No.: APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS DALLAS COOK. Plaintiff-Appellant. vs.

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1 No.: APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS DALLAS COOK Plaintiff-Appellant vs. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Sitting As the State Officers Electoral Board and Its Members, WILLIAM CADIGAN, ANDY CARRUTHERS, BETTY J. COFFRIN, ERNEST L. GOWEN, JOHN KEITH, WILLIAM M. MCGUFFAGE, CHARLES W. SCHOLZ, CASANDRA B. WATSON In Their Official Capacities As Members of the Illinois State Board of Elections; and ROBERT B. HAIDA, JOHN BARICEVIC and ROBERT LECHIEN, Candidates for Circuit Court Judge in the 20 th Judicial Circuit Defendants-Appellees Appeal from the Appellate Court, Fourth District, No Appeal from the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois Case Nos.: 2016MR000042, 2016MR and 2016MR Honorable Estaban F. Sanchez, Judge Presiding PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL Aaron G. Weishaar Reinert Weishaar & Associates, P.C. 812 North Collins Laclede s Landing St. Louis, MO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED No /01/2016 I2F SUBMITTED AWEISHAAR - 09/01/ :44:49 PM DOCUMENT ACCEPTED ON: 09/02/ :39:23 AM

2 No.: APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS DALLAS COOK Plaintiff-Appellant vs. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Sitting As the State Officers Electoral Board and Its Members, WILLIAM CADIGAN, ANDY CARRUTHERS, BETTY J. COFFRIN, ERNEST L. GOWEN, JOHN KEITH, WILLIAM M. MCGUFFAGE, CHARLES W. SCHOLZ, CASANDRA B. WATSON In Their Official Capacities As Members of the Illinois State Board of Elections; and ROBERT B. HAIDA, JOHN BARICEVIC and ROBERT LECHIEN, Candidates for Circuit Court Judge in the 20 th Judicial Circuit Defendants-Appellees Appeal from the Appellate Court, Fourth District, No Appeal from the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois Case Nos.: 2016MR000042, 2016MR and 2016MR Honorable Estaban F. Sanchez, Judge Presiding PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL PRAYER FOR APPEAL OR FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL COMES NOW the Petitioner, DALLAS COOK, and hereby respectfully petitions this Court to appeal as a matter of right pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 317 or in the alternative, for leave to appeal as a matter of discretion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) from the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth Judicial District. 1

3 JUDGMENT BELOW On July 28, 2016, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the Sangamon County Circuit Court s judgment of February 23, 2016, and confirmed the decision of the State Officers Electoral Board (the Board ), allowing the Honorable Robert B. Haida ( Haida ), the Honorable John Baricevic ( Baricevic ), and the Honorable Robert LeChien ( LeChien ) all to remain on the ballot as candidates for election to the Office of Circuit Court Judge in the 20 th Circuit. Petitioner has not filed a Petition for Rehearing. POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVIEW This Court should allow this matter to proceed as of right or grant Petitioner leave to appeal in this matter so as to consider whether the Fourth District Appellate Court, properly affirmed the Sangamon County Circuit Court s decision to confirm the decision of the Board for the following reasons: 1. Underlying the determination of this matter is the interpretation of Article VI, Section 12(d) of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, This is the first case in Illinois to specifically address the particular issue of whether the Illinois Constitution permits a sitting judge, who has been elected, the option to forego seeking retention under Article VI 12(d) in favor of seeking nomination and election under Article VI, 12(a) as if running in an election for the first time. As a matter involving a question of constitutional interpretation, an appeal lies to this Court as a matter of right. 2. In the alternative, granting leave to appeal under Rule 315(a) is warranted in this matter as it is a case that raises a question of general importance for all people of the State of Illinois. This case concerns the future of judicial elections, and obviously, 2

