About the Authors Bruce Anderson FlaviaCarbonell Bellolio Carlos Bernal Thomas Bustamante

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1 About the Authors Bruce Anderson s published work has focused on the discovery process in legal reasoning. Recently he has been investigating connections between visual art and law. He is a Professor of Business Law at Saint Mary s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. FlaviaCarbonell Bellolio is professor of Legal Theory and Legal Philosophy at the Faculty of Law, University Alberto Hurtado, Chile. She is Director of the Law Department. She is a member of the board of the Chilean Association of Legal and Social Philosophy. She holds a LLM from the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, Spain, and a Master in Public Law from the Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, as well as a specialization in Legal Argumentation from the Universidad de Alicante, Spain. Among Carbonell s publications are Coherence and post-sovereign legal argumentation, In. Menéndez, A. & Fossum, J. (eds.), Law and Democracy in Neil D. MacCormick s Legal and Political Theory, Springer, 2011, pp ; F. Carbonell, R. Letelier, Principios jurídicos e interpretación democrática del derecho ( Legal Principles and Democratic Interpretation of Law ), In. F. Carbonell, R. Coloma, R. Letelier (eds.), Principios Jurídicos. Análisis y Crítica (Legal Principles. Analysis and Criticism), Santiago, Abeledo Perrot, Thomson Reuters, 2011, pp Carlos Bernal is a senior lecturer at Macquarie Law School (Sydney, Australia). He has research interests in the fields of jurisprudence, torts, theory of action and constitutional theory. He has published widely in all these fields in seven different languages. His qualifications include a LL.B. from the University Externado of Colombia (Bogota) (1996), a S.J.D. from the University of Salamanca (Spain) (2001) and a M.A. (2008) and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (2011) from the University of Florida (U.S.A). Thomas Bustamante is a Tenured Adjunct Professor of Legal Theory at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, and a member of the research programme on Legal Theory and Legal Philosophy at the Law School of the same university. From 2008 to 2010, he has been a Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, C. Dahlman and E. Feteris (eds.), Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Law and Philosophy Library 102, DOI / , Springer ScienceCBusiness Media Dordrecht

2 226 About the Authors UK, where he still holds an honorary position. Amongst Prof. Bustamante s key publications are his books Argumentação Contra Legem: A Teoria do Discurso e a Justificação Jurídica nos Casos mais Difíceis [Contra Legem Legal Arguments: Discourse Theory and Legal Justification in the Hardest Cases], Teoria do Direito e Decisão Racional: Temas de Teoria da Argumentação Jurídica [Legal Theory and Rational Decision-Making: Essays on Legal Argumentation], and Teoria do Precedente: O peso da Jurisprudência na Argumentação Jurídica [A Theory of Precedent: The Weight of the Case Law in Legal Argumentation]. Christian Dahlman (professorin jurisprudence), David Reidhav (assistant professor in jurisprudence) and Lena Wahlberg (assistant professor in jurisprudence and medical law) teach legal argumentation at the faculty of law at Lund University (Sweden). They are currently conducting a research project on ad hominem arguments, funded by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet). Eveline T. Feteris received her Ph.D. in Humanities at the University of Amsterdam. She is an Associate Professor at the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric and a member of the research programme Argumentation and Discourse and the research school of the International Learned Institute of Argumentation Studies (ILIAS). She is director of the research masters s programme Text and Communication. She is a member of the editorial board of the journal Argumentation, the journal Argumentation in Context and the journal Language, Law and Interdisciplinary Practice. She is a member of the editorial board of the series Argumentation in Context of John Benjamins. Among Feteris key publications are Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation: A Survey of Theories of Justification of Judicial Decisions, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands 1999; E.T. Feteris, H. Kloosterhuis, H.J. Plug, Argumentation and the application of legal rules, Amsterdam: Sic Sat, Address: Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rethoric, Spuistraat 134, 1012 VB Amsterdam, Netherlands. e.t.feteris@uva.nl. Jaap Hage Department Foundations and Methods of Law, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, Netherlands. Harm Kloosterhuis studied Argumentation Theory (MA and PhD) and Law (LLM). He is lecturer and researcher at the Erasmus School of Law Rotterdam and lecturer at the University of Aruba. His main areas of research are legal argumentation theory, legal theory and speech act theory. His publications include Reconstructing Interpretative Argumentation in Legal Decisions (2006) and Argumentation and the Application of Legal Rules (2009, co-edited with E.T. Feteris and H.J. Plug). His articles on legal theory and argumentation theory have been published in Argumentation, Ratio Juris and Artificial Intelligence and Law. Marko Novak is an associate professor of legal theory and constitutional law at the Faculty of Law in Nova Gorica, where he is director of the Legal Theory Department and Vice-Dean for Student Affairs. His major publications in the area of legal argumentation include: The Promising Gifts of Precedents. In Changes in Culture and Techniques of Judicial Decision-Making Priban, J, Roberts, P.,

