UK: Final Draft Royal Charter on Self- Regulation of the Press

Transcription

1 UK: Final Draft Royal Charter on Self- Regulation of the Press October 2013

2 Executive summary In this document, ARTICLE 19 comments on the final draft of the Royal Charter on selfregulation of the press, publicised on 11 October The final draft is an amended version of the original Royal Charter, released in March 2013, which has been widely debated in the past seven months. This final draft is scheduled to be referred to the Privy Council on 30 October There have been extensive discussions on whether both the original and final drafts of the Royal Charter comply with international freedom of expression standards. ARTICLE 19 notes that international human rights standards do not prescribe a specific model of press regulation. Instead, they require that any regulation meet a specific threepart test in order to be compatible with the right to freedom of expression, since regulatory measures for the media could interfere with press freedom. However, ARTICLE 19 views specific legislation on the press with caution as it is often a tool for governments to excessively restrict, rather than protect, the right to freedom of expression and information. Given the instrumental importance of the press in a democratic society, it stands to reason that journalists and their publications should not be subject to greater restrictions on the right to express themselves than ordinary people. Legislation to impose specific regulation on print media has been absent in the UK due to a deliberate policy of preventing unnecessary regulation. We emphasize that self-regulation of the print press should always be the preferred model over and above a press regulator established by some form of legislation (including the Royal Charter) since the self-regulatory mechanism is the least restrictive means available by which the press can be effectively regulated. At the same time, self-regulation must be meaningful: it must not only provide protection for members of the journalistic profession, but also hold them accountable to their profession and hold press outlets accountable to the public. ARTICLE 19 notes that, although self-regulation is the preferred model, statutory and coregulatory systems, as seen in other European countries and elsewhere, may be compatible with European and international human rights standards provided they include strong guarantees for media freedom and the independence of regulatory bodies. This applies to the proposal pertaining to press regulation in the Royal Charter. We recognize that the current system in the UK has been inadequate and failed to ensure the accountability and responsibility of the press. To replace it, we favour a meaningful form of self-regulation that would be accountable and win the trust of public. We also note that a functional model is one in which all stakeholders can identify the benefits of active involvement. We note with concern that the continued stalemate and lack of consensus demonstrate that the main stakeholders in this process are failing to provide what is required: an independent, effective and accountable system of press regulation in the UK. Page 2 of 16

3 ARTICLE 19 analysed the original version of the Royal Charter in March Hence, this latest analysis highlights our comments on the process undertaken so far and on the nature of the proposed new system of press regulation, and offers set of recommendations on how to take this matter forward. Summary of recommendations 1. Representatives of the main political parties and the media community must engage in negotiations about the future of press regulation in the UK, carefully considering the various options. They must commit to reaching agreement in the foreseeable future. It is imperative to avoid solutions that have not been agreed by the majority of stakeholders, which may lead to the creation of a dysfunctional system damaging to all. 2. The Government should reflect on the transparent multi-stakeholder process that legitimised the Leveson inquiry as compared to the problematic process that led to the Royal Charter. As such, it should postpone the scheduled referral of the final draft of the Royal Charter to the Privy Council on 30 October The aim of doing so should be to provide a reasonable opportunity to secure agreement on the new model that both acknowledges and addresses the failings of the past, and ensures strong guarantees of press freedom. 3. Negotiations on the future of press regulation must be inclusive, and should consider proposals made by those representing publishers, editors, journalists, and members of the public (such as academic experts, NGOs and advocacy groups). 4. A respected public figure independent of political parties and the media community should be appointed to lead the negotiations between the stakeholders. 5. The negotiation process must be fully transparent, using, for example, governmentsponsored roundtables. All stakeholders should proactively make their proposals and comments publicly available. Negotiations should ideally be live-streamed; if not, a clear and systematic process should be used to communicate the proceedings to the public. 6. All stakeholders should engage in constructive discussions about the content of the final draft of the Royal Charter. Discussions should focus on two key issues: whether it includes sufficient guarantees for the independence of the new self-regulatory bodies; and whether it realises the fundamental objectives of self-regulation - accountability of members of the profession to their peers, accountability of media outlets to the public and protection for members of the profession. 7. Regarding the content of the final draft of the Royal Charter, we reiterate our concerns in that: The recognition criteria for the new press regulator should require their mandate to extend to advocating for freedom of expression. The new regulator should defend the rights of members of the profession, guide their conduct and adjudicate on complaints from members of the public. The membership of the regulator s Board should ensure, at the very least, equal representation of the media community and the public. Page 3 of 16