4 questions of election law are inherently matters of public concern. It also deals with the interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, the fundamental blueprint for the legal and political organization of the state. As such, the decision of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, impacts not just the Petitioner in this case, but has consequences for all who are governed by the Illinois State Constitution. Finally, when dealing with a state s constitution, as in this case, it is imperative that there be clear authority as to its meaning, especially when confidence in the electoral process, judicial impartiality, and the rights of the electorate are at stake. Therefore, Petitioner seeks the authority of this Court to resolve the disparate interpretations of the Article VI, Section 12. STATEMENT OF FACTS On December 7, 2015, Petitioner filed Objections with the Board objecting to the Nomination Papers of Haida, Baricevic and LeChien, challenging these judges as candidates for nomination to the Office of Circuit Court Judge in the 20 th Judicial Circuit. All three of these candidates are currently sitting judges having been elected to the 20 th Judicial Circuit. Rather than seeking retention of their current offices, each of these judges submitted letters of resignation to Chief Justice Rita Garman in August 2015, announcing their resignations effective the end of their current term in December After submitting their letters of resignation, Haida, Baricevic and LeChien then proceeded to file their Nomination Papers seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for seats on the bench in the very same court in which they currently hold office. While their letters of resignation each stated that I intend to seek election to my own seat as a Circuit Judge rather than seeking retention, the Nomination Papers filed by Haida and Baricevic claimed to be seeking each other s vacancies while the Nomination Papers 3

5 of LeChien claim that he is running for his own vacancy. The Board appointed a Hearing Examiner to prepare a recommendation on Objector s objections for the Board s consideration. On Wednesday, January 20, 2016, the Board, sitting as the duly constituted State Officers Electoral Board, convened for the purpose of hearing and passing on the objections. At the hearing, a motion was made to accept the Hearing Examiner s Recommendation that the Illinois Constitution allows these sitting judges the option of seeking election instead of seeking retention. The Board split four to four on whether to accept the Hearing Officer s Recommendation, and in failing to achieve the majority vote necessary for any action of the Board to become effective, no affirmative action was taken on the Nomination Papers of Haida, Baricevic and LeChien. The effect of the Board s deadlock vote was that the Nomination Papers of the three judges were allowed to stand. Following the deadlock vote of the Board, Objector filed Petitions for Judicial Review of his Objections to the Nomination Papers of Haida, Baricevic and LeChien with the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois, naming as respondents the three judges, the Board, and the Board s individual members: Andy Carruthers, Casandra B. Watson, Ernest Gowen, Betty Coffrin, Charles W. Scholz, John Keith, William Cadigan, and William McGuffage. Objector s Petitions for Judicial Review were consolidated and oral argument was heard on February 19, On February 23, 2016, the Honorable Estaban F. Sanchez denied Objector s Petition and affirmed the January 20, 2016 decision of the Board. (See Order of the Circuit Court, App. A12). In so denying the Petition, Judge Sanchez refused to strike the names of Haida, Baricevic, and LeChien from the Official Ballot for the 20 th Judicial 4

6 Circuit for the vacancy of Circuit Judge in the 20 th Judicial Circuit for the State of Illinois. Each of them ran unopposed on the Democratic Party ticket in the primary election on March 15, Petitioner filed timely notices of appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District. On July 28, 2016, the appellate court delivered its judgment with opinion, affirming the Sangamon County circuit court s judgment and confirming the Board s decision that allowed the three judges to remain on the ballot for the upcoming general election in November. (See the Judgment with Opinion of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, App. A1) ARGUMENT 1. The Illinois Supreme Court should review this matter as of right under Supreme Court Rule 317 as it involves a question of constitutional interpretation. The essence of the question that was before the Fourth District Appellate Court was one of constitutional interpretation. Precisely, the issue was whether the Illinois Constitution permits a sitting judge, who has been elected, the option to forego seeking retention under Article VI, Section 12(d) in favor of seeking nomination through the primary and general elections under Article VI, 12(a). In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court found that the Article VI, Section 12, of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois contains no limitations preventing an elected judge from running for his or her own vacated judicial office instead of retention. The limitation, however, is spelled out by the whole of Article VI, Section 12. When all the provisions of this section are read together, it is clear that the Illinois Constitution provides a comprehensive mandate on the two ways someone may find himself on the bench in Illinois: elected or appointed. If a person who has been elected 5

