The absentee voting process also requires that voters. plan sufficiently enough ahead to request an absentee ballot,

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1 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 1 of 1 of In any event, as Secretary of State Cox pointed out, an absentee ballot is only counted if it is received by the registrar in the voter's jurisdiction by 7 :00 p.m, the day of the elections. Even absentee ballots postmarked by that date but delivered after 7 :00 p.m. on election day are not counted. The only method voters have of ensuring that their vote is counted is to show up at their polling precinct on election day and vote in person or to hand-deliver their absentee ballot to the registrar in their jurisdiction before 7 :00 p.m. on election day.' The absentee voting process also requires that voters plan sufficiently enough ahead to request an absentee ballot, to have the ballot delivered from the registrar's office via the United States Postal Service, to complete the ballot successfully, and to mail the absentee ballot to the registrar's office sufficiently early to allow the United States Postal Service to deliver the absentee ballot to the registrar by 7 :00 p.m. on election day. The majority of 6 The second method assumes voters know that they may handdeliver absentee ballots and that voters know where to deliver those ballots. Many voters simply may believe that they can hand-deliver their absentee ballots to a polling place, which is not a viable alternative. Furthermore, many absentee voters do not drive or otherwise lack transportation. Although many organizations provide free transportation to the polls on election day, the availability of free transportation to the registrar's office likely is limited or nonexistent. 91 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

2 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 2 of 2 of voters--particularly those voters who lack Photo ID--would not plan sufficiently enough ahead to vote via absentee ballot successfully. In fact, most voters likely would not be giving serious consideration to the election or to the candidates until shortly before the election itself. Under those circumstances, it simply is unrealistic to expect that most of the voters who lack Photo IDs will take advantage of the opportunity to vote an absentee ballot. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that absentee voting simply is not a realistic alternative to voting in person that is reasonably available for most voters who lack Photo ID. The fact that voters, in theory, may have the alternative of voting an absentee ballot without a Photo ID thus does not relieve the burden on the right to vote caused by the Photo ID requirement.? Additionally, the State argues that voters who do not have Photo ID will not be "turned away" from the polls ; Defendants argue that no constitutional right to vote in person exists, citing Oregon's policy of having elections conducted entirely by mail. Oregon's voting by mail structure differs significantly from Georgia's voting procedures. One major difference between Georgia's Photo ID requirement and Oregon's policy of conducting mail elections that is particularly noteworthy is that Oregon's policy places the same burden on every voter. Here, Georgia's Photo ID requirement places the burden of voting absentee on the very class of voters who will be least likely to navigate that method of voting successfully. 92 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

3 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 3 of 3 of rather, those voters may vote a provisional ballot and return within forty-eight hours with a Photo ID. In support of this argument, the State points to the September 20, 2005, special election in Richmond County, where thirteen people without a Photo ID voted via provisional ballot and only two of those individuals returned with a Photo ID within the requisite forty-eight hour period to verify their identity and have their ballots counted. Given the difficulty of obtaining a Photo ID discussed above, it is highly unlikely that many of the voters who lack Photo ID and who would vote via provisional ballots could obtain a Photo ID card within the forty-eight hour period. Indeed, although many organizations are more than happy to transport individuals to polling places on election day, it is unlikely that those organizations or any other organization or individual would be able or willing to provide transportation to DDS service centers to allow voters of provisional ballots to obtain Photo ID cards. The ability to vote a provisional ballot thus is an illusion. Further, many voters may not even attempt to vote a provisional ballot in person because they do not have a Photo ID, and they believe that they cannot make the necessary arrangements to obtain a Photo ID within forty-eight hours after casting their votes. 93 SAO 72A (Rev )

