September Term, No.34. JOHN DOE, et al., MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND September Term, 2012 No.34 JOHN DOE, et al., Petitioners, v. MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Respondents. RESPONDENT MDPETITIONS.COM'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI John Doe, et al. v. Maryland State Board of Elections, et al. Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, Case No. 02-C Filed August 1, 2011 The Honorable Ronald A. Silkworth Paul J. Orfanedes Chris Fedeli JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. 425 Third Street, S.W., Ste. 800 Washington, DC Tel: (202) Fax: (202) Attorneys for Respondent MdPetitions. com

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS RESPONDENT MDPETITIONS.COM'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CER TIORARL l ST AND ARD OF REVIEW INTRODUCTION COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION...6 I. Review is Not Necessary to Secure Uniformity ofdecision...7 II. No Special Circumstances Render It Desirable and in the the Public Interest That the Circuit Court's Decision be Reviewed A. Petitioners failed to support their claims below B. Petitioners' assertion that Senate Bill 167 directly mandates and requires spending increases is wrong C. Petitioners' other arguments for granting review are without merit CONCLUSION CERTIFICAIB OF SERVICE... 17

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230 (1940) , 7 Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408 (2000) Kelly v. lvarylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md (1987)... 2, 7 Vanhook v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co.. 22 Md. App. 22 (1974)... 9 Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules Md. Const., ar. XVI, 2... passim 2009 Laws of Maryland, ch. 487, Laws of Maryland, ch. 484, : Laws of Maryland, ch. 497, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc Md. Code Ann., Educ , 12 Md. Rule 8-303(d)

4 RESPONDENT MDPETITIONS.COM'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Respondent MdPetitions.com ("MdPetitions.com"), by counsel and pursuant to Md. Rule 8-303(d), respectfully submits this Answer in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("the Petition") filed by Petitioners John Doe, et al. (''Petitioners"). STANDARD OF REVIEW The granting of a writ of certiorari is appropriate where doing so is necessary to secure uniformity of decision or where the legal question presents special circumstances making certiorari desirable and in the public interest. Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408, 418 (2000), citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc INTRODUCTION Petitioners, who were the plaintiffs below, ask this Court to review a decision of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (the "Circuit Court") granting summary judgment in favor ofmdpetitions.com, the Maryland State Board of Election, the State Administrator of Elections, and the Secretary ofstate. In the Circuit Court, Petitioners had sought to reverse the State Board of Election's certification that Senate Bill which had been enacted by the General Assembly during its 2011 session and was signed by the Governor on May 10, was subject to referendum in the November 2012 election. Senate Bill 167 changes Maryland existing tuition policy to make certain unlawfully present aliens eligible for in-state tuition at Maryland's community colleges and public universities. 1

5 Petitioners' sole legal argument in the Circuit Court was that Senate Bill 167 was an "appropriation" for "maintaining State government" and therefore was subject to an exception to the people's right of referendum set forth in Article XVI, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution. After reviewing the clear and unambiguous text of Senate Bill 167 and applying this Court's well-established precedent defining the term "appropriation" under Article XVI, Section 2, the Circuit Court found that Senate Bill 167 was a policy bill, not an "appropriation," and therefore was not subject to the exception. Consequently, the Circuit Court rejected Petitioners' attempt to deprive Maryland's voters of the opportunity to vote on whether Senate Bill 167 should become law. Review of the Circuit Court's ruling is not necessary to secure uniformity of decision. Petitioners do not even appear to argue as much. In fact, Petitioners raise what they assert is a question of first impression by a king the Court to reconsider its longstanding precedent under Article XVI, Section 2. Since at least as early as 1940, the Court has held that a bill enacted by the General Assembly is an "appropriation" for purposes of the Article XVI, Section 2 if its "primary object is to authorize the withdrawal from the state treasury of a certain sum of money for a specified public objective or purpose to which such sum is to be applied." Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 459 (1987) (quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 245 (1940)). Petitioners seek to expand this definition to include bills that "directly 12. Far from seeking to secure uniformity of decision, Petitioners seek to expand the 2

