To What Extent Domestic Actors Internalize International Norms? Dr. Anil Sigdel

Transcription

1 To What Extent Domestic Actors Internalize International Norms? Dr. Anil Sigdel Paper for the International Studies Association (ISA) Global South Caucus 2015, Singapore 1

2 Abstract The international practice of resolving domestic conflicts through a democratic political process which accommodates both rebels and governments, thereby neutralizing their security dilemma has been globally institutionalized. Domestic actors, warring parties in particular, have accepted the international normative formula mainly because it provides a common political space in which they could continue to pursue their redefined objectives. However, this study hypothesizes that actors tend to defy any normative requirements that actors are expected to fulfill which could potentially jeopardize their political future if not ultimately their existence itself. This article conducts a small-n comparison among the conflict resolution cases of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nepal; it examines, in particular, the issue of truth commissions to test the hypothesis. These resolution cases were based on the framework of democracy and did not relapse into war. The study shows that while warring parties had internalized the political process to give up arms, they either resisted the formation of an independent truth commission or a full implementation of the recommendation thereof. Key Words International Norms, Domestic Conflict, Truth Commission, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nepal Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the University of Vienna and the Austrian Society for Political Science as well as the ISA GSCIS 2015 for granting me some financial assistance so that I will be able present my work at the ISA GSCIS 2015.Similarly, I would like to thank Univ. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner, University of Vienna and Austrian Institute of International Affairs, because without him this work would not have been possible. Finally, I must thank Prof. Markus Kornprobst, Vienna Diplomatic Academy, because without his comments and suggestions this work would not have taken the present shape. 2

3 Introduction For centuries, the realist discourse has dominated the world politics (Mearsheimer, 1995). This fact shows in itself a very powerful explanatory capability of the realist paradigm. However, International Relations (IR) scholars started to engage in an ideational explanation vis-à-vis realists material explanation (see Waltz, 1979) under a different ontology known as constructivism, particularly since the end of the Cold War (for instance, Wendt, 1992; Finnemore, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996; among others). The post- Cold War period not only saw a firm establishment of norms discourse, or the return of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), but also unleashed a huge debate between constructivists and realists, neo-realists in particular (see Mearsheimer, 1995; Wendt, 1995). Most IR constructivist and realist scholars characteristically remained at the systemic level of analysis of world politics, not taking into account domestic politics. Among several strands of realism in IR, the neo-classical realism takes the domestic variable into account in order to underpin its foreign policy theory (see Rose, 1998). Some constructivists did start examining the effects of international norms in domestic politics, but again only in relation to explaining state behavior in international politics; their focus was on the explanation that change occurs via domestic politics (Cortell and Davis, 2000). Constructivists also started critically examining the tradition of checking norms effect by taking them (norms) as fixed. They instead examined the robustness or salience of norms, hard or soft norms, adaptation or localization of norms (Legro, 1997; Cortell and Davis, 2000; Acharya, 2004) as a causal factor of why and how some norms are internalized and others not (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Checkel examines norms diffusion across varied regimes the European Human Rights regime in Russia, Ukraine, Germany and the UK (Checkel, 1997). Klotz explains the implications of an internationally institutionalized norm for coordinated sanctions and for domestic change the norm of racial equality against the Apartheid regime of South Africa (Klotz, 1995). Hawkins shows the impact of human rights on the military behavior of Chile while under the dictator Pinochet (Hawkins, 2000). Some also examined why and how an idea becomes a norm in the first place before talking about actors selection of a norm. Kornprobst explains why domestic actors in the Republic of Ireland came to 3

