The Role of Personal Rule in West African Diplomacy: A Study of Charles Taylor s Exit as the Conflict Settlement in Liberia 1

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1 The Role of Personal Rule in West African Diplomacy: A Study of Charles Taylor s Exit as the Conflict Settlement in Liberia 1 Artanti Wardhani, University of Indonesia A. Introduction On 11 August 2003 Charles Taylor, at that time the president of Liberia, went to the safe haven in Nigeria. This was an invitation tendered by Nigeria s president, Olusegun Obasanjo; endorsed by the international community, largely the United States (the US) and African Union (the AU) in attempt to seek peace in Liberia. When the conflict first erupted in 1989 there was very little attention given by the international community. Plea for help went into oblivious as the end of Cold War restrained major power to intervene, while effort to put this crisis in the UN Security Council s agenda was hindered by the regional rivalry in West Africa (Aning, 1994) 2. Amid the absence of international community, the burdensome states in West Africa were left alone to solve the crisis. Initiatives were then taken within the framework of sub-regional organization the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The initial phase of the sub-regional mediation and peacekeeping intervention by ECOWAS was kept intact throughout the occurrence of Liberian conflict. It was also the mediation effort of ECOWAS that brought Taylor into safe haven and ended the Liberia s conflict in In the state-to-state relations, the interactions held were conducted by means of diplomacy (Bull, 1977). The diplomacy established in the context of finding solution for Liberian conflict became the channel to communicate options and considerations on behalf of Liberia. It was held within ECOWAS, and being closely consulted with the international community despite its abandonment in the earlier phase of conflict. The focus of this paper will be concentrated in the process and political dimension within the diplomacy in West Africa upon Taylor s departure, with special emphasis on the most recent peace process in Liberian conflict, the Accra Peace process in June-August The general literature on Liberian conflict mostly point out the personal role of the leaders in West African states in every phases of ECOWAS role. I argue that this characteristic distinguished African politics with other international politics in broader scope. B. Problem Identification The main purpose of the paper is to explore the political dimension on the diplomacy generating the safe haven option. Thus, the research question formulated to guide through the study is formulated as follow: 1 Paper presented in the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific: 32 nd Annual Conference Africa in a Restructuring World Brisbane, 30 September-2 October The writer could be contacted through address: awardhani@gmail.com. 2 The reluctance of Cotê d Ivoire reflects the issue of long-term rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone states in West Africa. 1

2 How did the role of personal rule explain the character of diplomacy in West Africa and how did they deliver the adoption of safe haven as a strategy of conflict settlement in Liberia? The question is built upon the following assumptions. (1) Taylor s exit is necessary to end the conflict in Liberia. (2) It was the humanitarian rationale which concerned the safe haven arrangement that facilitated Taylor s exit from Liberia. (3) The main feature of Taylor s exit rest on its ad hoc manner that bypassed the ECOWAS bureaucratic channel. It brought implication on the pragmatism of the West African political practices, and the importance of personal role, which is very much present in the African politics. (4) The distribution of power in West Africa shaped the unilateral dimension in the safe haven arrangement in West African diplomacy. Taylor s departure provided new settlement in the Liberian conflict. It was the pre-requisite condition for transition and for lasting peace. Despite the controversy and criticism along with his departure, the ultimate goal underlying this decision was reached. The departure of Taylor from the domestic Liberian politics and the West African regional politics paved the way to the continuation of the peace process. As necessitated from the measure of conflict settlement, the arrangement brought finality to the conflict. The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement and the establishment of the transitional government led Liberia in the transitional period after the conflict. C. Theoretical Framework In order to provide a comprehensive elaboration to the research question, the theoretical framework in this paper is built around two theories: the practice of diplomacy by Bull (1977) and Anda (2000) and the concept of weak institutionalization of political practice by Chabal and Daloz (1999). By means of utilizing these theories I aim to explain the role of personal rule in the West African diplomacy. Departing from the phenomena of West African states played a central role in mediating the Liberian conflict; an elaboration and identification of the characters of diplomacy within interstate relations in West Africa will take us to the explanation on the role of personal rule behind the agreement that brought Taylor s orderly exit from Liberia. Diplomacy The concept of diplomacy (Bull, 1977 in Jönsson and Langhorne, 2004:75) refers to the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means. This term is applied to the official relations not only of states but also of other political entities with standing in world politics (p.76). According to Bull (p.77-78) features of diplomacy include (1) the formulation of a state s external policy and its execution, (2) either bilateral or multilateral relations. Bilateral links formally link one state or government with another, but in present practice they are also links between one people or political system and another. Multilateral diplomacy, on the other hand, may take form of 2

