DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT OF COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESSES

Transcription

1 Article Copyright 2008 SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) Vol 7(2): DOI: / DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT OF COLLABORATIVE PLANNING PROCESSES Annika Agger and Karl Löfgren Roskilde University, Denmark Abstract Collaborative planning is often mentioned as one of the most appropriate planning theories in relation to the network society owing to its focus on creating fair and inclusive institutional settings for deliberations among public and private stakeholders. Even though this theoretical framework discusses potential outcomes, the actual democratic effects of collaborative planning processes are notably overlooked in the literature. The central question raised in this article is: how can we assess the democratic effects of collaborative planning processes? The article presents a tentative evaluative framework for assessing the different stages (input, process and outcome) of collaborative planning processes deriving criteria from democratic theory, as well as from theories on collaborative planning, which can be deployed for empirical studies. Keywords collaborative planning, democracy, democratic assessment, networks, participation How can the quality of democracy in collaborative processes be assessed? While the initial thoughts on collaborative planning considered the implication of these processes for democratic governance in a wider context only to a limited extent, we claim that there are now at least three good arguments for discussing the issue. First, within the current theoretical debate on collaborative planning, many of the arguments in favour of using collaborative thinking as a starting point go beyond the basic idea of collaborative planning, that is, mediating 145

2 146 Planning Theory 7(2) between conflicting social interests, and ultimately, creating common visions of the future of a particular geographical area (Healey, 2003). 1 At present, collaborative planning is put in the same category of new democratic instruments as, for example, deliberative polls, where the planning processes, as well as possessing value in mediating between social actors, serve as vehicles for establishing new avenues of more deliberative and participatory modes of democratic governance in addition to liberal representative institutions (Collaborative Democracy Network, 2005). Equally, there is considerable conceptual overlap between theoretical planning approaches, and political science frameworks for new modes of democracy, where ideas on collaborative policymaking (Innes and Booher, 2003) and collaborative public management (Blomgren Bingham and O Leary, 2006), for example, are shared across various disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, it can be said that the collaborative planning tradition is forced to reflect on the procedural outcomes of the processes in a wider democratic perspective. Second, from a profound theoretical starting point, collaborative planning is a public policy-making process by default, and as such, part of the democratic governance of a certain territory (albeit on a micro-level). Even though collaborative planning processes are normally based on delegated actors from traditional representative democratic institutions within a limited geographical area, and usually include only those stakeholders who are directly involved in a planning decision, they do not take place outside the framework of a political system. 2 Consequently, since collaborative planning activities have become institutionalized policy-making processes across many democratic systems, they should also be subject to democratic scrutiny in line with other political institutions and processes in society. Third, while evaluation per se is a well-established aspect of planning practice in general, the focus within planning research has been mainly on technical and physical achievements (Khakee, 1998), rather than on the normative democratic foundations. Little attention, if any, is given to the considerable complexities of democratic theory and practice, and the often contradictory norms that are embedded in democratic theory and practice. Conversely, scholars of democratic theory have not put too much effort into actually developing empirical programmes (see Delli Carpini et al., 2004). Both among scholars and in the community of planning practitioners, there seems to be substantial uncertainty about how to assess the democratic effects of collaborative planning processes (Abelson and Gauvin, 2006), while at the same time, there is a demand for methods on how to appraise the democratic performance in collaborative planning projects. This article presents the first steps towards a methodological framework, based on normative criteria, on how to assess the quality of democracy in collaborative planning. In the next section, we discuss some of the conceptual and methodological problems encountered by the researcher, and also the practitioner, as s/he tries to evaluate democracy. We also present our understanding of the assessment of collaborative planning projects, where these processes are perceived as a form of network governance (to be defined below). In the

