Summary Report. CT MORSE representation at the United Nations General Assembly 22 September to 1 October 2015

Transcription

1 Summary Report CT MORSE representation at the United Nations General Assembly 22 September to 1 October 2015 Policy implications for the EU [IFS/2014/ ] Report prepared by Anton du Plessis1 ISS Managing Director aduplessis@issafrica.org 1 With input from CT Morse partners Mark Singleton (ICCT) and Alistair Millar (GCCS)

2 1 Table of contents 1 Introduction to CT MORSE and background to UNGA assignment 1.1 Overview of CT MORSE CVE, counter-terrorism and the broader development context Background to UNGA representation and reporting assignment 3 2 General observations from the UNGA and relevant side events relating to CT and CVE Summary of observations and recommendations to EU and CT MORSE 4 3 Overview of selected meetings/events attended by EU CT MORSE Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network events GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25 September GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 28 September International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) and Hedayah meeting: Building more effective responses to the FTF threat addressing prevention, prosecution and reintegration challenges GCERF side event on exploring the relationship between violent extremism and the private sector, 29 September US leaders summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism, 29 September Strong cities network official launch, 29 September EU/International Crisis Group meeting on Balancing Security and Development: Preventing Violent Extremism and the SDGs, 29 September High-level event on integrating a gender dimension in preventing and countering violent extremism policy and practice, 30 September 29

3 2 Introduction to CT MORSE and background to UNGA assignment 1.1 Overview of CT MORSE In January 2015, the European Union (EU) established a project on Counter-terrorism Monitoring, Report and Support Mechanism (CT MORSE) in recognition of the growing importance placed on the EU s engagement on countering terrorism. The specific objective of CT MORSE is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counter-terrorism (CT) projects financed by the EU, as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) framework. In achieving its objective, CT MORSE has five key result areas: 1. Monitoring 2. Coherence and coordination: both within the programme itself and with respect to any other relevant initiative. 3. Recommendations to the EU: Opinions and recommendations are provided to the EU on needed and advisable adjustments to on-going projects and appropriate actions 4. Expert analysis and awareness raising: Expert analytical advice is provided to the EU on reports delivered under the different components of the CT Programme 5. Visibility, liaison and information sharing: The visibility of the EU and of the CT Programme is increased within the EU, Member States, beneficiary countries, partner countries and organisations 1.2 CVE, counter-terrorism and the broader development context Terrorism and violent extremism pose a multifaceted threat that impacts on security, development, the values of democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of citizens. Fighting terrorism is among the priorities identified in the European Security Strategy and the EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development. The EU is taking an array of actions as part of a comprehensive approach to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, and to keep its citizens safe. The Commission has mobilised hundreds of millions of Euros in humanitarian and other economic assistance to respond to the threat and has developed a number of leading initiatives to improve coordination and impact. Key among these is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) brings key experts together and works to ensure that research and analysis on this continually adapting threat is up-to-date. The Council of the European Union has outlined a series of steps to ensure the security of citizens by taking action against terrorism, in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. And as the EU s diplomatic service, the European External Action Service is engaging with third countries an

4 3 international organisations, not least the UN, to offer support and strengthen collective efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and stem the tide of foreign terrorist fighters, including supporting adoption and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution The long-term EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) CT programmes aim to fully contribute to the implementation of the EU development and security strategies, while complementing related measures supported under EU geographic instruments, short term Instrument for Stability crisis response actions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CDSP) activities, and EU Member States assistance. Moreover, international CT cooperation in particular in the framework of the UN and of the GCTF will also be fostered. 1.3 Background to UNGA representation and reporting assignment The EU commissioned a non-key expert to represent CT MORSE at the 70th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in order to follow developments at key events and deliver a policyorientated report that examines the conclusions of the UNGA and related events for EU policy, programmes and response, for the benefit of EU stakeholders and delegations. This task was carried out by Anton du Plessis from ISS in close collaboration with the other members of the CT MORSE consortium, International Center on Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) and the Global Center on Cooperative Security (GCCS) represented by Mark Singleton and Alistair Millar respectively. Summaries and key conclusions from these meetings and side events are provided below. Agendas and concept notes for the various meetings are annexed to the report. Despite the main focus of the UNGA being on the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 20302, the topics of counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) were high priorities for the UN and its member states. This recognises the extent to which the rise of terrorism and violent extremism can serve as spoilers to broader development objectives. There were a number of events both within the main deliberations of the UNGA, and in affiliated side-events, with an impact on international policy regarding CT and CVE; that will strengthen the evidence-basis on which this policy is based, or will contribute to the identification, dissemination or replication of lessons learned and best practices in efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Many of these UNGA and GCTF related events and their conclusions have implications for EU policy, programmes and responses. Moreover in the margins of the UNGA, the EU hosted and cohosted two events. The first focused on the nexus between CVE and development, in relation to the SDGs. The second was a high-level session on Integrating a gender dimension in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policy and practice. 2 UN, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,