7 to the office of Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge wishes to continue in that office and succeed himself, the Constitution provides the exact steps that need to be taken steps that Haida, Baricevic and LeChien have attempted to circumvent. Nothing in the Illinois Constitution, and more specifically in Article VI, Section 12, describes a process by which sitting judges have the right to choose at the end of their term if they want to run for election in a partisan race, or run on their own record, when they want to stay in office for another term. Furthermore, nothing in the Illinois Constitution describe a process by which an elected judge can succeed himself by re-election. Even the title of this section belies the position that there is a choice to be made. It is entitled Election and Retention, not Election or Retention. Retention also holds incumbent judges to a higher threshold for retaining their seat, requiring 60% of the electorate to approve of a judge s retention, instead of needing to have a simple majority (50% plus one vote) as required in a general election. Permitting Haida, Baricevic and LeChien to run for re-election and to decide for themselves what percentage of the electorate they think need to stay on the bench, calls into question the independence of the judiciary and diminishes the strength of those voters who think the judge s records is not worthy of retention. The Court of Appeal s decision lacks the proper context of and ignores the whole of the other key provisions of Section 12 of the Judicial Article. More specifically, the Court of Appeals completely failed to address Section 12(c) when read in conjunction with Section 12(d). If an appointment is made by the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12(c) to fill a vacancy of the Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Court, it would be true to say that the appointed judge was not elected. It therefore follows that the 6

8 appointed judge, if he/she so desired, could run in the next general election or judicial election to fill permanently the vacancy, having not been previously elected. Conversely, the appointed judge could not run for retention, because he/she was not elected. Section 12(c) sets out the only time when a sitting judge may actually occupy the judicial seat, performing all the duties of a judge, and also run in a contested, partisan election for that same seat. That time, as mandated by Section 12(c), is only when the judge has been appointed to fill a vacancy. As Baricevic, Haida and LeChien were not appointed to fill a vacancy on the bench, but had been elected, they are ineligible to run for another election for the same circuit court seats. As such, Petitioner respectfully submits that the lower court has gotten it wrong. In addition, and contrary to statements in the opinion of the court, under Petitioner s interpretation, elected judges are able to run for other judicial vacancies, because Section 12(d) mandates the retention process for those who have been elected to that office and seek to succeed themselves. In addition to the above, the lower court missed the mark by its treatment of the word may as used in Section 12(d). May indicates something permissive rather than mandatory. See In re Marriage of Freeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 298, 478 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1985). Clearly, sitting judges are permitted to run for retention and submit their names for candidacy to succeed themselves. As Petitioner has repeatedly stated, may as used in Section 12(d) is not mandatory in the sense that a sitting judge just must run for retention and for good reason. For example, it is entirely possible that a sitting judge simply wants to retire at the end of his or her term. However, may as used in Section 12(d) is mandatory to the extent that a sitting judge who has been elected is desirous of staying on the bench for another term. Retention is therefore mandatory when a sitting 7

9 judge who has been elected has the intention to succeed himself stay in office which is precisely what Haida, Baricevic and LeChien want, they want to stay in office. Nothing in Section 12(d) gives a sitting judge a choice of running for retention or in the alternative the choice of running for re-election. Unless retention is found to be the only method permitted by the Illinois Constitution for sitting judges who have been elected to stay in office for another term, the possibility and probability of sitting judges who could potentially abuse the Illinois Constitution and game the system is immense. Not only as set above can judges then decide how much of the electorate they need to vote for them (either 60%, when running for retention or 50% plus one vote, when running for re-election) but they could also abuse and misuse the election process in other ways. The current terms of Haida, Baricevic and LeChien end in December Since pursuant to 10 ILCS 5/2A-9 a sitting judge who intends to resign at the end of his term must do so no later than 92 days before his term ends, and if hypothetically Haida, Baricevic and LeChien had not submitted resignations letters to Chief Judge Garman, and if it is the intent of the Illinois Constitution to give sitting judges (who have been elected) a choice of running for retention or in the alternative to run for re-election, would Haida, Baricevic and LeChien have been precluded from filing nomination papers in the fall of 2015 so as to run in the March 2016 primary? Doubtful. Under that scenario, depending upon the outcome of the primary election (or even prior to the primary election if he so decided), a sitting judge who submitted his name as a candidate for re-election would still have the option of running for retention provided he timely filed a Declaration of Judicial Candidacy to succeed himself in the office of the Illinois Secretary of State (not less than 8