4 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 4 of 4 of The right to vote is a delicate franchise. Indeed, the Court notes that Plaintiff Watkins declined to pursue his claim when he was informed that Defendants planned to depose him.' Given the fragile nature of the right to vote, and the restrictions discussed above, the Court finds that the Photo ID requirement imposes "severe" restrictions on the right to vote. In particular, the Photo ID requirement makes the exercise of the fundamental right to vote extremely difficult for voters currently without acceptable forms of Photo ID for whom obtaining a Photo ID would be a hardship. Unfortunately, the Photo ID requirement is most likely to prevent Georgia's elderly, poor, and African-American voters from voting. For those citizens, the character and magnitude of their injury-- the loss of their right to vote--is undeniably demoralizing and extreme, as those citizens are likely to have no other realistic or effective means of protecting their rights. ii. State Intere st The State and the State Defendants assert that the Photo ID requirement is designed to curb voting fraud. Undoubtedly, this interest is an important one. Unfortunately, the fact 8 Counsel for Plaintiff Watkins indicated during an October 5, 2005, telephone conference with the Court that Plaintiff Watkins likely would choose not to participate in this litigation if the Court did not grant a request for a protective order to prevent Defendants from deposing him. 94 S AO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

5 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 5 of 5 of that the interest asserted is important and is legitimate does not end the Court's inquiry. iii. Extent to Which the State ' s Interest In Preventing Voter Fraud Makes It Necessary to Burden the Right to Vote Finally, the Court must examine the extent to which the State's interest in preventing voter fraud makes it necessary to burden the right to vote. As discussed above, the Photo ID requirement is not narrowly tailored to the State's proffered interest of preventing voter fraud, and likely is not rationally based on that interest. Secretary of State Cox testified that her office has not received even one complaint of in-person voter fraud over the past eight years and that the possibility of someone voting under the name of a deceased person has been addressed by her Office's monthly removal of recently deceased persons from the voter roles. Further, the Photo ID requirement does absolutely nothing to preclude or reduce the possibility for the particular types of voting fraud that are indicated by the evidence : voter fraud in absentee voting, and fraudulent voter registrations. The State imposes no Photo ID requirement or absolute identification requirement for registering to vote, and has removed the conditions for obtaining an absentee ballot imposed by the previous law. In short, HB 244 opened the door wide to fraudulent voting via absentee ballots. Under those 95 oap 72A (Rev. 8/82)

6 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 6 of 6 of circumstances, the State Defendants' proffered interest simply does not justify the severe burden that the Photo ID requirement places on the right to vote. For those reasons, the Court concludes that the Photo ID requirement fails even the Burdick test. C. Summary For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that under either the strict scrutiny or Burdick test, Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claim that the Photo ID requirement unduly burdens the right to vote. Consequently, this factor counsels in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. 3. Poll Tax Plaintiffs next argue that the Photo ID requirement imposes a poll tax on Georgia voters. Plaintiffs point out that voters who do not have a Georgia driver's license, a passport, or another valid form of Government-issued identification must pay $20 to obtain a five-year Photo ID card or $35 to obtain a ten-year Photo ID card. Plaintiffs contend that even though the Photo ID requirement does not use the term "poll tax," the fee for the Photo ID card is a tax and is not a user fee. Even if the Photo ID card fee is not a tax as defined under Georgia law, Plaintiffs contend that the State cannot evade the requirements of the Fourteenth and 96 Ib, A0 72A (Rev. 8182)

7 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 7 of 7 of Twenty-Fourth Amendments by labeling something as a "fee" when, in reality, it is a tax on the right to vote. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides : "The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." U.S. Const. amend. XXIV. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment thus applies to elections for certain federal officials. Plaintiffs contend that the $20 fee for a five-year Photo ID card or the $35 fee for a ten-year Photo ID is a poll tax because voters who do not have other acceptable forms of Photo ID must obtain the Photo ID card to cast their votes in person at the polls. Although Defendants point out that the DDS can waive the Photo ID card fee for voting under certain circumstances, Plaintiffs argue that this fee waiver provision is illusory. In any event, Plaintiffs argue that the possibility that a small number of voters can avoid paying the cost for a Photo ID card does not make the Photo ID scheme constitutionally permissible ; it still places a burden on the right to vote. For the following reasons, the Court finds that 97 % A0 72A (Rev. 6182)

