Syllabus for POLS 412: International Political Economy, Fall 2015

Transcription

1 Syllabus for POLS 412: International Political Economy, Fall 2015 Department of Political Science Section 501, MWF, 9:45-10:35 a.m., Allen 1015 Section 502, MWF, 10:55-11:45 a.m., Allen 1015 Instructor: Amy Pond, Assistant Professor Phone: (979) Office: Allen 2123 Office Hours: MWTh 1:00-2:00 p.m., or by appointment Course Description International Political Economy (IPE) is an interdisciplinary field focused on the politics of international economic relations and the interactions between political and economic realms in the contemporary world. IPE addresses many issues, including: the management and openness of the international economy, determinants of trade and financial flows, bargaining between firms and the government, and the politics of economic development. After completing this course, students will be able to answer, and to assess existing answers, to the following questions and to many similar questions. In this course, we will analyze the relationship between economic issues and political incentives. Economic issues include trade and financial flows, monetary policy, fiscal policy, growth, inequality, and economic crises. Political incentives often stem from regime type, partisanship, political institutions, and election timing. How do domestic political institutions and partisanship influence international economic policy and economic outcomes? How do international economic flows affect and constrain domestic policymakers? Why do policymakers create international institutions and how do they affect economic policy and outcomes? Prerequisites POLS 206; junior or senior classification or approval of department head. Learning Outcomes During the course of the semester, students will gain knowledge about the history and development of political and economic ideas and organization, as well as about current events. Students will improve their ability to read and understand academic research, to assess the validity of existing arguments, to form their own positions based on evidence and logic, and to present their positions - along with relevant evidence - clearly and concisely in oral or written form. More specifically, students will be able to: Understand and extend existing theories presented in academic work, Develop a logical theory or argument that can be evaluated using evidence, Provide relevant evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with the theory, and Clearly and concisely present academic work to a group of their peers. 1

2 Learning Environment It is of utmost importance that every student feels comfortable speaking in class and that we are always respectful of one another. Students with concerns, challenges or special circumstances of any sort should let me know as soon as possible. Americans with Disabilities Act Policy Statement The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact the Department of Student Life, Services for Students with Disabilities, in Cain Hall or call For additional information visit Course Materials There is one required textbook for the course: Thomas Oatley. International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy. Pearson Education, Inc., New York, NY, It is available at area bookstores. Edition 4 or 5 is acceptable for use in the course, and the syllabus lists the assigned reading in both editions. There is one day (9/11) when the reading is only available in the 5th edition - that reading will be available in.pdf format. There is one recommended textbook for the course: Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Norton, New York, N.Y., 5 edition, The book provides a compilation of influential articles and ideas in IPE. Many of the chapters are available in article form, but the book provides a compact set of relevant readings. A number of additional readings are also required; students can access them on the library e-reserves: Students may need to download a.pdf viewer before viewing them. If, for some reason, the articles are not available on the course site, it is incumbent on the student to download them from the internet. The University Library and Google Scholar are good resources for this. Students are expected to have completed the reading by the day for which it has been assigned. All the readings are equally vital, and the exams and assignments will evaluate your knowledge of the textbook, articles, and any material covered in lecture. Attendance A student whose absence is excused will not be penalized for that absence and shall be allowed to take an examination or complete a missed assignment within 30 calendar days from the last day of the initial absence. Students should inform me in a timely manner of excused absences, as they must make up any missed work. If students need to miss class for a religious holiday, these absences are excused. Accommodations sought for absences due to the observance of a religious holiday can be sought either prior or after the absence, but not later than two working days after the absence. If students have a medical or personal emergency and need to miss class,these absences are excused. In cases where prior notification is not feasible, the student must provide notification by the end of the second working day after the absence, including an explanation of why notice could not be 2

