Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 1 of 18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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1 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 1 of 18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, v. Plaintiff, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as Attorney General, Case No. 1:12-cv-203 (CKK, BMK, JDB) Defendants, and, JAMES DUBOSE, et al., Defendant- Intervenors. DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AS TO JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS OF ONGOING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN SOUTH CAROLINA

2 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 2 of 18 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence ( FRE or Rule ) 201, Defendant-Intervenors respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of (1) key factual findings and conclusions from civil- and voting-rights litigation pertaining to racially discriminatory and retrogressive voting laws in South Carolina s recent history, and (2) the United States Congress s reliance on evidence of continuing racial discrimination in South Carolina voting laws in reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act ( VRA ) in 2006, with South Carolina as a covered jurisdiction. 1 I. ADJUDICATIVE FACTS IN RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute and that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court may take judicial notice of the factual findings of another court as part of the public record. United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 350 F. Supp. 2d 80, 89 (D.D.C. 2004). Indeed, courts have done so with respect to adjudicative facts reported in judicial opinions on civil rights litigation in South Carolina and other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Edgefield County, 650 F. Supp. 1176, (D.S.C. 1986); see also Rural W. Tenn. African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 209 F. 3d 835, 843 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting district court s taking of judicial notice of findings from Senate Plan cases regarding the history and effect of discrimination in voting ); Whitfield v. Democratic Party of Arkansas, 890 F.2d 1423, 1424 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting propriety of judicial notice of Arkansas s official discrimination in its electoral process and racially discriminatory voting practices); Smith v. Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (The Court takes judicial notice that there is a history of racial discrimination in the electoral process in Arkansas. 1 The State did not respond to Defendant-Intervenors offer to stipulate to these facts.

3 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 3 of 18 We do not believe that this history of discrimination, which affects the exercise of the right to vote in all elections under state law, must be proved anew in each case under the Voting Rights Act. ). Pursuant to Rule 201, therefore, Defendant-Intervenors hereby request that this Court take judicial notice of the following adjudicative facts from the cases listed below: 1. United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2004). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court s decision in United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.S.C. 2003). (See infra 4.) In holding that the district court s decision on the vote dilution claim was not clearly erroneous, the appellate court found that the United States presented uncontroverted evidence of racial polarization and minimal minority electoral success, noting how the experts agreed that partisanship and race as determinants of voting are inextricably intertwined. 2. Vander Linden v. Hodges, 193 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit held that the South Carolina s legislative delegation system was unconstitutional for violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, concluding that there is no serious dispute that the delegation fails to satisfy this [one-person, one-vote] requirement. In so holding, the appellate court noted that the legislative delegation system [in South Carolina], which developed in place of locally elected county government, was similarly created out of fear of African-American voting power, and arose against the backdrop of a white supremacist movement led by Governor Ben Tillman, that sought to diminish African-American voting power. 3. Levy v. Lexington Cnty., S.C., No. 3: , 2009 WL (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2009). Plaintiff challenged the at-large method of electing school board members violated

4 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 4 of 18 Section 2 of the VRA. 2 In ruling for plaintiffs, the district court found that [a]lthough the more egregious forms of discrimination, such as separate facilities for different races, no longer are practiced, segregation has continued to exist to a great extent with respect to churches, workplaces, businesses, and communities. According to the court, [t]he evidence supports a finding that there are lingering socio-economic effects of discrimination, given the pronounced disparities between black and white households in median income, poverty rates, unemployment, lack of a vehicle, and education. 4. United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.S.C. 2003). The district 2 court invalidated Charleston County s at-large election system because it unlawfully exacerbates the disadvantaged political posture inherited by generations of African- Americans through centuries of institutional discrimination. The evidence relied upon by the court included that: (1) the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 included a literacy test, a poll tax, disfranchisement for certain enumerated crimes, and long residency requirements; (2) blacks were subject to segregation laws which had a discriminatory effect on most aspects of their lives; and (3) African Americans have suffered a pronounced and protracted history of past discrimination; and [d]uring the first half of the twentieth century, African-American citizens in Charleston as in other areas of South Carolina, were subject to segregation laws which had a discriminatory effect on most aspects of their lives. Moreover, the court noted the voluminous testimony put forth by the United States concerning what it characterized as a On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court s opinion because it had declined to re-open the record to evidence from recent elections, and because it performed an improper analysis of minorities political cohesion and majority bloc voting. 589 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 2009). On remand, the district court found against the plaintiffs on the majority bloc voting prong of the Section 2 analysis, while acknowledging its prior findings on the lingering effects of racial discrimination WL (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2012).

