IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

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1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE PARKWAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, v. Plaintiff, MICHAEL NOVAK, Defendant. MICHEAL NOVAK, v. Counter-Plaintiff, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE PARKWAY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Counter-Defendant. No. 08 CH Calendar 16 Judge David B. Atkins MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THIS CAUSE COMING ON TO BE HEARD plaintiff/counter-defendant s motion to strike, and defendant/counter-plaintiff s motion for summary judgment, the court having considered the briefs submitted, and the court being fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff/counter-defendant s motion to strike is denied and defendant/counter-plaintiff s summary judgment motion is denied in part and granted in part. Background This case involves a condominium owner who requested numerous documents from his condo association. Michael Novak ( Novak is a resident of State Parkway Condominiums, and a title owner of one of its units. He has allegedly made 39 document requests since 2005 that have either never been produced or were produced past the applicable statutory timeframe. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 1. The Board of Directors of the State Parkway Condominium Association ( the Association is responsible for the administration of the property. The Association

2 contracts with Lieberman Management Services to provide managerial services for the property. This includes the task of maintaining the Association s records and responding to production requests from unit owners like Novak. There is a single property manager responsible for managing the property and responding to production requests. In March 2008, the Association initiated an action against Novak for allegedly harassing the property manager with excessive document requests among other actions. Novak filed a counterclaim in December 2008 and a second amended counterclaim on September 1, The second amended counterclaim contains five counts. Count I seeks injunctive and compensatory relief for failure to produce or late production of the requested documents under the City of Chicago Condominium Ordinance ( Chicago Ordinance. Count II seeks injunctive and compensatory relief under the Illinois Condominium Property Act ( the Act. Count III seeks injunctive and compensatory relief under the State Parkway Condominium Rules ( Association By-Laws. Count IV seeks injunctive and compensatory relief under the Illinois General Not- For-Profit Corporation Act ( Not-For-Profit Act. Count V seeks an order compelling document production and attorney s fees due to a breach of fiduciary duty. On May 9, 2011 the Association voluntarily dismissed its complaint. Novak then filed a motion for summary judgment as to Counts I-IV along with an affidavit and a statement of facts in support of his motion. The Association responded with a motion to strike certain aspects of the motion for summary judgment and facts alleged in the affidavit. In the alternative, the Association filed a response to the motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition to the statement of facts. Novak filed a reply in support of his motion for summary judgment on May 2, 2011, and a response in opposition to the Association s motion to strike on May 9, The matter was fully briefed and taken under advisement for consideration of the issues and to prepare a written order. However, various transfers of this action between various divisions of the circuit court delayed disposition of the motions. The court now rules. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits illustrate no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. William Cheverolet, 326 Ill. App. 3d 642, 648 (2001. When examining a motion for summary judgment and determining whether a question of material fact exists, the court must consider all the evidence before it strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant. Id. (citing Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 751, 753 (1999. Because summary judgment is a drastic means of disposition of litigation it should be allowed only when the resolution of the case depends on a question of law, and the moving party s right to judgment is free from doubt. See Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500 (1998. If the party moving for summary judgment supplies facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle the party to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party cannot rely on pleadings alone to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Fields v. Schaumburg Firefighters' Pension Bd., 383 Ill. App. 3d 209, 224 (1st Dist A court must accept an affidavit as true if it is uncontradicted by counteraffidavits or other evidence. Id. 2