3 sent prior to the class. If students need to attend an activity, these absences are also excused. The student is responsible for providing satisfactory evidence to the instructor to substantiate the reason for the absence. The fact that these may be university-excused absences does not relieve the student of responsibility for prior notification and documentation. Failure to notify or document properly may result in an unexcused absence. Falsification of documentation is a violation of the Honor Code. View the university s full attendance policy, Rule 7, here: Assignments and Grading Grades in the course will be based on the following assignments: 20 percent in-class presentations 25 percent unit paper (3-5 pages) 25 percent in-class midterm exam 30 percent final exam Grades will be awarded based on the following grading scale: A=90-100, B=80-89, C=70-79, D=60-69, F=59 and below. Participation Students must come to class having read the material, and they must be prepared to engage in discussion of the week s readings. If it becomes clear that students are not completing the reading assignments, quizzes and other in-class assignments will be provided and will be included as part of the presentation grade. Cell phones are not permitted in class. Computers are permitted for word processing, but, if they become too distracting, students may be asked to put them away. Presentation Each student will present information from two assigned articles. The presentations will include a summary of the author s argument, research design [or methodology], and findings, as well as possible extensions (10 percent each). Article presentations will be assigned to students at the beginning of the second class meeting. Although the class is often assigned an excerpt from the articles, students should read the full article (or chapter) for their presentation. Presentations are expected to last around five to ten minutes. Unit Papers The course is loosely divided into three units: (I) Trade, (II) International Investment and Banking, and (III) Fiscal and Monetary Policy. A third of the class will write a paper at the conclusion of each unit. At the end of the semester, each student will have written one unit paper. Unit papers will be assigned to students at the beginning of the second class meeting. Towards the end of the unit, students will submit a brief outline of their argument, including relevant evidence (3 pages at most). If the outline is not submitted, the student will receive a 5 percent deduction on his or her unit paper grade. After receiving comments from me, students will have a week to write and submit their 4-5 page, double-spaced paper (25 percent). In the unit paper, students are asked to extend one of the arguments discussed in class or present a novel argument related to the unit s topic. The paper should resemble a (much-shorter) article. 3

4 As such, it will include a brief discussion of the question the paper seeks to answer ( half page), the theory that addresses the question ( two pages), how evidence could be used to evaluate the theory ( half page), whether evidence is consistent with the argument ( one page), and implications or extensions of the theory and evidence presented in the paper ( half page). There will be no right answers in this paper. Students should feel free to draw any conclusions they like, so long as the paper is well reasoned and demonstrates knowledge of the material. Exams The midterm and final exams will be closed book exams featuring short answer questions (roughly one paragraph) and essay questions (roughly three to five paragraphs). These exams will require students to know the assigned readings and concepts, as well as to be able to synthesize the material. I might ask short answer questions like: What is IMF conditionality and when is it likely to be effective, according to Stone? or What are bilateral investment treaties and how might they affect invest flows? or essay questions like: What do you expect will happen to a country s trade and investment patterns if that country transitions from dictatorship to democracy? Discuss the arguments of at least two authors. The midterm exam will cover readings and lectures from the first half of the course (25 percent). The final exam will focus on the second half of the course but may reference concepts and readings from the first half (30 percent). Grading Policy Late assignments will lose one-third of a letter grade (i.e., from A to A-) for each day they are late. The only exceptions will be for an excused absence, in which case students must make personal arrangements with me. I will try to provide detailed comments while grading that will be helpful to students. I am also available during office hours to answer any questions students may have. If a student feels as though a grade should be changed, after discussing the grade with me, he or she should initiate a grade appeal. The appeal must be initiated within one week after receiving the graded assignment. The appeal must include the original assignment and a brief explanation detailing why the assignment deserves a higher grade (attention to the content of the assignment and the assignment prompt will be useful here). I will re-evaluate the grade. Aggie Honor Code An Aggie does not lie, cheat, or steal or tolerate those who do. Upon accepting admission to Texas A&M University, a student immediately assumes a commitment to uphold the Honor Code, to accept responsibility for learning, and to follow the philosophy and rules of the Honor System. Students will be required to state their commitment on examinations, research papers, and other academic work. Ignorance of the rules does not exclude any member of the TAMU community from the requirements or the processes of the Honor System. For additional information please visit: Helpful Links Academic Calendar Final Exam Schedule 4