3 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 147 third section, we present our own criteria-based framework for assessing the democratic effects of citizen involvement in networks based on a synthesis of modern democratic theory (including Dahl, 1998; March and Olsen, 1995), and on some of the thoughts embedded in the collaborative planning tradition. This section is structured around five criteria for democratic assessment: public access to political influence, public deliberation, development of adaptiveness, accountability and finally, the development of political identities and capabilities. Based on these five criteria, we generate a number of general questions, which we hope will increase the understanding in research and practitioner communities, and provide a framework for assessing the democratic consequences of collaborative processes in a comparative perspective. In the final section, we present a tentative scheme of research questions in accord with the different stages (input, process and outcome) of collaborative planning processes. A framework for assessing the democratic effects of collaborative planning Existing thoughts about democratic assessment in collaborative planning theory It would be a red rag to a bull to suggest that collaborative planning circles ignore democratic values, and criteria. However, from our perspective, and others, it is clear that this has never been a prioritized research issue (Margerum, 2002; Petts, 2001). Existing thinking on democratic criteria usually portrays them as interactive qualities of planning processes (Healey, 2003: 106); they remain undeclared in the works of the collaborative planning tradition and often conflate with more substantive outcomes (such as community-building). When they do finally appear, they are limited to partial aspects of the planning process, but we believe it is possible to extract from the collaborative planning literature some underlying democratic criteria for the planning process per se and also some criteria for the outcome. In terms of the process, these include that: a) representatives from all relevant social groups ( stakeholders ) are included in the process; b) individuals are granted the right to express opinions (voice); c) the actors demonstrate reciprocal respect vis-à-vis other actors in terms of the deliberation process; d) the actors are given access to all adequate information concerning the actual planning issue; e) the actors are given the capacity to contest other participants assertions; and finally, f) the actors are able to influence the decision-making process and the subsequent outcomes (Healey, 1997; Hillier, 1998; Innes, 1998, 2000). Turning to outcomes, one of the main claims of the collaborative planning tradition is the need to expand the domain of inquiry beyond the modernist paradigm that primarily focuses on substantial outcomes such as economic achievements, and also to embrace softer outcomes. For example, the outcome should be assessed on the extent to which a) there is success, or failure, in reaching reciprocity and consensus among involved actors (Connick and Innes, 2001); b) the collaborative process creates trust, new relations and interpersonal networks, and in the end, enhances a higher degree

4 148 Planning Theory 7(2) of social, intellectual and political capital, among involved actors (Healey et al., 1999; Innes and Booher, 1999b); c) there is empowerment of the participants through the joint learning processes embedded in the collaborative planning processes (Innes and Booher, 1999a); and d) the collaborative processes create new, and more flexible, institutions (Healey, 1999). Even though we fully subscribe to these criteria, it is our contention that collaborative planning theories are ignoring certain democratic criteria (such as accountability), as well as the methodological problem of how to transfer democratic norms to more systematic and workable criteria for empirical assessment. Before presenting our norms and criteria we would like to mention something about the methodological starting point of our framework. We have been guided by some of the ideas embedded in the UK democratic audit tradition (see Beetham, 1994, 1999; Lord, 2004; Weir and Beetham, 1999), but also by newer frameworks for evaluating democratic performance in network governance (Leach, 2006; Mathur and Skelcher, 2007; Skelcher et al., 2005). Democratic assessment is still a relatively unexplored field within planning literature compared with traditional public policy evaluations (we exclude the political science tradition for studying causal links between democracy and economic development, or constructing league tables of human rights and democracy in comparative politics; Beetham, 2004; Catt, 1999). However, based on existing literature in the field we can identify some conceptual and methodological premises relevant to our framework. Democratic assessment is not policy evaluation Democratic assessments are different from normal policy process evaluations where policy is measured against predefined goals or strategies, and the reasons for success or failure are analysed (see Vedung, 1997). The purpose of a democratic assessment is to identify the extent to which certain democratic values are either enhanced, or undermined, by certain institutions or practices. In relation to policy evaluations, the indicators, that is, the democratic values, are not given a priori. As a concept, democracy can undoubtedly be placed in the category of essentially contested concepts in politics, which means it inherits a normative angle of vision (Connolly, 1993: 29). Therefore, one cannot define democracy in a purely empirical sense since at the same time, it entails an ideal a normative statement of how citizens should govern themselves. In this respect, we cannot simply take a descriptive-exploratory standpoint where received political institutions, traditions and norms of our traditional representative system provide the benchmarks against which collaborative planning practices are assessed (see Beetham, 1994). We ourselves need to identify norms, and subsequent criteria, which can provide indicators. This does not mean, however, that anything can be included as a basis for democratic norms and criteria. Following Beetham (2004; see also, Mathur and Skelcher, 2007), in our framework we have derived criteria that combine modern democratic theory, and its universal principles (see later), with the implicit democratic norms of collaborative planning theories (see earlier), where the choice is