3 conferences of two or more states, or, of permanent conferences that is international organizations. (3) Diplomacy may be either ad hoc or institutionalized. Present day diplomatic contacts among sovereign states are institutionalized in the sense that they take place against the background of a permanent relationship among the parties involved, and that they are conducted in the basis of well-understood rules and convention, in some cases having the status of law (p.78) The interaction and approach being performed by the West African states in the second phase of the Liberian conflict during Taylor s presidency was carried out in diplomatic means, unlike the military approach which was more dominant during the first phase. However, diplomacy is empirical piece of evidence where we could start off deeper discussion on the characters of political interactions in the region. Characters of West African Diplomacy The general discussion of diplomacy then leads to discussion on international relations in contemporary Africa. Michael Anda (2000) studied the extent to which African states have succeeded or failed in harmonizing their foreign policies as a strategy towards maximizing the collective goals of African unity (p.1). In addressing the issue of political and diplomatic interactions, he referred to those aspects of external relationships and political network between states that include the status of diplomatic relations and formal diplomatic channel, interstate political visits and relations within intergovernmental organizations (p.54). Such institutional relationships and processes may be cooperative, competitive, or conflictive but they are generally reflective of the relationship of power between states and the nature of influence within the organizational structure of international political institutions. Although some assessments of the study were based on the number of diplomatic representation approach to international relations involving African states, it suggested formulation of the character of West African diplomacy which I resort on to pinpoint the state-to-state interaction in West Africa. The characters of West African diplomacy are to be formulized as follows: First, the diplomatic communicative network within West Africa is fairly intensive, but due to the highly centralized political structure, coupled with the presence of pre-eminent political leaders and the collegial nature of the decision making process, makes the precise delineation of factors in the making of foreign policy difficult to assess (p.125). Second, personalities played a significant role in African diplomacy, particularly as the central role of the leader as the formulator of foreign policy is consistently enhanced (p.126). The emphasis on the personal interaction and communication undoubtedly adds an individualistic angle to African foreign policies. This personalized nature of African leadership combined with the latitude in decision making afforded the leader means, in effect, that any established pattern of foreign policy decisions may sometimes be easily upset by the leader s idiosyncratic action (Ibid.). 3

4 Third, the contention of foreign policy making in Africa is hindered by the absence of an experienced diplomatic corps and slim national budget. The defects are somewhat compensated for by the frequent personal interactions between African leaders (p.126). Both formal and private visits to neighboring states could be viewed as exchange between old friends. The result of these is a much greater degree of policy coordination. This practice also underlines importance of the presidential dominance over foreign policy issue. Fourth, critical issues are often negotiated at the highest level, involving heads of government in summit diplomacy (p.126). Personal diplomacy and contacts made through interstate visits by heads of state may thus serve as the useful analytical barometer for testing political relations between states. As we could see that one particular feature present at every characteristics in the diplomacy in West Africa is the importance of personal role, which tends to advocate the notion the individual level. The emphasis of this paper is focused on the role of personal rule that explain the character of diplomacy in West Africa. The importance of personal role clearly does not represent the formal process in which only nation-states are taking part. In attempt to mediate the discrepancy I will turn to another conceptualization on African politics by Chabal and Daloz, and draw my discussion within the framework as elaborated below. Weak Institutionalization of Political Practices in Africa The starting point in this conception lies with the argument that the state in Africa was never properly institutionalized as required in the Weberian approach of modern state because it was never significantly emancipated from society 3 (Chabal&Daloz, 1999:4). The fundamental concept of power is defined as the informalization of politics. By having a weakly institutionalized state, the systems where the public and private spheres operate become functionally vague. This is known as the patrimonial system. Hence, the patrimonial model implies an instrumentally profitable lack of distinction between the civic and personal spheres (Ibid. p.5). Those who are in power could easily extract the profit through the weak institutionalization of political practices (p.13). The ramification of the weak institutionalization of politics in Africa generates two consequences: first, the state in Africa is vacuous in that it rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic and factional struggle. As a result it failed to acquire either the legitimacy or the professional competence which are the hallmarks of the modern state (p.14); second, it is also ineffectual in that it has never been in the interest of African political elites to work for the proper institutionalization of the state apparatus. In other words; its usefulness is greatest when it is least institutionalized (Ibid.). By deriving from concept of weak institutionalization of political practices in 3 According to Weberian approach the modern state is the outcome of a process by which the realm of politics is gradually emancipated from society and constituted into increasingly autonomous political institutions. The key to such institutionalization is not so much the gradual acquisition of the monopoly of legitimate violence as successful establishment of a truly independent bureaucracy. The emancipation of the state thus rests on the establishment of increasingly autonomous political institutions. The implication of such an analysis marked the end of patrimonialism, where the public and private sphere becomes functionally distinct. (See Chabal&Daloz, 1999: Chapter 1 for detail). 4

