THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

Transcription

1 THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) September 2011, Dhaka, Bangladesh 1

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3 Foreword Bangladesh had witnessed sporadic acts of terrorism in the first half of the last decade. A number of serious attacks were mounted, particularly in 2004 and The most significant of these was the 21 st August 2004 grenade attack on an Awami League public meeting, which specifically targeted the Awami League leadership, including Sheikh Hasina, the then Leader of the Opposition and currently the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. On 17 th August 2005, around 500 home-made bombs were exploded, in 63 out of 64 districts, and the issue of terrorism in Bangladesh gained worldwide attention. The violent nature of these incidents has convinced stakeholders in the government, civil society and general public that if Bangladesh becomes susceptible to terrorist activities, there will be severe consequences for the stability, security and economic development of the country. With this backdrop in mind, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) has undertaken a three-year project ( ), with the objective of conducting research on the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The project covers the writing of three annual reports and developing a national counter terrorism strategy, aimed at creating a more effective counter terrorism regime in the country. The first annual report, The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh , published with some relevant conclusions and recommendations, has been disseminated to the relevant government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh The second annual report, The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh, , is the outcome of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information and data collected by way of desk research, perception survey and key informant interviews. The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime-related activities have declined. Although people are aware of the activities of militant organizations, they are usually unwilling to talk about the active presence of these groups. Militant groups were found to have networks within the country as well as around the world. Networking was found to be strong, particularly in terms of following common or similar ideologies, receiving training on high-tech equipment and funding. The findings also indicate that Islamist terrorist groups in Bangladesh have changed the pattern of their activities and organizational identity in order to ensure their survival and sustainability. Some militant groups have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir, where activists have access to a modern education system and share a strong network with international terrorist groups. HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been found to be regrouping and following alternative strategies, due to concerted counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the current government. The results of the study also indicates that poverty unemployment, governance problems, decline in the quality of education and lack of political consensus are perceived as contributing factors for the people, especially the youth, to join either Islamist militant groups or support their activities and ideology. This report provides valuable information regarding terrorist activities in , as well as background information of the various terrorist groups in Bangladesh. We hope this information will contribute to the preparation of an effective national strategy to combat terrorism in Bangladesh. 3

4 The commitment of the team of dedicated researchers of the Foreign Policy and Security Section of BEI in preparing the report deserves to be commended. We would also like to express our deep gratitude to the Royal Danish Embassy for its generous financial support for our project and for making this publication possible. We would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to all those who provided us with valuable inputs and suggestions for improving our understanding of the problem of terrorism, and in the writing of this report. Farooq Sobhan President Bangladesh Enterprise Institute 4

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword List of Tables List of Figures EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION Background About the Project Objectives of the Project Objectives of the Report Structure of the Report 2. METHODOLOGY Data Collection Methods Sample Selection Procedure Data Processing and Analysis 3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents Age, Gender and Residence Education and Working Status 3.2 General Perception on Security 3.3 Terrorism and Bangladesh Public Definition of Terrorism Public Reluctance to Share Information Common Activities of Militants Objectives of Militant Activities Militant Networks Present Trends: Signs of Regrouping by Militants Sources of Finance for Militant Groups Involvement of Women in Militancy Target Population of Militancy Recruitment Motivational Techniques used in Militancy Recruitment Consequences of Militancy/Terrorism Reasons for Getting Involved in Terrorism 5

6 Sources of Information on Militants Respondent s Views on Combating Terrorism Awareness of Anti-Militancy Programs Steps towards Combating Terrorism 4. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM Updated Profiles of Terrorist Organizations Regional and International Cooperation Role of the Concerned Groups of Society Social Integration of Former Militants Need for Counter Terrorism (CT) Policy 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS APPENDIX TABLES