8 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 8 of 8 of Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on their poll tax claim. In Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia requirement that a federal voter either pay the customary poll taxes as required for state elections or file a certificate of residence. The Supreme Court reasoned that the requirement to file a certificate of residence imposed a material requirement solely upon those who refused to surrender their right to vote in federal elections without paying the poll tax, and, consequently, the requirement violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 380 U.S. at The Supreme Court stated : It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution. "Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be. indirectly denied," or "manipulated out of existence." Significantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment does not merely insure that the franchise shall not be "denied" by reason of failure to pay the poll tax ; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote shall not be "denied or abridged" for that reason. Thus, like the Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes" of impairing the right guaranteed. "It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise" by those claiming the constitutional immunity. Thus, in order to demonstrate the invalidity of of the Virginia Code, it need only be shown that it imposes a material requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a poll tax. Section unquestionably erects a real obstacle to voting in federal elections for those who assert their constitutional exemption 98 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

9 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page 9 of 9 of from the poll tax. As previously indicated, the requirement for those who wish to participate in federal elections without paying the poll tax is that they file in each election year, within a stated interval ending six months before the election, a notarized or witnessed certificate attesting that they have been continuous residents of the State since the date of registration (which might have been many years before under Virginia's system of permanent registration) and that they do not presently intend to leave the city or county in which they reside prior to the forthcoming election. Unlike the poll tax bill which is sent to the voter's residence, it is not entirely clear how one obtains the necessary certificate.. This is plainly a cumbersome procedure. In effect, it amounts to annual re-registration which Virginia officials have sharply contrasted with the "simple" poll tax system. For many, it would probably seem far preferable to mail in the poll tax payment upon receipt of the bill. In addition, the certificate must be filed six months before the election, thus perpetuating one of the disenfranchising characteristics of the poll tax which the Twentyfourth Amendment was designed to eliminate. We are thus constrained to hold that the requirement imposed upon the voter who refuses to pay the poll tax constitutes an abridgement of his right to vote by reason of failure to pay the poll tax. The requirement imposed upon those who reject the poll tax method of qualifying would not be saved even if it could be said that it is no more onerous, or even somewhat less onerous, than the poll tax. For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a pre-requisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder substitute may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon the federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the constitutional immunity subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-fourth Amendment and must fall under its ban. 380 U.S. at (citations omitted ; footnote omitted). Similarly, in Har er v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 664 (1966), the Supreme Court struck down 99 %Aa 72A (Rcv. 8/82)

10 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 Virginia's poll tax requirement for state elections, finding that the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated : We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax. Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate. Thus without questioning the power of a State to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot, we held that a State may not deny the opportunity to vote to a bona fide resident merely because he is a member of the armed services.. Previously we had said that neither homesite nor occupation "affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State." We think the same must be true of requirements of wealth or affluence or payment of a fee. 383 U.S. at (citations omitted). The Court further observed : [W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored. To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. In this context-that is, as a condition of obtaining a ballot-the requirement of fee paying causes an "invidious" discrimination that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause no 7zA (Rev. 8 / 82)

11 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 Id. at 668. After the enactment of the Photo ID requirement, voters who do not have other acceptable forms of Photo ID must obtain Photo ID cards to be able to vote in person at the polls. Voters who choose not to obtain Photo ID cards, or who are unable to obtain Photo ID cards for one reason or another, are free to vote via absentee ballot. As discussed supra Part III.A.2., however, absentee voting is unavailable to many voters who do not have forms of Photo ID--either because those voters are unaware of their eligibility to vote via absentee ballot or because the voters are unable to navigate the absentee voting process successfully. As a practical matter, therefore, the majority of voters who do not have other acceptable forms of Photo ID must obtain a Photo ID card to cast their votes successfully and to ensure that their votes will be counted. The fee for a Photo ID card is $20 for a five-year card and $35 for a ten-year card. Because, as a practical matter, most voters who do not possess other forms of Photo ID must obtain a Photo ID card to exercise their right to vote, even though those voters have no other need for a Photo ID card, requiring those voters to purchase a Photo ID card effectively places a cost on the right to vote. In that respect, the Photo ID requirement runs afoul of the Twenty-fourth Amendment 101 % A4 72A (Rev. 8/82)

