The Nordic-Baltic Space a concrete sphere of community in the making

Transcription

1 The Nordic-Baltic Space a concrete sphere of community in the making Dr Annika Bergman Politics, SSPS University of Edinburgh George Square EH8 a.bergman@ed.ac.uk Telephone: +44 (131) Paper presented to the European Consortium on Political Research Joint Sessions, Nicosia, Cyprus, 25 th -30 th April The main objective of this paper is to investigate contemporary international relations (IR) debates on political community through the lens of the emergence of a distinct Nordic- Baltic sphere of community. i I wish to add to the normative debate on the transformation of political community, by drawing upon the ethical reasoning of Andrew Linklater (1991, 1998, 1999, 2002). First, by providing a case study that can help us understand how concrete communities have tried to work out particular and universalistic commitments (Elshtain, 1999:145) to nationals and non-nationals alike. Second, by showing that thin cosmopolitanism is both desirable and possible, rather than an abstract thought experiment. Third, by arguing that sometimes it is more meaningful to speak about spheres of community rather than wholesale transformations of existing political communities. This conception of community differs from that of pure communitarians who hold that moral agents are situated selves and that their sense of morality and solidarity is confined to their co-nationals. Rather it rests upon Linklater s (1998) advocacy of new forms of political community that respect national loyalties while also supporting social and cultural diversity and whereby ethical principles and issues of justice can be negotiated through equal political dialogue. The paper commences by examining Linklater s conception of community and thin cosmopolitanism. It argues that his conceptions of exclusion and inclusion, international duty and ethical dialogic communities resonate well with the foreign policy traditions of the Nordic states, and, moreover, that they are significant pillars in the creation of the Nordic- Baltic sphere of community. It also addresses some of the main criticisms of Linklater s work, in particular the alleged abstraction in his reasoning. I go on to examine political community as a social construct. In so doing I purport that the construction of new spheres of community requires participating agents to adjust their distinctive local solidarities because

2 they may obstruct efforts to pursue new points of collective identification. I go on to provide an analysis of the distinctive features of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community, pointing to its virtues and imperfections. A key argument is that the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community is closely connected with the wider process of adjacent internationalism, and that it has emerged in a favourable historical context. It is thus socially constructed and dependent on the social and historical setting in which it has emerged. In an effort to trace the obstacles to the construction of new and more inclusive conceptions of community I critically examine some of the problems currently facing the N-B sphere of community. By way of conclusion it is noted that although the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community is far from perfect it can provide a normative case for new forms of adjacent communication communities. IR, political community and the Nordic-Baltic Sphere of Community There is a prolific and lively debate in contemporary international theory on the difficult nexus between our statist obligations to our own political community and our cosmopolitan duties to distant others. From a cosmopolitan perspective we inhabit a single ethical space defined by universal moral principles and codes of conduct that take priority over our membership of particularistic social or political communities. Foreign policy should not only be about security and order but about the realisation of the good of our common humanity. For pure cosmopolitans, which is a fairly small group of scholars, borders have no moral significance. This is the most contested dimension of cosmopolitanism in international relations theory and has led some to equate it with idealism or even utopianism. The basis for this criticism is that there is little evidence of states acting in a purely cosmopolitan fashion i.e. in an entirely other-regarding manner, and scholars and people vary in their perception of cosmopolitan obligation and community. Given this it is hardly surprising that cosmopolitanism has come under criticism by communitarians who argue that our sense of morality is socially constituted and dependent on the shared social knowledge of a particular community. The communitarian-cosmopolitan debate in IR theory is thus centred around our conception and practice of obligation beyond borders. Within this debate there is an increasing interest in new conceptions of political community that are more inclusive and respect both universality and cultural difference, with the writings of Andrew Linklater being central to this perspective. Common to most investigations into the transformation of political community is the view that political community is socially constructed and not a priori given. Without this insight one would have to question the feasibility of the transformation of political community. We shall revisit this argument below when we discuss the distinct features of the Nordic Baltic sphere of community. However, before we do so let us look at Linklater s work and determine the extent to which it can help