7 LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Proportion of respondents who provided opinions on crimes that occurred in their localities. Table 1.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the current situation based on the prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts as compared to the previous year. Table1.3: Percentage distribution of respondents opinions on the most frequent injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts which occur in their localities. Table 1.4: Measurement of respondents fears of facing injustice due to crime/suppression/ torture (%). Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by people (%). Table 1.6: Peoples perception about Militancy/Terrorism (%). Table 1.7: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%) Table 1.8: Common activities of terrorist organizations found by the respondents (%). Table 1.9: Strategies followed by terrorists in their dawat (%). Table 1.10: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%) Table 1.11: Major causes of women s active participation in militancy (%) Table 1.12: Categories of people involved with militant groups (%) Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by militant activists (% of respondents) Table 1.14: Terrorists usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of respondents) Table 1.15: Scopes of terrorists/militants threatening national security and democracy (% of respondents) Table 1.16: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (% of respondents) Table 1.17: Major sources of information about militant groups and their activities (% of the respondents) Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents) Table 1.19: Respondents awareness of anti-terrorism activities (%) Table 1.20: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the prevention of terrorism (%) Table 1.21: Suggestions for mitigating insecurity and violence caused by extremist groups (%) Table 1.22: Suggestions about integration of Ex-Militants within mainstream society (%) 7

8 LISTOF FIGURES Figure 2.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the current situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal acts as compared to the previous year. Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%) Figure 2.3: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%) Figure 2.4: Recognized women participation in militancy (%) Figure 2.5: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (%) Figure 2.6: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the prevention of terrorism (%) 8

9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The inception of the new millennium was marked by a series of sporadic and often deadly terrorist attacks in Bangladesh. In addition to the mainstream political groups, some extremist religious organizations have come into existence under political patronage. These organizations follow the same doctrine as that of the Taliban. The violent intentions of these groups were made apparent by several fatal terrorist attacks. The 2001 bombing of the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which killed 10 people and left scores injured was a major terror attack by HUJI. The following year JMB exploded bombs in several cinema halls in Mymensingh, killing 15 people and injuring many. Again in 2004, an attempt was made to murder the eminent writer and academic of Dhaka University, Humayun Azad, and the British High Commissioner, Anwar Chowdhury. There was also a deadly attack at a public rally of (the then opposition party) Awami League, which killed 24 people and injured 200. HUJI was accused of carrying out all these deadly attacks. In August 2005, JMB conducted synchronized explosions in 63 of the 64 districts of the country. These incidents galvanized immediate public attention and international concern for the need to counter these terrorist groups. With the extensive support of the current government, law enforcement agencies conducted effective counter-terrorism operations which reduced the level of activities of terror groups. However, it has been stated in several research reports that these groups still exist in the country by assuming different identities and following diverse strategies to continue their actions. Against this backdrop, DANIDA has extended their support to the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute to undertake a three year project on assessing the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The main objective of this project is to develop a National Counter Terrorism Policy (NCTP) in close partnership with the Government of Bangladesh. Under the Phase I project activities, a report entitled The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh was published, which contained relevant conclusions and recommendations and was disseminated to government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh Under the Phase-II activities of the DANIDA project, a survey has been conducted with a view to assessing and monitoring the characteristics, patterns and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism and thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information. With a sample size of 3,200 comprising different segments of literate people between the ages of 18 and 65 years, the survey was undertaken in June 2011 throughout the country. In addition, prominent citizens, religious leaders (the Imams), law enforcement agency personnel and gate-keepers of the community were included as Key Informant Interviewees. Information from newspapers was also included in this survey. The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime related activities have reduced. Also, in comparison with last year, a slight decline has been observed by a significant proportion of (about 40 percent) respondents. Some people (20 percent) still believed that the situation was the same as the year before. While identifying the types of illegal activities, respondents mentioned the following: robbery, highjacking, theft (80 9