5 Online Catalog Student Rules Religious Observances Course Outline Class meets MWF for fifty minutes each day. Reading assignments are indicated using PAGES in all capitals. When no specific PAGES are indicated, the entire chapter or article is assigned. The readings are subject to change. Any changes will be announced in class and will be updated on the online syllabus: apond/2015 Pond 412Fall Syllabus IPE.pdf. 8/31 Introduction What is IPE? Preferences, Institutions, Policies, and Outcomes How to read academic papers? Unit I: Trade Policy 9/2 Principle of Comparative Advantage and Gains from Trade Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer. Does trade cause growth? The American Economic Review, 89(3): , June 1999; PAGES Sign up for reading presentations and unit papers. 9/4 Why do policymakers restrict trade? Prisoners Dilemma and Collective Action Oatley Edition 5, 58-63, 79-88; Oatley Edition 4, 59-62, Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt. Industrial location and protection: The political economic geography of U.S. nontariff barriers. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4): , 1999; PAGES & Daren Bakst. Congress Should Separate Food Stamps from Agricultural Programs. The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief, 4375, April 7, 2015, 9/7 The Factors Model Oatley Edition 5, 69-75; Oatley Edition 4, Michael J. Hiscox. Global Political Economy, chapter 3: The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies, pages Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 3rd edition, 2010; PAGES /9 Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy: Regime Type and Partisanship Helen V. Milner and Benjamin Judkins. Partisanship, trade policy, and globalization: Is there a left-right divide on trade policy? International Studies Quarterly, 48:95 119, 2004; PAGES , Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota. Why the move to free trade? democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. International Organization, 59: , 2005; PAGES ,

6 Daniel Y. Kono. Optimal obfuscation: Democracy and trade policy transparency. American Political Science Review, 100(3): , August 2006; PAGES /11 Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy: Electoral Timing and Political Institutions Oatley Edition 5, Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield. Timing is everything: Elections and trade liberalization in the postcommunist world. Comparative Political Studies, 37(4): , May 2004; PAGES , Daniel L. Nielson. Supplying trade reform: Political institutions and liberalization in middle-income presidential democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3): , July 2003; PAGES RECOMMENDED Fiona McGillivray. Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., /14 The Sectors Model Oatley Edition 5, 73-79; Oatley Edition 4, Helen V. Milner. Resisting Protectionism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1988; PAGES Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. What determines individual trade-policy preferences? Journal of International Economics, 54: , 2001; PAGES , /16 Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy: Executive-Legislative Relations and Delegation Oatley Edition 5, 80, 95-99; Oatley Edition 4, 82-93, Michael J. Hiscox. Global Political Economy, chapter 3: The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies, pages Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 3rd edition, 2010; PAGES Jonathan Weisman, Deal Reached on Fast-Track Authority for Obama on Trade Accord, New York Times, April 16, 2015 (accessed August 13, 2015), 9/18 Strategic Trade and National Security Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Kerry A. Chase. Economic interests and regional trading arrangements: The case of NAFTA. International Organization, pages , Winter 2003; PAGES , skip the indicated sections. Joanne Gowa. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1994; PAGES Rodney D. Ludema. Allies and friends: The trade policy review of the United States, World Economy, pages , 2007; skim article. Paul R. Krugman. Is free trade passé. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(2): , Autumn /21 Import Substitution Industrialization and the Shift to Export Orientation Oatley Edition 5, 91-95, ; Oatley Edition 4,