4 The standards code to which members of the profession endeavour to adhere should be the preserve of journalists and media organisations. It should be developed by the most representative journalists body such as the national journalists union or professional association. Where there is more than one body, they should be encouraged to develop one joint national code. During the development of the standards code, public consultations should be encouraged. Regular public consultations on the code should be held. The role of the Board and the Code Committee should be to reach agreement on a national code of minimum standards. The provisions for group complaints must stipulate that any decision about such complaints must fully comply with international freedom of expression standards. The press regulator should also have powers to refuse to hear any group complaints that are vexatious and/or are lacking merit. Only a person affected by a publication may bring a complaint to the regulator. Recognition criteria should stipulate that the regulator can impose financial sanctions in the most serious and systemic breaches, but only as a matter of last resort when other measures would not be capable of redressing the harm caused to the individual. The regulator should always be required to assess the level of any financial sanction against its potential effect on the right to freedom of expression. Financial sanctions even in cases of serious and systemic breaches - should never be disproportionate to the harm caused. Page 4 of 16

5 Introduction On 11 October 2013, the final draft of the Royal Charter on self-regulation of the press (Final Draft or Royal Charter) was made available to the public. 1 It was announced that this Final Draft will be put forward for approval at a specially convened Privy Council meeting on 30 October The Final Draft is an amended version of the original Royal Charter, released on 18 March 2013, which was based on the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, led by Lord Justice Leveson (the Leveson inquiry). ARTICLE 19 commented on the recommendations of the Leveson inquiry and analysed the original version of the Royal Charter 2 in March. In our analysis: We expressed concerns about the problematic process that led to the Royal Charter, about the lack of transparency of the Royal Charter negotiations between the political parties and about the equally opaque process of reforming the existing model of selfregulation embedded in the Press Complaints Commission (the PCC); We emphasised that self-regulation should always be the preferred model of press regulation, being the least restrictive means for the press to be effectively regulated; We noted that both statutory and co-regulatory systems may be compatible with European and international human rights standards provided they include strong guarantees for media freedom and the independence of regulatory bodies. However, we concluded that the original draft version of the Royal Charter failed to meet such guarantees. We urged the Government to make sure that the final Royal Charter is based on agreement between all stakeholders, including the media community and representatives of the public; We provided a series of recommendations which included revisions to the proposed text of the Royal Charter. They also included measures that would be needed in order to guarantee media freedom and the independence of regulatory bodies in full compliance with international freedom of expression standards. The final draft of the Royal Charter was released after several months of heated debate and negotiation about new press regulation in the UK. This included discussions on an alternative Royal Charter, named the Independent Self-Regulation of the Press, which was developed by the media community in order to be free from the potential for political interference. This alternative Royal Charter was rejected by the Privy Council on 9 October A number of other proposals, as well as calls for negotiations between political parties and the media community at large, have also been unsuccessful. 1 The Final Draft Royal Charter, published by the Government and re-printed by main media outlets is available at rter_11_oct_2013.pdf. 2 See ARTICLE 19, UK: Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press and Amendments to the Crime and Courts Bill; available at Page 5 of 16