10 percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3 percent), and extortion (49.2 percent). Eve teasing was found to be common and an issue of great community concern. There are more issues which are causing insecurity among community people, such as drug addiction (74 percent), torture by police (17 percent), women and child trafficking (15.2 percent) and murder (28 percent). Over 13 percent of the respondents believed that these crimes had high impact on their lives. It is important to note that quite a low proportion, only 6 percent of the respondents, recognized about crimes related to any religion and 2 percent cited about the use of explosive devices. Findings indicate that the relationship between general people and law enforcement agency personnel, especially the police, is not amicable. In regard to approaching the police, general people expressed their fear of being involved in legal matters, as it requires considerable amount of money and other associated consequences. As a result, the majority of criminal cases are resolved among themselves. Regarding militant groups, although the respondents are aware of their activities, very negligible proportion of people is willing to talk about the active presence of these groups: JMB (10 percent), JMJB (4 percent), Allahr Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent), Hizbut Tawhid (0.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8 percent). The major objective and goal of these militant groups are: to threaten people initially and then takeover the country and establish an Islamic regime in the long-run. Some of the respondents believe that this is a strategy to destroy democracy and establish a rigid Islamic system of governance in the country. Militant groups were found to have networks within the country as well as around the world. Networking was found to be strong particularly in terms of following common or similar ideologies, receiving training on the use of hightech equipment and funding. Funding is provided through NGOs in the name of community development or during religious festivals. Different wealthy Islamic countries are mentioned as sources of funding by over 51 percent of the respondents. About 53 percent of the people surveyed believe that the flow of funding is maintained by activists in different developed countries. Funding activities of local militant groups are mentioned as looting, murdering, high jacking, extortion or other illegal criminal activities. It has been reported in newspapers that many Rohingyas living in some Middle Eastern countries are involved in providing funds to militant groups. Ukhiya in Cox s Bazar, at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, had been reportedly used for training by many notorious militant activists. In order to save themselves, these militant groups (previously notorious for heinous activities) have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir where activists have access to the modern education system and have strong networks with international terrorist groups. HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been found to be regrouping and following alternative strategies due to strong drive taken by the current government. The reasons behind supporting militant groups have been mentioned by the respondents as poverty, illiteracy, lack of proper practice of democracy and misinterpretation of Islam. The question therefore posed to the respondents was how to fight terrorism in Bangladesh? Generating mass awareness through broadcasting programs in the media and other campaign programs could be one way of combating terrorism and this is supported by 92 percent of the survey respondents. Strengthening legislation and justice 10

11 system has been mentioned by 79.3 percent of the respondents. Appropriate attention should also be given to the cases that have remained unsettled for several years. There are about 50 international terrorists and militants who have been captured in Bangladesh; however, due to lack of adequate evidence against them, legal complications, lack of funds and other difficulties these cases have remained pending. About 92 percent of those surveyed have suggested that Imams have a responsibility to inform people about the peaceful nature of Islam. Appropriate amendment of the madrassa education system, impeding/checking corruption in different government circles, empowerment of people and banning student politics have been mentioned by 75 percent, 59 percent, 54 percent and 30 percent of the survey respondents respectively. In addition, families, societies, Ulema, public representatives and the youth have responsibility to rescue the nation from this process of creeping anarchy. Finally, we can conclude by saying that in order to combat terrorism in Bangladesh, the accomplishment of the following tasks is essential. These are: implementation of a national counter terrorism strategy and policy; establishing strong co-operation with the international community on a global counter terrorism strategy and policy; maintaining continuous efforts for overall sustainable socio-economic development of the country to offset the negative impact of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, misinterpretation of Islam, improper practice of democracy and so on. It was also mentioned that creating a sense of patriotism, and campaign and awareness related programs against militancy is also essential. Employment generation at different levels also should take place, respondents stated. 11

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13 1. INTRODUCTION Background When we look back on the history of terrorism, there are several different linkages to this issue. In South Asia, terrorism has had a profound impact on inter-state relations. Accusations of cross-border terrorism and state terrorism continue to constrain moves towards a constructive engagement. It has also been reported by a segment of the Indian media that some South Asian countries have spawned, encouraged, aided and abetted terrorism in neighboring countries making border areas the familiar scene for terrorists including providing sanctuary, training and financial support. 1 Therefore, to understand the trajectory of terrorism in Bangladesh, its history, roots and potential impact on society must be explored. Bangladesh s history, geographic location, weak infrastructure, socioeconomic and demographic factors and Islamic roots have facilitated the spread of extremist agendas. 2 Political inaction and tacit approval of certain vested quarters encouraged terrorists to consolidate resources and strike when least expected. One of the first terrorist attacks for which HUJI gained nationwide notoriety was the 2001 attack on the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which killed ten people and left scores injured. 3 The following year, JMB carried out near-simultaneous explosions in cinema halls in Mymensingh which killed 15 people and caused grievous injuries. In 2004, heinous attacks were carried out allegedly by HUJI members on eminent writer Humayun Azad and British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury. One of the the deadliest attacks was in August 2004, at the then opposition Awami League s meeting, which killed 24 and injured 200. It was widely perceived that the target of the attack was the party leader Sheikh Hasina. 4 JMB and JMJB grew unnoticed between until they violently announced their existence in August 2005 with a countrywide bombing campaign of 500 coordinated bomb explosions in 63 districts of Bangladesh 5. Although the number of casualties was small, this was the largest terrorist bombing campaign in the country and demonstrated the coordination and tactical capabilities as well as the wide reach of extremists. In November 2005, nine people, including two lawyers and a police constable, were killed and 78 persons injured in two suicide bomb attacks by JMB on the Chittagong and Gazipur court premises. In the same Rahman, R. Bangladesh s Fight against Terror: Lessons learnt and future perspectives. Osmany, M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective. APPL, Dhaka: P. 18 Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective Ramna Batamul Blast Case in The Daily Star viewed on the 01/06/11 Karlekar H. The Terrorism that stalks Bangladesh in Global Asia Spring 2008, Vol 3, No 1, p42-48 Viewed on the 01/06/11 Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective. Osmany, M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective. APPL, Dhaka: P