4 choose the European norm of territorial status-quo (Kornprobst, 2007). Hirsch shows that how an ideational change in terms of the South African truth commission has paved the way for the international institutionalization of the norm of truth commission (Hirsh, 2013). Risse even goes beyond the explanation of logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences (see March and Olsen, 1998) and brings in Habermas s communicative theory and logic of arguing (Risse, 2000). In the same line, Kornprobst also employs the concept of argumentation to overcome the two logics to explain why and when actors accept a norm vis-à-vis their existing beliefs in a domestic setting (Kornprobst, 2007). All the explanations given above, apart from those that explain the making of a norm, either talk about the quality of norms- salience, robustness, specificity etc. as determining factors for their effect (Legro, 1997) or the role of norm promoting side like transnational advocacy (Risse, 2002) or domestic resonance of international norms and coordination power of norms (Klotz, 1995) or modifying a systemic norm to a subsystemic institutions or organizations (Acharya, 2004)or norm diffusion in different domestic settings (Checkel, 1997). Legro explains why some matter and others not by examining the quality of norms durability, clarity etc., but remains at the international level by examining war time prohibitory norms like submarine attacks against merchant ships, the bombing of nonmilitary targets, and the use of chemical weapons (Legro, 1997). Acharya goes beyond his predecessors by arguing that not only some norms matter and others because of their quality, but norms matter by being localized also (Acharya, 2004). Some other devised resonance to explain variation across different settings (Checkel, Cortell and Davis, Ulbert cited in Risse, 2002). But these explanations do not convincingly explain the behavior of norm-takers vis-à-vis a norm - a hard norm in particular. To be more specific, when a hard norm cannot be localized, cannot be adjusted with previous beliefs or system and has a huge implication for norm-takers political identity and future, or an existential threat for that matter, the above-mentioned explanations do not explain how do norm-takers behave and why. Furthermore, here there is no question of resonance argument vis-à-vis norm-takers fear and insecurity. It is true for communicative or argumentation theory also, since the norm jeopardize the very 4

5 existence of norm-takers, there is no possibility of arriving at a reasoned consensus (compare Risse, 2000; Kornprobst, 2007; for the theory see Habermas, 1996). Why IR Constructivism? The research question requires theory that adequately addresses the dynamics of the shared understandings social norms and institutions and the mechanism of norms reconstituting identities and interests of social actors. Realism seeks to explain conflicts in terms of material elements scarce resources independently from ideational elements social identity or group-identity. Similarly, since the research question warrants social psychological insights, as factors like fears and insecurities are involved, constructivism has them embedded. Constructivism not only borrows insights from the social psychology but takes it further from its traditional elements of beliefs to shared norms and their observance (Stein, 2002). Rationalism can explain the dynamics of conflicts through its strategic dilemmas, but does not go as far as constructivism in endogenizing interests and identities. Rationalist approach only examines behavior and takes identities as fixed. Constructivists argue that identity lies at the root of conflicts (Adler, 2002). Similarly, in terms of the necessity of constructivism, the path that is needed to bring the systemic theory into the domestic level, the Transnational Actors (TNA) literature provides a two level game (Risse, 2002). The game refers to the role of international actors in promoting human rights norms by pressurizing an authoritarian regime through a top-down approach, and domestic norm entrepreneurs supported by the international advocacy to pressure the regime through a bottom-up approach. Neoclassical realists also examine domestic politics but they are realists, therefore, their foundation is the balance of power which is not relevant in studying shared social understanding-related questions. Similarly, the peace research tradition either largely remains positivist and examines large-n cases with numerical analyses or assumes liberal paradigm. Sociologists or cultural anthropologists remain at the domestic societal level and cannot explain the norms links between global and local level. Consequently, the IR theories can give convincing explanations when it comes to the link between national and international dimensions of internal conflicts. 5