10 six months before the general election preceding the expiration of his term in office). Allowing this procedure to stand would also allow any sitting judge to quietly circulate petitions for nomination without any announcement of any kind, and then on the very last day possible resign from his office (effective the last day of his judicial term) and at the same time file his own nomination papers with the board of elections. Meanwhile there is no time for any opposition to circulate petitions. Under the above scenarios, sitting judges could conceivable control the entire election process. Such options and choices could not have been the intent of the framers at the Constitutional Conventions. The historical notes from 1962 tell us Judges who are incumbents on January 1, 1963 and thereafter would run against their record, without party designation rather than against an adversary candidate in the appropriate general election S.H.A. Const. Article VI. There is no choice laid out in the Illinois Constitution giving incumbents an option. Besides, no other elected official is given a choice of running for retention or re-election. This is clearly a matter involving a constitutional question, and Rule 317 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules provides for an appeal as of right when a constitutional question is raised. See e.g. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Cox v. Miller, 586 N.E.2d 1251, 146 Ill.2d 399, 166 Ill.Dec. 922 (Ill. 1992). 2. The Supreme Court s review of this matter under Supreme Court Rule 315(a) is warranted as it is a case that raises a question of general importance for all people of the State of Illinois, and it requires the authority of this Court to provide a clear interpretation of the Illinois Constitution. This is a matter involving elections, and this Court has stated that questions of election law are inherently a matter of public concern. Jackson v. Bd. of Education Comm rs of Chicago, 975 N.E.2d 583, 363 Ill. Dec. 557 (Ill. 2012); Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL (Ill. 2014). Underscoring this case as a matter of general importance, 9

11 and therefore, worthy of this Court s review, is the fact that it centers on the interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, the fundamental blueprint for the legal and political organization of the State of Illinois. As the submissions set out above illustrate, the decision of the lower court and its interpretation of the Illinois Constitution will have consequences that reach far beyond the individual Petitioner and impact all the people of Illinois. When dealing with a state s constitution, it is desirable that there be clear and consistent authority as to its meaning, especially when confidence in the electoral process, judicial impartiality, and the rights of the electorate are at stake. In a deciding the mootness of a case involving a question of eligibility for nomination under election law after both the primary and general elections had past, this Court expressly considered the need for certainty in election matters, stating, [A] definitive ruling by this court will unquestionably aid election officials and lower courts in deciding such disputes promptly, avoiding the uncertainty in the electoral process which inevitably results when threshold eligibility questions cannot be fully resolved before voters begin casting their ballots. Goodman v. Ward, 948 N.E.2d 580, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 350 Ill. Dec. 300 (2011). Contrary to the lower court s opinion, the Illinois Constitution does not give Haida, Baricevic and LeChien the right to choose between running in a contested election or seeking retention based upon their records. They have been elected judges and as such, must now follow the process for seeking retention if they want to remain in office. To allow this decision to stand undermines the electoral process and erodes the confidence in the impartiality of our judiciary. These judges attempt to evade the retention process set out in the Illinois 10

12 Constitution is evident by their letters of resignation. Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution 1970, Article VI, Section 12(b): The office of a Judge shall be vacant upon his death, resignation, retirement, removal, or upon the conclusion of his term without retention in office. Emphasis added. This Court certified the office of the Honorable C. John Baricevic, the Honorable Robert Haida and the Honorable Robert P. LeChien each as being a vacancy (presumably created by their letters of resignation), yet by making their resignations effective at the end of their term, they continue to sit on the bench while campaigning for the same office instead of devoting full times to their judicial duties. The effect of Haida, Baricevic and LeChien deciding to resign and to seek nomination to run for their own self-created vacancies in the 20 th Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois is striking for a number of reasons. In particular, when a judge, in accordance with Article VI, Section 12(d), seeks retention by separate ballot (without party designation), he/she is required to obtain affirmation of 60% of the electorate to remain in office. With this increased percentage for retention, the framers empowered the electorate with the power to cast out a judge whose performance was not good enough or in whom the electorate lost confidence. Being able to retain or not retain a judge in this manner is a constitutional guarantee to the electorate, a right that has been plainly violated and taken away by the actions of these three judges in their attempt to remain in office through a general election where only a simple majority is required to win. The actions of these judges is most problematic because circumventing this constitutional guarantee to the electorate seems to be precisely why these judges have resigned and re-entered the political quagmire of St. Clair County. Presumably, they saw 11