5 4 General observations from the UNGA and relevant side events relating to CT and CVE Overview of UNGA: The 70th UNGA was a remarkable gathering of global leaders and representatives from numerous constituencies, including civil society, academia, business and religious leaders. The breadth of representation is testament to the progress made at the global level towards more inclusive policy making and the recognition that addressing today s challenges requires a whole of community and collaborative response. The adoption of the SDGs and Agenda 2030 represents a consultative and collaborative process that is unprecedented in the history of the UN. Due to recent developments (fuelled by the growing threat of ISIL), CT and CVE were priority topics during the UNGA and the multiple side events. This profile was further elevated by the USlead CVE summit held at the UN on 29 September that was hosted by President Obama and attended by hundreds of world leaders and representatives from governments and civil society. These topics are moving up the priority list of the UN, with the upcoming UNSG comprehensive strategy on Preventing Violence Extremism being mentioned several times. The adoption of the SDGs and the 2030 Action Plan provided a good platform and context to discuss the intersections between global challenges, including terrorism, violent extremism, and conflict from a broader development perspective. Gender, youth, the nexus between development and security, results/concrete impact, and M&E, were key priority areas in discussions on the SDGs. Civil society had a higher than usual profile at this UNGA. Despite the distractions caused by various parallel high-level meetings, gatherings and events, and the US/Russia bilateral engagement on how to respond to the Syrian crisis, there was a spirit of cohesion and collective action rarely seen at the UN. The Syrian crisis dominated discussions, with a particular focus on Russia s interventions and its growing counter-terrorism engagement, mostly against ISIL. 2.1 Summary of observations and recommendations to EU and CT MORSE General observations on CVE CVE is based on the notion that interventions located broadly in the development domain can result in security improvement outcomes. Other fields that are based on this view (e.g. violence prevention, aspects of peace building) have found that for interventions to be successful, long-term investment is needed in well-designed social programmes (usually between 5 and 15 years), and that significant and ongoing investment in programme implementation is required. CVE programming is therefore not a quick fix, and donors need to

6 5 have the funds and sustained engagement to invest in multi-year programmes, and their ongoing evaluation. CVE is an emerging field, with a limited body of reliable, methodologically sound and transferable evidence. Building this body of evidence requires donors to collaborate in longterm investments. Two broad fields of inquiry are needed at this stage: (1) understanding the local drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, and (2) implementing programmes to test theories about CVE, and the evaluation of these programmes. Item (1) needs to prioritise empirical studies that gather primary data from direct sources, rather than desk-based studies. Item (2) requires multi-year programme funding, with strong monitoring and evaluation built in from the beginning. As more of this evaluation data mounts, programme data emerges, investments should be made in meta-analytical studies that examine the results of similar programmes together, and draw lessons on what approaches show good results, or promise positive outcomes. While the application of these will necessarily have to be context specific, evaluation and identification of proven approaches would add value. CVE work should not be focused on reinventing valuable work undertaken already. For example, the violence prevention field has not only developed programme and evaluation tools (e.g. how to design evaluations, how to assess the reliability and validity of evaluations) but also amassed an enormous body of evidence on what interventions work for specific target groups and specific contexts. Donors should actively engage specialists from this field in CVE work, and ensure that their work is not replicated. General observations on the UN The UN is not as coherent and coordinated as it needs to be considering the priority and importance of the CT and CVE debates. Various UN entities are driving their own agendas, funding approaches and implementation, often pulling in opposite directions at crosspurposes. The primary reason could be the overt power struggle among CT-mandated bureaus and their governing entities. In addition, there is a structural lack of clarity & purpose and coordination. The discussions and interventions in New York at times seemed removed from reality. Personality clashes between senior leadership also complicates matters and hinders collaboration. Many in the UN system are hoping that the SG will develop a clear Action Plan on PVE (the P for prevention replacing C for Countering Violent Extremism), but what matters most will be the follow up on the ground. Engaging and empowering UN Regional Coordinators and country teams will be necessary, and so far, there appears to be little evidence of a willingness to do so. New ideas and practical/concrete suggestions are still in short supply in many discussions at the UN and related meetings during the UNGA. Many meetings rehashed discussions that