5 Africa, there are two central elements that coherently present: the personalization of power and the importance of vertical links among the elite. Personalization of Power in Africa As a result of the lack of a clear cut and legitimate separation between private and public domain it is important to underline that politics are being transformed into informal manner conducted in the framework of personal rule. This kind of interaction and exchange is facilitated by the various levels of social identification and loyalty which exist in African societies (p.6). The African informal political order is a system grounded in a reciprocal type of interdependence between leaders, courtiers, and the populace. It is a system that works to maintain social bonds between those at the top and bottom of society (p.44). It is therefore necessary to develop a clientelistic framework where the elite could maintain its power by being supported by its clients. The issue of legitimacy in Africa is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks. The legitimacy of the African political elites derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit governmental resources for patrimonial resources (p.15). As also pointed out by Bøås (1996:60), the most prominent characteristic of African state is the lack of institutionalized constraints. The lack of institutional constraints have made politics in Africa open to personal and factional struggle aimed at controlling the state apparatus. The consequence has been the lack of political stability and sometimes decreased the political game to a fight between personal contenders for power The process of establishing re-africanization of Western concept of state has led to reshaping of both political institutions and political actions by more informal and personalized (infra-institutional) African codes of practice (p.146). What is to be performed in most African countries, is that the state is no more than a pseudo-western façade masking the reality of deeply personalized political relations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:16). Importance of Vertical Link among the Leaders The second important factor of African politics is the overriding importance of vertical links within the political system that defines the patrimonial system. Ideally all patrons seek to constitute themselves as Big Men (Chabal-Daloz, 1999:15). What is significant in Africa is the extent to which vertical and/or personalized relations actually drive the very logic of the political system. It is the ultimate ambitions of those who have power to establish their standing as Big Men. Such standing, by its very nature, subjective, and can only be achieved within a context of personalized relations where clients, or dependents, will ensure its recognition. It is also necessary to be recognized as the primus inter pares among all Big Men; the superior among the superiors. Although it is the nature of human being to hold on to power, the aim of the elite however is not merely to gather power for their selves. It is much more fundamentally to use that power and the resources which it can generate, to purchase the affection of their people (Chabal-Daloz, 5

6 1999:158). Thus, it highlighted the importance of survival; more likely the ruler s survival rather than the state itself. Rulers seek to assure their personal survival by seeking the survival and indeed strengthening of their state (Clapham, 2000: 4). The institution of state is built as the arrangement by which regime of personal rule are able to secure stability (Bøås, 1996:63). By taking this into consideration, it is noted that the foundations of political accountability in Africa are both collective and extra-institutional. They rest on the particularistic links between Big Men or patron and their constituent communities, either in domestic or regional level. D. Introduction to the Conflict in Liberia Second Phase of Liberia s Conflict: Charles Taylor Presidency In the aftermath of the 1997 election the situation in Liberia was mainly stable; due to Taylor s coerce in maintaining order in Liberia, similar with his predecessors. The pseudo-stability however, did not last long. Only within two years after Taylor assumed presidency Liberia returned to situation of widespread insecurity, weak economy, the collapse of public infrastructure, patronage-fuelled corruption, interethnic clashes, and false coup plots. As a result of the declining security situation, particularly in Monrovia, Taylor lost his popularity. The absence of the rule of law marked the day-to-day affair in Liberia, and all of these led to the tense political climate in Liberia. In the regional affairs there was emerging tension between Taylor and ECOMOG in the issue of disarmament and security sector reform as Taylor s government did not completely cooperate with ECOMOG s mandate, particularly in demobilizing approximately former combatants (Levitt, 2005: 212). Internationally, Taylor also faced serious problem. The international community at this point showed dissatisfaction with the political development in Liberia and disengaged from the country, though at the beginning they promised to contribute rebuilding Liberia by giving out aid. The UN responded the deteriorating situation in Liberia by implementing the economic sanctions in 2000 and During the period of his presidency, his enemies were disorganized and united only by their opposition to Taylor as an individual. Their sole agenda was to remove Taylor from power; rather through military way than the political one. It was the UN sanctions that unifying and strengthening Taylor s enemies. Shortly after the sanction was being implemented a new armed faction in the conflict, the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) initiated its first larger offensive operations in Lofa County, bordering Liberia and Guinea (ICG Report, 30 April 2003: 3). Being concentrated in that district, the attack marked the next phase of the civil war. Not only ECOWAS was occupied with the conflict in Liberia, similar tensions also took place in Guinea and Sierra Leone which formed the crises in the Mano River area. It was since September 2001 that each country had been trading accusations and counter-accusations of harboring or supporting dissidents destabilizing each other s territory. Most of the efforts attempted to mediate the conflict negotiated at the highest level by involving heads of government in summit 6