14 month, a JMB suicide bomber killed two senior assistant judges and wounded three people in the district headquarters of Jhalakathi. 6 Later, only due to intense pressure from donor countries, the then government banned HUJI, JMB and JMJB in Prompted by the pressure of public perception as well as international concern, the extremist elements faced their first pressure under the Caretaker Government (CTG) of Fakhruddin Ahmed. By early 2007, six prominent leaders of JMB and JMJB had been arrested, tried and executed. The Awami League-led Grand Alliance government, upon assuming office in January 2009, continued the momentum started by the CTG and adopted a proactive approach to curbing terrorism. The adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Money Laundering Prevention Act in 2009 and the formation of The National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention and The National Committee for Intelligence Coordination have built a strong multi- faceted resistance to extremism and portrayed Bangladesh s concerted efforts against terrorism to national and international observers. 7 It is imperative that a comprehensive national strategy be adopted that would act as a holistic intra-governmental blueprint for countering terrorism with the plenary endorsement of civil, community and military constituents. About the Project The project, Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh aims to address the following challenges: Overcome the existing absence of a comprehensive national CT policy by initiating action to work with the government and other relevant stakeholders in developing a government-owned and consensus-based National Counter Terrorism Policy which would provide the framework and policies to enable the government to address the problems of radicalization, militancy and terrorism in a comprehensive manner; Lack of detailed action plans on priority areas of counter-terrorism, preventing strategies from taking practical shape; Lack of systematic information, monitoring and assessment on terrorism trends in Bangladesh. This information is vital for policy-makers and to raise awareness of various stakeholders. Objectives of the Project Long-Term Objective: The long-term objective of the project is to strengthen the counter terrorism regime through advocacy for a government-owned and implemented National Counter Terrorism Policy. 6 7 Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper July 2007 revised in March Ibid, p. 2 14

15 Immediate Objectives: The immediate objectives of the project are as follows: To reach a broad national consensus and raise consciousness of all stakeholders, particularly the government, on the need for a comprehensive national level government-owned policy addressing radicalization, militancy and terrorism; To assess and monitor the characteristics, patterns and trends of radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information for policymakers and other stakeholders to sensitize them about the need for a National Counter-Terrorism Policy; To develop intellectual dialogue and discourse against terrorism amongst civil society members and youth, making them vigilant against radicalization/militancy and giving them an ownership of the counter terrorism agenda; To provide technical assistance in developing a comprehensive government-owned policy on the basis of the BEI Strategy Paper on Counter Terrorism and other documents Objectives of the Report The objectives of the Report are to assess and monitor the scenario as 2 nd phase observation between the period of 2010 and 2011 focusing on the characteristics, patterns and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information for the policy makers, development partners, and other relevant stakeholders to sensitize them in order to further develop and provide inputs to countering terrorism in the country. Structure of the Report The report has been structured into four parts that include the Introduction, Methodology, Major Findings of the Survey and Concluding Remarks. Ancillary tables are presented in the appendix. 15