6 exception to the people's right of referendum in Article XVI, Section 2 to new and potentially enormous categories of legislation, thereby substantially diminishing the constitutional rights of Maryland voters. Nor are any special circumstances present that render it desirable and in the public interest that the Circuit Court's ruling be reviewed. If anything, the opposite is true. First, the Circuit Court reached the merits of Petitioners' sole legal argument despite the complete absence of any affidavits or other factual evidence submitted by Petitioners in support of their summary judgment motion or in opposition to Respondents' crossmotions. Petitioners' claims in the Circuit Court suffered from a fundamental failure of proof: They would not have prevailed even if the Circuit Court had defined the term "appropriation" in the expansive and unprecedented manner Petitioners advocate. Second, the entire premise behind Petitioners' request that the Court reconsider its longstanding precedent is erroneous. Petitioners base their request on the assertion that Senate Bill 167 directly mandates and requires future spending increases in amounts "to be determined" in future Budget Bills. Nothing in Senate Bill 167 directly or even indirectly mandates or requires that future Governors and future General Assemblies provide any particular level of state support to community colleges in future fiscal years. Consequently, even if the Court were to hold that a bill that "directly mandates and requires" an increase in future spending constitutes an "appropriation" for purpose of the exception, Petitioners still would not be entitled to any relief because Senate Bill 167 is standing precedent and redefined the term "appropriation" in the expansive way 3

7 Petitioners advocate. Accordingly, no special circumstances make it desirable and in the public interest that this Court review the Circuit Court's ruling, which was nothing more than a garden variety application of this Court's longstanding precedent to a quintessential policy choice enacted by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor. If anything, the public interest requires that Petitioners' failed legal challenge to the State Board of Election's certification comes to an end now, without farther litigation, so that the parties and the voters of Maryland can focus on the upcoming referendum. The State Board of Elections determined that MdPetition.com had satisfied all of the requirements for submitting Senate Bill 167 to referendwn and certified the provision for placement on the November 2012 ballot. The Circuit Com1 reviewed that determination and found that it was correct. Further litigation will only distract from the referendum process. It is time for Maryland's voters to have their say. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioners' statement of the case fails to fully describe the nature of the legislation and proceedings at issue, so a brief counterstatement is in order. In 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 167, sometimes referred to as the "Maryland Dream Act." Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Amend. Compl.") at, 6. This new tuition policy would make certain unlawfully present aliens eligible for reduced, in-state tuition at Maryland's sixteen,,.,...,,,n : er,.., -..vuuuu.. 7"' 1 al II " - B c o uy... " olleges ""' d,..,+i.., i.1: un: ve-s :+: en 'V c.uj vuiv1 puuuiv u 1 iu ;,. i.u. 0c;1u1le 1 u vv a u l enacted as part of an annual budget bill or supplemental appropriation bill. Intervener's 4

8 Statement of Grounds and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support oflntervener's Cross-Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment ("MdPetitions.com's SJ Mem.") at 2. Nor was it referred to either the Senates Budget and Taxation Committee or the House of Delegate's Appropriations Committee, which are the committees that consider proposed education appropriations. Id. Rather, it was referred to the Senate's Education, Health, and Environmental Affairs Committee and the House of Delegates' Ways and Means Committee, which are committees that consider proposed general laws and policy questions, not appropriations. Id. MdPetitions.com organized and led the petition drive to place Senate Bill 167 on the November 2012 ballot. Amend. Compl. at 33. Throughout May and June 2011, MdPetitions.com collected a total of 132,071 signatures in support of the petition. Id. at The State Board of Elections ultimately verified and validated 108,923 of those signatures -- nearly twice the amount required - and certified that Senate Bill 167 would be placed on the November 2012 ballot. Id. at 136. Petitioners then commenced this lawsuit to prevent the voters of tvlaryland from deciding for themselves whether Senate Bill 167 should become law. As the petition sponsor, MdPetitions.com sought and was granted pennission to intervene in Petitioners' lawsuit. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to a mutually agreed-upon scheduling. See September 22, 2011 Scheduling Order. Petitioners, however, failed to submit any evidence whatsoever in suppmt of their swumary judgment motion or in opposition to tv1dpetition.com's crossmotion or the cross-motion of Defendants. See, e.g., MdPetitions.com's SJ Mem. at 3-4; 5

