FEDERAL COURTS. Federal jurisdiction is often about: separation of powers and federalism.

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Allison Golden
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1 FEDERAL COURTS Federal jurisdiction is often about: separation of powers and federalism. Article III: Section 1 - Judicial powers The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Section 2 - Trial by Jury, Original Jurisdiction, Jury Trials The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. **federal courts, unlike state courts, are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction **Article III creates SCOTUS but merely authorized the creation of lower federal courts. SO: 1. Original JD as to: a. Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls and cases to which a state is a party 2. Appellate JD as to law and fact with exceptions and under regulations Cong. shall make: a. Controversies between two or more states b. Admiralty and maritime JD c. Controversies between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, subjects d. U.S. as party 1

2 e. Between citizens of the same state claiming land under the grant of different states f. Between citizens of different states g. Affecting ambassadors, public ministers and counsels h. Between a state and citizens of another state Note: constitutional avoidance: Courts shouldn t decide Constitutional issues when it can avoid doing so (Ashwander courts must pass upon Const question if another proper ground exists by which case must be disposed of) CASE OR CONTROVERSY JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES * controversy = only civil matters;; case = civil or criminal matters Prohibition on advisory opinions 1) Correspondence of the Justices: a) As Secretary of State, Jefferson asked SCOTUS for legal device, without the context of a dispute, about international law concerning ports. b) SCOTUS justices refused to answer the question, because it wasn t in the context of a case or controversy. Said that judicial power didn t extend to issuing opinions outside of the context of a case or controversy c) No premature decisions (court should not commit itself to answers it may later regret (when case more developed d) Hypothetical/abstract nature of questions (need more particularized and detailed factual case) e) No adversity between parties b. Coordinate branches may get advice from within. 2) Note: state legislatures can authorize state courts to issue advisory opinions. 3) Buckley v. Valeo: a) Buckley challenged the validity of campaign finance reform measures. Clear that Buckley was using declaratory judgment to determine if this was a valid statute. Court said this was constitutional (even though this was really an advisory opinion) b) Compare Buckley v. Vallejo (1976) (Amend. I campaign funding case) (S. Ct. in per curiam opinion answers 22 certified questions regarding campaign finance reform law) c. Distinguishing: 1. Adversaries argued the case; 2. Court better situated to answer the question. 4) Marbury v. Madison: a) SCOTUS has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional. b) Facts: Marbury brought suit in the original jurisdiction of SCOTUS for delivery of the commission appointing him a JJP. Jefferson objected to his appointment and Secretary of State Madison refused to deliver the commission. c) Holding: Established judicial review (it s the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. ) Also, original jurisdiction cannot be expanded by statute. Judiciary Act of 1789 couldn t give SCOTUS the power to hear originally what the Constitution said it could only hear on appeal (writs of mandamus). 2

3 Finality requirement: federal courts can only adjudicate where decisions aren t reviewable by other branches 5) Hayburn s Case: (1792) a) Facts: after Revolutionary War, Congress established compensation for veterans. Federal circuit courts were supposed to find whether servicemen were disabled and tell the Secretary of War, but if Secretary suspected imposition or mistake he had the power to withhold the claimant s pension. b) SCOTUS justices riding circuit declined to hear these claims because the statute raised problems of both executive and legislative revision Secretary of War could ignore the decisions, and Congress could refuse to pay. Justices said that Constitution didn t allow Exec or Leg officials to sit as court of errors c) Fed court can t issue judgments subject to revision by the coordinate branches of the federal gov t. 6) Chicago & South Airlines v. Waterman: a) Court refused to revise/review an administrative judgment which the President could overrule, because this wouldn t be rendering a judgment (but what about allowing immigration courts? Prez can overturn these) 7) Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms (1995): a) Congress passed a law requiring courts to reopen some final judgments. SCOTUS said that Congress could not do so. b) Holding: Congress not allowed to reverse final judgments by Article III courts. It is without power to reinstate suits where dismissals resulted in final judgments. i) *but note: Congress may require application of a new law to pending cases where there is no final judgment. ii) *Note: but, if federal court tosses out a case based upon a statute so that U.S. wins, and then Congress passes another statute specifically allowing suit on that cause of action between those parties, that s ok 8) Miller v. French: a) Prison Litigation Reform Act limited power of federal judges to issue decrees about prison conditions courts had to find that relief extended no further than necessary and is least intrusive means to correct violation, in order for decrees to stand. Also, motion to terminate injunctive relief operated as automatic stay. b) Holding: nothing in Plaut or Hayburn s Case restricted Congress authority to alter the prospective effect of previously entered injunctions. Provision of prospective relief is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law. 9) Gordon v. United States: (1865): a) Court of Claims is non-article III court with authority to hear and determine most types of non-tort money claims against the gov t. At the time this case was decided, Congress had to specially appropriate funds for any Court of Claims judgment to be paid out over $100k. b) Holding: SCOTUS review of Court of Claims judgments were barred by Article III c) *Note: Congress struck the offending provision and then SCOTUS upheld its right to review these cases. 3