13 the writing on the wall and came to the conclusion that it would be much more difficult for them to stay in office if they needed 60% of the electorate to vote in their favor, as opposed to the simple majority of 50% plus one vote required for re-election, the easier avenue which they chose. Clearly, by the plain language of Article VI, Section 12(d), the electorate has been given the right under the Illinois Constitution to decide in an impartial, non-partisan way whether a judge is qualified to remain on the bench after serving an elected term in office. Allowing these judges, rather than the people, to choose what percentage of the electorate is needed eviscerates this constitutional guarantee to the electorate and disenfranchises the voters in the 20 th Judicial District who are entitled under the Illinois Constitution to approve or disapprove the performances of these judges. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court grant this petition to appeal as a matter of right or, alternatively, grant leave to appeal as a matter of discretion the Order of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, dated July 28, Respectfully submitted, REINERT, WEISHAAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. By: /s/aaron G. Weishaar Aaron G. Weishaar, # North Collins, Laclede s Landing St. Louis, MO (314) Telephone (314) Facsimile aweishaar@rwalawfirm.com Attorneys for Petitioner Dallas B. Cook 12

14 Certificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this Petition conforms to the requirements of Rules 341(a) and (b). The length of this Petition, excluding the pages containing the Rule 341(d) cover, the Rule 341(c) certificate of compliance, the certificate of service, and those matters to be appended to the brief under Rule 342(a) is 12 pages. /s/aaron G. Weishaar 13

15 Certificate of Mailing The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via and one copy via regular mail, postage prepaid this 1st day of September, 2016 to: Michael J. Kasper 222 N LaSalle Street, Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois Mjkasper60@mac.com Richard S. Huszagh Assistant Attorney General Office of the Illinois Attorney General 100 West Randolph Street 12 th Floor Chicago, IL rhuszagh@atg.state.il.us CivilAppeal@atg.state.il.us /s/aaron G. Weishaar 14

16 APPENDIX No /01/ I2F SUBMITTED AWEISHAAR - 09/01/ :44:49 PM DOCUMENT ACCEPTED ON: 09/02/ :39:23 AM

17 TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX July 28, 2016 Opinion...A1 February 23, 2016 Order...A12 Article VI, 12(a)...A 26 16

18 2016 IL App (4th) NOS , , cons. FILED July 28, 2016 Carla Bender 4 th District Appellate Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT DALLAS B. COOK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Sitting As the State Officers Electoral Board, and Its Members, WILLIAM CADIGAN, ANDY CARRUTHERS, BETTY J. COFFRIN, ERNEST L. GOWEN, JOHN KEITH, WILLIAM M. McGUFFAGE, CHARLES W. SCHOLZ, CASANDRA B. WATSON, In Their Official Capacities As Members of the Illinois State Board of Elections; and ROBERT B. HAIDA, JOHN BARICEVIC, and ROBERT LeCHIEN, Candidates for Circuit Court Judge in the 20th Judicial Circuit, Respondents-Appellees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from Circuit Court of Sangamon County Nos. 16MR42 16MR43 16MR44 Honorable Esteban F. Sanchez, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Harris and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION 1 In December 2015, petitioner, Dallas B. Cook, filed with the Illinois State Board of Elections, sitting as the State Officers Electoral Board (Board), objections to the nomination papers of respondents, Robert B. Haida, John Baricevic, and Robert LeChien (hereinafter, "the three judges"), all of whom are candidates for circuit court judge in the 20th Judicial Circuit. After a tie vote, the Board took no action on petitioner's objections. Pursuant to section (a) of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/ (a) (West 2014)), petitioner filed petitions for judicial review of the Board's decision. After a February 2016 hearing, the Sangamon County circuit court denied petitioner's petitions and affirmed the Board's decision. A 1

19 2 Petitioner appeals, asserting article VI, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (1970 Constitution) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 12) does not provide a sitting judge the option of seeking reelection. We affirm the circuit court's judgment and confirm the Board's decision. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 The three judges are all current circuit court judges in the Illinois 20th Judicial Circuit. In August 2015, the three judges sent letters to Illinois Supreme Court Chief Justice Rita Garman, announcing their resignation from their current judicial office and stating their intent to seek election to their own judicial office, rather than seek retention. The effective date of their resignations is December 4, 2016, which is the last day of their respective terms. Justice Garman accepted the three judges' resignations and certified the vacancies. On November 23, 2015, the three judges each filed nominating papers, seeking to be a candidate for one of the three circuit judge vacancies in the 20th Judicial Circuit. Judge Haida's papers stated he sought to fill the vacancy created by Judge Baricevic's resignation, and Judge Baricevic sought to fill the vacancy created by Judge Haida's resignation. Judge LeChien sought to fill his own vacancy. 5 On December 7, 2015, petitioner filed with the Board his objection to the three judges' nominating papers, essentially asserting the three judges were required to seek retention and could not seek reelection. By agreement, the three cases were consolidated before the Board's hearing examiner. The parties submitted briefs in support of their respective positions. On January 4, 2016, the hearing examiner conducted a hearing, at which the parties' attorneys presented arguments. On January 15, 2016, the hearing examiner filed his recommendation. He recommended the Board overrule petitioner's objections. The hearing examiner found that, when given their plain and ordinary meaning and read together, article VI, sections 11, 12(a), and A 2

