Arms Control & Disarmament

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4 !I PREFACE Arm. Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. - Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. ý Author and subject indexes appear in the first thre.ž numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes. To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyri~dc alphabet are tran,- lit-rited according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page. Matters of fact and opinion presented in Arms Control & Disarmament are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, Lad their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works. The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. $ources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals., With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to pres. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines. The abstracts are written by the Arms Oontroe and Disarmament Bibliography Seedon, except that abstracts or summaries published wit* the articles to which they relate are. with the permission of their copyright owner. sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and urre lejignated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified." iii

5 Library of Congrm Location Symbols (Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials) Chi Kor Chinese and Korean Section DXLM U.S. National Library of Medicine Hebr Hebraic Section Japan Japanese Section LL Law Library Newsp Newspaper Reading Room Nr East Near East Section P&GP RR Feriodical and Government Publication Reading Room Sci RR Science Reading Room Slav Rm Slavic Room

6 CONTENTS Preface Pag iii I. The international political environment Basic factors in world politics Foreign policies I1. The strategic environment Modern war Modern weaponry and related technological developments National security policies and military strategies Consequences of national defense policies and war Biological Economic Ethical and social Other Il. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace International law International organization International peace and security forces Other processes, plans, and proposas als IV. General analyses and comprehensive approaches The historical background General analyses General and complete disarmament V. Specific problems and limited measures Negotiation Reduction of the risk of war Escalation Conventional arms transfers Nuclear proliferation... SU Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, ete.) Regional Tension areas Disengagement, neutralization, etc Outer spae Violation of agreements and responses Violation, inspection, verification Enforemet Consequences of arms control and disarmament measures Other problems Oterprblmsan and measures mavre Authorin e... ine... Subject Indexa...

7 1. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 925 Berkowitz, Leonard, gm ROOTS OF AGGRESSION; A RE-ECAHINATION OF THE FRUSTNATION-AGGRY~LSOM ElY- 923 POTHESIS. New York, Atherton Press, p. Afirnovi6, Ljubivoje. ENONALINED COUNTRIES AND E=R- illus. W5T5A044~ FEAR SECURITY3 Die blockfreien LUnder und die Includes bibliographeie. europlische Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v.24 Dec. 10, 1969: Contents.--The fristration-aggression hypothesis D , v. 21. revisited, by Leonard Berkovitz.--The frustrationaggression hypothesis, by Neal E. Niiler.--Extinc- Nonslinement can be considered a foreign policy tion-induced aggression, by A. H. Asrin, R. R. doctrine, a certain type of foreign policy behav- Hutchinson, and D. F. Hake.--Pbysical aggression ior, an incipient international system. The poli- in relation to different frustrations, by Arnold cy of nonalinement resides not merely in a neutral H. Buss.--Arbitrariness of frustration and its "atit.;,le to or nonparticipation in blocs and mili- consequences for aggression in a social situation, tary alliances; it consists of a constant effort by Eugene Burnatein and Philip (,rchel.--a study toward a pea~ceful world order free of power poli- of catharsis of aggression, by...hahbaz Khan Haltics, spheres of influence, and hegemony. This lick and Boyd R. NcCandleas.--Some conditions fagives the movement a "universal fuanction." There cilitating the occurrence of a Wression after the are two attitudes toward the establishment of Bur- obs.'~vation of violence, by Russell G. Geen and opean security. Those holding the first want to Leonard Berkovitz.--Toward a theory of revolution, realize this goal within the existing diviston of by Jaess C. Davies--Neas index.--subject Index. the world into spheres of influence-, the other group sees the solution only in a new internation- Examines the frustration-aggression hypothesis al system eevoted to the equality of all nations. in the light of it: implications for other social There are mk.ny converging points between this sec- phenomena like civil disturbance and political ond attitude and the policy of nonalinement. The revolution. Berkowitz states the need for t~ertain nonalined movement influence& to a degree and is changes in the hypothesis, noting that all aggresinfluenced by an intera 'tion of developments on sive actions do not stem from prior frustrations the global, regional, ani. national levej 3. It and that the correlation between frustration and oust therefore adapt Its irleolcg add t.acticm to aggression Is not as close as had been thought. the present state of -iitervatioral relations. On' the global level it has already contribitted to checking the expansion of *caocs and tc tae i~lax&- tion of tensions. Tlw-cugh auatonomous initivives and active participstion in superpower i.,viatives the nonalined and neutral nations car diretct the process o_7 European sett~.ewmnt toenra a demolition 926 of blocs and spheres of influencew and secure a Beavick, D. G.., gm1. D. 11il.s. AN AI.BTNALIAN UNtruly European solution. NOCUT1ISN SCALE. Australian journal of psyahology, v. 21, Dec. 1969: IWl.DT4, v. 21 To form a scale of ethnocentrism, 32 Itein ware 924' selected according t~o both their power of diveria- Bergquist. Hats. TRADS AND SECURITY IN THE NORDIC ination between criterion groups of subjects and AREA. Cooperation and conflict, no. ii. 1969: their Internal consistency 'a a pilot study of T MPI RNt subjects. The original pool of Item was set up 'Revised version of a lecture... to the For- to comply With various factet of ethaoceetriew as eign Policy Association of the Younger Generation defined by Leviane mand Illustrated io the Cali- In Finland, at Oodby, Aaland Isles, Finland, 31 tornia I scale end the British Ethnocentrism 3cale. August 1969.'o Validity was demonstrated4 io the main stuft of 273 subjects by highly significant differences between IExmines the national security implications of -,wion groups select e accodig to age, soclobilateral trade relations, particularly with tic status, stueset-acostujent, levels of adstate-tradinig countries, and of ismobership in the L. income, religion and other criteria In Luropean Free Trade Associatia~ia the suropean leo- *..,-i ulth the the"y and previous Ir1adiap to nosle ComAaity. or the proposed organization for dritain and the U.S. Partitioning of the min economic.*operation between Wa.moak, Finland. sample revealed t.he predominance of education as a Norway, "Ad Sweden. deterainant. (Abstract supplied)

8 210 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT Bigelow, Rlobert S. MS DAWN WARRIORS MXI'S IVW- Durtwa, John W. CONFLICT A CCSKMlICfISK: TIMU SE TioN TQaw= FunC. Boston, Little, Brown Cg6qj OF CONTROLLED COMMICATION IN UnUU1ETZCIAL RZA- 27 p D5 TIONS. New York,?ree Press C19693 Xvii, 21.6 p. "An Atlantic Monthly Press book." illus b Contents. -Authort a note.--cooperatican-for-con-. contests.- Introduction.-pt. 1. Controlled f~lot.5-ociallsed monkeys and qpsw H~-x tcommunication: The zosearob setting. Conflicts, H1-bomb.-Poulation explosions.- 451w and natu- pearties and issues.* The representatives, of parral uelection.-cavalry and battleships.- Prehis- ties.* The establishment of oommicastion. The torie peace.- Goldsn rules and promsed lands. control of communication. functionaliss and re- Biala" and cilture.--cooperticni-for-swrvival.- gionaliesm Conflict avold~sce. Political iii- Rfrnes. -led". lingus., to resolve czcafit.-pvt. 2. Assesset "A possible approach to the study of huma evo- Trends in the analysis of world society. Trends lution and human nature which has not yet bean In the control of conflict. The philosophical bafully explored." The trebling In volume of mo' ale or settlemenlt. The philosophical basis of bri since hi ameren from his sp-utaa resolution.aseaa.-lbigph-ie. pithecine ancestors cam have been cawned only bv Cnrle omnctin natcnqtb very powerful natural selection pressrwe In favotoleornctin satehiu of brains endowed with more Intelligence, which which political man social scientists exercise would permit better communication and awre effec- coto of discussion between representat1:es of tivre cooperation between individuals in social nations and states Involved in conflict. "The groups.* The selection pressure could have bees distinctive hypothesis is that the conflict behamaintained only if the*e groups were increasingly viour vf commnities and states looises alterat war with each otber. Cooperation or love with- able components such as perception of external in the group Is cooperation for the conflict conditions, selection of pals from many possible against other groups. The course of history shoan ~ ~ ecoce fcf ~n mu5o tann the expasnsion to clan, tribe, nation, and super- goals, and assessment* of values and means in reover bloc of the gruap In which man cooperate in lotion to "*"Samnts of eost of conflict."0 zxlove and suggests the necesslit of making the next parience and knowledge can alter these comontnts, step, International cooperation against the global thus altering relaticaships. In controlled canthreat of nuclear annihilation. munication relevant theoretical and emirical knowledge are Introduced to dispel the fispaceptions that parties to a dispute have of each otb- 92tns-iai Siar. Sen ryfs Y. While no bargaining or negotiati~. takes boutoo-hali ji Dotros Simns reyfs. TIMplace, the preconditions of agreement may be es- AlS-MASINDYMM3L Ie smvmit afro-sasatiqw. tablished bw preliminary controlled communication. Parls, Presses univeraitaires do France, p. (Trexam: at recherebes do I& FamaltS 49 droit at sciences '*II -qmaes do Paris. Ski.l "Afrique," wo. 6).115f2.27*83 0ibliography p. Cl?91-MS. Partial ccntents.--pt. 1. Larg currests of the D Afro-Asian ionvmeeat: Asianism. Pa-slanuima. k'.ton, John W. SYSTU, RAM, DIPLWCT AND Arabian. Pan-Africanism. Maidam. Contribution WiLE. Lamdon, Combidge ftiverneiy Press. 19"8. to a definition of Aftv-WAusmaa.-pt. 2. Afrt- 251 P. illiam. J11395."63 Asian conferences z The Conference of Beandvg. Afro-.ýaian and neutalist conferences. Falr of Contents.-pt te" OW states. 1ptem. the Algiers comference MA the crisis of Afro- Th of at" Leiitwansd behaviour. De- Aaianian.-pt. 3. Afro-Asian organizations, calsi-maki". Comfliet.--pt' 2. The behaviour Loeague of Arab States. Afro-Wasi Legal Consults- of states. The mystand behowiem or states. tive Committee. Afro-Asian People'sa Solidarity behaviin. Reactions to sam-systommic Organization. Afro-asia Organisation fbr Swon- bebovicur.-pt. 3. Diplomacy: The role of theaer lc Cooperation. Aftro-Asanims to the United Is- to decisatn-ankiag. An alternative system of tics~s.-qwenrli cnlin-a ee.thught. The reponsibility Of Ntates mmay.-pt. k. Otaide-Usee: International *aid$- Studies Afrro-lAsianje as too originally separate lits". Retstanst amd propco tioas.-- Biblisagrhat a4rsall monmeto that find c ý ro unpsd in phy. -ldex. the War against neocolonialism and the nwed for neratre,1isa and *comnaie development. The politi- outliaess a thweor or *tat* behavior to determine Cal, idsologieal, and religious foe" ats In ved policy odadeline. for the aluiasa~ton of 41aflaaare analyzed in view of the Afro-sian dctnise tional Interstate caufliet. fte solution to dysrosualated by other witers end a amw definition functional coat 1.. t Is to be round ant is, coerpraosed. boutros-4*hali thins that 16il0 the bi- cion, rhustiwe law, or sa other soat from outcontinental emwft t ha asdea great progress aid* the system. bwt to th diseovery of %.heoriea. rvwv otly, itsba served Its historic"l purpose of Insighats, mad rales that viii enable *tat"c to ed"aning the PrvStig or the disadvantaged an avoid *Onsyst4Mic, IIahMUtlY coflltn eal hehations on the intoraatioeml eset. Ior.

9 931 ~THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 211j Cho, W. Y. CASIA's CONSWIZBT PAM~iM E19iU punc;n araham, Eugh D., Mi Ted a. Gorr. VIMLCE IN MalR- AND imsco Asion* kamunistische Partejen swl- CA: 8STORCAL AM1D COSIARATITS PUWPCTVM; A schen Poking und Nookau. flarope-arcblv, Y. 25, NOW T0?HIZ 3ATI3UL CMSISSIrV 01 1U CAU= Jar. 25, 1970: 71-T9. AND FEYN0TION Or YXOLUCZ. (Lashington, For male DB39.186, Y. 215 by the Supt. of Doom., U.S. Govt. Print. off T. (nil, &1A P.) Illus. ftu.s. Nationmotes that the Sin*o-oviet rift bag produced al Cinisioo. on the Casms and Prevention of Vicdifferent attitudes toward Wosow sod Poking in lencej Tosk force reports) Asian Commnist Parties, depending onm the nation's 3, colonte 1969 res v'm ý I tertational and domestie sitaa- Report of the Task Force an Historical and Cmation. Man of the parties wte attracted ideclog- parative Paespeatives. icallyr by brand of numudsm, vhich ap- Includes bibliopraphles. pears to them tantmocunt to oatiouaalln. Cho discusses primarily the Comialst Parties of north Contents. -Preface. -Introduction, by Mugh Dovie Vietna=. North Korea, Japw. and India. Graham and Ted Robert Gurr.-Acknovledpswnta.- pt. 1. A historical overview of violence in 932 RaOpe and Awrica.-pt. 2. Imigrant societies and the Colton. Timothy. TIM "M BIOLGT AND THE CAW=U frontier trsadition.-pt. 3. Tb. history of vork- OF WAR. Canadian journal of political science, ing-class protest and violence.-vt. is. ftatterns Y. 2, Dec. 1969: 43"Tbb. and sources of racial aggression.--pt. 5. Per- PW 3r mpoetives an crise in the United states.-pt. 6. International conflict and Traes" Internal the strife.-pt. history of the 'ner bioloar; one, 7. Cmparativ. patterns of strife and violence. lyaewi tin vork of Its epokesma, Konrad lorens -pt. 8. Processes of rebellion.-pt. 9. ftologand Robert Ardre; criticises the thesis linking teal and anthropological perspectives.-concluowl's tendency to War 1ith his evolutionar horl- sion, by Nugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Curr.- tuge; and evaluates the Implications of this pram- Figures.-Tablet. Ise. Papers on the 002ce9 comses, patterns. * etnt, 933 conditions, and processes of violence In the Unit- Columbia University. Lasearc ZMtaSec$mNtoa ed states copared with swimia phenamenas in -IBMt In 1ast Contral RrMe. pvjr31.jjruiw other countries. particularly thw~e at Western FISMA SYSTI... Prepard for U.S. Arms Coo- surwoe. tr0l And Disariaent. Agency by Columbia UniversitY. low York (Col~umba Uniwersity] C ongav. WStanped ~ p~~rr. Ted R. Charles Ikte g CROSS- IMI01- Stopedon y TodP. -P. lendor, v.1: lto. EisaWbet FankAL N. Mas,. UDIS and Jarosla O C VI IOWCZ. Duask. Mashingtos, 4%or. co tkvrly Center for Research In Stamped Social Syson t.p., v. 2: ly LnSelo C&irjak &and tes p. G.orge Pall. dited 1w Thad P. Altoa -- I KLUZ&-Icese beth Rass. Ioncludes bacmgrphes.k Coateats.-pt. I. Iatrceaction: Theory and Zacluds blblograbies.thodalbov -Pt. 2. FIMe tests '-W a cmas4 moa- Coo~nts.-v. I. CsecbQ6oelovsk.-v e Introduction. The theoretica model. No- 9637mrowb &vetio. oesawes at civil violence. mesalts; a statistical a'inry. Direct asasme of luwtjsys Czech sad Rupeertoo risanctal syto relativo priwvtlon. Measures of value capahi 31- asthey "Vtc actually appeared, With secoadery at- ties. Om wesue of value sopecwtatoe. Mtediatiag "W14to $^ast. A possibl~e ttatgr* dweveac %a.n variables. The predlco&.. aapaatims.-pt. 3. Rev OrM... NVOSAWE ammasre for Coaparin nations-. 9sh Introduction. Tbe aptiwm Interval; as error- Preand, Ludwig. (tix WMITON orm U W reportin mand scaling. eno tndloes for croas- VwjM AND THE IrARZLI M. Of ALI.~c I INOW. nationa agalyses. Notes, Mbk"o':sphy. CIO#- S1AX TD Die Frw ge wete4iewardk~eea 9M. Appendlces. List of tables. WVon* anu die Labilitit vet. Allsaidsea in mot- Italnatea' teiuribftea. webrtame. V. is, saw. tvbusutes a& aoerel. explamsawoy tumvory 01 ke %* V3.W)9,. is condtils of Violent civil confliet %W OPPlying cool"am ~d wwrfol statistical tocheiqae to Aiscribes the sofct*" of Comaist ;sqcbooglaie~ daa from a taroe 8~e of aetics.0 amrwvtor the ahee of effective Ceesterpraopaouad. ftreedn evaluates present peace research, 9r.7 discusses the mi&wiatleaa V flw ats Of auow on.- Nwrign. utbom. To CLUALL0 OF To I s Yu incioueae69 amd patriotic ftolhao Mor a matiaoo' W?0S. Ike we of general %iii- 4erans morale a" *a lianee's lftit or "a""p, LayMrvny. l1?9m edpoleta to the laflusaefo f adjeate on alliao" W IM inetehility. I nloades awarles i I&~c wo WAwat d

10 212 ARMS CON4TROL A DISARMAMENT Assesses the strategiu and economic impo~rtance causes of Sino-Aaerican tensions instead of trying of the northern regions of the Atlantic Ocean. to resolve differences tbrva~h dir'ct negatia- The northern World Is destined for developent tions, by seaking to Improve China's standard of at the sodof the century when its resources will living, by recognizing that Pesking Is not the be exploited by refineries in the Atlantic coun- cause of all the torflitts in Asia, and by making tries. Narritie asserts the the lack of a now It clear that the United States Is not joining frontier say account for the discontent that has with the Soviet Union in a nuclear peact against overtaken democratic societisfi and that the tar China. north offers the sam challenge to adventurers today as to past blropean explorers. 940 Johnson. U. Almezi. ASIA INDM 1970'S; TiM MD 938 POR ~M1T. Vital speeches of the day, V. 36, Hopkins, Terence K. THIRD ~WM IVDUIIZATIOE1 11 Apr : 3d&.389. TRAMATIhNfAL PVSZMPCrM. ;I American Academy F36121.'152, v. 36 of Political and social Scence,. Phldlb& Delivered before the Cleveland council on World Protagonists, powe, and the Third World- esase Affairs, Clevelsand. Feb. 2C, 197o. on the changing Phi ladelrpaia, (Lam. Annals, v. 386, Ify. 1969) The West prortse made by the con-communist p U1.AI, v. 386 countries of Bast Asia In the past deaeis often overlooked because of preoccupation With Conflicts "Ilodercisation Is the progressive organisation In Laos Abd VietAM. U.S. Interest in Asian atof societies at the national level in the context fairs is not a recez'.~ phenomenon, and Asians need of an evolving global network of such societies, not tear that the United States is about to ath- This formalation raises a nmbser of questions, for draw from the area. Japan is alra4y the strontexamle: how we think about change at the indi- set nation in Bast Asia and will continue to prosvidual level in relation Ito societal chawg; c012- per as long as the free world economy rnawins trants between lorganico and atechooloicale eve- healthy. TaIvan, Indneiaa Thailand, Malaysia, lution (borrowing the terma from the biologist the Philippines. S"th Kore, and even South Viet- Weld); and the causal relevance of a sociporly po- Inc once the vw Is over. can look forward to sition In International network$. and of the ohs'. rapid economic pa~ess. security in the area my acteristics of those networks, to Its moenia.~- Proceed at a slower pace, although it would he Uina. The fundamental hypothesis Is that the mod- greatl~y bolstered by a mes active Japanese role. eraiuation of today's Third World co~untriee-in t~me sense of their development as national socie- 941 tics-is unlikely within the contest of the Weet- Kielmonseag, Joqaema A., 23L. ESAIAN or POWE IN ern-centered or capitalist po.t tion of the Interne- SPi OF chm03i oloichgowicht trots CI ma? tianal Political ecancay. Mareover, our theories Voksvirt. Virtachafts- amod?iuas-zeitung, v. 23, of modernization my well obscure the key problem We A. 969: 50. ~55 of ThirO world development. (Abstract supplied) v Pbrecasts the coatimawtion of the bipolar bal- Jaris. OLIN ecobk. IT:9 AIA.Pow eadrance of power, despite its growird Instability, Javi. J5co Ap.K SI.7. ladr for the cast two decades * Chima's agxwoo.s as a M.137, v. 53 nuclear poutr, end possible Third World ianfluece. Adaptead from a recent address to the World At- July an unlikely big gain 4wr -m aperpomer could faire ionference In Pearls. Ill., sponsored by s really desira the balance before Its replacemect University of Illinois. by a tnipolar "*usm with China as a third saperrower. Wok to possible so earlier than the Four probable devlopments 4f~a ing son do*- eighties. The existing balance, Is chotanig is ads my ecntibute toward a leamming of character, however, becaus or the wrowing sophis- Chioese hostility and Provide 00h basis for a tication of Mew W"ao systems, wibch maes it Inpeaceful and prospercias Asia. The opwer vocoa cotesigis' sift iialt to insee the oesemps *IIIof the 1950's will U replaced by a Ma tal tary potential end 0add to the Instability of the ftur-powr Strategic balinee -m& IV of Chiae, asclea? "ea. and the sew vole of the Soviet.:apem, the Soviet Ialcm. and the United State. AMeN as a woe. "ae powr. it is ualihely is tbr Thetre will he a reduced U.S. military prs"me In an decade tbat my onse ecl~a pawers vi1' %alito Asia. alth*oug Oth United St~aID will catinae to agaist the third. provide a andes, shield fior Mt Asike Allies. &oth Cosaist and otionallwt Chios, will modergo leadership chadena t"ai will reduce the ravolu- Kau Klaus.f~chrdSaaat.IiT~A tiomary ft.o L O a tat fbmser 4" sae sm"r likely (uffm 09W j et t~stit-a wp11e % resolution or TaitwAns status 40 the basis of scbwrpunke der Frieemenrsebeng. rulitisehe selt-determinatioa. XWOMAc4t ft 4"V111M 0 t Sbuiiva. v. 21. Jam./Fob. 19W0: l3jlliz. tawn4wtog the artintiratien or jmpktý and?,,w wt- 13$.Mfi. 't. 21 'to 'Otatrs wn ell as ChnA& Will W"e up new ui '44M,"w- Par coappration. te Usited Vf~tee ofm Lists o s and addrisee af over cm ppetw re- U~re hse d~eopa IV focusnig on the rafth inst itta to is~onastri 2 vs.

11 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT London. Institute for Strategic Studies. SUR.VE OF Miller, Iinda B. TIEM STATES AND THE INTZNA- STRATEGIC STUDIES. London, p. (Its TIONAL SOCIETY. In American Academy of Political Adelphi papers, no. 64) and S coal Science, PhijadtbMht&. Protagonits., U162.A3, no. 64 power, and the Third World: essays on the changing Reference guide by country to insti~urlons &and International system. Philadelphia, (It._s Annsis, v Now. 1969) p university departments conducting strategic stud- Hl.A4, v. 386 ies. This term includes modern military organization; the study of contemporary international and internal armed conflicts in their political, eco- The expectations of the new states toward the international society are shaped by their relanomic, and military aspects: the role of alliances tionships with each other and with the superand othc'" security systems; disarmament and arms powe-s. Neither set of relationships has proved control; and strategic doctrines and national de- to be stable in the decolonization era. Increastense policies. Iniormation includes number of lag cleavages in the group of new states and A research staff, main focus of research, publics- shifting priorities in the foreign policies of the tions, library, and source of income. United States and the Soviet Union attest to the 944 fluidity of the contemporary environment. As t-, Lyon, Peter. EUROPE AND THE THIRD WORLD. In Amer- new states press their demands for social justice lean At.ademy of Political and Social Science, and economic development in the councils of inter- Philadelphia. Protagon4sts, power, and the Third national organizations, they reject ad hoc proce- W~rld: essays on the changing international ays- dures and seek "legislative" outcomes. If issuetem. Fniladelphia, (Its Annals, v. 386, areas become more autonomous in the next two dec- Nov. 1969) p ades, the fate of established "trade-off patterns" Hl.Ah, v. 386 will become uncertain, although some form of inter-regional or interfunctional bargaining is Europe and the Third World are both richly likely to persist. The authority of internatioral evocative, rather than exact, terms, as immediate- organizations will remain contingent during the ly becomes apparent if we trace--however lightly-- period of the 1970's when the net states will consome of their varying connotations from their ori- centrate on consolidating the gains -of the immegins to today. The idea of Europe is ancient, am- diate postindependence years. (Abstract supplied) biguous, and multivariable. The Third World is a powerful myth and a practical anachronism. European colonialism and decolonization--especially 947 Morse, Edward L, THE TRANSFOR 4ATION OF FOREIGN POLthat of Britain and France--have left many lesa- ICIES; MODERNIZATION, IN'TERDEPENDENCE, AND EXTERjies v. 22, Apr. 1970: Lies tcday and help or hinder new dtifnitions, D839.W57, v. 22 which provide opportunities fcl- continuing NALIZATION. World politics, declaratory and operational, of purposes, pollcies, and prciedures. The future of Europe and Modernization is effecting a continuous transthe future of the Third World are two profoundly open and complex sets of possibilities which will, formation of the domestic and international set- tings in which foreign policies are formulated and in s,,me manner, undoubtedly interact. Any sub- conducted. Domestically, modernization is accomstantial pclltical rearrangements in Europe will, panied by centralization of decisionmaking and init As most likely, be inaugurated and practiced creased attention to socioeconomic wants; internawithout any substantial influence from the Third tionally, it is associated with increased levels World. If greater European unity is accomplished, and types of interdependencies among national sotber, &iropo, could become a great benefactor to cieties. The general results are a breakdown of some, or most,.f the countries of the Third the line of demarcation between foreign and domes- World. Europe and the Third World are, in many tic affairs, greater emphasis on the individual important senses, eumembers of one world. (Ab- citizen's welfare, and a decrease in the ability stract supplied) to control events that are either internal or ex- 945 ternal to modernized states. The chances of in- Mendershausti,, Horst. THE DIPLOMAT'S NATIONAL AND stability for international society as a whole r! ANSNATIO11AL COMINTMLNTS. Foreign service jour- have been augmented since interdependence has adnal, v. 47, Feb. 1970: 20-22, vanced beyond the instruments capable of control- JXI.A53, v. 47 ling it or the available knowledge of its effects. Explores the divided commitments of the diplomat 948 who must live and work in two or more collectivi- Munk, Frank. COMMUNIST HERESIES: HOPES AND HAZties and be accepted by them. These commitments ARDS. Western political quarterly, v. 22, Dec. may be national or transnational; that is, to 1969: JA1.W4, v. 22 states and International organizations or to complex governments and more than one govern.ent at a time. Mendershausen identifies situations that Speculates on the consequences of Communist her- esies. Munk compares the present situation to demand saxiral ccngruity of the diplomat's commit- that which existed in Europe during the Reformsments or accentuate their incongruity and so im- tion, when the disintegration of the universal lvde the performance of the diplomat's function, church released a flood of violence that lasted

12 214 ARMS CONTROL & DUARMAMENT for several centuries and engulfed heretic, Catholie, and Innocent bystander alike, and warns that cumpetitive play. Results based on observation ot free-pl&y behavior were: (a) participation in the freed breakdown the We"t of frm Ccomunist me serious bloc unity danger my only have to ex- predicted competitive group games ordering Increased for aggression, aggressiveness and the (failpose it to another. ue, success, no competition) was obtaned in 3 of the h possible comparisons; (b) exposure to the aggressive model increased girls' but not boys' 09 aggressiveness; (C) boys were more aggressive than leas of oomnism, v. 19, Jan./Feb. 1970: 1-27;,O-rls, but only after witnessing the onaggressive model. Boys aad girls exposed to modeled aggres- Mar./Apr.: HXR.PT5, V. 19 sion were equally aggressive. (Abstract supplied) Contemts.-v. 1. "Nonolithic" vs. "crumbling" cmmunism, by Andrew Ezergailis. Cmemntaries, by 952 Michel Tatu, ;ugh Seton-Watson, Bernard S. Norris, Rabier, Jacques Rent. ESOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOL0- Rodger Swearingen, K131 NeMhnert, Alec Nove, GY, AND POLITICAL SCIECE IN REGARD TO EUOPEAN Donald W. Treadgold, Massmiehi Inoki, Rex Mor- INTEGRATION3 La psychologie socisle, la sociolotimer, Joseph Starobin.-v. 2. Commentaries, by gie at la science politique devant 1'int6gration William E. Griffith, Severyn Bialer, Tibor Sza- europfenne. Politico, v. 34, Dec. 1969: m-ely, Renato Miell, Leo Labedz. In reply, by JAl8.P65, v. 34 Andrew Ezergailis. The literary-historical approach, which is domi- Symposium initiated by Ezergailis' examination nant in the study of European integration because of the rival "myths" of monolithic and crumbling of the early prevalence of jurists and economists, communism and the Western belief that the declin- should be replaced by comparative or internationing ideological -cohesion of the Communist world al studies that are multidisciplinary in methodolreduces the dangers facing the West. Commentators ogy and emphasize the dynamics of the historical addreas themselves to such questions as the past succession of events. The creation of a Raropean and present epplicability of the monolith charac- research center on public opinion to act as a terization -to\.iniernational commuism, the real clearinghouse should be given priority. -.Xistsri of-an "International Comunist movement," and the effect of the growing independence 953 Of sl* bational Communist Parties on their inter- Rapoport, Anatol. N-PERSON GAME THEORY; CONCEPTS nal organizational structure andoverall policies. N APPLICATIONS. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press tc1970) 331 p. 950 QA270.R NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC. Current history, v. 58, Apr. 1970: , Contents.-Introduction: some mathematical D41o.C82, v. 58 tools.--pt. 1. Basic concepts: Levels of gametheoretic analysis. Three-level analysis of ele- Contents.--The United States as a Pacific power, mentary games. Individual and group rationality. by William C. Johnstone.--The Philippines under The Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. The Shapley Marcos, by Richard Butwell.-The U.S.-Japanese value. The bargaining set. The kernel. Restrictreaty crisis, by Robert Epp.-The two Koreas, by tions on realignments. Games in partition func- Byung Chul Koh.--New Zealand in the 1970's, by W. tion form. N-person theory and two-person theory Keith Jackson.--Australia as an Indo-Pacific pow- compared. Harsanyi's bargaining model.--pt. 2. er, by Harry G. Gelber.--The future of North Viet- Applications: Introduction to part 2. A small nsam, by Arthur J. Docmen.--The trust territory of market. Large markets. Simple games and legislathe Pacific islands, by Donald D. Johnson. tures. Symmetric and quota games. Coalitions and power. Experiments suggested by N-person game Reviews the internal developments of the major theory. "So long sucker"; a do-it-yourself exper- Asian countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, iment. The behavioral scientist's view. Concludexcluding the Soviet Union and China, and assesses ing remarks. Notes. References. Index. their respective roles in regional affairs. Presents "the essential ideas developed in the original fornulation of N-person game theory by 951 Von Neumann and Morgenstern and the subsequent ex- Nelson, Janice D., Donna M. Gelfand, end Donald P. tensions by the present generation of game theore- Hartmann. CHILDREN'S AGGRESSION' FOLLOWING COMPE- ticians." TITION AND EXPOSURE TO PN AGGRESSIVE MODEL. Child development, v. 4t0, Dec. 1969: HQ750.AlIc45, v. 4O 954 Raupach, Hans. EANTAGONISM, COEXISTENCE OR CONVER- Aggressive behavior was studied in and 6- GENCE OF WESTERN AND EASTERN ECONOMIC SYSTEM4S year-old children who observed either an aggressive or a nonaggressive adult model. Subsequent Antagonismus, Koexistenz oder Konvergenz west- 8stlicher Wirtachaftesysteme. Politische Studien, to viewing the model each child either succeeded v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: or failed in competitive games or engaged in non- H35.P66, v. 21

13 1THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 215 Considers a comparative theory of politicoeco- 958 no ic systems and the spontaneous synthesis be- LUIDERSTANDINGO MERN CHINA. Edited with an introd. tveen caitalism and socialism. History shows by Joseph M. Kitagava. Chicigo, Quadrangle Books, that an sgreement or difference in principle be p. =mps. tween social orders is unamportant for power-poli- 17O3.-4.U tics relations and, consequently, for peaceful coexistence." Essays presented to a seminar at Solvang, Calif., in March 1968 on the theme "After Mao and Chiang: Two Chinas?" sponsored by the Council on Religion and International Affairs. 955 Includes bibliographical references. Russett, Bruce N. INDICATORS FOR AMEICAOS LINKAGES WITH THE CHANGING WORLD ZIVIBONM1. In American Partial contents.--introduction: Western under- Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadel- standing of the East, by Joseph M. Kitagava.--The pa. Political intelligence for America's fa- geography of China, by Norton Ginsburg.--The ur.. y ture. Philadelphia, 19TO. (Its Annals, v. 388, of China, by S. G. Pulleyblank.--Political leader- Mar. 1970) p ship and modernization in Communist China, by Hl.A4, v. 388 Henry 0. Schwarz.--Economics, ideology, and the cultural revolution, by Yuan-li Wu.--The style of Many variables are thought to be relevant to in- politics and foreign policy in Comunnist China, by ternational politics. Better theory is needed to Melvin Gurtov.--The Taiwanese in Taiwan, by increase parsimony, but meanwhile a tour d'horizon Stephen Uhalley, Jr.--Chinese in Southeast Asia, of possible data-gathering efforts is offered. by Claude A. Buss.--On being Chinese: a philo- Collection costs could be eased by sampling na- sophical reflection, by Vincent Y. C. Shih.--China tions according to level of development, region, in Asia, by Joseph M. Kitagava.--Two realities, by or policy importance, and many highly correlated Mark Mancall.--American perceptions of China, by measures could be eliminated. A list of indica- Seth Tillman. tors for American linkages to the world is given, with indicators distinguished between stock and Designed to stimulate popular discussion on the flow; over-all linkages and links to particular problems of the present and future of mainland states; and ratios of foreign links to domestic China and Taiwan and to introduce concerned laymen equivalents. The world environment should be doc- to "the seemingly incomprehensible and perhaps irumented according to national-attribute data on remediable problems" posed by China. politics and social conditions; the world-wide distribution of value-achievement; value-aspira- 959 tions; and the level and pattern of linkages of a Vernon, Raymond. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE world society. All indicators are labeled as to NATION STATE; PROJECT REPORT FROM THE HARVARD current availability or potential cost of collec- BUSINESS SCHOOL. Journal of Common Market studtion. More effort should go to collating and die- ies, v. 8, Dec. 1969: tributing existing information than to new data- HC241.J6, v. 8 gathering, except for variables of exceptional theoretical interest. (Abstract supplied) Third annual progress report on the study of multinational enterprises. The project was designed to evaluate problems of the multinational 956 enterprise in finance, marketing, organization, Sidjeaski, Dusan. [NEW DIRECTIONS IN STUDIES OF and business-government relations and its role in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION3 Nouvelles orientations des international trade, capital movements, and techrecherches sur l'int6gration europ6enne. Politi- nology transfer. co, v. 34, Dec. 1969: JAl8.P65, v Wilcox, Wayne. THE PROTAGONIST POWERS AND THE THIRD Categorizes European and American studies of WORLD. In American Academy of Political and So- European integration by the research methodolo- cial Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, gies that are employed. Sidjanaki concludes that and the Third World: essays on the changing inthe institutional approach prednminates and that ternational system. Philadelphia, (Its European scholars lag behind Americans in the ex- Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p ploitat.on of quantitative methods. H1.A0, v. 386 The international system has undergone great 957 changes since the nineteenth-century European SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS; "AGENDA FOR EUROPE" INTER- balance of power. Central in its dynamics has NATIONAL WEEKEND EETING: May 2/4, Jour- been the changing number, nature, and power of nal of Common Market studies, v. 8, Dec. 1969: the protagonists in world politico. Sonme of the HC241.J6, v. 8 disorganization of the interwar period may be explained by the reluctance of the United States and The significance of West Fure'pean integration the Soviet Union to play key roles in the postwar for planning, industrial democracy, education, world. After World War II, Soviet reconstruction and participation in political decisionmaking. and preoccupation with East European and Chinest

14 216 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT allies kept the Soviet Union from challenging Ideological and theoretical background. Organiza- America's do Lfto begemony outside the socialist tion. Prices, exchange rates and tariffs. Weapcountries. United States policy toward the Third aem of trace policy.--pt. 3. Major issues in World was to favor nationalism and to strengthen Eaut-West trade: Equality of trading opportunity. new states by transferring arms and economic re- Dumping. Payments and finance. Politics in partsources to them. This pattern of diplomacy sta- nership with trade. Strategic embargo. Trade bilized the international system and led to the disputes. Gains and waste. East-West trade as an emergence of confident Third World governments avenue of convergence.--a selected bibliography.-- that becoeme protagonists in the new system. The Index of names.--subject index. special American role in ensuring this form of world order is now diminishing, for a variety of Study of trade between two antagonistic economic political and strategic reasons; and Russian and political systems, which emphasizes the ecocapabilities, while mnch greater, are also heavily nomic processes but brings out political considerinvested in regional and domestic commitments. Third World states are, therefore, the most dynamations where warranted and assesses their extent, relative importance, and effects. Wilczynski ic elements in the changes in world politics, evaluates the proposition that East-West trade may Their role as protagonists is accelerated by tech- be a factor in promoting the convergence of the nological change and by the entrance of world cor- two systems. porations and other transnational actors into global politics. (Abstract supplied) FOREIGN POLICIES 961 Wilcox, Wayne, ed.. PROTAGONISTS, POWER, AND THE 963 THIRD WORLD: ESSAXS ON THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL Albinsk T., Henry S. POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN SYSTEM. In American Academy of Political and AUSTRALIA; THE IMPACT OF VI.YNAM AND CONSCRIPTION. Social Science, Philadelphia. Philadelphia, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, p. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p DUIIT.A7 Hl.A4, v. 386 Bibliographical footnotes. Contents.--The protagonist powers and the Third Partial contents.--the Australian public and the World, by Wayne Wilcox.--The great powers as pro- salience of external affairs: a perspective.--the tagonists: Presidents, politics, and internation- clash of party positions on Vietnam-conscription. al intervention, by Paul Y. Hammond. A view from -Stylistic characteristics of the party dialogue Washington, by Thomas Perry Thornton. The Soviet over Vietnam and conscription.--vietnam and con- Union in the Third World: purpose in search of scription as reflections of labor's internal probpower, by Fritz Ermarth. "One percent"; the prob- lems.--organized public protest activity: general lem of economic aid, by Lev Stepanov.--The Third characteristics-the churches, veterans, and World states as participants: The Third World and Vietnam-conscription.--Vietnamese protest among the great powers, by Sisir Gupta. Peking's revo- academics, artists, and university students.--some lutionary strategy in the developing world; the observations on the Australian political process: failures of success, by Thomas W. Robinson. India party politics, foreign policy, and civil liberand the Soviet Union, by Dietmar Rothermund. Can ties.--the Australian public and Vietnam-conscripa ministate find true happiness in a world dominat- tion: some measures of interest, opinion and ed by protagonist powers?; the Nepal case, by Leo electoral behavior. E. Rose and Roger Dial.--New factors in the world Studies the Vietnam and conscription themes in system: The new states and the international so- recent Australian foreign policy to interpret the ciety, by Linda B. Miller. Nuclear technology, int between etrn Pofirs ao mestic weapons, and the Third World, by Ciro Zoppo. interplay between external affairs and domestic Third World modernization in transnational per- policies in the Australian political process. spective, by Terence K. Hopkins. Europe and the 964 Third World, by Peter Lyon. Ali, Picho. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT. East Africa journal, v. 6, Oct. 1969: Examines changes in the international system DTa21.E2sn v. 6 brought about by changes in the composition and role of the great powers and the rise of new pro- Nonalinement can be a dynamic. s~tive policy tagonist states in the Third World. to maintain the independence of the small state in 962 conformity with the U.N. Charter and in the spirit of active international cooperation for world Wilczynski, Josef. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF peace and security. In the contemporary world EAST-WST TRADE. New York, Praeger C p. nonalinement rejects commitment to the military HFIP4ll.W55 bhocs and actively ouj.orts the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. %For Africa, non-alignment Contents.--List of tables and diagraa.--fore- must stand on a progressive, socialist economic, word, by Profeasor Harry G. Johnson.--Preface.-- social and political order If it is to be a vital, Pt. 1. Eat-West trade in perspective: East-West meaningful, and real instrument in the hands of trade. Structure. Changing patterns of direc- Africans for political, economic and social libtio,.--pt. Le. Principles, policies, practices: eration."