9 Intervener's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Cross-Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment ("MdPetitions.com's SJ Reply") at I, 2, 5, and 7. Petitioners failed to submit so much as a single affidavit from one of the the named plaintiffs attesting to who they were, how they claimed to be aggrieved, whether they were registered to vote in Maryland, or even what their interest was in the the new policy. Id. On February 17, 2012, the Circuit Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor ofmdpetitions.com, the Maryland State Board of Election, the State Administrator of Elections, and the Secretary of State. Petitioners now seek further review from this Court. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION Petitioners ask the Court to grant certiorari to decide whether a statute that "directly mandates and requires an increase in future appropriations" is an "appropriation" for purposes of the referendum exception to the people's right of referendum. Petition at 5; see also id. at 12. Review of the Circuit Court's ruling is not necessary to secure uniformity in the law because the Circuit Court's ruling was firmly rooted in this Court's precedent. It is Petitioners' attempt to drastically and expansively redefine the term "appropriation," not the Circuit Court's ruling, that is at odds with longstanding precedent. Nor are there any special circumstances that render it desirable and in the public interest that the Circuit Court's ruling be reviewed. Indeed, this case is wholly unsuited for reconsidering this Court's longstanding precedent defining the term "appropriation" because the question presented for review by Petitioners is irrelevant to the outcome of this litigation, if not moot. 6

10 I. Review is Not Necessary to Secure Uniformity of Decision. The law defining the term "appropriation" for purposes of the exception to the people's right to referendum is well-established. An act of the General Assembly is an "appropriation" for purposes of the exception if its "primary object is to authorize the withdrawal from the state treasury of a certain sum of money for a specified public object or purpose to which such sum is to be applied." Kelly, 310 Md. at 459 (quoting Dorsey, 178 Md. at 245. A general law does not constitute an "appropriation" for purposes of the exception even if it contains an incidental provision for the appropriation of public funds. Id. (citing Dorsey, 147 Md. at 251 ). Petitioners do not appear to argue that the Circuit Court deviated from this wellestablished definition in ruling that Senate Bill 167 is a general law, not an "appropriation." The question of whether Senate Bill 167 is a general law or an appropriation is a simple one that can be answered merely by reviewing the bill itself. Consequently, Petitioners re-cast the question presented for review to be whether this Court should essentially rewrite the Maryland Constitution to exclude from the people's right of referendum not only revenue raising and spending bills, but also bills that 1 "directly mandate[] and require[] an increase in future appropriations. Petition at 5; see It bears noting that Petitioners' current formulation of the legal question presented for review differs substantially from the question they presented, at least initially, to the Circuit Court. In their summary judgment papers, Petitioners expressly denied any claim that Senate Bill 167 must be considered in pari materia with any other statute, future or otherwise, in order to constitute an "appropriation." Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 16 ("The issue here is whether [Senate Bill 167] itselfis a 'law making any appropriation' within the meaning of the Referendum 7

11 also id. at 12. Multiple times, Petitioners observe that the Court has "never addressed" this question. Id. at 12 (the "question has never been directly addressed"), 14 (the "Court has never addressed the question..."), and 15 (this is "an issue of :first impression for this Court."). It has never been addressed because this Court has never defined the term "appropriation" as Petitioners do. What Petitioners are seeking is an enormous expansion of the exception in order to prevent Maryland voters from overturning unpopular legislation at the ballot box. Far from demonstrating that review is necessary to secure uniformity of decision, Petitioners ask this Court to grant review so that they may advocate for a drastic expansion of the exception to the people's right of referendum. Review is not warranted under such circumstances. II. No Special Circumstances Render It Desirable and in the Public Interest that the Circuit Court's Decision be Reviewed. Nor have Petitioners demonstrated the existence of any "special circumstances" that make it desirable and in the public interest that the Circuit Court's decision be reviewed. This case is wholly unsuited for litigating the unprecedented expansion of the exception to the people's right of referendum that Petitioners advocate. This is because, not only did Petitioners fail to present any evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment or in opposition to the cross-motions ofmdpetitions.com and Defendants, but Petitioners also are just plain wrong when they assert that Senate Bill 167 "directly mandates and requires'' increases in future appropriations. It does no such thing. Exception -- not whether [Senate Bill 167] is an integral part of a package with some other law that is an appropriation measure.") (emphasis original). 8