7 Dani Rodrik, Gene M. Grossman, and Victor Norman. Getting interventions right: How South Korea and Taiwan grew rich. Economic Policy, 10(20):55 107, April 1995; PAGES Arvind Panagariya. Miracles and debacles: In defence of trade openness. The World Economy, 27(8): , August 2004; PAGES /23 GATT and WTO Oatley Edition 5, 21-44, 59-68; Oatley Edition 4, 21-44, Timm Betz. Trading interests: Domestic institutions, international negotiations, and the politics of trade. Working Paper, Presented at APSA s Annual Conference, 2015; PAGES Krzysztof J. Pelc. Why do some countries get better WTO accession terms than others? International Organization, 65: , Fall 2011; PAGES ; /25 International Institutions and Trade Meredith A. Crowley. An introduction to the WTO and GATT. Economic Perspectives, pages 42 57, 2003; PAGES Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. An exclusive country club: The effects of the GATT on trade. World Politics, 57: , 2005; PAGES NBER Digest, Does the World Trade Organization Actually Promote World Trade? 2003 (May); PAGES 2-3. Stephen Castle and Mark Landler, WTO Talks Collapse Over Farm Trade, New York Times, July 29, 2008, 9/28 WTO Rules and Participation Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Prema-Chandra Athukorala and Sisira Jayasuriya. Food safety issues, trade and WTO rules: A developing country perspective. World Economy, pages , 2003; PAGES Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. Who files? developing country participation in GATT/WTO adjudication. Journal of Politics, 71(3): , July 2009; PAGES , Paul Blustein, Against All Odds: Antigua Besting US in Internet Gambling Case at WTO, Washington Post, August 4, Unit II: International Investment and Banking 9/30 Multinational Corporations: Why FDI? Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Pol Antras, Mihir A. Desai, and C. Fritz Foley. Multinational firms, FDI flows and imperfect capital markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3): , 2009; PAGES Unit 1 Outline Due 7

8 10/2 Benefits and Costs of FDI Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Beata Smarzynska Javorcik. Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? in search of spillovers through backward linkages. The American Economic Review, 94(3): , June 2004; PAGES , 625. Brian Aitken, Ann Harrison, and Robert E. Lipsey. Wages and foreign ownership: A comparative study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. Journal of International Economics, 40: , 1996; skim. 10/5 Political Risk Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Andrew Kerner and Jane Lawrence. What s the risk? bilateral investment treaties, political risk and fixed capital accumulation. British Journal of Political Science, pages 1 15, December 2012; PAGES 1-8, Chad Angles for Greater Share of Oil Rewards, Financial Times, September 4, Marching Orders? How the Thai Economy is Hurting As Generals Scare Investors Off, Financial Times, April 17, /7 Attracting Investment: Domestic Political Institutions and Policies. Nathan Jensen. Political risk, democratic institutions, and foreign direct investment. The Journal of Politics, 70(4): , October Joseph P.H. Fan, Randall Morck, Lixin Colin Xu, and Bernard Yeung. Does good government draw foreign capital? explaining China s exceptional foreign direct investment inflow. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4206:1 40, April Quan Li and Adam Resnick. Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. International Organization, 57(1): , /9 Attracting Investment: International Investment Agreements Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Andrew Kerner. Why should I believe you? the costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 53:73 100, 2009; PAGES 73-83, Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, International Organization, 60(4): , Autumn 2006; PAGES , Matt Moffett, Besting Argentina in Court Doesn t Seem to Pay, Wall Street Journal, April 20, Unit 1 Paper Due 10/12 The Race to the Bottom Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Quan Li. Democracy, autocracy, and tax incentives to foreign direct investors: A cross-national analysis. The Journal of Politics, 68(1):62 74, February 2006; PAGES Layna Mosley and Saika Uno. Racing to the bottom or climbing to the top? economic globalization and collective labor rights. Comparative Political Studies, 40(8): , August 2007; PAGES