15 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT Japan's changing focus. The aggressive Allison, Graham T., Ernest R. May, and Adam Yarmo- People's Republic of China, menace or nyth? The linsky. LIMITS TO INTERVENTION. Foreign affairs, Vietnam War in perspective.--pt. 3. The critical v. 48, Jan. 1970: questions; a time for entrenchment or an opportu- D4lO.F6, v. 48 nity for modification?: Security for East and First article in a section entitled "U.S. Mili- West. Recognition of Ccomunist China, points for tary Policy." consideration. Taiwan. Chinese representation in the United Nations.--pt. 4. A new age for Asia: Present discontents about the U.S. role in world Trade and development, keys to Asian stability. affairs offer the opportunity to set a new course The importance of cultural exchange. The prosin A-,rican foreign policy and lay down new rules pects for the future. Fresh approaches to ancient to govei.' th. ue o f nonnuclear forces. One can problems.--acknowledgements. readily distinguish three categories of cases that raise the possibility of nonnuclear intervention Position papers and discussions on Communist abroad. The first category covers instances in China and its relations with Japan and the United which a major Ccnmunist power commits overt ag- States by prominent Japanese legislators and their gression against a U.S. ally. For this category, American counterparts and others. Among the epethe President should establish a presumption that cific issues discussed are the renewal of the the United States will intervene but only after he U.S.-Japan security treaty and Japanese rearmahas made an intensive review of all existing U.S. ment. treaties of alliance and reaffirmed or revised each of them accordingly. The second category covers cases in which anw state commits overt aggression against a state not allied with the Unit- 967 ed States. In these cases, the degree of U.S. in- Aspaturian, Vernon V. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AT THE terest will depend largely on whether other major CROSSROADS: CONFLICT AND/OR COLLABORATION? Inpowers are involved. When they are not, there ternational organization, v. 23, summer 1969: 589- should be a presumption against U.S. intervention JXl9Ol.I55, v. 23 The third category covers instances of "internal violence jeopardizing a friendly state, perhaps The decisiveness with which the Soviet Union inaided from outside but not involving significant tervened in Czechoslovakia was a notable exception overt action by foreign ground. air or naval to the vacillation and drift that have characterunits." For these cases, the United States should ized Soviet foreign policy since the Brezhnevestablish a stror?resumption against interven- Kosygin takeover. The more eccentric and unpretion. Even with the suggested presumptions in ef- dictable behavior of Khrushchev has given way to fect, the United States would have to maintain the cautious and bland policies of his successors, substantial nonnuclear, or general purpose, for- but the basic conditioning factors remain the ces. The administration should set as its goal sawe: "the erosion of ideology and the consequent the reduction of general purpose forces to the loss of the sense of purpose and direction which levels maintained during the Eisenhower period. has always been a strong point in Soviet decision- Besides saving substantial amounts of money, sharp making;... the frapentation of the decisioncutbacks in general purpose forces would make it making process which hau contributed to the eroeasier for the President to put the new policy sion of ideology and which in turn has been accelpresumptions into effect. As long as the United erated by it; and... the globalization of So- States maintains nonnualear forces greater than it viet comitments in world affairs at a time when needs to fulfill its basic treaty commitments, that country has suffered both a loss of purpose others will be skeptical about the new presump- and a weakening of will." Khrushchev sought a dttions, and the bureaucracy will be encouraged to tente with the United States and even hinted at the establishmant of a joint Soviet-U.S. condomin- ium with recognized spheres of influence, anticipating that such a condominium would lead to arms control agreements and other reductions in defense keep its attention focused on solutions requiring the use of force. 966 expenditures, enable the Soviet Union and the ASIAN DILEMMA: UNITED STAVE, JAPAN AND CHINA. A United States to deal more effectively with SPECIAL REPORT FROM TIE CENT FOR THE STUDY OF threats to their hegemony, and make possible a DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. Eited by Elaine H. rise in the Soviet standard of living. Breshnev Burnell. Santa Barbara, Calif., Center for the and Kosygin pursued a modified version of [hrush- Study of Democratic Institutions C19693 xvi, chev's d~tente policy in their first years in 238 p. (Center occasional paper, v. 2, no. 5) power but faced groving opposition within the So- E183.8.C5A75 viet leadership as defense of the status quo appeared to surrender the political and diplomatic Contents.--Preface, by Elaine H. Burnell.- initiative to the United itates. While Its relapt. 1. An isolated China; threat to world peace: tionship with the United States remains of para- The three teachers of Man Tse-tung. The Influence wunt Importance, however, the Soviet Union ist of United States China policy on Sino-Soviet and increasingly take account of the groving power and Soviet-American relations. Barriers to stability aspirations of China. Son* of these considersand prosperity in Asia.-pt. 2. The making of an tions is likely to affect Soviet policy tcovard the impasse: The United States and China to United Nations.

16 218 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT Axon, Hermann. CON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND Beebe, Lucius. THE CMINA FORNULA. Cosant6ir, v. 29, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS] Zur In- Oct. 1969: ternationalen Lags und mar Entwicklung des KXrfte- Ul.C8, v. 29 verhtltnisses. Berlin, Didtz, p. (Der Reprinted from RevueLi ±e asnsrale. Parteiarbeiter) D1058.A91, U, 12. Revised text of speech given to a seminar of the Central Ccmmittee, Socialist Unity Party, and Describes the unofficial "apect of Communist first secretaries of the District Administrations, China's diplamacy, the effort -o penetrate into Brandenburg, Oct. 9-13, the grassroots of the der tloping rations. Ar:- cording to Lin Piea, Maoism will reach a vst and Depicts the conformance with social law of the receptive ma.%s, and Chinese Coas,.mist stevardship develolpment of the international class struggle will be follmwed by Chinese suserainty. and world power relationships since the seventh congress of the East German Socialist Unity Party. 972 Axen discusses these trends in connec.ion with the Brandt, Willy. A PEACE POLICY FOR EUROPE. Nov party's international relationships and the pres- York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston C p. eant problems of East Germany's foreign policy. DD Translation of Fr4.edensooitik In Suro, which was cited as item 460 in v. 5, no. 2, of this bibli graphy. DD259.7.B7A5 969 Underlines the overriding importance of an East- Balabushevich, Vladimir V., comp. Edited by V. V. West settlement in Europe for global interbloc an- Balabushevich EandJ Biula Prasad. INDIA AND THE cmmodation and contends that ditente in Europe SOVIET tuion; A SYMPOSIUM. Delhi, People's Pub. and development of West European economic and po- House C p. litical cooperation would more likely solve Euro- D6450.R8B3 pean problems than would the political Integration of Western Europe within the Atlantic fra-rvok. Contents.-The background of Indo-Soviet friend- The German Federal Republic shares the American ship, by Biula Prasad.--Steady growth of rela- goal of strengthening peace through am, contrtl tions, by K. P. S. Menon.-The USSR and India in agreements. the struggle for peace, by V. Pavlowsky.-Indoijoviet friendship as a catalyst in world politics, 973 by D. N. Mallik.--Soviet-lndian economic ties, by Brandt, Willy. REPORT ON TIM STATE OF TIM NATION. M. Alexandrov and 0. Mfyev.--Indo-Soviet economic In Wilpy REPORT ON E PrATE E N. cooperation: retrospect and prospect, by M. In Grmany (Fe.eral Reuabli. lq29- ) e Dubey.-Soviet impact on Indian planning, by V. B. G.frmanffirs. Bulletin, a 2,ekl40urpes of Singh.--The USSR Academy of Sciences and Soviet-,, DGa.A35, Indian scientific ties, by S. 0. Korneyev.-Sovi- S t. 18 st-indian cultural relations, by X. P. Babkina and S to the hnde s, Jan. li, 10. S. I. Potabenko.-The ideal of October and India's Underlines the oneness of the German nation, progressive thought, by E. N. KImarov.-Indology in USSR. by V. V. Balabushevich and A. H. Vaoa.- whose reunification in a Mroean peace arrange- Soviet studies in India, by R. Vaidyanath. mnt remains the Geman people's long-range goal. In the meantime, the German Federal Republic (GFR) "A ttseeks regular relations with the German Democratic "tribute to the friendship and unity between Republic (ODR) but alvews rejects the condition the two peope. c and countries and an effort tothd wottebe er curisfstrengthen thu bonds of their mutual understanding that the tvo ce oon.s states dured cuntrie ma ot - and smlty." eign to each other. Such relation mast not adversely affect the right of the Oerman people to self-deteralnation, West Berlin's ties v1t0 West Germany and the Four Powers' responsibility for the whole of Berlin; the Three Powers' rights and 970 commitments in regard to Germa as a whole, the Sechtoldt, Heinrich. CTIE BILATERALIN OF GE M 'S German Federal Republic, end Berlin; and Vest Ger- EAST POLICY] Dot Bilateralismus deutscher Ost- =A rights snd obligations toward the Three Powpolitik. Aussonpolitik. v. 21, Jon. 190: 5-8. ers. Poland does aot seem to asree with East P839.A885, v. 21 Berlin that tast German recognition of the Odor- Salse Line as a final peace boundary was ame in Asserts that, without any change in West German the name of all Germans, nor do the Soviet Union alliances, Vest Germany's politieal envlroeant sad other Warsaw Treaty Organliation countries now all Bonn to condct an ative Eastern p01- support the OWu dasmd that the (W loosen its tcy, which will evwtually lem to a well-balanced Uses with SATO. ITt amltmeants to NATO canmot be f-reign policy. The pneral intensification of' the subject of 2IR-WR diseusion. Domn seeks to bilateral Eat-Vest talks and VWet Germa's gro- improve relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern 44 econo mic potential contitute a favorable can- baoe, and Ohe P through bilateral renumciationbination of circumstanees for new initiatives in oft-frce agreements and supports the Three Powers' Cermaay's matern policy. intention to talk with Moscow about Berlin.

17 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT T7 Brinkley, George A. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED Clubb, 0. Edmund. THE GLOBAL TRIANGLE. Progres- NATIONS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF TIM DEVELOPING sive, v. 34, Mar. 1970: COUNTRIES. Review of politics, v. 32, Jan. 1970: AP2.P8655, v JAI.R4, v. 32 The present thaw in Chinese foreign policy will Examines recent changes in the important tris - manifest itself in Peking's relations with the gular relationship between the Soviet Union, the Third World and Europe. The possibility of a rap- United Nations, and the developing countries, as prochement with the United States is less than exemplified in statistics on U.N. voting, budget- with any other country. Mao's anti-imperialism ing, and other business. The present Soviet lead- and American anticcamunism are both too rigidly era have adopted a policy toward the United Na- held to permit reconciliation. China cannot =Initions and the Third World that some observers de- cably accept an American presence that denies cscribe as a "return to Stalinism" but which might cess to Southeast Asia and the South Seas. China be better characterized as a policy of "skeptical will maneuver to attain a position from which it conservatism." By pursuing detente with the Unit- can play the United States, the Soviet Union, and ed States on the one hand and seeking to preserve Japan against each other. In the long run, China its role as spokesman for the developing countries must always remain closer to Communist "revisionon the other, the Soviet Union my succeed only in ists" than to Ameriean "imperialists." alienating both parties. However, the issue is still in doubt, and Soviet diplomacy, which has had a long experience with putting good use, should not be discounted. ambivalence to 97C6 THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, Edited d b 1y Robert e R. James. London, Weidenfeld & licolson, p. amp. D 15.6.C87 9Expansion of a background paper prepared for a 9C5 conference organised by the Institute CameronStudy for the of International Organiati, University UNITED STATES. Midwest quarterly, of v. 11, winter Oman, October 14-16, : A830.N5, v. 21 Contents.--Profaco,--ib Cmaeoholowah back- The 1964 Canal Zone riots led to several changes Coun'.--e Soviete dila.--th e rb l of the Weain the contral and regulation of the Panama Canal saw - and the crlis.--the United Nabut left unresolved Important questions concerning rises t crisil.-imter tis a onclu- U.S. interests there. "The existing lo cd anal is a - het cred saulogy, Janrd- ecauter Inherently indefensible" despite its acknowledged s68.--pmldix 1: Tch Wars.' P t.-&-ppendx 2: military and economic Importance to the United h lettr an the Cuachoalovk rely.-ap- States and Latin America. The threat of internal pendix 3: Security Council resolutions. 22 and violence remains greater than the threat of for- 2 Ae 3 dix1 4 The re ement eign aggression, but either could render it Iop- August.-ApeandIx 5: L ' apeots of the "vt,- erative with relative asne. The proposed sea- elan of Cae5s:lovkLa.--lale bibliofgthy.einlevel canal nov under study could not only handle dex. ct a great volume of military and comercial traffic but also would he difficult to destroy. U.S. in- Analysis of the Soviet intervention in C ehoterests in the Isthmus might better be served ty a slovakia mad its implications far the Varaw Pact, binational U.S.-Panmaian authority than by the, a t Naios. The intervention present Hsy-Varilla Treaty structure, which fre- revealed that the Mew Fac0s prime importance 4 quently obscures the basic U.S. interest of main- I a an la"tniment for" oviet cota'ol a UN *Sotaining the efficient and continuous flow of all cialist Caomvem atth end revived Western interest traffic at reasonbe coat. n RM. Operating within Its limits, the United Nation acquitted itself reasonably effectively. The most Important lesson for the Vest is that it 9T6 should not expect any of the East European coun- Church, Frank. TDVARI tnwa POLICY FOR ULATI AMa-. tries to move substmatliall ahead of chat the so- CA. Christianity and crisis, v. 3D. Mar viet Union will manction. and it is here ared MU-lC64T1, Y. 30 that sanc a conclusion is not necessarily a ds- Adapted froam a speech to the Catholic Iater- prosim ome. American Cooperative Program confrence in Vasbington, D.C. 9T9 Calls for a low profile appromeh to U.S.-LatLa Zrmft, Frits. THE UN115 5ION 13 T IIIRD American relations, emphasiing that "the more %VW: NPOIM IN VA81 Or 10M. I& American Santly w press our anleiabrs, tho greater our in- Academy oc Political and Social Science, ZheAWrlusoce Is likely to be." Church trac" #A eia's Protagunates pome, asd the Third W rld: u.etralned invlwement in Latin America sloce mes on te chan intenational lot" and lists eaidedlone for U.S. polcy for the Phiawdelpbia, (ILa Amosis. v Nov. 197O's. 1969) p. U , v. 3

18 220 ARMS CONTROL A DISARMAMENT Although the Soviet Union Inherited its ideolog- Malaysia, and Vietna= and has pledged forces to ical commitment to revolution in the Third World Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawfrom Lenin. it vat only in ikbrushchey' 5 time, af- al. Australia has played an important and conter industrialization and victory in World War 11 structive role in the loonomic Comission for Asia had made the Soviet Union a world pover, that this and the Far Bast, the Asian and Pacific Council, comitment became an important component of Soviet the Colombo plan, and other regional institutions foreign policy. Khrushchev envisaged a fairly strengthening self-help and cocperation. Austrarapid transition by postoolonial states toward lia'sa willing involvement in economtic cooperation Soviet-type "socialism." This process was to be is evidenced by the fact that in terms of grass guided by the example of Soviet national develop- national product Australia Is second or third ment, protected ty the deterrent shield of Soviet among donor countries overall. Trade with the strategic power, and accelerated by a modicum of countries of Asia, particularly Japan, is quan- Soviet economic and military aid. But Khrush- titatively and qualitatively Important for Austrachv' vision exceeded the Soviet Union's power to lia, whose Government actively encourages the confualfill it. Nationalists in power throughout the comitant establishment of joint enterprises by its Third World advanced thetr own vision. of the fu- investment insurance system. The expansion of ture, often at varianue with Soviet views. And cultural relations with Asian and Pacific counthe Western powers were not restrained from inter- tries Is also reflected in a great variety of ways. vening actively in the Third World where their interests were at stake. Khrushhv's successors have been less sanguine. They have tended to concentrate an specific areas of the Third World and 982 have also been more willing to intervene in Third Gelber$ Barry G. EPO6SIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF World military conflicts involving the United A Nid AMERICAN POLICY 1WA1D CHINA3 Nfgl4 chkeiten States. Only the future will show whether they aind tkenzen sinter neuen amerikanischen Chinause their increased power with the restraint that Politik. Eurarpa-Archiv, v. 25, Feb. 25, 1970: weak~ness imposed upon thems In the past. (Abstract D v. 25 supplied) Contends that improved Sine-American relations 980 could make the U.S. Asian policr mowe flexible and anyvalchales REORTFMN ASTRN UROE. re- lead to ams control talks with China. Hovever, venyvwoildcwarls REPO, n T5 RO. vit BTD JpiOPE Pr70: the achievement of a modus vivendi with China is vent1 word arli o. 75, winerspin 190omt a near possibility; ew after Mao's death l~ll )731775,1970Poking's absorption with China's domestic affair's The Soviet Union prefers the present limited war will continue to dominate Its fbreicn policy. Amy In te wichreqire Mddl Eat. Inceasng rab Important amov by the United State* toward China dependence, to another full-scale var. Israel Is with bou nnd t hnlune Soirectl Amioniopn thelqaetions replacing West Germsny as the object of Soviet wt aa n h oituin pnteqeto hate propaganda because an anti-israeli campaign of China's admission to the United Nations, and increases Moscow's influence among th Arab Stttes adversely affect the American presence in Asia. and tho Chinese disputa In forcing the Russians to To he realistic, America's Chinas policy not not search for ddtente in Euarope. which requires bet- be rigid but try cautiously and patiently to work ter West German rels'4ions. A thaw In Soviet-lasa- for Sino-American agrements in areas of' nonidecolet relations Is 0 out of the question"t until Is- lgical concern. These ma soe relate, to secuarirael withdraws fro the occupied territories. ty and leand to war prevention talks. Ther most Israel could hope for, however, would be freedom of navigation of the Straits of Tiran and possibly the Suez Canal. In the satoellite countries there Is mob sympathy for Israel outside93 thur Comunist party and even within the party to %mb~. Mnuaemhaa. CNINA'S COIFLCT WITH MNIA AND "tungar and Yugoslavia. THE SWINT UNION. Calcutta, World Press, i3p. EST4O.5.X Contents.--pt. 1. Chiaa,41viat relations: In- Freeth, Gordon. AUSTRALIA AND ITS RMATIONS WITH trodaction and re-ati (69-92) Relations ASIA. bj Australia. Ds. o mrl& s. frais W97 to 196h&-pt. 2. Chisa-ladia rasa- Current notes on tnternati.asa. affairs, v.. ho tiams. Revival of caitwal neatast. The Tibet- Oct ý-578. no quesetion. Leadership of Asia and the Soviet MW4l~.33, v. 10 aid. Powers Interested Ila Chinaf-indIa ecnflict. intrigues on Tibet ean the WeA 14sastor. The Australia's participation In regional socurity conclusion. The postacrips.-4kte.--important wats, aims to assisot legitimate gawsrmeo that dee -Glc iblicprapby. wre or art likely to become the targets of extertally supporte subvrsion to derendt theeselves Pro-aeviet, 410ti.40011t 4ismASS10on Or t1e India- 'wv~tually. in accordance with the keystone of Chiso-Soviet Vnion triangle. India to endangered Au rai1ler security, the Ansus Treaty of 19u1. as not by internal commialma bet ow a Sia.-Americas t--w-a-uted by tbe southast Asia Collective We- alliance, inspired by Joalcousy or India$& growing f-t.-v ;.rvaty, Australia ei asoret tro-to to Korea, Induastrialization.

19 THE OnTU 'ikflal FOLITIAL ENVIRONMEN J. rity system. The American emhasis on the nuclear Graff, Henry F. PARTICIPATORY FORNINOLICY. New nonaproliferation treaty precluded nuclear sharing, leader, v. 53, lmar. 2, 1970: illus. end tae strategic ams limitation tialks Implied Ea11J3T, Y. 53 acceptance of Sovist-Amuuican parity. This doubt about the effectiveness of an American nuclear coa- Senate Resolution (B. Res.) 85 in effect asserts mitment to Buanpe previously taken for granted upthat Congress mast be recognised aso an equal part- set Do Gaualle's timetable. The suiperpower standner of the President In shaping foreign policy. off had come prematurely. that Is. before burope Support for S. Rea. 85 came from "International- would be able to protest effectively ag"aist havlets' and "isolationists," who are united in Ing its future shaped in possibly inapproriate thinking that Inordinate growth of presidential ways. The Idea of "European cmacus,' the interpower has occurred through default of Congress. gst in maltilateral development sad production of The effort to alter the presont relationship Is wospon system,. and the change In French strategic one aspect of America's discontent with its ew. policy W~ar from the 'all-aximuths" theory are foreign policy performance. While not in itself signs of a as' Preach attitude toward alliances. a movement to isolation, although It say foreshad- These sips do not mean that France will accept or ow such a move, CO. Res. 85 expresses the hope of promote a united Europe closely tied to the Uninted "discovering a fresh way of defining such unavoid- States or return to MATO. The French objective Is able concepts as 'national interest' Lad 'inter- to mesh its military power into the NATO 1ayzteo innational responsibilities.' lodpendently. The successful dovetailing of a small Independent deterrent force with NATO would give Western Europe the assurance It requaires while 9as nt NTDUEE TEtfT searching for a new security system. ED STATES AND 112TRNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. (Amer- 98 Ica's role liz world affairs series) Inglewood Hammncd, Pau Y. p33sedint, POLIIf~CS, AND IMTM~A- Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Haln P. TIORAL INTURVITION. kn American Academy of Po- JX29TT.2.U512 litical and Social Science. Phiadephia1. Prota- Bibliogrsphics.ý footnotes. onists, power. and the Third World: seesq& on the Contnts.atine. ~ ~changing International system. Philadelphia, tiona ytent.- Amrionand dtatesmen and the intern (LU Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p national system. latoo"l security, world peace,.ia v 8 and disszmmnt.-world economic development, In repudiating Isolationism after World lbr 11, trade, end finance.-the next challeng: human the intornationslists did not specify any princirights, science, sad techoology.-tbe future In- pig of discrimination for oar Involvement beyond ternational systes-agencies.- Index. on undisputed Interest In saying lmrage. Two con- ~mins 'te ciaiaot- ntwos a~ lng-ditions prevented a thoughtful sifting: of Ameican foamies, the nstwrait aod ishotitutiongradevie interests and opportunitiea after World forcs, War he en cnstains II: Intittion deis"the need to mobilise American political consent to channel them, amd the Immersion of the national fo an lntermatlonal role and the obtrusiveness of Interest of the United States in this pattern," the Souiet Commnist enmv. Furthermore, the powhich ccmirlse the International 'ýweb.f interdo- litical costs that the Truman adinistration Inpendence. The meaner in which Americans fouua- on-red after 108 1W swpearing to let Nationalist late specific policy demands on International or- Ciafl e wr rsdnilamnsrto ganizations is Illustrated In the areas of collec- edina fall led e~r arsien tirall adeinistrategiotive, security, regional defensive alincs sicahntmdotacvwalbeasrt o contol. tchncal id nd eveopmet, radesodword thbe Carsinmiat world. The Korean war predis- Mactrol aide and techeical ts evelotettoo trladeand posed the voting public to Want soesolution, and tecnology. enternghtsionalapan~ning &M Ascmience %boy turne to Eisenhowr. The election of 19% Uwecheolog. and interatioalmso planning. trensau Indicated a bread PAUbic coanfdence tn his; yet, WAthe acvtiiance n of soiystemirac existing, tead his critics were a&me to capitallse on anxieties skdetches contnuation of theystemictlearling, Dana over bis apparent complaceac aboat the roreign sketches~~~dvu-mt fth thet fuse otraioaassemk triggered in 19%?. Kennedy MnOd foreign policy as a political opporp66 ~tudlty, "apialling ON %he 6mnis Of foreign Hadik, Loasso. MAXIVES 10 AiPIDAC To MRSIM M- policy to expand his popularity quickly. Johason POPMA SMOZTY. Worid affairs. v D : ame himself aver to a military solution is Vitt JM90I.V7, nea n Mnanffoet toheepabad OftpUhIc top&- tleace over te war. The Niton adinistrat~on' W. Qulls 80k Important changes in einks.. and earls strategy eom to to to "Ovseage a rvduepriorities before passing on his alliance and secu- tion of public attention to Vistoem and Other forrity policies %a F'ompiesu. lie had bees forced Into sign-policy leass. mod a retura to deferential 1vthifthing his coffoepta or soviot-bloc inner rela1- public attitu-1desmimisesft of Etlasesher's nfl~t tions~hip$ Ma4 Of Trtace's piaue in mu~p by the tofu. "hat any be onssetial to via public %cc*%_ Catch inasion% and the ruse 1966 flou. In %"Id- ame of aw feasible Vleat settlemast. As for tics. U's Volte ft&ats Won" to himt to he puriv- the futo", Vietnam make it possible aw* to %abe- L04 a ccoase Q~at endangered the lesfur soft*~ fts the coesl b tsarasea. (Atrtbet sucmp.- Frn.o required to cc"a.rmet a sew ELspean svec- plied)

20 22 MMI ZDNTROL & DISARMANENT 988 Cantenta.- Preface.-ULst aoaf eiain. Buopeanlea, Jukka. THE fl OF COOFAWIZU List at charts.- Introdlectiam.-!hs Internal Metn IM "WOl8 POLI WCY. Revieow of interafs- ti-mg or North Xmra's foreip policy.- Earth Kame tianal atfairs, v. 20, Dec. 5, 1969: mod the Slno-Soviet rift.-north Konea.d Korean D639.1th, v. 2D meifiaatica.-nartb Korestis relatians with the Third Vorld and beyoai -4komary mod conclusion.- Neutral and socali-ned states Increasingly see 3ibi"igraphy.-Aboust the mothor. their optimal policy em a comination of Invertiality end constructive activity. Organizations Analyse North Ems.'. policy toward the Soviet like the loooamlc Comission flor mwarpe, vhiob Union, China, the?bird Var,14, and the Vwt and promote sent-vest cooperation, we of Interest to eaminmes the goals and tactics of its unification Finland. Linited regioaul cooperation of the kind policy. infto cich Finland bas entered with the other Scandinavian countries i-n a transitionl eaur towrd Beaposs security. 22e Finnish relatione- 992 ShiP with the Soviet Usia. is an atmple of the Kah, W'tmg Chug. ZMM AMI MD VM possibility of peacefial coexistence of cauntrias OCRKM. Vestera political quately, Y. 22, Dec. with different political mad social systems. In 1969: 91w0-962 JAI. IA, v. 22 this Finland hen boween aefl. to hamar the spirit of neutralism. When Finland becemm am associate Asserts that national self-interest and personal, member of the borapemn Free Trade Association, the political mobitions are the major deteralnants of saea acmmercial privileges were avarded the Soviet North Korea's approach to the Sino-Soviet schies. Union, sad Finland does not contemplate joining The practice hao been to exploit the schies to inthe C mar ket, With its praonouced political crease North Korea's suatomy within the Communist emphasis. In Ve 1969 Finland expressed the posi- com and *"act a sennimm of bloc sesssistence for tive aspect of neutrality by w~oman its wii- industrialization In the north and communization Un~govess to host a frwoposm security conference. In the south. 989 Jha, D. C. A!ThWI OF ONNW13T GINA 73VA1 ID 99 INUO-PAKISTANI UWCUM. LIndin Journal or Kudriestsev, V. WO NUR.. Correct digest of political sciewnce v. 30, Jualy/Sept. 1969: 24- the Soviet Press, V. 22# Feb. 3, IM70 23-lA *26.15, v. 30 Df9.CST, v. 22 uvela Commnist China's reatiaons wit lafte, Zxh Slow an.o,190.4d Pakistan, cophsiting &lno-pakistami collab..savh oration aginst India. JAf concludes that ChM- Vise president Agnew's Asian tour anderlined nespolicy toward the 106-PokistanI sabcati- that, th Oo Doctrinem does at alter taw Wg set ios haped by regional Sins-Indian cometition Veesive Intentions Implicit In f"mme Presideint and Sineo-American and Sine-Soviet rivalries. Jobaso's 'Asia. Doctrine." While the Presiden presente Vlaieteniatifa as a panacea, the Viet Prealdent, oak"s 1% clear that, Vietsemilsatioa an Kals. Volf. CU.S. MOMZI PWLCY 1N LATIN AIENCAI that tia Iitud Stated vill -e try to stifle ma- Sicbsrheit~spoitik der USA. ts Lateinmmarika. Au,- tsual liheratias moeents with active reactionseapolitlk, V. 20. Dec. 1969:?56.T rare" 0839-A885, v. 20 The Unlited States considers Lattln Aseritas outpost of its Security policy, but Its methods Looev. M OWPOLITIChl, COMOW!1 IN IE ft- &ave changed in years. 'Dig stick' -st- CITIC. IntRUSat"ic affairs IlMkVcW) Mo. 1. Jan. ow** have becoae impracctasi almee the last In- 1970: DO M0 to$ 0 tiom tn the Dielieaa Republic. Vaskington no ims for the dmoestic security Of Latin AD" - U611,O the Mti-rlcanlen tat increas. ca against rebellliom.4 revolution. Kate here Ingly dharstevise 1he Third Vmrs str*wo analses contractual arrangemeats "A aenhcis to apiset Leperialism. U.S. pollaymmehers usido like eactmi Iab this. - h presen P omens io Amterian to disguise their fti~t *0tast the national ZIt'- policy methods coincides, with the graaig imae. Oration iweenst Isimultalting a political MAn at military regime. is the regone. Nili1tary aid military wtittr-a-al ftro Sestuoat A1ik. noe "An W" trade Plowys ImLportant role as U.S. of- brut of & th e fesive bdea VWold thee fall to forts to IMPOeW LatinAarbeiame epc"ity. (Times- the MOMe itates MMelaSd -. tbh the UMite latoma or supplied abstract. sediried) States, pnionrl*y Japan a"d Austalia. "I1 tab, 4"* awul. UK as3 POLICY VW331 Wm. New Taft. hftwe U9199 W~. 73? P. (Presege M Levi. ftwae.- USX=. 1IMlinIS. AM 99MAI 1W.- "speia tadies is international, politics end pt*- MV. 1V&&teraatie lest.1s I~t-i.v A. ftr. Lit aflejip. 1) W v. A 99n

21 i1n INTERATIOAL FOLITIAL INVIRONMEN 223 Analses the relative importanes of idoolog demonstrate that Soviet aid to Xndia is without end national Interest$ s -determinants of foreign political strings, while imperislist aid Is a Policy. Levi contends that ids*olog plays a sub- Morm of econamie blackmail. Manon's forevctd ordinate end minor role in deciding the statels calls the growth of Indo-SOwiet friendship and objectives mad plan for action to reach them, end cooperation Oa remarkable occurence" that saw a more important role In Justifying the decision be expected to esimars. once it bas been made." Lodge, George C. IMaiS OF CRO; UK=TI STATI' Matinez, Lusion C CMIIU13 CIMI POLIC TOIIA WDM IST AND UVOUMOA 11 lati N MUCA. With IN= ANWCA7-9. uwlvrns. ee eiwv 2 an introd. by Somel P. Huntington. New 9". 3. Knopft, 1969 x. 411 wll 10 blpical referenees in %oftotes * Partia oantents.-the ecan-oeq the strucr;.ures uesciss hy eigo hns of powr end powerty.-panltis: problems of le- Sw "cu' Polcy us-soie a China"i gitimacy end inteuatian.-the culture: a crisis mtard idof ogicltreatesipn ofd the l~ti Aricen of purpose.-a doctrine ~hu chang end tend- frielgcllaesi tteltnaeia virmomsnt.-applying the doctrine: Mexico, Vone- CNMMrist Portion, and concledes that Poking has sutla, and Drsail.-Tbe military.-comnmists end tailed to Increase Its Influence In the region. revtolutinaeries.-tbe interests of the United States.-A cominitmnt to chanee.-now structuresm for the revolutionary process.- Imdex. ~~C 1 15 U DU.~n0 Reassesses U.S. policies in the Third World, a. AiAqo 3 PLCIVrneeava a peciall Latin America, exposs the contradiction Greamm sinai Vearnftigm ostioultk. Poutitach inaeias foreign policy between commtmouts toet.1,du.36:2b change end stability. end outlines a nam ideolog SJ5,.3 far U.S. foreign policy u replace enticommuism. si h alto h oaetc the Gaemm Federal Reumb'ie that Daiwa% faitara 997 of ponlelts differeatiatien ni ae n Impending MacDougll. Callms. AF UR' MIM. Far liberallmatiem Is the Soviet bloc end paseibili- MCeters 4c~ review% V. 66, Des. 25a IM6: ties tar Iimroied rl~atios mith Vent cormew. 70l-7m. ilung. U~Ik Ji, ".l. 66 Nasa points to the eantinatien of Soviet control over Bust G!rmm men Botona Mape, a a aet I*. Analyses fsin-cenadies relations, foousing am Portent factor In Moseem' aoffam policy end Mogtrade and the uraet diplomatic negoiations in PAS, that ft= rawein Soviet policygoals am Stockholm. Simne the tawk Wre proceeding moth- tanmlate a new Matters polcy. ly end the Taiwan Ismn offears asotishle, it is only a matter of time befota China end Canaa mestablish 4iploawtic relations. 10 Meathlee VaYoker. CUIII AND AMCICD China ad At- 996 rims. Ig lietitst fir Asiak. Ulttellungen, Nalsviys. Rarsh V.. MR AID FM FIOU USATS no. AS. W9O: nm-80511f Uw WcC owomaios. ftvw4: Uw 1. P. S. Res"n. Prerl ft.. 6. car%. New ftlhi. :M60i-Sovlet Cultural SOCIti C1W6S) '6 P'. Caet-Pel.irn cto:chinesewr~-590.1riir Atrim re~t~lotms; a roesearb mad biwnooephiapla. rst.-chlma's Africa pointy from the Mambn~g camtn".-pnoanind tn so""e Union end tn Costerene til Chm os-isi' jemrsa of & India. IV qyma Chaa.-Soo~oncen MACultural re- -The Arriem a jinuy ot Cho ft-la, Ratios or en md Wmis. %V 5. N1. Papv.-Sawi- China's VAtries policy after amw Me-al's jourat union "At the stoy oro" iianoll, %W 1. D. soq--the tnstiititoo" bmis of h"inas Atricas N~lvlj.-ovIt-ldis eenic a" tothaical Poiqw.-Ie seas of Chisa's Atriuas Pollcy.-Itb cep~retiaa. by 15. V8hncko.-1eeAL an Sowiet aim of China's African W..tq.-Problme t, wconomicl aid. *- sand Znp- China's Africsanple.4Il~p qua. 02e trul. ptartne1rs It. teft years of Inioowiei% qeonmicl tooperstion. Pastas weeks as Siss-Afticas reiatioss mod tsa- 1y I. o. f"v.-tba feoou. of Soviet freigp wes t- developmet at huing's Africa. pulery. tuv with bv"ieqlat toautries, %W T. A. &*low. MIAiee considers Pu"Ia's military aid to sews- -4wi~t Wtlatlag end #vblidatloa, %W A. Si14mw. 3utiosu, Arriew eomp. iralifing the --raaiaig -lawas.*viet VconoIc ties: U10 hewolaplgs Va Of A~ftissm Is pevilla weafat. Aith~g CuIna -~~~14 L*0~i t seek see.mni prerequisites toe repine. Vasteam ad Swiss ~alaqeaee is Amres, it we wr- Artleles cal..ct" 1 by tass onaca Coperntioo aged is a relatiwely short time ionoata"if~hag or -it UNlb :na-sovivt CslIWTaLI Soclety to apitl.iyisetmes "'eesae there.