3 About the Authors 227 Young J. (Eds.). Ashgate, Dartmouth Publishing; Limiting Courts: Toward Greater Consistency of Adjudcation in the Civil Law System. In Logic, Argumentation and Interpretation Joseph Aguilo-Regla (Ed.). Nomos, Franz Steiner Verlag; Three Models of Balancing (in Constitutional Review) Ratio Juris. Vol. 23, No. 1; Pravna argumentacija v praksi [Legal Argumentation in Practice] Ljubljana: Planet GV. Antonino Rotolo CIRSFID, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy. Corrado Roversi CIRSFID, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy. Frederick Schauer IS David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. He is also Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, Emeritus, at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, where he taught from 1990 to 2008, served as Academic Dean and Acting Dean, and also taught at the Harvard Law School. Previously he was Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, and has also been Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Morton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth College, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Toronto, Distinguished Visitor at New York University, and Eastman Professor and Fellow of Balliol College at Oxford University. A Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and former holder of a Guggenheim Fellowship, Schauer is the author of The Law of Obscenity (1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982), Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991), Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003), and Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (2009). He was founding co-editor of the journal Legal Theory, has served as chair of the Section on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and of the Committee on Philosophy and Law of the American Philosophical Association. In 2006 Schauer was author of the Foreword to the Harvard Law Review s Supreme Court issue, and has written numerous articles on freedom of speech and press, constitutional law and theory, evidence, legal reasoning, and the philosophy of law. His books have been translated into Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Turkish, and his scholarship was the subject of a book (Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Linda Meyer, ed., Hart Publishing, 1999) and special issues of the Notre Dame, Connecticut, and Quinnipiac Law Reviews, Politeia, and the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Jan Sieckmann is Professor for Public Law at the University of Erlangen and Visiting Professor for Constitutional Law and Legal Philosophy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Buenos Aires. Among Sieckmann s key publications are Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1990; Modelle des Eigentumsschutzes, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998; El modelo de los principios del derecho, Bogotá, Univ. Externado de Colombia, 2006; Recht als normatives System, Baden-Baden, Nomos, Also he edited various books on the theory of principles and of balancing, in particular J. Sieckmann (ed.),

4 228 About the Authors Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte. Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2007; L. Clérico/J. Sieckmann (Hg.), Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation. Studien zur Rechtstheorie Robert Alexys, Baden- Baden, Nomos, 2009; J. Sieckmann (ed.), Legal Reasoning: The Methods of Balancing, ARSP-Beiheft 124, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, Giovanni Tuzet is Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Law at Bocconi University. He studied law and philosophy in Turin and Paris and wrote his Ph.D. thesis on Peirce s theory of inference. Formerly post-doc researcher at the universities of Lausanne, Switzerland, and Ferrara, Italy, he teaches at Bocconi Philosophy of Law, Legal Hermeneutics and Legal Argumentation. He is a member of the editorial board of the series Argumentation in Context (John Benjamins). His publications include the book The Rules of Inference. Inferentialism in Law and Philosophy (edited with D. Canale, Milan: Egea 2009) and several papers on legal reasoning and legal argumentation in journals like Ratio Juris, Informal Logic, Argumentation and Analisi e diritto.