5 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 149 made on the basis of their contribution to democratic life in the context of collaborative planning. Democratic assessment should be criteria-based Whereas much of the collaborative planning tradition is based on thick narratives of case studies with the assumption that these cases can work somehow as best practice based on their face value, our methodological framework is based on criteria. The advantage of choosing a criteria-based methodology is that: a) it is transparent and replicable; b) it enables comparative assessments between organizations and over time; and c) it implicitly promotes democratization initiatives in the local contexts as the results themselves generate incentives for further democratization (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007). However, it is worth bearing in mind that a democratic assessment is not simply a question of judging whether something is democratic versus nondemocratic. Each criterion represents a continuum in which the questions for assessment are phrased in comparative terms: to what extent...? how far...?, etc. (Beetham, 1993). Democracy is a matter of more or less, rather than a Pareto-optimal state of governance. Moreover, a democratic assessment should not attempt to measure democracy, but rather make a judgement of the state of democracy. As stated by Lord, most accounts of democracy concern the felt relationship between rulers and the ruled: whether they feel they have a right to public control which they exercise as equals (Lord, 2004: 14, original italics). In this sense, we disagree with Mathur and Skelcher (2007) who make a distinction between, on the one hand, criteria-based assessment which is somehow only applicable to measuring democratic hardware (i.e. institutional design) and, on the other, interpretive approaches for studying democratic software (i.e. the practice) of networks and partnerships. As we go on to discuss, we believe it is possible to employ criteria-based approaches for making judgements based partly on the actors interpretations at least in the field of collaborative planning. Collaborative planning as network governance Another central aspect of democratic assessment is that the choice of criteria exploited for the assessment should entail a dialectical relation to the object studied. While there are several different ways of describing collaborative planning activities, and their underpinning rationale, we suggest that in terms of governance and organizational form they can best be described as a form of network governance. The term network signals that the governance of collaborative planning is distinct from the ideal models of governing through market and hierarchy, but also that the networks per se represent both means and ends to collaborative planning (Innes and Booher, 1999b). Collaborative planning often takes shape in the form of networks, or partnerships, composed of representatives of local governments, business and associations of the civil society, as well as ordinary citizens. Even though they are usually initiated by local authorities, they are fairly autonomous vis-à-vis public authorities and

6 150 Planning Theory 7(2) traditional representative institutions (Booher, 2004). Our framework is thus developed for autonomous local networks that are formally initiated by a public agent, which include both citizens and stakeholders as active members, and where there is a clear objective to solve planning issues. Our understanding of citizens is rather broad as it also includes representatives of local nongovernmental organizations (e.g. environmental associations). In terms of stakeholders, we include both public street-level organizations (e.g. public housing associations, as well as public administrators from local governments) and business actors (e.g. land developers and local business). We use the term collaborative networks as a way of describing the organizational structure of collaborative planning processes. Democratic assessment should encompass the whole process As previously mentioned, the collaborative planning tradition has related frameworks to the overall theories of democracy only to a limited extent, thereby putting too much focus on deliberative processes and consensusbuilding and, consequently, neglecting other aspects of democratic theory and practice. In particular, this concerns the input-side of the planning process where classical democratic questions on access and participation, such as who participates, who initiates the deliberations, and who is excluded, are generally ignored in the literature. Equally, collaborative approaches are not providing any answers to aspects such as the sustainability of networks, and how to secure democratic accountability. Even though both the process and the outcome are important stages of a collaborative planning process, the input to the process is equally important from a democratic perspective. Criteria for democratically assessing collaborative planning processes As previously stated, defining democracy inevitably implies a normative point of reference. Various conceptions of the actual meaning of rule by the people have implicitly included a number of contested issues (rule? rule by? the people?), which have so far remained unresolved over time, and probably always will be (Held, 1987). However, in terms of identifying those cornerstones considered as legitimate among democratic theorists, Dahl s five criteria for evaluating democratic processes have been widely accepted, at least among students of democracy (Dahl, 1979, 1998; see Habermas, 1996b; Saward, 2001). The five criteria are: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of all adults (Dahl, 1998). They are criteria that a process for governing an association would have to meet in order to satisfy the requirement that all the members are equally entitled to participate in the association s decisions about its policies (Dahl, 1998: 37). Political equality is thus the underlying rationale behind the choice of these five. The search then becomes one of identifying the institutions that can embody them, and the necessary requisites for safeguarding the existence of these institutions.