6 Hypothesis of the study Building upon the insights of the humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow, according to whom safety is one of the basic human needs that motivates a certain behavior (Maslow, 1943; Maslow, 1954), and also building upon the social psychological explanations of conflict which argue that fears of collective insecurity, if mobilized by some, could transform into violence (Stein, 2002), I argue that for fear of a hard norm s implications for their basic needs, norm-takers circumvent the logic of appropriateness, and try to just anyhow block their (norms ) diffusion. Maslow explains his hierarchy of needs in his works, Theory of Human Motivation and Motivation and Personality in a five-stage pyramid model which starts from the most basic needs to self-actualization physiological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943; Maslow, 1954). He explains that these needs, like instincts, motivate behavior. Here, the first need, physiological, is irrelevant for the study, thus the second need, safety (I add here survival also), is considered to be the basic need. Maslow explains that human needs move from lower to upper stage when the need associated with the lower level is satisfied. But this study simply focuses on the fact that safety and survival are the basic needs of humans, thus when they are threatened, their instinctive reaction cannot remain in line with norms (or appropriateness). Janice Gross Stein, similarly, explains how the origin of collective fears of future insecurity and impetus to those fears could lead an identity-group to resort to violence (Stein, 2002). While explaining the dynamics of incompatible group identities as a permissive context of conflict, she argues that realist explanations are faulty in only focusing on scarce resources as a cause of violence by ignoring the collective identities of contending groups. However, she argues that the rational choice model becomes compatible with psychological explanations. Rationale choice also assumes that the collective fears of future insecurity causes strategic dilemma which leads to a rational response of violence. She explains that, as long as the rationalists bring the intervening variable of ethnic entrepreneurs who play on fears to cause violence, their approach is 6

7 compatible with psychology. However, this study stays at the constructivist side as discussed earlier as opposed to the rationalist explanations. I examine how the issue of truth commission norm played out in the post-conflict period of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nepal. 1 The truth commission norm in these cases would not take anything less than an independent commission and would prosecute those involved in serious crimes. This means the warring sides, state army and rebels, in particular, have no option of adapting the commission as per their interests but to either accept or go to any extent to block it for their survival- i.e. to defy trial and justice and to opt for reconciliation and amnesty. This norm gives only dichotomous possibility; either you accept it and be good or else be evil. For instance, when in El Salvador an amnesty law was passed in the parliament or when the Guatemalan stakeholders did not implement the recommendation of the truth commission or when Nepal s Constituent Assembly passed the truth commission bill without the consent of rights organizations, the stakeholders have clearly chosen to remain bad. Furthermore, this norm provides no possibility of any congruence building or tallying some norms vs. other norms to see which prevail (see Acharya, 2004). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, which preferred reconciliation vis-à-vis justice, would not give such scope. Although South African practice did propel global institutionalization of truth commissions (Hirsh, 2013), many experts argue that it was not an ideal model because it gave undue preference to reconciliation as opposed to truth, trial and justice. South Africa is excluded in the analysis anyway because it does not meet the case selection criteria laid out below. Rationale for Case Selection All three cases of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nepal, represent ideological cases communist insurgency seeking central governance, post-cold War period conflict termination and non-recurred war case (see Kreutz, 2010). El Salvador was the first case of extensive involvement of norm promoters in the absence of the US and USSR s 1 In Nepal s case, as of this writing the TRC has not been formed. The TRC issue has been in the public eye for quite some time now, and even the Constituent Assembly-II passed the TRC bill in June 2014, there has been strong opposition from the rights activists. Previously, the ordinace of the TRC was eventually blocked by the Supreme Court. For the detailed information on Nepal s TRC issue, see Sigdel,

8 ideological interests. Guatemala was a case where lessons learnt from El Salvador were implemented. Nepal case happened at a time when the non-military post-conflict reconstruction had become an internationally internalized norm. While norms are not apt to explain the conflict resolution in every region, argue Peceny and Stanley, the Central American cases are suitable region to study norms effect (Peceny and Stanley, 2001). They showed how liberal values helped transformed conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala peacefully. This article brings a South Asian case of Nepal which has very different social, historical, cultural and political settings from Central America. Besides, the geopolitically hard-pressed Nepal, being situated between India and China, represents a challenging setting for international norms to project their power and effect. To explain the problem, this article proposes three stages of norms internalization (see Sigdel, 2014). Three stages because, like in a general process of actions, first, normtakers commit to or endorse prescribed norms. Second, norm-takers seek to understand the guidelines in detail and interpret. Third, norm-takers make the decision either to internalize or defy norms as per their understanding. With regard to the term internalization, this study has followed this concept since, as mentioned earlier, the norm of democratic post-conflict reconstruction has been internationally institutionalized or internalized. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink explain the concept of internalization and its measurement in their norm life cycle explanation (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The question however, definitely arises of whether actors are internalizing norms or using them tactically. Rationalists would argue that actors do the latter and that constructivists would argue the former. My research question seeks to address the extent of the internalization of a norm under the logic of appropriates or, in other words, to test the norm-takers behavior in terms of how far they act appropriately vis-à-vis a particular norm. Therefore, I employ the constructivist ontology that norms constitute identity and interest, thus, the behavior corresponds to those (re-)constituted identity and interest. Incidentally, the matter of a possible or an impossible synthesis between rationalist and constructivist approaches is extensively dealt with by scholars under ontological versus 8