7 diplomacy (Anda, 2000:126), primarily brokered by Nigeria s Obasanjo and Malian president Alpha Konare by holding summit on this matter and attended by other countries of ECOWAS (Paris AFP, 11 April 2001). Particularly in accordance with the broader scope of de-escalating tension along the border crisis in the Mano River area, ECOWAS tried to engage the peace process in Liberia and encourage Taylor in a constructive way to participate in the peace negotiation with LURD since The Liberian government, the ECOWAS, AU, European Union, and the UN were also urged to endorse and support this approach of peace in Liberia (Ibid.). One of the positive measures towards the efforts to create peace in Liberia was made through the establishment of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) on 17 September 2002 in New York, made up of the ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union, Ghana, Nigeria, France, the United States, Britain, the United Nations and Morocco 4. Several previous negotiation rounds on Liberian conflict leading the establishment of the ICGL showed that the diplomatic communicative network within West Africa is fairly intensive (Anda, 2000:125). The extensiveness of ECOWAS diplomatic network were not only successful in convincing most of the relevant parties to join the negotiation, but also in gaining support from the continental and international community to take part as moral guarantor in the peace process. The establishment of ICGL gave a sense of international involvement in mediating the Liberia conflict, thus prompted confidence as well as pressure for the warring parties. Efforts by ECOWAS were conducted by various meetings and interactions among the head of states in order to advocate peace negotiation. Most of these interactions were addressed to Taylor due to his position as the president of Liberia. Thus, the framework where the leader of a country, in this case the president, provided them to formulate any related policy concerned. As the talks continued, this progress on the diplomatic relations implied that Taylor was willing to cooperate in a sense that it might help lifting the sanctions. Economic sanction could have been the main reason for Taylor to cooperate 5. For example, Taylor asked for help from AU, and Togo to back Liberian in the UN forum (Paris AFP, 6 May 2001), while ECOWAS worked further and a assessment report on the effect of sanction to Liberia (Dakar PANA, 5 October 2001). Meanwhile as the fighting continued in Liberia, efforts to bring peace in Liberia reached a final point when the warring parties in Liberia were convinced to be brought to the negotiation round. On the 16 May 2003 after several exchanges of meeting ECOWAS announced that peace talks between the Liberian government and two rebel groups will take place on 2 June 2003 in Accra, Ghana. The talks, to be held under the aegis of the ICGL, were expected to result in a comprehensive peace process, including a lasting cease-fire, security, electoral reform, respect for 4 The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mohammed Ibn. Chambas then reported and consulted the US Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner about progress in the peace process (Paris AFP, 26 July 2002). At its first meeting in December 2002, the ICGL agreed to resolve the Liberian crisis through the promotion of internal dialogue among all the political groups, and good neighborliness among the three neighboring countries Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Paris APF, 14 April 2003). 5 The new sanction against Liberia was come into force on 7 May 2001 and included a 12-month ban on imports of all rough diamonds originating from or passing through Liberia, restriction on air travel by its senior officials. It was given in continuation to the previous arms embargo and economic sanction enforced on 7 March

8 human rights, the rule of law and national reconciliation based on interactions with all parties and stakeholders (AFP, 16 May 2003; Wrokpoh,24 May 2003). This negotiation round was seen as a crucial and important point to bring peace in Liberia since all stakeholders were involved. Preliminary talks with both groups were scheduled to be held in Sierra Leone prior to the Accra meeting, but several obstacles occurred; for example delegates from one warring faction; the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) failed to show up. Later on, it indicated that it would not compromise on its main objective, demanding the resignation of Taylor (IRIN, 27 May 2003). Later on the date and the place of the negotiation round was changed, due to security concern (Wrokpoh,24 May 2003). Nevertheless the peace round known as the Accra peace process was gearing up to its way. At the end, after long process of sub-regional effort to bring the warring parties into the negotiating table, on 4 June 2003 the negotiation round was begun. Head of states attending the peace round were Charles Taylor for the government of Liberia, the President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki as the chairman of the African Union, Olusegun Obasanjo, the President of Nigeria; President Laurent Gbagbo of Cotê d Ivoire, President of Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano. Alas, on the very same day when the negotiation was about to start, another interrupting incident occurred when the chief prosecutor of the Sierra Leone Special Court unexpectedly unsealed an indictment towards Charles Taylor containing charges on crime against humanity in Sierra Leone s conflict. The indictment thus became the turning point of the peace process in Liberia. The indictment from the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) went public when David Crane, the prosecutor at the SCSL unexpectedly unsealed an indictment and a warrant of arrest for Taylor, right on the first day of the Accra peace talks. The charges came as a result of Taylor s alleged backing of the RUF during Sierra Leone s civil war. 6 In statements about his decision to reveal Taylor s indictment while the president was at the Ghana peace talks, Crane suggested that only outside of Monrovia would there have been a realistic chance of an arrest (Cobb Jr., 2003). As the jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone special court were only limited within Sierra Leone, it could not reach Taylor unless he was being handed over to Sierra Leone special court or when he was outside national border of Liberia. Therefore Crane asked the Ghanaian government to hand him over to the Special Court. It was not clear on what had he thought that the Ghanaian officials would oblige and detain Taylor. Ghanaian government ignored this, but both Taylor and LURD reacted immediately on this indictment. Embarrassed and infuriated by the unexpected announcement, the Ghanaian authorities hurriedly flew Taylor back to Monrovia on the Ghanaian presidential jet. At the same time LURD and MODEL also withdrew from the negotiation by claiming that they will not negotiate 6 The indictment constituted on charges on crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and indicted him on 17 counts, ranging from terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments, sexual violence, use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labors, to attacks on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) personnel (The Special Court Sierra Leone, issued on 3 March 2003 available at ) 8