5 Name Index A Alexy, Robert, 23, 27, 31 33, 35, 41, 72, 104, 107, 110, 113, 114, , 135, 153, 156, 189, 190, 192, 193, 198 B Bench-Capon, Trevor, 181, 184, 187 Bengoetxea, J., 2 5 Bobbio, Norberto, 29, 33, 38 Boella, Guido, 175 Briggs-Myers, I., 148, 155 I Iguartua Salaverría, Juan, 29, 33 J Jansen, Henrike, 27, 28, 33 Jung, C.G., 148, 154, 155 K Kloosterhuis, Harm, 23, 37, 86, 88, 89 D Daube, David, 22, 24, 25, 28, 33 Dworkin, Ronald, 2, 26, 34, 86, 104, 127, 132, 136, 142, 189, 190, 211 F Frank, Jerome, 150, 158, 213, 219 Furlan, Boris, 158 G Gilbert, Margareth, 165 Golding, Martin, 23, 33 Governatori, Guido, Grootendorst, Rob, 9, 10, 58, 59, 66, 89 Grossi, Davide, 187 Guastini, Riccardo, 24, 29, 33, 211 H Hage, Jaap, 135, , 187, 196 Hart, H.L.A., 35, 105, 129, 153, 163, 180 Houtlosser, P., 80, 81, 87 L Lagerspetz, Eerik, 130, 165 M MacCormick, Neil, 2, 3, 5 7, 12, 24, 27, 34, 37, 71, 72, 75, 77, 107, 121, 130, 147, 153, 156, 160, 163, 166 Maximiliano, Carlos, 24, 29, 39 N Nino, 29, 33 Novak, Marko, 113, 114, 117 Nowak, Leszek, 30, 33, 38 P Peczenik, Aleksander, 72, 107, 173, 175, 180, 181 Perelman, Chaïm, 3, 6, 30, 41, 196 Prakken, Henry, 184, 187, 196 C. Dahlman and E. Feteris (eds.), Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Law and Philosophy Library 102, DOI / , Springer ScienceCBusiness Media Dordrecht

6 230 Name Index R Ross, Alf, 104, 167 Rotolo, Antonino, 32, 57, Roversi, Corrado, 32 Ruiter, Dick, W.P., 130, 165 S Sartor, Giovanni, 167, 170, 171, 173, 180, 181, 184, 186, 214 Searle, John, R., 31, 104, 131, 164, 165, 171, 186 T Tuomela, Raimo, 131, 165 V van der Torre, Leendert, 175 vaneemeren, F.H., 9, 10, 58, 59, 66, 74, 87, 89 W Wróblewski, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 23

7 Subject Index A Ad hominem argument negative, 61, 63, 66 positive, 61, 66 Ad hominem fallacy abusive, 63 circumstantial, 58 Adversarialism (and adversary procedures), 212, 213, 221, 222 Advocacy, 61, 209, 212, 221 American Legal Realists (ALR), 146, , 154, 158 Argumentation in judicial decisions, 5, 73, 75, 82, 174 Argument form, 23, 30, 62 Argument referring to consequences, 3, 5, 16, 18 Argumentum ad absurdum, context, 22, 27 28, 41 foundations, as instrumental rationality, 38 normative significance, practical requirements, as a pragmatic argument, rules of interpretation strictly formal sense, 22, 23 structure, 21, 23 Authority, 5, 31, 33, 34, 41, 58, 66, 78, 95, 103, 108, 149, 151, 203 Authority argument, 58, 66 Autonomy, 105, 151, 157, 192, 203 B Balancing, 4, 11, 15, 17, 104, 106, , , Best theory, arguments to, C Cognitive functions auxiliary function, 148 evaluation, 155 inferior function, 148 intuition creative intuition, 148, 156, 160 hunch, 145, 153, 157, 158, 160 instrumental intuition, 148, 156, 160 recognition, 156, 158 perception, 148, 151, 153, , superior function, 148 tertiary function, 155 thinking, 28, 47, 52, 104, 114, 131, 141, , 152, 153, , 160 Competence, 4, 7, 108, 202, 213, 217 Concepts, legal and ordinary, 151 Conceptual holism, Consequentialist arguments, 2, 3, 7, 9 14, 16, 18, 22, Consequentialist reasoning, 1 18, 41 Constitutive rules, Constructivism, , Context, 1, 22, 27 28, 38, 41, 53, 63, 64, 71 73, 75, 77, 78, 87, 89, 90, 94, 97 99, 113, 117, , , 165, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, , , 193, 209, 211, 216, 221 Correctness, 7, 16, 18, 32, 41, 46, 48, 52, 59, 74, 103, 107, 109, 116, 127, 128, 132, 158, 192, 195, , 219 Counter argument, 17, 57, 58, 61, 62, 66 69, 73, 174, 184, 190, 200, 201, 216 Credibility, 60, 61, 65, 66, 69 Critical discussions, 9, 71 82, 89, 91, 93 C. Dahlman and E. Feteris (eds.), Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Law and Philosophy Library 102, DOI / , Springer ScienceCBusiness Media Dordrecht