3 Discussion Motion to Strike The Association moved to strike aspects of Novak s motion for summary judgement for three reasons. The Association argued first that Counts II-IV are duplicative of Count I and should be stricken, citing to Neade v. Portes. However, this case is distinguishable because Neade dealt with a motion to dismiss. See Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, (2000. If the Association believed certain counts of the complaint should be stricken as duplicative, the Association should have raised this argument through a motion to dismiss. Presently, this does not serve as a basis for striking the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, Palm v Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass'n indicates that the counts are not duplicative. See 2013 IL , 23. The court in Palm found no conflict between the Chicago Ordinance, the Illinois Condominium Property Act, and the Not-for-Profit Act, and allowed similar claims to continue under each statutory or ordinance scheme. Id. at 23, 42. If there is no conflict when raising like-claims under each statute or ordinance, Novak s like-claims in the alternative do not warrant a motion to strike. Moreover, Novak s claims all seek document production and attorney s fees, but the statute or ordinance he might prevail under dictates the specific number and types of documents he can receive from the Association. The Association next argues that Exhibit A in Novak s affidavit constitutes additional allegations outside the scope of the violations alleged in his second amended counterclaim. Accordingly, the Association argues that affidavit paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40, along with the corresponding exhibit tabs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 16, 18, 19, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39, should be stricken because they were added with the motion for summary judgment as opposed to the second amended counterclaim. However, the Association could not have been unduly surprised by additions to the affidavit of document requests that it produced late or failed to produce at all by the time of Novak s motion for summary judgment. It may be a different story if Novak included pending document requests that were not late yet. However, each request that the Association moves to strike under this argument was allegedly made before Novak initiated the litigation, or is arguably late by the time of the response to the second amended counterclaim. Beyond a technical argument, the Association provides no provable facts to question Novak s entitlement to recover these documents as an equitable matter. Finally the Association argues that affidavit paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26, and the corresponding exhibit tabs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25 should be stricken as moot. The Association argues that because they voluntarily complied with these document requests before Novak brought suit there is no valid enforcement action to compel production or receive attorney s fees. The Chicago Ordinance, states In any action brought to enforce any provision of this chapter the prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees. Chicago Municipal Code (2014. In Count II the Illinois Condominium Property Act has similar provisions for attorney s fees if Novak prevails in an enforcement action to compel examination of records. 765 ILCS 605/19(a (West This language is silent as to whether a suit is legally impossible if the Association voluntarily produced documents, though late, and failed to produce 3

4 others. Novak s counterclaim in whole also includes Count V, in which he seeks attorney s fees for a breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the voluntary production, and Novak s own efforts to retrieve documents from third parties, may make production moot but does not eliminate the consideration of attorney s fees in the case. Moreover, this argument is better addressed when considering the merits of the motion for summary judgment rather than whether to strike the motion. The motion to strike is denied. Motion for Summary Judgment Novak seeks injunctive and compensatory relief primarily under Count I, pursuant to the Chicago Ordinance. The Chicago Ordinance requires the Association to produce financial books and records when requested by unit owners within 30 business days. 1 See Chicago Municipal Code (2014. This is the same response time required by the Illinois Condominium Property Act ( The Act. However, the Ordinance, unlike the Act, does not contain an explicit proper purpose requirement. In cases involving the Chicago Ordinance, courts have maintained the proper purpose requirement of the Act as a statutory gap-filler. See Palm v Lake Shore Drive Condo. Ass'n, 2013 IL , 41 ( the ordinance, by remaining silent, did not supersede the portion of the statute providing a remedy. ; Oviedo v S. Blue Island Condo. Ass'n, 2014 IL App (1st , 33 ( the requirement in both the Condominium Act and the Not For Profit Act that the request be made for a proper purpose is not superseded by the Municipal Code, which is silent on this issue, but rather fills a gap in the ordinance.. Any relief granted on Novak s records requests is more appropriately considered under the Act in Count II. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to Count I is denied. Count II seeks the same relief pursuant to the Act, which grants the Association a 30 business day time period to produce legitimate document requests. See 765 ILCS 605/19(e (West In addition to arguing as to the merits of each request, the Association also argues that many of the requests are moot. The Association s mootness argument is a preliminary matter that the court addresses prior to the merits of the requests. The first set of document requests include documents that the Association claims were voluntarily produced, and Novak s affidavit agrees. Affidavit paragraph 3 and exhibit tab 2 show that Novak requested and received the Baird 2005 year-end investment portfolio statement in 63 days. Affidavit paragraph 4, exhibit tab 3, shows that Novak requested and received the August 2007 Financials prepared by Lieberman Management Services in 77 days. Affidavit paragraph 5, exhibit tab 4, shows that Novak received a copy of the August 2007 Financials prepared by G.O. Parking, in 72 days. Affidavit paragraph 7, exhibit tab 6, shows that invoices related to certain repairs were requested and produced in 94 days. Affidavit paragraph 10, exhibit tab 9, shows that Novak requested supporting budget details for the Proposed 2008 Executive Budget and received those in 43 days. Affidavit paragraph 11, exhibit tab 10, shows that Novak requested September 2007 Financials and received them in 37 days. Affidavit 1 At the time of filing their briefs, the parties provided that the Ordinance has a three business day response requirement, but the Ordinance has been amended to match the 30 day requirement in the Act. See Chicago Municipal Code (amended Jan. 15, The court follows the most recent 30 business day requirement. Moreover, applying the prior three business day requirement to the 29 unique requests that fall under the Ordinance would create an undue burden on the Association. 4