5 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 5 of 18 consistent and more recent pattern of white persons acting to intimidate and harass African American voters at the polls during the 1980s and 1990s and even as late as the 2000 general election, and, while acknowledging that much of it was anecdotal, the court agreed that there is significant evidence of intimidation and harassment. In particular, the court recounted the testimony of various Charleston County election commissioners and officials who attested to inappropriate behavior by white [poll] managers at majority-black precincts who, among other things, caused confusion, intimidated African-American voters, and had the tendency to be condescending toward those voters ; harassed African-American voters ; and denied African-American voters requested assistance. Despite the defendants suggestion that such instances of harassment of and intimidation against African-American voters were attributable solely to partisan politics and not race, the court found that the uncontroverted testimony establishes that such conduct never occurred at predominantly white polling places, including those that tended to support Democratic candidates. In particular, the court expressed particular concern over two recent episodes of racial discrimination against African-American citizens attempting to participate in the local political process, discussing how the salary of the first and only African-American person to serve as the County s Probate Judge was immediately reduced following his election, and how immediately following the 2000 Charleston County School Board elections in which, for the first time, five of the nine board members were African-American the Charleston Legislative Delegation sponsored several pieces of legislation to alter the method of election for the school board in Charleston County and to to remove control of the budget of the school system from the School Board.

6 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 6 of Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D.S.C. 2002). Plaintiffs sought a declaration that districting plans in South Carolina were unconstitutional as to each elective district and sought the implementation of interim court-ordered plans in time for the impending 2002 elections. Holding that elected officials of South Carolina failed to redistrict the General Assembly and South Carolina s Congressional seats in accordance with their constitutional obligations, the district court noted, the history of racially polarized voting in South Carolina is long and well-documented, and, despite the passage of time, such polarization continued: In this case, the parties have presented substantial evidence that this disturbing fact has seen little change in the last decade. Voting in South Carolina continues to be racially polarized to a very high degree, in all regions of the state and in both primary elections and general elections. Statewide, black citizens generally are a highly politically cohesive group and whites engage in significant whitebloc voting. Indeed, this fact is not seriously in dispute.... South Carolinians are still very divided in terms of where they live and that elections throughout South Carolina continue to be marked by very high levels of racial polarization in voting. Black voters are generally politically cohesive and white voters almost always vote in blocs to defeat the minority s candidate of choice. The court further considered the extensive documentation of the history of votingrelated racial discrimination in South Carolina, which was submitted largely as a stipulation among the parties, and [e]vidence of the depressed socio-economic and educational status of blacks in the state which hinders their ability to participate effectively in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 6. Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp (D.S.C. 1996): A three-judge panel held that race was the predominant factor in drawing certain state house and senate districts and thus they were unconstitutional. In so holding, the court found, [i]n South Carolina, voting

7 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 7 of 18 has been, and still is, polarized by race, and that such a pattern of racial polarization is general throughout the state and is present in all of the challenged House and Senate districts in this litigation. The court also found that in the challenged districts, there is a socio-economic gap between the average white citizen and the average black citizen, noting: There is a larger percentage of blacks than whites below the poverty level; the household income of blacks is generally less than that of whites; unemployment is greater among blacks; and the level of formal education among blacks is less.... More blacks than whites are without private means of transportation Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1995): The State of South Carolina and its officials sought to enjoin enforcement of National Voter Registration Act ( NVRA ). Holding the NVRA to be constitutional, the court permanently enjoined the State from refusing to comply. The district court found South Carolina had failed to offer voter registration in various state social services and public assistance agencies a NVRA requirement that enabl[ed] more low income and minority citizens to become registered, and was designed to reach out to those sectors of the population which are not likely to have driver s licenses or other identification cards issued by a motor vehicle agency. The court further found that [t]he clients of the social service agencies are not only poor but minorities and poor and minority citizens are less likely to be served by the DMV, and concluded that South Carolina s noncompliance ignores Congress statutory scheme and open the door to discrimination that Congress so carefully shut. 8. Stanley v. Darlington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp (D.S.C. 1995). In an action to enforce compliance with court-ordered desegregation, the district court found that before and after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), South Carolina took

