Open data for accountability in the fight against corruption. Joris Hulstijn Darusalam Darusalam Marijn Janssen (TU Delft)

Transcription

1 Open data for accountability in the fight against corruption Joris Hulstijn Darusalam Darusalam Marijn Janssen (TU Delft) 1

2 Open data and the fight against corruption E-government: opening up government data Application area of open data: fight against corruption. Corruption can harm society and result in increased poverty, reduce available money for essential public services, destroy citizens trust in government and undermine economic growth (UNDP 2008). Many factors influence corruption. Here we focus on transparency and accountability. That seems intuitive. Example Brazil : Nonetheless, open data is still underutilized, and anti-corruption enforcement is weak (Transparency Int. 2017; p4) e.g. opening up too much data, is ineffective or even counterproductive (Elia 2009) Relationship rests on specific assumptions. 2

3 Research Approach Derive requirements and design principles for an open data architecture (seen as a socio-technical system) Theoretical approach: 1. Analogy of corruption with fraud. Fraud triangle (Cressey 1950) suggests mitigation measures 2. Theory of public accountability (Bovens 2005), where accountability relationships are seen as a kind of dialogue, between the actor and some significant other (forum). Derive requirements on basis of literature and examples. Illustrate and test requirements in a case study, an e-procurement system in the local government of Palembang, Indonesia. 3

4 Corruption Corruption: behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique) pecuniary or status gains (Nye, 1967, p. 4) Corruption as misuse of power. Analogous to fraud, which is defined as a misuse of trust (Cressey 1950). For instance, corruption involves bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgments of a person in a position of trust), nepotism (bestowal of patronage because of ascriptive relationship rather than merit), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses (Nye, 1967, p. 4) Anti-corruption strategies: prevention, detection, investigation and sanction (cycle) prevention, enforcement, access to information and empowerment, and capacity building (Kim et al 2009) 4

5 Analogy to Fraud Opportunities: the actor has been trusted with responsibilities that involve certain powers (budget; decision rights) limitations on power (preventative; detective & corrective) in IT Pressure: the actor has a non-shareable problem (e.g. financial problems, status), and misuse of trust can offer a private solution remuneration; environment in which people discuss problems Rationalization: the actor provides a kind of explanation for crossing the line: I am only borrowing the money or others do it too. corporate culture; moral standards; harder to rationalize 5

6 Example of IS and Corruption Kim et al (2009) OPEN system is an online system used to disclose administrative procedures (likely to be related to corruption) to citizens in various public service areas (such as housing and construction, sanitation, and urban planning,..). (p 45). City government of Seoul; period: reduce opportunities: yes. (detective measure) audit trail decisions can be compared 2. reduce pressure: don t know. reduce opportunities for interaction. ; web-interface 3. reduce rationalization and change in organizational culture: yes Mayor Koh took resolute steps to fight corruption. He launched a variety of reform programs which culminated in the declaration of a War against Corruption (Kim et al., 2009) (p 46). 6

7 Accountability as a dialogue (Bovens 2005; 2007) Actor: feels obliged to report about conduct, to forum Forum: some significant other, e.g. clients, general public, God,... Can be specified as a dialogue game (Burgemeestre et al 2011) 7

8 Accountability Bovens identifies 5 necessary conditions: 1) public accessibility of the account giving and not purely internal, discrete informing; (2) explanation and justification of conduct and not propaganda, or the provision of information or instructions to the general public; (3) the explanation should be directed at a specific forum and not be given at random; (4) the actor must feel obliged to come forward instead of being at liberty to provide any account whatsoever; and (5) there must be a possibility for debate and judgment, including an optional imposition of (informal) sanctions, by the forum and not a monologue without engagement (Bovens, 2005) (p 185) 8

