberalization and the Wage Skill Premium: Evidence from Indonesia * Mary Amiti Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR Lisa Cameron Monash University April 22, 2011 Abstract: In this paper, we

More information

Secondary Towns and Poverty Reduction: Refocusing the Urbanization Agenda

Secondary Towns and Poverty Reduction: Refocusing the Urbanization Agenda Secondary Towns and Poverty Reduction: Refocusing the Urbanization Agenda Luc Christiaensen (World Bank) and Ravi Kanbur (Cornell University) The Quality of Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Workshop of JICA-IPD

More information

Gender Equality and Economic Development

Gender Equality and Economic Development Gender Equality and Economic Development The Role for Information and Communication Technologies Derek H. C. Chen * The Knowledge for Development Program The World Bank Washington DC 20433 Abstract This

More information

DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS

DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS No. 2009/4 ISSN 1478-9396 IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND CORRUPTION? EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA Stephen DOBSON and Carlyn RAMLOGAN June 2009 DISCUSSION

More information

Wage and Employment Effects of Minimum Wage Policy in the Indonesian Urban Labor Market

Wage and Employment Effects of Minimum Wage Policy in the Indonesian Urban Labor Market executive summary Wage and Employment Effects of Minimum Wage Policy in the Indonesian Urban Labor Market A paper from the SMERU Research Institute, with support from USAID/PEG October 2001 The findings,

More information

Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani

Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani Growth and Poverty Reduction: An Empirical Analysis Nanak Kakwani Abstract. This paper develops an inequality-growth trade off index, which shows how much growth is needed to offset the adverse impact

More information

Local Labour Markets and

Local Labour Markets and Local Labour Markets and Cultural Diversity 1 Uwe Blien 2, Linda Borrs 3, Jens Südekum 4 and Katja Wolf 5 Introduction 2013, Südekum, Wolf and Blien 2008 and 2014, Brunow and Blien 2014) by looking at

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SICK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION? VOTE ISLAMIC. J. Vernon Henderson Ari Kuncoro

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SICK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION? VOTE ISLAMIC. J. Vernon Henderson Ari Kuncoro NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SICK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION? VOTE ISLAMIC J. Vernon Henderson Ari Kuncoro Working Paper 12110 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12110 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050

More information

UNEMPLOYMENT RISK FACTORS IN ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA 1

UNEMPLOYMENT RISK FACTORS IN ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RISK FACTORS IN ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA 1 This paper investigates the relationship between unemployment and individual characteristics. It uses multivariate regressions to estimate the

More information

THE BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEX SURVEY 2008

THE BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEX SURVEY 2008 THE BUSINESS CLIMATE INDEX SURVEY 2008 Prepared by: The Steadman Group, Riverside Drive, P.O. Box 68230 00200 Nairobi, Tel: 44450190-6, October, 2008 1 Summary of Main Findings 1. Introduction In meeting

More information

EXPORT, MIGRATION, AND COSTS OF MARKET ENTRY EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL EUROPEAN FIRMS

EXPORT, MIGRATION, AND COSTS OF MARKET ENTRY EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL EUROPEAN FIRMS Export, Migration, and Costs of Market Entry: Evidence from Central European Firms 1 The Regional Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL) is a unit in the University of Illinois focusing on the development

More information

Rural-Urban Poverty and Inequality in Thailand

Rural-Urban Poverty and Inequality in Thailand 1 Rural-Urban Poverty and Inequality in Thailand Summary Note 1 The issues of poverty and inequality across regions as well as between urban and rural areas in Thailand are results of imbalanced development.

More information

Crime and Corruption: An International Empirical Study

Crime and Corruption: An International Empirical Study Proceedings 59th ISI World Statistics Congress, 5-3 August 13, Hong Kong (Session CPS111) p.985 Crime and Corruption: An International Empirical Study Huaiyu Zhang University of Dongbei University of Finance

More information

Transparency, Accountability and Citizen s Engagement

Transparency, Accountability and Citizen s Engagement Distr.: General 13 February 2012 Original: English only Committee of Experts on Public Administration Eleventh session New York, 16-20 April 2011 Transparency, Accountability and Citizen s Engagement Conference

More information

Beyond Tariffs and Quotas: Why Don t African Manufacturers Export More? George R.G. Clarke *

Beyond Tariffs and Quotas: Why Don t African Manufacturers Export More? George R.G. Clarke * Beyond Tariffs and Quotas: Why Don t African Manufacturers Export More? George R.G. Clarke * * The data used in this paper are from the Investment Climate Surveys 2002-4 The World Bank Group. Responsibility

More information