7 6 have been circulating for the past 10 years. Member states, CSOs and academic experts should be challenged to bring fresh thinking and practical suggestions to the table. Almost all meetings start with a commitment to move from words to action, but then the circular discussions continue unabated with the usual faces and rhetoric. UN entities working on CT/CVE (especially CTED and CTITF) should focus on their core mandates and should be placed under pressure by Member States and the Security Council to deliver effectively on these. There is currently too much overlap, too much institutional infighting, and too little coherence and coordination. General observations on CT and CVE side events during UNGA CT and CVE were priority topics. Many countries are developing new strategies to support global efforts and respond to national and regional priorities. The EU is a leader in this regard with its Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project. The EU is thus well placed to inform global policy development. But considering the breadth of the growing CVE architecture, there is also a growing need to ensure coherence and complementarity between EU, UN and other efforts and initiatives. UN officials do not know enough about EU CVE efforts, so additional outreach and briefing may be required. The CVE leaders summit (rebranded into countering ISIL and violent extremism ) and GCTF ministerial did not attract the kind of profile or achieve the impact many hoped for. There seems to be some confusion on the side of the US administration and others on the question of how to move forward with the objectives set out of the initial White House Summit in February this year. It is unclear what follow-up will be given to the September summit proceedings and action plan. This said the official White House report from the summit (see summary below) provides an overview of global CVE initiatives, albeit without any clear guidance on how to enhance cohesion and collaboration. CVE has a newfound priority status within most parts of the UN and donor agencies, with multiple agencies and individuals trying to claim a slice of the potentially lucrative funding pie. Everyone wants a place at the CVE table, including traditional development and peace building actors who until now have shied away from CT and CVE discussions and projects for well-known reasons. As a result it is a crowded space, with different political and operational agendas driving the debate, often in different directions. Donors and member states (including the EU) should demand greater collaboration and coherence, especially from UN CT/CVE actors. To achieve this, donors will need to improve their own coordination and communication. In light of the above and lessons learned from the post 9-11 War of Terror era, CVE (and CT) label should be used with caution, and for the right strategic objectives. Member states, donors and the UN should resist the temptation of slapping it onto development and conflict

8 7 prevention initiatives without careful consideration. We should not allow CVE and CT to capture the development and related work of the UN and other actors, especially not if the end objective is (state) security. Human security is an important component of sustainable development, and development priorities should be inclusive, and citizen centric. Many CT/CVE actors in New York lack proper field experience in understanding the drivers of conflict and violent extremism. As collaboration between development/conflict prevention and CT actors improves, we should look to development experts with proper field experience to drive policy responses to CVE based on what works best from a sustainable development perspective. On the positive side, despite all its conceptual shortcomings and intellectual confusion, the embracing of CVE/PVE as a longer-term strategy at the political level marks an important step forward in the prevention arena. This offers promising opportunities for: i. ii. iii. Resource mobilisation for research, policy development and programming Collaboration with the wider diplomatic and development communities, in particular the Fragility & Conflict, Stabilisation, Peacebuilding, Governance and Rule of Law constituencies, who have, over the past decades, built up an impressive evidence base at the policy, strategy and implementation level, including tools and instruments for analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; Influencing of the hard CT communities. The SDGs as well as the discussions within the DAC offer very interesting hooks for broader discussion on how to practically improve the human security dimension of the debate, what not to do, and how to do it (starting from the premise that context is everything). Two downsides of political momentum are harming CVE: first, politicians are often not the most credible messengers; and second, political momentum usually calls for quick fixes to complicated problems, ignoring context and one s own role & impact.