6 ARTICLE 19 views specific legislation on press regulation with caution as it is often a tool for governments to excessively restrict, rather than protect, the right to freedom of expression and information. Given the instrumental importance of the press in a democratic society, it stands to reason that journalists and their publications should not be subject to greater restrictions on the right to express themselves than ordinary people. Legislation to impose specific regulation on print media has been absent in the UK due to a deliberate policy of preventing unnecessary regulation. We reiterate that self-regulation of the print press should always be viewed as the preferred model, but that self-regulation must be meaningful. It must not only provide protection for members of the journalistic profession but also hold them accountable to their profession and hold press outlets accountable to the public. At the same time, ARTICLE 19 recognizes that the current system in the UK has been inadequate and failed to ensure the accountability and responsibility of the press. To replace it, we favour a meaningful form of self-regulation that would be accountable and won the trust of public. We note with concern the continued stalemate, lack of consensus on the Royal Charter and lack of vision on how to move the process of press regulation reforms in the UK to resolution. We find that the developments of the past seven months and the lack of consensus demonstrate that neither the political parties nor the media community are able to offer the public what is urgently needed: an independent, effective and accountable system of press regulation in the UK. This document does not intend to replace ARTICLE 19 s earlier recommendations about the original version of the Royal Charter. Instead, it outlines our comments on the process undertaken so far and on the nature of the proposed new system of press regulation and its compliance with international freedom of expression standards and best practice. We also offer our recommendations on how to take this matter forward both in terms of the process and the content of the Royal Charter. Page 6 of 16

7 General observations Compliance with international freedom of expression standards ARTICLE 19 notes that many governments see the development of complex regulations for every aspect of life in their society, including the press, as their task. State regulation of the press exists in countries right across the world, including developed democracies. It has become accepted that statutory media regulation is justified in many situations, for example, where the protection of minors, privacy or reputation is concerned. At the same time, states should also guarantee freedom of expression which is regarded as one of the foundations of democratic society. The dilemma, therefore, lies in when and how much state intervention in the press is required. When governments decide to regulate the press, they must comply with international standards on freedom of expression. International standards do not prescribe a specific model of press regulation. 3 Instead, they require that any regulation meet a three-part test in order to be compatible with the right to freedom of expression, since regulatory measures for the media could interfere with press freedom. The three-part test requires any mechanism of the press regulation to be: prescribed by law; in pursuit of a legitimate aim, including, inter alia, the rights of others. Importantly, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) has elaborated that states have a positive obligation to regulate the exercise of freedom of expression in order to ensure the adequate protection of other rights by the law. However, they must not do so in a manner that unduly deters the media from fulfilling their role of alerting the public to apparent or suspect misuse of public power; 4 necessary in a democratic society: unnecessary or undue restrictions are those which don t respond to pressing social need, which are not proportionate to the interests sought and for which there are not relevant and sufficient reasons. Importantly, if a less intrusive measure is capable of achieving the same purpose as a more restrictive one, the least restrictive measure must be applied. Part of the purpose of the 3 For a summary of applicable international standards, see the analysis of the original version of the Royal Charter; op. cit. 4 The European Court repeatedly stress the vital role of public watchdog which the press performs in a democratic society (see Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports 1996-II, p. 500, 39, and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no /93, 59, ECHR 1999-III). The European Court also reiterated that although the press must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities information and ideas on political issues and on other matters of general interest (see, e.g. De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, pp , 37; Thoma v. Luxembourg, no /97, 45, ECHR 2001-III; and Colombani and Others v. France, no /99, 55, ECHR 2002-V). Page 7 of 16