5 paragraph 12, exhibit tab 11, shows Novak requested October 2007 Financials and received them also in 37 days. Affidavit paragraph 13, exhibit tab 12, shows that Novak requested and received details of a Budgeted Capital Expenditure in 39 days. Affidavit paragraph 14, exhibit tab 13, shows that invoices related to certain repairs were requested and produced in 34 days. Affidavit paragraph 17, exhibit tab 16, shows that November 2007 Financials were requested and produced in 35 days. Affidavit paragraph 19, exhibit tab 18, shows that Novak requested and received certain invoices for elevator repairs in 48 days. Affidavit paragraph 20, exhibit tab 19, alleges that Novak requested and received December 2007 Financials in 14 days, which would not be considered late under the Act. Affidavit paragraph 22, exhibit tab 21, shows Novak requested and received the February 2008 Financials in 36 days. Affidavit paragraph 25, exhibit tab 24, shows that Novak requested and received the 2008 Baird Investment Portfolio Statement in 27 days, which would not be considered late under the Act. Since both parties recognize that these documents were produced by the Association, the motion for summary judgment as to the production of these documents is denied. The second set of document requests is comprised of affidavit paragraphs 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 38, and the corresponding exhibit tabs 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, and 37, in which the Association did not assert they were already produced, but Novak admits they were. These requests for production, like the first set of requests, are moot and the motion for summary judgment as to the production of these documents is denied. In a third set of document requests, the Association claims they voluntarily produced the documents before litigation, but Novak asserts they were produced by a third party. In affidavit paragraph 2, exhibit tab 1, Novak alleges that a Life Safety Evaluation Report was never produced. The Association fails to provide facts contesting Novak s claim that he received the Report instead through the City of Chicago s Department of Buildings. (Aff. of Novak 2. The Association provides no evidence of its production or a counteraffidavit that would create a genuine issue of material fact. See Fields v. Schaumburg Firefighters' Pension Bd., 383 Ill. App. 3d 209, 224 (1st Dist An order compelling production of this requested document, however, would be unnecessary because Novak admits to already possessing it. Thus these document requests are also moot. In a fourth set of document requests, the Association claims they voluntarily produced the documents while Novak asserts they were only partially produced. Affidavit paragraphs 21, 23, and 26, and exhibit tabs 20, 22, and 25 allege that Novak requested the names, addresses, and ownership percentages of all unit owners, but the Association denied his request. The Association eventually produced names and addresses, but not ownership percentages. (Aff. of Novak 26. Affidavit paragraph 24, exhibit tab 23, alleges that the Association produced part of a 2007 Annual Financial Statement, but not the Supplementary Information Section. The requests for remaining portions of these documents are not moot, and the Association has failed to address whether they produced the documents in full beyond simply pleading that they have. Additionally, in a fifth set of document requests the Association makes no claim that they voluntarily produced the records, but Novak alleges they were only partially produced. Affidavit paragraph 40, exhibit tab 39, alleges that a request for the Association s December

6 Financials was only partially produced as to the statements on their Operating Fund, but not the Replacement Fund. This request, like the fourth set of requests, is not moot. Finally, there is a sixth set of document requests that Novak claims the Association never produced. The Association does not explicitly deny this. The documents referenced in Novak s affidavit paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 27, 28, 31, 35, 36, and 39, and their exhibit tabs 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 17, 26, 27, 30, 34, 35, and 38, remain allegedly unproduced in whole and the requests are not moot. The fact that Novak received the documents in the first, second, and third sets of requests eliminates any need for the Association to re-produce them. The motion for summary judgment as to these requests is denied. Now that moot document requests have been identified, the court will continue to the merits of the fifteen unique document requests referenced in the fourth, fifth, and sixth set of requests. These include the documents referenced in affidavit paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 21 in part, 24 in part, 27, 28, 31, 35, 36, 39 and 40 in part, and their corresponding exhibit tabs. Novak s entitlement to the documents he requests depends on Section 19 of the Act. In pertinent part it states: (e Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g of this Section, any member of an association shall have the right to inspect, examine, and make copies of the records described in subdivisions (6, (7, (8, and (9 of subsection (a of this Section, in person or by agent, at any reasonable time or times but only for a proper purpose, at the association s principal office. In order to exercise this right, a member must submit a written request, to the association s board of managers or its authorized agent, stating with particularity the records sought to be examined and a proper purpose for the request. 765 ILCS 605/19 (West Thus whether Novak can prevail on the motion for summary judgment as to these document requests turns on: (1 if Novak is a member of the Association entitled to the records and (2 if Novak states a proper purpose for his requests. The Association argues that Novak is not a voting member under the language of the Not-For-Profit Act, and therefore is not entitled to make these requests. However, the Association does not provide the same argument for a lack of entitlement or proper purpose under the Illinois Condominium Property Act. Moreover, the text of the Act and several cases interpreting it entitle unit owners to production, bypassing the nuanced voting member language used in the Not-For-Profit Act. See Taghert v. Wesley, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1146 (2003 ( Section 19 is clear as to plaintiff s [unit owner s] right to an examination of the books and records of the association ; Oviedo v S. Blue Island Condo. Ass'n, 2014 IL App (1st , 34 ( a proper purpose has been established where a unit owner asserts a good-faith fear of mismanagement.... Novak is undisputedly a unit owner, as admitted by the Association (Opp n to Statement of Facts 3, and is therefore a member of the Association entitled to make certain requests for documents under the Act. 6