16 2. METHODOLOGY In accomplishing the aforementioned objectives, the research adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods. Qualitative method included desk research and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with three categories of respondents (Religious Leaders/Imams, Influential People of the Community, Law Enforcement Agency Personnel), in order to gather detailed information related to community insecurity, violence and militancy. In addition, a newspaper survey was done to collect more supportive and case specific information on these issues. A field survey for data collection was conducted in the month of July Data Collection Methods Quantitative Quantitative data was collected following a semi-structured questionnaire in face to face interviews with adult male and female respondents. Survey participants were selected from those who have at least primary level of education. Qualitative Qualitative data collection was conducted through the following methods: Desk Research Key Informant Interview (KII) Newspaper Survey Sample Selection Procedure The target age group for the quantitative portion of the survey was between 18 and 65 years. Throughout the country with similar segment of male and female, respondents were selected on random basis. Distribution of Sample Size and Location The study locations were selected from all seven administrative divisions of the country, with two upazilas from each of the selected districts. These locations were identified as most insecurity-prone places in terms of Islamist radicalization, extremism and religious militancy. Having this in mind, a total of sample size was selected from 64 thanas/upazilas (Sub-districts) of 32 districts of the seven divisions. Equal distribution was maintained in each thana/upazila having 100 in each. 16

17 The following table depicts detailed distribution of sample for the survey: Table 1: Distribution of survey locations Division District (Urban) Rangpur Lalmonirhat Thakurgaon Nilphamari Kurigram Rangpur Gaibandha Rajshahi Jaipurhat Naogaon Chapainawabganj Rajshahi Natore Sirajganj Pabna Khulna Kushtia Jhenaidah Chuadanga Jessore Satkhira Khulna Barisal Barisal Barguna Bhola Dhaka Dhaka Gazipur Jamalpur Mymensingh Sherpur Sylhet Sylhet Habiganj Chittagong Noakhali Chittagong Cox s Bazar Upazila/Thana (Rural) Patgram, Durgapur Ranisonkhail, Baliadangi Dimla, Domar Ulipur, Bhurungamari Pirgachha, Badarganj Sadullahpur, Phulchhari Khetlal, Akkelpur Atrai,Raninagar Shibganj, Bholahat Bagmara, Godagari Singra, Gurudaspur Ullapara, Shahzadpur Santhia, Chatmohor Mirpur, Bheramara Shailokupa, Moheshpur Alamdanga, Damurhuda Jhikorgachha, Sharsha Kaliganj, Shyamnagar Dakope, Paikgachha Gournadi, Agailjhara Pathorghata, Amtoli Char Fashion, Borhanuddin Dakshinkhan, Demra Kapasia, Tongi Sharishabari Fulbaria, Muktagachha Nokla, Nalitabari Jaintapur, Jokiganj Baniachar, Nabiganj Begumganj, Chatkhil Hathazari, Raujan Naikhangchhari, Ukhia KIIs As many as 96 KIIs were taken with 3 different respondents namely, Religious Leaders (Imams), Teachers, Public Representatives (Chairman/Member) and Officials from Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies (Police, RAB, NSI, DGFI). Desk Research A review of different newspaper reports, articles, editorials, books and documents was done, reflecting the overall situation of the different communities in Bangladesh and 17

18 exploring the associated problems that have been hindering the development of these people. Media Survey As source of media reports, BEI has chosen twelve daily newspapers. These newspapers are nationally and internationally well known and acceptable to the public as impartial news reports/sources on Community Security, Radicalization, Terrorism, Drugs and Arms Trafficking in the country. The newspapers are: The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, New Age, Shamokal, The Independent, Sangbad, Daily Naya Diganta, Jugantor, Inqilab, Ittefaq, New Nation and The Daily Janakantha from July 2010 to June Data Processing and Analysis The data, acquired from the survey using three different techniques, was processed and analyzed independently and then triangulated. Under the newspaper survey, articles or any kind of news on community security, radicalization, terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking and the use of explosive devices were collected from the 12 selected newspapers between July 2010 to June For quantitative data processing, SPSS (Version 17.0) was used for data analysis. Data processing involved the following stages: Data entry and entry verification Cleaning and processing of data Coding and code transfer Development of analysis plan Analysis of programme development Programme running and report generation 18