8 necessity test is to prevent governments from following their legislative instinct. and to make sure that the regulation of the media is kept to a minimum. Any proposal of press regulation in the UK must be assessed for its compliance with this three-part test. The nature of the proposed press regulation ARTICLE 19 reiterates that there are different types of media regulatory systems around the world that reflect the cultural, social and political traditions of individual states. In general: The term statutory regulation applies to any measure passed by parliaments to direct the media, and is characterised by stronger state interference (e.g. France, Italy or Spain). The model of co-regulation, sometimes also called regulated self-regulation, is ambiguous and not clearly defined. Typically, it contains elements of self-regulation anchored in a statute (e.g. Denmark or Ireland). Self-regulation is a framework that relies entirely on voluntary compliance; legislation plays no role in enforcing the standards (e.g. Germany or Sweden). Those who commit to this type of regulation do so not under threat of legal sanction, but for positive reasons such as the desire to further the development and credibility of their profession. Self-regulation relies first and foremost on members common understanding of the values and ethics that underpin their professional conduct. However, ARTICLE 19 points out that there is no uniform definition of self-regulation of the print press. Models labelled "self-regulation" in one country may qualify as "co-regulation" elsewhere. The central criticism of the Royal Charter and related amendments to the Crimes and Court Act 2013 has been directed at the nature of this new regulatory model. It has been argued that the proposed model of self-regulation through statutory underpinning will amount to de facto statutory regulation of the press in violation of international and European freedom of expression standards. In response to these concerns, ARTICLE 19 wishes to reiterate the following: First, we note that the proposal for press regulation in the UK is untested, but may offer a new construct for press accountability. Its nature (which establishes the Royal Charter as the basis of self-regulation in combination with incentives in the Crimes and Court Act) resembles the model of co-regulation, where the basis of the selfregulation is established in legislation. This hybrid model represents neither a model of strict state control nor a voluntary and autonomous self-regulation model. Page 8 of 16

9 Second, we stress that state regulation and co-regulation of the press are not prohibited by international law. However, it has been acknowledged that selfregulation is the least restrictive method of interference with press freedom. 5 All models of press regulation may be acceptable if they meet the three-part test (described above) and if they include sufficient safeguards for media freedom. We find that arguments claiming that the Royal Charter in itself violates international human rights law are misleading and counter-productive. Third, we observe that the UK Government could have introduced press regulation through a statute (a bill that is passed by Parliament). Instead, it has opted for a Royal Charter, with additional incentives for joining a recognised regulator provided in the Crimes and Court Act. We acknowledge that some critics consider a Royal Charter to be an outdated type of legislation, but we note that it is typically used to establish significant independent organisations, including universities and the BBC (the public service broadcaster in the UK). We believe that this approach attempts to create a self-regulatory scheme that is independent from governmental interference. It also attempts to make the new system effective, to create incentives for all members of the press community to fully implement it, and to ensure public trust and confidence in the self-regulation. Fourth, whether established voluntarily or by law, ARTICLE 19 has long argued that sector-wide self-regulatory bodies should be o independent from government, commercial and special interests; o established via a fully consultative and inclusive process; o democratic and transparent in their selection of members and decisionmaking. Any press regulation must be simultaneously geared towards promoting and protecting press freedom rather than only imposing restrictions on the media. In the light of the above, ARTICLE 19 suggests that instead of deliberating on the nature of the proposed model in isolation, all stakeholders should carefully review the content of the final draft. The core of their examination should be whether the proposed model contains sufficient guarantees for the protection of both freedom of expression and the media (see below). Recommendation: All stakeholders should engage in constructive discussions about the content of the final draft of the Royal Charter. These discussions should focus on two issues: whether it includes sufficient guarantees for the independence of the new self-regulatory bodies; whether it realise the fundamental objectives of self-regulation - accountability of members of the profession to their peers, accountability of media outlets to the public and protection for members of the profession. 5 For example, Resolution No.2 on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights adopted at the European Ministerial conference on Mass Media Policy states that public authorities... should recognise that all those engaged in the practice of journalism have the right to elaborate self-regulatory standards - for example, in the form of codes of conduct which describe how their rights and freedoms are to be reconciled with other rights, freedoms and interests with which they may come into conflict, as well as their responsibilities. Page 9 of 16