8 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 8 of 18 actions to perpetuate racially dual school systems; that the effects of the State s actions persist to the present; and that, although most active resistance had ceased by the mid- 1970s, the State of South Carolina has done little or nothing since then to eliminate the vestiges of the dual school system by them, despite an affirmative duty to do so. 9. NAACP v. Spartanburg Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 7: (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 1993) (Ex. A). In an action challenging the at-large system, the parties settled the case by adopting a mixed-district electoral plan. Although the defendant school district did not admit any violation, it recognized that polarized voting along racial lines occurred in some elections in Spartanburg County, and that black citizens throughout the State of South Carolina have experienced a history of racial discrimination in areas such as education, employment, health care and housing, which has impeded their ability to participate effectively in the political process. 10. Burton v. Sheehan, 793 F. Supp (D.S.C. 1992). 3 The district court accepted the parties stipulation that since 1984 there is evidence of racially polarized voting in South Carolina, further noting the testimony of plaintiffs and the Governor s experts that voter polarization had increased since 1982, when 2 was amended in certain areas of the state. 11. NAACP v. City of Bennettsville and United States v. City of Bennettsville, Civ. Nos. 4: , 4: (D.S.C. May 8, 1990) (Ex. B). Plaintiffs challenged the at-large system of electing the Bennettsville City Council as a violation of Section 2 of the VRA and of the 14th and 15th Amendments. The parties entered a consent decree admitting a Vacated and remanded by SRAC v. Theodore, 508 U.S. 968 (1993) and Campbell v. Theodore, 508 U.S. 968 (1993), in light of the positions of the Solicitor General and Governor, in which both agreed with Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee that the district court failed to apply a proper analysis under 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

9 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 9 of 18 prima facie case of racial vote dilution and abandoning the at-large method of electing the council. 12. NAACP v. Town of Saluda, No. 9: (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 1990) (Ex. C). The NAACP challenged the at-large method of electing the Saluda Town Council as violating Section 2 of the VRA and a consent decree was entered changing the system. 13. Houston v. Barnwell County, South Carolina, Civ. No (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 1989) (Ex. D). Plaintiffs, black residents and voters of Barnwell County, challenged the method of electing members of the Barnwell City Counsel. The parties entered a consent decree in which defendants adopted a plan which would provide African-American voters in the county a greater opportunity than previously existed to elect candidates of their choice. 14. Robinson v. Abbeville, Civ. No (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 1989) (Ex. E): In a suit alleging that the at-large method of elections for the city council and the county board of commissioners violated the Constitution and Section 2, the parties settled, with defendants recognizing that black voters have been unable to elect candidates of their choice under the at-large system. 15. Holloway v. Board of Trustees for Sch. Dist. Number One, Civ. No (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 1988) (Ex. F). In a challenge to at-large election system for the Saluda School District Board of Trustees, the district court found that [p]laintiffs have established a prima facie case that the present method of at-large elections violated Section Reaves v. City Council of Mullins, South Carolina, C.A. No. 4: (D.S.C. August 5, 1988) (Ex. G). Black residents of the City of Mullins filed suit in federal court challenging at-large elections as diluting minority voting strength. In its findings of fact,

10 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 10 of 18 the district court recounted South Carolina and its cities long histories of discrimination, South Carolina s undisputed historical use of discriminatory devices as the poll tax, literacy tests, and the anti-single shot voting law, which have directly affected the rights of black voters to register, to vote, and to otherwise participate in the democratic process, and other official acts of discrimination, such as statutory segregation have indirectly affected the voting rights of black citizens in Mullins. African-Americans in Mullins, the court found, bear the effects of both public and private discrimination in the areas of education, income, employment, housing, and public services and facilities, and despite the vast strides [that] have been made since the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the lingering effects of discrimination are still evident in the depressed socioeconomic status of the majority of blacks in Mullins. The court concluded that its findings of fact demonstrate the history of both public and private discrimination in Mullins, which has hindered, both directly and indirectly, the ability of Mullins blacks to participate effectively in the political process. 17. Beasley v. Laurens County, South Carolina, Civ. No (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 1987) (Ex. H). In a suit by private plaintiffs and the United States challenging the atlarge method of electing the Laurens County Council as violating Section 2 of the VRA, the district court found that black voters [in the county] have never been able to elect candidates of their choice under the at-large system. 18. Owens v. City Council of Orangeburg, Civ. No. 5: (D.S.C. June 3, 1987) (Ex. I). Black voters in Orangeburg sued the city council, alleging that the at-large system diluted black voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution.