20 12(d) of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 11, 12(a), 12(d)) give elected judges the option of seeking retention pursuant to section 12(d) or running in an election in accordance with the process set forth in section 12(a). The Board's general counsel concurred with the hearing examiner's recommendation. 6 On January 20, 2016, the Board held a hearing on the three consolidated cases. After hearing the parties' arguments, the eight-member Board voted on whether to concur with the hearing examiner's recommendation. The vote was a four-to-four tie. Under section 1A-7 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1A-7 (West 2014)), "5 votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective." Thus, in each of the three cases, the Board entered a written decision, which stated no action was taken disposing of petitioner's objection. 7 On January 25, 2016, petitioner filed petitions for judicial review of the Board's decision as to each of the three judges (Haida No. 16-MR-42, Baricevic No. 16-MR-43, LeChien No. 16-MR-44). We note that, while the Board took no action on petitioner's objections, the Board's vote was nonetheless subject to judicial review. Hossfeld v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 238 Ill. 2d 418, , 939 N.E.2d 368, 371 (2010) (citing 10 ILCS 5/ (West 2008) (which provides an "objector aggrieved by the decision of an electoral board may secure judicial review")). In his petitions for review, petitioner challenged (1) the constitutionality of a previously elected and currently sitting judge seeking to remain in his office by election rather retention and (2) the proxy vote of one of the Board members. Petitioner later withdrew his challenge to the proxy vote. The circuit court consolidated the three judge's cases. 8 After the parties briefed the issue, the circuit court held a hearing on February 19, The court heard the parties' arguments and took the matter under advisement. On February 23, 2016, the circuit court entered its written order, denying the petitions for judicial A 3

21 review and affirming the Board's decision. The court found section 12(d) was not ambiguous. It further concluded section 12(d), when read in conjunction with sections 11 and 12(a), gave elected judges "the choice of seeking to remain in office by retention or through other constitutionally approved method, namely, election or appointment." 9 On February 26, 2016, petitioner filed timely notices of appeal in substantial compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) (Haida No , Baricevic No , LeChien No ). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction of these appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). In March 2016, we consolidated the three appeals at petitioner's request. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 Where judicial review is sought pursuant to section of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/ (West 2014)), "the proceeding is in the nature of administrative review." Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL , 19, 28 N.E.3d 170. Thus, when a circuit court reviews an electoral board's decision, this court reviews the Board's decision, not the circuit court's. Solomon v. Scholefield, 2015 IL App (1st) , 15, 30 N.E.3d 480. "[T]he standard of review is determined by the type of question on review." Hossfeld, 238 Ill. 2d at 423, 939 N.E.2d at 371. Here, petitioner asserts his appeal presents a question of law, and respondents contend it sets forth a mixed question of law and fact. We agree with petitioner his appeal requires us to interpret a section of the Illinois Constitution, which presents purely a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, which has been characterized as "independent and not deferential." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398, 406, 948 N.E.2d 580, 585 (2011) (quoting Hossfeld, 238 Ill. 2d at 423, 939 N.E.2d at 371) A 4