3 us theorise about the distinctiveness of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community, and moreover, how the Nordic-Baltic sphere can add both theoretical substance and empirical vigour to contemporary debates on political community. In Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, Linklater (1982:15) confronts the tension between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism by reflecting on our dual existence and responsibility as men and citizens. Thus his analysis is concerned with the problem of reconciling our existence as men with the acquired status of citizenship. Linklater s solution to this dilemma is the re-creation of community in a society shaped by the presence of individualism and universalism which is an idea that he develops further in his later work (Linklater, 1982:17). What this means is to claim a status which transcends that of membership; it is to be incapable of total identification with the community to which one belongs, to demand recognition of one s humanity as well as one s citizenship. (Linklater, 1991:49). In order to realise this objective we need to recognise the equality and independence of the communities of other human beings and be sensitive to the existence of human freedom and as such enable all men to promote their individual development (Linklater, 1982:203). In a prescript to the second edition of Men and Citizens Linklater (1991:209) provides a neat summary of his argument by purporting that a critical theory of international relations should clearly embrace the proposition that there are limits to universality just as there ought to be limits to difference.what is perhaps the most astonishing about Men and Citizens is that it treats men as being equitable with the whole human species and that it makes no attempt to include women in this category. It would seem that a political theory that seeks to bridge our dual loyalties as humans and citizens should treat our common humanity as being made up by both men and women. This negligence stands in direct contrast to Linklater thin cosmopolitanism which holds that most modern societies have not been content to enact only internal concepts of obligation, and they have shown resistance to having their moral and political experience represented simply in the language of ethical particularism (as well as gender particularism one might add) (Linklater, 1991:55). In Transformation of the Political Community (TPC) Linklater directly takes on board the idea of community. Linklater s objective is to reconcile communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, by arguing for a new conception of community. In doing so he continues to advocate an account of a political community, which allows for both cultural diversity and universalism. In order to do so the members of distinct communities must recognise their dual obligation to the members of their own sphere of community as well as others. What this amounts to is a thin form of cosmopolitanism which is a theme first developed in Men and

4 Citizens. However, Linklater does not prescribe an ethical reasoning that denounces social and cultural diversity. The greatest challenge is not the lack of universal ethical principles but the insufficient recognition of cultural difference. However, this does not lead him to give up on the cosmopolitan project. Quite the contrary he argues that an account of moral progress is already implicit in the recognition of cultural difference (Linklater, 1998:75). Similarly Walker (1993:78) argues that we should consider how universality and particularity might be rearticulated without capitulating to the modernist presumption that the different must always be resolved into the same. Linklater s concern with cultural difference takes place against the backdrop of his thin cosmopolitan project. He advocates a thin conception of universality which defends the ideal that every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion which govern global politics (107) Such dialogic communities involve relevant outsiders in key decisions regarding the distribution of membership, citizenship and global responsibilities and holds that bonds between members have to be loosely formed to permit the evolution of wider communities of discourse (Linklater, 1998:103). Hence, the ethical boundaries of political communities should be renegotiated in such a way that they allow for inclusion rather than exclusion. Drawing upon Habermas s discourse ethics Linklater argues that this can happen through the formation of universal communication communities, which is a core aspect of his ethical reasoning. The idea is that all humans who are affected by a certain decision or way of reasoning should be invited to participate in political dialogue. Linklater holds that norms cannot be regarded as universally valid unless they have or could command the consent of all those who stand to be affected by them (Linklater, 1998: 96). His conception of universality is thin because it recognises cultural diversity while it defends the ideal that every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion which govern global politics (Linklater, 1998:107). Only by advancing such a dialogue can social and economic inequalities be reduced and universal emancipation be achieved (Linklater, 1998:109). Linkater (1998: ) also distinguishes between three ideal-typical frameworks of action that are available to states which are committed to enlarging the boundaries of moral and political community and to cooperating with others to eradicate unjust modes of exclusion Moreover, each of these political frameworks widens the boundaries of community to ensure due consideration for the interests of others; each moves beyond the supposition that the difference of the other is a good reason for privileging the interests of insiders. It is

5 important to remember that there is no sense in which one of these three wider universalities, or societies of states, can be regarded as superior to others (Cochran 1999:111). Linklater draws upon the English School of international theory in developing these frameworks. The first is the pluralist international society, which represents movement beyond egocentric social systems that deny the rights of outsiders. The second is a solidarist international society which breaks away from exclusion of individuals, minority nations and indigenous peoples by granting them rights prescribed by international law. The third idealtypical framework is participation within a post-westphalian international society which rests upon the commitment to widen the boundaries of the moral community so that insiders and outsiders can be associated as the equal members of a transnational citizenry (Linklater, 1998:175). By widening the boundaries of the moral community the post- Westphalian international society can overcome some of the obstacles that sovereignty, territoriality and national citizenship impose on the formation of common international political action. An example of such a community could be the EU or event the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community. To sum up Linklater s conception of community allows for a normative analysis of relations between states as well as the emergence of new spheres of communities. He advocates an account of a political community that rests upon a thin form of cosmopolitanism which does not prescribe a way of life which denounces social and cultural diversity. By moving away from a thick form of cosmopolitanism in favour of a thinner less demanding brand we can overcome the common juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. For example, in previous work on Nordic military policy I contend that the Nordic states relatively strong senses of collective selfhood are compatible with their deepening senses of duty to distant others (Bergman, 2004). More specifically, Linklater s thin cosmopolitanism also allows us to explore the post-cold War formation of a distinct Nordic-Baltic sphere of (dialogic) community and the implications that this might have for theoretical and empirical investigations into similar formations. This is also an approach that can be applied outside the Nordic-Baltic regional setting, the EU post-enlargement comes to mind, in an enlarged union it is even more crucial to allow for a greater measure of cultural diversity while maintaining the cosmopolitan values of the Union including universal human and minority rights. Finally, a thin cosmopolitan approach allows us to pursue research that is informed by cosmopolitan scholarship without having to ignore the continued significance of bounded political communities. Thus, by opting for a thinner form of cosmopolitanism we can rid ourselves of the naivety that is so often associated with a thick cosmopolitan approach. Before we go on to examine the N-B sphere of community through the lens of Linklater s thin