9 with a war convict, thus prepared to attack Monrovia (IRIN, 6 June 2003). As a result of the indictment, the negotiation was terminated because the negotiating parties and the stakeholders were shattered into unpredictable collapse. There was no sense of order as the negotiation was thrown into chaos. Taylor went back to Liberia, also the LURD and MODEL started to mobilize their troops heading towards Monrovia. Consequences from the Indictment The indictment came at a delicate moment as in short time LURD forces had advanced to the outskirts of Monrovia and making the violent defeat of Taylor s regime a virtual certainty if no negotiated solution could be reached. The ill-timed announcement of indictment showed a clear lack of understanding of the regional politics dynamics (Aboagye-Bah, 2004). The court showed a lack of understanding or disregard of the conflict dynamics in the region by having expected the government of Ghana to arrest Taylor who was its guest (Ibid.). The Special Court s inadequate consultation with ECOWAS and the Ghanaian government before unsealing the indictment had a negative impact on the relationship between the Sierra Leone Special Court and the regional leadership (Aboagye&Bah, 2004:4). As pointed out by Aboagye & Bah (2004) although arresting Taylor and handing him over to the court would have been the desirable and right thing for the Ghanaian government to do, it would have been viewed in many quarters as a breach of the norms of diplomacy and as a betrayal of traditional hospitality (p.4). Apparently, loyalty to numbers of the heads of state club is still strong. Accusation against fellow African by the west is often seen as the exercise of double standards and in the face of Africa s continual marginalization they are still determined to maintain solidarity (Baker, 2004:1497) The indictment, in the view of Ghana and Nigeria, was direct attack on the West African attempts to find diplomatic solution to the Liberian crisis (IRIN, 30 June 2003). Crane s dogmatic style did not fit well in the diplomatic practice established in West Africa (Bøås, 2005:87). The political leadership in West Africa simply found this unsuitable and disrespectful to corner a fellow African president and also completely odds with their peace attempts. The indictment also immediately bolstered the determination of LURD and MODEL to pursue a military option (Aboagye&Bah, 2004:3-4). This was clearly manifested when both groups hardened their position at the negotiations, insisting that they would not negotiate with an indicted war criminal. Taylor on the other hand, was determined to fight to the last a scenario that did not fit well for the civilian population trapped in Monrovia. As the fighting between factions continued, West Africa mediators threatened to formally end the peace talks if the warring parties did not reobserve the ceasefire by 27 June 2003 (ICG Report, 3 November 2003). The facilitator of the peace talks, Nigerian general Abdulsalami Abubakar appealed to all three groups to adhere to the cease-fire (IRIN, 26 June 2003). The LURD delayed the mission s progress by failing to represent representatives as they expressed their reluctance to negotiate any further with Taylor. 9

10 Meanwhile on the 18 July 2003 the various groups participating in the Accra talks began analyzing a draft comprehensive peace document released by the mediators (IRIN, 19 July 2003). The mediators had proposed that the conference delegates select a president and a vice president to head a transitional government (Ibid.). The progress with the negotiation at this point was also stalled as both LURD and MODEL refused to sign a draft peace agreement (IRIN, 22 July). Both contingents were displeased by the lack of representation extended to them in the Accra Accord and proposed transitional government. In order to safeguard the ultimate objective of the peace process, the diplomatic community of West Africa retained whatever it takes to keep the peace process rolling. By seeing that the situation after indictment that led to the win or lose situation for the warring parties, and with Taylor being cornered among all; an intervention strategy was needed to save the situation for the sake of the civilians trapped in Monrovia. Steps leading to Pragmatism Instead of determining that the indictment caused the negotiation breakdown and humanitarian disaster, another point of view could have otherwise seen it as an entry point to change the stagnation in Liberia. The need of intervention strategy to create breakthrough from the situation deadlock had turned the indictment into a starting point to lead Liberia to its conflict settlement. It was Nigerian president, Obasanjo who came out with the option of providing safe haven for Taylor. Yet it cannot be claimed that Obasanjo stood alone behind this decision. One must bear in mind that the decision was closely consulted by the international community and agreed by the diplomatic community in West Africa. What could be explained from this decision is that Nigeria took the lead to find breakthrough in the situation in Liberia. Alas, it was the sense of pragmatism that strongly dominated. Subsequently, after the indictment made public there was a widespread rumors about a safe haven option to Taylor offered by Obasanjo. Following the collapse of the Accra peace round, on 2 July 2003 Taylor discreetly sent his envoy, the Liberian foreign minister, Monie Captan to come to Nigeria and brought an undisclosed letter (Kaduna Radio Nigeria, 3 July 2003). The initial interaction might have indicated Taylor s consideration on the offer. The international community back Obasanjo s policy justifying that asylum as a way out of the civil war in Liberia. According to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, a senior UN diplomat, as Nigeria does not have the law that would allow Taylor to be extradited to the special court in Sierra Leone; it was Obasanjo s decision to make that offer public (Radio Kaduna Nigeria, 3 July 2003). Once again, it proves personalities played a significant role in West African diplomacy, particularly as the central role of the leader as the formulator of foreign policy is consistently enhanced in Liberian peace process (Anda, 2000:126). Despite of Taylor initial rejection to the plan, during Obasanjo s visit to Liberia on the 6 July 2003 it was announced officially that Nigeria offered to provide asylum and safe haven for Taylor. ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mohammed Ibn. Chambas termed Obasanjo s visit as a part of 10