12 A. Petitioners failed to support their claims below. lt is axiomatic that, on summary judgment, a party must support its contentions by placing before the court facts that would be admissible into evidence at trial. Vanhook v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 22 Md. App. 22, 27 (1974). It also is axiomatic that "facts alleged in pleadings are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts for summary judgment purposes." Id. at 27. Petitioners had ample opportunity to place evidence before the Circuit Court demonstrating that they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. They failed to do so. For instance, Petitioners never offered any affidavits or other evidence supporting their factual contention that Plaintiff "John Doe" ever graduated from a Maryland high school, had any plans to attend community college in Maryland, or could satisfy any of the eligibility requirements of Senate Bill MdPetitions.com's SJ Mem. at 3-4; MdPctitions.com's SJ Reply at 1, 2, 5, and 7. Nor did Petitioners submit any affidavits or other evidence from Casa de Maryland to support their factual contention that Casa de Maryland would be "aggrieved" in any way if Senate Bill 167 did not become law. Id. While Petitioners alleged in their pleadings that Casa de Maryland would have to raise and expend additional funds to provide social services to unlawfully present aliens if Senate Bill 167 did not become law, they failed to present any evidence whatsoever to support this allegation. Id. Similarly, Petitioners also failed to present any affidavits or other evidence in support of Petitioner's factual contention that the "registered voter 2 Plaintiff"John Doe" is the sole remaining anonymous plaintiff now that Plaintiff "Jane Doe" has been removed from the lawsuit. Petition at 4, n.2. 9

13 plaintiffs" were actually who they claimed to be, were registered to vote in Maryland, and had been injured in some fashion or were at least sufficiently "interested" in Senate Bill 167 to seek a declaratory judgment. Id. Such facts obviously were material to Petitioners' claims, yet Petitioners either neglected or were unable to submit any evidence in support of these simple contentions despite ample opportunity to do so. Consequently, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to any relief at all. Given this fundamental failure of proof, Petitioners could not have prevailed on their claims no matter what definition of the term "appropriation" is applied. The question presented for review is moot. There is no reason for this Court to grant review to consider the drastic and unprecedented limitation on the people's right of referendum advocated by Petitioners when the answer will make no difference to the outcome. B. Petitioners' assertion that Senate Bill 167 directly mandates and requires spending increases is wrong. Petitioners' argument that the term "appropriation," as used in Article XVI, Section 2, should be redefined to include legislative enactments that "directly mandate[] and require[]" increases in "future appropriations" is premised on the contention that Senate Bill 167 is an enactment that somehow mandates future spending. Petition at 5 and 7 ("Thus, the law directly requires and mandates an increase in the amounts appropriated for community colleges... in future fiscal years.") (emphasis original). Petitioners' contention is wrong. Consequently, the Court need not grant review to consider whether the term "appropriation" includes bills that "directly mandate[] and require[]" increases in "future appropriations" because Senate Bill 167 is not such a bill. 10