12 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 for federal elections and violates the Equal Protection Clause for State and municipal elections.' Defendants argue that the DDS service centers will waive the fee for a Photo ID card if a voter who does not have another acceptable form of Photo ID needs the Photo ID card for voting purposes and if the voter completes an Affidavit. The Affidavit requires the voter to sign the following statement : I hereby swear or affirm that I am eligible for a free identification card f or voting purposes pursuant to O.C.G.A (d). I am eligible for this card because : 1. I am indigent and cannot pay the fee for an identification card ; 2. 1 desire an identification card in order to vote in a primary or election in Georgia ; 3. I do not have any other form of identification that is acceptable under O.C.G.A for identification at the polls in order to vote ; 4. I am registered to vote in Georgia or I am applying to register to vote as part of my application for an identification card ; and 5. I do not have a valid driver's license issued by the State of Georgia. 9 See John Victor Berry, Take the Money and Run : Lame-Ducks "Quack" and Pass Voter Identification Provisions, 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 291, 304, 314 (1997) (noting that "[t]he Attorney General of Michigan made the observation [with respect to a Michigan voter identification law] that : `Requiring purchased photo identification is a reprise of the notorious poll tax scheme used in the past to prevent voting ;"' and that "the ability to obtain certain types of photo identification costs money, which is unconstitutional in light of Harper, as a qualification based on affluence.. "). 102 oa0 72A (Rev. 8/82)

13 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 (Watson Decl. Ex. A.) The DDS, however, instructs its employees not to investigate the truth of the representations made by voters who complete the Affidavit. Instead, DDS employees are to issue a Photo ID card to any voter who completes the Affidavit, without asking any questions. As discussed supra Part III.A.2., however, many voters may not be aware of that policy, and understandably may be reluctant to sign an Affidavit that requires them to state that they are "indigent and cannot pay the fee for an identification card" when such a statement is not true. Additionally, many voters simply may be too embarrassed over their inability to afford a Photo ID card to request and complete an Affidavit for a free card. Berry, supra note 9, at 307. Consequently, very few voters likely will take advantage of the fee waiver affidavit option. In any event, as Plaintiffs' counsel correctly observes, the fact that some individuals avoid paying the cost for the Photo ID card does not mean that the Photo ID card is not a poll tax. Moreover, even if the Court accepts as true Defendants' argument that the fee waiver affidavit option is realistically available for any voter who wishes to use that option, the fee waiver affidavit still runs afoul of the Twenty-fourth Amendment. As the Supreme Court noted in Harman, any material requirement imposed upon a voter solely because of the voter's 10 3 S AO 72A (Rev. 8182)

14 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 refusal to pay a poll tax violates the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Harman, 380 U.S. at 542. A voter who does not have another acceptable form of Photo ID and who wishes to vote must, as a practical matter, obtain a Photo ID card. To obtain a Photo ID card, the voter must arrange for transportation to a DDS service center or the GLOW bus, if that option is available, and must navigate the lengthy waiting process successfully. The voter then must pay the $20 fee or sign the fee waiver affidavit, which may require the voter to swear or affirm to facts that simply are not true in order to avoid paying the $20 fee. Under those circumstances, the Court cannot determine that the fee waiver affidavit is not a material requirement, as discussed in Harman. Consequently, the Court finds that the Photo ID requirement imposes a poll tax. For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the Photo ID requirement constitutes a poll tax. The Photo ID requirement thus violates the Twenty-fourth Amendment with respect to federal elections and violates the Equal Protection Clause with respect to State and municipal elections. Under those circumstances, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits with respect to their poll tax claim. 104 oa0 72A (Rev. 8182)