11 behind-the scene moves so that the peace process moves forward (AFP World Service, 6 July 2003). Later on the same day, after meeting Obasanjo, Taylor was reportedly accepted the offer and transferred the presidency to Moses Blah, his vice president. The term was called an orderly exit from power (IRIN, 6 July 2003; Radio France Internationale, 7 July 2003). By looking through this, one could conclude that it was a pragmatic decision for the purpose to compromise with the demand of LURD for Taylor to leave power. Only with his absence could the negotiation have been resumed. To some extend it confirms the main assumption of this paper that pragmatism was highly employed here. And it also confirms the repeated pattern along ECOWAS involvement in Liberia. Jaye (2003) assessed that the intervention from ECOWAS was characterized by procedural irregularities and justified under the ECOWAS protocols on the grounds of humanitarianism and regional security (p.232). As pointed out the foreign policy in many African states are largely characterized by an ad hoc decision making, which due to the occasional absence of a solid, overall foreign policy structure (Anda, 2000:125). In the situation that ECOWAS faced, it was necessary to make decision based on political necessity, rather than to be held down by the weight of procedural matters while thousands of people were dying and others fleeing the country (Jaye, 2003:232). ECOWAS approach was characterized by adhocery, approach to be taken were all determined at the last minute. But at the same time, the cohesion and coordination were ultimately only possible because of Nigeria that has sufficient resources to assume the bulk of the burden in securing Taylor s exit from Liberia (Taw&Grant- Thomas,1999:71). Post-Safe Haven: Continuation of Diplomacy Meanwhile, support towards Obasanjo s decision came from the US. During an official visit to Nigeria from July 2003 Bush congratulated Obasanjo on his offer of asylum to Taylor. (AFP World Service, 11 July 2003). The US Secretary of State Collin Powell also indicated that the US would participate in a peacekeeping operation in Liberia. He said that a transfer of power in Liberia would have to be facilitated and supported in some way by the United States, and that any military involvement would be conditioned on Taylor s resignation (New York Times, 15 July 2003). By taking this as a signal of approval from the international community, Obasanjo intensively started to run the regional diplomacy in continuing the decision. One of the visits was done on 13 July 2003 when he visited Guinea s president Lansana Conte to discuss the situation in Liberia (AFP World Service, 13 July 2003). It can be seen as one of the efforts to socialize the idea and making it known to the head of states in West Africa. Subsequent with Nigeria s active promotion in the region, a resolution authorizing the Nigerian-led ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Liberia was adopted by the UN (IRIN, 2 August 2003). Following the dominant role of Obasanjo mainly in the post-indictment period, it has been presented that Obasanjo alone took the role in intervening and safeguarding the peace process in Accra. Although he was in close consultation the US, it was presented to the public that he was the 11