11 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 11 of 18 In a consent order, the court found that based on discovery and prior proceedings, plaintiffs would present a prima facie case that the at-large system violated Section Jackson v. Edgefield County School District, 650 F. Supp (D.S.C. 1986). In an action by African-American voters challenging the at-large system used to elect members of the Edgefield County school board of trustees, the district court held that at-large method of election for membership on Edgefield County school board of trustees resulted in denial or abridgement of voting rights of black citizens in violation of the VRA. In so holding, the court found that despite court-mandated progresses made toward racial equality in South Carolina[,] [t]hese relatively recent achievements... have not purged the continuing adverse effects of past racial discrimination on black citizens ability to participate effectively on an equal basis in political affairs under certain circumstances in Edgefield County and in the State. The court reviewed the history of racial discrimination in South Carolina as a useful starting point in fathoming the degree of its lingering effects that impairs the present day ability of blacks to participate on an equal basis in the political processes. The court found that despite defendants attempt[] to dispel the apparent residual effects of segregation and discrimination that there is credible and substantial evidence showing that a pervasive racial discrimination has left the County s black citizens economically, socially, and politically disadvantaged and that a severe degree of racial bloc voting and the minimal degree of electoral success by minority candidates exacerbate the difficulties faced by black candidates seeking election to the position of the School Board Trustees under the existing at-large electoral structure and practice. 20. County Council of Sumter County, South Carolina v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 35 (D.D.C. 1984). In a preclearance action, the three-judge panel held that county officials failed to prove that a law requiring at-large elections ha[d] neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the right of black South Carolinians to vote. The court found:

12 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 12 of 18 [t]he State has a history of segregation and pervasive racial discrimination which has been an important factor in detrimentally affecting the political participation of black South Carolinians ; [u]ntil after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, South Carolina enacted and enforced a variety of laws that had the purpose and effect of denying the right to vote to its black citizens ; and [r]acial segregation was, and in large measure remains, the way of life in much of the private sector of Sumter County. Voting in Sumter County is racially polarized. The court further found that plaintiffs had not effectively rebutted evidence that racial considerations influenced the Council s decision not to hold a referendum and that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proving that the legislature did not pass Act 371 in 1967 for a racially discriminatory purpose at the insistence of the white majority in Sumter County. 21. McCain v. Lybrand, Civ. No (D.S.C. Apr. 17, 1980) (Ex. J). The district court struck down Edgefield County s at-large method of electing the county council, holding it diluted black voting strength in violation of the Constitution and Section 2 of the VRA. In so holding, the court made detailed findings on the history of discrimination and racial polarization in the county, stating: (1) there is still a long history of racial discrimination in all areas of life, (2) [n]o black has ever received a Democratic nomination or been elected to public office in a contested election in Edgefield, (3) after the decision in Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1974), blacks in Edgefield County found it very difficult to register and threats were made against some blacks who did register, (4) until 1970 no blacks had ever served as a precinct election official, (5) blacks were virtually totally excluded [from the political process] up to 1970, and since that time they have progressed to minimal tokenism, (6) blacks have been excluded from county

13 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 13 of 18 employment by the County Council, even up to the present, (7) whites absolutely refuse to vote for a black, (8) the majority vote requirement, run-off elections and even staggered terms of the members of council tend to dilute the voting strength of the blacks, (9) all advances made by the blacks have been under some type of court, and (10) [t]here is bloc voting by the whites on a scale that this Court has never observed. II. THE 2006 VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION Rule 201 provides that a court may take judicial notice of the official report of a legislative or congressional committee... where the report, within the scope of the subject matter delegated to the committee for investigation, contains findings of fact on a matter which is at issue in the judicial proceeding. Stasiukevich v. Nichols, 168 F.2d 474, 479 (1st Cir. 1948) (emphasis added); see also Del Puerto Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (Senate and House reports are appropriate for judicial notice ); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1662, 1670; 31A C.J.S. Evidence 66 ( Congressional documents may be judicially noticed, as may reports to Congress and proceedings in Congress. ). While the court need not accept the findings in the report as indisputable truth, the court may take judicial notice of its existence and contents as evidence of the facts asserted. Stasiukevich, 168 F.2d at 479. Defendant-Intervenors, pursuant to Rule 201, hereby request that this Court take judicial notice of the following facts from the U.S. Congressional record: 1. In 2006, Congress most recently reauthorized the VRA by a vote of in the House and 98-0 in the Senate; both South Carolina Senators and five out of South Carolina s six Representatives voted in favor of the reauthorization. 4 (Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks 4