9 Accountability Typical example: parliament Another example: auditing management stakeholder auditor This shows another four necessary conditions (6) Reliable reporting (accurate and complete). Effectuated by internal controls, built into processes and systems. (7) Independence. Else not credible to challenge. Means: no dependence of forum on actor (8) Expertise. Forum has or has access to experts, to evaluate the reports, compare them to norms, and ass judgement. (9) Power. Forum must make the actor feel obliged to come forward as in (4), and to have a credible claim to sanctions (5). Aften based on some dependence of Actor on Forum. 9

10 Open data architecture Architecture: set of fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment, embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design and evolution (Lankhorst et al 2009) (p 2). policies Raw Data => Selection => Aggregation => Reporting internal controls Involves governance: socio-technical system! 10

11 Open data architecture Raw Data => Selection => Aggregation => Reporting Data publishing requirements Forum requirements D0. Availability F0. Mobilize D1. Data selection policies F1. Access D2. Representation standard F2. Analysis D3. Content F3. Challenge and response D4. Reliability F4. Archive D5. Relevant F5. Complaints procedure 11

12 Case: e-procurement in Palembang e-procurement system (LPSE) Data Collection: various sources, including the official website, official documents, and participating observations of the authors. Goal of LPSE: improve efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and transparency in the procurement of goods and services. Hosted by independent unit, across departments and divisions ; use of LPSE is compulsory (no bypass) Request for quotation; contracts decided on basis of quotations Government Defines needs Publish RFQ Receive Proposals Evaluate proposals Select Suppliers Conduct Negotiations online Request tender Receive of Financial and Technical Proposal Evaluate Suppliers No Yes Sign contract Pay Evaluate Send Request Payment Clearance Submit Suppliers Receive RFQ Develop Proposal Send Proposal Submission of financial and proposals Deliver product 12

13 Case: e-procurement in Palembang Huge potential for opening data: Auction announcement: what types of procurement are available Information about system failure: to allow traceability Electronic Catalogue (EC): products, prices, delivery times. Monitoring and online evaluation: information about financial progress, physical progress, procurement of goods and services Whistleblowing: link to Opportunity to report illicit activities to corruption watch or audit board. 13

14 Case: e-procurement in Palembang Findings. six types of patterns for corruption detection, all based on internal controls being built-into the processes and systems. 1. Storing and opening documentation 2. Cross-data comparison <= most promising 3. Four-eyes-principle 4. Segregations of Duties 5. Authorization 6. Application controls not only data should be opened, but also meta-data about the administrative processes and internal control measures 14

15 Case: e-procurement in Palembang Evaluation Actor: local government of Palembang Forum: to be decided, i.e. potential vendors who didn t get a contact (1) public: yes, indeed (open data) (2) (5) dialogue with forum: remains to be seen. (6) reliability: much emphasis on internal controls; also opened up (7) independence: to be seen (8) expertise: audit board; watchdog; international bodies (9) power or influence: depends 15

16 Conclusions Much developments in open data are driven by a push to open up data, regardless of the objectives and aims. Specifically, in open data and the fight against corruption, initiatives are initially promising but fail to deliver in the long run. data quality issues (relevance; timeliness; completeness and accuracy) enforcement and follow up (lack of involvement; lack of authority) We propose a theoretical approach, based on accountability specific forum, not general public => relevance forum must be independent, have expertise, and power => tools to mobilize 16

17 Conclusions (ii) Case study of open data from e-procurement system in Palembang still very early Findings: hosted by independent party; support from audit board focus on internal controls (meta-data) forum: potential vendors (large group; have interest) In general: architecture for opening up data involves governance aspects, as well as technology and data. 17

18 References Bovens, M. (2005). Public Accountability. In Ferlie (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford, United Kingdom. Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. European Law Journal, 13(4), Cressey, D. R. (1950). The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust. American Sociological Review, 15(6), Elia, J. (2009). Transparency rights, technology, and trust. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(2), Kim, S., Kim, H. J., & Lee, H. (2009). An institutional analysis of an e-government system for anti-corruption: The case of OPEN. Government Information Quarterly, 26, Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: A costbenefit analysis. American political science review, 61(02),