14 State funding for community colleges in Maryland is based upon a statutory formula known as the Senator John A. Cade Funding Fommla ("the Cade Formula"). Regardless of Senate Bill 167, the Governor and the General Assembly will continue to be as free as they always have been to decide how much state funding to provide to community colleges in Budget Bills for future fiscal years. A full examination of the Cade Formula shows why this is the case. The Cade formula is not the automatic or mechanical trigger Petitioners claim it is. Under the Cade Formula, the State provides funding to community colleges based on a percentage of the funding that it chooses to provide to designated public four-year institutions of higher education per "full-time equivalent student." See Md. Code Ann., Educ ( c ). By way of example, if in a given year the Governor and the General Assembly choose to provide $100 of funding for each full-time equivalent student at a four-year institution and set the Cade Formula at 20% for that yea, then the State would provide $20 of funding for each full-time equivalent student at a community college for that same year. Id. Thus, rather than the mandated amount that Petitioners claim, the Cade Formula requires that the Governor and the General Assembly first select the level of fllllding that the State chooses to provide to the four-year institutions, then select the percentage of that amount that the State chooses to provide to the community colleges on a "full-time equivalent student" basis. Historically, the Governor and the General Assembly have adopted a schedule that sets forth Cade Fonnula percentages for multiple years, then revised those percentages substantially, based upon the State's financial condition and priorities. Md. Code Ann., 11

15 Educ note (Effect of Amendments). For example, before 2009, the Cade formula percentage for Piscal Year 2013 had been set at 30%. Id.; see also 2009 Laws of Maryland, ch. 487, 1. In 2009, it was reduced to 27%. Id. In 2010 it was reduced to 2 l %, and in 2011, it was reduced to 19%. Id.; see also 2010 Laws of Maryland, ch. 484, 3; 2011 Laws of Maryland, ch. 497, I. Not only do the Cade Formula percentages change substantially even after they have been set, but the legislature can eliminate them entirely in any given year. For example, in enacting the Budget Reconciliation and Financing Act of 2010, the Governor and the General Assembly abandoned a percentage fonnula altogether and instead set state funding for community colleges at a flat amount for both Fiscal Year 2011 and Fiscal Year Laws of Maryland, ch. 484, 3. Clearly, nothing in Senate Bill 167 "directly mandates and requires" any particular level of state funding for community colleges in future fiscal years. If more full-time students seek to attend community college in future years and the State wishes to keep its support for community colleges at the same level as in prior years, the Governor and the General Assembly retain the discretion to do so regardless of the policy change made in Senate Bill 167. If the State wishes to reduce its support for commwlity colleges in future years, it may do so regardless of Senate Bill 167 as well, and the community colleges may seek to make up the difference by raising tuition and/or obtaining greater support from the county or counties the community colleges serve. Contrary to Petitioners' argument, the Governor retains discretion to request state funding for community colleges at whatever level he or she believes is appropriate, and the General Assembly retains the discretion to adopt or reduce the Governor's request. Senate Bill 12

16 167 does not directly or indirectly mandate or require any particular level of state spending on community colleges. Indeed, the Circuit Court expressly found that, regardless of the enactment of Senate Bill 167, state funding for community colleges remains dependent on a number of variables, including the discretion of the Governor and the General Assembly: Assuming, arguendo, that the Court does in fact need to consider [Senate Bill 167 and the Cade Formula] together, a future appropriation would be dependent on a number of variables, including there being an increase in eligible students, the Cade Formula remaining unaltered by the General Assembly or Governor, and any alteration of the appropriation by the General Assembly before the Budget Bill is passed. Memorandum at 13 (emphasis added). Petitioners' counsel acknowledged this fact as well when he stated at oral argument that the Governor's annual Budget Bill "can be subject to later adjustment by the -- downward by the General Assembly." Transcript of Proceedings at 20. Counsel continued,"... obviously, the budget bill can be adjusted by the General Assembly, the -- that's exactly what they did with the Cade funding formula last year and I believe the year before." 3 Id. at Accordingly, even if additional students qualify for in-state tuition as a result of Senate Bill 167, the Governor and the General Assembly still retain the discretion to raise, lower, or maintain at previous levels the amount of financial support the State 3 As they did in the Circuit Court, Petitioners again cite to a line in the Fiscal Note for Senate Bill 167 stating that the bill "affects a mandated appropriation." Petition at 8 (emphasis omitted). Obviously, whether a bill "affects" a mandated appropriation is substantially different from whether a bill "is" a mandated appropriation. Moreover, state funding for community colleges is only "mandated" to the extent that it is set by a formula, in this instance, the Cade Funding Formula. The Governor and the General Assembly retain the discretion to decide which inputs go into that formula or to disregard the formula entirely, as Petitioners' counsel acknowledged. 13