6 cosmopolitanism it is worth examining some of the criticisms that have emerged in response to his work. The transformation of political community- a plausible project? There is no doubt that Linklater s scholarship is central to new debates on political community and that it opens up for the analysis of exclusion and inclusion in international politics. Despite this his work has been tainted by some criticism such as lack of clarity and empirical rigour, misconceptions of the core texts that inform his reasoning, including the philosophy of Kant (Walker, 1999). The harshest criticism can be found in Schweller s (1999) reading of TPC. He dismisses Linklater s normative agenda in its entirety by arguing for a parsimonious neorealist account of IR that does not engage in wishful thinking. Elshtain s (1999) critique is much more sophisticated and subtle, although she retains that Linklater s work suffers from a measure of abstraction. While expressing her general support for Linklater s normative conception of dialogic communities she asks the reasonable question who is to be in charge of such dialogue? Moreover, who will be charged with the transformation of political community more generally? Below I develop the contention that the Nordic states are particularly well placed to be in charge of both tasks due to their pursuit of small states solidarism and ethical conduct beyond borders. Elshtain (1999) also notes that millions of people have already united in new transnational communities through their universal religious practices. Molly Cochran (1999) is another scholar who has actively sought to evaluate the significance of Linklater s work for normative reasoning in IR. She finds it hard to see how the unfolding experience of modernity and the logic of the full extension of citizenship rights can ensure the progress Linklater envisages, without a wider conception of the institutions of international political practice further she doubts whether the state will sit idly by as the momentum of its central paradox rolls of over it, forcing it to take on new responsibilities and make the kind of dialogical transformation that Linklater suggests for the extension of moral inclusion and human freedom (Cochran, ). In her words where Linklater sees that connections or responsibilities between persons are to be historically and sociologically unfolded and illuminated as more or less given in a future institutional form, I find that these connections have to be created (Cochran 116). Common to Elshtain and Cochran is their general support for the transformation of political community, even if they urge us to think about the manner in which this can happen. Linklater (1998) himself suggests that one way of doing so is to widen our conception of citizenship, so as to make it more global, and points to the EU as regional actor that has started this process. Yet, this part of his work is far from exhaustive and there is a great deal of work to be done here. Lynn Dobson (2006) is a scholar who has applied this kind of insight to the concrete case of the EU. Linklater, on the other hand, has shifted his focus toward the

7 concept of harm arguing that political communities which are committed to cosmopolitanism need to base their foreign policies on the no harm principle and the key point is that it is wrong to promote the interest of our own society by exporting suffering to others (Linklater, 2002:?). One of the problems with this conception of harm reduction is that Linklater (2002:146) remains rather vague at to who is to be charged with the task of making progress in a broadly cosmopolitan fashion. He nonetheless provides some empirical examples emerging from the no harm principle and they include ethical investment, fair trading and ethical tourism (145). Others have examined the extension of political community through the lens of security community discourses. Adler and Barnett (1998) dedicate an edited book to this debate. Their definition of a security community is informed by the work of Karl Deutsch (1957) and his contention that pluralistic security communities, of which the Nordic states is an example, do not go to war against each other. Adler and Barnett (1998:30) define a pluralistic security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. For this to happen there needs to be trust between the members of a security community. What is more they depend on a shared structure of meanings and identity and are socially constructed. Pertti Joenniemi (2003: ) examines the relevance of this debate for our understanding of Nordic unity and community. In doing so he argues that the Nordic space is not formulated as a security project. Instead a different lens was installed in viewing realities, and security was, in the new context that became visible, depicted as a basically irrelevant concern Hans Mouritzen s (2003: ) position is slightly different in that he defines the Nordic region as the mother of all security communities. He nonetheless argues that a bottom-up approach defines the Nordic Security Community that builds on mutual sympathies that have developed spontaneously at the popular level. While I don t dispute that the North of Europe displays signs of a security community, particularly their total disinclination to resort to war against one another, I am not convinced that this is the best way to explore the emergence of new spheres of community, since such investigations do not sufficiently engage with the moral and ethical concerns arising from the transformation of political community. They certainly do not engage with the boundaries of our ethical obligations and the manner in which we can make political community a more cosmopolitan-minded construct, which is a central theme in my analysis of the Nordic-Baltic space. This is why I have chosen to apply Linklater s ideas about exclusion, inclusion, international duty, and ethical dialogue to the Nordic-Baltic context. In so doing I hope to bring some insight into the role of states and non-state actors in furthering new conceptions and practices