9 10/14 Portfolio Investment, Capital Account Openness, and Economic Outcomes Barry Eichengreen. Capital account liberalization: What do cross-country studies tell us? The World Bank Economic Review, 15(3): , Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries? American Economic Review, 80(2):92 96, May 1990; SKIM. Frederic S. Mishkin. Is financial globalization beneficial? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(2/3): , Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian. Why did financial globalization disappoint? IMF Staff Papers, 56(1): , January RECOMMENDED Michael W. Klein. Capital controls: Gates versus walls. NBER Working Paper No , pages 1 43, November /16 Capital Account Openness and Political Motivations Dennis P. Quinn and Carla Inclán. The origins of financial openness: A study of current and capital account liberalization. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3): , 1997; PAGES Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett, Alexandra Guisinger, and Jason Sorens. The political economy of capital account liberalization. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, December 2001; PAGES 1-10, Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz. Capital, trade, and the political economies of reform. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4): , October 2007; PAGES Thomas B. Pepinsky. The domestic politics of financial internationalization in the developing world. Review of International Political Economy, 20(4): , 2013; PAGES /19 Fiscal Policy & Constraints Posed by Mobile Capital Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg. Remodeling the competition for capital: How domestic politics erases the race to the bottom. American Political Science Review, 98(2): , May 2004; PAGES , 275. Nita Rudra and Stephan Haggard. Globalization, democracy, and effective welfare spending in the developing world. Comparative Political Studies, 38(9): , November 2005; PAGES Layna Mosley. Room to move: International financial markets and national welfare states. International Organization, 54(4): , 2000; PAGES Andrew Kerner. Can foreign stock investors influence policymaking? Comparative Political Studies, 48(1):35 64, 2015; PAGES 35-46, 54-57, Europe Competes for Investment with Lower Corporate Tax Rates, Wall Street Journal, April 17, RECOMMENDED Charles E. Lindblom. Politics and Markets: The World s Political-Economic Systems. Basic Books, Inc, New York, N.Y., RECOMMENDED Fred Block. The ruling class does not rule: Notes on the marxist theory of the state. Socialist Revolution, 33:6 28, May-June /21 Investor Protection and Rights Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of 9

10 institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. Journal of Economic History, 49(4): , Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58:3 27, 2000; PAGES John W. Cioffi and Martin Höpner. The political paradox of finance capitalism: Interests, preferences, and center-left party politics in corporate governance reform. Politics and Society, 34(4): , December 2006; PAGES only. 10/23 Introduction to the Politics of Commercial Banking, Basel Agreements Listen to first 42 minutes of This American Life: Bad Bank Originally Aired on 2/27/2009, available at David Andrew Singer. Capital rules: The domestic politics of international regulatory harmonization. International Organization, 58: , Summer 2004; PAGES Frances Rosenbluth and Ross Schaap. The domestic politics of banking regulation. International Organization, 57(2): , Spring 2003; only read up to page 317, plus the conclusion. Thankom G. Arun and John D. Turner. Corporate governance of banks in developing economies: concepts and issues. Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies, 12 (3): , July 2004; SKIM. Brooke Masters and Tom Braithwaite, Tighter rules on capital: Bankers versus Basel, Financial Times. October 2, Jim Brunsden, Giles Broom & Ben Moshinsky, Banks Win 4-Year Delay as Basel Liquidity Rule Loosened, Bloomberg, 10/26 Review Session 10/28 MIDTERM EXAM Unit III: Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes 10/30 Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates Choices Oatley Edition 5, , ; Oatley Edition 4, , J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffry A. Frieden, The Political Economy of Exchange Rates, Handbook of Political Science (2006), Neil Gough and Keith Bradsher, China Devalues Its Currency as Worries Rise About Economic Slowdown, New York Times, August 10, Unit II Outline Due 11/2 The Mundell-Fleming Model or Unholy Trinity Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4,

11 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Basics of Foreign Trade and Exchange (September 2, 2002); PAGES /4 Evolution of the Global Financial Regime: Bretton Woods and Embedded Liberalism. Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism (Norton, 2006), PAGES , 290-2, , John Gerard Ruggie. International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organization, 36(2): , Spring Barry Eichengreen. Hegemonic stability theories of the international monetary system. NBER Working Paper, 2193:1 82, March 1987; PAGES /6 Exchange Rate Choices: Domestic Determinants Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, William Bernhard and David Leblang. Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments. International Organization, 53(1):71 97, Winter 1999; PAGES 71-87, Thomas Oatley. How constraining is capital mobility? the partisan hypothesis in an open economy. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4): , 1999; PAGES William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg. Mobile capital, domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy. American Political Science Review, 94(2): , 2000; SKIM 11/9 Exchange Rate Choices: Feasibility Andrew Rose, Currency Unions, March 7, Eswar S. Prasad and Raghuram G. Rajan. A pragmatic approach to capital account liberalization. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3): , Summer Dani Rodrik, The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves, NBER Working Paper 11952, January David A. Singer. Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world. American Political Science Review, 104(2): , May Unit II Paper Due 11/11 Latin American Debt Crisis Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Francois J. Gurtner, Why Did Argentina s Currency Board Collapse?, World Economy (2004), Dani Rodrik, Argentina: A Case of Globalization Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough?, January 2, /13 Financial Crises: Patterns and Sources Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Revisit Rose s article on optimal currency areas. David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath, Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises, International Organization 60 (2006), ,