7 The remaining question is whether Novak has a proper purpose for his requests. Where a unit owner alleges a good faith fear of financial mismanagement by a condo association, a proper purpose is met. See Oviedo v S. Blue Island Condo Association, 2014 IL App (1st , 34. Additionally, proper purpose is shown when a unit owner has an honest motive and is acting in good faith, as opposed to requesting documents for vexatious or speculative reasons. Id. In affidavit paragraph 6 and exhibit tab 5, Novak alleges that he submitted a written request for reimbursement denial letters from the City of Chicago on September 10, The letters would allegedly corroborate why a $12,461 scavenger rebate write-off was denied for 2004 and 2005, as stated in the Notes of the Financial Statements in 2006, and allow Novak to learn when the Association knew about the denial. (Aff. of Novak 6. Novak voiced a concern that the write-offs would be expected to occur in 2004 and 2005 as opposed to 2006, and this is a proper purpose. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 5. Three days later, on September 13, 2007, Novak allegedly sought the Association s cable television bills from December 2005 to January (Aff. of Novak 8. Affidavit paragraph 8 and exhibit tab 7 shows that Novak sought these bills with the purpose of determining if either the auditor did not recognize enough cable television revenue, or the Novak s paid too much relative to other owners. Novak states in his written request that from February to December 2006 he paid $21.76 per month for bulk cable, but paid slightly lower in January. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 7. Then Novak derives that with a revenue of $34,989 from cable television, versus $41,785 budgeted, it amounts to $18.22 per resident per month. (Id. However, there are several factors that may explain the discrepancy, such as a change in the number of residents, previous over or underpayments, or a change in the cost of cable overtime. Novak s request amounts more to speculation that he might be paying more, than a good faith fear of mismanagement. There is no proper purpose for this request. Also on September 13, 2007, Novak submitted a written request for a breakdown of the 2006 year end Accounts Payable balance by vendor or expense account. (Aff. of Novak 9. Affidavit paragraph 9 and exhibit tab 8 reveal that Novak thought the value of the balance, $85,014, seemed unusually high after a cursory review. His stated purpose for the request was to find out if bills were paid on time and to confirm whether it included bills for the Exterior Façade Inspection and Minor Repairs that were paid in the summer of (Aff. of Novak Ex. 8. Whether or not the Association is paying bills on time is a proper purpose to request these documents under the Act. As stated in affidavit paragraph 15 and exhibit tab 14, on November 9, 2007, Novak allegedly requested to examine invoices related to $6,382 of Professional Services that were reclassified in August He alleged that the purpose of his request was to obtain an accounting of inspection and repair Phase 1 and 2 projects, and determine more about why this value was reclassified. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 14. Reclassification speaks to the financial management of the projects and this is a proper purpose under the Act. 7