8 of political community. This might also lead to further knowledge of the role of middle powers such as the Nordics, institutions and regional affinities in facilitating the process of community construction. It might also help us understand how they can be sustained through transnational ties. Moreover, Linklater s conception of community enables us to examine the possibility of extending access to political dialogue to those who were previously excluded from it with the former Soviet Republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania being instructive examples. While I can only begin to explore these questions here it is hoped that the analysis of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community will eventually bring some more clarity to such debates. Linklater s conceptions of exclusion and inclusion and international duty resonate particularly well with the foreign policy traditions of the Nordic states, and, moreover, they are significant pillars in the creation of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community. Elsewhere I have defined the Nordic states as thin cosmopolitans (Bergman, 2004, 2007). If this line of argument has substance, it appears to challenge the common juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism by postulating the co-existence of strong senses of collective selfhood as well as deepening senses of duty to distant others, what can be defined as thin cosmopolitanism. It would be a mistake to claim that the Nordic states have ridded themselves of their distinct communitarian allegiances. Arguably, the Nordics display the same inclination as other modern states to provide for their own citizens before seeing to the needs of others. Thus they adhere to the idea that states primary duty is to pursue the interests of their peoples but in the context of a set of wider duties towards other states, and through other states, the rest of humanity (Brown 2001:26). Most western and non-western states have acquired a degree of commonality and common identity with myriad of other states. As the solidarist branch of the English School has argued, strong senses of sovereign identity have not precluded the creation of solidaristic international community. While generally supporting international order the Nordics have done more than most states by giving real substance to solidarism in global politics, through its extensive involvement in the United Nations (UN), mediation in conflict, active participation in UN and European Union (EU) led peace operations. Traditionally the Nordic states have been exceptionally mindful of the needs of other states while privileging the welfare needs of their own citizens, albeit to varying degrees. As thin cosmopolitans the Nordic states tend to support the emergence of a global social democracy which promotes the rule of international law; greater transparency, accountability, and democracy in global governance; a deeper commitment to social justice; the protection and reinvention of community at diverse levels; and the transformation of the global economy into a free and fair rule based economic order (Held, 2004:163).The enhanced presence of a distinctive Nordic-Baltic sphere of community

9 illustrates this claim. This argument will be further substantiated when we turn to adjacent internationalism below. The Nordic states belong to a Nordic, European as well as, a global community- all denoting different spheres of solidarity and loyalty. Here I define these sites of solidarity and commonality as spheres rather than referring to them as fully blown political communities. The use of sphere denotes the multiple sites of identification and community that national bounded communities and their citizens belong to. Each of these spheres requires a certain transfer of loyalty and duty as well as a sustained dialogue between their members. Fraser (1999:73-75) uses the term partial community to define multiple sites of community and examples of these are the gay community, a linguistic community, a world community a street all denoting connectedness, the meeting with another soul to soul feelings of belonging. In Linklater s words, they constitute pockets of solidarism (Linklater, 1998:207). Because communities and spheres of communities are socially constructed they are capable of both expanding and contracting (Carr in Linklater, 1997). They are not fixed entities, but subject to change and dependent upon the social context in which they emerge (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Linklater also holds to the view that communities are socially composed (1998). Arguing from a slightly different angle Mervyn Frost s (1993:9) view is that we are embedded in practices rather than communities The fact that communities are historically and culturally contingent does not mean that they have closed in on themselves. Rather it means that they are constantly under reconstruction and that they constitute imagined communities (Neumann, 1999:115). Of particular significance for this discussion is the observation that a new Baltic dimension has been added to the Nordic states spheres of community in the post-cold War era. By implication, the Nordic states have demonstrated that they are not alien to the formation of new spheres of political community, that require multiple loyalties, a shared identity which enables the re-conceptualisation of the other so as to make it part of the self (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004:12). As Neumann (1999:23) has noted Self/other relations have to be understood in their historicity, they are aspects of historically contingent ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time and space. Moreover, the self and the other are not only mutually constitutive entities but also are necessarily unbounded (36). As is the case elsewhere the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community emerged in a distinct historical context, which was defined by the demise of the USSR. In this process old myths and imaginary symbols of historical affinities and a shared Baltic Sea identity have been revived for the purpose of sustaining the construction of the adjacent dialogic community (see also Neumann, 1999). Moreover, the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community is embedded in