22 224 ARMS WWTfROL A DISARMAMNTf , Nelchidord isbibe., Charles. C311 AND DIWOKA- MUst, Thmu. B. AIVMYILTA'S anzz POLMC. CT: U.S. AMONW AROUND 25 RO D WJ fnee at CSBdeql Awns =4 Robertson C1963 xiw, 361 p. liplametie: laction 6sn etat-uni. dan. I* wandt. so (m linit" papers) Revae atiltaire dinfiral.; Omnimal itary review, 1wnU3 DA no. 20, Dec. 1969: 6T3-W9. Dibliogrqulw: p. C u2.rnd ISP69 Includes smmaries In langlh and German. COvtnt~s.-Ittoduction.- Tbe inhsritance.-tbe context of foreign policy decisions.- AustrsJlia Rzomies U.S. policy toward ftrope, the Vidai. end Asia: 1.* The nearer meighborhood.-australia Zest, and the Far Bast. The United States maud end Asia: ni. The continent end region.-aaaslike to ease relations with Parts to strendthen tralls and the Uniuted Slates.-A~utralia, Britain NATO, but philosophical diffrences remain, The and *the Ouwlh.-wpe et and la5t.- afthar maintains Oat Amsrica's Middle 1eastern Areas ot developping diplamatic Interest.-hAustapolicy say became save balanced to ensure oil In- lia, New Zealand, and the Pacific.-AustraLla en vestments and offeet Soviet Influence. American the United Nations.- Soes economic aspects.- Imalleaders hope to Obtain Soviet support for a far gration and foreign relations.-fte vay ahead.- Vietuan settlement. but Noscov's price ma be Appendimes.- Index. Runins Australia's foreign policy within the framework of Its foreign relaticns, role In the 1003 United Nlatious..d Imigration policy. In liht wolnikov, 0=11l. C~i MI ya Tim PI~aNCa or RA- of Great Britain's witldrawal last of Suez and PALL O", m ' InTWm VIT FFOFMS0 DmIU America's Far goast policy, NSlwa contends that OIW.EIKO, A BDOM = ON U O R *lab "Ihbin Australia should develop solitical attitude, Upfflr die Prninipien van Repallol; SIm..Gespr"a ward China that wmore nr cousisa'-* with Its trade sit am oujoebashe Dentschlm&-Eqerten Pvrof- policest Involve itself in Inikinesia's recoustrucso. Dmilil Nelalbor. Spiapl, v. 2b. Jqm. 19, tion, sod coordinate, in ocooperation with New W97: 90, 92, ?, un. Zealand mad the United States, a aevalopmsnta1 aid AP30.866, v. Ab prqra for the South Pacific islands. As loam as Eawoe in divided Into military and ecoic bloc.. It M remain a powfer had and a 10 twreet to vorld peace since bropean wars are tin- founheao. Charl**. iumww F OLIICS; CKINA AND ditionall difficalt to localias. A solution to TRAM-AMU PEOLI'S Esiu2 Ur*.IMI1T UOMANDAthe present predicamet ousal %W edtente reame.?iu, ?. Cambridge, lost Asian Research tisof the am race, end a liquudation of the Canter. Harvard Wonv 1u1yp distribautod kv arvard aes all aimed at the establishmenat of a brope- Wvrst Preom, p. (Ilervart Bet an security ayxtaw. Si*teaslc b] Cmmt Aside& ==erqarh 77). wt alrseslike Increased socamiopc r. Bibliographica referenoes included In "Notes: atio. American participation in the wrwopan so aarity patas would depeni on a decision 1W an W-allE peas ocaf oere. Within V ~bxr~opew so- -Xta4.tia-Dlb donent. 3.- thoie, German $teate could devlop Ceiro end West Asia.-Comakry to Nmfti: the Africloser cooperation with each other thean with eth- amn* abe.-und ~fte PW4in ve. Muetou.- -1cally different state.. Their ooafeders.loo Ito Wiameba to Algiers: the deaward slope.-4te end bm-sr. lupoasible. given their differeat politi.. 0 a poliy.-cocm**a -ApwAend 1: IlRatioal cal Oratef. noe M99 Soviet draft of a ferass affiliates of the LAPSO-Appendi11,I Cmaatri"a pow*e trety still stf " on ft.r to p'1imi represented on the LiMO nvout iv. Consitta..4 ple. The Cermam Podrerl epublic mast tisally Pormspet secretariat. retogie the 0emsm Ganoerate fe"iblic NAn the Iwo ti bounderies La intersatiowa Iaw. IeSo a.- the "l oy role. ed Wefetivenesa of Vitt Union's Interent is a pow.1ble, emanciatiom- ts ktoasa rvples' Solidarity Organisation of-forc Iwoemt with bone stem ftro Its desire end its relatiouskip to Cuines frenigs policy. kwo each Weecus With all ftropea State.. Saka 4MG.s entould Geea Pow Into a frietaish.p past like the Treaty at Sapallo. aticb NIt. dies*-chong. JAPAN'S FREGX RUJC?. M=t. vus very.awtitalv fat Geruaant ad the Soviet POsT-. AID PMi!. rmt's flttse Latiow., Uniofm. The 3oriet Uniong ami gt q I to uliefsial w.ide Jan. LPN0; a K. geet Geman from its Meeters moeimbeea. As an vms&.f W. it VComit West Power, Meet aerms could Olait a Mach ftniawt role!ýolttlealls If it and PAee The LAfMwee of..4pas's slogra** and softe" fteonic relations With Mersa Sores.. did set diplomat,4 ~exrieaee as Japwae pereeptio ocs ulo* re reige farce. me& ameipteted itscear fron cw'vrt ftreid paic~y limes. aim rredlts a rvrtrflctivraoris J ~isa fuens. I* Wpsineple hup ioot~ftitwe of tup U.S.-.Japm secuity treaty taoiltility or a "special' relotioooer4 betwfq bryoif LM7 am a aim but steso Iacreeee Ito %%a the 5ovIet Unon mstas. JWapans Arue" Prores.

23 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT China's international role with its West European Nixon, Richard M., _Pr~uU.S. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY partners whether its negotiations to join the Corn- FOR THE 1970'S; A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE. In mon Mar.ket are successful or not. As a second- U.S. Deit. of State. Denar'tment of State bulle- rank power Great Britain will have to create an tin, v. 62, Mar. 9, 1970: efficlent and resourcefau. foreign service by in- JX232.A33, v. 62 creasing the contacts between officials and scholars and making full use of potential intellectual Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The National resources. Se'urity Council system -- pt. 2. Partnership and the Mixon doctrine: Europe. The Western Hmisphere. Asia and the Pacific. Vietnam. The Mid dle East. Africa. International economic policy, Ray, Hemen. CHINA'S INITIATIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE. The United Nations --pt. 3. America's strength: Current scene, v. 7, Dec. 1, 1969: Shaping our military posture. The process of de- DS7O1.C9, v. 7 tense planning. Strategic policy. General pur- Bibliographical references included in "Notes": pose forces.--pt. 4. An era of negotiation: The Soviet Union. Eastern Europe. Communist China. Arms control. Issues for the future.--conclusion: Assesses Peking's East European policy, focusing A new definition of peace, on initiatives since the Czechoslovak invasion. China's attempts to mobilize support in Eastern The U.S. President's 1970 report to the Congress Europe may be designed to prevent a Soviet invaon the stste of the world and U.S. foreign and de- sion of China and seize the political and Ideologfense policy. ical leadership of the Communist movement NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT: AN INADEQUATE VISION Reischauer, Edwin 0 TH2 HIDDEN CRISIS IN ASIA. OF PEACE CedltorialJ War/peace report, v. 10, Reader's digest, v. 96, Feb. 1970: Mar. 1970: JXl9O1.W38, v. 10 AP2.R255, v. 96 President Nixon's foreign policy report reflects The possible termination of the -mutual security some progress in relations with Communist China, treaty has produced a crisis in Japanese-American chemical and biological warfare, and international relations. Although retention of the treaty is to trade and recognizes that the United States can no Japan's advantage, some Japanese opponents could longer play "world policeman" nor pursue nuclear force their Government to reject it if public superiority. However, the "Nixon Doctrine" in pressure continues to mount. While Americans are part "contains weasel words which would permit unaware of the crisis, U.S. commitmints in East U.S. intervention virtually at will," and the de- Asia hinge on the existing relationship with Japan plovment of the ARM and the multiple independent and access to military bases there and on Okinawa. reentry vehicle contradict President Nixon's rhet- Abrogation of the treaty and raarmament would oric on nuclear "sufficiency." The President's bring internal political turmoil to Japan, dimin- 7isition on Vietnam has been politically clever, ish the possibilities for regional security and but long before the elections it will be oh- cooperation, and cause greater uncertainty in the vious that his policy is prolonging the war. prospects for world peace. Increased defense ex- Instead of suggesting that peace requires world penditures would probably slow Japan's rate of law, President Nixon has based his concept of economic growth and curtpil its economic aid propeace o,. the same system of states that has bred grams. It would be a tragedy for Japan and the war for centuries. United States to compete militarily in the Pacific again Northedge, F. S. BRITAIN AS A SECOND-RANK POWER International affairs (London) v. 46, Jan. 1970: Richardson, Elliot L. UNITED STATES-AND WESTERN JXI.I53, v. 46 EUROPE; SECURITY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Feb. 15, 1970: Political nostalgia is shaping Great Britnin's PN6121.V52, v. 36 foreign policy. The Camsonwealth and the Anglo- Delivered before the Chicago Council on Foreign American "special relationship" have fostered Brit- Relations, Jan. 20, aln's illusions of global power. Great Britain must refrain from acting as a world mediator, Deupite the prosperity and stability of Western treat second-rank powe:s as equals, rethink its Europe and some relaxation in East-West tensions nuclear policies, and recognize its impotence in since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the security shaping the balance of power. Britain's only in- of Western Europe remains firmly linked to that terests in the Soviet-American 46tente lie in suc- of the United States. NkTO's strategy of flexi- = cessful arm's limitations talks and ensuring that ble response depends for its effectiveness on an the superpowers "do not manage the dgtente in such adequate U.S. military presence in Europe, drasa way %s to damage British or West European inter- tic reduction of which would seriously weaken the eats." Since Britain will have even less influ- alliance and contribute to European instability. ence on Chinese relations, it should discuss Reliance on large-scale troop airlifts is not yet

24 226 ARMS COrROL & DISARNMUM feasible, and the savings that would result from Sumwarises U.S. foreign policy objectives in ivthdrawing U.S. troops from Europe would be neg- Asia. Rogers contends that peace lies in the inligible. Cooperation between the United States terdependence of the peoples of the world. and Western Bu ope is also essential if progress is to be made toward reducing tensions in Europe and iproving the economic position of co- Rogers, William P. Cinterviev3 CHANGING ROLE OF,. ~~tries. reu.s. The United Stste supports current moves 1T:2-.ilsU.S. Dews & world report, v. 68, Jan. 26, toward European integration but believes that a strong, united Western Europe is necessary to at- JX..U65, v. 68 tain this goal. Responds to questions on the Vietnam War, tensicns in the Riddle East, U.S. relations with the Conmmist world and Europe, domestic determinants 1013 of foreign policy, and State Department reorgani- Robinson, Thomas W. EKING'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY zation. U.S. policy on all these matters is con- IN 111 DEVELOPING WORLD: THE FAILURE OF SUCCES. ditioned by the Nixon administration's decision to In American Academy of Political and Social Sci- shift to "a lowered profile and a reduced presence ence, Philadelnhia. Protagonists, power, and the of the United States, consistent with security Third World: essays on the changing international considerations." system. Philadelphia, 196. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p lo16 N1.Al, v. 386 Rose, Leo E., and Roger Dial. CAN A MINISTATE FIND TRUE HAPPINESS IN A WORLD DOMINATED BY PROTAGONIST Three facets of China's strateg of revolution- POWERS? THE NEPAL CASE. In American Academy of ary war are examined: (1) the Mao Tse-tung-Lin Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Pro- Piso theory of "people's war"; (2) the history of tagonists, power, and th: Third World: essays on Chinese Commnist ilvolvement abroad in promoting the changing international system. Philadelphia, "national liberation wars"; and (2) saw con (Its Arnals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 89- straints upon this instrument of Chinese policy. The contradiction between theory and practice is 101. HI.A4, v. 386 explained by real-world restraints upon Chinese Can a ministate located precariously between desires. The Maoist ".heory is essentially an hostile protagonist powers achieve a substantial analogy between the Chinese pre-19&9 revolutionary degree of independence in the formulation and inpast and the realities of the present-day world plenentation of its foreign policy on the baais of political situation. The analogy is imperfect, its own capabilities, or can this only be the conhowever, and many of the problems which China has sequence of forbearance on the part of its more encountered in fostering revolutionary movements powerful neighbors? We have explored the tactics abroad may be traced to this fact. Chinese lead- by vhich one such ministate, Nepal, has succeeded ers, prisoners of their limited world outlook, in developing an impressive repertory of responses cannot admit this. In fact, there is a low level to the intrusion of unwelcome, and often threatenof actual Chinese involvement in the "Third ing, external influences: balancing external in- World"; nowhere have the Chinese become, or are fluences and tacking back and forth between its they about to become, a majcr element in attempts two neighbors--india and China. The objective is to overthrow local governmenus bor rural-based both to minimize the restrictions imposed on guerrilla tactics. Three sets of limitations-- Nepal's freedom of action and to contribute to internal, external, and historical-are important that country's internal and external security. because together they place severe limits on the B&lance was sought through nonalignment in the level and the direction of Chinese involvement, disputes between its two neighbors during the past The possibilities for successful revolutionary war decade and through a process of political and ecolie in the hands of those who elect to pay more nomic diversification that was intended to mitiattention to local circumstances than to the nice- gate Nepal's "semisatellite" relationship to ties of the Chnese theory. (Abstract supplied, India. Neither policy has as yet been a total modified) success, end there are still important limitations on Nepal's capacity to act independently. Nevertheless, the range of freedom allowed to Nepal has been considerably expanded, and the Nepali leaders ioi4 have demonstrated their skill in defining the lnm- Rogers, William P. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE PACIFIC itations and exploiting them to their own advan- COMMUNITY; AN ADDRESS. [Washington3 Dept. of tage. Thus, we argue, any study of contemporary State (1or sale by the Supt. of Does., U.S. Govt. international politics that did not include an an- Print. Off., p. (Department of State alysis of ministate power would be incomplete. publication East Asian and Pacific series (Abstract supplied) 182) DS U6R Contents.--Asian-Pacific security: Viet-Nam.-- Period of change in Asia.--Communist China'a pow- Rosser, Richard F. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET FOR- EIGN POLICY. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prenticeer.--Efforts to comunicate ignored.--reaffirming Hall C p. maps. U.S. interests in the Pacific.--Collective securi- DK266.R66 ty in Asia.--Our Asian policy. Includes bibliographical references.

25 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 227 Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The bases of 1019 Soviet foreign policy: The roots of Soviet for- Rubinstein, Alvin Z. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED eign policy. The Marxist-Leninist ideology. WORLD. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University The impact of the ideology on Soviet foreign Press, xv, 353 p. policy.--pt. 2. The tactics of Soviet foreign DR367.AlR8 policy: The Bolsheviks acquire a country, Bibliography: p The consolidation of Soviet power, The Nazi menace, i1. The great Partial contents.--the uncertain years, patriotic war, The cold war, Between unalignment and nonalignment.--in The interregnum, Offensive the vanguard of nonalignment.--yugoslav diplomacy coexistence, Prudent globalism, at the United Nations: the political dimension Conclusion.--Significant dates in Soviet Yugoslavia and international economic cooperation: foreign policy.-other sources for the study of focus on the U.N.--Influencebuilding in the Third Soviet foreign policy.--index. World.--Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic: Evaluates the motivations behind Soviet fora study of the evolution of interdependence.-- Tito's acentric communism and Sino-Soviet rivalry eign policy, suggesting nine roots of Soviet ac- in the Third World.--Beyond nonalignment. tion, three of which Rosser emphasizes as both affecting and determining Soviet foreign policy. Focuses on the origins and developments of Yugo- Of the "motivational trilogy"--soviet national slavia's policy toward the nonalined world. interest, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the pow- Rubinstein examines the forces motivating Yugoslav er strdggle among members of the party elite-- leaders to begin their nonalinement policy, Belthe ideological root is discussed in most detail, grade's relationships with the United Arab Repuband Rosser analyzes the evidence for its contin- lic and other nonalined nations and its attitude uing existence as the prime motivating factor in toward the Moscow-Peking rift, and nonalinement's Soviet foreign policy. The interaction of these changing role in international relations. three roots is demonstrated by an examination of the major periods in Soviet foreign policy Schleicher, Charles P., and Joginder S. Bains. THE 1018 ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH Rothermund, Dietmar. INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED NATIONS. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana In American Academy of Political and Social Sci- Publications, p. (The Maxwell School ence, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the series on the administration of foreign policy Third World: essays on the changing international through the United Nations, 3) system. Philadelphia, (Its Annals, v. 386, JX I47S34 Nov. 1969) p Bibliographical footnotes. H1.A4, v. 386 B Indo-Soviet relations have formed a complex pat- Partial contents.--india's role in the United Nations system.--united Nations field operations tern in recent years: changing trends in foreign in India.--The conduct of Indian foreign policy; policy, trade, and aid; the fate of the Communist a general view.-the Ministry of External Affairs. party of India (CPI); the death of Nehru and the -Other ministries and organs.--india's permanent removal of Ihrushchev; Kosygin's mediation at UN mission and General Assembly delegations.-- Tashkent and Soviet military aid to Pakistan; the India's contributions to the United Nations sys- Chinese bomb and nonproliferation--these are only ten.--the Indian public and the United Nations.-- a few of the elements in the pattern. The two Summary. triangles India-China-Soviet Union and India- Pakistan-Soviet Union are of crucial importance in outlines Indian administrative organization and the game of international diplomacy, in which the Soviet Union has scored several points while India procedures for developing and administering policy vis-a-vis the United Nations system.--since U.N.- was groping for a new orientation after the period related tasks are performed largely by the Indian of the old cold war had come to an end and non- bodies responsible for both domestic and foreign alignment had lost much of its meaning. India's aspects of national problems, the outline is made political system has shown a remarkable stability, in the general context of the Indian political and it has been actively supported by the Soviet system. Union, although Soviet analysts and Indian Commu- s nists find it difficult to justify this support in Marxist terms. The reality of world affairs has 1021 often overruled ideological considerations, but Schttze, W'alter. LFRANCE BETWEEN FAST AND WEST) they must be taken into account, nevertheless, Frankrelch zwischen Ost und West. Moderne Welt, particularly in Indo-Soviet relations which go be- v. I0, no. 4, 1969: yond the diplomatic sphere and extend to internal D839.M58, v. 10 affairs, such as the development of the public sector of India's economy and joint production- Points to a recent Franco-American rapprochement p.anning for a diversification of exports and im- as dictated by changes in the international situaports. There are compelling reasons for the fur- tion and France's national interests and domestic ther co-operation of the two countries in spite of situation. Domestic political pressures have occasional misgivings. (Abstract supplied) caused France to continue nuclear armaments and

26 228 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT start new initiatives toward the East. The pre- in identifying than solving the great problems requisite for East-West dftente is, however, a co- that face the movement. The usual Soviet response ordination of Western policies toward the East. to nationalism, the youth movement, and other troublesoma issues is a greater dose of orthodoxy." 1022 The major goals of the Soviet leaders in organiz- Scott, U Robert. CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED ing the Moscow meetings were precisely to stop the STATES; A BRITISH VIEW. Foreign affairs, v. 48, erosion of C-meunist ideology and to strengthen Jan. 1970: their own Counist legitimacy. In view of this, SD41O.F6, v. 48 it is not surprising that during the course of the conference a series of clashes developed over such The American military presence in Vietnam will issues as the proper course to take with socialcontinue far longer than desired by advocates of democrats and the right of each party to make its immediate and complete withdrawal. The Soviet own policy, or that the meetings become a platform Union will not exert any pressure on North Vietnam for blatant attacks on Communist China. Given the to moderate its objectives because Soviet politi- importance it attaches to unity, the Soviet Union cal leaders see no reason to end a war that is certainly will continue to press Zor greater cohecostly to the United States in men, money, and sion among Communist Parties. However, it will be prestige. Communist China will continue to advo- satisfied with a rather loose institutional struccate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam ture and limited doctrinal content. It is diffiand support the establishment of a friendly gov- cult to see what practical consequences this kind ernment in the south. Although American confron- of unity would have. In a time of increasing Comtation with China is on the decline, there are munist heterodoxy, the Soviet Union cannot expect formidable obstacles to Sino-American cooperation. much support for its diplomacy from world Comnu- By overcoming these obstacles China could improve nist Party conferences. Nevertheless, the unity its economy and have a greater role in world af- of international communism is still a potent symfairs, and the United States could achieve a more bol in the Soviet Union and one that the Soviet flexible foreign policy. Further, there might be leadership continues to follow. a hope of negotiating a "hands off" agreement on Korea and Vietnam. Indeed, since America is 1025 clearly seeking to lessen its commitments on the Stoph, Willi. NORMAL RELATIONS ONLY WAY. Democratmainland of Asia, China may relax its anti-ameri- ic German report, v. 18, Dec. 3, 1969: canism. But there is no quick solution to world DD261.D3, v. 18 tensions, which are likely to continue. Excerpts from a speech of Nov. 12, Points out that the acknowledgment by West Ger- Smith, Gaddis. THE AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. man Chancellor Brandt of the German Democratic St. Louis, McGraw-Hill [ p. (Grass Republic (GDR) as a separate state represents roots guidebook series) progress in the German Federal Republic's policy E183.7.S563 although onn has not yet renounced the discrimi- Bibliography: p natory Hallstain doctrine. Bonn should hold negotiations on an equal basis with the GDR on the Contents.--Preface, by Townsend Scudder.--pt. 1..establishment of mutual relations in internation- Independence, Land, Power, al law The World Wars, Security, pt. 2. Foreign policy and the Constitution, Washington's Farewell Address, Sep tember 17, The French threat on the Missis- Str hm, Carl 0. CENTICDMDtT WITH RAPALLO. MOSCOW'S stppi, The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, "WISHES" FOR THE NEW GERMA FEUVAL OVERNMENT) Mission and opportunity in China, CHit Rapallo wird gelockt. Moskaus "WQnasche" an Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy, Presi- die neue Bundesregierung) Christ usa Welt, v. 22, dent Wilson's Fourteen Points, Outlawing Oct. 31, 1969: 7. Bt4.C37, v. 22 war, The arsenal of democracy, The Truman doctrine, The Cuban missile crisis, Considers the isolation of the German Federal Kennedy's strateg for peace, Ameri- Republic from the West and its reduction to Soviet can policy in Vietnam Dissent on Vietnam, dependency as aim of Moscow. Str8hM warns that Bonn's hopes for West German-Soviet and West Ger-man-East German accmodation mare illusory. History of U.S. foreign policy with a selection of historical documents Thornton, Thmas P. SUTH ASIA AND TI GMRAT POW- Sontag, John P. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND SOVIET ERS. World affairs, Y. 132, Mar. 1970: FOREIGN POLICY. Review of politics, v. 32, Jan. JXX9Ol.W7, v : JAI.R4, V. 32 Considers the ebb and flwo o0 relations of the The conference of Communist Parties held in ons- Southeast Asian states with the major systems as cow in June 1969 proved once agin that the inter- a model of interaction. Thornton concludes that national Commnist movement is very important to the area's present and future international postthe Soviet Union, which has been more successful tion will be deterained largely by the following 102T

27 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 229 generalizations: Any action by one invokes reae- moved closer to Pakistan to reduce its dependence tions by the others; subsystem ambers necessarily on both China and the West. become involved in the affairs of the major eyetemn; each nation seeks to have its allies support the totality of its international position; and 1030 major system competitors can cooperate in coping Tung, S. T. TM SINO-BOVIT CONFLICT AND TIE RECOGwith events occurring within a.ubsystem--e.g., NITION OF RED CHINA. West and East, v. 14, Dec. the parallel attempt of the Soviet Union and the 1969: 2-4. P&GP RR United States to stop the Indo-Pakiston war, a Address delivered to the Canadian Chinese Culpossible first step toward recognizing each other tural Society, Montreal, Canma, Oct. 8, as acceptable negotiating partners at the major system level. Surveys Sino-Soviet relations and concludes that war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. If Canada recognizes the Cmmunist Chinese Gov ernment, other nations might follow its example, Thornton, Thomas P. A VIEW PROM WASHINGTON... setting off a chain reaction that could perhaps Amerlean Acadeay of Political and Social Science, undermine the viability of the Nationalist gov- Philadeohbi. Protagonists, power, and the Third ernment. Recognition might be rwe appropriate World: essays on the chaning international ays- after the death of Mao Tse-tung. tea. Philadelphia, (its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p Hl.Ah, v UNA-USA National Policy Panel Toward the Reconcilia- American attitudes towards the Third World are tion of Europe. TOWARD THE RECONCILIATION OF ]ZURpassing through a critical period. Especially be- OPE: NEW APPROACHE FOR THE U.S., TIE UN, AID cause of the Vietnae ezperience, Americans are NATO; A REPORT. CNev York, United Nations Associplagued with self-doubts ad disillusioned with ation of the United States of America, p. the results of previous involvement. America can- JX1417.U2 not, hovever, turn its back on the Third World; it finds important interests there, as woll as a Contents.--Preface.-Tbe new setting: after pressing humanitarian challenge. The present Czechonlovakia.-Recent assumptions In European trend in U.S. policy involves a rejection of the policy.-nev measures for strengthening the unity role of world policeman, tempered by a realization of the Veat.- -ultilateral initiatives in the that U.S. power and near-onipresence place on- East-West area.-iinitiatives for a settlement of avoidable responsibilities on it. In establishing the German question.-the United States, the Soa new role for itself, the United States will have viet Union and lurope.--emoronda of coment, resto reduce the intensity of its involvement and ervation and dissent. look more toward multilateral arrangements. Despite the easing of the cold war, there ae major Outlines the basic premises of postwar U.S. problems at stake in dealing with the Soviet Union policy in Europe, recomends changes to strengthen and communisa as an ideology of modernisation. In West European unity and promote better relations a world in which violence will be widespread but with Eastern Europe, and suggests a new approach in which American power imposes limitations on to the problem of German reunification. U.S. actions, the Americans will have to develop strong nerves. The major challenge coms in the economic field, at a time when American reeources 1032 are badly strained. Problems involving invest- U.S. ept, *. Offitaet of M sia Svices. Cmmant, trade, and the grwing needs of the poorer MONIST CHINA. C[eshingtom, for sale tw the Supt. countries make urgent the development of a new and of Does., U.B. Govt. Print. Off., p. more productive approach to foreign aid. (Ab- in us. (Issues in United States foreign policy, stract supplied, modified) no. 4) U535 Department of State publication East 1029 Asian and Paciiee series 173. Tiwari * S. N. IS M)SOOW AT TIME QJI-DISTANCE FRM NEW MLI AND RAWALPINDI? Southeast Asia quar- Contente. -latr duction.-profle.-politics. - terly, v. h, July 1969: Econcmes.c-Agiculture.-Fosei policy.--4nited PAGP RR Ctates relations with Peking.--Chlmese puzazle.- Bibliography: p Conclusion.-"*s$ of China. Contends that the Soviet Union's recent deal- SArreys Chlna's political and economic position sin to extend milita ry aid to Pakistan marks a and its forein policy, particularly its relations major turning point In Soviet-Ind an relations. with the United States. Tiwari reviews the evolution of Soviet Indian relations from the das of the Indian National Movement to the present and nates their deterio ration since the Tashkent declaration. He con- THE UNSPCTACULAR FOREIGN POLICY. China newm sca- ;l, cludes that, far from remaining neutral in the *su, no Feb : 1-7. Inlo-Pakistani dispute, the Soviet Union has now DS771.5.CXk69, 1970

28 230 ARMS CONTROL &DISARMAhMNT Analyzes Camunisft China's foreign policy in the The political, pgeoapktr should play a major 1960's, focusing on the current Slo-Soviet ngop- role in forelga policy 4ecisioomaeking because he tiations, Chinats efforts to establish a new Pe- understands the Implications of physical cheang king-centered Communist Internationals, and the and advanced technology on the Political enviroongeneral political situation in Asia. The posul- went and cam iuterpret, fthe politics at a given bility of major nad. armed clashes In considered nation or Frou or nations with far mowe e n remote as long "s the Sino-Soviet negotiations than most. In an era of brinkmanabhip diplomac continue. If China adopted a more moderate and the political geographer can collect pertinent flexible foreign policy, it could play a dominant data, 1st qqrat. the. to a global context, and political role in Asia. It has, however, 4alient- translete the results. ed smany of the Asian nations by denouncing their leaders as criminals, and, as longas. the preseint 1038 leadership remains in control, a change in policy Woodmn, Dorothy. HIMALAYAN FROMMID; A POLITICAL is not anticipated. REVIEW OF BRIT 8H UISINDIAN, AND MIJUAN 14VALlIIIS. Nov York E1970, c p. maps. Valkenier, Elisabeth K. NEW NO IN SMI WO15.5V 1 KRIIC RELATIONS WITS U0ZUD NWOL. World poli- C tet. ap-prfc-!daand China In tics, Y. 22, Apr. 1970: Asia.-The f1rontier that was assuemd.--were three D639.V57. Y. 22 emires amet.-vest of the Karakorum Pass: tri- Note ai tht andtrae Svie plices ithangular diplomac.--china and Britain on the fromthe Third World have entered a phase In which Ver prld to the N.-obanfereei-Iatepeomcc. considerations of profit wre chalenging the Watd happnedtote ( Linl-rasn speoat.- hitherto dominant political motivations. While a~knd a~lndfghtn (SeptMl.-l re2-am spent).-un neither Soviet economic relations with the As-Taknadfihng(et 92k veloping countries nor the new pattern ip tof decided fronti-ers: the eternal triangle.-refrelations is now of decisive importance, a well- erences. -Bit lography. -Appendixes.-Index. coordinated economic penetration may be marre last- Reviews the role of the Himalayan frontier In ingly effective in the Third World than ptilitical India's foreign relations. India should initiate infiltration. an active foreign policy and reopen talks with 1035 Pakistan and China to reconsider the present Whetten, Lawrence I.. CHANGING WFIXT ATM TO stalmate In Weib the Himalayas form a military MARDS ARAB RADICAL VuinMM; M R" rin ~ OBT m bondsary. COMl rl X97. Now, Nonle moat, no. 1s, Nor. 1970: n. 006.l Zweig, Pertynand. ISRAEL: M WON AND t0 SAM. Reviews Soviet policy toward Camindnit Partie TH U IPVOEC AND T3WSTIU OF RE- In Arab countries. the relations of these parties RiaherONrCNROESA Tarlig Vikno ISRAEsIt PrssCNY with Arab governments, and the Internal conflicts Bu19693rd Fa l Dikiso Unvrst Prs between pro-soviet s=d pro-chinese flautions.ex0 2p.D2658 M Whetton notes the variations In Soviet policy and nt tpt1 Id tiyad fage Te the difficulties of Implementing the basic policy Contetigure. I.Ieonty feae sef-teimaga:therg of assimilation with the ruling parties. Sare~s rigrs Cmmnon faturty eisraes o h Jewtbaish 1036 cultures, and the search far Jevishoess. The Im- Whetten, Lawrence L. THE MOLS OF an =Khy in pact of Ieabreiaation and sulti-linealme. The 1111 MnlA-SOVIV RXATIOUS. Vwold today. v. 25, Journey in tim. ftra fo="atom of Idetity amd Dec self-imag. 21e basic m'tha of Israel. 'Del- DblO.143* v. 25 gioaulity,' the mntionalatouato religious cul- The re oslag behind Vest Garmaay's am Bas ture. ho, Is a Jaw? Speaific worsm generic emman policy. the early results of It 1mp..n antl-smitiaa.--pt. 2. Status and stratification: tation. and Its longterm consequences fbr the two Th two Twols. Stratrifiction MAd status die- 0"W,the Soviet Ihios. and Moope. The two tinations. Tbe Prooes of urbessatiom. the lee- Geraysmybe ueble to reach formal agremnt. ta ofth kibbutz saerla..t. Itiatfldl9t, lateon unification or esanfederation, but the growth of pral treis Milolmm fte dwevlution of Israeli an Informal community of Interests and a womansociais. The presses of uriestallsatio.-gpt. view an foreign policy might enable then to act in 3. Two aysiques: The awutiqea or wiotsano. The concert and 6exercise the authority of a tuird srsti a Vmofre4tioo. 110 figure at Joe"s an Power to Continental oatters.0 If so, the Soviet the Isrmeli hairiaon.--ptf. 11. manometers MAn dia- Union will have to find memo to scac modate, the logest The Arab-Israeli counflit. The Iosre~li Germs Interest without peruitting It to dominate drtisb amonster. The Isreit-Amoriaft dialegue. EuropeT"e lesfuli-posasi ansouater. The Isrooel-O emm aamoater. The Zsranl.-Afro-Asian co-operation. Tue discrepancy betin. Israel and the diaspora.- Viniters, Philip It. POLICY AID TO POLITICAL 'isowa- Comalusiom? oballea and rsoe.ida MoR. A~ united States NaVal Institute, ANN&- ILL. Proceedings. v. 95. Dec. 1969: Analyses lareaeli soiety, ftreign relations, asd mis. Y.US v. 95 Isroalel ftle smog sations.