22 12 A. Mootness 13 Before we address the merits of petitioner's argument, respondents assert this appeal is moot because petitioner sought to have the three judges' names not included on the ballot for the March 15, 2016, primary election and that election has already occurred. Petitioner contends the issue of whether the three judges have the option of foregoing the retention process in favor of a general election is still very much alive, and it does not matter whether the three judges' names are not included on the primary ballot or the general ballot. 14 A reviewing court will find a case on appeal moot when " 'the issues raised below no longer exist because events subsequent to the filing of the appeal make it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.' " Goodman, 241 Ill. 2d at 404, 948 N.E.2d at 584 (quoting Hossfeld, 238 Ill. 2d at , 939 N.E.2d at 371). As respondents note, petitioner's petitions specifically requested the three judges' names not be printed on the official ballot for the primary election and made no reference to the general election. However, the general election has not yet occurred, and thus whether a judge can seek election rather than run for retention is still at issue. 15 In Hossfeld, 238 Ill. 2d at 421, , 939 N.E.2d at , a voter challenged a candidate's eligibility to run as a Republican candidate, and despite the candidate winning the Republican primary, our supreme court found the appeal from the voter's challenge was not moot because the general election had not yet occurred. Our supreme court further found that, in any event, the appeal raised "an issue of election law which 'inherently is a matter of public concern' and reviewable under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine." Hossfeld, 238 Ill. 2d at 424, 939 N.E.2d at 371 (quoting Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210, 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2008)). As in Hossfeld, the general election A 5

23 has yet to take place, and this court can still grant effectual relief on the issue raised by petitioner. Accordingly, we find this appeal is not moot. Moreover, even if it is moot, the appeal would be reviewable under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In making that finding, we disagree with respondents' assertion the question raised in this appeal is not likely to recur. 16 B. Article VI, Section 12, of the 1970 Constitution 17 Petitioner's argument is essentially the language of article VI, section 12, of the 1970 Constitution does not provide a sitting judge with the option of seeking "reelection" instead of retention. Respondents contend the only issue before the Board was whether the three judges' nomination papers were valid. Petitioner does not dispute the candidates' nomination papers met the other statutory and constitutional requirements. He is arguing the nomination papers are unconstitutional because they violate article VI, section 12, of the 1970 Constitution. 18 In interpreting the 1970 Constitution, this court must ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions in the constitutional contexts in which they appear. Maddux v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill. 2d 508, 523, 911 N.E.2d 979, 988 (2009). Further, we must read and understand the constitution provisions according to the most natural and obvious meaning of the language to avoid eliminating or extending its operation. Maddux, 233 Ill. 2d at 523, 911 N.E.2d at 988. Similarly, courts should not, under the guise of interpretation, add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistent with the provision's plain meaning. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392, 667 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1996). "Where the words of the constitution are clear, explicit, and unambiguous, there is no need for a court to engage in construction." Maddux, 233 Ill. 2d at 523, 911 N.E.2d at A 6

24 19 Article VI, section 12, of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 12) states the following: "(a) Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary elections or by petition. Judges shall be elected at general or judicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law. A person eligible for the office of Judge may cause his name to appear on the ballot as a candidate for Judge at the primary and at the general or judicial elections by submitting petitions. The General Assembly shall prescribe by law the requirements for petitions. (b) The office of a Judge shall be vacant upon his death, resignation, retirement, removal, or upon the conclusion of his term without retention in office. Whenever an additional Appellate or Circuit Judge is authorized by law, the office shall be filled in the manner provided for filling a vacancy in that office. (c) A vacancy occurring in the office of Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge shall be filled as the General Assembly may provide by law. In the absence of a law, vacancies may be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court. A person appointed to fill a vacancy 60 or more days prior to the next primary election to nominate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled for a term at the next general or judicial election. A person appointed to fill a vacancy less than 60 days prior to the next primary election to A 7

25 nominate Judges shall serve until the vacancy is filled at the second general or judicial election following such appointment. (d) Not less than six months before the general election preceding the expiration of his term of office, a Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge who has been elected to that office may file in the office of the Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself. The Secretary of State, not less than 63 days before the election, shall certify the Judge's candidacy to the proper election officials. The names of Judges seeking retention shall be submitted to the electors, separately and without party designation, on the sole question whether each Judge shall be retained in office for another term. The retention elections shall be conducted at general elections in the appropriate Judicial District, for Supreme and Appellate Judges, and in the circuit for Circuit Judges. The affirmative vote of three-fifths of the electors voting on the question shall elect the Judge to the office for a term commencing on the first Monday in December following his election. (e) A law reducing the number of Appellate or Circuit Judges shall be without prejudice to the right of the Judges affected to seek retention in office. A reduction shall become effective when a vacancy occurs in the affected unit." 20 In his opening brief, plaintiff asserts the language of section 12(d) is A 8