9 8 Key recommendations to the EU and CT Morse 1. The EU s CT and CVE programmes have a fairly solid foundation in terms of EU policy and practice. But there are still some shortcomings in terms of coordination, coherence, impact and evaluation. It should also have higher visibility and impact with the UN and key actors in New York. The EU seems to be punching under its weight on CT and CVE at this point. There are various ways in which this can be done, partly through CT MORSE, and the IcSP more broadly. Section 4 provides some specific recommendations on EU engagement. 2. Whether it is through CT MORSE or the IcSP itself, the EU needs to engage in a more strategic dialogue at the national and regional level with various stakeholders, based on a profound understanding of the actors and factors, causes, trends, needs and gaps. That is where planning and eventually, impact measurement, starts. As a result of this context analysis, the IcSP resources must be allocated strategically, either as innovative seed money (CVE specific), or as complementary to other (related) interventions (CVE relevant). Rather than trying to be present in all continents, IcSP staff should ask themselves where their contributions stand the best chance of generating the most success. Coordination with EEAS, other DGs, the CT Coordinator s office and the EU delegations on the ground should improve. Cooperation is best guaranteed if a shared objective/interest can be found, and this is often easier to achieve at the national level. EU staff could benefit from interactive training and technical assistance on CVE: concepts, methodology, correlations and differences vis-a-vis the conflict, stability, governance and peacebuilding sectors. 3. The EU needs to demonstrate that it is a CVE/CT key player, not just a payer. EU should engage more in GCTF politically and technically, and demand (directly and through MS) improvement in UN engagement, coherence, coordination and impact. 4. The EU needs to engage more with civil society actors, not just governments, from the outset and help strengthen national dialogue processes and buy-in. 5. Through CT Morse and via EEAS and the EU CTC, the EU can highlight the EU s experience and comparative advantage at the nexus of development and security, with its vast field presence around the world and its capacity to train field personnel in EU Delegations about how current and future programming can be tailored to be more CVE-relevant and in some cases CVE specific, by working at the local levels to build community resilience to violent extremism. 6. The EU s work to support youth and women in fragile country contexts can also be highlighted more at the UN, within the GCTF and other international fora where awareness of the importance of CVE is increasing, but to date, examples of concrete projects and best practices are still undeveloped or disseminated. 7. EU CT Morse can play a key role in driving priorities that move CT/CVE from theory and political commitments to practice. It can draw on concrete success stories from broader EU/CT

10 9 initiatives, and recommendations from strategic networks like RAN and research on key challenges. 3 Overview of selected meetings/events attended by EU CT MORSE During the course of the UNGA, there were several side-events relevant to the work of CT MORSE. These side-events, including those hosted by the EU, focused on various aspects of countering terrorism, effectively responding to the threat posed by violent extremism and development of strategies geared to address conditions conducive to both. On behalf of CT MORSE, the non-key expert from ISS, together with ICCT and GCCS partners attended the following events: The RESOLVE Network launch and research conference, 22 September; Meeting of the RESOLVE Steering Committee, 23 September; GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25 September; GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September; GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September; The global youth summit against violent extremism, 28 September; GCERF side event on exploring the relationship between violent extremism and the private sector, 29 September; The US-lead Leader Summit on Countering Violent Extremists and ISIL, 29 September; Strong cities network official launch, 29 September; EU/International Crisis Group (ICG) meeting on Balancing Security and Development: Preventing Violent Extremism and the SDGs, 29 September; EU meeting on Integrating a Gender Dimension in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Policy and Practice, 30 September. 3.1 Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Networks events The ISS was requested by US Institute for Peace (USIP) to participate on the Steering Committee of a proposed new RESOLVE network. The ISS was particularly recommended for this role due to its track record of research and analysis in Africa. Prior to the UNGA side events, the ISS had participated in several telephone conferences to discuss the proposed network s activities and focus. In addition to the steering committee meeting, the ISS participated in a workshop on RESOLVE and met individually with key stakeholders. The concept for RESOLVE developed from the 2015 White House Summit on CVE, which identified the promotion of local research and information sharing as key objectives. At this stage, this

11 10 network remains a concept that is not fully developed (in terms of scope and activities), but it was formally launched on 22 September. Early versions of the concept note state the overarching goal of the network as, to improve policy and practice by increasing our ability to generate knowledge regarding what CVE strategies work in specific contexts and why. Ideas for what the network could do include: Identifying local researchers doing work at the sub-national or community level to bring into the network. Providing capacity building and resources to those researchers. This will be supported by a group of experienced researchers who will serve as mentors/advisors to the local researchers. Gathering, synthesizing, and presenting the work of the local researchers in ways that make the results accessible and actionable to national and international policymakers and practitioners. The US Department of State is the central donor, and USIP is the implementing agency. The US has provided a 1-year grant to USIP to establish a clear mandate for the network. Importantly, this funding also includes some funds for grants to local researchers The RESOLVE Network launch and research conference, Expanding the CVE Knowledge Base, 22 September The event brought together around 60 researchers from around the world, many of which who are involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programming; or directly undertaking CVE-related research (e.g. on the drivers of radicalisation) The network was launched officially by Sarah Sewall Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, US Department of State, and also attended by USAID. The discussions included setting out the key motivations for the network, and exploring the views of participants on how the network should operate. Questions explored during discussions included: what issues should be prioritized for research; who should be included in the network; how to strengthen local research capacity and how the new network relates to other, existing initiatives (e.g. Hedayah), and how to mobilise resources Short presentations were provided by some of the participating researchers, which profiled innovative research from countries including Afghanistan, Indonesia and Singapore, as well as multi-country studies. There seemed to be a limited understanding in the discussions that much of the work contemplated (e.g. M&E strategies for CVE programming) has already been developed in related fields (e.g. violence prevention) and that these lessons and materials would be easily transferable to the CVE domain. These issues were noted by the ISS.