29 I!Iw II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT MODERN WAR insurgecy The Indoeian war, of indepedene, Conflict in thu Widdle last, T. Lessons for conflict control 10110from the five conf~lits.-pt. 3. United States Anderson, David C. f63iiowurre OF DhVIA2. Cur- interests. Towrd a strategy of conflict control. rent, no. 11.1, Jan. 1970: &S6. -Anms~me.: The structure of local conflict. AP2.C9259, 1910 The structure af local-conflit control. The Reprinted from The Va~ll Street Journal, Nov. 2h., fifty-four locl conflits. Model of U.S. policy cal, political, end psychological loss. Predict- Proposes a strateff of conflict control. to pre-j ably, In Vietnam, each of those Is a tangle of en- vent, contaiz, or terminate local conflits In biguities. America's physical losses have been which the United States has an Interest. Bloom- Uerimms but not bumiliating or crippling. Politi.. field end Lts. examine five such conflicts ase a sally, thu m.jar result has been not a loss but a basis for constructing their strategy. lenson; via, that there awe limits to U.S. power abroad, especially In the developing countries. The psychological results awe not ccmplete. buat It 101,3 is very probable that on balance they winl be pos- Dorst, Jay A. LZJUT 00hVMTAL WER-CAN IT IN itive. A period of national self-examination io ucuesiul? "a U.S. -Ar ndgnra tf the mast likely consequence of defeat, end, If 2Q.b W-M- M ilitary review, v. 50,. this results In a better, more mature understand- Jan. 197: 3Aý Was 5 log of U.S. responsibilities In the world. peace will be nerved. The notion of ambiguous defeat In not self-crotradictcr. National powax depends on Doe discovery that neither massive retaliation internal developments as mobh as external ones, nor limited mmdar war is a rational solution to and the United States stands to pin more from the the strategic problem Po0ed %W maclear W*apons led liquidation of an unpopular war then It will lose to adoption of the strategy of fissibls response. through permitting Conmmnist conquest of a no- Tadft that strategy Is being tested in v.l.nw in strategic area, a entitled version In ubich the United States has refrained from wsing or threatening to use nuclear weapons and acepted restraints ona the wse Of Its 1041Conventional florcos. Could this limited cowebirkoe, Alexander S. A 313LOMMUICAL DhIOUCTIZO tional war version of the ftexble response strat- 70 YhIIGP =MIARY IIODICA. Military at- egy ever be successfual? The answer wuald appear fairs, v. 33, Dec. 1969: ~ M6. to he no. The Vietnam War hasabove that, If Ila. E1S1.055,v 33 Its are set to escalation end the nscalatioa that doe tab. place Is no deliberate that the eno Surveys a military journal of ladi&aend ths or cam freseoe It 6 smaths in advance, the will of the major continental bwopweea coutries end pro- the asa, *wem a weak sum, canot be broken vides a brief description of their Principal im- The ability of the United States 'to aesist a weak terets. ally in defeating en externally miseted insurgency is limited 1W the inhibitions, moral, rational, end ponltial, %Web cit voluntarily iqinose(a 104 pmn CItal theoretical power' bloonfield, Lincoln P., nj Amelia C. Lets. C0U suw. NA; A 821R&W ro ink ~ Sm Io**, Knopf, W99. xiv. 422, ativ p. LLLAs JKI Keddi, George Ne?., Joe V. Levis.?99 Wrl *A staft hen the Center for laterastioal w"m IN "Mo. IWT. "d. Sm York, Dial Studies, masacmehtts institute of?ehodlog.'0 Press (1.* miw, 5115 p. map. (A Riblicpepbeal fe~otace. Dial repovt 5?A Cca~as.Iatodeton.-p.. The ev of I*- contents.-dietorleal baekwom*.-ftuan "nd cal ccathi'i. As smnats of counfict. Lessons the Vieenisb.-The GenevcaCefsroefe.-The aftftos Mawen hieown.-pt. 2. Levaning fron ager pn of tan altes.?e oeiis of the civil i.. a tehiqe " Sawes-JIrsaa" ccaflet, ftr.-uw4mie ae~t ~ toiial or the 19&1-19&T. l. 3W or Pip, The areak T e ra-elto sepose.-fte unstable. I

30 232 ARMS CONTROL A DSAMUAMENT gouth.--chinsa".4 ietan...the global cooatet.- posed of specific persons end acting under can- Limits Of cets Woe Apeios.Slc- historical maditions.0 Nmiever, guvernad bibllography.-zflds. moats tbat are, beset by smite crimes, Walc could PoecLAe the loyalty at critical emaeuet of the brings the story of the United states In Vista". population bring a war, Villi refrain from enterup thrcoug mid Kabi aend bowls concluade n"i complications. that "the manroneous poilses that provided the rationale for the folty Judigments of those cose daiaoiins led, the Unaited States to project W48 its pow arwnt Vietuoen still ipuera American "Il- Stupak, NoWal J., M1onald booher. WUPRLLZA i0109. *UWAUAP: A STRAUIMC ANALYSIS IN THE SUPOWU M"W3. studies an the Boviet Union, T. 6, no. 4. 1lo9: WECLET,.6 Lgites. Nathan C., M1 C~rle Valf. MME IXAN Argues that guerrilla warfare that Is used of- MUTT; )J AWAXZIC WBU 05D 001 fbesiwely fron a poseition of strength like that PLICY. Chicas, *zhhen Pu. Co. 174 P. of the Soviet Union cam became a strategic vemp- (Naftbom series In P&ble Policy enslysls) an comparable to the St aegice Air Command or 3C326.5.LA3 mny other force capable af exerting influence cn mootber nation. Homierer guerrilla watrfare is Contents.- Prefnee.-IftrodwUcon.--Cwret be- unique in that It operates below the threshold of liefa end theoxy.-4 alteratve appronoh: in- nula excbmp and Is lass likely' to escalate. sergucy as a sptn-!erbellion's viewpoint: Weather or not the strategic value of guerrilla structures, operations, enfd PPW~elvties.-'Jh en- wuarfar mokes it "Oesentiawl an instrument of thorityss viewpoint: concepts Med conduct of protracted cooflit io debatable. If It Is not, counterrebel~lics.-inflicting d=e.-.xnteli- ilt Certainly Could beoome oce.0 Pace end infolmation.-rsellon end ouatority: 049 haslyses specific oases Of lasugscy's in dwvel- Turnr, predariok C. PUFSWWHORLZ AXWM aping coutries to elemat theories af insurpamoo UP'TN ANIW LUM. COaentiro ff- 29, Oat. to the level tat Wes been attalsed in tae study 196: 3n., b. of =*aw skr 5ttat. UI.cS. v. 29 Surveys Soviet militar ;mubllatiomm. focusing 1046 on earmar-related articles. While military history ax, Alphomns. Cifi WII la NNUT 3S LAMI bas ~lq been Stressed. recent Wittlng have en- ANW1CA Die Pwtisea mnbwei Is LAtei~maria. jbasisd =mawlear endobical loaer. en am s ibipolitisohe Welt, v. 12, Dec. M89: 1S-2O. me., victor, mod sigbt combat operation. ftunu DWA5.P5 v. 12 assert that Soviet literature denonstatee a conspicuous lack of cosoer fur tactical air support contends that Latin Amcas lacs Important 000- although there wre omross refereasee to airbomn t~ica. far a popular gm~uerla vartsnt. The an halloonpler-aim troop landings In conjunction maeetthat has beon active there NJ iaes ala- with emo opersatios. Mate from privileged class"e. Decomme or Oligurchic exclusivensse Its leaders d[otres the popolace's obilitr to %mfsastgas Its ueintereets mi 1050 Often wre coa aandtoe % their naswomree. The Weidmmom, Mestbela. CMflOU AND A*mOC OfT movement "has so libe3.wt it only 0a one.0 Y.S. AXMS U *M =in 2W W#M Or 1W CNLW- MOSCOWlot ý that % so onm t is binsd to fail IMe=Or 4F UOCUSUL MR Amtos (3865- mod "its to turn the failure to its sftad - X986)) Prblams mod Aspetde r IUA-Aressiou top.. sowni We WA 4d hr bgeallosi3 aa t&" erfalp*ebfte Awbr"Ofae ( ). Saltackrift fit Niuilarsoasebibt. v. moa. 6, 1016 or969i : SPl?08. III". W OV fter. Ame J. DVMN CXMl MI FWb35zv 10 No= % A MnAU= ~mawxý' jemralof matsrea Uity v. 41, Sept Contedso tht the ObtdSat Bu" es "a"" Jnu a 3) v. hithe Tlt"eRe WW to tet ath possibility- of limitd wars *cm thet boates or the Socialist 90rld wat is a %*aol f Monstie potltesa wen is "aetn"o try Woo eshosivoa of tat mst~s. ft"ed * poutciens ch seek to salvwg their witia pwliftlea eneesel. from Offort posaitim eringse asatou""crisle. The IV twom"ateo escalation,.4 amod prut*a*e the t- polties ot diuueriamm War ad mouategrreof01.a0 Imperialist, NA isenatie enoemet from the sobaen been guaeely tied, to the Norepea "fte fom Cialiet st~ato. Ibe two *Sobbas Prowe tw 1870 to a9%. Lessafta to Ciomevit,, prepuan- futility of U.S. air attks as lan Nort k 0itn, bas atics flr war mod Its Oeltiasl Puroa are decided mofe a fiasc of the Am am concp or limited Ow i "abaat states but 1W owweroesets ma mt. U.S. dfat" is vietarn Pooest be at- iou -

31 THE MIRTUWlX DI3NVm~ m n33 trib"te mol3 ft. local ftdeveiqets but ftflecta matural poss &*A **"ae ar es th wiela coplot*hi prepam"m c af tbe Socialist world sstam Blam. So was" an requested wamr PMovshore v" the dirinking froedm of mction at the imporl- faa exiperiments. austmsptam. 105h 1051A 'arme mtakaiee Imsttute for bubli Potis Be- Vleabfer, DMisr. an u mm on=vd' O orcw VAmarob. u = Wuam AN urg. %dftgt An = 1 m P m Oý Y~ILTI w uaimais] os C T p. (VA Spmual smelymls, 91st Cam- Kriegabl]Ade4r boimmvehr to Spicmi bsutlm gross, let msiadm, no. p*2litsob-ollitfriscbev 9) Dhulitlt es. Vehrkuofto U3.V396, w. 18 llo~elfoats Examin the bmiaavehr's "ilriegobild'; I.*., atms-ar~ta.usc~-oiia "ams abstratim of total reality retlated to wm act soviro amot.-first strike.-am rb* at esula. at wor, whisk amp on~ a fumy7 'sefll aaordina- tiaa?-uwm sffectlwt-4are mests asootable?-volt tion of tbeaq md practice." Viam~fer d~souses. plwiedl -r. o mpw * * gerrill mrfare durift World war n a~d incamo- Almist theoy =4 Practise to PrOve tbftt, as a *tot.. ml oal..tin at the AN drot.. with maflfeststlam of modern reality ml so alternative extema"e voao fr 3f erusipsm" in to ftuwsamle ve, It should te Incorparated into tea bs. bmfteowbr's &Iregabld Ledersom, ilim R. L'IS ED SAM5 10 tm. umgal, Otto. = m (1W! mmof WU. BomJ Dadr's 41.6et. v. 96, Feb. 2m7: 22l"l-0. liv iheorie dmm klelom Waiges. R~m. ilitaie AMU.3$, v. 96 ghfira.; -- Ire military reovie, go. 6, Oct. 1969: Vi kk, 39 The pmteatlo afforded Ir smansm pa 6 enca- * Inlads resi stall"h WeFech t'n at ooar4ostel am- a" lead-hamod A31' NiAM givo the iitod Statesm a defmm -isosp Troese the dvolqpmit at porrilu wor theories that wotul der Inure""e proteetloom to a vital ftrm Clmmewits to oumr am I" Piag am stresses Portio ot U.S. votallator boece. f aem-bmed th* "moogl ovppot at tw poqdulaio wd outside satlb"llstle smioole Ingureept Votes (SUM5) logistic St ame s esmsamt fur orrective snrwll ship* osms eipne &l~ to in Award postims trus actlam. vowgel asasidres Isteresatmel leaso- vuei ow inemifg =W1' os au e 0Istereeptal postof Stuerilla %nfers md dlsousa uatipe- laftfem "ClY o aid dis ed Goa, seelterrila nethods, polatifg cot that sold rules ceplt woul tvu r e vo the Amopue mlod e like umlag the epmrrinllas am vempams modust hia ewter, Uar~k Amorics vmhl be sh4dedi tras the we still 4"lemble taft. dim"c effect of molest blest ad relloatve falout. SAuD coul sie db" Rod eisub.. e marim-lblm*6 ballstic Mussule. it. we"uldmi- MODERN WEAPONRY AND crsi estabt act n twomr tro a iser uasofawfoo vepos.friam?3 pamor cowu OWhel RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL sei prep- DEVEUWMENT the mot of SUMS skips for their an dfewme. fts=is *" vlmo m lsdmo Gemtuw itstho t lod-bese" qtem me me am Sa".tre Uve prif.. lase there bl mover bem a resamom- AW UXWG. Smlear smew, Slar. IM7t 20-n9. QV70.3M, V. 1U 13. abig arp100at SPI810t 585 Dfeses* Deportame appositift 10 a Ugmwe K A easily Ietskae.0 Amalync Me Atowl gorgy Commiesoa'os budget ftque~t fbr 1Y 19M11060bt11010 in Nudet r0qmt- 10$6 44 rorro vmsaterials aecqiutsleft, givilles appli- Lr~was Smovey. SM IUa tuid U.S. AMf VIAS1 otboams or minleac eqso"ame, "ad wvon casts Of sm. A SMarlos Lge" wo iso W. as* Mu other pew.o use moewn hartofe IV ncreses" ilue. P5?0A1A. v. as ia rod. ror epesima ma~le moten ls, woepses. ml nectar &mwl, 1,-. The vieffoom progoi se-te " m t"he levifes imweouf Omerw ti i. ccpms.o the lbol. ftwelpest testing, pro- notetiof St Ue1.S. LAM Q~ Deweiepmost Oms Imetlas, I" etoopilla# at oeasies owa - maml a" s*11w oolastless for e Is ov ftct 6r Gmpimilet ato rumofetse FPrwM4 Viena 5ur. mfta "sue" to-& U.S. mihutaq 4" pstilptie"al is %AN 4evelspast or oeloe, q" tectasogleal wommito we eam sof us a %ftt mouetum ieamlm".?be few~te iwelopmeat ftt" tor pairili. %oneti ml wo la* fthn. #craom ospwmelne ume liqui meta fsto breemser ti11tw 0! the cmimst strxa orno or In-. wft~cs. ICA tisubewe Strogsm tee PrOebtniost Oferatias."

32 234 ARM CONRuOL U5ARIWWENT 1057 pendently tarptable roemtry vehicle Do Volpt Bereubmo, P. WED AIM DOWI. Soviet zhituay,aefit. that depaplomst of this I'mc will Inreview, Jan. 1970: MUae. ceam asa5w? of rim-strumik goamerm a" &&c- U1.87, Mo7 olistal moseur war, accelerate thu oma rooe, moad bores. tme coewlty of thu umprpornr. Rmbaselm the Ametmome at Inatomue" trop nobillty, speed at offset at wampowe and a a oat of " 1* coders~i ne Rthde 'Itmoomesbet-?oltlk baste moc" In adem oes" S3etiggtf It"r review, A*b. mot U: Chafs joam 3. in SAW AMD 3*. Orbaso., Inc1ad., WM2-0 Ie n yinch Raguslab. v.5k Spt/Oi.299: Ill".. contends that abm psrewtisites for a Policy a iv1.067, v. 54 tame br a aual power aglaist a small coastal?s:m~.::, W incet~ing am obts G1c. Frit S. ES M3 "MMMA MawCY SnU. VAL- rraima UWNay's of" th pott~r. 504 kr of the roloo years, Inelnding the first Atlestit oireraneaiat of e~s~oa ardtin t laccessaod ww---'oplaw tails bom al~t th e- ai'aacs a VeaOID~ of dive-bembift tasiniqvntan the wosin"a hem Soie V gminate a pemboat of atomc proalglam. chfee dtiesme ibm latix- poj qisr tmo vrmed" Siam the Soiet Beay fte, awe tchoca, f seoapce im dlqvt ofa lot intervene in the comatries Thee ports it viamoo ~ ~ ~ hu4pq.t ~ ~ ~ fa ~ ~~ ~ U cflosstehn~ ane also, 4ls6=s0e the made"m equipmentof ballustic missile fno", the moltiabot Portable flame wepo aptes. Mo ate role of cornate.- UW Soie tic. &Vd command a"d ocatrol. w063 CM WJC0s3'VUW uuumm ITS F&UT XW-mm MWM toalrsea "vreiports, r v. is J"a18 190: k52- EM.L11. ftblag review, v. 13, Apr : b I. L~. inm.m,2 w. 33 ftemdem bibliapaphiom footmotea. womlated crom a a"n has t'eg bad 08 Doew ~ ~ ~ ~ oty Cuse Ses Aewlralmea F~~mS Apil 5, bmaealandbioleglal wartuu (CM) 4to P*AU*l IM. N tt4u*m I MO U144SWUM 42=af the US& Describes thoe satelite, Achic "'moks a pood be- or8140 mageo CW Oagets Is V Van I mod lsingin In the develoimmtat MfCiae's space tech- n * Koam, mad Vieftm; ask &semass aempesromal- &I lntereot in beoimatb umapea. 1"kb loin 1pmlOF or I M ftuwubl mag, V. 13, Mar. ~~IJA~ u IM MCCIU3 370 ho-o. 111uM. stop. ~MWOMM" COJMM MR3 OWN= M- WM9,v 13 CI= Mr. &0040 a cum Chistalme proe, go. hu1b. oft. 10 o l '.Uo Chtstn..-?p-puaWu pops ItOn fast tree- 3??T.55.Uor 190 a uacr, %W Nltoame.-am cointrcuteat adsa hma Vas bel soi taem MUMn owe LAQ 3 ad o per.goe: pyaade to IUM developet. tr releine bogli, FabLeS. act M. L. 7. nlbya mod J. 0. Aarteurs.-Mlel and m %, 190 Woal. irremdlato poepo Is swn of UN "ppf, 1W V. X. age amo J. C. Table. -a" as a Rkeport. goa two ammoat Ime t chd"we Moclea ftat reactor iursdiatift fasilty. tv Pl~ebrcb taseff* Ie puea" a" se malt t isslwa tatifa t00 molker mw**ul mainaineid tv th VMS"Iei"Utet faspws"doe"ai% seat.. ad t" Sovit Viass. MWCi"apr- - I q toae VA0"fe 0 bapa oof rert proeitluas t-o hilf ~r wa thor- aidyv palq tow il r m r"e cup amtructifa or mslem MagmW a'nodes. 60" MA.a* prtomat vlu tmport~ant musear MA ew t i wi saw be"a fit"e to ama thea. mls ~~~~~00 no W Mlnadn 3 W-~W ~ "SO MW An M. balletta of Uth amesr Ieffletm iets U MZ3 R ALIW. Pat.,. WLOS.) w. Mo, '- ha.9s: Mr. Ab. Ifni "~It93. ziovassat the epus t"106l. otei0.. Cammte go the US. Atmic Muac Camosimoa 'At XtretqejG L"aglitimos OfU e thwtlileia- 0U FT 1"I) bold aepiat.. Mor ftsijec r2avodar, m

33 TIM STRATEIC ENVIRQM)N 23S the progrm to construct thermmonulear research omponbnts ote a t "S3tan, the S"femaard Paies lowshare WONget sets could hav men- Wll be very shot lived. Other currest or potena. ameqsemeee , fbr SX109. tial 0stomm ilk. sapabard miles, a see-beaed or to a loss ot trained pereomel, but moa"- has yet mwhile I=U, multli'le independent rwtq weldarticulated a maund gomwemi ame hr the project. elm, advanced smined strategic aircraft, shortrange attack Misiales, or ripevmosie oanis. mame decop coumd protect *ounift's assturd-deatmaotlo. KenM, VI=ln 1. mm or?xgw.o- ait mance. v. Sb, Je./Feb o-w * SbLowshw. lerame. AN RADM: NUM VS RFKLM.I Productionato a a meleg-iampg ti*4er-bcambr 5pt.ce/sercamitiZ V. 52. sar %.6". i- med me a sicm-mte-c-teetian Wtern has Ims V*MA&T v..r bae. partian, bloocked b' t W eier that the in a section anttlod. "Strategle Dm~s-*oe. strategic threato isutiting tim -ie bashaera~ta ~~dswdsseiaeu to bellistic missile.. While this ftbate per- Conensha ~ a bdeua foe ae moeermp hobr fte ~Is~ btates Mo m-lo ca"1070or aastos ifrmtfo h thm erf2ormanmee edmnbellistic alstor. In er. Saemr syste OutZ major mortlozmof amgram. the effedataof haletoopter 5pulsea" amthe wold hravetomm bee eie, ah" torstrctr 2, e 1AM9 elzectrode lase-uaposo tw airrat Wotheriablsin- aroun 17 ill... tru. wasi pcpbity like the air-gopewlcity tighter. fighter-bhmeer, andvaned4 ame4 strategi airuraft. and edea d Sam. advantages or :-hamem med biological ustlg-rame InterceatrwiULU be insaammyst 1=4 fare (MV).abchuwterimties aed osqabilltis of Pat"er taw aircraftos Varied variou chemical assts med diseaeom cegmim; missioms. 2he Mature of the fightr In mawal awl- dissamissatim med preftleetm staegie. '"aniotta atiam vill de nm the Mume at the aircraft prdits. that chemicl= mologiami "Pas; Will am. *r. be UNA In future conflicts god arges that metimes that leck COW pebiutr wlu be at a am" disadvantage. Leis tuat X. M$I: U230WM OF A DMON1- U. pae/ermtiev. 52, Oen. IM6: 3"7-h? 071 til..ii5o.al8 W. 52 Nsrn-ett, Jobs. NAVAL EBILD. Internationl 4.- roes. orlvis, Me. 3, 396: 945..Mb. Lulna. Discuseso the cmoneptual debate vithis the DO- me NO ("e De 3partmet and MOMg printe autroetetro the Wiesiom, scorn-e'p~iemainganetie Sinvee %be stas, ftervteristie, med cappaand aviftle. and - upa Om I *W of thbe 7-2s erm- muiitim of fivewtpseor waters. N"Ad"sAil UM ame main mmnt of m.16t arehips, the Wea med Vill met be replaced QooePItel* 1W misiles Loodaa. $iebmel P. AW UM : M_ =W A CPOICP for mother 20 years. ~pae/rmeetn.. 2. Pa. 1069:b-*~ 11-1*ms. 21,5I.Asa?, v. P? Is qk Wittlem mettled *Umtreaq DOOMe.' no"* John?. GUILE SAWi SIMAM NUMM TIS- A tuunkil-latervept OWBUM coud wet owr no. E!.ctrasle doelip, v. 18. Api. 12, 19OM: the Moa. omassaa medoset, med ineeiaw lls. problem that usafreat me AM. A be"%sst emi Is W&srbeto aslt.w Sw~ I.j 13 bomw Describes the ftsfp said moeehiliiee ot various *t# is vey &"~ei"*s med e1liati ftefpe-. 10W *pwmi that ismeter amd meav peayload bt- Mo hah cs UW ootd MAs eo~tal lww. A MAS- ilsviot and teahesiques. twa? *4 oft* be Pmearaabd even Ill 'A rl&- t"iut,amephituested Wt' U. As offeeti* we n- gi~at c.utme aoast asmeal at of aio slower m -?I I or is avvpsor that Oos diseriialstr meftame Somel.?4 UTWlE or 2U OW to " rime am"* esp iatertqt sistemea t (a at.- 2.iJC1 FMA Opoeatiom reeetart, LOA an Mauler at ftm~ masil. smw radafl 9~ 10a.~Ipt thasotmid he Near semub Vitusa t ideal'" tun A3. v. i FIVI. btin i s pfssible to beild iqug* L"ttd reftfreses: p. ' ~ ~7

34 226 APHI CDWNROL A DISAMANE9fr Organised 14fiev of the Unclassified literature relative to commercisi me of uacleer explosives an the missile-allocatioa problem. The problem In the United States ead abroad, 0ae Interior Deon~sidered Is: given an misting vesepi force, and paztusnt's battle to win a role In the decisiona set of targets, v~at is the optimal anllocation making on uestiams ceonsraing OU~eral Uses of of weapon$ to targets? References are Organized nuclear explosive., ead the growth of conmpe.. by type, characterised 1W submodel, discussed, and sioael opapositioin to Plowshare are 'briefly disanotated. It Is proposed that thig reviev mavh- cussed. odolov~ he appied to Other appropriate area.. (Abstract supplied, modified) "t"!e W~CTORS l9to-3dm. Nucleer engneerifg, Mowrer. Thoas It. EThI CAIA~ SMv. v. 1.3, Feb. 1970: 1,Tu.90:0-3.v.5 VA49.528, v. 13 General Information, technical data. end prog- KWarmndu from the Chief of Naval Oj~ertiinu to ress schedule, for all the vorld's nucleer pover the Sihcretay Of the NW.y John 3. Chafe.. resactwor-..pjnnin, under construction, and opera- Parto. 1-3 of this article war* annotated as tional. Item no. 62 in v. 6, m.~ 2, of this bibliogra.phy, nhe U.S. audi.,;'. case for macleer- and conven tioald-povered aircraft carriers. Prins. L. Efgar. AEGIS-NAVY 87TIVIU To0 MW SMif CPUIS1 MISSILE 181AW. Navy. v. 13. Mar. 1970: 10T ilum. TA19, 528, v u. Sien-.chang. RXD CHUI'S XXLNU MIGW. Ordmaerg, V. 54. Jan.0"F. 1910: 39-a Describre the U.S. "Isy' prqp to develop a un~o? v 5 fleet defense against the Soviet Unicn's Sty'x and submrie- mad bafber-laused cruise missiles. Truece t'w Aevetlopmesat Cof Cmist China's a a- cleer m -vca prepems ftra 1951 to Al 108D thuagi acleant.u In asclear joteials proiiac- I~vao D. a. P. AN RRUICI IN DU9013. Intics end Impaemogmto In the vwt*-yie14 ratio torortiomsl defense review, no. 3, 1969: 23d of vespons have bee. particularly inpressie Ilusyer from a technical and saeimtifcle pit of view.iim the cultur'al reolutic. M has esed the nuelear Describes th devopenat of' Canad's destroyerprwm- antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicoptr program 10T6 focusing on aircraft and shilp deeiga ago trial -flight operations. The Aid helicopter weapon sys- C5JWaW NAVYTI3 v, 13. Feb. 17TD, A-51. It teat ceo Jetect, classify, and attack under alu lus. VA4.W.38 v. 13 Mratber c..ditice %be soat sofers submarines Comnt.- E'etprses-tateOf DRCI~ 60" p~lanse for the ftatwe. tw 9ltan C. Fw-lrsi'ed.W:the strategic acse~r, IW John (- 5nerls.-Soievesc 1081 Spb. mcleer surface ship coastructliom, %WSo Schrader, Narsid. lagessr K. Olseon. kit glfjim- NtyN.Jansa.-l.Iarsub-taskcrs: the answer kvist. TIC=. Astronautics 6 sercoautics, v.?, to carrying Alaska oilt bw Clay P. WaIr. Jr., Dec. 1969: ill.. WRILAXU and UUSAL: a taiq" persoeali *Ie. %W TL501. AU"A. v. 7 pear PAireJ I. P. ilae.- issrto buack way from tw Admiral Jobe Describes the evoluation or SWed10eto aircrft to- Vil.Iulersubs ont w *usueim prloriv,. tw ta~ the pserel chaaaeteristica of the Sash 3? Noema olnr.-uwy spart 0ANYOrIa %*li~ pw VIgges. mad te Organization and iagemat WWth or ft&anct*. IF OW. Clot WoItlIv...-4dwalr. oft applied to the Via" project, 4Aich reoulte Mooter Ma the CVWM ap thy Tugas a. "Maren-ho- in bkasipst met' stability. flit or Vice Lesiral lymma 4. Rickower. IW ^brjqa Arcice, s vaiouc Iat-'tts or tlb. v&, Qr amwi- 3400et 'd Iutoriia. Ferdtinan 1. VON. CITIM NMIor veea for s*up frsjn1im. COAN WIMSPU V191 I~a Due ch na*a*ua. Owcl~a awto v. L3. Jim. 19M: bw-&. 1fim articl* tn a wette 1A"title* *11lowea syste" *A jelt. cat Costly N.laibows utlý^ 0.4t.. thst oflet..ive strutvilc WOSPOe s'at(ie. l'raeetp1. ar ctiv1 tir ill 1*9. I~tur vem; attack* sua ht depjos'ptj cjb.; be rysuits of teats Ia the exestlie. age Iotat- Welfpts to, Imobile silos mcalj vlur, the xft M1k &W frodctiou poep le0g14tat wascti'm lpti,*s a-tiecail

35 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Contents.--Coentary: changing reqiiareeents Terzibaschitech, Stefan. CNAVAL ARMAMENTS AS RE- of U.S. security, by Abdu A. Said.--Seurity and FLECTED IN NEW NAVY MANUALS3 Maritime RUstung American diploacy, by Whittle Johnston.-Securiim Spiegel neuer Flottenbandbilkher. Marine Rund- ty and threatmanship, by Smuel L. Sharp.--Vestschau, v. 67, Jan. 1970: illus. era Europe, by Hans J. Morgenthau.-Tbe Balkans, V3.M3, v. 67 by Theodore'A. Coulcumbis. -Latin America, by John $. Plank.--Sub-Saharan Africa, by Charles Notes the 1969 changes in the naval armaments Burton Marshall.-The Middle East, by Abdul A. of 27 nations, with special attention to Great Said.--South and Southeaat Asia, by Richard But- Britain, France, and Italy. v--ll.--the Far East, by Takehiko Toshihashi.- U.S. security through multilateralism, by Urban i084 Whitaker.-U.S. security and the community of na- Zoppo, Ciro. THIRD WORLD. NVCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, In American Academy WEAPONS, of Political AND THE tions, by Lawrence W. Wadesorth.-U.S. security and regionalism, by Jmes R. Jose.-Military techand Social Science, Philalelghia. Protagonists, in the 197Os. by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.- power, and the Third World: essays on the chang- Index. J ing international system. Philadelphia, (Its Annals, -;. 386, Nov. 1969) p lh1.a4, v. 386 Exaines U.S. foreign policy, explores the is- sues of the changing requiremeots of American se- The decade ahead is likely to witness a dimin- curity, and rec~uiends new security roles for the ished capacity by the protagonist powers to control United States in the 1970's. the universalization of that nuclear technol- ogy most suited to eventual military purposes. The fast-breeder reactor and centrifuge-enrich ment, two nuclear developments on tl. threshold of ARMED FORCES REORGANISATION. Asian almanac, v. 7T, commercial feasibility, are the most foreboding. Dec. 2C, 1969: They would provide, as by-products of the genera- DSI.A2752, v. 7 tion of electricity, two fissionable materials used in making nuclear weapons: plutonium and en- Surveys the recdht reorganization of the Indoriched uranium. This technology will be developed nesian Armed Forces Command, which includes a plan by industrial countries, like Germany and Japan, to retire 50,000 army personnel by A milibut it could be exported to countries in the Third tia will be formed to compensate for these reduc- World, where it is fervently believed to oe the tions. The new tasks of the armed forces will be key to economic developr'nt. The prospects that sociopolitical and military. Although strategic the Soviet Union and the United States will effec- estimates indicate that Indonesia will not be contively cu'. the spread of this technology seem fronted with an external military threat during poor beca" mutually reinforcing economic, sta- the next 5 years, Coammunist subversion will contus, and security innentives will undermine the tinue to be a major problem. diplomatic leverage of the superpowers and lead to relaxed safeguards. Thus, even a Nonproliferation 1088 Treaty ratified by most threshold and Third World Barnett, A. Doak. A NUCLEAR CHINA AND U.S. AR) countries would not prevent the eventual formation Y Foreign affairs, v. 48, Apr. 1970: 27- of a base for.juclear technology amounting to a POI2. FrDlO.g6, 4 v. 1 real military option in many developing countries. (Abstract supplied) While it would be impossible for China to NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES achieve a first-strike capability or gain parity with future, either it may of the acquire superpowers a limited in defensive the foreseeable second- AND MILITARY STRATEGIES strike capability in time. Th- Chinese can be expected.1085 to be constrained by the realities of nu- clear deterrence. Once China attains a minimal Aber, John W., MERCHANT MARINE: and Paul W. Garber. A CRITICAL COALITION. THE NAVY AND THE In Unitcredible deterrent, a new leadership might be more inclined to reassecs its posture on strategic ed States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceed- problems and arms control, concluding that it ings, v. 96, Mar. 1970: 4o-44. ilaus. would be more advantageous to reduce the nuclear Vl.U8, v. 96 weapons gap through negotiated strategic arms lim- Examines the inadequacies of existing U.S. or- itations than by competing in a costly and futile ganizations and doctrines to control and protect arms race. The United States and the Soviet Union merchant shipping in view of recent technological should therefore agree in the strategic arms limichianges, tation talks not to deploy antiballistic missiles or take other measures designed to prevent China 1086 from acquiring even a limited second-strike capa- AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE IN THE 70'S. Edited by Abdul bility. Instead, as soon as it is justifiable A. Said..nglewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall they could indicate to China the credibility of p. (A Spectrum book) its nuclear deterrent. U.S. and Soviet ABM de,. E84O.A64 ployments in an attempt to maintain total damage- Ir'cludes bibliographical references. denial capability against China would delay

36 233 ARMS CONTROL & DISARNAMENT China's event.asl acquisition of a second-strike tare strategic picture, they are used here as cri-,apability, ensure its continued opposition to teria of the limits and possibilities of the alli- U.S.-Suviet sponsored arms control proposals, and ance systems. *Deterrence isa continuous proinhibit Chinese willingness to participate in arms control negotiations. In addition, ABM's would cess.0 Each failure adds to the Importance of de- tarring the next bigger disaster. Since deterescalate the Soviet-American arm race, adversely rence alas primarily at peace, its rules resemble affect Sino-American relations, and convince the those of "crisis management" rather than war. It Chinese that Moscow and Washington are actively requires, however, a flexible "set of military incollaborating to perpetuate their total strategic struments," too costly for nation-states and too superiority vis-a-vis Peking. The United States difficult for classical alliances to acquire. should make it clear that it will not support the Only in modern alliance systems can a maltination- Soviet Union's anti-chinese policies and will al division of labor reduce the costs adequately maintain an evenhanded policy toward both powers. and secure a high strategic mobility of forces. A united but politically nonintegrated Western Earope could never achieve INATO' s deterrent power Arms control is an unusually complicated process Barrett, Raymond J. GEOGRAPHY AND SOVIET STRATEGIC that can serve many purposes like reduction of the THINKING. In U.S. Comand and General Staff Col- chance, intensity, or escalation of war. In the lege. Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, future the military alliances will Leal with arms Jan. 1970: illus. control on a superpower level as in the strategic Z6723.U35, v. 50 arms limitation talks and on a regular mualtilater- &I level as in a European security conference. It is a serious mistake to assume that Soviet Success will depend on factors like a realization strategic thought is the mirror image of U.S. by the two sides that there is a law of diminishstrategic thought. Geographic vulnerability, the ing returns in arms races and that the interests major fact of Soviet geography, presents Soviet of industrial states increasingly converge. By strategists with a range of problems not faced by their contribution to the balance of power, NATO their U.S. counterparts. This vulnerability ex- and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have cemented plains wiy Soviet decisionmakers are so defense the status quo, but they have nevertheless shown minded, why they persist in maintaining outsized flexibility in their objectives, structures, and conventional forces, and why they follow the poli- strategies. A European peace order might be cy they do with regard to the Warsaw Pact. This achieved by a rapprochement and osmosis of the two am factor is a major sourze of the friction with alliances. Since the "political scenery is no Commnist China, whicn in turn provides the raison longer strictly bipolar," the military alliances d'stre of ABM deployment. Because of its vulnera- offer their members greater security than would bility, the Soviet Union vi.l be chary o, agreeing neutrality despite the risks involved in memberto freeze ABN deployment or limit its conventional ship. Europe's future security will depend on forces or of permitting changes to the status quo these alliances, while other problems will be in central and Eastern Europe, and for the saw solved through supranational and!iternational uoreason there will be no rapprochement with Commu- operation. nist China. China is bound to play a greater role in Soviet strategic thought and to have a decisive 1091 impact on the Soviet attitude toward disarmament, Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von. THE NATO STRATEGIC CONd6tente, and economic development. Moscow will CEPT. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Dec. 1969/ continue to be cautious in its relations with the Jan. 1970: UA646.F5, v. 14 United States, but, if its Vietnam policy and naval strategy are any indication. it may be trying Thoughts on modern strategy, the doctrine of to force the United States into a position of vul- flexible response, and future strategic problems. nerability similar to its own. As the pressures along the Soviet frontiers increase and Soviet sensitivities grow, the United States will have to 1092 develop "policies that will encourage gradual Bauer, Helmut. [HOME DEFENSE OF DJROPEAN NATIONS; changes while not precipitating explosive reac- A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION: THE GERMAN FEDERAL tions stemming from Soviet anxieties." REPUBLIC-FRANCE3 Die Landesverteidigung europllscher Nationen; eine vergleichende Auswertung: Bundesrepublik Deutschland--Frankrelch. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift f~r 10?) die europfische Sicherheit, v. 19, Oct. 1969: Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von. [LIMITS AND POSSIBILI U3.W485, v. 19 TIES OF MILITARY ALLIANCE SYSTEMS; SECURITY-POLIT- ICAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE COMING DECADE) Grenzen Examines several aspects of the French and West und M8glichkeiten militirischer Btndnissysteme; German defense postures, including geography, sicherheitpolitische Perspektiven im kommenden legal ttructure, organization, logistics, eco- Jahrzehnt. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 10, 1970: nomics, civil defense, leadership, planning, and D839,E86, v. 25 morale. Bauer concludes that in most of these fields France is superior to the German Federal Since deterrence, arms control, and the achieve- Republic and suggests measures to improve West ment of peace are likely to loom large in the fu- Germany's defense posture.