8 Also on November 9, 2007, Novak submitted a written request for invoices related to $24,875 of Prior Period Activities. (Aff. of Novak 16. Affidavit paragraph 16 and exhibit tab 15 do not provide a purpose for the request, though a later letter referencing multiple requests states that the purpose was to see how certain major expenditures were accounted. Novak acknowledges that he has the October 2007 financial statements and already can account for the $22,000 for Façade Expenses included in the Prior Period Activities. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 15. There is not a sufficient purpose provided for the prior period activities request, and Novak has not demonstrated a genuine concern that the Association is engaged in financial mismanagement of the remaining $2,875 unaccounted for in prior period activities. Novak alleges in affidavit paragraph 18, exhibit tab 17, that on December 18, 2007, he requested to inspect the Association s books for the current fiscal year because the Association had yet to produce other documents related to specific projects. Although Novak has an entitlement to inspect the books and records of account under the Act, his request was not stated with particularity. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 17. The proper purpose requirement cannot be met by parroting the language in the Act, and it must be tied to some legitimate fear of financial mismanagement. A blanket request to inspect all books for the current fiscal year is overly burdensome on the Association. This is clear in light of the fact that Novak was still waiting for outstanding requests that encompass all or part of the books and records of account that he is concerned for in this same fiscal year. On February 29, 2008, Novak first requested the names, addresses, and ownership percentages of all owners. (Aff. of Novak 21. In affidavit paragraph 21, exhibit tab 20, Novak states that the purpose was to be able to continue communicating with unit owners about his legal activities with the Association, and urge other voting members to replace the current board. The Association produced the names and addresses, but not the weighted vote of all members. (Aff. of Novak 26. The ownership percentages are not necessary to communicate with other unit owners, or to replace the current board. Additionally, knowing ownership percentages of other unit owners does not relate to Novak s fear of financial mismanagement by the Association. Novak has not demonstrated a proper purpose for this request. In affidavit paragraph 24, exhibit tab 23, Novak alleges that he sought the 2007 Annual Financial Statements on April 4, Allegedly, the Association produced only part of the document and omitted the Supplementary Information Section. (Aff. of Novak 24. Novak seeks this supplemental information on the basis of the Association By-Laws and not the Act. As a result, he does not provide a written proper purpose and cannot compel production under Count II. On September 26, 2008, as shown in affidavit paragraph 27, exhibit tab 26, Novak requested the 2009 Proposed Budget Details, including budgets for each of the Association s Income and Expense Accounts. The Association denied this request as over-inclusive on the basis of Section 18(a(6 of the Act, which states that each unit owner shall receive a copy of the proposed annual budget together with an indication of which portions are intended for reserves, capital expenditures or repairs or payment of real estate taxes. 765 ILCS 605/18(a(6 (West Importantly, Novak s purpose for his request was that the format of the 2009 Proposed Budget Summary did not comply with the Association By-Laws. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 8

9 26. This does not relate to a good faith fear that the Proposed Budget is mismanaged, and is a purely vexatious request. Novak does not provide a proper purpose. In affidavit paragraph 28 and exhibit tab 27, Novak alleges that on June 1, 2009 he requested to examine the Association s detailed records in chronological order of receipts and expenditures for the last 17 to 29 months ending in May 31, Novak s stated purpose was to receive a complete accounting of income and expenses in time for two upcoming votes by unit owners, given that the Association had not distributed the 2008 Financial Statements for March and May. (Aff. of Novak Ex. 27. Novak s purpose is not related to his fear of mismanagement, but instead because he had yet to receive other financial documents. If the purpose is to replace information provided by the 2008 financial statements for March and May, then this request is clearly excessive and vexatious. The stated purpose is inconsistent with an onerous request for detailed chronological records for the past 17 to 29 months. There is no proper purpose for this request. According to affidavit paragraph 31 and exhibit tab 30, on June 30, 2009, Novak requested to inspect the minutes of all meetings of the Association and its board for the past 7 years. The Act does not require a proper purpose for minutes of all meetings of the association and its board of managers for the immediately preceding 7 years. 765 ILCA 605/19(a(4. The Association has an explicit obligation to maintain these minutes and Novak is entitled to inspect them under the Act. On September 2, 2009, Novak requested to inspect books and records of account for the Association s current fiscal year. (Aff. of Novak 35. Affidavit paragraph 35 and exhibit tab 34 shows Novak s stated purpose was to receive a timely accounting of the Association s income, expenses, and financial position. Not only does Novak fail to connect this purpose to some sort of financial mismanagement, but the request is not stated with sufficient particularity and merely parrots the language in the Act. On September 22, 2009 Novak requested to inspect ballots and proxies related to ballots for all matters voted on by members during the previous 12 months. (Aff. of Novak 36. Affidavit paragraph 36 and exhibit tab 35 shows that Novak s purpose was to identify how many unit owners were present at two specific meetings, as well as special meetings, to compare attendance. This is more of a speculative and vexatious request than an attempt to uncover financial mismanagement. Depending on how often the members voted during the past 12 months, and the relevance to any financial matter voted on, ballots for the entire previous year would be a disproportionate request for the specific limited purpose that Novak stated. On April 2, 2010, Novak requested to inspect the Association s books and records of account again for the preceding year. According to affidavit paragraph 39 and exhibit tab 38, the purpose was because the Association failed to produce the 2009 Annual Financial Statement to unit owners according to the Association By-Laws Section (Aff. of Novak Ex. 38. This request lacks particularity, parrots the language in the Act, and is overly burdensome. If the purpose for the inspection is because the 2009 Annual Financial Statement was not provided to unit owners under the Association By-Laws Section 6.05, this does not relate to any stated fear of financial mismanagement. 9