12 11 A report on the event will be provided by USIP Meeting of the RESOLVE Steering Committee, 23 September The committee is chaired by USIP and its current membership includes the ISS, the Hedayah Centre, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, United Nations University, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore), as well as other individual researchers. Jon Gandomi of the US Department of State also attended the meeting. The membership, Terms of Reference and governance relating to the Committee were discussed briefly, but remain in development. The discussions again involved considering the purpose and key functions of the network, and while further ideas emerged following the conference A key issue discussed was the potential role of the network as a funding mechanism for local researchers. The ISS noted the existence of other funding mechanisms for localized CVE work, especially GCERF, and noted that care should be taken not to replicate these functions, especially due to the infrastructure that would need to be established to serve this function. Key observations and recommendations: In general, the RESOLVE network could have an important role to play especially in building an international body of knowledge on CVE. However, its focus needs to be clear, and it should not duplicate the efforts of other CVE-focused entities, including GCERF and Hedayah. However, more work needs to be undertaken to ensure that the network does not duplicate work that have also been produced in other fields, particularly on technical research methodologies, M&E and approaches for the production of synthesised, meta-analytical studies. Extensive and high quality documentation is available and easily transferable from very credible institutions such as the World Health Organisation, the US Centres for Disease Control, etc. The Network needs to develop clear strategies relating to both the production of good research, as well as its targeted dissemination to relevant audiences (including those at the policy-making level, and at the community level). The activities of the network could involve a series of events to share current research findings on specific themes. Communication will be key, as well as transparency of funding opportunities, how to become a partner, etc.

13 12 The Network certainly benefit from the upcoming CT Morse review of global CVE initiatives. 3.2 GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25 September This was a short morning discussion session that sought to raise debate on the security/development nexus, particularly in the context of CVE programming. Short presentations were made, followed by a brief discussion session. The presenters at the event were Khalid Koser, GCERF; Amb Armitage (Head of CT for Australia also on GCERF Board); Amb. Haque, Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary; and Eric Solheim, Chair of DAC. The following key issues emerged from the presentations and during the course of the discussions: CVE needs to be understood and defined more specifically to better understand the outcomes required from development and security actors. Particularly, the CVE field needs to learn from efforts made in other domains on addressing violence fields such as violence prevention and peacebuilding have already produced valuable strategies and approaches. In this regard, a far more nuanced understanding is needed on the dynamics of local communities and individuals. The contemporary world has created young people that are interconnected globally, and that have great ambitions. Some of the greatest frustrations emerge from the lack of opportunities to achieve ambitions, including opportunities for education, training and employment. Engagement at the political/diplomatic level is critical especially where local grievances become apparent early resolutions to local conflict should be a central focus. CVE falls directly into the security and development nexus, and understanding how these issues inter-relate should be a key focus, especially if local-level programming is to be effective. That said, there has already been a great deal of debate on this issue, particularly with concerns being raised by development actors about the securitisation of development. Generally, there seem to be varying degrees of cooperation and mistrust as development and security actors engage with each other in different local environments. The impact of violent extremism takes place mostly outside of OECD countries. The needs in the most affected countries are for economic growth, stability, and fairness (particularly given the many grievances, real or perceived), that may drive violent extremism An important strategy is to counter the extremist narratives at the local level. There is an absence of counter-narratives at the community level and this needs to be emphasized. Thus community