37 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Bechtoldt, Heia ich. C10NA'S STRATEGY OF REVOLU- BONN PREPARES A TOXIC WAR) Bonn bereitet Giftkrieg TION; WITH TH THIRD WND AGAINST HUSSIA AND vor. CHrog. vom Ministerium far Ausvwrtige Ange- ANWRICA3 China# Revolutiosetrategie. Mit der legenheiten der DDR3 Berlin, Stasteverlag der Dritten Welt ogagn Rusaland und Amerika. rvom Deutachen Demokratischen Republik, p. Autor erv. u. aktualisierte Ausg.3 CK1lnohen3 DD259.2.B65 Deutscher Tasehenbuch Varl p. (DTV, 615) 7IO.5.RBh 1969 Partial contents.--introduction.--from a declara- Originally issued under the title: Die Allianz tion by Ehrenfried Petras, former head of the Miait der Arumt. Chinas Revolutionsstratexie gmp crobiological Laboratory at the West German Insti- Ruseland und Amerika. tute for Aerobiology in Grafschaft/Sauerland, to DSO10.5.R8BJ an international press conference held on December Enlarged and updated by the author. 6, From a speech by the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Contents.--Foreword to the pocket edition.-the Republic, Secretary of State Gfnther Kohrt, to an revolutionary daniatca of Maoism.-Russian imperi- international press conference held on December 6, alism in China.-Ideological escalation against Memorandum by Friedrich Jung (Humboldt Uni- 4 Moscw.-The Fifth International as a counter- versity, Berlin), Werner Scheler (Ernst-Moritzfront.-Call to the Third World for a revolution. Arndt University, Greifswald), and Horst Ankermann -Model war for the world revolution.--extremely (Friedrich-Schiller University, Jena) on the creahigh hope and a fall Into the abyss.- Unequal tion of prerequisites in West Germany for biologitreaties and the intermdiate zones.-nuclear cal and chemical warfare. An appeal to scienweapons for the protection of people's var.--in- tists, engineers, and technicians in the West Gertroversion as a revolutionary reserve.--annota- man Federal Republic.--West Germany, the home of tions and references.--selected bibliography.--in- crime.--scieace and technology in the service of dex of names and subjects. crime.--index of names. Examines the origins, methods, sad goals of C-s- Asserts that West Germany is developing toxic munist China's strategy of world revolution and substances and biological weapons and lists pertidiscusses the Siao-Soviet dispute and Mao Tse- nent laboratories, institutes, and firms. tung's theory of intermediate zones, az:.ording to which Canada, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia will develop closer rela tions with China than with the United States or Braune, His J. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE. Royal Air the Soviet Union. Bechtoldt examines China's nu- Forces quarterly, v. 9, winter 1969: clear armaments and its negative attitude toward illus. UG635.G7A1252, v. 9 arms control agreements. Although Peking formally rejects the notion that nuclear proliferation automatically increases the danger of nuclear war, Traces the develupmcent of the German Air Force since the fifties and projects it to the midsevenit nevertheless realizes that proliferation abroad ties. Braune discusses the force's mission, is not in China's best interest. Once China ac- strength, equipment, organization, personnel, quires full-fledged nuclear status, its security training, and integration in NATO's air defense policy may change. system. The change in NATO's strategy from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" had little effect on the force's basic mission, which in- I094 eludes air defense of areas assigned by NATO, di- Beer, Francis A. INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN rect support of the battlefield, and participation NATO; PROCESSES OF ALLIANCE COHESION AND PROSPECTS in NATO's nuclear counterstrike. FOR ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. [Columbus) Ohio, State University Press Ec1969] 330 p. (A Publication of the Mershon Center for Education in National 1097 Security) ua646.3.b39 Burke, Arleigh A. ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES. Naval War,:ontents.--Introduction.--Political consultation College review, v. 22, Mar. 1970: P&GP RR in NATO.-NATO military forces: integration.-- Address delivered 1 the Seapower Symposium at NATO military forces: leadership, functionalism, the Naval War College. and spill-over.--nat0 armaments.--nato infrastructure.--nato science.--nato: past and fature.--ap- In view of the Soviet Union's new interest in pendixes.--notes.---i2dex. seapower and the growing reluctance of the United States to commit ground forces to overseas combat, Contends that NATO is not integrated. Although U.S. global strategy will gradually shift from a the organization's structures and tasks have dependence upon troor commitments and fixed land changed and become increasingly differentiated, bases to reliance on navaj power to exercise dibinding institutional procedures and alliance au- plomacy, protect Vital national interests, and thority remain mostly ineffective. Political maintain existing treaty commitments. The Rusleaders have been unwilling to support sizable sians will confront the Americans with a policy of joint activities except when they were in the na- more competitive intervention in international potional interest of their own countries. litical and military affairs and improved military

38 240 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT capabilities. The Soviet Navy, which was formerly eral military review, no. 10, Dec. 1969: , tied to the flanks of the army, now operates siz- no. 1, Jan. 1970: T7-65. able forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, U2.R48, 1969/70 Pacific, and Indian Oceans. The Russians are im- Includes summaries in French and German. proving their merchant marine, fishing, and oceanographic research capabilities on a large scale, are building submarines at a faster rate than all Assesses the implications of U.S. policy toward Western Europe for future defense policies and reother nations combined, and soon will have more ballistic missiles at sea than the United States. lations with NATO. A policy that emphasizes nu- clear weapons rather than conventional forces They also are adopting a maritime strategy that could counter the exaggerated Soviet threat to will use naval forces for combat and in conjunc- Western Europe. The flexible response strategy is tion with the merchant marine for global political not relevant to Europeans because they are conand economic influence and will be supported by a large and versatile shipbuilding program. Alcerned with deterring aggres ion, not defending against attack. Coffey outlines the policies that though national navies might be combined through could best promote a sense of security among the alliance systems or integrated into a U.N. naval NATO allies, including a realistic limitation to command, and multinational naval forces based on the level of NATO's conventional operations. Neimutual regional interests are feasible and desira- ther arms limitation measures nor a move toward a ble, such efforts must take second priority to specific national interests, detente "are likely to be acceptable as long as the NATO allies are at odds with the United States over the strategic concepts and the force postures 1098 required for their common defense." Cabrita Matias, A. THE ATLANTIC AS AN OBJECTIVE OF SOVIET GEOSTRATEGY. NATO's fifteen nations, 1102 v. 14, Dec. 1969/Jan. 19T0:, v. 1 Cox, Frederick J. THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN EGYPT. Naval War College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: Analyzes the Soviet Union's motives for expand- map. P&GP RR Ing Anayits ita naval fores. forces. Cariont Cabrita Matiaes Matias warns that- that, notes": Bibliographical p references included in "Foot- if the Soviet Union, which now enjoys superiority in air power and ground forces, gains the advan- Surveys Soviet policy in the Near East, emphatage in nuclear weapons and seapower, it will be sizing current economic and military aid programs strongly tempted to provoke a showdown with the West to secure its European or Atlantic frontier in Egypt and concluding that the Russians control the Egyptian Armed Forces. The Soviet presence before Communist China becomes a serious threat. in the Near East alters the global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, increases the possibility of a confrontation between the su perpowers, allows the Russians to outflank NATO, Caucig, Franz. [THE AIMS OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. and threatens American naval hegemony in the Med- DEFENSE POSSIBILITIES ABOVE ALL] Die Ziele der iterranean. The Soviet Union's increasing influtdrkischen Regierung. Verteidigungsm8glich- ence in the Arab world stems directly from its keiten an erster Stelle. Politische Welt, strategic naval capability in the Mediterranean. v. 12, Dec. 1969: 4-6. D839.P65, v. 12 Considers Turkey's defense problem after the 1103 United States closes its military bases. To main- Datta, N. P. THE VACUUM AND ALL THAT. In United tain an adequate defense capability even with NATO Service Institution of India, New Delhi. Journal, support, Turkey will have to develop its own de- v. 99, Apr./June 1969: fense industry. Ul.U5, v. 99 Western and Russian interests in the Indian 1100 Ocean area have become marginal. The inevitable Chou, En-lai. SPEECH BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AT Chinese effort to fill this vacuum will endanger PYONGYANG MASS RALLY. Peking review, v. 13, Apr. Indian interests. The Indian Achilles' heel is 10, 1970: D6701.P42, v. 13 not the northern borders but Burma, for whose in- Delivered on Apr. 7T tegrity neither the United States nor Russia feels sufficiently concerned to intervene in a Chinese- Expresses concern over Japan's rapidly expand- inspired internal revolt. A Sino-Indian military ing defense program. and the position of Taiwan balance making possible a state of coexistence and South Korea in its evolving Asian security would not imperil the smaller states, whose intersystem. ests coiicide with Indials, nor anger the superpowers, who would welcome the appearance of a second Asian power. With the growth of the Indian 1201 economy, the increased military budget allocations Coffey, Joseph I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEFENSE necessary need not exceed the present percentage OF WESTERN EUROPE. Revue militaire g~n~rale; gen- of the gross national product.

39 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT scientists, v. 25, Dec. 1969: Denis, Michel. ECHAUVINEAU AND TOE CREDIBILITY OF TK9145.A84, v. 25 DETERRENCE) Chauvineau ou I& orddibiliti do is Reprinted from the Oak Ridse National Laboratory dissuasion. Revue militaire ggnarale; general Review. military review, Feb. 1970: U2.018, 1970 Civil defense in the Soviet Union is a large- Includes summaries in English and German. scale, veil-coordinated program that includes compulsory training, realistic exercises, detailed Discusses Narcisse Chauvineau's military con- planning, and proteotion measures. Everyone is cepts, which remain relevant to the problem of en- exposed to civil defense and "instructed on how to suring coverage for NATO countries against supe- respond to surprise attack and to the preattack rior Warsaw Pact forces, and argues that the most credible deterrent is nuclear mines. government order to evacuate their cities." The people are taught in realistic exercises to fight fires, administer first aid, rescue the injured, and construct emergency passageways in destroyed 1105 shelters. Although the rural progra has lagged Fulbright, James William. VIETNAM: THE CRUCIAL behind its urban counterpart, the discrepancy has ISSUE. Progressive, v. 34, Feb. 1970: been reduced. Dispersion of industry and duplica- AP2.P8655, v. 34 tion of production ara encouraged to ensure the President Nixon maintains that Vietnam is an survivability of industrial installations. In rural areas, the civil defense program is designed exemplary place for the United States to demon- to ensure agricultural production in wartime, furstrate that the Communist doctrine of expansion nish manpower for rescue operations, snd protect by proxy cannot succeed, while virtually every livestock and water supplies. non-government specialist on Southeast Asia regards the war as a civil conflict in which communism has always been secondary dto the struggle for 1108 national independence. From the point of view of Gallois, Pierre M. [FROM NA URAL DETERRENCE TO AR- U.S. strategic interests, it is of no consequence TIFICIAL INSECURITY3 De la dissuasion naturelle I whether Vietnam is Communist or not, united or l'insfcurit6 artificielle. Politique 6trang~re, divided. To pursue "victory" in a war that serves no. 5/6, 1969: 5h no worthy political purpose, as both Presidents JX3.P6, 1969 Nixon and Johnson have done, is immoral and destructive of the national interests. Nixon's The nuclear arms race has deceived the superpovstrategy of "Vietnamization" is based on the illu- era. They have accumulated an excessive destrucsion that the Theiu-Ky government is viable, that tive potential at the price of a tremendous techit has the support of the South Vietnamese people, nological effort, only to succeed in nullifying The only workable solution to the war is to cqtab- their mutual progress. According to the author, lish a coalition government through negotiations the Americans, by invoking the "missile gap" since with the National Liberation Front and the North 1960 to launch their strategic armaments program, Vietnamese. This could be achieved if it were not are at the origin of this escalation. Today, for the Nixon administration's unwillingness to technological progress again menaces the painfully sacrifice the Thieu-Ky government even when it reached "equilibrium of prudence." When, for exmakes a negotiated settlement impossible, ample, a multiple independently guided warhead will have been constructed, a possible aggressor could be tempted to risk a first strike, but could 1106 one be sure that an accord prohibiting the con- Gache, Paul. [RUSSIA AND THE MEDITERRANEANI La struction of such missiles would be observed by Russie et la MNditerrange. Revue militaire g~nf- the superpowers? A strategic arms limitation rale; general military review, no. 9, Nov. 1969: agreement difficult to achieve--a global agree U2.R48, 1969 ment--would appear all the more problematic be- Includes summaries in English and German. cause the superpowers will renounce neither the privilege that their strategic superiority confers Assesses the Soviet effort to convert the Ned- upon them vis-a-vis the middle powers nor the sciiterranean into a Soviet sea. Gache concludes entific and inlustrial advances that such an armathat the Russians could achieve their goal by ment effort requires. (Translation of supplied emerging as the "protectors" of Israel after a de- abstract, modified) terioration of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Soviet Union may then obtain U.S. withdrawal from the Mediterranean because "a few more Israeli 1109 blunders or excesses may provoke an attitude of Gambles, Fernand C. [THE FATAL SKIN3 La peau do neutrality on the part of the Western powers al- chagrin. Revue de d~fense national., v. 26, Jan. most without their realizing it." 1970: DklO.R45, v. 26 Warns that "the fatal skin of deterrence is lil) shrinking dangerously" and that deterrence theory k~ailar, Joanne L. SEVEN WARNING SIGNALS: A REVIEW will no longer be valid. The multiple independent OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE. Bulletin of the atomic reentry vehicle and the SS-9, the proliferation of

40 242 ARMS CONTROL A DISARMAMENT nuclear tecbnolog. and the Chinese psycholog and 1113 logic of deterrence threaten the balanae of ter- Hakovirte, Harto. TI FWINISH SECURITY PI0DIN. ror. Cooperation and conflict, no. 4, 1969: PlOP B Proposes "a rough analytical modal of the prob less of decisiol making in Finnish security pol- Georgetown University, J&. 1.Cter le1 icy, comprising only the most significant struc- Stratetic and Intemational 3?tudies. 50V11 SEA tural elements and relations of action and inter- POWER. Washington, p. illus, action." "(ts Special report series, no. 10) VA Contents.-Preface.--46mbers of the panel and H8pker, Wolfgang. CHOW RVD IS ITDITDRRANEIA 3 contributors.--pt. 1. Policy findings and Vie rot st dsa Mittelmeer? Politische Welt, implications for U.S. policy.-pt. 2. The v. 12, Dec. 2396: background paper: Introduction. Historical D839.P65, v. 12 trends. Soviet maritime stratea, roles and missions. Present status and plans for Soviet Sees in the reduction of the Soviet Mediterranaval forces. Soviet naval aid to other coun- nean force a sin that Moscow is discouraging an tries. Soviet merchant fleet. Soviet fiahing intensification of Arab militancy. The Soviet fleet and intelligence activities. Soviet ocean- submarine fleet nov causes the greatest concern ography.-pt. 3. Panelists' and contributors' to the NATO Mediterranean Comand. The Soviet comments: Panelists' coments. Contributors' military posture in the area, although inferior to comments.--chats. that of the West, my Improve b the acquisition of airfields in coastal Arab countries. H pker Assesses the growth of Soviet maritime power discusses plans for improving KiTO's Mediterranean and its implications for the United States. The defenses end the roles of Turkey, Greece, and panelists warn that failure to improve the U.S. Italy. Navy and merchant marine will lead to a diminished global role for the United States Jen, Wu-chun. HOLD AIDOT TER UAT SO ROM OF 1111CHAIWNIA MAD'S THINKIN Of PEOPLE'S WAR AND Goodstadt, L. F. LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR. Far STRE HeN THE BUILDING OF = MILITIA. Peking Eastern economic review, v. 66, Dec. 4, 1969: 485-,v.P12, 63 Drv v illus. HC4ll.F8, v. 66 Focuses on the opposition of forner Chinese po- Describes war preparations in China, focusing on litical and military leaders to the guerrilla civil defense measures. While the Chinese seen to strateg favored by Ma Tse-tung and Lin Pis,. and be convinced that a Soviet strike is ininent, the its overemphasis on a massive, untrained militia. possibility exists that the invasion scare is be- Since the militia will continue to play an imporing used as a propaganda ploy to generate internal tant role in modern warfare the author prescribes unity. Although Mao Tse-tung's "spiritual atom increased political and military training. bomb" might discourage a Soviet Invasion of China, it is not an effective deterrent asganst a Soviet strategic missile and air attack Kahn, Herma. Of THOWUCLIAR WAR. 2d ed., with index end a new pref. written % the author espe clally for the paperback ed. Bw York, Free Press Goetony, Peter. CLEADERSHIP IN THE HUNGARIAN P0- C1969, cl9693 xvi, 6"8 p. illus. (Free Press PLE'S ARMY3 Manschenfhrung in der ungarisechen paperback) UT76T.K Volksarmee. Wehrvissenschaftliche Rundsehau; Zeitschrift. f~r die europlische Sicherheit, v. 19, Partial coatents.-lecture 1. The nature and Dec. 1969: feasibility of thermonuclear war: Alternative na- U3.W1485, v. 19 tional strategies. Will the survivors eavy the dead? Nelbher oblivion nor surrender.-locture 2. Considers the postwar history of political lead- The formulaticn and testing of and ership and indoctrination within Hungary's Armed plans: Conflicting objectives. Stresses and Forces, the relationship between political and strains. Additional remarks on the military protcommanding officers, reorganization and purges in lems.-lecture 3. Vorld War I through world war the arm after the 1956 Hungarian revolt, and the VIII: The role of &awaijs. The real past. The present morale and political reliability of the hypothetical pat. Present end future. Racapitutroops. Gostony concludes that the strong indi- lation. The problem must be taens seriously.- vidualism and patriotism of the Hungarian soldler Appendices: Introduction. Improve policy formahampvr Cmmunist indoctrination efforts. lation. Proposal for a war damage equalination

41 THlE STRTEGIC ENVIRONMENT 243 copoation. The special importance of Installs- the evolving relationships of the Departments of *tiogas. A proposed civil defense program. Some State and Defense to the NBC. qujestions and answers. Index. Estimates the effects of thermonclear war an problems between the superpowers liesprl in La.load. ARMU CONTIOLt AN APFiIACI TO DISARNM- *coexistence or collaboration, which the United NW. Indian journal of political science, v. 30, States can achieve by being strong enough to pre- Ju.&/Sept. 1969: M vent nuclear blackmil end aggressive tactics and.7a26.i5. Y. 3D make Soviet leaders believe that agreements would be worthwhile. Although the United States could In the present atmosphere of international hosmatch the Soviet Union in aom production and de- tility, nations will not and deped velopment for several decades, en uncontrolled on an unreliable system of collective securi ty but ar= race would create unacceptably high risks of will value security through armaments over uncer- Irresponsible behavior, tain security through disarmament.* National sorereipty acts as an obstacle to diesarament because it Is often the basis for rejecting an lnliltspection 1117 of all disarmament systain, which is an essential corollary agreements. Further, despite KimYou-50. (HE M'SKORAN EOPES SHYthe uasefujlness of the 18-Nation Comittee on Die- (INX[N-iOJN): THE PAST AND THE PRESM)T Die nord- armatent, OCD is not compatible with the U.N. koreniahe (nminkun: olkarme Vrgageneit Charter. The decline of aggression In the classitad Verwisenshaftich egevart Itudscau;cal sense and the growth of civil wars and revolu- Zeitebrft ie eropisoe ~r Schereit v.19, tions as the major techniques in interstate con- Nov.W flicts deprive disarmament "of much practical util- U3.W85,. 19ity as rar as the mitigation of these new types of Traces the development of the North Korean Armed intra-frontier wars and conflicts is concerned." Forcs wth snce19i, secil ephais n ~Since OCD is neither attainable nor desirable, Forcs wit snce spcialempasison 948 harms control iii available In light of threats to Korean War and recent years. Kim notes that the tedlct aac ftro n ol oss wrsv' s dependency on Soviet military aid hindersoflglybnigiatrlr uiaea.te- North Korea's leaders from turning their country ofes legally binding bifatertal oremgimaerpartreainto a model of Independence and self-reliance for iis eicersto fcranrgos ata n restrictions on nuclear testing, establishment of other Afro-Asian countries.* communications between adversaries, an embargo on ares shipments, restrictions on the production of flssile materials or a nation's military opera- Knr,. lus1182: tions, development of a universal law of mankind, Knor. MO: Kaus PSTPRMET,. ROSPCT.or strengthening ofthe United Nations to enforce CNew York3 Foreign Policy Association C19693 disarmament agreements. Although the ams con- 63 p. illus. (Headline series, no. 198) trol record is not very encouraging, its contriua6h6.3.k52 bution "to the avoidance of wars bar misunderstand- Bibliography: p ing and to the mititation of the cold war... Contents.--The foundation of NAT.-Huatory andcanobeiord evolution. -- Is NATO indispensablet-ways WAd means. -- Future role for the United Stat~es.-- Talking It over Love. Oecrge E. 1TIMNH-CEPTURY DWERSETS.AND History and evaluation of NATO. Knorr examines DETEMWCE. Virginia quarterly review, v. 1.6, scne of the basic problems of NATO and recommends winter 19T0: 2T-1.5. a U.S. NATO policy based on active cooperation AP2.VT6, v. 1.6 but with no attea;t to force U.S. leadership on reluctant allies. The United States shoul&d reexamine Its nuclear strategy to determine whether international realities and technological advances have made it obso lete. The mobile- and fixed-based deterrent eye- Kolodulej, Fdward A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: tema of the sixties promoted en Was race that INNOVATIONdS AND D(PL!CATIO'C. Public administra- will bring forth a "New Age" of strategic systems tion review, v. 29, Nov./Dee. 1969: for which neither the average men nor the deci. JKl.P85, v. 29 sionmanker will be prepared. The solution Is a mobile, sea-based ICBM system armed with over 5,000 Compares the organization and operation of the warheads and targeted against the Soviet Union's National Security Council (NSC) under the present and China's urban complexes. Further, the United und previous administrations. Kolodalej finds the States should encourage a united Europe and the previent NISC more formally structured than under *ovlet Union to deploy similar "ea-based systems Presidents Kennedy and Johnson but less so than end discourage nations fromi constructing firstunder Eisenhower. Special attention Is given to strike weapons system.

42 244 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 1122 lent. Presumably this should force the attacked Luchainger, Fred. NO SUUTITTtI' noe SECURITY (edi- regimes to moderate their countermeasures to avoid torial3 Swiss reviev of erld affairs, v. 19, dangerous reactions. Under such circustances a Mar. 19TO: 2-3. D839.S9, V. 19 nonviolent revolt should be as effeetiv' as n Speculation on American troop withdrawals from armed one. Successful nonviolent struggles have been too disparate to permit the formation of a Europe %is blatantly premature, since the matter general theory. The doctrine of civilian defense has by no means been decided.* Despite hints of tries to project a dmestic struggle mechanism a reduction in President Nixon's State of the Un- into the area of interstate relations, whose forion message and Senator Mike Mansfield's call for ces and institutions make such a transposition ir- "*substantial reductions," Washington officials em- relevant. Theoreticians differ In their points of phasize the maintenance of troops in Europe. A departure on eiv'lian defense as an instrument. large-scale reduction could influence West Europe- Some call for the democratization of the nation. an countries to cut back their comitments, but no Gene Sharp proposes the replacement of the mili- European country could meet the challenge. The tary defense organisation by civil and social de. uncertainty over troop reductions could damage fense 'vithin the framework of existing intrana- East-West negotiations on mutual troop reductions Uional and international relationships.' Civilian and undermine current efforts at ditente. defense eliminates the dangers of militarism and the arms race; it is neceasarily defensive in nature and may be a new road to world peace. Civil ian defense could be an equivalent of West German McGovern, George S. AND NOW THAT TSE AMERICAN I)EAM military defense If it were integrated into the IS SAFELY I THE HANDS OF THE MILITABY-INWDSTU AL Western defense system and became a power factor WIABLISHUUNT, WE WAKE TO A NEW DECADE. Esquire, in West German foreign policy equal to armaments. v. 73, Dec. 1969: 189, , However, reliance on civilian defense would fail AP2.E845, v. 73 to deter an attack. It would restrain the nation's foreign policy and upset the existing bal- The military-industrial complex consrues a dis- ance of power, which is essential for present seproportionate share of the Nation's human and nat- curity and progress In disarmament. Such defense ural resources. Because Congress lacks the caps- could develop into the most total form of war, bility to scrutinize every individual weapons eys- guerrilla war. Nevertheless, it would be worthten proposed by the military, it mast focus its while for West Germany to consider civilian decriticism on the military-industrial amplex it- fense a subsidiary defense means although civilian self, not on specific proposals. The enormous defense lacks the necessary qualities to equal growth of the military establishment has dimin- militar7 defense or eliminate the danger of war ished rather than increased the Nation's security from the world. by diverting resources fram pressing social needs. Nevertheless it would be a mistake tt. berate allitary leaders for the present situation sine a for 1125 the most part they have only implementes tbh poli- Moebius, Erich. [THE GUERRILLA IN 0!OPE?] Guerilcy directives of their civilian superiors. The la in Europa? Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 573- initiative for change must therefore originate 575, , v. 18 with the executive and legislative branches, both of which should review the Nation's military capa- Suggests that guerrilla warfare against enemy bilities and coemitments and look for vaye to ui- occupation of the German Federal Republic be igvert present defense expenditures to useful social nored in West German defense planning because most purposes. The existing method of reviewing mill- prerequisites for a successful resistance of that tary requests is inadequate because it tends to type are missing in densely populated and indusconsider questions or military efficiency alone triallsed Western Europe and the potential enemy when in fact weapons system like multiple Inde- is superbly experienced in suppressing underground pendently targetable reentry vehicles have much activities. "Civilian defense," a form of passive broader policy implications, resistance, although comendable, would have no decisive Influence on the aressor. K.ebius stresses the value of NATO for West German def-nfse and urges the Government to plan defense measures 112M against possible enemy guerrilla activities. kechtersheimer, Alfred. (CIVILIUA DEFUSE--A UTOPIA OR AN ALTERNATIVE TO I. GERMAN FEDERAL REUBLIC'VS ARM FORU3?3T Sosiale Verteidigung--Utople odor.1126 Alternative sur BSwdewvehr? Wehrvissenscbaftliche Montfort. _ooa1-divisioaire. CWIAT1S NEW AT Rundschau; Zeitschrift tr die europlische Sicher- KATO?) A I'OTAN, quci de nouveaut Revue millheit, v. 19, Oct. 1969: 5a taire suisse, v. 115, Mar. 1970: k. U3.Wb85, v. 19 U2.R5, V. 115 According to the advoentes of 'civilian defense," Reports on NATO's current activities and probit would rely mn nonviolent action as do some in- lns. qeneral Ooodpaster's recommendtion' ror trastate protest movements. Its techniques may increasing the effectiveness of UATO's oroe-s, the vary, but Its ultima ratio always remains nonvi3- r-vults of a meeting of the Nuclear PlaniLng

43 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 24S group, and the problem of troop reductions wre have to eaqwg In a convestional battle for days, discussed. or oven woeek. MA~'s policies end goals most refleat the political changes in the 1970's that wre already manifest to U.S. policies toward the alli once an a resuit e. America's omitment In South- Noorer, Thoma H. CintervIsvW RIME OF730713'SMA east Asia mad In 0.arie ' attitude toward the Owri. ordnance, Y. 54. itm./reb. 197: 39h-398. alliance as a reault of Its policy toward asotern Illus. Url.06T. V. 54 Europe. W09O' fa ituret is bleak because of the pressues an amber governments to reduce their Discusses the modernization and expansion of the codtments to the alliance. ffie basic problem Soviet Navy and merchant marine, Increasing marl- will be to maintain a credible deterrent while and Indian Oceans, and relative naval strengths ina tics, wichb could canoge tia membership and struethe Mediterranean. If necessary, the United ture of the orgeanizaticon. Sttsi rprdto operatein the Indian Ocean. '1 TO VTIIG siet noffensive naval Strategy of global pro in terms of underway logistical apomrt, antisub- Time, Y. 95, 16W 1., 1970: %-We40, -,47. Illus. marine warfare, and naval airpover. AP2.T3T, v. 95 Surveys Soviet military capabilities sand organi zation. changes in postwar Strategy. and the Sovi- Horice, Girard. [IS DETRRECE STILL POSSIBLEt3 La et view of the strategic arms liaitation talks. dissuasion est-elle encore possible? Science et vie, v. W.T Mar. 1970: T2.S3, v. 1n7 Includes statements by Andrf beaufre sad Fernand 1131 Gambies. Munth-ass, Haald. MWIXSO W A NUNS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 67, Jan. 29, 1970: 196- Debates whether deterrence can be maintained in Illus. light of nuclear proliferatioi and innovations in xnbl. PIS. v. 6T weaponry. Beaurre asserts that total war is "dead"' because it would be too exorbitant and cat- The Soviet Union's diplomatic an trade ofreeastrophic, while (3mbiez contends th*at Chaina's sive In Asia Is wiewed apprehensivelyr br, the asgroving nuclear power and tbe multiple independent tiofla In the region althog with lassa hostility reentry veh~icle are threatening the baance of nwtban a few years ago. WIile the Soviet Union terror. stesstenniiaycaw fisproposed Asian collective security pacts It has Increased the strength of Its armed fbarce man the HIMo- 1129Soviet border and redeployed an Increasing ameber Morris. C. E. T1(5 PJU2RE OF THE NOMI ATLANIC AL- of warships and oceenogrephic research vessels LIAJICE. Army quarterly, v. 99, Oct. 196: into the Indian Oasean, to the alarm of' the Indiana Ul.A85, v. 99 and AustraliAns. Tte Russians have been reportedly pressurieg the Indians fo' saval bases sad any The fluture of Western Europe's defense lies In seek such installations in srr~ouading countries. an overwhelaing U.S. military commitment and in- The Soviet union is primerily concerned about the dependence for European members to guarantee their next generation os' U.S. inuclear submarines, which own Integrity while ensuring deterrent credibili- will be able to strike targets in the U.S.S.R. ty. The solution to these requirements rests on from protected positions an the Indian Ocean. The devising "al System In which fifteen nations ca Rus~sians might deploy amphibious assault forces Ina merge their national sovereign Interests toth the Indian Ocean to improve their copebilit$ to extent necessary'" to right another war in LSwope Intervene on the ground. Soviet naval power may and to L.nble members to parsue their Intervsts als0 be used to protect sewly acquired oil lateroutside the I=T are without escalating thea into aets an the Persian Culf. M'neral war. NATO must have the ability to handle sh -t of am all-euta invasion and be "Capable or putting up a dogged resistance and in- 41iU flictino, terrible punishment on the Invader." Al- Mutrpty4, Freank N. 80ZeCM AIM THE SATELLITES. l thu~1, the present trend of reducing NATO' a force- United States savw" Institute.,jMNWAA. Frolevol will continue because or rising costs, the ceedings, v. 95. fov ilts. Introduction of jet transports helps alleviate the VIMU, v. 95 problem. The flexible, response Strategy requires wr-ll equipped, well trained, end highly mobile Stresse" U.S. naval power at an instrument to conlventioflal forces. A reduction of forces would influence the eat Ilite countrie. and keep tmoir eu~egt t-hat the recourse to naclear wrapons could hopes or freedom alive. A regional organization occuir macht sooner. A sreat deal deponda on the would reducc the Instability of Lost central Zuccmbakt orriciency o.f NATO's forces, which might rop'e, a source of friction between the s%**rpow-

44 246 ARMS CONTROL & DUIMAKNEIT we. by settlng problems like the divisiion of Nuiqloal confrontation, and elsewhere; ocesnogra- Groummy. A tulted Rtestears ep should not mass phy and madersea toachnolog; the U.S. and Soviet dlsseaggsa~t for the United states, foe U.S. se- enrchant marine; the FT T3 U.S. defense pro- CWitY Is CloselY related to WMoPe's. grom; and other recent naval events and issue EuRAO'S DIFINI iaumuu International defbmee ro- U36 view, Go. b. 1969: 333L-346* , ATLANTIC COUNCIL UEISTEIAL KRUM MILD AT L PMGP INJSSueN. IR U.S. orss Dspavuent of State bouleti, v.. e.2,1969 W62.3D. Comtents.-Tbe structure and strengib of NA4TO.- JI -A3 v.6 NADU: front line of RAW0'S al" defeneeu.-m4illtary comat systems for Wrope.-Tbe United KIng Manl aemioque end declaration of the Vruth dom armaing and maitearing orpanisation. ty John Atlantic C.,scil's regalar ministerial meeting, Marriott.-Tbe missile spuste of the Italian hold at Brussels. Jelgm,. Decemer ".ay by A1do Daldini.- UU Ulael: Witain's?he GoL4Meta briefly.raptolate the proceedings first helicopter carrier.-veapons systems for ot the Ministers and the positieas taken an major warships, ty J. S. Fricker.-Tbe Moyal Marines issues facing the alliances via, militery stratespacial boat service.-msspons, vehicles. equip-. mr. gat-vest relations.s, o control and dissanamot.-optical and IN equipment of the MUX 30.- mat. sad ee.o technieel. ad cultural coop- Coherent puls doppler radars for the French Ams. eration. -The Mein Air Force an target. Statue of IM2 defense capabilities In rT Scall. Maie. HOW DO VCUAV TKI TO CIVIL Mw 1134 FUCE. Internatioasl civil defrace. v. 16, Dec. 53wora. Koj. UTAIA2OIC SPLIT. For Eastern co : M926.1h88, v. 16 scaie review. v. 67, Mru. 19, 197: 6-?. Excerpts re ma article that appeared isni WUhI.FIM, v. 67 bete DR5S.2.0AU ownine the debate betwee the JapaeaseDe P- Deecribes Noing's complacry civil defense prothow Awnq and the National Definse Connell ame gron focusiag an "Pepl and Dffem.e, a special the statue ad structure at Japanese dofe"" fbr- group that inrser professional, cultural, and cue in the 19W0. a 'f. ormemtroveray mo subsa- civic siesciatoams of invelopmeats io civil istially effect American suteatic thinking aed do- ffn.. Alcgmt In the Pacifi." NAVAL YIIV, IM6. Ulted %W Froo MMSi. Arnapo- oosam., Fruar d. v= LnM!s or VIuIemui lis. unted States naval tnstitaut u 9693 %T6 p. Die ermseo dor Vietnadsiermag. Amuseampolitik, Illus. VIO v. 21, Jam. 1700: Ḋ89.AIS5, v. 21 Cotmtsat.-pt. 1. A strategic analysis ot the baltic Seam and the Danish Strait&. 1Waor Points Got the soeaolaign of Vietmandsatian MVegeer. A strategic analysis of the baditerrom- mad considers oceamie, military, and political an, pe V. lookill. The riverime force to ftec to 1 Smith Vistes that its u'atlisaasc, , 1W V. C. VaLls. Naval logistic Use. TV* **blaom to theee problemis tont in support. Wma lbo to Fba Owin, hy Norbert T. "in. obrise corps operations to vietnan, 196?. %w Wdet a. Sismose. The Indonesian 1Wfotaib J. Vealtaa. Tue V.S. tanker im"zy. %WRa Ne et- 111i weas. Developments and problnm io carrier-baeed Palsokar, 8. D. WSUM3 1m 11AN TI A614S %ttaft aircraft. 1y C. 0. Unlaquist. studies for EDAME JA Unite" Seeise lastitatioa of *a&&a,, tbp mew Icebreaekrs. %W Keith S. 8Scbh-eAr. The lwdli Journal, v. 99. Apr./Jie 1969: ocess eciences adt the Navy, by Waoters. Jr a-us. v. 99 Men's fettr# beneath the mea. %r Course F. Road.- Pt. 2. level 04 seritins events, I July Tie chissee poseesessi or Roatltefid esslser June 1968, by marold a. twrrace. -.w me., waepoas tilts the Asian military balance against. 196?. 1y Joam D. Nares-pt. 3. U.S. manva opera- India. Lew-yild melee wepa eft am ove d%- tums egaust North Vistam. Augst 1q6L4W*"br delive local victoris "Measet oemveatioaawl ? SeVeath fleet% eams. The Soviet Weaed two", Z if Is d h ad statleal molues VW4nwrrchant sarie, %y the U.S. Maritime Aftlaistroo- a", the poseabl~ity or a doetruetiwo *Wmalum t~oo. U.S. defense prop. 104'-V193. by tho Mo~tt deter Chiasee sessi". poklestase icac- 5"crtary or bereins (bobert. 5. unkoeat. ties to a meelem india ebald Get he goesideed deelsiw,. Falitia tus"es* betweenu two - or trobicas ot naval strategy, U.S. and 4111,4 ma- betwee lindi an Chits wil Ut be redece if val operations In the Vistam Wat. tie Indobesla- toia VMIne NOMMUar ad hae- Weaker tha