10 On January 3, 2011 Novak requested December 2010 Financial Statements. (Aff. of Novak 40. Affidavit paragraph 40 alleges that the Association produced the Operating Fund but not the Replacement Fund documents. The corresponding exhibit tab 39 shows that Novak requested a statement of financial position as of December 31, 2010, an income statement for 2010, a statement of retained earnings as of December 31, 2010, a statement of cash flows for 2010, and all supporting budget documents used to prepare the 2011 Budget. This request completely lacks any written proper purpose. In sum, Novak is entitled to, and provided a proper purpose for, four unique document requests. The motion for summary judgment is granted as to these requests. First, the Association must maintain and produce the letters from the City of Chicago explaining why the Association s reimbursement was denied, as requested in affidavit paragraph 6 and exhibit tab 5. Second, the Association must produce a breakdown of the 2006 year end Accounts Payable balance by vendor or expense account, as requested in affidavit paragraph 9 and exhibit tab 8. Third, the Association must produce invoices related to $6,382 of Professional Services that were reclassified in August 2007, as requested in affidavit paragraph 15 and exhibit tab 14. Finally, the Association must produce for inspection the minutes of all meetings of the Association and its board for the past 7 years, as requested in affidavit paragraph 31 and exhibit tab 30. All otherwise non-moot document requests under Count II are denied. Novak alternatively seeks the same production of documents and attorney s fees in Count III under the Association By-Laws. However, this does not change the conclusions under the Act in Count II. The Association By-Laws do not independently provide a time frame for compelling production or a means for awarding attorney s fees. One request from Count II remains relevant here. In affidavit paragraph 24, exhibit tab 23, Novak sought the 2007 Annual Financial Statements and Supplementary Information Section on April 4, Novak s written request mentions the Association By-Laws but does not provide a proper purpose. As discussed in terms of Count I, courts maintain the proper purpose requirement as a statutory gap-filler in cases involving the Act and a different basis for production with a less onerous standard. See Palm, 2013 IL , 41 ( the ordinance, by remaining silent, did not supersede the portion of the statute providing a remedy. ; Oviedo, 2014 IL App (1st , 32, 33 (finding the lack of a proper purpose requirement in the Chicago Ordinance did not omit that requirement under the Act. There is no reason that the proper purpose requirement should not be applied to the Association By-Laws here, which like the Chicago Ordinance in other cases, do not explicitly discuss a proper purpose requirement. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to Count III is denied. As his final alternative, Novak seeks production through Count IV under the Not-For- Profit Act. The Not-For-Profit Act holds Novak to the same burden of exhibiting a proper purpose as the Illinois Condominium Property Act does. See 805 ILCS 105/ ( Any voting member shall have the right to examine but only for a proper purpose.. Novak s recovery would be the same as in Count II based on the proper purposes he submitted. The Not- For-Profit Act also contains slightly different language than the Act, requiring Novak to be a voting member in order to be entitled to documents, as opposed to simply a unit owner. Id. Whether Novak is a voting member is an open question, the answer to which would not entitle 10

11 Novak to any greater relief under the Not-For-Profit Act than he already received under the Illinois Condominium Property Act. Thus the document requests under Count IV are denied as relief is available under Count II. WHEREFORE, plaintiff/counter-defendant the Association s motion to strike is DENIED, defendant/counter-plaintiff Novak s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in part as to Counts I, III, and IV. The Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part as to Count II, for requests made in affidavit paragraphs 6, 9, 15, and 31, and their corresponding exhibit tabs 5, 8, 14, and 30, and DENIED in part as to all other documents requested. ENTERED: Judge David B. Atkins The Court. 11