15 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that Georgia's Photo ID requirement violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A by applying different standards to absentee and inperson voters within the same county and by precluding voting due to an omission that is not material to the right to vote under Georgia law. Defendants argue that both of Plaintiffs' claims under 1971 fail as a matter of law because 1971 does not furnish a private right of action. Because that argument may dispose of Plaintiffs' 1971 claims, the Court addresses that argument before turning to the particulars of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants rely on language in 1971(c) stating that "the Attorney General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventative relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order." (State Defs.' Br. Opp'n Pls. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 49 (citation omitted).) Defendants rely wholly on the quoted statutory language and cite two cases as additional support for their argument : Willing v. Lake Orion Community School Board of Trustees, 924 F. Supp. 815, 820 (E.D. Mich. 1996), and Good v. Roy, 459 F. Supp. 403, 405 (D. Kan. 1978). Defendants further contend that even if 105 SAO 72A (Rev )

16 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of affords Plaintiffs a private right of action, Plaintiffs' claims still fail because the Photo ID requirement does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or previous condition. The Eleventh Circuit directly addressed the issue of whether 1971 could be enforced by a private right of action in Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). In Schweir, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court ruling which relied on McKa v. Tham son, 226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000), which in turn relied entirely on Willing, which in turn relied entirely on Good--the two cases cited by Defendants. The Eleventh Circuit held that "the provisions of section 1971 of the Voting Rights Act may be enforced by a private right of action under 1983." Schwier, 340 F. 3d at The Eleventh Circuit's holding is not limited to the fact pattern at issue in Schweir, regarding an individual's refusal to disclose his social security account number, and Judges Dubina, Black, and Ryskamp conducted a thorough analysis of the legislative history behind 1971(c) and the Supreme Court's rationale behind holdings permitting private rights of action to enforce other sections of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at The Court is bound to apply Schweir, and the Court consequently finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs 106 SAO 72A (Rev. $ I82)

17 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 may assert a private right of action under 197 for the alleged voting rights violations at issue. a. 42 U. S. C. A. 1971(a) (2) (A) First, Plaintiffs argue that Georgia's Photo ID requirement violates 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a)(2)(A) by applying different standards in determining whether individuals within the same county or other political subdivision are qualified to vote. 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a) (2) (A) provides that "[n]o person acting under color of state law shall," when "determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote." 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a)(2)(A). Plaintiffs argue that the Photo ID requirement runs afoul of this subsection because the Photo ID requirement applies different standards to voters who reside in the same city or county who vote absentee than it applies to people who vote in person. Plaintiffs note that the Photo ID requirement applies only to voters who vote in person at the polls, while voters who vote absentee by mail do not have to comply with the Photo ID requirement unless they are registering to vote absentee, 107 S AO 72A (Rev. 8 / 82)

18 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 or are voting absentee for the first time. Additionally, voters who registered by mail and are voting by absentee ballot for the first time may include a utility bill or bank statement with their absentee ballot as a means of voter identification. (Oct. 12, 2005, Hr'g Tr.) Plaintiffs point out that although the stated purpose of the Photo ID requirement is to prevent voter fraud, the Photo ID requirement does nothing to address the largest sources of potential voter fraud--absentee voting and fraudulent voter registrations. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite to correspondence from Secretary of State Cox to Governor Perdue and the Georgia State Senate with respect to HB 244 indicating that over her tenure, she and her staff could not recall a single case or complaint of voter impersonation at the polls. In contrast, her office received numerous complaints of fraudulent absentee voting during the same time period. HB 244, in Secretary of State Cox's opinion, expanded opportunities for absentee voting by mail by eliminating the previous restrictions on obtaining an absentee ballot. Consequently, Plaintiffs contend that the Photo ID requirement, by its plain language, clearly violates 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a) (2) (A) because it imposes standards on voters in the same county or city that differ for absentee voters versus in-person voters. 108 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

19 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 Defendants contend that HB 244 does not apply different standards in determining whether any individual is qualified under State law to vote in person in any election. Defendants argue that individuals who choose to vote in person are all held to the same standard regardless of their race or color, and that individuals who choose to vote by absentee ballot are all held to the same standard regardless of their race or color. Plaintiffs cited no case law and provided limited information in support of this claim at the preliminary injunction hearing. The Court therefore cannot determine at this point that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of this claim. Because Plaintiffs may be able to produce evidence and authority at a later stage of the proceedings that support this claim, the Court reserves a ruling on the merits of a claim for a later date. b. 42 U. S. C. A. 1971(a) (2) (B) Second, Plaintiffs contend that Georgia's Photo ID requirement violates 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a)(2)(B), which prohibits a person acting under color of law from "deny[ing] the right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in determining 1 09 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