14 13 engagement should be at the heart of CVE, with a particular emphasis on addressing issues related to gender equality as this could have a dampening effect on reducing violent extremism. There should always be efforts towards diplomatic solutions even where it seems that such approaches may be impossible (provided example of experiences of Tamil Tigers). There needs to be more openness to these kinds of discussions Emphasis on the need to resist the tendency towards identity politics relating to language, religion, sects and focus on countering these types of narratives. Last and certainly not least is the need to address the sources of funding and focus on the countries that fund terrorism. 3.3 GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September US CT Ambassador Tina Kaidanow and Turkish CT Ambassador Tunc Ugdul chaired the GCTF Coordinating Committee meeting. Both co-chairs provided an overview of today s FTF threat and announced two new GCTF-initiatives. The three GCTF-inspired Centres Hedayah, IIJ and GCERF updated the meeting on progress and future plans, and ICCT on the transfer of the Admin Unit to ICCT. The US co-chairmanship was handed over to The Netherlands at the end of the meeting. Ambassador Kaidanow underscored the US s commitment to the GCTF both now and in the future New GCTF initiatives The first initiative is the US and Turkey-led Cross-Working Group Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalisation to Violence. US co-chair Kaidanow emphasised the need to create greater synergy between existing working groups. The aim is to take existing work and use that further to bring forward the agenda and bring GCTF s work into sharper focus. The initiative is meant to cover a broad range of themes, irrespective of religion and geography. Most of the discussion evolved around defining the target group(s), i.e. FTFs only or also others, e.g. home-grown terrorists, radicalised people and/or extremists; the importance attached to de-radicalisation; the need for concrete tools, instruments; and the emphasis on results. The coordinating committee adopted the initiative without any amendments. A second initiative, the International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity-Building Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM) was also discussed and endorsed. The aim of the ICCM is to catalogue international efforts, including those outside the realm of the GCTF, identify gaps in assistance / interventions on the civilian side, and work closely together with the governments of the 3 pilot countries to assist them to coordinate programming. Should other country or institution want to, they could use this information. Following an initial pilot phase, if proven successful, GCTF could expand to other countries.

15 14 The GCTF also endorsed two documents on Good Practices on Women and CVE and the Addendum to toe Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists Cross-cutting themes and updates of the working groups Besides updates from each working groups on their work plans and activities, presentations were given by the UN on the Border Security initiative: a joint GCTF UNCCT Moroccan government initiative. Switzerland informed members about a conference held in conjunction with UNICRI on Juvenile Justice in a CT Context. Main takeaways from the various working groups were: CVE: UK co-chair informed that the WG is developing an action plan on implementation of Abu Dhabi memorandum, stressing the importance of developing an evidence base and M&E framework; dialogue with Private Sector; the importance of youth and women; tackling the radicalisation lifecycle including de-radicalisation. CVE would be a particularly important area of interest for the ICCM. Criminal Justice Sector and the Rule of Law: The US co-chair informed the meeting that the focus of the WG would lie on juvenile justice and implementation of selected Good Practices 1, 2, 8 & 9, in particular Goof Practices 2 & 9 as they relate closely to UNSCR 2178 and Coalition against ISIL. The WG will draw on work carried out by CTED. In the context of the New Initiative, the WG would aim to develop tools to address recruiters. Furthermore, recommendations would be drafted on preventive and rehabilitative measures that can be made in the context of a CJ system response. The WG will work closely with the working group on Detention to develop tools for Rehabilitation and reintegration. Detention and Reintegration: The WG announced two events: (a) a workshop on life skills and cognitive skills, in Nairobi on 7-8 October; and (b) WG meeting in Sydney on 2-3 November on the management of reintegration of prisoners. The WG will also develop a training package to assist prison officials in the identification of risks in management of inmates: identification of radicalisation and response mechanisms. FTF. The co-chairs reiterated the 3 priority themes (Strategic communications; Border Control; CJ and Rehab) and 2 cross-cutting themes: trends and dynamics and outreach and engagement. The aim of the WG will be to developed standards and highlight trends and dynamics as the basis for responses. Horn of Africa: Both co-chairs EU and Turkey declared commitment to continue their co-chair role The EU representative reported about the 4th plenary that had taken place in Kampala 19/20 March, and on an event in June marking the creation of a research centre in Djibouti.

16 15 Reference was given to Juncker s announcement of an EU Emergency Trust Fund ( 1.8 billion) for West and the Horn of Africa, with a view to address root causes conducive to radicalisation, violent extremism as well as migration and exile. Focus will lie on strengthening law enforcement capacity. Sahel: Next plenary meeting will be held in May An inter-sessional workshop will be held in January/February, details TBD. 3.4 GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September Outgoing co-chair, US Secretary of State John Kerry opened the meeting, taking stock of the unprecedented threat levels posed by ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Taliban, Lashkar-al-Taiba, and others. He called on the international community to step up to the plate and address these threats better and more broadly, including by countering violent extremism. He reiterated the obligations under UNSCR 2178 to curb FTF, and introduced the initiative on the lifecycle of radicalisation. Incoming Dutch co-chair Foreign Minister Koenders laid out his plans for the coming two-year period, emphasizing the following five points: Results: The centre of gravity should become action, and less time spent on reflection. In doing so, GCTF needed to include the multilateral work into our national strategies; Resources: a strong political commitment is not enough. More resourcing of the required actions is needed; Reinforcement: focusing assessments and question ourselves what works and what does not work, combining resources and accelerating coordinated responses together with international stabilization and development partners. This requires reinforcement of our toolkit; Relations: GCTF needs to redouble its outreach efforts, beyond its members. More concrete projects and intensification of region and country specific approaches are needed: countries that are in dire need of counter terrorism support, but also regional organisations willing to actively pursue CT programmes; Renewal: lastly, GCTF must invest in innovative, context-specific initiatives. Prevent global, think local, especially at the community-level. The UN and GCTF members gave prepared statements, mostly gravitating around the topics already discussed during the coordinating committee meeting the preceding day. The Ministerial Meeting adopted the two new initiatives and papers and marked the official handover of the US co-chairmanship to the Netherlands.