7 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 151 Despite our sympathy with the underlying rationale, and acceptance of these criteria as vital for our framework, we perceive them, like the UK democratic audit tradition, as mainly focused on the building of democratic nation states, rather than micro-level local arrangements for citizen involvement. Consequently, one of the criteria usually employed in Dahl s frameworks voting equality is not immediately applicable in our framework since collaborative planning processes do not entail election of representatives, and decisionmaking takes place through deliberation. Moreover, Dahl s framework, like most of modern liberal democratic theory, is founded on a dichotomy between the political and the the private. But we find that democratic identities and capabilities are not necessarily connected to this dichotomy. As demonstrated in the studies on the Danish everyday maker (Bang and Sørensen, 1998), a political identity is not just something that originates in the citizen s formal relationship to state authority. This aspect is also vital for encapsulating the outcome of collaborative network arrangements, where the results might be weak in terms of better governing, but where aspects such as democratic learning, community-building and conflict resolution might be unexpected side-effects. These should not be neglected in the performance appraisal of collaborative planning activities. The criteria we are applying are based on a number of democratic norms. These unify traditional democratic norms (as described by Dahl, 1998) supplemented from the rich literature on communicative and collaborative planning especially where it relates to criteria for collaborative processes and potential outcomes. We use the following norms as a point of departure for developing evaluation criteria: access, inclusion and participation public deliberation democratic adaptiveness accountability the development of democratic identities We go on to describe the different norms, and add some general research questions which practitioners could raise in order to enable a democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes. Access: a norm about influence and equality in the channels for influence The democratic ideal of access (and inclusion) is one of the major motives for establishing networks for citizen involvement (and is also one of the basic norms within most liberal democratic political systems; Dahl, 1998). Ideally, by establishing extra-parliamentary realms, a group of involved citizens larger than the normal group of representatives elected for certain posts, should acquire access to political decision-making. Despite the general consensus, both in planning and in democratic theory, on granting access to political processes, this does not imply full enfranchisement of all concerned parties in a local collaborative network, only that the networks should ideally be accessible to

8 152 Planning Theory 7(2) those concerned, that is, the stakeholders. The norm on access should, however, manifest itself through endeavour for a high level of inclusion. Moreover, the work of the collaborative networks should be transparent to those who do not actively participate, but would still like to be informed. Two questions are relevant in this context: Q1: To what extent are the collaborative networks open to participation by the affected stakeholders? Q2: To what extent is the work of the collaborative networks transparent to the wider public? Our second issue primarily refers to both the range and extent of these collaborative networks, that is, to the investigation of how many of those who could participate, actually do so. While classical policy network literature mainly refers to networks as elitist phenomena, collaborative networks are supposed to expand the number of involved participatory stakeholders. Although access is imperative from a democratic perspective, actual participation is equally important. A high (and equally distributed) degree of political participation within a political system is normally considered to be beneficial. An enlightened, active citizenship (in contrast to the passive client or consumer ) demands significant popular political involvement. To define political participation is, however, not an easy task. This implies a judgement of the distribution of those accessing the networks in terms of different groups, and of how representative of the population as a whole these groups are. Classical definitions, such as Verba and Nie s (1972) or Parry et al. s (1992), usually limit political participation to those actions distinctly aimed at directly (or indirectly) affecting public authorities or political representatives. Such definitions, however, exclude a number of citizen activities, and consequently also exclude elements of participation that pursue communityshaping and/or identity-shaping (Andersen et al., 1993). What is desirable here is to identify the extent of citizen participation in the collaborative networks. Further research on this issue could be framed as follows: Q3: To what extent are those concerned actively participating, or being represented, in the networks? Another requirement of participation is that there should be some form of equality of access to collaborative networks. One of the main critiques of participatory processes is that they tend to exclude members of ethnic minorities, that they consist of fewer women than men, and that they are often age-biased; the result tends to be a majority of white middle-class men. Structural inequalities make it more difficult for certain groups to participate, and favour citizens and representatives with resources (Fung, 2004). Studies in collaborative planning demonstrate that a bias exists towards those who are politically active. Citizens with resources (knowledge, time, etc.) are more likely to be active than those lacking these means (Nordvig-Larsen, 1999).

9 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 153 Even though many collaborative planning processes seek to include all those affected by a certain decision, they often have difficulties in overcoming some of the structural inequalities that make it easier for some groups, rather than others, to take advantage of formal opportunities for participation (Young, 1996). Therefore we are interested in investigating whether or not the distribution of those politically active in the collaborative networks is representative of their communities or groups of people, that is, the passive or marginalized or excluded citizens. This issue also concerns the very essence of the classical representation debate, whether or not representation should be based on ideas and interests (Pitkin, 1967), or should embody politics of presence, that is, a more descriptive reflection of representation in which historically disadvantaged groups in society are represented by peers, for example, that women are represented by other women, etc. (Phillips, 1995). Not only should those participating act in the interest of those other than themselves, they should also be perceived as representing certain values. This argument also refers to the ideal of bringing in a variety of knowledge to the planning process. This should comprise not only technical or expert knowledge, but also tacit knowledge, individual views, and more practical and moral types of knowledge (Healey, 1997). The questions relevant in relation to these perspectives are: Q4: To what extent do the collaborative networks embrace a high level of both ideational and descriptive representation, that is, idea-correspondence between the public and its representatives? Q5: To what extent are different types of knowledge employed in the process? Even though many formal collaborative networks are open in principle to participation by any involved citizen, the choice of institutional design related to the deliberations in the collaborative networks can have an influence on who actually participates. Some planning theorists point to the fact that different methods of citizen participation attract different types of citizens (Pløger, 2004). Moreover, the mechanisms for participation should not just grant stakeholders a formal right to participate where actual deliberative mechanisms (formal or informal) systematically deprive certain groups of their chance to influence the processes, but preferably should provide the stakeholders with a genuine voice throughout the deliberative process. This has proved to be a particular problem in citizen involvement at a local level, as revealed in Jane Mansbridge s seminal work on town hall meetings, where informal channels of influence came to dominate decision-making (Mansbridge, 1980; Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005). The institutional design, and the methods employed, always involve choices, which, deliberate or not, may exclude certain actors, issues, viewpoints, actions and possible substantive outcomes (Connelly and Richardson, 2004). This leads us to ask: Q6: To what extent are the participation methods employed enough to secure genuine access to decision-making?