9 pragmatic ground (see Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Checkel, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; Risse, 2000; Kornprobst, 2007). El Salvador El Salvador s negotiated settlement between the rebels Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the right-wing government, Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), represented a successful post-conflict reconstruction case right at the beginning of the post-cold War era. The UN led the peace process with a broad mandate and the conflict resolution strategies applied by the UN together with other international norm agents achieved a significant success: from the guerrillas transformation (into political parties) to security reform to judicial reforms. Since the Cold War ended, the international supply ended, which was mainly responsible for the war to continue. In the new world order, the dominating reason for the endurance of El Salvador s peace happened to be the liberal social reconstruction of the socio-polity. The term liberal social construction refers to liberal democracy and open market economy as means of post-conflict reconstruction (Peceny and Holiday, 2001). It was particularly the emergence of the insurgents understanding of (also of the government s and the military s) and belief in the democratic polity, as means to pursue their objectives (Peceny and Holiday, 2001). The rebels were pushed to that end by several factors: a result of the changing international conditions, a stalemate situation between the warring sides and the international community s policy to rely on a framework of democracy and human rights. The international community had not enforced peace with military power but put strong conditions of respecting human rights on the warring sides. Even though there were no security guarantees provided to the FMLN rebels vis-à-vis the heavily militarized state of El Salvador, the international community succeeded in neutralizing their security dilemma (for this argument of outsider s security guarantee, see Walter, 1997) through diffusing the international norms and carrying out institutional reforms. While the tough agenda of extensive security sector reform (SSR) succeeded to a large extent (Toft, 2010), the right-wing ARENA did not cooperate as expected in terms of the Ad Hoc Commission s and the Truth Commission s recommendations. The two 9

10 sides had agreed upon the Ad Hoc Commission which would try to transform the powerful military by purging their staffs who were involved in human rights violations during the war. In order to form a strong base for democracy, the Ad Hoc Commission was viewed as a necessary step to hold the military responsible for its wrong deeds in the past. Although initially some portion of the SSR materialized, the military vehemently resisted the Ad hoc Commission s pressure. The army was not only apologetic but also issued threats to harm the cadres of the FMLN, forced the PM to speak in their support by resisting the Commission s recommendations. In terms of the Truth Commission, the UN itself had presided over this transitional justice mechanism, which was agreed upon in the Mexico Peace Agreement between the FMLN and the ARENA. The Truth Commission, led by three international commissioners, produced its report amidst strong opposition: mainly by the government and the army, but also by the FMLN to some extent. The Truth Commission had given its report in just six-month time. Given the speed of the Commission s formation and investigation (within one year), the UN was, arguably, concerned about somehow completing the process, even without producing a satisfying outcome. Therefore, it only examined a few infamous cases of the El Salvador conflict: El Mozote village massacre, murder of six Jesuit Priests and so on (Call, 2002). As was the case with the Ad Hoc Commission which was limited to investigate the cases of few army personnel. The Truth Commission s report attributed 85 percent of the acts of violence to state agents. 2 Even though the Commission s recommendations were binding as per its mandate, apart from some half-hearted judicial reform and purging some army staffs, the government and the army refused to implement the recommendations. They went to the extent to which the legislative assembly passed an amnesty law in complete defiance of the international effort. Even the Supreme Court judges charged the Commission with being excessively over-reaching in its mandate and a few convicted army officers were even released, also retaliating to the Commission s recommendation that the judges proven to be involved in defending human rights violators should resign. 2 Truth Commission: El Salvador. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Available at: < accessed 15 October