10 The necessity of the proposed regulation The proposal to introduce statutory underpinning of self-regulation through the Royal Charter rather than to reform the existing system of self-regulation - must be examined under the test of necessity. ARTICLE 19 highlights the following considerations: There is no single one size fits all model of self-regulation. Each country should develop its own version that suits the political, cultural and economic environment in which the media works. Any proposal for press regulation must be carefully considered in the light of the country s tradition of press regulation. We note that in the UK, the press has traditionally been fully self-regulated and the self-regulation has been seen as a main condition and characteristic of the country s press freedom. Hence, all attempts by the Government to introduce a new system of press regulation will be perceived as an attack on the very notion of free press. There is compelling evidence that self-regulation (carried out by the Press Council) has been inadequate. We understand the motivations behind the Royal Charter, given the findings and recommendations of the inquiry led by Lord Justice Leveson. Notably, this independent inquiry found that the press had "wreaked havoc with the lives of innocent people." The Press Complaints Commission has been found to be woefully inadequate and has failed to ensure the accountability and responsibility of the press. It is also apparent that the UK public s trust in the press has fallen and is now at a low point. Given the findings of the Leveson inquiry, the Government cannot ignore its obligation to protect other legitimate interests and rights such as privacy and reputation and to guarantee effective remedies for their violation. The Government also has sufficient evidence to argue that, in order to improve the existing (and inadequate) self-regulation system, a new framework for press regulation in the country might be necessary. We are concerned that despite several negotiations, there has been no consensus reached on the final version of the Royal Charter. The print press has largely rejected the final draft of the Royal Charter. It is clear that if passed in its current state - the Royal Charter will not be accepted by the majority of the media community. If the media community cannot be convinced that the proposed model is appropriate and well-meaning in theory and if it continues to be hostile to this proposal, the final Royal Charter will further alienate the community. In the light of all these considerations, ARTICLE 19 suggests that the UK Government must recognise the traditional powers of the press to self-regulate. It must ensure that the new press regulation framework is supported by the majority of the media community (newspaper publishers, editors and journalists) as well as by the general public. At the same time, the media community must also seek to make concessions. The goal of effective and legitimate press regulation in the UK must be reached by mutual agreement between the main political parties, the media community (representatives of the publishers of national and local newspapers, editors and journalists) and the representatives of the public. Recommendations: Representatives of the main political parties and the media community must engage in negotiations on the future of the press regulation in the UK. They must carefully Page 10 of 16

11 consider various options and commit to agreement in the foreseeable future. Solutions that do not have the agreement of the majority of the media community should be avoided. For the time being, the Government should postpone the referral of the final draft of the Royal Charter to the Privy Council (scheduled for 30 October 2013). Negotiations on the future of press regulation must be inclusive, and should consider proposals by those representing the publishers, editors and journalists and also members of the public (such as academic experts, NGOs and advocacy groups). A respected public figure independent of political parties and the media community should be appointed to lead the negotiations between the political parties and stakeholders. Transparency of the negotiation process ARTICLE 19 also remains concerned about the lack of effort by both the Government and the media community to make the process of developing new UK press regulation fully transparent. This is in striking contrast to the Leveson inquiry which was conducted in exemplary fashion: the inquiry was fully independent, it was led by a highly respectable former judge, it was livestreamed on the Internet and the majority of all evidence and transcripts of the inquiry were made available to the public. Hence, in order to ensure a broad sense of ownership of the new model, as well as the trust of the public, all negotiations about the final draft Royal Charter must be consultative, inclusive and transparent. Recommendations: The negotiation process for the final Royal Charter must be fully transparent, using, for example government-sponsored roundtables. All stakeholders should proactively make their proposals and comments publicly available. The negotiations should ideally be live-streamed; if not, a systematic and clear process should be used to communicate the proceedings to the public. Page 11 of 16