19 3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY Under this section, major findings of the surveys are presented in different broad and subheadings which were derived from three separate methods that include quantitative household survey, Key Informant Interviews (KII) from three distinguished groups of personalities spread in different sections of the communities, information through desk research and the newspaper survey. 3.1 Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents Age, Gender and Residence This section presents the socio-economic characteristics of the survey respondents in terms of age, sex, education, religion and occupation. Table 2 shows the distribution of male and female respondents throughout the survey areas under seven divisions of the country. The distribution of respondents by division of residence shows that a majority of the respondents live in Rajshahi (22 percent), nearly one-fifth (19 percent) live in Rangpur and another one-fifth (19 percent) lives in Khulna. Over 9 percent live in Barisal and 16 percent of the respondents reside in Dhaka division. The number of respondents living in Chittagong was found to be similar to that in Barisal (over 9 percent). Sylhet division showed the lowest proportion (6.2 percent) of respondents in the survey. Nearly nine in every ten were Muslims, while the rest were mostly Hindus. Table 2: Background Characteristics of the Respondents Percentage distribution of male and female respondents by age, religion, gender, education and occupation Background Male Female Total Characteristics Age Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Division Rangpur Rajshahi Khulna Barisal Dhaka Sylhet Chittagong Religion 19

20 Background Male Female Total Characteristics Islam Hindu Others Education Primary Secondary Higher Secondary Graduate Post-Graduate Occupation Employed Student Politician Businessman Unemployed Other N 1,880 1,320 3,200 Education and Working Status About 35 percent of the respondents interviewed completed Higher Secondary level schooling. The second highest respondents (27 percent) completed their education up to secondary level. A good number of respondents interviewed completed their level of education up to graduation. There were also post-graduate level respondents, at over 10 percent. The lowest (4.2 percent) responses were taken from the respondents who had primary level of education. No significant differences were found in education levels between male and female respondents. A variation was observed in the occupation list of the participants. It seems that the majority responses were taken from the students (45.4 percent). The second majority responses (22.2 percent) were found to be employed. About 17 percent of the respondents had small or medium categories of businesses; among them almost 97 percent were male. Although it is very low and insignificant (1.4 percent), there were people who hold politics as occupation. 3.2 General Perception on Security From a security perspective, in order to get a clear view of the situation of the country, respondents were asked about the frequency of crime/injustice/extremism/illegal acts or incidents compared to the previous year. About 40 percent of the respondents opined that such acts had declined, compared to last year. Similarly, from in-depth interviews taken of particular professionals, it was revealed that terrorist activities had decreased comparatively in their respective localities, although the reasons behind this changed situation were not given by them. Over 15 percent of the respondents said that there was little increase in terrorism. More than 20 percent of the respondents believed the situation was the same as before (Appendix Table: 1.1). 20

21 Figure 2.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinion regarding the situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal acts compare to the previous year Male Female Total Too high Little increase Huge decline Small decline Very little Same as before Types of illegal activities were gleaned from the survey participants. According to their opinion, crimes related to personal property such as robbery, highjacking and theft (80 percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3 percent), and extortion (49.2 percent) were found to be common in the participants respective areas of residence. Another often reported crime is eve teasing. A significant proportion (63 percent) of the respondents had complained about this cause of insecurity. Drug addiction is another crime that causes high level of insecurity among community people as more than 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about it. Among others, police torture (17 percent), trafficking in women and children (15.2 percent), and murder (28 percent) were mentioned by the survey participants. About 65 percent of the respondents believed that all this had some influence on their lives. Although a significant number of responses were noted to have experienced the influence of crime in their lives, the vast majority (83.2 percent) of them denied experiencing any injustice or crime during the past one year (Figure: 2.1). Although respondents mentioned a series of crimes the community people had dealt with, a majority (65 percent) of them believed that this had little influence in their lives. Over 13 percent of the respondents felt that it had high influence in their lives. During the past one year, how much the community people had come across any injustice/crime or suppression was measured. About 17 percent of the respondents said that they had experienced such crimes. Among them, 10 percent were male and 7 percent female (Table 1.5). The majority of the respondents mentioned crimes related to personal property such as theft, robbery, looting, hijacking, etc to be a common type of violence in the community, 33.4 percent claimed that violence was mostly politically motivated, while 21 percent thought about eve teasing to be another cause of rising violence in the community. About 11.3 percent of those surveyed agreed that drug addiction was a reason for community violence. Conflict due to religious reasons was cited by 6 percent of the respondents, and violence using explosive materials was stated by only 2 percent of those surveyed as another reason for community violence. Participants (64 percent) also said that they would report to the police if they were confronted by these types of violent acts again (Table: 1.5). 21