10 154 Planning Theory 7(2) Public deliberation: a norm about public debate in relation to planning processes. This norm primarily concerns the opportunity for those affected by a planning process to put items on the political agenda and discuss them in an open and tolerant manner, prior to the decisive stage of a decision-making process. The criteria involved here in the study of this norm are concerned with the quality of the actual participation as it is manifested in the collaborative networks. The ideal of collective problem-solving through deliberative discussions not only appears in political science literature on democracy (see Dahl, 1998; Fishkin, 1995), but is also the very essence of the whole collaborative planning tradition (Innes, 2004). Two criteria are involved here in appraising the qualitative aspects of dialogue within collaborative networks. First, it is important to stress the openness, tolerance and interactivity of public debate. Second, there is every reason to address the issue of the efficiency of the dialogue. In respect of both these questions, it is hard to neglect the work of Jürgen Habermas, in particular as it relates to the discussion on deliberation. Habermas has, through his work on the structural transformation of the public sphere (Habermas, 1996a), been one of the most well-known critics of the decline and loss of autonomy of the public sphere in the age of advanced capitalism and the social welfare state. His work has been a source of great inspiration for the thinking now embodied in collaborative planning theories, although there is good reason not to exaggerate its actual influence in collaborative planning processes in practice (Innes, 2004). Already in his initial work of structural transformation in the public sphere Habermas explicitly defines the assumptions and conditions under which deliberation plays a significant role in democracy (Habermas, 1996a). However, it is usually his later works on democratic discourse, in which he presents rules on the ethics of discourse, that is, what a democratic dialogue should entail, to which collaborative planners refer (Habermas, 1983, 1996a, 1996b). Although we find this framework rigid, 3 collaborative planning theory has drawn at least one imperative lesson from Habermas in relation to the criteria on public debate: that is, the value of reciprocity and tolerance (see Hillier, 1998). In terms of collaborative networks, these two concepts have significant importance to actual deliberation processes for many reasons. First, it is embodied in the rules that dialogue should not function as a prejudiced realm for the top-down dissemination of information, in which participants holding authoritative posts or roles (such as civil servants, politicians, experts) directly, or indirectly, prevent representatives of the public from taking part in the actual deliberation prior to decision-making. This is also in line with Frank Fischer s work on the value of citizen expertise in policy-making, where he suggests that the deliberations of ordinary citizens can be of value in policy-making processes by contributing local contextual knowledge to the professionals expertise (Fischer, 2002). Second, the rules also encourage all participants to a tolerant dialogue visà-vis each other. Certain viewpoints, attitudes and assertions should not be excluded beforehand, and the dialogue should be based on mutual respect for,

11 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 155 albeit not necessarily acceptance of, divergent arguments. Moreover, this rule implies that certain citizen voices should not be granted greater privilege based on, for example, the duration of residency in the area or the value of certain property. Third, the dialogue, at least initially, should be free from coercive arguments in which, for example, threats of legal action(s) underpin the deliberative argument. We understand that coercive instruments might be necessary in certain deadlock situations, but the deliberative process should not initially be embraced by coercion. The question arising from this norm is: Q7: To what extent do the debates within collaborative networks approximate standards of reciprocity and tolerance? In light of what has just been stated about reciprocity and tolerance in public deliberation, there is reason to include something on the outcome of public deliberation. By and large, this is a question of whether or not the involved participants believe that their voices are actually included in the decisions made by the network (or conveyed to other decision-making bodies). In one respect, our recognition of democratic deliberation diverges from Habermas s: we do not agree that the end goal of deliberation should always seek consensus. Rather we would agree with Mouffe (2000) who, by and large, criticizes the Habermasian ideal of consensus as conceiving conflicts as unwelcome antagonism, rather than (productive) agonism (see also Pløger, 2004). Conflicts are inevitable, and striving for consensus might in fact undermine the quality of the deliberation process, as it may set up certain frames for the dialogue too early in the process, thereby suppressing other views and assertions. Instead, we limit our criterion on deliberative efficiency to a demand that the deliberation process should actually produce something that leaves footprints in the further decision-making process, rather than being an idle talk realm with no other purpose than the purely symbolic. For example, the participants could sense a higher degree of network power or glue of collaboration (Innes, 2004). This leads us to ask: Q8: To what extent do the debates produce something perceived by the participants as essential to the decision-making process? Adaptiveness: a norm about the development of an adaptive political system By and large, this democratic criterion refers to a vision of matching constantly changing political institutions and their environments with a commitment to (enduring) democratic values. If the other criteria are those enlarging democracy, this criterion is the restraining one. As discussed previously, democratic institutions are products of democratic norms, and vice versa. There exists a co-evolutionary relationship between the environments, that is, the democratic norms or the democratic culture, and those political institutions that are set up to defend and sustain the very same norms. As democratic norms are by nature imprecise and obscure, the question