10 discursive practices that has helped to maintain its existence (Bergman 2002, the Nordic Council of Ministers, 2004). In Neumann s (1999:32) words A tightly knit epistemic community of Nordic foreign policy intellectuals played a conspicuous role in producing the knowledge that was used to prop up these several ideas. As we shall see below there is also a close connection between the Nordic states pursuit of adjacent internationalism towards the three Baltics and the emergence of a specific Nordic-Baltic sphere of community. Adjacent internationalism and new spheres of community Here I shall explore Nordic-Baltic relations in an effort to trace the significance of common historical experiences, institutional developments and co-operation as well as the role of popular support in sustaining new spheres of community. The Nordic states post-cold War involvement in the Baltic states and the construction of an adjacent sphere of community have taken place against the four Nordics internationalist tradition in global politics. Key dimensions of the solidarist position of the English School of IR theory have for some time been present in the foreign policies and national political discourses of a small group of internationalist minded states, of which the Nordic states are prominent members. As noted above while generally supporting international order the Nordics have done more than most states by giving real substance to solidarism in global politics, through various activities. More than anything else though, Sweden and its Scandinavian neighbours have viewed themselves as the best friends of the developing world and using their generous provisions of overseas development assistance to further their commitment to a more equitable distribution of global income and as a way to listen and accommodate their specific demands. As I have argued elsewhere Nordic internationalists have generally shared the broad liberal vision of the importance of free trade as well as international cooperation, while arguing that these alone are inadequate means for promoting global peace. Rather, they have subscribed to a social democratic conception of global obligation across borders, which entails placing greater emphasis upon global social and economic justice, particularly the reduction of uneven development Given this, it is more insightful to understand Nordic international behaviour as a distinctly social democratic variety of internationalism rather than as prototypical liberal internationalism (Bergman, 2006: 76). ii A core assumption here is that the motives underpinning the Nordics engagement in the Baltics differ little from their traditional commitments to internationalism and solidarity at the global level (Ruin, 2002), a contention that is widely supported by Nordic policy-makers as well (interviews with Carlsson, 1999; Blankenborg, 1998; Bjurner, 1998; Houlberg, 1998;

11 Sierla, 1998). I have argued elsewhere that the long-standing Nordic tradition of solidarity with small and vulnerable nations in the international system can be traced through to their post-cold War relations with the Baltic states (Bergman, 2006), expressed in their support for Baltic EU and NATO membership accompanied by the process of civil regionalisation which involves, trade union, local councils, churches, choirs etc. I have defined this process as one of adjacent internationalism which is a political process that builds on small states solidarism (Bergman 2006). It is precisely their conduct of solidarism towards small vulnerable communities that makes them well placed to be charged with the task of transforming the political community in IR. As small and newly independent republics in the North of Europe the Baltics struck a chord with the dominant beliefs underpinning Nordic internationalism. It is doubtful whether Russia would fit into this picture because of its oppressive past and sheer size. Adjacent internationalism differs from the wider process of Baltic Sea regionalism in that it exhibits a stronger normative dimension which contributes to and distinguishes it from a plain manifestation of regional integration (Bergman, 2006:81). Hence, adjacent internationalism is a normatively informed political process that provides a point of unification for Nordic commitments to international, European and adjacent forms of solidarity, democracy and stability. What is more it has contributed to the emergence of a distinctive Nordic Baltic sphere of community. As I have noted above I am deliberately using sphere of community here to capture the different layers of solidarity, loyalty and community that we all adhere to rather than a fixed and clearly defined political community. I think that such a fluid definition captures better the attempts undertaken in Europe and beyond to re-conceptualise duty across borders and it certainly fits the Nordic-Baltic case. Central to the Nordic-Baltic collective identity formation is their willingness to re-conceptualize their sense of us to include others (Wendt, 1994: 84 96). This means that the Nordics and the Baltics, respectively, have allowed for part of their national identities to be reshaped by their geographical, historical and cultural affinities with their neighbours. Thus, the otherness of their adjacent partners no longer function as a way of identifying the self but is embedded in the self. The specific character and durability of such feelings of solidarity are dependent upon the social settings in which they emerge. As I have noted elsewhere the Nordic welfare states suggest the thesis that states that practise solidarity on the national level are more prone to do so on the regional and international levels (Bergman, 2006; 2007). This conception of community differs from that of pure communitarians who hold that moral agents are situated