45 IDE STRATEGIC ENV3tONMWIT 247 China. Inian. diploma~ shold be channeled to- they asierios aetbaftc abroad unless It habsps Its mird aosvinclag Pakistan at the Chinese threat to policy and speculates an the ossiblew benefits ot both nations. India now needs the adinim nuclear a no arlestatioa in world afflairs. dat"ir t "Molast attack bw haistan and China. l W' DWWAUBp MEWUUCTIUNC In OW uw_~ FM1. tuagmi DfVVr N P 10ka DOhiioMet. 1ank, Deda. analysis, wn. M.0 Feb. 69 l97tz 1-?. 1969: P65. v. 12D7T5.C6,17 China mafs in Describesica tawree roesaiateen th Cvi-a thet for Soie * the mes fbthe Chviet sonael Apart ftv ViCenta Cnit~ue,? the civilian 57 ofe i apten Mel tiale Cooinra Bawlbe st Paruty a case to adste.i oasouby thea t"itoko etensrg adt van Prhid th asterarlty euitesimuo etheu.ear Varee,?ftt ith"tirt Orvsselos ebalwoatal. evl thrug Smahe revluioar to repla troop ofespfaltbes In cse amd xmalties. party leades itlae eto- WACS. 1arsed Fuse maganreviv. v. 22. Apr. wuai~the ret~0o 1970: l 1Wla is so : 5. sutm"s Itya. CAwarev SChims nove hmistory tietassese Curei- ftot Dwt. EMU IN ANo OMPIE. W,-AT. 3.5t Claus that,1ti the 1saw5 thset Chime navalai rvi v. 66af. Ve. le, lg6. 60M. 5T& epossany deie relat.ive Slto Meica. Us Sovit th ia.3cl.v396 v. 16 Unioted tate. Uniehd Sttes CUMclemu bew acozy n ~i dsusin nsn"aou h fin erhe net asearu gmleser 1 ~emdle. of the 22%setbihey acsiotf S a U delaesw intat scowda T~~~~~~~t~~ lttus'pcan.hv Fef It Mh Riggebd Jqan'o thue NomDebeasse VIUUS-A 10002, :d Foreml anwonate qetryy91 Apr.r pur.vm for Mele exantis. of pp-t alse the *d I. viewend mgamisagla' As an Impotan aes-t sctieee.phiia toe a ntiawll defamee a wet-lly iapo4ia and 'ue pila wm-wv. v. 16ttl. 3,0 elateue ues h Cooper**~~~~~~~~~ ato cp~l fy oft~ u 1. lbwtsstaei b do.a aa Mm. Plan 1976 fa Uwtet. ftso aste Cuerna thre at M tutu" bevew lea Wa on.tu A es.*9 wi0l4me W".oss tcea soofg The Sovie.t Ulln carn pt. tnja alu masattai v.r Aina 6h ftw4u States theta the tscatairne pavr um*i etu mert'pts At ee t bri~t sov#t at h miitarlantlam fatig pai, paifa qswt.u ap4 Japan's beap La?2 ml..- an~~~~~~~~~~~ a~~t n ~bhtetg ovlao meu ped. will smoe 1AM Wre slet by the and a9tata Wi..~t~t~ldt~nU7 o ~ rt sess e~t of Jpu~anese NUV" mid197'. thatmftas ~ eaimelv~ ie.eswloea is vievedl Isce bfwaw I s toonce- waevn an VMAnd ata=?l - alplsdloter psi.. 4"Wtmey U ~ ~ ~~~~~~~W the that~ ~ at71 tas asios mind shig a Varstly inproov scran osle h-pns ittdsae detow"ap 110rs plte" tolaead esar

46 M4 ARMS CONTROL A DI5ARMAMEI4T mad nffal indmatri., Go a lare scale tu meet rim- the Ves't 4aenn5 ams '. became awar., that tbay wobild Ing defense needs. have,,) bear the brunt of on attack on Vestern 3Varow. 114T SW.7S POLICY 0U NATZONAL CM3IT. Java. Socialist 1151 revie.v no. 191, Nov. 15, 1969: chd~t"~ Wilt.,. ClUE IDRA OF ISN *WOPEM CAUaW'; POU!31L12Z or EDOPEA cooputou WiTmI NIW.J3, 1969 NMOI Dig If.. des fturopm" Cuwmom'; maglichkoi- Criticims Japaaso defense and foreign policies, too 144 lecher mus"minnaareit in der MAo. Ruconcludifg that the prospects for world peace are rope-ai'.hv, v. 24. Dec. 25, 1969: Improving smd that max me not inevitable. Since 9M v.2 history demostrates that the balance-of-farce. concept led to ana race sd war, Japa Cuatends that no stimt.eic reasce eist for a jshold puresue a foeseig policy based an the "five West Buropeas deffense ccimmnity silce thk- security principles of peace,' pocltive and unearmd neu- of Vestera Brwcpe depends ;rimarily an global detrality, and Military noaalnmst. terrence of a Soviet nilitary attack. Theretre, aww planning of Vast ftepee. defense mnot involve American asuistance. Only the unlikely situation in mbich the Soviet Union diamem its European j1148 territory could warant % joint Vest end rast Ta.- Savornin Lohum Jadm V. H. de. CSOM ASPECTS ropes orm control and disosarmenmt arrangement. Or ~ MMXIMM O M O~usapcsd Is ardor not to be degraded Into a moriket for Is dtene. mearlaudaise. evue ailitair. 66o&. American military hardware. Wielorm Borpe could role; pasterl military review ano. 10. Dec. 1969: cpeat*ý in a onmams an ora production nod n. U2.248, 1969 procurement. Whs indeofinite aorsmiaatln would Includes ammarles in balish end Germ. weld legal formeium ena ecomically selfdefatmotug proteaticalm aglaist Ammri"a. Scbktu Assesss the Dutch Amed Forcess' strength and considers Political, military, technical. and fi. ccntributino to MAO. Cooperation senng allissce nsocial Prerequisites of Vest Europeam defense commbevs and a better dlstribsatica of aalsimmou *oerstino end outlines its spieii fbrm. far woc, a production gal personnel training are stressed. 11W~ Sctuwab, George. VATI2W IA S TWTICAL VJCLEA U49 MUUM POLICY. 'Vrbts. v. 13, fall 1969: Schmidt. malont- Emma AND Dam f. m IS i nom O.w.1 v6 Sw O m MP UrOU A21VartedI$ans Although 9it Aerad Is neutral, it hass the miad be' Ob dl WA7 SIM 5*a benrgtt D df,isl with conventional or maclo- Slebrbtt S*datmd fr brops ochll., 1. WVeso".The aclw osimentquestion h.- U34S56,. 13 U to aeuttauesai aiotln'.1v.. Several. yvrs be,- Sateest nt mad oxe Doo.. 9 In ar.a tm fose %be"e WIitatves, the Gov"rneato mittleai setw f b Vs mr aet nme. 8.1 tmerland could not aoquire atomic wo~apme. Ommader OwImpotane o IAO a Vet Brn-fore~d e 'nsice to $twy woo or asking the Consderstheiqiotene ofnato d Vst Ese-ayu a moew efectie Combt force. The oomml- Poea4m-Aeicen tis for West Morapeag. secity "Ad Bie osaaled that the WWI#e Movep.. COAUl be tast.-ist diteste, inter-aiuied decisiamobeziag Ists.mpae oteiaimlarwpebt %he MM of 4064,er WOOPoan tm P0ssibILt Of boes SAONe t 11Varn ttens iawea~l.of woodue. bt a 5aut-Vort Wameat am troop rtm tion in bure" towea bce" Swt enlead w : Inapbe aas at qseaw La a a prieiple of the Morapean balsoe of re~ wetheear by it caloet tdet vevlopmensi enitpraieb~lwt'me slterativftt could.estwaaay produce bar am nclear maqiom. the ~~ ~ ~ ~ f Imca atai. veisstiea at the on*s$ AMq, which Ws to bave been a istesomeilate "te befoethe aimewd Affc. could be equippe with senesar 18eapof. be- I~cow tw Govereamo's baste policy. This eoincid- :4h.*%i4Wr. Pmmfd T. CtOM WAWM 3 AND ONOIA 44 With enseasisk of tension. Ia Viope, sashed IV WIUMOI,3 Pmible~see alostaiqus Am "340.10"n the Vartial test bea treaty The Ocverment booe" Ievwe mia2&"tar gswmre; grenea I Ant so 6fiectiwe ousroufrsatim treaty (ImTh miiftay review, Pe. IM7 j$. M-. would *11imiate the thret of snclu~r war. fte 112.Pb Unialsbet cf %best bowe 1W the oviet Isvealce i"clai-8 sumrifeis IS 18 ad WAais Ges. at caecboolmook!% will almost CW' also rope the awtso maclear dwbate. Ofte ft,ýw the inwasino ^ontemft that the 12 Vest Cerham divisions ram ~ te~n a t~rsiado lc h U* 009% susanetia 1 Pant or t10 AM~ r""n qsr- J'IM %. altboohm NNW e, 160 Wceentrige had a loftae the Sovie iatent'.n or Zs.;beeloWuta. t*l~ It Vf he ttxe of the tnag lob. ;w~terr~mi.-

47 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT had not. By giving up nuclear weapons, Switzer land has helped stem the tide of proliferation. Sokol, Hans. CIEATO, QUO VADIST3 NATO, quo varia? The Government will continue its neutral policy-- Revue militaire g n6rale; general military review, with or without nuclear weapons--hoping to avoid Feb. l any conflict that could put it under the NATO urn- U2.R48, 1970 brella and cause it to lose its neutrality. how- Includes susmaries In French and English. ever, if this is unsuccessful, "Switzerland's safety valve for the foreseeable tuture remain,, Compares the performances and military postures NATO." of NATO and the Soviet Union and considers NATOts history and strategies. Sokol criticizes the alliance's purely defensive posture and suggests reor ganization and improved coordination of its con- Schweinitz, Kurt, Graf von. 'ITALY'S STRATEGIC ventional and nuclear forcns. The stret,1c arms SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] Die strategische limitation talks in Helsinki, the Geneva arms con- Lage Italiens im Mittelmeerraum. Wehrkunde, v. 18, trol and disarmament conference, and the coming jov. 1969: into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty U3.W396, v. 18 may cause an upgrading of NATO's conventional forces. NATO should also consider possible expan- Contends that the Soviet Union, by its newly in- sion into the South Atlantic. creased activity and naval presence in the Mediterranean, aims t,) change the strategic balance of power and transforz the area into a Soviet flank 1157 against NATO. Moscow exploits the fact that the THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA. Interna- Near East, Cyprus, northern Africa, and most Bal- tional defense review, no. 3, 1969: ilkan states are not within NATO's defense area. lus. P&GP RR Italy, "almost isolated geographicelly from its allies," would be excessively vulnerable to enemy attack except for its dominating geographical Analyzes South Africa's strategic value to NATO, focusing on that country's relative military weak- 6trategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Schweinitz outlines the strength of Italy's forness, the rising Soviet threat in the area, and the increasing importance of the sea route around ces, its defense concept, and the prospects for the Cape of Good Hope. Since South Africa's Armed NATO defense. Forces are incapable of securing this vital line of communication and trade, the arms embargo should be lifted, NATO and South Africa should ork out a defense agreement, Joint military exer rises should be conducted, and NATO should station Sharp, F. R. THE THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA. In Can- a naval force in South African waters. ada. Emergency Measures Organization. E( national digest, v. 9, Duc. 1969/Jan. 1970: 2-4. UA926.C295, v Extract from a paper presented to the Standing ETOWARD A BALANCED DETERFENi) Pour une dissuasion Committee on External Affairs and National De- 6quilibrge Eby3 **** Epseud.l 2Conomie, v. 26, fence, May Mar. 14, 1970: HC2,.E42, v. 26 Evaluates the Soviet bomber, missile, and space threat to North America. "The emphasis has shift- Urges that France halt defense development, reed from a solely bomber threat in 1958 to a mas- organize its military stiuctures, and adapt its sive missile and a limited but still significant strategy to present conditions. The author advobomber threat in 1969." cates the strengthening of internal defenses because they are the basis of deterrence Shim, Jae-hoo.i. KIM ON THE NIGHBOARD. Far Eastern Van der Kroef, Justur M. AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHEAST economic reviw, v. 67, Feb. 19, 1970: 11. illus. ASIA: THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC COMMITMENT. South- HChI1.F18, v. 67 east Asia quarterly, v. 4, Oct. 1969: 119. P&GP RR Duscribes the improved capabilities of the North Bibliography: p Kcrean Armed Forces, focusing on recent significant increases in personnel strengths, weapons, Examines Australia's defense relationship with and equiment; the modernization of the South Southeast Asia in the light of recent statements Korean Armed Forces; U.S. military aid; the prospects for U.S, troop withdrawals; and "Koreanizaand remarks by Prime Minister Gorton, notably at the Five Power Defense Conference held in Canberra tion" programs. According to the former director in June Van der Kroef notes Gorton's delibof South Korea's CIA, "this buildup is creating en crate restriction of Australia's commitments to irbawiance of power in favor of North Korea that could lead to another full-scale war." the peninsula of Malaya instead of Malaysia proper but stresses Australia's substantial military aid

48 250 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT to Vietnam and its continuing interest, in con- 282 p. ilus. (Prasger special studies in U.S. junction with the United States, In maintaining economic and social development) its forward defense perimeter In Malaysia-Sings- UA2.W36 pore. Contents.-pt. 1. Introduction: Isproving the bases for desision, by Davis B. Bobrov.-pt General perspectives: Defeame deeislon-asklng; Veilly, N. CAN OPINION ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT3 Uns cost-effectivenesas mdels end rationality, by opinion ur le pacte de Varsovie. Revue Dilitaire gkn6rale; general military reviev. no. 1., Jan. Philburn Ratoosh. Ahdao8 end bypotbeses con- cerning active and passive defense systems end 1970: U2.R48, 1970 the types of response they seem likely to evoke, Sary of a study written by Andrsej Korbonski, by Robert C. Iorth.-pt. 3. Analogous universes: University of California. A possible cross-bistorical survey of active and Includes ssuries in English and German. passive defense, by George R. Quester. Models Describes the difficulty of establishing a lastand missiles; simlation research and ABN defense, by John R. Raser.-pt. 4. Major current ing alliance and the sensitive problem of adapting actors: Chinese Cisunist response to alternaorganizations like NAMT mnd the Warsaw Treaty Or- tive U.S. continental defense postures, by Davis ganisation to changing requirements. B. Bobrow. The genuineness of Soviet elite fear of U.S. aggression, by Ralph K. White. Estimation of Soviet responses to alternative U.S. defense 1161 postures, by Bryant X. Wedge. A cost-benefit Vukadinovi6, R - van. THE ROLE AND STRENGTH OF THE analysis of French elite attitudinal response to CHINESE AMY. Review of international affairs, U.S. active and passive defense sstem, by Morv. 20, Dec. 5, 1969: ton Gorden. Prediction of U.S. public response D839.R4, v. 20 to a damage-limiting progran, by Eugene L. Hartley.-About the contributors. Even before the armed forces took over the apparatus of state power, their special place in the Results of a 1965 study of the usefulness of overall dynamics of Chinese sociopolitical devel- the behavioral sciences in national security deopment was clear. An unbroken qualitative and cisionmaking. Continental defense was chosen as quantitative advance throughout the chaos of po- as illustrative case. litical events is demonstrated by the cripling of the Chinese defense budget over the past 8 years. However, lagging armaments mean that the army can probably equip only 400,000 men for field opera Westmoreland, William C. THE ARMED FORCES; A REPREtions, and the air force lacks fuel and spare parts for its 2500 planes supported by 120,0OO SENTATIVE SEGMENT OF AMRICAX SOCIETY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Mar. 1, 197O: troops. It seems almost certain that China pos- PN6121.V52, v. 36 sesses several dozen atom bombs ranging from 2 to Speech delivered at a convocation, Lincoln Acad- 200 kilotons and a few hydrogen bmbs with a very emy of Illinois, Springfield, Ill., Jan. 31, limited delivery capability. Recent work on missiles has been intensive, but "the estimate that Warns against the erosion of mutual trust be- Chinese missile forces would be able to pose a tween the American people and their Armed Forces, threat to other continents only by the end of this castigates those forces that tend to diminish this century probably provides an approximate picture." trust, and concludes that the Army "has served 1the3 Nation with unfaltering dedication." 1162 WE CONDEMN Al0UMENTS FOVR "INDEPENDENT DEFENSE." 1165 Japan Socialist review, no. 192/193, Dec. 1/15, Wheeler, Earle G. OUR MILITARY STRATEGY. Ordnance, 1969: HX9.J3, 1969 v. 54, Sept./Oct. 1969: UF1.067, v. 54 Argues that the Japanese Defense Agency's plans for expanding conventional and nuclear forces Traces the evolution of U.S. "national military are irrational in terms of the threat perceived. strategy," summarizes the principal components of Rearmament will undermine the political and eco- the containment policy, and forecasts future milinomic systems and lead inevitably to imperialist tary security needs. Although Vietnam may cause expansion and Japan's isolation in Asia. Japan some reassessment, basic policy is to maintain a should adopt a policy based on unarmed neutrality, balance of power in Europe and the Pacific and to military nonalinement, and the "five principles of contain Communist aggression. peace." White, S. N. THE THREAT TO CANADA. In Canada. WEAPONS SYSTYX DECISIONS; POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGI- Emermency Measures Orgamization. D0 national di- CAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE. Edited geat, v. 9, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: illus. by Davis B. Bobrow. New York, Praeger C19693 UA926.C295, v. 9

49 ITHE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 251 Estimates the consequences and effects of an en my nuclear attack, discusses the time factors in- DEFOLIANTS, DEFORITIES: WHAT DISK? Medical world volved, and concludes that adequate protection newv, v. 11, Feb. 27, 1970: illus. will be neesshary for the very high proportion of R!Ul.864, v. 12 survivors. Examines the growing controversy over reports that 2,3,6,7-tetrachlorodibenzo-gprdioxin, a con taminant found in the widely used herbicide, Zorthian, Barry. i1h= DO WE go FROM H? Foreign 2,4,5-trichlorophenozyaeetic acid (2,4,5-T), is a service Journal, v. 47, Feb. 1970: 16-19, powerful teratogenic agent. Several laboratory JXl.A53, v. 47 and field reports are now on record that attribute fetal deformations in test animas, exposed domes- The basic requirement of counterinsurgency is tic breeds, and humans to dioxin or its carrier, acceptance of the truism that insurgency is pri- 2,4,5-T, but the evidence as to whether the herbimarily a political phenomenon and only secondarily cide poses any real danger to human populations is military. Consequently, a governmental organiza- inconclu3ive. A lack of statistical data on birth tion designed specifically for counterinsurgency defects in the United States and in South Vietnam, rather than conventional war and characterized by where massive quantities of 2,4,5-T are being used a coordinated single channel of politicomilitary in the defoliant program, hampers the investigaauthority is the first necessity. The host goy- tion and adds to the fear that herbicides are inerment must he interested in responding to the flicting extensive, but undetected, genetic damage legitimate needs of its people and the assisting on the American and South Vietnamese populations. Americans skillful in encouraging reform. The last requirement is the effective communication of the nature, goals, and progress of the counterinsurgency effort to the public of the United 1171 States. the host country, and the world. To im- Hamilton, Andrew. CBW: NIXON INITIATIVE ON TREATY plement these principles, the United States needs ANTICIPATES CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS. Science, an independent center with interagency authority v. 166, Dec. 5, 1969: to provide total integration of the civilian- QI.$35, v. 166 military effort in the field and in Washington. Di These essentials are not applicable when an insur- Discusses recent changes in U.S. policy on a hem-b gency has been transformed into a battlefield war. ical and biological warfare (CBW) against a background of mounting congressional pressure for ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and criticism of U.S. CBW practices in Vietnam. "The op- CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL erationally significant fact about President Nixon's new policy on CBW is that it does not direct- DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR ly affect U.S. practices in Vietnam." - Reports on a return visit to the Bikini Atoll, site of 23 U.S. nuclear weapons tests. Cameron's visit was made in conjunction with a U.S. program to prepare the islands for the return of their original inhabitants, who were evacuated in 1946 before the tests. Biological 117L HUNTING "HOT SPOTS" IN UTAH. Nuclear news, v. 13, 1168 Feb. 1970: illus. Cameron, James. 23 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS LATER. New QC770.NI5, v. 13 York times magazine, Mar. 1, 1970: 24-25, 44, 46, illus. AP2.N6575, 1970 Describes a joint research project of the University of Utah, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory to detect and measure radioactive fallout in the environment and determine whether it poses a danger to animal life. Some scientists are predicting that the project will grow into "the most detailed and thorough ra- diation-ecology investigation in the world." Cookson, Sybil. INTERNATIONAL CON.,.:iXNia lk, ' BW. Machta, L., K. Telegadas, and D. L. Harris. STRON- Pax et libertas, v. 35, Jan./Mar. 1970: 2-3. TIUM-90 FALLOUT OVER LAKE MICHIGAN. Journal of P&GP RR geophysical research, v. 75, Feb. 20, 1970: QCBli.J6, v. 75 Report on the International Conference on Chemical and Biological Weapons, which cites Richard Measurements of Sr 90 in Lake Michigan water and McCarthy's contribution toward eliminating such sediments indicate that fallout is no greater over weapons, focuses on the need to strengthen the the laie than over nearby land. Excess "oceanic" 1925 Geneva Protocol, and publicizes the report of fallout over land fallout is in controversy. The U Thant's consultants on chemical and biological Lake Michigan result favors no enhancement. (Abwarfare. stract supplied)

50 252 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 1174 Report presented to the World Assembly for Meselson, Matthew S. BEHIND THE NIXON POLICY FOR Peace, Berlin (0DR), June 21-24, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 23-24, Reports on the ecological effects of defoliants, TK1145.A84, v. 26 crop-killing chemicals, and conventional high ex- Edited extracts of testimony before the U.S. plosives employed by the United States in the Senate Ccmuittee on Foreign Relations. Vietnam War. Pfeiffer voices concern that the military effectiveness of defoliation will lead to Testimony on the characteristics of various its extensive use "in any future military operachemical and biological agents under development tions in areas like Vietnam unless scientists esby U.S. scientists or already in U.S. arsenals and tablish that it is a serious threat to the ecology the political and military implications of the of a country." U.S. chemical and biological warfare program. Meselson argues that for good or ill the United States is certain to play the decisive role in de terminin" the future of these weapons. He recom- THE PROPHETS OF POLLUTION. Nature (London) v. 225, mends that the United States ratify the Geneva Tan 31. Natur (oonv.25 Protocol of 1925 and calls on the administration Jan. 31, 1970: to abandon "weapon-by-weapon or situation-by-situ- Ql.N2, v. 225 ation analysis" in favor "of an overall policy on Professor Ernest Sternglass complains that which decisions regarding particular weapons or Nature, as well as some other scientific publicaparticular situations can be based." tions, is unwilling to give a fair hearing to his views on the effects of radioactive fallout, and 1175 he has even allowed it to be said that there is a conspiracy to silence him. The truth is somewhat Neilands, J. B. VIETNAM: PROGRESS OF CHEICAL WAR. Asian survey, v. 10, Mar. 1970: different: In order to keep the channels of scholarly communication free of "spurious traf- DSl.A492, v. 10 fic," scientific journals have had to develop strict rules to determine the fitness of materials Questions the legality of America's chemical submitted to them for publication. So far, nothwarfare program in Vietnam. There is evidence ing offered this journal by Dr. Sternglass has that antipersonnel gases and herbicides are not measured up. What purpose does Dr. Steraglass exempt from the Geneva Protocol an4 that napalm hope to serve with his publications? Too often, and white phosphorus, if not outlawed by the pro- campaigns of this kind, originating in fear of the tocol, could be prohibited under the 1907 Hague effects of uncontrolled technology, become gener- Convention. Neilands laments the lack of concern alized assaults on technology, reason, and even within the scientific comnunity over defoliation the scientific method. It is not technology, howin Vietnam and appeals to scientists to become en- ever, but the failure to control it that is at gaged in the problem. fault. It will be difficult, indeed, to repair the damage done by those who oversimplify complex issues, feed the flames of emotionalism, or cry 1176 wolf once too often. [NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND INFANT MORTALITY] Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Dec. 1969: TK9145.A84, v Contents.--Fetal and infant mortality and the Slgdkovi;, R. [AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TRANSPORT OF FALLOUT FROM THE SEVENTH CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION environment, by Arthur R. Tamplin.--A reply, by INTO THE ALPS] Untersuchung fber den Transport Ernest J. Sternglass. des Fallout von der siebenten chinesischen Kernwaffenexplosion Challenge to Ernest J. Sternglass' thesis that in den Alpenraum. Archiv fur Me- teorologie, Geophysik und Bioklimatologie. Serie fallout from nuclear weapons tests is responsible A: Meteorologie und Geophysik, v. 18, no. 1/2, for the decrease in the rate of decline of fetal 1969: illus. and infant mortality in the United States with a QC851.A73, v. 18 rebuttal by Sternglass. Tamplin argues that ra- Summaries in French and German. diation dosages from fallout have never been large enough to produce the effect Sternglass attributes The first swath of artificial radioactivity from to them and contends that changes in fetal and in- the seventh Chinese nuclear explosion of December fant mortality over the last 50 years are best ex- 24, 1967, was detected at the three mountain sites plained by reference to changing socioeconomic Zugspitze (2963 m.), Wank (1780 M.) and Garmischconditions and medical practices. Partenkirchen (735 m.). Unexpectedly the said swath arrived at the Zugspitze station on the seventh day after the test, and 12 hours later at the 11T( valley station. This implies that cond.;tions for PI'eiffer, Egbert W. ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE VIET- fallout transport and downward tropopause penetra- NAM WAR. Peace and the sciences, Oct./Dec. 1969: tion must have been exceptionally favorable in the JX1901.P25, 1949 region surrounding our stations. A meteorological

51 TUE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 253 Sstudy uncovered the fact that the radioactive ma- nounced that these operations already conformed to terial had been moved from the explosion site by a the supposedly new policy. With equal facility, relatively strong jet stream; it was also found the Pentagon later deprived the U.S. decision to that the fission products in question were carried renounce biological warfare of any practical imdownward into the troposphere by high-level subsi- plication for the defoliant program by denying dence in the eastern Atlantic Ocean during the that herbicides were biological weapons. Neither period December 29, 1967, noon, to December 30, the Government nor industry has ever conducted a midnight (central European time). Isentropic tra- thorough study of 2,4,5-T's teratogenic properjectories were computed leading backward from the Zugspitze peak from December 31 to 29, 1967; it ties. That uncertainties can still exist on the question lends new weight to the lesson taught by was found that the airflow originated in the said the experience with thalidomide; viz, that the subsidence region. Computations of potential vor- Government is unable to protect the citizen from ;icity revealed the stratospheric origin of the manmade environmental dangers. If this is the air mass marked by the fresh fallout. (Abstract situation "under orderly, normal medical condisupplied, modified) tions in a highly developed country, how is one ever to measure the harm that might be done to unborn children in rural Vietnam, in the midst of 1180 the malnutrition, the disease, the trauma, the Volchok, H. L., and others. OCEAN FALLOUT-THE CRA- poverty, and the general shambles of war?" TER LAKE EXPERIMENT. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Feb. 20, 1970: QCalI.J6, v. 75 Eononrk By the analysis of water and sediment cores, the 1182 total inventory of strontium 90 in Crater Lake, Anderson, Richard M. ANGUISH IN THE DEFENSE INDUS- Oregon, was determined to be 4.2 curies. In terms TRY. Harvard business review, v. 47, Nov./Dec. of surface fallout, this is equivalent to about : , 166, , mc/km 2k The comparable fallout on the surrounding HF500.NH land area, determined from analyses of soil sections, was 58 mc/km 2, and a value predicted by ex- Identifies some of the major problems confronttrapolation from other Oregon stations was 73 mc/ ing the U.S. defense industry and proposes changes km 2. Hence, no substantial difference in the ef- in Government and defense industry policies to alficiency of fallout collection could be attributed leviate them. Anderson focuses on the lack of to the mere presence of the large water surface. (Abstract supplied) planning capabilities among defense industry managers and the unrealistic requirements imposed by thý Government on defense contractors Whiteside, Thomas. DEFOLIATION. New Yorker, v. 45, Feb. 7, 1970: 32-38, 40, 43-44, 46, 49-50, 54-56, , 62, AP2.N6763, v. 45 Berkley, George E. THE MYTH OF WAR PROFITEERING. New republic, v. 161, Dec. 20, 1969: U.S. officials argue that U.S. defoliation and AP2.N624, v. 161 "food denial" operations in South Vietnam are innocuous. They carefull =void characterizing the program as one of chemical or biological warfare, Analyzes the financial status of the leading de- fense contractors from 1965 through 1968 and conthough it is both, and never mention that the eludes that most experienced declining profits. agents being used were developed in biological Many of the munitions makers are therefore expandwarfare programs. But is the program as safe as ing into the more profitable civilian sector. the Government claims? Many critics think not. There have been some disturbing reports that the defoliant chemical 2, 4,5,-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, or 2,4,5-T, may have potent fetus-deforming 1184 properties, and the Government was forced by pub- Boulding, Kenneth E., and others. NATIONAL PRIORIlic criticism into announcing last October that it TIES; MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL. Washington, would restrict the use of 2,4,5-T in U.S. domestic Public Affairs Press [1969) 176 p. civilian applications and military operations. UA23.N249 This announcement greatly understated the case against 2,4,5-T. It also erred in claiming that Contents.--Values in crisis, by Senator J. W. it was improbable that any human beings were en- Fulbright.--Budgetary considerations, by Robert P. dangered by Dresent uses of the agent, for it is Msyo.--Maintaining economic stability, by Paul W. qu.te possible that pregnant Vietnamese women were McCracken.--Balancing military and civilian prothen and are now receiving into their systems a grams, by Charles L. Schultze.--Planning for the percentage, by body weight, of 2,4,5-T only future, by Joseph A. Califano, Jr.--Goals for slightly less than that which deformed one out of America, by Walter P. Reuther.--Civilian econoav every three fetuses in experimental rodents. The prospects, by Leonard A. Lecht.--The role of mili- Defense Department made no changes in the defolia- tary power, by John Kenneth OsIbraith.--Pentagon tion and food-denial programs. Instead, it an- accountability, by Senator William Proxnire.--The

52 254 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT effects of the war industry, by Kenneth E. Bould- Includes bibliographical references. iag.--ultimate costs of Vietnam, by James L. Clay- Introduction abstracted as item 545 in v. 6, no. ton.--national security considerations, by Robert 2, of this bibliography. C. Moot.--Maintaining military capabilities, by Malcolm W. Hoag.--Weapons development criteria, by Contents.--Introduction, by David Horowitz.--Who F. M. Scherer.--The military rationale, by Merton made American foreign policy, ? by G. Tyrrell. William Domhoff.--The large corporation and American foreign policy, by William Appleman Williams. Articles on various aspects of the problem of -- The New Deal, new frontiers, and the cold war: determining priorities smong competing national a re-examination of American expansion, , security and domestic programs. by Lloyd C. Gardner.--Business planners and America's postwar expansion, by David W. Eakins.--Eco nomic effects of the cold war, by Joseph D. Phil- Brandt, Geraard. EARMAMENTS AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM lips.--the militarization of the American economy, IN THE GElRN FEDERAL REPUBLIC) Rdlstung und Wirt- by Charles E. Nathanson.--Index. schaft in der Bundesrepublik. In Studien zur politischen und gesellschaftlichen Situation der Argues that the supercorporations have been the Bundesvehr. Witten, Eckart-Verlag, (For- main influence over American foreign policy in the schungen und Berichte der Evangelischen Studien- past few decades and that every major sector of gemeinscheft, Bd. 21/3) p American manufacturing has become deeply, perhaps UATIO.$S4 irrevocably, militarized. Edited by Georg Picht. Contents.--pt. 1. The German Federal Republic's 1187 armaments in the tense setting of the Western ail- THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ON THE DEFENSIVE. Humanist, itary alliance: Economic motives for incorpora- v. 30, Mar./Apr. 1970: tion of the German Federal Republic into the alli- BL27OO.H78, v. 30 ance. About the organization of the Western mili- Symposium based on the first "National Teach-In tary alliance. Economic aspects of common mili- on World Community," held at Columbia University. tary policy in the alliance.--pt. 2. Armaments Participants: Joseph Clark, David Dellinger, and private economy: The reflection of rearmament Herman Kahn, Allard Lowenstein, Seymour Melman, in the business community. The armaments-economy and David Schoenbrun. organization of economic interest groups. The armaments-policy demands of private business.--pt. Views on the need for successful arms negotia- 3. Revision of the armaments program, tions, congressional control of Defense Department -pt. 4. Characteristics of the new armaments expansion, gun control, and the place of violent policy (1): Manifest and latent functions of ail- dissent in American society. Kahn answered inquiitary armaments. About the size and structure of ries on the possibility of disarmament, and Schoenthe German defense contribution. The development brun urged a new internationalism to strengthen in time of German rearmament.--pt. 5. Character- the United Nations. istics of the new armaments policy (2): Domestic and foreign procurements? On the structure of the West German armaments potential. Compensation 1188 payments as a third component of the German de- Fossum, Egil. SOME COMMENTS ON THE POSSIBLE CONTRIfense contribution.--final remarks.--list of ref- BUTION OF THE MILITARY TO THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT erences.--subject index.--list of tables. OF THE POOR COUNTRIES. Bulletin of peace proposaln, v. 1, no. 1, 1970: Appraises the effects of West Germany's rearma- als, v1 ment on the country's economic system and development. Brandt considers the economic mechanism and Argues that the military has made few, if any, limitations of the political-military-industrial contributions to the development processes of accomplex and the spinoffs from civilian and defense cumulation, Institutionalization, distribution, industries. By the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in its planned defense effort, the German and mobilization in the developing countries. The issue is a political one, relating "to who has Federal Republic upsets the rational division of power, in whose interests they act, aid what kinds labor in NATO, where nuclear deterrence should re- of solutions are adopted." main in the hands of the most technologically advanced ally. It thereby reduces the credibility of its conventional deterrence against limited 1189 conflicts and war escalation and fails to contrib- Heidt, Contr~leur g6n4ral. CTHE 1970 DEFENSE BUDute its share to arms control and disarmament ef- OFT) Le budget de la d6fense nationale pour forts. Revue de ddtense nationale, v. 26, Jan. 1970: D41o.R45, v CORPORATIONS AND THE COLD WAR. Edited by David Outlines the 1970 defense budget, which is a Horowitz. New York [Monthly Review Press, study more of past than of future expenditures ow- 249 p. v. 2) (Studies in imperialism and the cold war, HCllO.D4C6 ing to the economic crises of early Its ob- jective is to develop to the maximum of the cur-