12 The final draft of the Royal Charter: outstanding concerns In our analysis of the first draft of the Royal Charter and the amendments to the Crimes and Court Act, ARTICLE 19 provided detailed recommendations about how the proposed system of new regulation should be brought into full compliance with international freedom of expression standards. We note that the Final Draft Royal Charter was modified in of the following ways: Changes to the terminology used; Changes relating to the fact that the self-regulation of the press is a devolved matter for Scotland; Changes concerning the establishment date: the Charter will become effective after the Chair of the Board and at least 4 members of the Recognition Panel have been appointed; Changes regarding the Appointments Committee, the appointment of the Chair and members of the Board of the Recognition Panel and the functions of the Commissioner for Public Appointments; Different fees for different circumstances with a modified fee cap for the first three years after the establishment of the Recognition Panel and in cyclical reviews; Changes regarding the Standards Code; Changes concerning the arbitral process for civil legal claims against subscribers. In addition, the Amendments to the Crimes and Courts Act have been adopted, receiving Royal Assent on 25 April These address some of the criticisms regarding exclusions of some entities from the definition of relevant publisher. 6 ARTICLE 19 observes that our recommendations, outlined in our March 2013 analysis, are not reflected in the final draft version of the Royal Charter. We hope, however, that the Government will follow our recommendation to continue negotiations on the final version of the Royal Charter with both the media community and other stakeholders and that it will therefore consider our concerns as part of this process. In particular, we wish to reiterate the following: 1. The press regulator s mandate must include advocating for freedom of speech ARTICLE 19 observes that the final draft of the Royal Charter sees the role of the regulator narrowly and puts emphasis on providing society with a dispute resolution mechanism in relation to the media. This mechanism would act as an alternative to the courts and remove any excuse for those who cling to outdated legal provisions to protect themselves from public scrutiny. 6 Schedule 15 of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 includes exclusion for micro-business, that is a business with fewer than 10 employees with an annual turnover of no more than 2,000,000. Page 12 of 16

13 However, we note that one of the important roles of any self-regulatory body should be to contribute to safeguarding freedom of expression and the freedom of the media. The role is totally omitted from the final draft of the Royal Charter. This aspect of the regulator s functions should be reflected in the final version of the Royal Charter and should be included among the recognition criteria for the new regulator. This could also encourage widespread support for the new regulator among the media community and help raise its public profile. Recommendation: The recognition criteria for the new press regulator should include a requirement that the regulator s mandate extends to advocating for freedom of expression. The new regulator should defend the rights of members of the profession, guide their conduct and adjudicate on complaints from members of the public. 2. An equal representation model for the regulator s Board should be considered ARTICLE 19 continues to be concerned that the Royal Charter proposes a model of minority representation of the press on the Board of the new regulator. The criteria for recognition of the new regulator (Schedule 3, Section 5) include a requirement that the Board must comprise a majority of people who are independent of the press. We reiterate that a self-regulatory mechanism should involve the media community as widely as possible. The power with which a whole community can exert positive pressure for professionalism is far greater than that of a club of like-minded publications. We recommend to consider a tripartite model where the press regulatory body s membership would be made up of representatives of the public and the media community. The representatives from the media community would include representatives of publishers (and maybe other media), journalists and independent members. This model is also more likely to support stronger media professionalism, responsibility and peer-accountability. Recommendation: The membership of the regulator s Board should ensure, at minimum, an equal representation of the media community and the public. 3. Provisions on the standards code should be revised ARTICLE 19 observes that Section 7 of Schedule 3 of the final draft of the Royal Charter was amended. It now stipulates that the standards code will be the responsibility of, and adopted by, the Board, advised by the Code Committee. The Code Committee may comprise both independent members of the Board and serving editors. Serving editors have an important part to play although not one that is decisive. We note that this is a change from an earlier version of the Royal Charter which required that: the Code Committee should be appointed in accordance with best practice for public appointments; Page 13 of 16