12 one behind the idea. The numerous exchanges of meeting made between Obasanjo and Taylor, personally and through envoys showed the frequent personal between African leaders (Anda, 2000:126). To some point the visits the other head of states in West Africa after the safe haven option was announced publicly to a much greater degree was aimed on the policy coordination (Ibid.). Promptly after Taylor indicated his willingness to go to exile, the peace negotiations in Accra shifted from talks of cease-fire condition to the formation of a transitional government (IRIN, 9 July 2003). Specifically, there were intense negotiations over who should head the interim government after Taylor s departure (Ibid.). Along with the continued talks, the ECOWAS Military Mission (ECOMIL) was deployed to provide security guarantee in Liberia. The first group of Nigerian dominated ECOMIL as arrived in Liberia on 4 August as vanguard force. A number of troops were on immediate standby, while ECOWAS hoped to have troops in the ground in Liberia by the end of August with troops coming from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Mali (IRIN, 31 July 2003). The decision to deploy troops was taken during the Emergency Summit of ECOWAS concerning the crisis in Liberia. In that forum, Ghana s President John Kufour urged fellow West African leaders to take quick actions to save Liberia from self-destruction (Ibid.). This showed that in West Africa, the critical issues are often negotiated at the highest level, involving heads of government in summit diplomacy, as also previously taken to discuss the measures to end the Mano River crisis earlier in 2001 (p.126). On the same day of the arrival of ECOMIL, a motion to approve Taylor s resignation and his replacement by Vice President Moses Blah was approved by the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives by a vote of 46 to 1 (AFP World Service, 9 August 2003). Shortly after this, Jonathan Taylor, the Liberian State Minister of Presidential Affairs, was sent by Taylor to Nigeria to arrange his departure (Paris Radio France International, 6 August 2003). On the 11 August 2003 Taylor resigned the presidency of Liberia and went into exile in Nigeria (See Hoffman, 2006: for details). In his departure speech delivered from the Executive Mansion, Taylor announced, I have accepted this role as the sacrificial lamb (Hoffman, 2006:308). Likening himself to Jesus, Taylor challenged international forces to step in now that he had kept his promise of relinquishing power. On the same day Taylor arrived in Nigeria where he was welcomed in a presidential ceremony. Immediately after Taylor s resignation, Moses Blah took the oath of office. Soon after that Blah held talks with leaders of both the LURD and MODEL, hoping to finalize a peace agreement over the coming week. As the negotiation resumed and all parties agreed to sign the peace agreement on 18 August 2003 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Liberia was signed. It was acceptable for both LURD and MODEL to have the government of Liberia signing the agreement, without Taylor s presence. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement proved to be the turning point of the peace process in Liberian conflict, as a settlement on ending the conflict finally had been reached (IRIN, 18 August 2003; FBIS, 2003p). 12

13 E. Analysis Safe Haven: Exit Strategy for Everybody? It was clear that in the early stage of Accra peace process Taylor was unlikely to be defeated by the rebels and yet he was also not in position to militarily and definitively defeat LURD and MODEL. The indictment on the other hand did not give any chance for Taylor. Taylor was cornered, both by the indictment and by the advancement of the rebels towards Monrovia. By any chance, both situations did not apply any good for Taylor. When there was an opportunity to escape the difficult situation by relying on a trustful ally, it was seen as the best way to overcome the situation. Taylor s willingness to accept Obasanjo s offer finally opened up solution to Liberian crisis and transform the stagnation situation into new settlement. From what I perceive, the safe haven offer from Obasanjo could be considered as a guarantee, both politically and militarily, for Taylor to step outside the battleground assured to be safe and untouched by the indictment. 7 As Taylor s exit was something ultimately demanded by LURD and MODEL, after the demand was fulfilled, they agreed to continue the negotiation. In my view, the safe haven strategy as intervention move was needed before Liberia could move with the sequence of conflict management, by reaching establishing the transitional government and democratic election. The indictment towards Taylor created different and difficult situation in the peace process, but at the end Taylor s exit proved as an opportunity as new settlement in the conflict without causing further severe humanitarian emergency in Liberia. Alas, in the case of finding settlement to the Liberian conflict from the practice of West African diplomacy, it was the notion of pragmatism that saved Liberia from the total humanitarian catastrophe. On the Diplomatic Path towards Accra Peace Process The thorough steps along the peace process in Liberian conflict reflected the success story of the West African diplomatic community in the conflict mediation in the region. The scope of this diplomatic effort was quite intensive. By then the region did not only witness the upsurge in Liberia, but also in Guinea and Sierra Leone. It made the task of bringing peace to the Mano River areas a big challenge. At this point ECOWAS did not only emphasize the regional diplomacy, but also sought support in the continental level by engaging the AU as the important player in the continent; and primarily the international community. The diplomatic initiatives within ECOWAS implied the importance of the personal factor, with the emphasis on the role of the heads of state in the region. It takes place in the numerous personal interactions and presidential visits. It is also of importance to mark that crucial issues in the region were discussed within the summit level of the regional forum. However, the indictment towards Taylor created difficult situation in the peace process. The peace talks reached a deadlock and the possibility of a complete breakdown of the peace process 7 On third party guarantee in the conflict settlement could be found in Walters (2002: Chapter 1). 13