20 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election." 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs contend that to be qualified to vote in Georgia, a voter need only : (1) be a United States citizen ; (2) be a legal resident of the county where he or she seeks to register ; (3) be at least 18 years old ; and (4) not be serving a sentence for a felony conviction involving moral turpitude or have been found mentally incompetent by a judge. Ga. Const. art. II, 1. Plaintiffs observe that none of those requirements include presenting a Photo ID, and that a Photo ID therefore cannot be material to determining whether an individual is qualified under State law to vote. In any event, Plaintiffs argue that because the Photo ID requirement does not apply to most absentee voters, the Photo ID requirement cannot be said to be "material" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(a)(2)(B). Defendants contest these assertions and argue that Plaintiffs' claim must fail because the Photo ID requirement does not add any condition on voter qualifications and that there is no error or omission on any record that is being used to disqualify any potential voter. Further, Defendants point out that a legislature traditionally has been allowed to reform state law one step at a time and therefore, the General 110 oa0 72A (Rev. 8/82)

21 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 Assembly may address one potential avenue for voter fraud at a time. Plaintiffs cited no case law and provided limited information in support of this claim at the preliminary injunction hearing. At this point, the Court simply cannot determine whether Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of this claim. Because Plaintiffs may be able to present sufficient evidence and authority to succeed on this claim at a later stage of the proceedings, the Court will not rule on the merits of the claim at this time. 5. Voti ng Rights Act of 1965 Finally, Plaintiffs a r gue that the Photo ID requirement violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 1973(a). That statute provides, in relevant part : "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account o f race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section." 42 U.S.C.A. 1973(a). 42 U.S.C.A. 1973(b) sets forth the requirements for establishing a violation of 1973(a), and states : A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 1 11 f,%,a4 72A (Rev. 8/82)

22 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered : Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C.A. 1973(b). Plaintiffs assert a claim of vote denial under 1973 (a), rather than a claim of vote dilution. The Supreme Court, however, has observed that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not simply vote dilution. Thornburg v. tingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 n.10 (1986 ). After the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, a plaintiff asserting a violation of Section 2 need not present "proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters." Id. at 44. Instead, the plaintiff must show that "'as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice."' Id. The Supreme Court has observed : In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or 1 12 S AO 72A (Rev. 8182)

23 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 practice on minority electoral opportunities "on the basis of objective factors." The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a 2 claim : the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision ; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized ; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting ; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes ; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and heath, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process ; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns ; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State's or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have probative value. The Report stresses, however, that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive. While the enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types of 2 violations, particularly vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and may be considered. Furthermore, the Senate Committee observed that "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." Rather, the Committee determined that "the question whether the political processes are `equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the `past and present reality,"' and on a "functional" view of the political process. Id. at (citations omitted ; footnote omitted). "The essence of a 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, SAO 7 2A (Rev. 8/82) 113

24 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." Id. at 47. Similarly, in Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed : Vote denial occurs when a state employs a "standard, practice, or procedure" that results in the denial of the right to vote on account of race. To prevail, a plaintiff must prove that "under the totality of the circumstances, the political processes are not equally open to participation by [members of a protected class].. in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." In making this inquiry, courts consider a non-exclusive list of objective factors (the "Senate factors") detailed in a Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments. 405 F.3d at 1228 n.26 (citations omitted) (alterations and omissions in original). Plaintiffs have presented declarations and Census data in support of their 2 vote denial claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to socio-economic data from the 2000 Census indicating that in Georgia : (1) 17.3 percent of African- American households have an income of less than $10,000, compared to 7.4 percent of Caucasian, non-hispanic households ; (2) an additional 16.0 percent of African-American households have incomes between $10,000 and $19,999, compared to SAO 72A (Re v. 8/82)