53 ; THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 255 intent was to use a strengthened military for po- litical purposes. rent defense program rather than implement new military planning JAPAN; 1970 BUDGET. Asian almanac, v. 8, Feb. 28, MILITARY CUTBACKS WILL SEND TREMORS THROUGH INDUS- 1970: DSl.A4T752, v. 8 TRY. Business week, no. 2101, Dec. 6, 1969: 91, 94, 96. illus. E5001.B89, 1969 Gives a detailed breakdown of Japan's new budget, which emphasizes nonmilitary sectors al- Estimates changes in the size and structure of though it provides for a 17.7 percent increase U.S. defense budgets in the 1970's and analyzes in defense expenditures and stresses the expan- their impact on military strategy, capabilities, sion of air and naval forces. and defense industries. Military expenditures may dip to 069 billion by FY 1973 and then swing upward to approximately 080 billion by the end of 1191 the decade. As U.S. commitments abroad and con- Lens, Sidney. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. ventional forces are reduced, the emphasis in EPhiladelphia3 Pilgrim Press C p. hardware will shift from tactical to strategic nu- HCllO.D4L43 clear weapons, and the United States will revert to an island strategy in the Pacific and a policy Contents.--Unmasking the Goliath.--Origins and of defending Europe first. purpose.--internal imperialism.--the military syndrome.--self-fulfilling strategies.--the labor lieutenants.--academia in harness.--an alternative 1194 to catastrophe.--notes.--index. Schultze, Charles L. REEXAMINING THE MILITARY BUD- GET. Public interest, no. 18, winter 1970: Describes the origins, nature, and growth of the P&GP RR military-industrial complex in the United States. Lens proposes several measures to dismantle it: Decisions on military programs ought to be made termination of military aid and an increase in in a long-term, national priorities context. A economic aid conditional only on effective pro- priorities-conscious evaluation of the military grams of social change, funneling of aid through budget should include a 5-year projection of budan international agency, purchase of large over- getary resources and claims on those resources. seas American firms by the U.S. Government as a This projection will indicate the amount of new preliminary step toward returning these firms to resources that will be available to meet domestic ownership by the native government, encouragement of regional economic and political integration, needs. For the period , this "fiscal div- idend" will equal the revenue added by economic multilateral or even unilateral disarmament in growth ($70 billion), plus the savings from a preference to continuing the arms race, and er-ha- Vietnam cease-fire and withdrawal (020 billion), sis on fulfilling the promises of the American Revolution as an alternative to militarism. minus the built-in growth of civilian expenditures ($35 billion), increases in non-vietnam military spending ($20 billion), and the cost of proposals already before Congress, or less that $20 billion 1192 total. Why the 020 billion increase in non-viet- Melman, Seymour. PENTAGON CAPITALISM; THE POLITICAL nam military spending? It might be accounted for ECONOMY OF WAR. New York, McGraw-Hill C19703 in terms of specific spending programs or other 290 p. HCllO.D1M4 cost factors built into the current defense bud- Bibliography: p get, but there are other, more fundamental reasons for the constant growth of military budgets: Contents.--Preface.--The state-management.--how the state-management controls its empire.--extenthe impact of technology on strategic nuclear forces, the practice among military planners of sion of control over means of production.--exten- preparing against every contingency, the growing sion of control over universities and research.-- cost of weapon systems, and, most important, the The science-fiction of defense and its consequen- circumstance that most of the decisions on which ces.--the Vietnam Wars program and its consequen- the military budget rests are seldom subjected to ces.--the ideology of the para-state.--the cost of outside review or public debate. This means that the para-state to American society by 1974? reform must be directed toward generating "an Or, can the state-management be stopped?--appen- informed discussion about the fundamentals of the dixes. military budget in the context of national priorities." To this end, it is recomended that the Contends that the U.S. Department of Defense di- State Department submit to Congress an annual posrectly manages the largest industrial empire in ture statement outlining the political situation the Nation and extends its control over signifi- abroad and devoting special attention to U.S. comcant related aspects of American society. Nelman mitments, that the Defense Department include in argues that the organization of the present system its annual posture statement a 5-year projection of state management was perfected during the Ken- of program costs and more cost data on force nedy administration under the guise of asserting components and weapon systems, and that an "approcivilian control over the military while the real priate Institution" be created within the Con-

54 256 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT gress to analyze these posture statements and quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: issue an anaual report thereon. JA1.W4, v Thn history and causes of the Argentine mili- Streit, Clarence. SHIFT TO ARMS IN 3 YOUTH GENERA- tary's involvement in politics and its present TIONS. Freedom & union, v. 24, Oct./Nov. 1969: 2, search for a new self-image and role JX1901.F6, v. 24 Includes Representative Paul Findley's speech to Congress, June 5, CONSCIENCE AND WAR: THE MORAL DILEMA. Intercom, Explhin3 recent changes in American values and v. 11, Nov./Dec. 1969: the generation gap in terms of rising U.S. mili- ZT164.I8148, v. 11 tary expenditures. During the past 21 years the United States has spent 37 times more on arms than Contents.--Introduction.--What is conscience?-- it spent during the youth of today's parents and Historical notes on conscience and conscription 181 times more than during the youth of their in America.--The individual and society.--the sagrandparents. lective service system st present.--rel.gious and philosophical approaches to war.--types of response 1196 to war and the draft.--some special prob- iem areas in dealing with conscience and war.-- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Economics What should voluntary organizations do?--organi- Bureau. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1969: AND zations working on the problems of conscience and RELATED DATA FOR 120 COUNTRIES. Washington [for war.--resources: Bibliography. Films. Records sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. and tapes. Off.) p. (Its Publication 53) P&GP 0R An analysis of the issues, together with a list Fourth report in a continuing assessment of the of actively concerned organizations, brief bibliography, list of film distributors, and bibliograsize and impact of the miitary expenditures of phy of films recordings and tapes. the nations of the world. In 1968 and 1969 world military expenditures continued to increase, although at a somewhat slower rate. Countries outside the two major blocs spend an increasing pro- HAS AMERICA BECOME A MILITARIZED SOCIETY? Center portion of world outlays, reflecting the acceler- magazine, v. 3, Jan. 1970: ated arms race occurring among developing coun- P&Gp RR tries. Comparisons with world economic growth demonstrate that part of the world growth divi- Contents.--We may be on our way, by Robert Gordend since 1964 has gone to higher military ex- dis.--anti-militarism is strong and growing, by penditures rather than the improvement of living Neil H. Jacoby.--We are falling fast, by Stanley standards. Statistical tables estimate military K. Sheinbaum.--We are in no serious danger, by expenditures and gross national product (GNP) Richard Bellman.--There is little evidence, by in terms of world totals and broad groupings of George N. Shuster.--The militarists have not precountries, military expenditures and related data byoadolf A.-Terle taist havenot l red of other public expenditures, per capita military vailed, by Adolf A. Berleo-We havent learned to expenditures and related data, military expenditures and military and GNP expenditures for , ranking and the of coun- GNP triesl Brief affirmative and negative replies to the question whether American society has been militarized Witze, Claude. DEFENSE CUTBACK--WHAT IT MEANS TO 1231 INDUJTRY. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Jan. International War Crimes Tribunal, 2d. Copenhagen, 1970: illus. Uo633.A65, v WE ACCUSE! A REPORT OF THE COPENHAGEN SESSION OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. Edited by Assesses the impact on the aerospace industry John Duffett. London, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, p p. illus. of recent reductions in defense expenditures. D6557.A Witze notes that most industry spokesmen remain optimistic abwut future prospects despite the cut- Contents.--Unmasking gsnouiele.--vietziaaase gesbacks. The fluctuations in various aspects of the tapo.--diem's prisons.--a's story.--interindustry during the past year are examined, and rogating priconers.--"so that's the vay it is." employment figures are included in charts. -A pattern of subversion.--napalm: what!t is and what it does.--bombing of Dal LI.-- Ethical and social American intervention in Lais.--Findings of the tribunal. Afliz, Carics A. THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES: THEIR Statements by two former prisoners of the Sai- F tqle AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMM. Western political gon government, testimony by three former member;

55 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 257 of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, and reports on the posed the problem of discontinuity with conveneffects of napalm, the bombing of a North Viet- tional Christian and Jewish piety. At the popular namese village, and U.S. intervention in Laos. level, the relationship between religious devotion The tribunal found that Japan, Thailand, and the and specific social commitments has not been clar- Philippines are guilty of complicity in the U.S. ified effectively, resulting frequently in alienaaggression against Vietnam and that the United tion of membership caused by "mixing politics with States employs weapons prohibited by interna- religion." Religious opposition to the war has tional law, mistreats prisoners of war and civil- more to do with what Robert Bellah has described ians, has extended the war to Laos and Cambodia, as the American civil religion than it does with and pursues a policy of genocide against the peo- explicitly Jewish or Christian formulations of ple of Vietnam. theology and ethics. The civil religion is, in turn, dependent upon the latter. The churches and synagogues face the challenge of enabling the civ il religion to illuminate and guide the course of McDonald, Donald. MILITARISM IN AMERICA. Center American power in the Third World. The question magazine, v. 3, Jan. 1970: of American power and world revolution is central P&GP RR to the Vietnam debate, and, although organized religion's opposition to the war has been gratify- Identifies the dominant characteristics of a ing, little progress has been made on the required militarized society, concludes that in large de- reconstruction of American civil religion. (Abgree America has become such a society, and recom- stract supplied) mends a program to reverse the trend toward even greater militarization NO CHANGE AT MIT. Nature (London) v. 226, Apr. 4, : 7. Q1.N2, v. 226 Mirski, G. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ARMY AND SO- There is no sign as yet that the trend among IETY. New times, no. 48, Dec. 3, 1969: American universities toward themselves D839.N1483, 1969 of their links with defense-oriented laboratories Without the military it is seldom possible to is over. Soon to come up for review are the Unioverthrow reactionary regimes in the developing versity of Cal.fornia'e relationships with the couerthries.w meanti regimes in ahe dveonomic y Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories, pacemakers countries. A military regme in an economically In research on nuclear weaponry, and the Massaunderdeveloped country may have relative freedom chusetts Institute of Technology's links with the of maneuver for some time, but in the long run it Draper and*lincoln Laboratories, which do impormust favor the interests of some classes and ne- tant work on offensive and defensive missile sysglect those of others. In this age of trarsition to a classless society, it is confroiited inevitatems and a variety of other defense-related tech- nologies. The argument sometimes heard that "we bly with the alternatives: capitalism or social- want to keep the links so that we can mount inism. Even when led by patriotic progressives, the telligent opposition if the.'litary-industrial army cannot take the place of a party that will complex gets outrageous in its claim" hardly mobilize the masses to carry out fundamental soci- seems applicable at California, but the situation ceconomic restructuring. at. MIT is less clear cut. The MIT labs offer the university a unique opportunity to gain experience 1204 in applying almost limitless resources to the search for interdisciplinary solutions to big Neuhaus, Richard J. THE WtAR, THE CHURCHES, AND CIV- problems. So far, the university has not availed IL RELIGION. In American Academy of Political itself of this opporturity. Debate over the fate and Social Science, Philadelphia. The sixties: of the labs has been conducted with intelligence radical change in American religion. Philadel- and proper restraint, and the longer it continues phia, (Its Annals, v. 387, Jan. 1970) p HI.A4, v. 387 the greater is the chance that ways will be found to harness the potential of these facilittes for The opinion leadership of American religion has, broader work. However, the principal danger seems never to be mentioned: Divestment would put the since succeeded in making opposition to the university out of touch with laboratory science Vietnam war respectable, to the effective exclu- and technology and. at the same time, consign the sion of divergent viewpoints. Dissent from this laboratories iti question tc a narrower, more denew orthodoxy is exercised by small enclaves with- rense-oriented, future. in a few scholarly centers and by larger church bodies that have remained aloof from the modern ecumer.ical dynamic In church co-operation and de- limt cislon-making. The rasons for positions taken on Perlmutter, Amos. FROM 0&6C=1tY TO RULE: THE the war by such different organizations as the Na- SYRIAN AMY AND THE B,'TH PARTY. Western polititional Counci? of Churches and the Southern Bap- Cal quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: tist Conventlon are, in large part. extrinsia to JAI.W4, v. ;2 the merits >r demerits of the war Itself. The ma- 'ority opposition to the war has, in a way similar to majority nisport for the civil rights bovew-nt, The role of thtt Syrian Army lr. politics from 1949 to the present. Despite itx rratricidal

56 258 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT tendencies and its other sources of internal divi- thousand experts, but "the core of the present desion and instability~, the army has managed to pro- terrence theor will remain in for-.." Paradouiserve Its heroic image as a modernizing elite and cally, elsewhere the theory of Vuerrill& arn-via, savior of the nation and now dominates Syrian so- a remillitarisation of the civilian populatioa-- ciety. will remain in vogue. After all, nuclear war omay not. in the end* turn out to be the real military issue of our times." In the world political scene 1207 today there Is little to suggest that a warless Perlmutter, Awes. MILITARY AND POLITICS 11 ISRAEL, milleniam Is at hand. NATION-BUILDING AND ROLE EXPANSION. Nov York, Praeger r19693 xiv, 161 p. zdl26.5.pbia 1209 Bibliography: p. E1413J-151. Wilson, Andrew. HOW RELEANT AnE TUE N=L OF VAR? Current, no. 1l.14 Jan. 197: 3-6. Contents.- pt. 1. Pre-independence, defence AP2.C9259, 1970 units and their political expectations, lgI8: Reprinted from Th bre (London), Nov. 30, Forerunners of the Naganah, 189T The Arab revolt; catalyst of Haganah expansion. The "acedsaies" of the future Israeli Argy.-pt. 2. The Sustained by the elaborate behavioral code of Army of Iasrel: The era of transition. Clvii- -c-a. a&w-45i. - yemry 4 inateres.. was to military relations; the Israeli formula. Zaalts bold down casualties, the rules of war were widely role expansion. The institutionalization of respected for 200 yewrs. What caused their decivil-military relations in Israel. Eshkol's ter cline wes the rise of mass &aises and Clausvitaian of office me Defence Minister. The role of Gener- theories of warfare. Worli Wars I and IU saw unal Noshe Doyan. A garrisoned state; the Israeli restricted submarine warfare, saturation bombing, solution. The military and nation-building; les and blockade widely practiced. The moral dilemmas sons for a comparative a lyi.g say-n-raised by these tactics pale, however, wben comdex. pared with those raised by guerrilla warfare and nuclear deterrence. Faced with these horrors, one Analyses civil-military relations in Israel and is tempted to run to extrmsm -t0 the unilateral demonstrates "in the process the persistence of rejection of war an an Instrument of policy or the civilian over military authorit~y" in spite of th abandonment altogether of the roles-but moat remarkable role of the Israeli military forces as Westerners will prefer to leave the moral contraan instrument of nation-building, dictions vunreolved. Perhaps the My Lai incident, which has proved that men cannot be committed toa situation "as confused and brutal as that In Viet nom without risking their moral disintegration," Scha~ll, James V. WAR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. Vi will provoke a more vigorous search for alternatal speeche& of the day, v. 36, Jan. 15, 1970: tives to violence and the threat of violence T. At4C21.v'52, v. 36 Delivered at the Un~versity of San Francisco, Nov. 11, Other Elevation of the avoidance at war Into an unlimited virtue to morally and politically untenable A condcmnation of all war Ignores the a-t,%ity of Aki, Keiiti, an tes NEAR-FIELD AND FAR-FIELD sin and evil as a consequence of the God-given NEISMIC EVIDPCUS FR TRIGGERING OF AN EARTHQUAKE freedom to accept or reject Godl. To think there BY THlE HMAN EXPLOSION. IlL S&lsmological Societs a single moral attitude to all war is to at- ty of Americe. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: tempt to escape the responsibility at choice be MUMl.S v. 59 tween lesser and greater evils that Is often Imperative for improvement of the human condition. A wide-band (0.01 to 10 cpe) accelerometer eye- A controlled violence Is sometimes the only alter- tom was used for recor~ing seismic notions at a native to total war. The balance at power depends distance or 18 km from the umiergrouad nuclear exon effective power. which includes religion or po- plosion HENAMA. The records clearly ahow a unique litical ideo.og, since Ideological and political difference In spectral structure between the radirealities are at the root of all war. Because of al and transverse componsnts of horlsootal noits impairedl irternal cohesiveness the United tions. The source of the transverse component ap- States to losing its Political effectiveness as pears to be a more efficient rsaiator of long the major military power in the world. The post- waes& than the source of the radial component. war Yalta system is breaking up. and the balance strongly suggesting that the transverse comapooent is wazeened, partly because of its fale assump- motion my not he due to trensformation of P '-ions of the balance-of-power and containment the- or Rayleigh wave: but duo to an addtional source aries. Domestic Ideological trends and technology which was triggered by the explosion. Combining Vill cause the United States to emabrk on decili- the result from Love wave spectra observed at tarititiot, after It withdraws Its overavewasmll[- Weston. "Masschusetts, we arrived at the following tt-.v prosence. Military protection of Olort"esz conclusions. (1) A faulting was triggered by the Ant-rice" will then be entrwtetd to a fow hundred~ explosion in such a timing that the shear waves

57 TIlE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 259 from the starting point of fault arrived at our and i orbital motlop, and in the vertical plane station 3 seconds after the arrival of the explo- with siamltaneous malti-level maaromments. The. sion-g nerateod sear waves. (2) The sine of variation of reak modal response Is shown vitb faulting estimated from long-p rod si-nface waves elapsed tim, moal combiations awe noted, an an is such that the product of fault area and dislo- example of tim-hlistwo compt response is cocation is about 1013 cm'. Ths value is f nuts- pared to manure* response. It is shown that tent with the length, displacme t and depth -it Mghrise Las Vegas building respond to gound moftalting - suggested frmo field beervatioon and tion with =niderab3e amplfication, that the aftershock studies. An alternative theory whi h fundmmntal -idea tend to dominate the peak rapostulates a release of high pro-existing stress sponses sltaguhb thae ar- excepti-as, that there (b00 to 300 bers) bg the formation of a crgshwd cam be sigificant modific..4on of loading condiregion can account for the mimic mont satins- tions because of sinmltan s motion in the two ted from lonc-period Love waves observed at a long horizontal -se evn though a building is symedistance. 'his theory, however, does not bhrm. trie, end that me buialing periods vary with m- nise with observations an surface faitirg and so- plitude and history cf non-dumieng prior response tershocks. (Abstract supplied) ýtle others do not. In general there are indications that code earthquake design criteria arf by no means conservative. (Abstract supplied) 1211 Basham, P. V., D. H. Veichert, and F. X. Anglin. AN ANALYIS of T1 'BE IBMUI AMMBOCXK SWEXiCE USIXG 1213 MNADIAN =CORDIOXS. Journal of geophysical re- zr-ndo, Henry. ARkYW OF UMR; 111 INSIN91 M search,. 75, Mar. 10, 1970: 'TSK AsiN w, oa M W AC. 1M Bon- QC81.J6. v. 75 ton, Gait, p. 1655T.A638T The Nevad Test Site (ITS) explosion Bonham caused a series of aftershocks well distributed Contents.-Foreword.--Prolog e The war that over the imgnitude range up to a 4.6, a range of went wrong.-tuman to Keaney: half-moasures.- particular interest to Canadian studies of detec- Johnson: the snamrs of cotinulity.-4illacies of tion and identification of M events. The re-escalation,-ari d: the stunte" peace flower. sults of an analysis of the aftershocks and other -Harold lilson: the penoalties of detrust.-the NTS explosions are reported here. The Yellow- last illusions of victory.--evolt of the elder$. knife array (Ome5*) and the Canadian network -Through the mate to Paris.--pilogue. The ulti- (12*5 AL <9 ) short-periou facilities can detect mate verdict.-index. I waver for all arttrsh zks larger than M 3.6, but not ror aftershocks maller than a 3.1; long-peri- Account or the U.S. involvteot in the Vietama ot racilities can detect Rayleigh waves for all W.~* based on interviews with mn high-level U.S. aftershocks larger than 1 La.0. The a versus a_ and pollcyaskers. Rran4oo recoutes how the major do- P-wave spectral ratio discrý.inants produce ex- cislons nf the war have t.' "de ad the poolcellent separation betrgen the larger aftershocks tions of those who pastic!.-ted In the decisionand salilar bodc,-vave aagmitude W1M explosions. maispr"* An ro: scatter or about 80 k In latitude and -O ke in longitude of the Yellowvknif e rray epierntort does not allow resolution of thke rval t.-- I-2 ýfcsin &~t4 exlaito 1ocation. Currey, Joseph I. IKE =19-4 AMt AND (Ab4trut swppliu ) bulletin or the static secl-atlsts, v. j..ana. l97th: 0-1i3. "K4!5A~~h.A& v. 1 -.he United States should contilq %a~ ftomintal % bltw. John A.?C;NEIM OF HIG0I:4 BUIL,:IXW'~ MO ztrww. a-.0-' rot~ahlietry ftwcv but. It doin4 to, P4110K1? 'tion -At'* IAehIOWUUD RICLWA DONNA- Choose aeant that Will not provogee a new stage in '-Mi. 1hi 4;eissoloical S--ciety or Awerica. tae orms race. ThIs rev"irea a knowlede or sovi- 'letýlflvi. V. Aý. Dec. 1969J: Z3iV t percoptions, ass activations. Vie Soviet l4ead- V. v vrhi r& a st. reasons for sappruviug frthver AM do auratstut. t!atei e Wua, :4 Owftt UVAsemats!.yric.1 data -Uitj oq4 thus 'ar lo tias Atomic %dainct 4"loying a ctrhecw yqtta. Mra al-!.wr$y Ctoalairn MuClea telt Frwagre on Wh rw- "mfiativ-s to 4 vostryhacsive rrzt~a would noct orts a hifhrfav ýas vefa~s buildni.t twro ~ ltmadl ~.t.. e ;rt' ic b.~v- a- ootion Yva-a 41statA mcebar vwe~tta lncludien; but. the.t0r a e act W-14~. ~iz4.tiazi -7r~rtýý KI And i*a MA art p~r eaoted, torevihr with lt ubother metter. An agra-enat pqmerftsttlg UP 'W4-aawad bul5dltw rvzpone# to diretant 9a'thrjV*Ave; servt.d. rttiaw Ciutc wvlwith ims" cv~.ll r -vt 'to wind eurats. Major variationa I-i Vt~t f. yat %A'j n ej Jtc s-zrtrr %O- &'.oen over the City rot U 27p--Cj.-cC W., 4~tb~r anus 4 c'ire.m AWSSAro. 7ha. Zu'av."t n- W.4en to wvrltod bans at the zaa tw't A.ý4tit i".ais Q& W11:4 %;!W.'4 t, r~ -' :ccatiot. tor dirrperta -vnts.-aa and -tatirtictu ;ur.-. a' itt ia lncer cit1ies, ant lb-; c s--a' l ~t.- %r..- shown for tbp rardoesaergo of s;irc- I-t.ce th -1A ;.ca i ":..'te 'r aio;. V-.-r%.' -.1w peak respona.- i.f Vall 1a114 a a ý; new. Lantt a &rv 4vari a. t~,z:howr, fur it-tp 0v.8 :A tma.n'latizs ue r'- ine-sitatbe. :t. 4L-Pi bara tth'

58 M0 ARMS CONTOL & DOS MAMEMI United States must act deiew deployment Couteats --PreFac. -Purewosd.-Status of nuoleof m of its uore advanced wapons syste and or explosives engineering in 1969: lational pollto poceed with as control talks before the So- q 00 Peaceful MeO. of mnclear explosives, by viet Union make* any Irrevocble and highly dema- ram F. Tape. Teidmologioal deveiapmet of w- Lag decisions. The United States Is ping to have c~ae exploslves eninsering, %W 0. V. John.. to accept sae limatations on its on strategic Omwugga euxperimt t, by Fred Balser. Nture caforces. In the lofg run, however, U.S. security tamed mnclear aploelv, pexperiments, by R. F. depends as moc om the encouragement of conoill- Coffer and G. H. Rin s. Nuclear excaation, by tory trends in the Soviet Union as en mainte"ece L. J. Vortman. The Corps of l aisneers' msaleer of its out military might. construction research progrm, %W Bernard C. Hughes. Nuclear explosives in water resomrce de voelopmt, qureýta bw ftr Arthur nula N. explosive Piper.-Tesagnewring: boological re- DOiSREAT AT TS1 OFFICE OF NAVAL EZARC1. Nature Technologe balm used in m exploaive en- (London) v. 225, M. T. 1970: W9o-. illus. ginserng in 1969, %W Joseph Knox. S'clear tweb- QI.N2, v. 225 naogy. by Wilson K. Talley. Hydrodriuaics, ty C. I. Leith. Seiead sicial and structural response, The U.S. Office of Navel Research (01M), estab- tb John A. BLtae. Airtblat tram Plowshare projlished la 106. was the first end mot endurins ects. bwe Jack W. Reed. vmting and tallout prop.r-.ctic--l..-jint1,*--& rt th 4ikire anet amy a tm by P. V. Allen. Orunwter cotenina- Natlmal Goverment has the resources to support tio, t Frank V. Stead.-L-gal problems and edubasic scientific research on an adequate scale. catiemal progrens: The limited test ben treaty An cutgromti of ILLtaw-cIvvlia collaboration in jad civil mnclear engineering, by Thois Erlich. World VWa U, it bo-- a pioneer in the practice Pl shre piogram develoment activities. by Fred of Sponmsring the ressareh projects of individual J. Clark, Jr. A m-vey of university coares in Investigtors outside te Government. Suspicious nuclear civil aginseeing, by Paul Kruger. Nucflat first, the univeruitise mon became persuaded ar explosives aemgarmeke g at Nichian bw T. Kenthat the procedure offered no threat %o their In- auab. Nuclear explosives engineering at the thaidependence, and tbrough outs. * contr ct ru,%e varsity of Ariuona, hy Kestom Keller. lucler *xand the work of its m laboratories 00 socs con- plose engitering at the University of Califorp;9ed en adasble record of scientific achieve- s, Davis. O Wilson K. Talley. Plowshare studm rt. often it areas with only the amst tams, b H Cm rs. Instructions to link to naral roquirem ts. In recent Iears, the applications of maclean devices at loft Stats tki.. budget squeeze has forced a tlghtening up of varsity. by Paul Kruger.-Unversity research sad standards of relevance, and OU'S Scele of opera- mapovar eds.: University role in nuclear osplotions end proportioasta shar*e in the sponsorship sivet enouinerin research, by 5dward Teller. of basic research have declined. Iteertbeles, kientiftic alicatlos e$ mncletr esplosiow, by its ran4g of interests Is still Lresi9ve end V. K. m i G. A. Conn. Moods ot Goevrmnnt Its support to university research substantial. and idstary far trained aulear- explosive esmi- To many scientists. it still retains 0sw of the aars by Joham V. Victvare. fcatianal tnwod 'ý.rtv# that endtartel It to university Scientists of gindsy. IV Normsn Iilct.Muainl0- na the yvrs after the SKd i'orld Mr. volopmest: Uriersity-AIC cooperatios, by C. V. lard. Curriculu dvelopmet. by Warren F. Vitaig. A look Into t.he fute r tu Plowshare, by V. T. Libby. S.Wa7ý by He ry 4. W&W t.d- ~,r ~t.igltaiti R T AM WO M&VOMSi 111 ZAXADIAS LWVKWTH. Nilitary affairs. v. 33, Dwrlcts the rrobl'ma aotssoia4 witb nuclea D1: 1969: explosives neearoing edecatiou. fris tka tech- KltlN"5. v. 33 analogits,urdto arriwcuns devvlctwag.t." 'be ob~vctlvw or the sympoesovf Was tc ftlt-c.? thr i"ls* Tuw rapid 0qu in military %later/ %A4 lee t1tuen the 4wvvloptont act'i wrvlty cuartifn "wreoivs in Canadianu,iilvvetstleo sinwe World ;me and tbe Arbhaatio of trained vagiewr-#- Vii :1. flyw rotarku W toi a hsaltw pheaerbnam *a1ito "beations b both the profe eal willwiay 4nr oovaetates. %bd tr rucs.ea cst in-. *.mtia gr tht ýrweaet trend. PeFiAtOS, R. X.. X.. Soa4.11 W~pk Z 41 f~~aa PI~ Zw~i-tj af Avarice. 31eal9iet. V. ý, :)ec. A.4 ~~~~~~~~v "?~ADfl Irn. weaver. 041tw- Aco.Jrts... 'nberlt MM AN oce extq4ea"a. a 1.1 Knegate to%%t of krltapa Uvr-#'e GM]" AT ;. Illas. I.b 21& b.wet& ;"7t M"%a at t&, yavaa ett t.7. inittated a nwjwwce of vqtb~vah-ý jazllr4 ra~*frt JeerSL %%set, a t V Y~e allfta Wvrs wotbs. :1w* 974rotet"t C thirs- ena.c* 'ta rto or ther Veac j%&l.'ýws a XW4 uc~r in;- w.:ao'te vit&alr a ;LA u. 'j, G ndb n Z P.TO-- ;' at %.-v;4_vwrsltp "r Arý'Zon. -wetas, Ari- a~i~ m** tzbt us-~~a h ImalL z5;-.. 'Ca'. U-z tr-nie A r-plib ru". fven mar vvrr.w- 14 hiý blwa-aoorfewr; h tbi.40 aen r'not ;&CS.'Mt 'j zrn ~~~~~m

59 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 2i A, 'hk major ground breakage. The earthquake distrlutlon!ind fault plane solutions together indi- The prospects of testing multimegaton warheads beneath the Aleutian Islands has caused concern cate that both ripht-lateral strike-sip fault among scientists and politicians because of the movement tuid dip-slip fault movement occurred. sociological, environmental, and geophysical haz- "2he explosion apparently caused the release of ards. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) says natural tectonic strain. (Abstract supplied) that "a nuclear explosion can't trigger an earthquake of greater magnitude than its own primary 1'19 shock wave," but seismologists contend that AEC Hottinger, Aruold. HUSSEIN AND THE GUERRILLAS. data were collected in southern Nevada, which "is Swiss review of world affairs, v. 19, Dec. 1969: seismically less nervous than the Aleutians," `0-29. illus. D839.$9, v. 19 and a multimegaton Amchitka test "could set off a king-size tsunami." Many Government officials Outlines the background of the growing discord question whether these tests are essential to between the Jordanian monarchy and the Palestinian the national security, and, if the Subcommiittee guerrillas and discusses the limits of coexistence on Air and Water Pollution determines that they between the two. Exaltations by the Arab press of are not it "would be correct in legislating an alleged successful guerrilla operations against end to underground testing." israel contribute to the diminishing prestige of the Jordnian Army Mahlman, J. D. LONG-TERM DEPENDENCE OF SURFACE 12Ad FALLOUT FLUCTUATIONS UPON TROPOPAUSE-LEVEL CYCLO- Kuby, Heinz. [ATLANTIC OR EUROPEAN SECURITY POLI- GENESIS. Archiv fur Meteorologie, Geophysik und CY?] Atlantische oder europlische Sicherheits- Bioklimatologie. Serie A: Meteorologie und Geopolitik? Europa; schweizerische Zeitschrift fur physik, v. 18, no. 3/4, 1969: europriische Fragen, v. 36, Dec. 1969: 7-9, 12-15, QC851.A73, v illus. P&GP RR Summary in German. Asserts thf.t the invasion of Czechoslovakia de- The downward transport of radioactive debris molished the Western qyth that the use of violence from the stratosphere in association with trocan no longer be a tactic of foreign policy. Kuby popause-level cyclogenesis offers a possible stresses the identical interests of the United physical explanation for seasonal and shorter- States and the Soviet Union in giving top priority period surface fallout increases. To examine to the security of their own territories, which these possibilities, a simple circulation index leaves Western and central Europe expo.-i to the which is related to the degree of cyclonic actividanger of wars by proxy. Superpower contiouaiion ty in the upper troposphere is compared tc a time of power politics and the arms race makes peaceful series of area-averaged fallout intensity. The coexistence precarious a~d threatens European se- comparison reveals that the spring fallout peak curity, on which the European countries have no cannot be explained adequately by an increase in decisive influence. Since a credible nuclear de- cyclonic activity at this time of year. Shorter terrent for Europe is missing, current West Euro- period increases, however, are strongly related to pean conventional armaments are meaningless. The occurrences of intense cyclogenesis in the upper nonproliferation treaty would deprive the European troposphere. The age-corrected fallout averaged nonnuclear powers of sovereignty over their arms- over the area of the contiguous United States rements, without which they ca rnot adequately im- veals the existence of a regular seasonal variaprove their security. tion with a maximum in late spring and a minimum in late fall. The spring peak in 1964 is a factor 12J21 of two less tn 1964 than reflecting the progressive Lapp, Haiph E. CORRECTING OUR POSTURE; SECRETARY depletion of debris following the nuclear testing moratorium of December kabstract LAIRD'S DEFENSE ESTIMATE, AND THE SALT TALKS. New supplied) republic, v. 162, Mar. 28, 1970: AP2.N624, v. 162 Critical assessment of Secretary of Defense 1224 Laird's posture statement, in which Lapp advocates Molnar, Peter, Klaus Jacob, and Lynn 1. Sykes. MIan adversary proceeding to subject the report "to CROEARTHQUAKE ACTIVITY IN EASTERN NEVADA AND DEATH merciless and hostile criticism." The basic asym- VALLEY, CALIFORNIA, BEFORE AND AFTER THE NUCLEAR metry of U.S. and Soviet ABM deployments, growing EXPLOSION BENHAM. In Seismological Society of Chinoao nuclear threat, and advances in weapons America. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: technology :ould preclude a strategic arms limita- QE531.$3, v. 59 "tion agrt-ment. Six portable, high-gain, high-frequency seismographs were operated in Nevada and California for several weeks before and after the underground nuu_,,ary, Vrank. JLHG.ID rclear TESTING: IS IT clear explosion BENHAM to assess the possibility a,.,;i:t,; X O LAN2C;? Armed F(rce management, that earthquakes at distances of tens of kilome- 1), 1:r. )-: j6-%. ill-s. ters or more may be triggered by large underground UBl3.A65, v. 16 explosions. A pronounced increase in earthquake

60 262 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT activity in the vicinity of the shot point was Gb- by-region disarmament with anti-ballistic misserved imediately after the detonation and con- siles, by David R. Inglis. Implications of supertinued for more than a month after the explosion, power deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems No significant change in activity within 25 km of for third countries, particularly for those in Euany of our instruments northeast of the Nevada rope, by Heik Afheldt and others. Implications Test Site was observed, and the activity in Death for other nations- -particularly in Europe--of su- Valley recorded after the explosion did not indi- perpower antiballistic missile deployment, by Bercate an important increase. These data imply that nard T. Feld. Some observations on the political this particular explosion did not significantly implications of anti-ballistic missile systems, by affect the seismicity of the region studied. Knud Mortensen. The impact of anti-balljstic mis- Throughout the period of observation the seismic sile deployment on the uncertainties of strategic activity northeast of the Nevada Test Site was balance, by F. A. Long. Anti-ballistic missile delow; an average of about one event per day was de- ployment and the doctrine of limited strategic nut'cted within about 25 km of each station. This clear war, by David Carlton. Anti-ballistic missuggests that the current tectonic activity of sile deployment and China, by M. Leitenberg. Cithis part of Nevada is lower than that of western vil defence programmes: research in the United Nevada and of mtt other tectonically active re- States concerning the post-attack environment, by gions where microearthquake studies have been M. Leitenberg. Some observations on the consemade. (Abstract supplied). quences of anti-ballistic missile deployment, by M. Nita. The arms race and public opinion: a suggestion, by F. Calogero.--pt. 3. The implications 1225 of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile sys- Moore, Raymond A. MILITARY NATION-BUILDING IN PAKI- 6TAN AND INDIA. World affairs, v. 132, Dec. 1969: tens, by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup.--Appendix JXl9Ol.W7, v. 132 Analysis of the strategic, political, and military implications of AEM deployment, which empha- Delineates the eeneral range of nation-building sizes the dangers of a new arms race. activities of the Pakistani Army and compares these practices with those of the Indian Army Moore concludes that, while the army in India has Russett, Bruce M. VIETNAM AND RESTRAINTS ON AERIAL not participated in development to the extent that WARFARE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. it has in Pakistan, in the future the Indian Army 26, Jan. 1970: may seek out the nonmilitary uses of military paw- TK2Jn5.A69, v. 26 er and, if social disorder becomes chronic, move to establish a military government. One of the more costly aspects of the Vietnam War may be its contribution to the erosion of re straints on aerial warfare. World War I and the Novick, Sheldon. EARTHQUAKE AT GIZA. Environment, smaller conflicts of the thirties saw the gradual v. 12, Jan./Feb. '970: illus. undermining of early scruples against the use of UF767.S33, v. 12 airpower against civilians. Limits were temporarily reestablished at the beginning of World War Discusses the hazards associated with the stor- II, but these soon gave way to the unrestricted age of 75 million gallons of radioactive wastes bombing.ampaigns with which the war ended. Conat the Hanford Atomic Products Operation. Novick, cepts of restraint were excluded from the strateciting a geolo r report that concludes that the gic planning of the postwar era. In the 1960s, Hanford facilities are in an area of moderate however, the development of the doctrines of tacearthquaka activity, assert- that deep drilling tical nuclear war, limited strategic war, and can establish the existence of faults beneath the counterforce targeting seemed to indicate U.S. reactor site. willingness to recognize limits on its use of airpower. The Vietnam War offered the United States 1227 an opportunity to prove its sincerity on thib mat- Pugwash Symporl, 2d, C hagen, IMPLICA- ter, but the results so far have been Rmbiguous. mo_,_ IPICA-In both parts of Vie+-ra, U.S. policy appears to TIONS OF ANTPA",._:-TTC MIl6;l oz. L,.ca be a comprumime tývw"- the zr, by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup. New York, Human- stricted aerial warfare and total abstinence. It ities Press 1: p. (Pugash monograph, 2) must certainly appear to the other side that the UG630.P avoidance of civilian casualties is not a primary U.S. objective. It is difficult to judge whether Contents.--pt. i1 The development and charac- the right precedents have been set. If they have not and the case for a countervalue strategy has teristics of anti-ballistic missile systems, by been strengthened in the enemy camp, the Vietnam C. F. Barnaby. Arguments for and against the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, by C. F. Barnaby.--pt. 2. The arms race implications of tragedies for the American people. anti-ballistic missile defences, by Nis Petersen. The interaction of ballistic missile defence, the 1229 weapons testing programme, and a comprehensive nu- SPECIAL PAPERS ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AT clear test ban treaty, by M. Leitenberg. Region- THE NEVADA TEST SITE. In Seismological Society