17 16 Observations The GCTF is entering a new phase in its still young existence. Increasingly, members are insisting on less meetings and elaboration of new recommendations, calling instead for more action. A consensus on the need to show results and, consequently, more and better measurement of outcome and impact is growing, spearheaded by Western members. The discourse during the meetings was largely informed by trends and developments in the Middle East, in particular ISIL and the need to counter its growing presence in the region, and destabilise its global outreach. One of the (undesirable) consequences of such an enemy- or threat-centric approach lies in its tendency to equate radicalisation and various manifestations of violent extremism with terrorism, thereby risking repetition of past (GWOT) mistakes. The GCTF meetings coincided with a series of thematic CVE events and the CVE White House Leaders Summit. How and to what extent the GCTF, UN and others are expected to adopt and integrate the White House CVE Action Plan remains to be seen. There are potentially contradicting messages coming out of the US State department on this matter, with some interlocutors strongly in favour of incorporating these within GCTF, and others less so. Despite its adoption, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the exact notion and scope of the Cross-Working Group Initiative, and how it fits within the incoming co-chairs expressed ambition to strengthen the synergy between the various working groups and reach out to the wider Fragility and Stabilisation community. It will be interesting to see how the transition of US leadership to The Netherlands plays out. This transition, which coincides with the build up to US Presidential elections, may offer opportunities for the EU to encourage a more medium- and longer-term Rule of Law based approach (see below). Despite upcoming UN-initiatives such as the PVE Global Action Plan, the GCTF will remain the centre of gravity for CVE and Rule of Law based approaches to counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, there is a material risk that the GCTF and the GCTF-inspired institutions are drawn into a more binary approach to CT; in doing so, the achievements of the past decade may be lost. The EU should weigh in and emphasise the importance of strengthening resilience at the local level as the most sustainable response to radicalisation and violent extremism.

18 17 Compared to its policies, collective weight and substantial resources, the EU s involvement in GCTF is relatively limited. By collaborating closely with the incoming co-chairs, supporting their 5R-agenda and assuming a more visible role in the various working groups, the EU can expand its footprint on policy content and implementation. As co-chair of the Horn of Africa Working Group, the EU is in an advantageous position to further develop and operationalize a comprehensive approach to radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. The EU-funded STRIVE project can serve as an excellent example at the practical level and merits wider dissemination among members, given that it is based on rigorous comprehensive analysis, existing insights and addressing local as well as global trends and dynamics. The EU s support to the GCTF-inspired institutions is equally important; these institutions should be given the opportunity to meet the expectations set out at their inception. Recent US-led initiatives (e.g. RESOLVE research network, the CVE centre in Djibouti) appear to have been borne out of dissatisfaction with Hedayah s performance thus far. Rather than creating similar initiatives elsewhere, we recommend to examine the validity of these claims and address these constructively, i.e. within the confines of the centre s mandate. 3.5 Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 28 September Over 60 youth-oriented leaders and organisations representing over 45 countries met for the first Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, which builds on the White House Summit on CVE convened in February The Search for Common Ground s Counter Extremism Project, with support from the US Department of State, hosted the Summit that included a number of high-level speakers during the plenary sessions as well as several breakout sessions. The summit adopted a novel and interesting format that allowed for informal and broad engagement on many priority issues, while still being able to bring key conclusions and recommendations back to the plenary session. The summit brought fresh ideas, energy and passion to a key component of the larger CVE debate. This bodes well for future engagement with these key stakeholders in the global CVE response. Key speakers on the plenary panels included: Francis Townsend, US President of the CT Extremism Project Shamil Idriss, President and CEO, Search for Common Ground Lisa Monaco, US Homeland Security Advisor to President Obama Ahmad Alhendawi, UN SG s Envoy on Youth Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb of Rotterdam Sarah Sewall, US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights The breakout sessions covered a broad range of issues, including: role of social media (led by Facebook); the role of traditional media in CVE; security and human rights dimensions of CVE;

