Rhetoric in Economics
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1 Rhetoric in Economics Itzhak Gilboa April 26, 2012 Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
2 Are Economic Models Scienti c Theories? Complaints: Poor predictions Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
3 Are Economic Models Scienti c Theories? Complaints: Poor predictions Assumptions are all wrong Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
4 Are Economic Models Scienti c Theories? Complaints: Poor predictions Assumptions are all wrong Ideologically biased Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
5 Are Economic Models Scienti c Theories? Complaints: Poor predictions Assumptions are all wrong Ideologically biased Over-mathematized Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
6 Some Responses: Poor predictions nobody s perfect Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
7 Some Responses: Poor predictions nobody s perfect Assumptions are all wrong well... Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
8 Some Responses: Poor predictions nobody s perfect Assumptions are all wrong well... Ideologically biased true, doesn t mean we shouldn t try Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
9 Some Responses: Poor predictions nobody s perfect Assumptions are all wrong well... Ideologically biased true, doesn t mean we shouldn t try Over-mathematized Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
10 Modes of Reasoning Analogies, case-based Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
11 Modes of Reasoning Analogies, case-based Theories, rule-based Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
12 Modes of Reasoning Analogies, case-based Theories, rule-based Psychology recognizes both Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
13 Modes of Reasoning Analogies, case-based Theories, rule-based Psychology recognizes both So does statistics: kernel methods, nearest-neighbor methods... Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
14 Scienti c Reasoning The argument in Gilboa-Postlewaite-Samuelson-Schmeidler: Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
15 Scienti c Reasoning The argument in Gilboa-Postlewaite-Samuelson-Schmeidler: Scienti c reasoning is typically viewed as rule-based Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
16 Scienti c Reasoning The argument in Gilboa-Postlewaite-Samuelson-Schmeidler: Scienti c reasoning is typically viewed as rule-based But it can also be case-based Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
17 Scienti c Reasoning The argument in Gilboa-Postlewaite-Samuelson-Schmeidler: Scienti c reasoning is typically viewed as rule-based But it can also be case-based Speci cally, much of modern economic theory is of this type Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
18 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
19 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
20 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets But what is it a model of exactly? Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
21 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets But what is it a model of exactly? One interpretation: a theory Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
22 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets But what is it a model of exactly? One interpretation: a theory Another: a theoretical case Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
23 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets But what is it a model of exactly? One interpretation: a theory Another: a theoretical case Many economic models are of this type cases Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
24 Example: Akerlof s Lemons Beautiful story Changes the way we think about markets But what is it a model of exactly? One interpretation: a theory Another: a theoretical case Many economic models are of this type cases... though typically without the similarity function Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
25 Implications Viewing economic models as theoretical cases can explain why: Economists feel that they learn a lot from models of nothing Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
26 Implications Viewing economic models as theoretical cases can explain why: Economists feel that they learn a lot from models of nothing Economists are not always troubled by violations of theories in experiments Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
27 Implications Viewing economic models as theoretical cases can explain why: Economists feel that they learn a lot from models of nothing Economists are not always troubled by violations of theories in experiments Economists think that everything is an example of their model Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
28 Implications Viewing economic models as theoretical cases can explain why: Economists feel that they learn a lot from models of nothing Economists are not always troubled by violations of theories in experiments Economists think that everything is an example of their model Economists deeply cherish the common language of their paradigm Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
29 Rhetoric This view of scienti c activity explains the role of rhetoric Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
30 Rhetoric This view of scienti c activity explains the role of rhetoric (Not in a negative sense!) Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
31 Rhetoric This view of scienti c activity explains the role of rhetoric (Not in a negative sense!) Analogical reasoning requires convincing Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
32 Rhetoric This view of scienti c activity explains the role of rhetoric (Not in a negative sense!) Analogical reasoning requires convincing And this is why axioms are important Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
33 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
34 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Yet, who does it apply to? Who maximizes a utility function? Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
35 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Yet, who does it apply to? Who maximizes a utility function? By contrast, it makes sense that most people, most of the time, make decisions Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
36 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Yet, who does it apply to? Who maximizes a utility function? By contrast, it makes sense that most people, most of the time, make decisions And do so in a transitive way Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
37 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Yet, who does it apply to? Who maximizes a utility function? By contrast, it makes sense that most people, most of the time, make decisions And do so in a transitive way This means that they behave as if they maximized a utility function! Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
38 Example: The 1st Welfare Theorem With all limitations, a powerful result Yet, who does it apply to? Who maximizes a utility function? By contrast, it makes sense that most people, most of the time, make decisions And do so in a transitive way This means that they behave as if they maximized a utility function! There are questions of interpretation, but the 1st Welfare Theorem appears more relevant. Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
39 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
40 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation But axioms would appear useless for descriptive purposes Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
41 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation But axioms would appear useless for descriptive purposes Indeed, according to the classical view of science, there is no room for rhetoric Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
42 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation But axioms would appear useless for descriptive purposes Indeed, according to the classical view of science, there is no room for rhetoric Yet, much of modern economic theory is not of this type Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
43 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation But axioms would appear useless for descriptive purposes Indeed, according to the classical view of science, there is no room for rhetoric Yet, much of modern economic theory is not of this type It uses models for qualitative reasoning, relying on analogies Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
44 The Rhetorical Role of Axioms Is obvious in a normative interpretation But axioms would appear useless for descriptive purposes Indeed, according to the classical view of science, there is no room for rhetoric Yet, much of modern economic theory is not of this type It uses models for qualitative reasoning, relying on analogies And then axioms matter. Gilboa () Rhetoric in Economics April 26, / 10
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