12 selves and that their sense of morality and solidarity is confined to their co-nationals. Rather, it rests on Linklater s (1998) advocacy of new forms of political community that respect national loyalties while also supporting social and cultural diversity. This process has been facilitated by the ongoing construction of the inter-nordic region which builds upon deeply embedded historical, cultural and political affinities between the five Nordic states. As Arnswald and Jopp (2001:23) argue the Nordic tradition of mutual low politics co-operation and its available institutional machinery facilitated their closer contacts with the Baltic states. For example, the Föreningen Norden (the Nordic Association), was formed in The purpose of the association was to promote Nordic unity through civil co-operation. According to Hansen the association aimed at bringing down barriers between people and to civilise conflict resolution through information and by, establishing new friendships (Hansen, 1994:10, my translation). During the inter-war period the association was widely supported by leading politicians who envisaged it as an important generator of Nordic interests and co-operation. However, during the Cold War it lost most of its political impetus and became a body for civil co-operation (Interview with Imnander, 1999). The association is still active and enjoys broad support across the Nordic and Baltic states. At the beginning of the 1930s the four Nordic states committed themselves to co-operation, which resulted in a multitude of new official contacts between Nordic Foreign and Prime Ministers. This unity was particularly visible within the League of Nations where the Nordic states developed joint positions, a pattern which was sustained throughout of the 20 th century (Wiklund, 2000, Andersson, 1994). Nordic co-operation was facilitated by Finland s increasingly more favourable attitude towards its Nordic neighbours and by the fact that social democratic parties were in power in all the four Nordic states in the 1930s. Nordic social democratic unity manifested itself the establishment of the Socialdemokratiska arbetarrörelsernas samarbetskommitee, SamAK, in 1932 (The Joint Committee on Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement). iii After the Second World War, Sweden approached Denmark and Norway with the aim of establishing a Nordic Defence Union in The project failed in 1949 because Norway and Denmark argued that the Swedish proposal did not go far enough in terms of providing a collective defence solution. Failure to unite in the area of defence did not prevent Sweden, Denmark and Norway from forming the Nordic Council (NC) in Finland was not able to join until 1956, due to its special relationship with the USSR. Apart from contributing to Nordic unity generally the objectives of the NC have been to promote co-operation in the areas of social policy, culture as well as communications including the establishment of common Nordic labour market (Andersson, 2000:86). The NC

13 has not only contributed to enhancing Nordic co-operation in these fields but has provided a forum for socialisation between Nordic parliamentarians. iv Nordic-Baltic Relations For most of the 20 th century Nordic-Baltic relations were inhibited by geopolitical restraints, despite the geographic proximity between the two groups of states. Soviet occupation of the Baltic states restricted the Nordic states from developing close ties with their neighbours. This had not always been the case though. For instance, Estonia and part of Latvia (Livonia) were incorporated into the Swedish dominion during the period Similarly, the Estonian region of Ösel was until 1645 under Danish rule. Even if Swedish rule was imposed upon Estonia there is some historical evidence, such as the old Estonian expression vana hea rootsi aeg (the old Good Swedish times), to suggest that it was not opposed by a wide section of Estonian society (Küng, 1992; Lepp 1994). For instance, the Swedish King Gustavos Adolfos II established the first Estonian University in Tartu in The situation changed in 1721 when Russia conquered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Until 1921 there were hardly any contacts between the Nordic states and their Baltic neighbours. However, during the inter-war period the Nordics established diplomatic relations with the Baltic states. This relationship did not last for long though since the USSR re-occupied the countries again in In this context, we should consider one specific incident in Swedish- Baltic relations which can, at least in part, explain much of early Swedish post-cold War activism in the Baltic states. In response to Soviet occupation of the Baltic states a fairly large number of the Swedish speaking Estonians expressed their wish to emigrate to Sweden. After difficult negotiations with the USSR Sweden managed to secure an agreement which allowed Swedish Estonians to take up residence in Sweden (Küng, 1991b). Furthermore, a fairly large number of Estonian political refugees were given shelter in Sweden. However, a group of soldiers, who had fled Sweden a result of the USSR take-over of the Baltic republics, were less fortunate (Zalcmanis, 1983; Freivalds, 1967). Common to these soldiers was their desire to escape detention in Soviet prisons, as a punishment for their co-operation with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The USSR, however, did not show much sympathy for those who had collaborated with Germany, and demanded that these troops should be returned to the Baltic states. Sweden was in no position to oppose this request and in 1945 the Baltic soldiers were extradited to the USSR (Kung, 1992; Carlgren, 1993). These events have continued to taint the Swedish collective consciousness and seemingly influenced Sweden s current relations with the Baltic states. Indeed, officials concede that a feeling of guilt can explain much of Sweden s early activism in the 1990s (Interviews with Kettis, 1998; Bjurner,