14 the Code should be composed of equal proportions of independent members, serving journalists (national or regional journalists - or where relevant to the membership of the self-regulatory body - local or online journalists) and serving editors; the Code Committee should organise biennial public consultations, the results of which must be considered openly with the Board. ARTICLE 19 reiterates that ethical (standards) codes should always be elaborated by media professionals themselves. They should ultimately be adopted by unions or associations of journalists if they are to be fully integrated into day-to-day work, subject to training and regular review. On the other hand, many aspects of these codes are of direct importance to members of the public and constitute key tools for building trust and accountability. The involvement of the public in reviews and public consultations during the development of the codes should be encouraged, as should their regular review. Bearing in mind the dynamic nature of the media and changing values in society, the standards code should be considered a working document subject to interpretation, rather than a set of rigid rules. To assist in interpretation, a definition of public interest should be included in the code. To ensure the code remains relevant to the changing environment, regular review and opportunity for debate about its contents should also be provided. As there might be different journalist associations and/or associations of owners, the role of the Code Committee should primarily be to reach an agreement over a national code of minimum standards. Recommendations: The standards code to which members of the profession endeavour to adhere should be the preserve of journalists and media organisations. They should be elaborated through the most representative journalists body such as the national journalists union or professional association. Where there is more than one body, they should be encouraged to develop one joint national code. Public consultations during the development of the standards code should be encouraged. Regular public consultations on the code should be held. The role of the Board and the Code Committee should be to reach agreement on a national code of minimum standards. 4. Possibility of group and third party complaints should be restricted We remain concerned that Section 11 of Schedule 3 of the draft Charter still envisages the possibility of group complaints in the public interest and third-party complaints. We recognise that the aim of this proposal might be to provide a tool for minority, marginalised and disadvantaged groups in society to voice their perspectives and concerns about negative stereotypes and misrepresentation in the media and to promote such groups right to freedom of expression. However, we warn against the potential for these provisions to be misused for issues that are incompatible with international human rights standards, such as group defamation or defamation of religions. We are also concerned that the possibility of third-party complaints can lead to large numbers of complaints from the general public. Such complaints might also damage the efficiency of the press regulator and result in self-censorship within the media community. Page 14 of 16

15 We therefore recommend that Section 11 should explicitly stipulate that, when considering group complaints, all decisions of the press regulator must strictly comply with international freedom of international standards and should never go beyond what is permissible under these standards. Recommendations: The provisions on group complaints must stipulate that any decision on such complaints must fully comply with international freedom of expression standards; The press regulator should have powers to refuse to hear group complaints that are vexatious and/or are lacking merit. Only people affected by a publication may bring complaint to the regulator. 5. Provisions on sanctions should be clarified and reduced ARTICLE 19 remains concerned that the recognition criteria (Schedule 3, Section 19) still include a requirement that the Board of the regulator should have powers to impose appropriate and proportionate sanctions, that can include financial sanctions for serious or systematic breaches of the standards code or governance requirements of the body. These fines can be up to 1% of turnover attributable to the publication concerned with a maximum of 1,000,000. ARTICLE 19 reiterates that: The sanctions regime remains ambiguous: it is not clear what other appropriate sanctions or remedial action can be imposed beyond the publication of corrections and apologies. All sanctions that the regulator can impose should be clearly enumerated. Although the possibility of financial sanctions is reduced to serious and systemic breaches of the standards code or governance of the body, financial sanctions should always be a matter of last resort. Non-financial remedies with less impact on the free flow of information and ideas should always be prioritised. In order to ensure this, it should be clearly stipulated that financial sanctions can only be imposed if other measures are incapable of redressing the harm caused. In assessing the amount of financial sanctions, the regulator should always consider their potentially chilling effect on freedom of expression. Financial sanctions should never be disproportionate to the harm done. There is still no possibility of an appeal against the decisions of the Board. We note that in Ireland, for example, complaints are adjudicated by the Press Ombudsman and the Press Council is responsible for hearing appeals against ombudsman decisions. Such a possibility should be considered. These shortcomings must be addressed in the final version of the Royal Charter. Recommendations: Recognition criteria should stipulate that the regulator can only impose financial sanctions in the most serious and systemic breaches as a last resort when other measures would not be capable of redressing the harm caused to the individual. The regulator should always be required to assess the amount of financial sanctions against their potential effect on the right to freedom of expression. Financial Page 15 of 16

16 sanctions even in cases of serious and systemic breaches - should never be disproportionate to the harm caused. A right of appeal against the decision of the Board should be included. Page 16 of 16