17 provides to community colleges in future years. Senate Bill 167 does not "directly require[] or mandate[] an increase in the amounts appropriated for the community colleges" or otherwise "directly result[] in increased expenditures by the State for support of community colleges." Petition at 7 and 17 (emphasis omitted). Because nothing in Senate Bill 16 7 mandates or requires increased state spending for community colleges in future years, the question Petitioners ask this Cowt to address -- whether a bill that "directly mandates and requires an increase in future appropriations" constitutes an appropriation for purposes of the exception to the people's right to referendum -- is irrelevant. Petitioners still could not prevail on their legal claims even if the Court reconsidered its long standing precedent and redefined the term "appropriation" in the expansive way Petitioners advocate. Not only do no "special circumstances" exist that make it desirable and in the public interest that this Court review the Circuit Court's ruling, but any such review would be futile. C. Petitioners' other arguments for granting review are without merit. Petitioners raise a handful of other arguments for granting review, none of which have merit. Petitioners claim that the Court should grant review to "clarify" the scope of the referendum exception as applied to measures regulating the raising of revenue. Petition at At the oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, however, Petitioners conceded that Senate Bill 167 was not a revenue raising provision: 14

18 [By Mr. Sandler] The issue is whether -- this is -- nobody is arguing this has anything to do with raising revenue, the question here is what type of spending bill is non-referable under Article XVI. Transcript of Proceedings at 15. The Circuit Court expressly noted this concession in its ruling, "Plaintiffs conceded that [Senate Bill 167] does not raise revenue... The Court will therefore focus its analysis on whether [Senate Bill 167] is a spending measure within the meaning of the Appropriation Exception." Memorandum Opinion at 10, n.7. Granting review to clarify the scope of the exception as applied to revenue raising measures is neither necessary nor appropriate because Petitioners have already conceded that Senate Bill 167 is not a revenue raising measure. The issue is moot. Finally, Petitioners also argue that the Court should grant review because allowing a referendum on Senate Bill 167 will harm the students whom the policy is intended to benefit and disrupt the operation of government. While the students who might benefit from Senate Bill 167 obviously are likely to prefer that the policy change take effect, that preference alone does not warrant granting review, especially where, as here, other factors weigh heavily against granting review. There simply is no disruption to the operation of"government." While community colleges and public universities obviously are not "government," but instead are publicly supported institutions, these institutions undoubtedly will continue to function just as they had functioned before the policy change and just as they have functioried ever since they came into existence. Petitioners make no claim that these publicly supported institutions will receive less state financial support if Senate Bill 167 does not become law. Their claim of dismption to the operation of "government" is a chimera. 15

19 CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, Respondent MdPetitions.com respectfully requests that the Petition be denied. Dated: April 2, 2012 Resp ectfully submitted, WATCH, INC. c::;k Paul J. Orfanedes Md. Bar No Chris Fedeli Md. Bar No Third Street, S. W., Suite 800 Washington, DC Tel: (202) Fax: (202) Attorneys for Respondent Md.Petitions.com 16

20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 2" d day of April, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT MDPETITIONS.COM'S ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be served, via and first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on the following: Elizabeth F. Getman Joseph E. Sandler SANDLER, REIFF, YOUNG & LAM, P.C Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, DC Brett Marston Michael Harris Patricio Grane Laura Cofer Taylor Margarita R. Sanchez ARNOLD & PORTER 555 Twelfth Street, N.W. Washington, DC Matthew Fad er Jeffrey L. Darsie Assistant Attorney Generals Beatrice Nunez-Bellamy Attorney OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 200 St. Paul Place, 20th Floor Baltimore, MD