12 156 Planning Theory 7(2) about which institutions are the most appropriate to fulfil these embedded democratic norms is one which inevitably involves negotiation of the meanings of the norms, as well as whether or not the institutions are legitimate, and/or are adapting to the democratic norms. According to March and Olsen, two features of political institutions are especially important in the development of adaptiveness: stability, and the rules to achieve that stability (March and Olsen, 1995). On the one hand, rules serve to coordinate actions, thereby fostering predictability within a political system, and thus making it less vulnerable to too rapid external submission to political, technological or economic changes that threaten human dignity and the political community (Deutsch, 1966). On the other hand, this inevitably inhibits the possibility of change in the political system. In terms of collaborative networks, this feature of political institutions can be coupled to the temporal aspects of citizen involvement. Just like many other aspects of contemporary political life, citizen involvement has been subject to the unbearable lightness of project management in which network-building with citizens has been conceived as a temporary initiative, with a temporary budget, and with a more or less clear objective to complete within a short project period. In contrast, we claim that the democratic success of collaborative networks is partly embedded in the continuity and stability of citizen involvement. By partly, we suggest that the networks should not become stable and rigid institutions. What we advocate is the presence of mechanisms (and subsequently rules) for making the network more than just the erection of yet another tomb in the crowded project cemetery. Even though there might be reasons to alter the composition of the collaborative network, change the rules, and even terminate collaborative networks, there should be clear, long-term strategies for the dissemination of experiences from the networks, the institutionalization of citizen involvement, and the sustaining of the dialogue. The collaborative planning literature demonstrates that the building of institutional capacity is seen as an important potential outcome of governance processes (e.g. Healey et al., 1999). But an interesting question is whether or not these competences, as regards learning and social capital, erode or can be sustained when a network comes to an end. The question we induce from this is: Q9: To what extent do the collective experiences and learning processes of the involved stakeholders, developed through the work of the collaborative networks, guarantee sustainability and continuity? Second, the whole idea of collaborative planning is built on a presumption of existing conflicts in planning, and the resolution of those conflicts. That is, collaborative planning schemes should be adapted to handle any conflicts that may occur within the framework of the planning process. However, this does not mean that collaborative networks should solve conflicts, merely that they should facilitate a functioning and legitimate realm for managing conflicts, and the likely negotiations and trades that may occur as a result of conflicts (March and Olsen, 1995). With respect to collaborative networks, this question refers to

13 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 157 one of the more common reasons for catering for citizen participation. That is, collaborative networks are established with the clear ambition of avoiding, or at least mitigating, conflicts between governors and those to be governed by means of public deliberation and inclusion. Even though this might be the official goal within the network, there is still reason to ask whether the networks are actually capable of handling conflicts. A benchmark here would be that the network itself has the autonomy and capacity to actually handle conflicts. A network in which conflicts are either transferred (back) to traditional political institutions, or by default are passed on to the legal system, is of less importance in enhancing democratic inclusion and equality. The question here is: Q10: To what extent are the collaborative networks capable of handling conflicts? Accountability: a norm about developing political accounts One basic premise of modern democracy is that citizens should have the capacity to hold policy-makers, in general, accountable for their actions. With respect to politicians, this principle is exercised through regular elections where citizens have the prerogative of sanctioning those politicians who have acted against the citizens will; civil servants are held accountable for their performance by rules and regulations. Notwithstanding the importance of the accountability of policy-makers, there is reason to distance ourselves from the traditional understanding of accountability. Much of the contemporary literature on democratic accountability demonstrates the problems of upholding this classical chain of accountability since collaborative networks, (among other political actors) albeit actively engaged in policy-making, are not always accountable to the citizenry for their performance. Therefore we adopt two important aspects of accountability from March and Olsen: information and sanctions (March and Olsen, 1995). The question of information is already dealt with above in the paragraph on access (transparency); here we examine the possibility of democratic sanctions. Sanctions can be both formal and official, exercised through rules and democratic competition, or they can be derived from internalized personal obligations of the policy-maker. That is, an inappropriate act is punished by guilt and a loss of self-respect, and is based on the existence of a strong sense of community (which might be organizational, professional or political). These two models of sanctions are not predetermined, rigid or once and for all, but are always subject to interpretation. Since the collaborative networks we are discussing here are set up, and usually meta-governed by public authorities, they are in fact bodies with accountable actors, that is, politicians and civil servants. As Torfing and Sørensen say, the networks should also include elected politicians in order to secure accountable decisions (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Regardless of the active participation of elected politicians in the local networks, it should ideally be possible to identify some chain of accountability where sanctions can be imposed. A network for citizen involvement operating in an accountability void is not favourable to democracy. Another aspect vital