11 PM Cristiani, unlike the case of Chile, criticized the international norm of transitional justice, the UN, and did not sufficiently acknowledge the needs of those who hoped for truth and justice. Cristiani was under such pressure by the army that he had urged some states to influence the UN to soften its stance on Truth Commission issue. He apparently had the fear that El Salvador would relapse into potential violence or would suffer a coup d état to be staged by the army. The Truth Commission only managed to denounce some individuals and jeopardize their elections prospects (although some won anyway). Otherwise, neither the ARENA government nor the FMLN followed the ban on public office for those charged of crime (Call, 2002). It should be noted that the Commission was mandated to investigate serious acts of violence, not all the cases, since The same stakeholders, particularly the right-wing ARENA, who accepted the guerrillas in the political power-sharing and significantly cut down on the security forces, did not follow the Truth Commission. The same is true of the FMLN. Guatemala While El Salvador learnt the practice of post-conflict reconstruction from the international community, Guatemala had sought to employ that increasingly internationalized practice for its increasing importance and usefulness. Guatemalan stakeholders came to believe that a democratic peace process was essential in taking the war-torn country on the path towards democracy and economic growth. Thus, it demonstrated to the international community its desire for a post-conflict reconstruction similar to what was employed in El Salvador. However, the international norm promoters played a critical role in motivating Guatemalans to move into that direction. For instance, the US and other international organizations, particularly the World Bank and the European Parliament, had put human rights as a strong condition (Stanley and Holiday, 2002). Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala had more of a moribund civil war than a stalemate. The staggering thirty-six-year long civil war had exhausted both the government and the insurgents Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit (URNG), 3 Truth Commission: El Salvador. United States Institute of Peace. 11

12 which ended definitively with the 1996 peace agreement. The agreement was the final accord in the series of accords signed since Therefore, both domestic and international stakeholders had to worry about the post-conflict reconstruction but not about how to stop the war or to maintain the ceasefire. The then-un-secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali credited the implementation of the definitive ceasefire as a testimony to the determination of both the Government of Guatemala and URNG to put an end to the bitter armed conflict between them. 4 The European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS) and several UN agencies and other states/governments contributed their resources and expertise to complete the demobilization process. In Guatemala, norm promoters had the opportunity to apply the lessons learned from El Salvador and further consolidated reconstruction programs to another liberal foothold in Central America. Guatemala represents an example of extensive participation of the civil society in the initiatives to end the war, through the Grand National Dialogue and the Civil Society Assembly, which were emboldened by the involvement of the United Nations. These initiatives led to several agreements on norms and institution-building. Thus, the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, emerged from the Oslo negotiation process, was established in In fact, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) 5 was already in place under the UN General Assembly, and the verification had already begun before the final negotiated settlement took place. In the post-accord period, the emphasis on human rights worked as a deterrence of abuses (Stanley and Holiday, 2002). The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) established under the UN, chaired by the German Law Professor Christian Tomuscat, produced its report in 1999 after operating for 18 months. The report claimed that the state forces and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of the violations documented during the conflict which had claimed two hundred thousand lives - 83 % of those killed were 4 Guatemala: Minugua. Background. Available at: < 20 October MINUGUA was initially named the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, 12

13 Mayan. 6 Given the difficulty in examining all the cases of human rights violations, the Commission prioritized to examine the cases of attacks on life and personal integrity. However, CEH was one of the two largest truth commissions worldwide, alongside South Africa s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Unlike in El Salvador, this Commission was not allowed to name the perpetrators. Therefore, some symbolic measures, some reform in the military and judiciary, were recommended. Human rights advocates protested the idea of not naming the perpetrators because such steps would undermine the very objective of truth commissions. However, unlike El Salvador where PM Cristiani spoke in favor of the army who was against an independent implementation of the Truth Commission s recommendation, President Arzu immediately apologized to its citizens for past abuses inflicted by the state. Leaders of the URNG also asked for forgiveness to the people for the crimes they had committed. The implementation process, however, practically stalled. By 2009, merely one military staff was convicted of human rights violation as charged by the Commission report. Stanley and Holiday (2001) write that the charges of the Commission did not come as a surprise. But the charges of genocide and racism committed by the armed forces (in their ruthless campaign against the guerrillas in the early 1980s) were taken by many as if they (charges) were UN-sponsored. The government refused to implement any of the key reforms proposed by the Commission, saying that important reforms were already under way, including reparations for war victims. The government did not implement the Commission s recommendations since that would have implicated the military significantly. As a result, the good cop UN which steered the peace process became a bad cop. 6 Truth Commission:Guatemala. United States Insitute of Peace. Available at: < accessed 20 October