19 18 education, faith and interfaith dialogue; networks and networking for CVE. The conference provided an excellent networking opportunity for youth organisations and individuals working on CVE, as well as a unique platform to showcase good practices and examples of individual action, including voices from former violent extremists. Beyond these objectives, the conference achieved its aim of highlighting the key role played by the youth in CVE. It also demonstrated the need for deeper and more sustainable engagement with key actors, especially at the local level. The challenge now will be to maintain the momentum and develop workable initiatives to identify and engage with relevant youth leaders and organisations working on CVE and related matters. To maintain momentum, the UN, regional organisations, member states and relevant CSO actors need to prioritise the Youth Action Agenda3 recommendations that were adopted at the summit to strategically and sustainability engage with youth actors in various CVE initiatives. The Youth Action Agenda proposes some global preventive measures against violent extremism. These include reaching out to former violent extremists and returned fighters and rebuilding relationships with families and communities, and using social media to counter narratives about violent extremism. The Youth Action Agenda developed articulates the following key issues: What young people know about violent extremism What they are doing in their communities to prevent it A call to action for governments, NGOs, and policymakers to seize this moment and engage youth as partners against violent conflict and violent extremism. The EU could mainstream the role of youth actors in its various CVE programmes and initiatives, making specific reference to the guidance provided by the Action Agenda. GCTF inspired organisations should do the same. 3.6 International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) and Hedayah meeting: Building more effective responses to the FTF threat addressing prevention, prosecution and reintegration challenges The foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) phenomenon is one of the most pressing challenges facing international counter-terrorism efforts at present. This is especially true for European countries and the US, but also applies to countries in other regions including the Middle East and Africa. Frightening numbers of FTFs (men and women) have been recruited to join terrorist groups (most importantly ISIL) in conflicts in Iraq and Syria, but in other countries as well. These individuals pose significant threats, not least the risk they pose when returning to their home countries after engaging with extremist groups abroad. Estimates of exact numbers vary, but recent indications place the number of FTFs in the region of 25,000 35,000. These individuals come from more than 3 Youth Action Agenda To Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace, 28 September 2015, content/uploads/2015/09/final- Youth- Action- Agenda- 1.pdf

20 countries. This is clearly a significant threat that requires urgent interventions, both at the global and regional policy levels, but also in terms of appropriate and effective law enforcement and criminal justice capacity to respond. To explore the issues further, IIJ and Hedayah convened a meeting of key experts to discuss priority elements of response, from a security and broader development perspective. As can be seen from the attached agenda, speakers included leading experts from the UN, Hedayah, IIJ, and senior government officials with experience and expertise on the matter. Despite the high calibre of speakers, the discussion at the meeting seemed rather stale and unoriginal, with most speakers rehashing well-worn debates without any new or exciting proposals and ideas for concrete action. Mr Auer from the EU gave perhaps the most strategic and useful presentation of the event that focused on what the EU has done in terms of policy and practice to respond to the growing threat, and how the EU is implementing the requirements of UNSC resolution He highlighted the relevant dimensions of the STRIVE programme and the EU s Foreign Security and Development Policy which prioritises a holistic whole of community response (including civil society) in support of focused law enforcement and security imperatives. RAN, EU engagement with the GCTF working group (and Hague-Marrakesh memorandum), NATO and OSCE initiatives were also put forward as examples of good practice. Other speakers highlighted the following key points: The UNSG s comprehensive CVE strategy will be released in the coming months and will focus specifically on the challenge of FTFs. This should guide and support other international, regional and local level initiatives and strategies on FTFs. The overview of the Safe Houses initiative in the Netherlands provided a good example of a multi-stakeholder (non CVE specific) programme that has proven to be extremely useful in the FTF context and could be considered for possible emulation. Several speakers reiterated the importance of more and better research to enable informed responses. We need a deep and granular understanding of the FTF problem in order to develop effective, appropriate and sustainable responses. Returning FTF youths and women should be prioritized as they can channel their energy and perspectives in very constructive ways. These people understand the nature of the challenge, and the allure of the terrorist groups, and they should therefore be key partners in developing responses to the threat. Prison radicalization was raised as a major challenge. Additional attention needs to be paid to this and lessons should be drawn from other experts who have worked on prison violence prevention and recidivism programmes.