4 d) *Fletch thinks Gordon is still good law. In Gordon the possibility of executive and legislative failure to comply with the judicial order to pay $ was built into the statute in such a way that the failure to pay was a legitimate act. The statute was then changed to eliminate the language you just quoted, so that a failure to pay was no longer a legit act in the same way. Glidden was decided under the new language. SCOTUS held that the possibility of revision by the other branches was consistent with the exercise of Article III power because (1) such revision was not endorsed by the statute, and (2) such revision rarely took place. 10) Glidden v. Zdanok: (1962) a) Court of Claims was an Article I court, until in 1953 Congress declared it an Article III court, until reorg in b) Court held that this did not violate Article III. That although Congress had the ability not to pay up, this ability wasn t specifically authorized in the statute, and that Congress regularly paid these judgments that it was close enough to nonreviewable that the Court of Claims could rely on the good faith of the U.S. 11) Postum Cereal: it s fatal to the exercise of Article III power that a judgment doesn t have a later preclusive effect (NOTE; THIS CASE HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY ABANDONED BY THE MAJORITY OPINION IN GLIDDEN) 12) Tutun v. United States: (1926): a) Question: does the effect of a naturalization proceeding having no res judicata effect on a subsequent denaturalization proceeding have a fatal effect on the courts? b) Prohibition against Article III court s issuing judgments that can be reviewed by exec or leg is b/c of separation of powers can t erode independence of judiciary. But, judicial revision of prior decisions is ok, so naturalization decisions may be set aside in later de novo judicial proceedings. c) (Fletch wishes they d just said that sometimes Article III judges do things that aren t adversarial) Feigned Cases/Test Cases: *Article III courts can t hear feigned cases, in which parties merely pretend to be adversaries. A true case or controversy requires that parties have, and seek to promote, their interests in the litigation *There s some slide/ambiguity about what constitutes a fake case. *When courts essentially want reform, they re a lot more willing to overlook collusive attributes of cases. 13) United States v. Johnson: (1943) a) Facts: tenant in property covered by federal wartime rent control sued to challenge his rent as too high, but the L/L had instigated the litigation, paid P s lawyer, and controlled the course of the litigation. Even though the U.S. intervened to defend rent controls, SCOTUS required that the suit be dismissed. b) Holding: even intervention of U.S. as a defendant could not cure fundamental lack of case or controversy caused by fact that there was no genuine adversary issue b/w the parties 4