22 Respondents were also asked about why they did not report to the police for the violent incidents faced in the past. In response to this question, a number of reasons were given. The survey results are presented according to the proportion of their response. Over 25 percent of the respondents gave family and personal reason, while 18.4 percent mentioned fear of vengeance or worsening of situation. Some respondents (17 percent) mentioned that they had resolved the problems through mutual understanding. Fear of harassment by the police was another reason as stated by 15 percent of the survey participants, while 14 percent mentioned about not having such kind of experience so far. However, 50 percent of the respondents said that they were a little worried, while 17 percent felt very worried for the members of their families who might be victims of any crime, torture or injustice. According to the KII respondents, money was another factor for not approaching the police. There is law but no implementation. Moreover, the police charges Tk. 1,500 to Tk. 10,000 for filing a case was the opinion expressed by many KII respondents of Jhenaidah and Pabna. Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by the people (%). Indicators Male Female Total Politically motivated violence Ethnic conflict Religious / conflict motivated by religious reasons Torture using explosive devices/materials Extortion Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery, looting, highjacking) Eve teasing Rape Murder Drug addiction/drinking Women and children trafficking Police exploitation / torture RAB exploitation/torture In favour of reporting to the police in case of facing any illegal activities Terrorism and Bangladesh Public Definition of Terrorism The public s understanding of terrorism was assessed through a survey of a number of people. The survey participants were asked have you ever heard of the word terrorism/militancy? Table 1.6 (Appendix) indicates that most of the respondents, except 2 out of 10 people, had not heard about the terms. Some views on militancy are recorded 22

23 here from the respondents idea about this issue. As many as 89 percent of the respondents perceived terrorism or militancy as using Islam as a reason to cause instability in the society, and causing fear through anti-social and anti-state acts such as, bombing, vandalism, looting, murder, use of arms, etc. More than 81 percent of the participants understand the term/issue of terrorism/militancy as using Islam to steer people in the wrong direction or giving people wrong concepts. Some people (21.1 percent) took this issue as a fight against non-islamic state. According to a report published in a journal, the power seeking leaders, who want to use religion as a tool, are the facilitators of extremism in Bangladesh. Beside these, religious and political ideological contradictions, rigid religious beliefs, socio-economic factors like poverty, unequal job opportunities, hunger, backwardness and unemployment also significantly contribute to the rise of extremism in Bangladesh. 8 Public Reluctance to share Information In this survey, attempts have been made to explore the nexus between religion and militancy. As such, questions were asked about active terrorist groups who motivate people using Jihadi 9 ideas in the participants respective localities. Compared to the response rate on other issues, a very low proportion of participants spoke about extremist groups. The active presence of JMB was Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%) JMB JMJB HUJI Allahr Dall Hizbut Tawhid mentioned by only 10 percent of the respondents. Regarding other militant groups, responses were lower than 10 percent. The other groups were JMJB (4 percent), Allahr Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent), Hizbut Tawhid (.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8 percent). From the findings and field observation, it was obvious that people were somehow not willing to provide information about the militant groups (Figure 2.2). Hibut Tahrir Male Female Total 8 9 Islam, M. A. Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh, BIISS Journal. Vol, 29, No.2, April P. 161 The meaning of jihadi is something of or relating to a jihad. Jihad is an Arabic for what can be variously translated as "struggle" or "effort," or "to strive," "to exert," "to fight," depending on the context. In the West, the word is generally understood to mean "holy war," and the terms are given, inaccurately, exclusively militant or violent connotations. Including "jihad" as one of the five pillars of Islam is another common Western misunderstanding. Jihad is not among the five pillars of Islam (the profession of faith, prayer five times a day, fasting during Ramadan, alms for the poor, and performance of the holy Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in each financially solvent Muslim's lifetime). 23