25 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 percent of Caucasian, non-hispanic households ; (3) 27.5 percent of African-Americans ages twenty-five or older have less than a high school education, including general equivalency degrees, as compared with 17.3 percent of Caucasian, non-hispanics ages twenty-five or older ; (4) 23.1 percent of African-Americans of all ages live below the poverty line, compared to 7.8 percent of Caucasian, non- Hispanic individuals ; (5) 24.7 percent of African-Americans ages sixty-five through seventy-four live below the poverty line, as compared to 7.8 percent of Caucasian, non-hispanic individuals in the same age group ; (6) 32.1 percent of African-Americans aged seventy-five and over live below the poverty line, as compared to 12.9 percent of Caucasian, non- Hispanic individuals aged seventy-five or over ; (7) 17.7 percent of African-American households have no vehicle available, as compared to 4.4 percent of Caucasian, non- Hispanic households ; and (8) only one of the eight Georgia counties with the highest percentage of African-American residents--sixty percent or higher--has a DDS service center. Plaintiffs also plan to present data indicating that in Georgia, 11.0 percent of Caucasians, 26.0 percent of African- Americans, and 30.0 percent of Latinos live below the poverty line. Plaintiffs argue that this evidence is sufficient to show depressed political participation by minorities and to 115 SAO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

26 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 demonstrate that the Photo ID requirement will discourage voting by minority voters. At this point, however, the Court simply cannot agree with Plaintiffs that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits with respect to their 2 vote denial claim. The Court therefore is reluctant to grant preliminary injunctive relief to Plaintiffs based on their 2 vote denial claim. Recognizing that Plaintiffs may be able to produce sufficient evidence at a later stage of the proceedings to support their 2 vote denial claim, the Court reserves a final ruling on the merits of that claim for a later date. B. Irreparable Harm The Court next addresses the second factor for obtaining a preliminary injunction--whether Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not enter a preliminary injunction. For the reasons discussed supra Part III.A., the Court concludes that the Photo ID requirement unduly burdens the fundamental right to vote, and likely will cause a number of Georgia voters to be unable to cast a vote and to have their votes counted. The Court also concludes that the Photo ID requirement constitutes a poll tax. Although Defendants argue that the Photo ID requirement will not deprive a single Georgia voter of the right to vote, SAO 72A (Rev. 8182)

27 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 because voters without Photo IDs can vote absentee ballots, as a practical matter, a significant number of the registered Georgia voters who lack Photo IDs likely are unaware of that alternative or would not be able to navigate the absentee ballot voting process successfully. Voters who lack Photo IDs and are unaware of the absentee voting alternative, yet still desire to vote, must undertake the often difficult and burdensome process of obtaining a Photo ID card. Still others who can navigate this process successfully either must pay a fee for a Photo ID card or sign an Affidavit swearing that they are indigent and do not have the funds to pay for the card--whether or not that statement is true--to obtain a free Photo ID card. The Photo ID requirement thus has the likely effect of causing a significant number of Georgia voters to forego going to the polls or to forego obtaining and voting an absentee ballot. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they or their constituents will suffer irreparable harm if the Court declines to enter a preliminary injunction. This factor therefore weighs in favor of granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction S AO 72A (Rev. 8/82)

28 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 C. Threatened Injury to Plaintiffs Weighed Against the Damage to the State Caused by a Prelim inary Injunction Next, the Court must weigh the threatened injury to Plaintiffs against the damage to the State caused by a preliminary injunction. Defendants presented evidence that the entry of a preliminary injunction likely will result in confusion for voters, poll workers, and elections officials, and may result in an inconsistent application of the identification requirements. Defendants have pointed out that it will be extremely difficult for the Elections Division to produce new voter certificates and posters and for all local elections officials to receive sufficient numbers of voter certificates and posters for polling locations. Further, Defendants' evidence indicates that local elections officials lack sufficient time to conduct training for poll workers and to educate the public. The Court certainly appreciates and understands the inconvenience and expense that entering a preliminary injunction may work upon the State and Defendants. The Court, however, is mindful that the right to vote is a fundamental right and is preservative of all other rights. Denying an individual the right to vote works a serious, irreparable injury upon that individual. Given the right at issue and the likely injury caused by not entering a preliminary injunction, 118 SAO 72A ( Re v. 8/82)