14 Nepal As in the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, the Nepalese Maoist insurgency also met a stalemate situation. Although it was claimed that the Maoists were exhausted fighting the state army, the state army could not achieve military victory either. Against that background, the Maoists sought to give up arms and pursue their agenda through politics. The war ended as the rebels (Maoists) and the democratic parties (Seven Party Alliance) signed the 12-Point-Understanding in 2005 in New Delhi and subsequently the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 in Kathmandu. There was no direct involvement of norm promoting organizations in the negotiated settlement; rather India had a major role in it. However, the growing discourse flared up by the norm agents to end the conflict through political dialogue under the framework of human rights and democracy created a space for negotiated settlement. 7 Several international peacemakers were involved indirectly in providing expertise during the previous peace efforts which had failed. The United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), which provided support for the elections of the Constituent Assembly and oversaw the SSR and Demobilization, Disarmament, and Rehabilitation (DDR) to a large extent, was invited by the local parties after the peace agreement. Similarly, the warring parties commitment to human rights and democracy, which has been articulated several times in the peace document, reinforces the fact that actors pursuance of norms made security guarantees unnecessary. The national and transnational human rights advocacy diffused among the elites the understanding of the importance of forming several peacebuilding institutions to oversee the conflict transformation. Among those commitments appears the agenda of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) formation, first articulated in the CPA-2006 document, and then enshrined in the Interim Constitution During the intensive conflict before the settlement, the multiplicity of international peacemakers contributed to that normative understanding in different ways. Teresa Whitfield listed those actors which are as follows: UN good offices, Swiss government special advisor to peace-building, Centre for Humanitarian Diaolgue, Carter Center, Crisis Management Initiative, Community of Sant Egidio, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Alert, International IDEA, Transcend, and US Instiute for Peace. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US (in the period of ) (Whitfield, 2012). Ivan G. Somlai has given some important behind-the-scene details of the negotiation attempts (Somlai, 2005). Similarly, many other bilateral organizations, UNDP, EU, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and so on. Most important were, perhaps, the OHCHR and UNMIN. 14

15 However, since the early days, a bill drafted by the government in order to establish the TRC (in 2008) drew wide criticism from the civil society, human rights activists, and national and international rights agencies. This is because the bill failed to live up to the international standards, owing in particular to the bill s granting of discretionary power to the Commission in relation to granting amnesties to perpetrators. This is because as the peace process entered the implementation phase in which those broader agreed frameworks of the CPA were to be worked out in detail through wider consultations and consensus, the Maoists reconsidered their normative obligations and their implications vis-à-vis their existence. Since the CPA did neither provide any specific model of truth commissions nor specify formation procedures, despite the continuous effort from the National Commission of Human Rights, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), and other stakeholders to pursue the government to form the Commission as per the international standards (Martin 2010), in 2008, eventually, the government planned to draft the bill bypassing the concerns of the right groups and victims. While the government continued to defend that the TRC was extensively discussed in the Constituent Assembly, human rights activists claim that the government had been dealing with the issue in a secretive manner all along. Commentators speculate that due to the entrenched culture of impunity in Nepal, since the verdicts of past commissions were never implemented, the Nepal Army and the Maoists presumably had some secret understandings about being unsupportive, fearing huge consequences. They feared that a truth commission formed as per the international standards would jeopardize their organizations significantly. The government repeatedly amended the TRC provisions responding to a wide call from the human rights defenders. However, the amendments still would not satisfy the opponents as the bill maintained some tricky provisions that eventually would allow the Commission to grant amnesty. The government apparently did so in an effort to form the Commission to give a clean-chit for past crimes rather than exhuming them. Eventually, after a long tumultuous debate, despite the President s endorsement of the 15