14 1998). However, there are also those who argue that such incidents are best forgotten (Interviews with Ignats, 1998; Elofsson, 1998). In the late 1980s the Nordic states started to explore ways of supporting the Baltic liberation process by offering moral support to their struggle and this process was followed through in the 1990s and the early 21 s century. In sum then the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community has emerged in a favourable historical context which has been symbolically important in furthering their post-cold War relations. As we have seen above this process was also strengthened by the Nordic states internationalist tradition and ethical conduct beyond borders, that can be traced through to their post-cold War involvement in the three Baltic republics. The Nordic-Baltic sphere of community at work Having examined the process of adjacent internationalism and the historical context in which the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community has been constructed we can now take a closer look at Nordic-Baltic relations in the post- Cold War period. The first thing to note is that Nordic support for the Baltic states re-entry into the international community has been an effective way of cultivating a distinct Nordic-Baltic sphere of community, based upon mutual trust and inter-subjective knowledge. Nordic support for Baltic EU membership and defence forces have had implications for the construction of a distinctive Nordic Baltic sphere of community, in particular by providing multiple settings for equal dialogue, negotiation, cooperation and socialization within which the two groups have come closer together. By reorganizing the Nordic Council and adopting a distinct adjacent dimension to the organization in the 1990s, the Nordic states indicated their willingness to pursue a permanent political dialogue with their Baltic neighbours, which is of course one of the key dimension to Linklater s conception of political community. Another example here is the 3+5 network launched in the late 1990s, which provides a forum for political dialogue between the two groups of states. Clearly, bilateral links have also been central to this. The construction of an adjacent dialogic community has been facilitated by the fact that the Baltic states have been comprehended as being quite close to the Nordic family and nordicity is moving beyond its previous boundaries, be they cultural, legal or institutional (Joenniemi and Lehti, 2003: 136). Community-building of this kind is in line with wider developments in post-cold War Europe, where emphasis has been given to the creation of new and more inclusive spheres of community. Indeed, Nordic support for Baltic EU membership should be seen as an important step in this direction. Lagerspetz (2003) argues that the inclusion of the Baltic states within the EU could lead to a stronger Nordic bloc within that organization. There is evidence to suggest that this is the case in that the two groups of states have recently launched an informal

15 three+three framework comprising Denmark, Finland and Sweden as well as the three Baltic states within the EU, which allows them to identify common priorities prior to top summits, with their joint interest in the EU s policy towards former Soviet republics being a good example. This suggests that there is still room for a distinctive form of Nordic Baltic cooperation post-enlargement even if the focal points of their relations have changed. The Nordic Council s Working Programme for co-operation with the three Baltic republics confirms that there is still political commitment to sustaining a distinct Nordic-Baltic sphere of community and so is the ongoing collaboration between the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Baltic Assembly as well as the numerous cultural and people-to-people projects taking place in the region (Nordic Counicl of Minsters, 2004). In the words of the Norwegian Minister for Nordic Cooperation Grande Røys (2006:1) active European engagement has... brought new elements into Nordic-Baltic co-operation. In this new Europe, regional co-operation will take on added importance and active Nordic-Baltic consultations and coordination in relation to European affairs will continue to be useful to all of us in safeguarding the common interests of the Nordic and Baltic countries. Given this, we can now argue that the creation of a Nordic Baltic sphere of community is well underway. More importantly, the Nordic Baltic project provides a normative case for the possibility of fostering new forms of political community, even if they are, in part at least, built upon mythical and imaginary conceptions of belonging to a shared geographical, historical and cultural space. Such myths can nevertheless be powerful tools in constructing and sustaining new commonalities between states. Civil regionaliation It should be noted that the Nordics support for Baltic entry into Western institutions has evolved in parallel with the publics engagement in different forms of civil cooperation (Bergman, 2002), a process that I have defined as civil regionaliation (Bergman, 2002). Public interest in issues of international justice and order has a long tradition in the four Nordic states, with churches, trade unions, youth organisations actively opposing repressive regimes in Africa and elsewhere (Bergman, 2006:79). However, the degree to which the Nordic publics have supported their Baltic neighbour is unprecedented. In many ways it has led to a localization of foreign policy, bringing it down to the level of voluntary organizations, local councils, choirs and churches. As result, the Nordic (and Baltic) governments can now claim, with some justification, that their pursuit of adjacent internationalism embraces elites, none-state actors and a considerable number of citizens. This process would have been more difficult to sustain had not a considerable number of ordinary citizens and other non-state actors become actively involved in the project. Indeed, Nordic-Baltic solidarity is dispersed