14 158 Planning Theory 7(2) to securing a high level of accountability is that representation of the (local) government is not just limited to civil servants. The question that arises here is: Q11: To what extent can sanctions enforce the accountability of collaborative networks for their actions? Political identities and capabilities: a norm about developing democratic identities Through civic education, socialization, and participation in democratic deliberation and decision-making citizens learn what is good, who they are, who they want to be, and the kind of community in which they want to live (March and Olsen, 1995: 76). The question here is to apply a criterion suitable for handling the theory and practice of identity formation that supports the empowerment of actors in the networks. This norm is about how, and if, participation in a network develops capabilities and new political identities for the actors involved. From the planning literature we saw that the concept of developing institutional capital and capacity was a way of analysing the output of network initiatives. Institutional capital can be divided into three forms: intellectual (knowledge resources), political (mobilization capacity) and social capital (relational resources) (Healey et al., 1999; Innes and Booher, 1999a). Social capital refers to trust-building through social interactions among participants, and the personal and professional relationships that are built up through faceto-face encounters. Political capital refers to the ability to work collectively for agreed ends at a relational level. Or as Healey et al. (1999) call it, the mobilization capacity (opportunity structures, arenas, change agents, etc.) at a local level. At an individual level it relates to an actor s personal ability to engage in political decision-making. Sørensen and Torfing formulate three factors that influence this ability: level of access to the decision-making process (endowment); their capability to make a difference in the process (empowerment); and their perception of themselves as political actors (political identity) (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). This can be both at a relational and individual level. Another way of formulating the capabilities gained through the participation is March and Olsen s distinction between four broad types of capabilities relevant to governance: rights and authorities, political resources, political competencies and organizing capacities (March and Olsen, 1995). In this perspective, the process of deliberation in a formal network contributes to the reconstruction of political identities, so the process is not simply the projection of group interests, but precedes this via the process of articulation through which identities, representations and rights are themselves contingently constructed (Hillier, 1998). Our interest here is whether the actors in the networks feel that their participation has contributed to the development of endowment, empowerment and democratic identity, and whether the networks themselves enhance institutional capital. In this instance, the questions are: Q12: To what extent does participation in collaborative networks contribute to citizen empowerment? Q13: To what extent do the activities of collaborative networks contribute to the building, or improvement of institutional capital and capacity?

15 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 159 Concluding remarks The aim of this article has been to present a framework for assessing the democratic effects of citizens participating in collaborative networks. We took a point of departure from current planning literature, focusing on theories of collaborative planning with their emphasis on institutional settings for deliberation and collaboration among actors. In this field, we identify a growing literature advocating more deliberative and participative approaches to public engagement within decision-making at all levels of policy-making. However, this literature does not explicitly address issues concerning the assessment of the democratic effects of more interactive decision-making processes, for example, formal networks in local planning. We find that the collaborative literature provides us with concepts for collaborative dialogues, which can be used as a normative standard for evaluating the process in order to secure a democratic and legitimate process. The literature is also explored in terms of the different kinds of potential outcomes, such as institutional capitals and capacity, which might result from formal network processes. However, we also find that the collaborative literature has overlooked certain democratic aspects, including perhaps more traditional accounts of democracy, for example, in relation to norms about representation and accountability. Hence, we have presented in this article a rather all-encompassing framework with the aim of including most of the major democratic aspects of network governance in local planning. There are still some questions not covered in this principally theoretical article. First, how can this framework be applied in a practical evaluation study of actual collaborative networks? The questions we have posed are at present rather all-encompassing, and do not produce detailed research questions for evaluation. However, it is our belief that any democratic assessments must encompass the different stages of input, process and outcome of collaborative networks. While our democratic norms are of a more general character, and thus applicable to the different stages, we find that some of the criteria are more easily applicable to certain stages of a collaborative process. The criteria on access and participation are vital to the discussion of input to collaborative network processes; the criteria on deliberation and adaptiveness belong to the process per se; and finally, the criteria on development of political identity and accountability are important for assessing the outcome. In terms of using our framework in practical assessments we cannot present a ready-made research design. However, we attempt a tentative presentation (in Box 1) on how some of the criteria can become materialized in the shape of more concrete evaluation questions based on different stages in a planning process. We have deliberately excluded anything on which research methods (where methods is not synonymous with methodology ) the evaluator should apply; the choice of research methods is dependent on the actual local context of the planning process. A second important issue that needs to be addressed is the trade-off between these norms and criteria. This problem, for example, can be traced back to Dahl. Fishkin points out the same problem with Dahl s criteria: furthering some