14 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 14 of 18 & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L (2006) (the 2006 Act ).) 2. As part of the reauthorization process, both the House and Senate received testimony and evidence. The Congressional reports collected many of the cases cited above, 5 among others, to show recent instances of race discrimination in voting laws in South Carolina. 3. Congress also received expert reports and testimony to the following effect: a. Voting in South Carolina continues to be racially polarized to a very high degree. H. Rep , at 35 (citing Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 641 (D.S.C. 2002), supra Part I, 5). Racially polarized voting, the House found, is the clearest and strongest evidence the Committee has before it of the continued resistance within covered jurisdictions to fully accept[ing] minority citizens and their preferred candidates into the electoral process. (H. Rep , at 34.) b. African-Americans are underrepresented among the ranks of South Carolina s elected officials, and no African-American politician has ever been elected to statewide office. (H. Rep , at 33 (noting Governor Sanford did not expect such an election in the foreseeable future ).) c. As recent as the 2000s, South Carolina and its counties have attempted to implement voting changes to which the Department of Justice had already denied preclearance or which courts had previously found diluted minority voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the VRA. (H. Rep , at 23, 39.) d. Preclearance objections under Section 5 of the VRA have continued to be prevalent in South Carolina since the previous reauthorization and amendments of Indeed, South Carolina had the fifth largest number of preclearance objections in this time frame, out of sixteen states covered partially or in their entirety under Section 5. (H. Rep , at 73.) 4. Based on the evidence in the legislative record, including the above evidence related to South Carolina, and based on the findings set forth in Section 2(b) of the 2006 Act, Congress concluded that [d]espite the progress made by minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the evidence before Congress reveals that 40 years has not been a 5 For example, the House Report cites the Colleton County Council case (Part 1, 5). (H. Rep , at 35.)

15 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 15 of 18 sufficient amount of time to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination, that [p]resent day discrimination experienced by racial and language minority voters is contained in evidence, and that without the continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years Act, 2(b)(3), (5). CONCLUSION Defendant-Intervenors respectfully request that this Court take judicial notice of the above facts pursuant to FRE 201(b), as they are not subject to reasonable dispute. Dated: August 22, 2012 Respectfully submitted, Arthur B. Spitzer (DC Bar No ) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL 4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 434 Washington, DC (202) (202) (fax) Laughlin McDonald Nancy Abudu Katie O Connor AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC. 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1440 Atlanta, GA (404) (404) (fax) koconnor@aclu.org /s/ Garrard R. Beeney Jon M. Greenbaum (D.C. Bar No ) Mark A. Posner (D.C. Bar No ) Robert A. Kengle LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1401 New York Ave. NW Ste. 400 Washington, DC Tel: (202) Fax: (202) mposner@lawyerscommittee.org Michael A. Cooper (pro hac vice) Garrard R. Beeney (pro hac vice) Peter A. Steciuk (pro hac vice) Taly Dvorkis (pro hac vice) Theodore A.B. McCombs (pro hac vice) Sean A. Camoni (pro hac vice) SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 125 Broad Street

16 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 16 of 18 Susan Dunn AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTH CAROLINA P.O. Box Charleston, SC J. Gerald Hebert (D.C. Bar No ) CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 215 E Street, NE Washington, DC (202) ghebert@campaignlegalcenter.org Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenors James Dubose, et al. Debo P. Adegbile (D.C. Bar No. NY0143) Elise C. Boddie Ryan P. Haygood (D.C. Bar No. NY0141) Dale E. Ho (D.C. Bar No. NY0142) Natasha M. Korgaonkar Leah C. Aden NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 New York, NY (212) rhaygood@naacpldf.org laden@naacpldf.org New York, NY Tel: (212) Fax: (212) beeneyg@sullcrom.com Wendy R. Weiser (pro hac vice) Keesha M. Gaskins (pro hac vice) Mimi Marziani (pro hac vice) Elisabeth Genn (pro hac vice) THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW 161 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 12 New York, NY Tel: (646) Fax: (212) keesha.gaskins@nyu.edu Armand Derfner (D.C. Bar No ) DERFNER, ALTMAN & WILBORN 575 King Street, Suite B P.O. Box 600 Charleston, SC Tel: (843) Fax: (843) aderfner@dawlegal.com Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors the League of Women Voters of South Carolina, et al. Douglas H. Flaum Michael B. de Leeuw Adam M. Harris FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP One New York Plaza New York, NY (212) Victor L. Goode NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 4805 Mt. Hope Dr. Baltimore, MD 21215

17 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 17 of 18 Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.

18 Case 1:12-cv CKK-BMK-JDB Document 225 Filed 08/22/12 Page 18 of 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on August 22, 2012, I filed the foregoing Request for Judicial Notice, through the Court s electronic filing system, which will provide notice to all parties. /s/ Theodore A.B. McCombs Theodore A.B. McCombs