61 THE STIATEGIC 0I4VIROME4NT 2 3 of America. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: tage of its critical materials. Sutton calculates QE531.S3, v. 59 that 84 percent of all U.S. imports from the Soviet Union consist of' such critical materials and lontents.--residual strains associated with a concludes that this could have come about only n,..lear explosion, by P. R. Romig and others.-- through a deliberate plan to make the United Microearthquake activity in eastern Nevada and States dependent on the Soviet Union for its sup- Death Valley, California, before and after the nu- ply of these materials..lear explosion BENHAM, by Peter Molnar, Klaus Jacob, and Lynn R. Sykes.--Transient and residual strains from large underground explosions, by 1231 Stewart W. Smith, Charles B. Archambeau, and Sutton, Antony C. THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE. In William Gile.--Near-field and far-field evidences Unitcd States Naval Institute, Anna. Profor triggering of an earthquake by the BENHAM ex- ceedings, v. 96, Jan. 1970: illus. plosion, by Keiiti Aki and others.--geologic ef- Vl.U8, v. 96 fects of the BENHAM underground nuclear explosion, by R. C. Bucknam.--Strain associated with tht Assesses the implications of the Soviet merchant BENHAM underground nuclear explosion, by D. D. marine for the free world. The Soviet Union's re- Dickey.--Subsidence related to underground nuclear liance on imported merchant vessels and engines explosions, Nevada test site, by F. N. Houser.-- signifies that the crea of Sc'vi.t naval archi- Fault displacements and motion related to nuclear tects, technicians, and workers are concentrating explosions, by F. A. McKeown and D. D. Dickey.-- on a large naval construction program. Despite a Aftershocks of the BENHAM nuclear explosion, by technological gap the Russians are rapidly in- R. M. Hamilton and J. H. Healy.--Amplitude and creasing their merchant marine fleet, which plays frequency characteristics of elastic wave types an important role in supporting national liberagenerated by the underground nuclear detonation, tion wars. The West could inhibit the Soviet BOXARbut W.Wmyesa ucerv nts, by sioecrt fornh- n teepr fmecatsisan.egnst BOXCAR, by W. W. Pahue Hc as.--response msa vens, uclar b RoertD. spectra for ync.--ing ability the to export fulfill of merchant its expansionary ships and goals engines by halt- to Seismic energy efficiency of underground nuclear the Sovi-t Union. detonations, by R. A. Mueller.--Analysis of seismic peak amplitudes from underground nuclear explosions, by J. R. Murphy and J. A. Lahoud.--Response of highrise buildings to ground motion from underground nuclear detonations, by John A. Blume. Wildavsky, Aaron. THE POLITICS OF ABM. Commentary, -Ground effects from the BOXCAR and BENHAM nucle- v. 48, Nov. 1969: ar explosions, by W. K. Cloud and D. S. Carder. DSIO1.C63, v. 48 Seismic and other effects of underground nuclear explosions, The ABM debate has resulted "in a heightened disposition on the part of Americans to blame one another for real and imagined errors in public policy." ABM has become a major domestic issue because it was manipulated by people primarily in tce7ested in ending the Vietnam War and because it Sutton, Antony C. SOVIET EXPCRT STRATEGY. Ord- offered a tactical opportunity to test whether a nance, V. 54, Nov./Dec. 1969: successful presidential campaign could be based on UFI.067, v. 54 antimilitarism. Safeguard was a political mistake because the administration's foreign policy is Contends that the United States has become dependent on the Soviet Union for certain critical mortgaged to Vietnam and President Nixon should realize "that he cannot subject the nation to conmaterials essential for modern warfare. The au- troversy without opening the floodgates of recrimthor examines the "weak-link principle" advanced ination." The debate could combine foreign and in Strategiia i Ekoromika by the Soviet military domestic disaster if it leads to continued attacks scientist and economist A. N. Lagovskii, who notes on the military and an unquestioning belief in an that the United States must import a large percen- assured-destruction policy. I

62 III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE INTERNATIONAL LAW and certainly a nation that can prc~ect the lives of seals and migratory birds nhoult! oe able to prevent genocide by the suae means. Nor 1233 would ratification diminish con titutional rights Berber, Friedrich. CINTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAR PRE- since each party to the treaty enacts and enforces VETION3 V8lkerreeht und Kriegsverhdtung. Poli- the necessary legislation for its implementation. tische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: The question whether cases arising under the con- H35.P66, v. 21 vention would be submitted to international adjudication could be considered on its merits at some The main drawback to international law as a future date. It is in the national interest for means of securing peace is its lack of enforcement the American Bar Association to lead a movement ability in regard to well-armed sovereign states. for the convention's early ratification. However, the importance of this shortcoming is greatly overestimated. International law has always been based on aemocratic principles of equal 1235 sovereign rights, which have far greater sociolog- Butler, William E. AMERICAN RESEARCH ON SOVIET ical and psychological value for progress in in- APPROACHES TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. Columternational behavior than coercion ever can. bia law review, v. 70, Feb. 1970: Still, the existing legal system of peace and se- LL curity inadequately induces its observance by the nations. In banning the use of force, the U.N. Reviews American studies on Soviet international Charter eliminates a serious loophole in the Kel- law to suggest areas for future research. Butler logg Pact, but the charter itself has several calls for exploitation of available historic data grave loopholes. Most proposals for reform aim at on traditional Russian approaches, development of juristic perfectionism rather than "a pluralism of case studies on Soviet practice,,.wre consideraautonomous entities" and "an integration of free- tion of the results of diplomatic history and comdom and common interest." A truly effective re- parative research in international law, and evalform plan must come from a comprehensive effort in uation of the status of international law and the the social sciences that would avoid two extremes: international jurist in the Soviet foreign policy legal overabstractionism and a Kennanian skepti- process. cism about the effectiveness of juristic measures. Systematic insight into the multitude and complexity of war causes should be scientifically devel oped. A remedy for complexity is the use of a [THE DIFFERENCE BETWFEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY multitude of means, acting in conjunction, none of TARGETS AND MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONS Der Unterwhich singly should be overestimated. These in- schied zwischen militgrischen und nicht-militiriclude arbitration, collective security, disarma- schen Zielen und die Massenvernichtungsmittel. ment, institutionalization of peaceful change, the Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 13, Nov. 15, 1969: 593. inclusion in national constitutions of the peace U3.W38, v. 13 obligations under international law, and, most important, a process of international integration Text of the September 9, 1969, resolution of the that would not destroy the independence of ifri- Institut de Droit International invoking internavidual states. tional law norms that comit governments engaged. Gian in armed conflicts to discriminate between milita-y and nonmilitary targets; not to attack civilpopulations; not to destroy entire groups of biuer, Bruno V. GEOCIDE REVISITED. American Bar people, tracts of land, or towns and cities; and Association journal, v. 56, Jan. 1970: not to use means of mass destruction. The U.N. Convention on Genocide was adopted unan imously by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 and Frenzke, Dietrich F. ERENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE signed by the United States, but it has never been END4Y-STATE CLAUSES3 Gevaltverzicht und Feindratified by the U.S. Senate, whose Foreign Rela- staatenklauseln. Europa-Archiv, v. 2.1 Jan. 25, tions Ccmmittee tabled the matter two decades ago. 1970: D839.E86, v. 25 During the Senate hearings on the proposed treaty, the American Bar Association opposed ratification The invocation of the enemy-state clauses of the on the grounds that tle convention appeared to be U.N. Charter does not threaten West Germany's seinconsistent with basic constitutional guarantees curity, since NATO's principal member states have and exceeded the Senate's treaty-making powers, repeatedly declared that the use of force by the There in good evidence to the contrary, however, Soviet Union or its allies in invoking such a 265 i4

63 " "vu-. ear. a :-" p-jo.- 1r-r' i r :.r'u".. &I confi ence that was shakenu b the verdicts in " ny Uny'r, s-. 4rity,re.rt'".t or!-nuncia- the 3oith- at AfJrics cases. The declsions in the ti )n u" fuor'_- betwveet the East %ar.,wet woul North Sm Cont al. S elf case were recognized t." me,,,',ss if the.oivi.t Union -or on- -;.ts as technically competent, although the failure to 'dtles "by an iq, o:_ "we enecm-;tatp clau- confirm the Geneva Convention on the Continental. ouitd u,2 xpl lotly ieserve for itseif" such use Shelf may have impaired the codification process ot" forcc. Ihe clauses were o:i ginaiiy designed to undertaken by the United Nations The confidence serve an imarinary U.N. security system that has in the Court prevalent mong ThI.'d World nations bee- largely invalidated by postwar alliances and Is manifest in the number of doclarations recogthe admission of rormer enemy states to the United nizing the Court's jurisdiction as compulsory in Nations. general international law limits the ef- cases under article 36 (2) of the Court's statute. fects otf those clauses, jlne precice limitation is a matter of controversy within the blocs as well 1240o as between them. Admission of the German Federal Lillic., -4chsrd B. FORCIBLE SELF-HELP UNDER INTER- Republic to NATO and of the German Democratic Re- NATIONAL LAW. Naval War College review, v. 22, public to the Warsaw Treaty Organization has Feb. 1970: P&GP ER changed the status of tht- two parts of a former enemy state inside and outside their respective Discusses retortion, reprisal, the use of force blocs. The optimal solution for West Germany to protect nationals, asd humanitarian intervenwould be for the Communist countries to renounce tion under customary international law and under explicitly privileges claimed under articles 53 the influence of the U.N. Charter. Lillich sugand 107 of the U.N. Charter in their renunciation- psts a reassessment of the original interpretaof-force agreements with the Federal Republic. tion of the chprter to allow the reinstitution or The next best formula would be a use-of-force ban continuea use of reprisals, forcible self-help similar to those in article 2 of the U.N. Charter. against a prior unlawfulness, and humanitarian in- A general reference to the principles of the U.N. tervention as sanctioning instruments under inter- Charter would be dangerous, since these include national law and discusses the limitations of such the enemy-state clauses. Bonn szhuld discriminate measures. between its Communist negotiating partners according to their status in regard to the clauses. Renunciation-of-force agreements, along with the 1241 other bilateral East-West arrangements, can help Lissitzyn, Oliver J. ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM to resolve the outstanding postwar problems. A TRE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Naval War future European secarity treaty, which is still a College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: distant possibility, must includu a clear renun- P&GP RR ciation of the rights claimed from articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter. Examines whether a coastal state has the right to interfere with foreign ships and aircraft in 1238 its contiguous zone of the high seas or air Grieves, Forest L. SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNA- space to prevent or control foreign electronic re- TIONAL ADJUDICATION. Urbana, University of Illi- connaissance from such areas and considers the nois Press, xv, 266 p. illus, present trend in relevant state practice. Lissit- JX1971.G75 zyn analyzes pertinent provisions of the 1958 Bibliography: p, [ Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the rules of universal international law and concludes Partial contents,--sovereignty and supranation- that such a right neither exists nor is claimed by alism.--central American Court of Justice.--Perma- any state and that military reconnaissance from nent Court of International Justice.--Internation- such zones does not violate international law. al Court of Justice.--Court of the European Comnu- National security is not a legal justification for nities.--european Court of Human Rights.--Summary the existence of contiguous zones, and internsand conclusions, tional law prohibits the prosecution by a coastal state of foreign personnel for such reconnaissance. Considers the de,elopment of internationual ad-udication a prerequisite of a world order ruled by 1242 law. "On the assumption that law is a function Stanford, J. S. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF of soeiety rather than a constant, the interns- TREATIES. University of Toronto law journal, v. tional court presents itself as a possible mea- 20, no. 1, 1970: s.uing device for the minimum level of supranationsui ingt tdc e forn tnve- mipn im leat w ve tolerate." fl s K25.N74, v. 20 Traces the work of the International Law Commis sion and the United Nations Conference on the Law Johnson, David H. N. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IN- of Treaties. Stanford outlines the solutions to TERNATIONAL COURT OF JUST-ICE. Modern law review, controversial issues in the Vienna Convention, v, 33, Tan. 1970: which is now open for signature. The problems in- LL clude compulsory coaciliation; implications of a multiple-depositary system for the entry into Summarizes recent developments, stressing the force of international agreements like the partial International Court's recovery of the internation- test ban treaty when they are signed by a country

64 PI IIMW O Vft FOR TW Vktr'(?L ~M W W FL40 is not rftogaised by a depositary; coercion ua comtnects -.- Frvfaew--Itotm--votng1Z grounde for the invalidity, termination, withdraw- the S3erty COACil: The lasta ProWtal, or suspension of the operation of treaties; sioeal, rules of procefrv.-the double veto.-the sia the doctrine of the supremacy of international veto: The Seeretary-Gaeral. Apmlicattons for law on the int~rnational level. mbership. The "echin of events theory. Arm control n dissavaut. Eastern brope. Suez 1243 (1956). Other vetoes.--limitiug and eircuavent- Stevenson, John R. ritemtioxal LAW AND THE ing the veto: How useful is the vttol-abeten- OCEANS: THE StABEDi. Vital speeches of the day. tton and absence: Obligatory abstentions. Other v. 36, APr. 1, 1970: abstentions, Nonparticipation in the vote. "Vol- PH6121.V52, v. 36 untary" abstentions or absence by a peraweent mem- Delivered before the Philadelphia World Affairs ber. The effect of abstentions (the so-called Council and Philadelphia Bar Asnociation, AcadenW hidden veto).--different kinds of consensus.-- of Music, Philadelphia, Feb. 18, Elections of Justice. and appointments: International Court Secretary-General. Subsidiary or- In addition to the classic functions of prevent- gans.--epilogue.--appendices: San Francisco ing conflict, providing security, and accousnodat- statement of 8 June 1945 on voting procedures in ing conflicting interests, international law is the Security Council. Voting provisions of the increasingly ccncerned with the promotion of com- Charter, the Statute of the International Court of mon objectives and the provision of guidelines on Justice, and the Provisional Rules of Procedure. questions previously resolved on a bilateral ha- Limiting the veto. Resolutions adopted and prosis. Of three alternative approaches to jurisdic- posals vetoed in connection with matters of which tion of the seas--complete freedom of the seas the Security Council was seized on 31 December with no national jurisdiction, control based an Resolutions adopted and proiosals vetoed superior force, and division of the seas according in connection with matters of which the Security to an agreed formula--only the first and third Council was no longer seized on 31 December merit serious consideration. There is virtually Proposals vetoed, Consensus and majorunanimous agreement that sovereignty extends to ity; report of the Sixth Committee of the General areas adjacent to a nation's coast, although the Assembly, 11 December Text of some presiprecise limits of this sovereignty vary greatly, dential statements of consensus or sumemary. Votwith most nations claiming from 3 to 12 miles. ing on resolutions adopted by the Security Coun- The United States supports proposals to fix the cii, Select bibliography.--notes.-- territorial limit at 12 idles, but only on condi- Index. ticn that "freedom of transit through and over in- Reviews the history of voting In the U.N. Secuternational straits and carefully defined prefer- rity Council since 1946 to consider the questions ential fishing rights for coastal States on the as to the purpose of a vote, the nature of the dehigh seas" be guaranteed. The problem of the sea- cision, the veto as a cause or symptom of disabed requirez special attention because of the vast greement, the double veto, and the significance resources of the Continental Shelf. The United of the abstention and the statement of decision. States has proposed "that an internationally Bailey emphasizes that the veto is less of an obagreed regime for exploitation of resources beyond stacle than is generally realized and that the national jurisdiction should be established as immediate task is not to supplant the SeceALj soon as practicable" to minimize the potential for Council but to improve it in preparation for inconflict, creased responsibilities Weber, Hermann. [THE INCIDENT IN THE GULF OF TON- Bebler, Ales (interview) PRECONDITIONS FOR UNITED KIN] Der Zwischenfall im Golf von Tongking. Ma- NATIONS RENAISSANCE. Review of international vfrine Rundschau, v. 67, Jan. 1970: 1-16; Feb.: 89- fairs, v. 20, Nov. 20, 1969: illus. V3.M3, v, 67 D839.R4, v. 20 Considers legal and factual aspects of the Au- Answers questions on the achievements and failgust 1964 incidents that led to the escalation of ures of the United Nations. The nonalined counthe Vietnam War. Weber concludes that, although tries and the Third World are the principal sup- American warships were entitled to resist the porters of the United Nations because it is "nec- North Vietnamese attacks, the United States vio- essary and indispensable above all for the weak, lated international law by its reprisals against for the economically and militarily weak, +hose North Vietnam. who need external assistance snd protection, those who see no prospect for their own development, prosperity and security without collective action INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION by the international community." Gervenka, Zdenek. THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY Bailey, Sydrney D. VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND ITS CHARTER. With an introduction by Diallo Bloomington, Indiana Univermity Pros- Ec19693 Telli. New York, Praeger ( p. 275 p. (Indiana University international studies) JX1582.C JX1977.B227 Includes bibliographies

65 :6%kit to~~(% T3ot & OSARMAISIN1.,i~k1 Ot +:t.--'&,. to the Addis Abft icciva.--tne prticipsats in international organi- ;-r..--te Addis Abta Summit Conference of zation: latior-states- Regional blocs. Politi- Headi )".;tate and ;overrisent of Independent A:ri- cal parties mad interest groups. Personal partis, 2 tat-.--iolitl~i' and legal analysis of the cipation. Interaction.--International institumain: provisions of the charner.--the peaceful set- tionalization: Legal fr~uework. Constitutioma. tlement of disputes.-,-the relationship between the framework. Decision-making. Administrative be- Organisation of African Unity and the United ga- havior.--financeas.--the dynamics of international tiona.--internationa~l Court of Justice and the organization: Management of power. Functionalgouth West Africa case.--the regional and politi- lsm. Processes of development. Protection of cal groups and their compatibility with the char- rights.--the progress of international organizater of the OAU.--The Rhodesian crisis.--the OAU tion: Political stability. Economic and social and the Nigerian crisis.--conclusion.--appendices. development. Constitutional evolution. Contem.- -Index. porary problems. Trends in evolution.--bibliographical aids. Political and legal interpretations of the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Surveys major studies published from 1945 including principles, operations, and major or- to gans. This expanded translation of the Januarý 1968 Czech original includes discussions of the 1250 issues involved in the Nigerian, Rhodesian, and Maheu, Rent. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TECHNIQUES South-West African situations from the point of AND ETHICS. New Delhi, Indian Council for Culturview of OAU principles and objectives. al Relations E: p. (Azad memorial lectures, 1965) JX1995.M Hassler, Alfred, BEYOND ALL SEPARATISM. Fellow- Illustrates from Maheu's experience with UNESCO ship, v. 35, Nov. 1969: 7-9. the concept of international cooperation as both JX19Ol.FI5, v. 35 technique and ethic. The first lecture describes UNESCO action in sectors of modern civilization The age of separation is ended. Man's most ur- like ccamunication and exchange, where internagent task is to find effective ways to transcend tional cooperation is a technical necessity and a the barriers of nation, ideology, and religion, requirement for efficient action. The second lec- The interdepondence of peace and justice is a ture points out that, since UNESCO's basic mission problem, the solution to which will require vast is working with the minds of men, it is essentialchanges in man's thinking, institutions, and so- ly an ethical organization. cial processes. There is reason for hope in the progress of science and technology and in the re volt of youth against violence and separatism. O NRS Pacifists face special responsibilikes. Nonvio- THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; STUDIES lent confrontation is no longer enough and myedeven contribute to disastrous social disintegra- ited by Robert W. Cox. New York, Praeger tion. New ways of creating and building must be c pr HC59p7.e discovered and new symbols, new organizations, and "Papers... originally prepared either for a a new moral and political consciousness created, round table on the political role of international The project of a new world organization to stand economic organization convened under the auspices as a symbol or the world community and promote and of atgeolsptme the International Political 96 rfo Science h Association aeie coordinate the essential work of education and at Grenoble, September 1966, or for the same item persuasion will seem grandiose and impractical on the agenda of the I.P.S.A. Congress in Brusonly to those who are incapable of escaping from sels, September The authors have in many cases revisd them in the light of discussions and ler ta moes of inno thouht It is of thctonstructin coamments." tency that men begin nov the w.'k of constructing London ed. published in 1969 has title: Interthe community of man. national Organization: World Politics. Includes bibliographical references. 2ohnson, Harold S., and Baljit Singh. INTERNATIONAL Contents.--Foreword, by Robert W. Cox.--List of N)RGANI ATItN; A CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY. East contributors.--list of abbreviations.--preface, by tlansing, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State Uni- Jacques Freymond.--Introduction: perspectives and versity, p. (Michigan State Universi- problems, by Robert W. Cox.-pt. 1. International ty. Asian Studies Center. South Asia series. organisations in the context of world politics: Occasional paper, no. 11) Economic development aid and international politi- Z6461.J63 cal stability, by Inis L. Claude, Jr. The political role of regional economic organisations in, ntents.--pr'1'ace.--approach"5 to the study of Latin America, by Gustavo Lagos. New states and int,,rnational organization: General. Historical. functional internst,onas organisations; a prelimi- L,,,p.a-constitutional. Institutional. Theoreti- nary report, by Harold Karan Jacobson. Policy oal. iuantitativw techniques.--the foundations processes and international organisation tasks, by of the international system: Grenrral. Historl- James Patrick Sevell.--pt. 2. Political develop-,to. Ideological. Legal. Political. Economic. ment; exteaual influences and internal processes:

66 1f4sflltU~r 4.%0 "IvW tooi TMWW t['s %&%t1 nr to* :00 Political development assiltance by United Nations -Xistenc the forve Vag rwogun.4 as a Wselt X. Organisations, by VWlter F. C. Laves. Multilat-r- attian $Oil. In tht bt%.wif lhii tat*.- -4f arai aid end influence on bover ment ojicies, by fairs was thought to be of l1itte Conte'wenc. Leon Gordenker. Toward a theory of conflict behav- and, in fact, it causd no major problem*s d4,rl tour in IAtin Amerioa, by Raymond Tanter. The the early years. As time passed, however. the functional role of l.bour as a predetenrinant of awkvardness i"f the situation began to mon.fest itaid, by Uillard A. Boeling. Ventures in polity self in the force's apparent loss of impartiality, shaping; external assistance to labour movements in its constantly diminishing freedom to accom- In developing countries, by Harold Karan Jacobson. plish its mission without undue influence from the Economic planning as a political process in devel- host state, in a gradual erosion of its prestige, oping countries, by Norman Scott. The impact of and, in general, in a sharp decline in its effecforeign aid upon the politicai roae of the armed Livyness. Ultimately, the gueat status of the forces in developing countries, by William F. force led to its dissolution at a critical moment Gutteridge.--pt. 3. The politics of international in The best way to avoid a repetition of trade and liquidity: The meaning of multilateral the UNEF experience would be to out the next surveillance, by Susan Strange. The general force's operating area under U.N. administration. agreement on tariffs and trade; pressures and Agreements could be negotiated with both sides to strategies for task expansion, by Gerard Curzon. guarantee its operational and administrative free- The creation of UNCTAD, by Charles L. Robertson. dom. At a minimum, the force commander should be The politics of liquidity, by Richard N. Gardner. briefed on the difficulties he is bound to encon- Commentary, by William Diebold, Jr.--Conclusion: ter if he is forced to accept a guest-host relaa prospective view, by Robert W. Cox.--Contribu- tionship. tors' biographies.--index. Study cee of of the the relationship political between processes international and consequensol254 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE XXIST INTERNATIONAL CONcial and economic organizations and the interna- FERENCE OF THE RED CROSS. International reviev of tional system and the nation-states. Concrete t Red Cross, no. 104, Nov. 1969: cases of the work of these agencies in the politi- HV560h cal development of new nations and international monetary and trade politics are analyzed from dif- Texts of resolutions on topics like prisone.s of ferent standpoints and with different methods. "Cutting across these themes are more theoretical war, war crimes and crimes against hulanity, weapons role of of mass the Red destruction, Cross In the world rules peace, of warfare, and disaster the concerns for the consequences of task expansion, the factors promoting international integration rolef. and those promoting nation-building and national relief. integration." INTERNATIONAL PEACE Weiner, Robert. THE USSR An UN PEACEKEEPING. Or- AND SECURITY FORCES AND RCESD839.o68, ECURTY his, v. F 13, fall 1969: v The Soviet Union refused to support the U.N. Harbottle, Michael N. PEACEKEING AND PEACEMAKING. operations Force on constitutional in the Congo and and the financial U.N. Emergency grounds Cosant~ir, v. 29, Dec. 1969: illus. and because they represented Western attempts to Ul.C8, Y. 29 colonialize all of the Middle East and Africa. Distinguishes between the functions of peace- Adherence to a strict interpretation of the U.N. Charter led the Soviet Union to argue for Security keeping and peacemaking by U.N. forces. Harbottle Council control over peacekeeping operations asr stresses the necessity for U.N. peacekeeping for- stress using all the means available in chapter VI ceo to rely on negotiation and arbitration rather than force or the threat of force to achieve their of the charter to resolve coes or international f. t are r I to ck aeso t the hasty utilization "-1.f peacela.i,. He describe, the orgacsza- v,' '.N. farc..s under Chapter V1I in the Interests toos and logistic% of U.S. peacekeeping forces and of the West." The Soviet Union contended that exassesses their role in Cyprus. penses foi peacekeeping operations should be borne by the aggrcssors" against the Congo and E&ypt It suggested other methods to finance operation: Oliveira, Kleber F. do. CAN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE like voluntary contributions or paents by the BE A GUEST FM E? ja U.S. Co2Mand and General countries directly involved. The wiresolved ri- Staff College. Fort Leavenworth. Military review, nancial crisis enabled the Russlans to *chievv. 50, Apr. 1970: illus. their objective of forcing the United Nations to Z6T23.U35, v. 50 rely on the unsatisfactory mothod of voluntary financing. Until the superpeverv arri". at an The United Nations bergency Force (CUNE) en- repee nt to finance these operatlon, the United tered Eypt in 1956 only ater obtaining the tot. Naticns will te handicapped In resolving peaceeent of the Eyptisn Goverament. Throughout ts keeping problems. 1255

67 OMHER PROCESSES PLAN&. ;umai-s the :wuteuts of a~nd 4t".- kny-v ii 'Yns 4geing adherenuce to,hr nuclear test ban AND PROPOSALS -rty and its -xtension to ban nergrou A test- Ing; prohibition of the levelpoment. pruction, and stolp:iling uf chemica.l and bacteriolor(ical *i.., b,,rt ". r':a )N Ih v,an-q A7,AL w -. ratification by all states of the 1925 ; Protocol; and a moratorium on "IA' I1.TION, the further New York. Van NXostraiv Rnholt testin4 and deployment of new strategic weapons con, 0.,Xew leractves in political by th* United States and the Soviet Union. ctn',19) JC A, includes bibliogra;hi,-:. 12'.,9 Contents.--Freface.--Acknovledmen-s.--beyond Gaitung, Johan. SEVEN TOSESI ON THE DJUOPEN SECUpolitical realism.--transnational participation.-- RITY COVNFERENCE. Bulletin of peace proposals, situdy, teaching, and research abroad.--settlement v. 1. no. 1, 1970: 7T5-78. abroad vid itc aftermath.--international assist- P&OP RR wnce.--,ervice in forelon missions.--residence ibroad for business reasons.--1residence abroad in Offers "some theses about conditions for the military service.--pirticipation in international success of the conference, and the system it non-r.overnu.ental orglmizations.--united Nations should aim at creating, as seen from the point of "2ecretariats.--The balance sheet of influence.-- view of general peace theory, not from the vantage Policies for rvace.--indox. point of any of the contending blocs." Hypothesizes that the 'mount and kind of transnational participation--that is, the leaying of a 1260 role' in a,roup that Involver people from differ- Galtung, Johan. VIOLENCE, PEACE, AND PEACE RE-,-nt nations--can subtly but significantly influ- SEARCH.,-nee international relations. Selective encour Journal of peace research, no. As9.J6, , 1969: t'emcnt or the most fruitful types of transnation-,%! 'arti.!ipation vill not pruduce substantive soutions for conflicts but can create the ato- Develops a trpology of violence and assesses its significance for peace and peace research. Just sphere and suggeit the procedures for their at- as there are two types of violence, personal viotainment. lence and social injustice, there are two typts of peace--the absence of personal violence, negative " peace, and social justice, positive peace. Peace Benko, Vlado. THESES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. Review research mist concern itself with both types of of international affairs, v. 20, Nov. 20, 1969: 1- violence and both types of peace, giving due em- 4. D839.RI,, v. 20 phasis to each type and taking into aceount the relationships between them. Otherwise, peace re- A European security system cannot be constituted search will degenerate into a rationalization of by i.,noring the United States and the Soviet right- or left-wing extremism. Union,,nd it cannot be directed against them. ow)vever, elimination of the bloc structures is a 1261 necessary precondition for its organization. Hallstein, Walter. ETHE IN COMPLETE FEDERAL STATE; Wihil., military power is being concentrated in the MOPEAJ EXPERIWCES AND REALIZATIO]153 Der un- International coemunity today, political power is vollendete Bundesstat; europliache Erfabrungen increasingly diffused. The dnmamies of the ad Krkenntnisse. Dbseldurf, Econ Verlag (19693 :oviet-american-chinese political triangle will 283 p. D0O0O. H28.urther encourage th- internal and external mobil- In cooperation with Hans H. G8tz and Karl-Heinz Ity,f the alined states. The intervontion in Narjes. s.,:*choslovakia was "a supremely harmful actn not only ui a violation of national sovereignty but Partial contents. -For~r4. --What we build on. also because it leisened the prospects for Euro- -Law instead of power.--organs of the community. t-.. :.ecurity. in the transitional period preced- -Motive forces sal c-acterfor et.-- kuropean ecohn" th- orlranization of Eurkmpean security, the in- nomic pol!.--the vori4 wrtad us.-1folitical t--rnati-wl olperati,.)na o.f the neutral and non- unlon. v.i:ti. -1. hou~ll t-.'xr'nd.'d. Unobatructed,x=sniarL:t~vn ;iver vp boundaril,-twe ir~i rsp~ouses tdie political!!,t1gratioe. of EuroT.e and vl,%.- *.1 w no erneta xu~s can flea e pas- *Jasc'asgt, pro*c -a tn twsn rfs4crwqa.%n Cd ii.: ur =-arivses. e pfrpotved, confor-rnc'- R4110%010n Conidero the pr~blems Uf collectliv 00-,r,Cur,-rein security 4ltht be rtenforct by fby - curity in turopt and conclues th*t esperivrcevs of - m 'rasnr-nt commission to -r.oerrat..loavly thv ýqrofa1 n EContaic comuwmisty ra. hv. vith th.. Uriiteri Xations. Xcsrcpean W-apmrta-1 mee'sy a Vut. rr:?c,, a.p :VCt. S' I :*L? Ispanint M. A. H. PAKXSTAX AnI SWW 00OI00AIL AlttArtl chm..i cle,. v U. c.:*tg(3~ Pfintas harloam, v. 22. r4. 3, 1969: * ~. 9w-?. VS36.l' v..p

68 i,* -ast Asia Tr-%at &rw.l,.t, #N1- ".. r -erntra! 7z"aty _ýtpaitati=e mvciv.. w101. 'atcs v Se rrglobal ~ei~n reglwel ens tiity. me2 a;. 5- *eers tc ami's Vrvi'ral.erb a sytt~'5 itary rivalry. The Asian ýilcti',e jeeiirity -.r#%- ý_,a &Jemsoi,*tvrr.#..! r ' the nization propos.4 by the Soviet Union, Vitt ta:.t -f. I, etlvei of the i" groups.s tr* discov- U.Z. aproval, voul perpetuate the stat&4 qu;.1, yri )f mt, o.g of setili: cflicts eef~i1. ;okuu, Asia and jeopsrdlse Pakistsn't. friendly re-.wst peace reswearhers of the new brand pursue a iations with China. However, it will never to. -x- gr-d.61 intetratior, of ali mankind Into one world ecuted, since certain countriet. including l'u*- commnity, whervr all military cnf.ict vill be Atan, will rot join. The emergence of China a a ".ceesticated." T1te new aeodinavion groul' dipowerful third world power is neceskary to protect videos &.l violence into "personal," physical viothe interests.t the Afro-Asian nationz, given a lence b--tveen individusls or grips and "struc- 3oviet-U.S. agreement to divide the world into turail violence. which denotes the injustice in- "spheres of influence and exploitation." hereft in a social dystem lip' the econozlc abyso between the developed and un. :developed nations Positive peace, in the Scandinavian view, aeais Korhonen, Keijo. THE FINNISH INTUIATIVE FOR A IVA0- the týtal absence of strurtural violence hnd not PEL 3EMRITY CONFERCE. War/peace report, v. just of wars. ileace research differs from tradi- 10, Feb. 1970: tional poiitical science by focusing on a concept JXl01.W38, v. 10 cf. requ;res a Lroad inter"..;-vlinary oftort. Since present arms control and d(isarma- Finlanu has propoued a series of regional ten- meuý weseures offer no security saainst a nuclear sion-producing plans like a European security con- disaster caused by the Irrational behavior of govference and a Nordic nuclear-free zone because the ernments, political science ihii.uld reexamine its success of its neutral policy depends upun Europe- own priorities. an peace and stability. The initiative on European security cone after the Czechoslovak invasion when a general feeling developed that something 1264 should be done to prevent more tension, and it dif- Pickius, Robert. ALM AND A WORLD WITHOUr WAR. With fered from the Warsav Pact proposal in substance the editorial assistance of David Luse. LBerckeand in principle. If the Finnish initiative caus- ley, Calif., WzVrld Without War Publication, es Europeans t" realise that they must exein 86 p. UG633.P52 outdated concepts and dovtriner critically and Biblioýjrapkth: p recognise now alternatives, it will fulfill its task. Parti -*iets.--u.s. initiatives for a world without war.--an issued 4entered 4pproach.--A 1orll without war approach.-ubo will make the de cision?-4qries for organizational leaders.--pol- L&ckert, Heins-Ralf. raspecrs OF A PSYCHOLOGY 7TO cy stands: Women's Intemi~tionaj League fqr SWCRE THE MKCE3 Aspekite &;ner Psychologie 4er Peace and Pre*4m. Federation of American Scien- Friedenssicherung. Politlsche Studlen, v. 21, tists. Commttee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Jan./Feb. 1970: icouncil for a Liveatlie Warle. Qu-stions and an- R35.P6, v. 21 were an the PBX, prepared by the White KoAss for Asserts that peace can be secured through educatid the Republican National Coittee. Freedom House. end plitics, consider3 pertinent pedagogic Discusses why the Americsn approach is so often Innovations and behavioral models, and discusses inadequate to the problea of preventing war. The t.e theory of eggrtsion. Education and politics Military ras an essent&al role in protecting the should not al& to create "t.nsio-free states of American people at, rýtoxl not h- sb-bte ty peace, s4nce ef'.ict end struggle 0emo "eft- isapli.tic isolation a %A1 antinillt*-i n., but strucive m nts of persoial end social dynsa- "the attack on th- svolien role of the military in ice." They should rather try to chamoel Irration- American life ýis surely warranted.* and the %! aggressiveness, wlich is not a primary himan "resent sn' titliitry e-11mate Otuld seeurv, Co ite6, into "spiritual' coqetition and struggle nist %gre-ear. on tcm.e basic steps thward estabthat can be resolved rationally. Politics should l htug a wor1 without wr. Pickus wutlines tht develop Qstits of cmflict resolution sad inter- cis essential ianr"eir.t4 at such a wor!d %A. 4knational institutions powteful eeow~b to Codify law end scure Peace. temrie-s the U.S;. rolv it. ;rontnwo rlde ;acr FPindr, Jom., t U.1 PFryc. VtMK. AFTO DE 10sacke. bitetr. fljiia MI PME XMNCU? Was lot 'AL- -!- 7r-AN TU M70P 37ATV Of IWM. Friedesfor-scbmg? brp_-ar v. v. 24k, s., Hr-r ieortb, Penguin, 191 t. (Penguit' 1969: '1" L~ v. 24 *Ci140 t' i; Dh ninem of peafe ftsearub "a "141r to emy research daes med to eontrbutte u peace. So. far Contnts. -- Ie, t. 1. t pe 10ay Trr.- itu prime contern has b#* hew to prevent a direct rote of a..slure T t UWtus: ationetate. T a