29 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 the Court finds that the potential injury to Plaintiffs outweighs the harm to the State and Defendants caused by entering a preliminary injunction. This factor therefore counsels in favor of entering a preliminary injunction. D. Public Interest Finally, the Court must determine whether issuing a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest. At the outset, the Court acknowledges that preventing voter fraud serves the public interest by ensuring that those individuals who have registered properly to vote are allowed to vote and to have their votes counted in any given election. As discussed supra Part III.A., however, the current Photo ID requirement simply is not targeted toward eliminating or preventing the only types of voter fraud that are supported by the evidence presented thus far : fraudulent voter registrations and fraudulent absentee voting. Rather, HB 244 opens the door wide for fraudulent absentee voting by removing the conditions for obtaining an absentee ballot. As discussed supra Parts III.A.2. and A.3., the Photo ID requirement unduly burdens the right of many properly registered Georgia voters to vote, is a poll tax, and has the likely effect of causing many of those voters to forego voting or of precluding those voters from voting at the polls. Because the right to vote is a fundamental right, removing the undue burdens on that right 119 oa0 72A (Rev. 8182)

30 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 imposed by the Photo ID requirement serves the public interest. This factor therefore counse l s in favor of granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. E. Summary In sum, the Court finds that the four factors for granting a preliminary injunction weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. In particular, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Photo ID requirement unduly burdens the right to vote and a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Photo ID requirement constitutes a poll tax. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs and their constituents will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not grant a preliminary injunction, and that the threatened harm to Plaintiffs outweighs the injury to Defendants and the State that will result from issuing a preliminary injunction. Finally, the Court finds that entering a preliminary injunction will serve the public interest. Consequently, the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observes that it has great respect for the Georgia legislature. The Court, however, simply has more respect for the Constitution. Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have a substantial 120 SAO 7 2A (Rev. 8/82)

31 Case Case 1:05-cv SEB-VSS 4:05-cv HLM Document Filed Filed 10/18/ /31/2005 Page Page of 33 of 33 likelihood of succeeding on their claims that the Photo ID requirement unduly burdens the right to vote and constitutes a poll tax, the Court must enter a preliminary injunction against the Photo ID requirement The Court acknowledges that its conclusion differs from the decisions reached in League of Women Voters v. Blackwe l l, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 2004), Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404 (E.D. Mich. 2004), and Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, No. 04CV7709, 2004 WL (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2004). All of those cases, however, involved identification requirements that allowed voters to show means of identification other than Photo IDs. Georgia's Photo ID requirement, however, applies to in-person voting and goes one step further than the laws challenged in Blackwell, Bay County Democratic Party, and Colorado Common Cause. For instance, Blackwell involved a challenge to an Ohio law implementing HAVA that required individuals who registered to vote by mail and who did not submit acceptable documentary proof of identity with their voter applications to provide "acceptable documentary proof" of their identities prior to voting. 340 F. Supp. 2d at 826. Such proof could include "a current and valid photo identification," or '"[a] copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows [the voter's] name and address." Id. Bay County Democratic P a rty, in turn, involved a challenge to directives issued to Michigan local elections officials concerning casting and tabulating provisional ballots, as well as a directive pertaining to proof of identity for first-time voters who registered by mail. 347 F. Supp. 2d at The directive concerning proof of identity for first-time in-person voters who registered by mail was revised to allow those voters to furnish the identification required by HAVA either at the polls or during a six-day period after election day. Id. at 434. The HAVA requirements, however, allowed individuals who registered by mail to present a current, valid Photo ID or "a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter." 42 U.S.C.A Finally, Colorado Common Cause also involved 1 21 wk%,aa 7z.a (Rev. 8/82)