16 160 Planning Theory 7(2) BOX 1 Questions for democratic assessments Norms Input Process Outcome Access Who are invited to Do the Are the outcomes participate? Which institutional biased in terms of channels for settings for the fulfilling the participation processes favour wishes of only exist? some types of certain groups of participants? Are participants? the processes transparent? Public Are different types Are the To what extent do deliberation of knowledge deliberation the debates produce included in the processes something which deliberations? characterized by is perceived, by the reciprocity and participants, as tolerance? essential for the decision-making process? Adaptiveness Are there clear Is the network Is the network s rules for the capable of handling work secured network process conflicts? sustainability and prior to the continuity in terms deliberative of e.g. process? competencies? Accountability Is there a clear Are the processes What are the political mandate transparent? possibilities for from politicians accountability when which can be held implementing the accountable? outcome of the networks? Political identities To what extent do Have the processes the processes of the contributed to the networks contribute building of to endowment and institutional capital empowerment? and capacity? criteria may require the sacrifice of others (Fishkin, 1999). We can, even from a purely theoretical outlook, see that a high score on one of these norms automatically means a low score on another norm. An example of this can be that the process had a high score on enhancing democratic capabilities and social capital, but a low score on the norm of access and inclusion. Our view is that this is something an empirical study based on this framework needs to consider in terms of the aims of the investigated collaborative network. If, for example,

17 Agger and Löfgren Democratic assessment of collaborative planning processes 161 the objective of the collaborative network is to enhance competence-building and empower citizen identity, democratic success should naturally mean that the citizens feel that the network has contributed to their empowerment. Equally, if the result is that the collaborative network has merely contributed to yet another project to be filed in the records of the town hall, and without any long-lasting effects on building on institutional capacity, this must be seen as a democratic failure regardless of the symbolic values. Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to Lenze Schaap, Eva Sørensen, Jacob Torfing, Peter Triantafillou, and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on early versions of this article. Notes 1. The theories of collaborative planning have also inspired many actual planning processes within urban regeneration, and land-use planning, both in Europe (e.g. the Danish urban regeneration project Kvarterløft, and the German equivalent die Soziale Stadt ), as well as in the United States (e.g. watershed management). 2. Here we adhere to David Easton s universal definition of politics as the processes, institutions and decisions through which the authoritative allocation of values for a society take place (Easton, 1971). 3. As Nancy Fraser notes: Declaring a deliberative arena to be a space where extant status hierarchies are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to make it so (Fraser, 1997: 74). References Abelson, J. and Gauvin, F.-P. (2006) Assessing the Impacts of Public Participation: Concepts, Evidence and Policy Implications. Research Report P/06, Public Involvement Report. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks/Réseaux canadiens de recherche en politiques publiques, Ottawa. Andersen, J., Christensen, A.-D., Langberg, K., Siim, B. and Torpe, L. (1993) Medborgerskab: demokrati og politisk deltagelse. Herning: Systime. Bang, H.P. and Sørensen, E. (1998) The Everyday Maker: A New Challenge to Democratic Governance, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Warwick. Beetham, D. (1993) Auditing Democracy in Britain, Democratic Audit. Colchester: Human Rights Centre Scarman Trust, University of Essex. Beetham, D. (1994) Defining and Measuring Democracy. London: SAGE. Beetham, D. (1999) The Idea of Democratic Audit in Comparative Perspective, Parliamentary Affairs 52(4): Beetham, D. (2004) Towards a Universal Framework for Democracy Assessment, Democratization 11(2): Blomgren Bingham, L. and O Leary, R. (2006) Conclusion: Parallel Play, Not Collaboration: Missing Questions, Missing Connections, Public Administration Review 66(s1): Booher, D. (2004) Collaborative Governance Practices and Democracy, National Civic Review 93(4): Catt, H. (1999) Democracy in Practice. New York: Routledge.