8 232 Subject Index Critical Legal Studies, 146, Cross-examination, 210, 212, 217, 222 D Deduction, 6, 189, 190, 192, 194 Defeasibility, 142, , 172 Dialectical analysis, 88 94, 99, 100 Dialectical goal, 90, 95 Discovery context, psychology of decision-making, 145, 153 E Easy cases, , 133, , 160, 223 Evidence, 40, 41, 76, 108, 115, 143, 154, 209, 212, 213, Expression, 3 6, 8, 12, 15, , 139, 149, 156, 174, 204, 216 Extensive interpretation, 163, 182 Extra-legal consequences, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, F Factual claims, 209, 214, 216, 220, 223 Fallacy, 57 60, Fallibilism, 210, H Hard cases, 5, 126 Hunch, 150, 156, 158, 160 I Ignoratio elenchi, 66, 68 Institutional facts, 80, 169 Institutional theory of law, , 142 Internal justification, 23, 108, 156, 223 Irrationality negative irrationality, 159 postive irrationality, 159 J Judgment, 23, 24, 26, 47, 61, 67, 74, , 122, 154, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, Judgments of value, , 211 Juridical consequences, 6, 24, 27, 37, 41 Justice (substantive), 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34 36, 39, 41, 47, 49 51, 53, 76, 93, 96, 127, 128, 151, 156, 158, 209, 210, , Justification deductive justification, 113, 156 external justification, 16, 23, 156, 223 internal justification, 23, 108, 156, 223 second-order justification, 5, 156 Justification context, 159 L Law as open domain, 137, 138 Legal consequences, 2 5, 8, 12, 14, 15, 35, 105, 108, 110, 111, , 135, 136, , 193, 211 Legal goals, 17, 18 Legal normativity, Legal norms, Legal principle, 4 6, 11, 72, , 109, 117, 131, 136, 148, 156, 158 Legal proof, 216 Lex commissoria, 35, 36 M Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, 148 N Nuremberg trials, 67 O One right answer, 132 Open texture, 18, 163 P Poisoning the well, 65 Postmodernism, 149, 152 post-postmodernism, 146, Power, normative, 31 Practical reflective insights, 113, 114, Pragma-dialectical approach, 16, 72 75, 77, 82 Pragma-dialectical school, 58 Pragma-dialectical theory, 9, 73, 79, 82, 87, 89, 95 Process of deliberation, 116, 117 Psychological typology argument from psychological typology, Q Questioning, 2, 200

9 Subject Index 233 R Rationality empirical rationality, 147, 148, 159 intellect, 147, 149 intuitive rationality, 147, 148 ratio, rational reconstruction, , 123 reason practical reason, 7, 23, 123, 147 theoretical reason, 147 test of rationality, 118 Reasonableness and fairness, 85, 86, 88, 91, 92, Recognition, 7, 8, 156, 158 Red herring, 66 Regulative rules, 165, 166, , 180 Reliability, 58 69, 119 Restrictive interpretation, Rhetorical goal, 87, 90 Rule of law, 6, 12 15, 37, 71 82, 217 S Scientific inquiry, 209 Separation between discovery and justification mild separation, rigid separation, 146, 154 Speech acts, 32, 33, 41, 75, 78 81, 89, 215 Statement, 9, 10, 16, 22, 23, 28, 30, 33, 34, 78, 86, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 104, 108, 165, 167, 195, 198, 200, 201, 204, 211, 215, 216, 223 Strategic maneuvering, Subsumtion, 104, , 121, , 194, 207 T Teleological reasoning, 180, 187 Testimony, 57, 58, 63, 65, 70, 213, 217 Theory construction, 1, 127 Theory revision, 185 Trial, 57, 128, 166, , 221, 223 Truth (and the distinction between Substantive and Formal Truth), Tu quoque, 58, 67 V Validity definitive, , 202, 203 objective, 195 prima facie, 104 in principle, 8 procedural, 190, pro tanto, 198 subjective, 195 substantive, 200, 201, 205 W Weighing and balancing, Weight, abstract, 119, 192 Weight formula, , 190, 192 Witness, 57 62, 65, 68, 70, 76, 151, 217

Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

Argumentation (2016) 30:61 79 DOI 10.1007/s10503-015-9376-0 Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions Eveline