16 widely and has moved beyond state structures, with Nordic trade unions and towns being instructive examples (Bergman, 2002). In many respects this is what distinguishes Nordic- Baltic relations from other forms of community, a view widely supported by Nordic and Baltic policy-makers (Bergman 2006). The Nordic and Baltic citizens have managed to bridge difficulties arising from cultural diversity in favour of a sphere of community that seeks to combine universal and particularistic loyalties. What are the obstacles to new spheres of community? Here I shall address some of the potential obstacles to the emergence of new and more inclusive spheres of community, starting with the implications of variations in the participating agents value systems. This dilemma has become increasingly more significant in the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community in that the Baltics do not share the Nordic states social democratic welfare traditions and the ideas associated with them. In actual fact they appear to be more neoliberal in their outlook, as expressed in their post-cold War economic policies. This is hardly surprising since all EU candidate countries were asked to reform their economic policies so at to meet the Union s entry criteria. The Baltic states were keen to be included in the first round of the Eastern enlargement and introduced economic reforms and cuts in their social welfare spending in an effort to join the EU. In some ways then the neoliberalisation of their economic policies was exogenously imposed. The Nordic states themselves have not been saved from this neoliberaliation process (Bergman, 2007), however, many of their specifically social democratic values and norms remain intact, even in Denmark has perhaps more than any other Nordic state departed from its social democratic legacy. The question emerges whether it is at all possible to construct a new sphere of community when the participating states adhere to different economic principles and notions of social welfare? There is some evidence to suggest that this is not an entirely unproblematic issue. A significant example here is the concerns voiced by Swedish trade unions regarding the influx of Baltic construction firms that are able to undercut Swedish salaries and labour market standards (Bergman, 2006). Against this, there is evidence to suggest that the Baltic countries have steeped their social security and pension systems in the Nordic tradition (interview with Zapolskas, 2004). Another issue that might impact upon the success of the Nordic-Baltic sphere of community is the lack of inclusion at the national level. Can we really expect bounded political spaces to engage in formation of new spheres of community when they are reluctant to grant equal rights to non-citizens at the domestic level. Two examples come to mind, first, recent events in Denmark have given rise to questions as to the future of Danish progressiveness and embedded social democratic ideas about solidarity, tolerance for the other and

17 internationalism more generally. The Danish Liberal coalition government has responded to the Danish public s growing concern with the country s immigrant groups by introducing more restrictive immigration laws (Fogh-Rasmussen, 2002:5), an issue that remains contentious in Danish public discourse (Østergaard, 2003). The recent publication of the famous Mohammed cartoons by the Danish newspaper Jyllandposten has also given rise to questions as to the country s ability to extend its sense of community beyond borders. A second example is the Baltic states failure to successful integrate their sizeable Russian minorities into mainstream society in the post-cold War era, even if some progress has been made in this field. Danish involvement in the US military intervention in Iraq has also led some scholars to question its traditional support for internationalism and solidarity in favour of a less social democratic approach to the resolution of international disputes and conflict (Lawler, 2004; Bergman, 2004; Brems Knudsen, 2004). It should be noted that the Baltic states followed suit. In partial mitigation of this shift, as Brems Knudsen (2004:83) notes, Denmark was not happy about leaving behind the UN and the established framework of international law. Although the other Nordic states were highly critical of the Danish position it has not led to a long lasting rift in their relations, which in itself indicates their continued commitment to Nordic co-operation and solidarity. Key here is whether Denmark s recent domestic and foreign policy shifts signal impending changes to the other Nordic states commitments to internationalism and their wider global and regional duties in international politics. If the Nordic political systems do not succeed in sustaining the universal welfare model and tolerance for refugees this may have a double impact on their ability to engage in new and more inclusive forms of political community. Nevertheless, developments in Nordic cooperation suggest that dis-unity over Iraq has not caused a permanent rift in their defence relations. In March 2003, the Nordic Council of Ministers issued a statement in which it reaffirmed its member states joint commitment to international conflict prevention and keeping the Baltic states as partners in this internationalism (Bergman, 2004). It is nonetheless difficult to determine the extent to which such divergences obstruct the construction of new spheres of dialogic community. There appears to be sufficient common ground between the Nordic and Baltic states to sustain both endogenous and exogenous forces for change. Regardless of these developments the Nordic-Baltic sphere can tell us a great deal about the construction of new and more inclusive forms of community, either by pointing to its success or by identifying obstacles to the process. Conclusion