5 c) A case is feigned even if U.S. intervenes in district court before a decision on the merits is reached. d) Note: even if an individual state actor is on the side of the party suing, Fletch thinks that this can still be an actual case or controversy b/c that state actor is responsible to his higher-ups/department. 14) Muskrat v. United States (1911): a) SCOTUS refused to entertain a suit that Congress had specifically authorized. b) Facts: Congress had allotted tribal lands and cash to certain Indians. Congress later enlarged the group of people entitled to share in that property, and passed a statute authorizing several specifically-named individuals to sue for a declaratory judgment that this was acceptable. Statute provided for attorneys fees to the litigants if the group couldn t be enlarged. c) Court said that it wouldn t decide this case b/c the state authorizing people to seek a declaratory judgment was an improper attempt to gain an advisory opinion. d) Fletch: says this case isn t puzzling at all, that at the time this case was decided, it was received wisdom that Article III courts couldn t issue declaratory judgments (now the Declaratory Judgment Act has changed that) i) Fletch also says: now that there s a Declaratory Judgment Act, Ps would have standing today. Ps were tribal members who wanted to preserve their lands, so they had a personal stake in the outcome of the case so court today would hear the case on the merits (they might not necessarily win though). ii) Wrinkle: does Congress setting up the Muskrat case by designating the particular Ps and subsidizing their lawsuit result in the Court viewing the suit as a forbidden request for an advisory opinion? Fletch thinks no. 15) Evers v. Dwyer: (1953) a) Black P boarded a bus once, refused to obey an order to sit in the back, got off, and brought a class action for a declaratory judgment against the enforced segregation. b) Court found this justiciable despite a finding by the district court that the P had ridden a city bus on only that one occasion, for the purpose of instituting the litigation. c) Fletch thinks that perhaps this is not a feigned suit b/c the interests of the P are still averse to the interests of the D bus companies STANDING: *Note: Brandeis came up with standing to keep the then-conservative Court from making Constitutional decisions. But Frankfurter kept applying standing doctrine eve after the liberals were in power. *Fletch thinks SCOTUS applies justiciability doctrines erratically and dishonestly, to control its docket. *Standing is a blend of constitutional and prudential requirements. *Constitutional requirements generally recognized as: Ps have to suffer a personal injury caused by D that can be redressed by favorable decision. These are necessary to subject matter jurisdiction. 5

6 *Other, prudential standing requirements: such as, P can t generally assert rights of third parties, generalized grievances aren t permitted (although there are questions about whether this is a prudential or constitutional bar), and P must be in the zone of interest protected by the statue. *Flast Harlan dissent: standing is a word game played by secret rules *The Court can consider all kinds of things in deciding whether deny "prudential" standing. The Court has not been systematic in telling us precisely what those things are, but they at least include such things as degree of alleged harm, redressability, etc. A prudential standing question arises in cases where the plaintiff has Article III standing, but is close to the Article III line, and where Congress has not been explicit in granting standing. *PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS CAN BE OVERRIDDEN BY CONGRESS. *Court isn t very particular about whether it dismisses for lack of standing under 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1) for subject matter jurisdiction, or summary judgment. If it s an Article III issue, this is subject matter jurisdiction and the court has the obligation to raise it sua sponte. If there IS Article III standing and the problem is a question of statutory standing (i.e., does this statute confer standing on this person), the federal court isn t required to raise it sua sponte, and this should be raised in a 12(b)(6) or a MSJ. *Inability to procure information to which Congress has created a right is an injury in fact. Taxpayer Standing: Frothingham v. Mellon: taxpayer tried to sue to challenge a law reducing infant and mother mortality. Court dismissed for lack of standing on the grounds that the taxpayer had only a generalized interest in common with that of every other taxpayer. Didn t explain whether this standing requirement was prudential or constitutional. Flast v. Cohen: P sued under Establishment Clause for Congressional spending, and Court granted standing. Test: taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of taxing and spendingn power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress o Nexuses: (1) logical link b/w taxpayer status and the type of legislative enactment attacked (2) taxpayer must show the challenged enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Article I, Section 8 Valley Forge: implicitly overruled Flast. Definitely limited it. Grant of land, not $, so not under Congress s taxing and spending power, and because the executive branch did the giving and not the legislative grant. United States v. Richardson and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee: neither allowed taxpayer standing despite a supposedly concrete limitations on Congress s powers Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation: no standing. Congress appropriated $ to the Prez, who spent it on religious stuff. Taxpayers couldn t challenge b/c the spending was by the executive, not Congress, and taxpayers can t ever challenge the executive. Case 6

FEDERAL COURTS. Federal Courts Fletcher Fall 2010

FEDERAL COURTS. Federal Courts Fletcher Fall 2010 FEDERAL COURTS 1. Historical Background... 3 2. Cases and Controversy... 5 a. Introduction:... 5 b. The power of judicial review Marbury v. Madison [1803]... 5 e. Advisory Opinions... 5 ii. Correspondence