16 bill, the Supreme Court blocked its implementation. Eight years after the commitment had been made in the agreement, not a single individual was prosecuted or punished for his/her war crime. 8 Those charged with murders still hold strong position in the Maoist party and run for elections. When a Nepal Army Colonel was arrested in the UK under the universal jurisdiction in relation to torture during the insurgency, the Maoists, and also the Nepal Army, criticized the UK government for attacking the sovereignty of Nepal. The Maoist leaders were heard explaining their cadres that had they not resisted, they would be ending up in the Hague at the International Criminal Court (although Nepal is not a signatory of the Rome Statute). The Maoists had the attorney general on their side through whom they tried to block the cases through conventional justice mechanism. Not only did they use the TRC as a tool to bargain, but they also succeeded in threatening or at least convincing other parties to form a Commission according to their own liking. Consequently, their relations with the international community strained. Findings and Conclusions In the varied cases studied here, the norm of democratic post-conflict reconstruction seems to have worked because in the absence of any security arrangement by the international community, warring groups have subordinated their security concerns to their faith in the political process. In terms of the truth commission norm, this study shows a similar pattern of domestic actors behavior from Central America to South Asia. The norm-takers have strongly defied the elements of truth commissions that would go against their interests. In fact, their existence was at stake, rendering the possibilities of redefining their goals irrelevant. The three cases showed the same pattern. The major stakeholders insurgents and the military somehow tried to block the truth commission s formation or implementing 8 A murder case of a journalist, Dekendra Thapa, during the war in 2004 seems to be an exception. The perpetrators, some of whom self-confessed their crime, were arrested by the police in 2012 as per the regular justice procedure. The incident unleashed a huge outcry; the Maoists vehemently opposed it claiming that all war-related cases should be dealt with by the TRC. But the rights activists argued that serious crimes should be investigated and perpetrators must be punished even in the absence of transitional justice mechanisms. As of this writing, in December 2014, the district court involved issued its verdict to sentence the perpetrators. By the way, the Constituent Assembly had passed the controversial TRC bill in June 2014 amidst a strong dissatisfaction of rights activists regarding the provisions of the bill. 16

17 the recommendations thereof. For that end, they did not care if their relations with the international community strained or if such behavior jeopardized their national and international legitimacy. They seemed to go down to any extent. In El Salvador, the military issued threats of violence against FMLN cadres, possible coup d état etc. In Nepal, the Maoists intervened in the judiciary, carried out activities to disrupt the peace process etc. In Guatemala, the government did not implement the CEH s recommendations. The state s armed forces in Guatemala, when charged of committing genocide, in turn charged the Commission for issuing UN-sponsored recommendations, openly challenging the international community s effort to book the culprits. In all the three cases, albeit in a varied degree, state militaries and rebels unapologetically defied the logic of appropriateness. This study diverges from other approaches as it examines the norm-takers position in the context of psychological needs and motivations of behavior instinctive response to safety and survival. The result clearly shows the limitation of norms and the agency of the norm-takers as critical in the diffusion or internalization process of norms. This finding contributes to the literature about why some norms cannot matter. As Legro puts it, it is equally important to examine the cases where norms fail as those where norms succeed to better understand norm dynamics. In terms of an alternative explanation, the social psychological explanation of conflicts or rationalist explanations, which were discussed earlier, might also give some useful insights. The psychological approaches assume that actors might resort to violence if they fear others winning and they themselves losing because spoilers could play on that fear. The rationalists would also argue that in such scenario, a strategic dilemma appears which in turn causes violence as an optimal response. In the context of a post-conflict reconciliation, there are groups who are directly responsible for war crimes militaries and former-rebels, and there are other groups which are not political parties. Consequently, those uninvolved groups enjoy a huge advantage over the involved groups in the political competition. Therefore, the two above-mentioned explanations (psychological and rationalist) become relevant. 17

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