26 unambiguous. However, in his reply brief, plaintiff argues for the first time the section is ambiguous when section 12 is read as a whole based on the differing positions between the parties. However, language is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree as to its meaning. Kaider v. Hamos, 2012 IL App (1st) , 11, 975 N.E.2d 667. Language is "ambiguous when it can be reasonably interpreted in two different ways." People v. Shanklin, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1144, 1145, 769 N.E.2d 547, 548 (2002). For the reasons that follow, we do not find petitioner's interpretation of section 12 of the 1970 Constitution is reasonable and thus do not find that section is ambiguous. 21 In his brief, petitioner contends section 12(a) applies to "a person who wants to be nominated, is eligible to be a judge and who is currently not a judge because he/she has not yet been elected." (Emphases in original). First, section 12(a) does not have any language limiting it to people who have not yet been elected a judge. Moreover, under plaintiff's interpretation of section 12(a), elected judges would be unable to run for other judicial vacancies because they are a current judge who has been elected. To the extent plaintiff suggests the language of section 12(a) means not yet elected to the same seat, plaintiff is adding even more qualifications to section 12(a) that are not included in the language of that section. Additionally, petitioner argues he is not adding language to section 12(a), but rather, he is requesting the words "elected to that office" in section 12(d) not be deleted, overlooked, or ignored. As we will explain in addressing section 12(d), the "elected to that office" language is not overlooked or ignored when section 12(a) is applied without adding additional language. Section 12(a) clearly provides Illinois circuit, appellate, and supreme court judges are to be elected and the only limitation on who can run for a judicial office is the person must be eligible for the office of judge under article VI, section 11, of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 11). Section 11 also does not A 9

27 place any limitations on an elected judge's ability to run for the same judicial office. 22 As to section 12(d), petitioner asserts it sets forth the required methodology for judges who have been elected to remain in their judicial office. However, section 12(d) uses the word "may." "May" indicates something is "permissive rather than mandatory." In re Marriage of Freeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 298, 478 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1985). Further, the "elected to that office" language of section 12(d) differentiates elected judges from those appointed to a judicial office. Section 12(d) only allows elected judges to seek retention, not appointed ones. Thus, we disagree with petitioner the "elected to that office" language makes retention the only means for a sitting judge to remain in his judicial office. Moreover, section 12(d) does not contain language prohibiting those eligible for retention under its provision from seeking to get on the ballot under section 12(a). Thus, while section 12(d) clearly provides elected judges may run for retention to keep their judicial office, section 12(d) does not limit elected judges to the retention procedure. As our supreme court has held, section 12(d) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 12(d)) "means exactly what it says: 'Not less than six months before the general election preceding the expiration of his term of office, a Supreme, Appellate or Circuit Judge who has been elected to that office may file in the office of the Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself." (Emphasis added.) O'Brien v. White, 219 Ill. 2d 86, 99, 846 N.E.2d 116, 123 (2006). 23 In support of his interpretation, petitioner cites our supreme court's decision in O'Brien. He asserts that, in that decision, our supreme court explained how the constitution created two schemes for electing judges, the initial election process and the nonpartisan retention scheme. However, it was the circuit court in that case which outlined the two schemes, and the supreme court only mentioned the schemes in recounting the circuit court's ruling in the background section of its opinion. O'Brien, 219 Ill. 2d at 92, 846 N.E.2d at 119. The supreme A 10

28 court did not mention the two schemes in its analysis. Thus, we disagree with petitioner the supreme court's opinion in O'Brien suggests the election process is limited to a judge's initial election to a judicial office. 24 Petitioner further cites historical notes to the 1970 Constitution and public policy in support of his interpretation of section 12. However, we have found the section is not ambiguous, and thus we do not consider those arguments. See O'Brien, 219 Ill. 2d at , 846 N.E.2d at Article VI, section 12, of 1970 Constitution sets forth both the election of and retention of Illinois supreme, appellate, and circuit court judges and contains no limitations preventing an elected judge from running for his or her own vacated judicial office instead of retention. While legitimate public policy arguments may exist for limiting elected judges to the retention process only, the 1970 Constitution was not written with such a limitation, and we are bound to uphold the constitution as it is written. 26 III. CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Sangamon County circuit court's judgment and confirm the Board's decision that allowed the three judges to remain on the ballot. 28 Affirmed A 11

29 A 12

30 A 13

31 A 14

32 A 15

33 A 16

34 A 17

35 A 18

36 A 19

37 A 20

38 A 21

39 A 22

40 A 23

41 A 24

42 A 25

43 A 26