14 was high. A breakout from this situation arose as the president of Nigeria, Obasanjo, offered a safe haven arrangement for Taylor. Safe haven is a diplomatic arrangement aimed to give protection towards a leader in a country for the purpose of terminating a crisis. Taylor s willingness to accept this arrangement finally paved the way for the solution to the Liberian crisis. It created the conflict settlement and it was believed to bring an end to the crisis. I also conclude that Taylor s exit was needed by Liberia to resume with the next sequence of conflict management, by establishing the transitional government and democratic election. Obasanjo s decision on the safe haven arrangement showed that the notion of personal role was more dominant in comparison with the pre-indictment diplomatic initiatives. However, by overcoming any regularity within ECOWAS, Obasanjo s option was conducted and implemented in an ad hoc manner. To conclude, the safe haven arrangement was a pragmatic solution to an emerging humanitarian crisis that avoided Liberia from the total humanitarian catastrophe. The Highly Personalized Power Relations in West Africa In West Africa, and much of the Africa, diplomacy has really been about the politics of personality (Aluko, 1977 in Adibe, 1997:482). Personalities played a significant role in African diplomacy. It enhances the role of leader as the formulator of foreign policy (Anda, 2000:126). In assessing the involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict, there had been numerous personal interactions which were largely held among the head of states. Thus, it strengthened the dimension of the personal role in the process of diplomacy. The personal relations during the Liberian conflict were present since the first phase of the conflict. 8 At this point it is important to pose a question on whose interest that might be represented here. The national interest is thus entangled with the leader s interest. The consequence of this entanglement is to be found in the transformation of politics as being informal. The informalization of politics is conducted in the framework of personal rule. As such, it can be personalized because there is a lack of clear cut and legitimate separation between private and public domain. Prior to the indictment most of the efforts to mediate the Liberian conflict were negotiated at the highest level at the regional forum, mostly through the summit meetings (Anda, 2000:126). The heads of state such as the president of Nigeria, Obasanjo; the president of Mali, Alpha Konare, later succeeded by Toumani Toure; the president of Ghana, John Kufour; the president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, the president of Togo, Gnassinbe Eyadema, and the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, rendered the consensus of the region sound by participating into the diplomatic initiatives. 8 The 1996 political agreement between Taylor and the Nigerian president at that time, Sani Abacha, showed this dimension of personal relations. Having united by mutual interests, both of them reached an agreement that brought Taylor into the presidential position in Liberia. Another example on how personalities played crucial point here was when the AU leadership tried to find solution to the Liberian conflict without involving the AU in the arrangement. Their persuasion to Nigeria s head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, was also conducted through a personal interaction. However, Nigeria s willingness to start a regional initiative on the Liberian conflict was very much based on Babangida s domestic political agenda. 14

15 Another point asserted by Chabal and Daloz (1999: 6) is on the various levels of social identification and loyalties which exist in the African societies that facilitate the interaction and exchange in the personalization of power. The loyalty and the social identification within the safe haven arrangement could be found among the heads of state in West Africa. The decision of Ghana for not arresting Taylor as requested by the Sierra Leone Special Court could be seen as an illustration to this. However, the loyalty and social identification is not merely addressed to the head of state as a personal, rather it is subjected to the institution of the head of state itself. The explanation to this is likely to be found in the neo-patrimonial state of Africa. Once an individual assume the position of a head of state, this individual will be respected. It is a shared understanding among the heads of state on their holding on to power. As a consequence, they grow loyalty among each other. Based on this kind of loyalty, the issues that emanates in the region are to be solved according to the West African solution. By this I understand, that the regional sovereignty are not to be interfered with any external actors. With regards to the diplomatic initiatives in the Liberian conflict, I would argue that the diplomatic initiatives that had been orchestrated by the West African diplomatic community were not to be devastated by the Sierra Leone Special Court, as an external actor. Another kind of solution appropriate for the norms in the region could be arranged instead. Despite the relative suspicion among them, the West African leaders performed a cooperative manner. The reason was again to be found in the incentive when the diplomatic initiatives succeeded. Thereby, in order to achieve the incentive, the approaches were conducted through the diplomatic initiatives. Additionally these initiatives were characterized by the high degree of personal role. Frequent personal interactions between the West African heads of state, undoubtedly marked the highly personalized power relations in the region (Anda, 2000:126). The character of personal role was even more evident as the safe haven arrangement was initiated by Obasanjo. It was made within the framework of personal rule. This unilateral dimension also made Obasanjo ignored the domestic opposition against this arrangement. Based on this, Obasanjo added another individualistic character into the process of diplomacy that had been personalized already. This reflection of the personalization of power showed another point on the complexities in African politics. Whereas domestically the leaders must seek support from their clientele, what is taking place regionally reflected the similar notion. The leaders also need to seek support and alliance from its regional clients. The engagement of the other states within an alliance and the consequence emanating from it will be discussed in the following part. By conducting the policy in the framework of personal rule, it explained the lack of clear cut and legitimate separation between the private and public domain. However, the diplomatic initiatives in Liberian conflict involved various personalized relations among the head of states in West Africa. With the indictment made public, Obasanjo s decision marked another personal 15