12 11/16 Financial Crises: Conditionality and the IMF Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Randall W. Stone. The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. American Political Science Review, 98(4): , 2004; , 590. James R. Vreeland. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? statistically selected cases. International Political Science Review, 24(3): , 2003; skim. Jeffrey Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, American Prospect (March-April 1998). Stanley Fischer, A Year of Upheaval, Asiaweek (July 17, 1998). Paul Blustein, Fast-Growing Countries to Gain More Clout at IMF, Washington Post, September 1, /18 Monetary Union and the Euro Oatley Edition 5, ; Oatley Edition 4, Jeffry Frieden, Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration, International Organization 56:4 (2002), , skip the regression tables if you want. Barry Eichengreen, Europe, the Euro, and the ECB: Monetary Success, Fiscal Failure, January Landon Thomas Jr. The Greek debt deal s missing piece. New York Times, August /20 Inequality Branko Milanovic. Can we discern the effect of globalization on income distribution? evidence from household surveys. The World Bank Economic Review, 19(1):21 44, 2005; skim. Nathan M. Jensen and Guillermo Rosas. Foreign direct investment and income inequality in mexico, International Organization, 61(3): , Summer 2007; PAGES , Thomas Piketty. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A., 2014; read Introduction, PAGES Nita Rudra. Openness, welfare spending, and inequality in the developing world. International Studies Quarterly, 48(3): , September 2004; PAGES , RECOMMENDED Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson. Foreign direct investment and relative wages: Evidence from mexico s maquiladoras. Journal of International Economics, 42: , /23 Immigration Margaret E. Peters. Trade, foreign direct investment and immigration policy making in the us. International Organization, Forthcoming:1 47, October 2013; PAGES. Michael J. Hiscox. Global Political Economy, chapter 3: The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies, pages Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 3rd edition, 2010; PAGES Nita Rudra and Nathan M. Jensen. Globalization and the politics of natural resources. Comparative Political Studies, 44(6): , 2011; skim. Branko Milanovic. Global inequality: From class to location, from proletarians to migrants. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 5820:1 25, September 2011; skim. 12

13 11/30 Development Models Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman. History lessons: Institutions, factors endowments, and paths of development in the new world. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3): , Summer Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5): , 2001; skim. Unit III Outline Due 12/2 Foreign Aid: Consequences William Easterly. Can foreign aid buy growth? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(3): 23 48, Jeffrey D. Sachs. The case for aid. Foreign Policy, pages 1 10, January Kevin M. Morrison. Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario. Public Choice, 131: , November /4 Foreign Aid: World Bank and Lending Incentive Explore World Bank Website, and Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics, 88(1):1 18, January 2009 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith. Foreign aid and policy concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(2): , April S.R. Why China is creating a new World Bank for Asia. Economist, November /7 Economic Sanctions William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg. Chapter 27. the political economy of economic sanctions. Handbook of Defense Economics, 2: , Dursun Peksen, Timothy M. Peterson, and A. Cooper Drury. Media-driven humanitarianism? news media coverage of human rights abuses and the use of economic sanctions. International Studies Quarterly, 58(4):1 12, June 2014, skim. Amy Pond. Economic sanctions and demand for protection. Journal of Conflict Resolution, pages 1 22, 2015, PAGES /9: Review Session Unit III Paper Due Final Exam 12/14, 8:00-10:00 a.m. for Section 501 (meets MWF, 9:45-10:35 a.m.) 12/15, 8:00-10:00 a.m. for Section 502 (meets MWF, 10:55-11:45 a.m.) 13