24 Common Activities of Militants Although respondents were somewhat reluctant to provide information about the presence of terrorist groups in their localities, survey participants were responsive in expressing their views on the activities of the militants. Few activities are mentioned here as stated by the participants: invite people through Jihadi concepts (46.3 percents), extortion (26 percent), motivating in Jihadi sentiments (23.1 percent), threaten (22 percent), torture in various ways (19 percent), disseminate motivational messages for fundamentalism (17 percent), teach about how to hate other religions and countries (16 percent), murder (14 percent), provide Jihadi training (12.4 percent), provide training on how to use arms (7 percent). (Table: 1.8) Table 1.8: Common activities of the terrorist activists found by the respondents (%) Common activities of the terrorist Male Female Total activists Giving dawat (special invitation) through jihadi concepts Murder Extortion Causing fear/terror Torturing in various ways Increasing/ Disseminating fundamentalism/radicalization Increasing/disseminating militancy Giving jihadi training Motivating in jihadi sentiments Training in arms use Teaching to hate other country/religion Arranging invitations to motivate people to join militant groups is a common strategy of these groups, which is commonly known as Dawati Strategy. Among their many activities under this strategy, some have been revealed in this survey. Dissemination of messages through distribution of Jihadi books, leaflets and CDs are known to the majority of survey participants; 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about this. The other activities included use of mosques to motivate general people (13 percent) and door to door visit (12.4 percent). Targeting madrasa students and motivating them (39.4 percent) has been claimed by different sources as well (Table: 1.9) Table 1.9: Strategies followed by the terror activists in their dawat (%). Indicators Male Female Total Jihadi Books, Leaflets, CD, etc Door to door visit Visit madrasas In Mosques

25 KII respondents from all seven divisions have mentioned that militant outfits involve themselves in activities such as spreading misinterpretation of Islam, distribution of invitations and manifestos, creating fear among citizens by bombing and killing. Respondents have also said that militants hide in mosques and follow the guerrilla style of warfare. Objectives of Militant Activities The study also aimed to understand the objectives of militant activities. KII respondents in different regions sketched a few aims of the militants such as: Their short term objective is to threaten people and long term plan is to capture political power of the country ; They have only one objective which is to disturb the people and government ; and, Demolish democracy and establish Saudi system of governance. These views were mentioned by respondents in Barguna, Jhenaidah, Lalmonirhat, Baniyarchar, Cox s Bazar, Khulna, Noakhali, and Joypurhaat. A report published in a journal states that JMB tries to instill fear in people and force society to accept a corrupt version of Islamic ideology. They attempt this not realizing that this ideology is deeply flawed and fails to fit in a nation that adopts a unique blend of religio-cultural values to govern their day-to-day life. 10 Another research report has shown that a global Islamist organization, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT, Party of Liberation) aims to impose Shariah (Islamic Law) across the world. With this aim in mind, the organization has built strong global networks 11. Militant Networks All three categories of KII respondents have acknowledged that there is a nexus between militant groups residing in Bangladesh and based abroad in terms of economic, technological and organizational connections. A religious leader from Barguna stated, Terrorist organizations in Bangladesh receive funds from international terrorist groups. In addition to receipt of funding, terrorist groups in Bangladesh also maintain connections for learning and adopting training techniques and the same ideology, as stated by respondents in Thakurgaon and Rangpur. Terrorist groups are quite proficient in using modern technology, such as the internet, mobile phones, some special signals and other types of very strong networking systems. This information was provided by all KII respondents from law enforcement agencies. In this survey, attempts have been made to figure out the number of militants operating in Bangladesh and those arrested. From the statements given by some KII respondents, it has been estimated that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militant activists are operating in this country and about 200 activists have so far been arrested by law enforcement agencies. However, respondents have not provided information about foreign militants who are suspected to have connection with home-grown terrorist groups M. Sakhawat Hussain, Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective in Mufleh R. Osmany, and Mohammad Humayun Kabir (ads.), Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective. APPL, Dhaka: P (Accessed on 26/10/2011) 25

26 According to newspaper reports, five Bangladeshi people were arrested on suspicion of conducting terrorist attacks near the Sellafield nuclear site in UK. It was also reported by the BBC that all the arrestees were suspected of taking pictures of the nuclear site hours after the killing of Osama Bin Laden. 12 In another case, a Bangladeshi citizen named Maulana Mohammad Imran, staying in Habiganj, was found working as a local cocoordinator for the Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT s Bangladesh co-coordinator Khurram, alias Mohammad Salem, was mentioned as the cocoordinator of India and Bangladesh LeT chapters. 13 Some leading newspapers have reported that militants are still receiving funds from several foreign NGOS to carry out their activities. It has also been alleged that militants have linkages with an islamist political party in Bangladesh.14 Some Islamist extremist groups are alleged to have collaboration with the underground leftist groups. Present Trend: Signs of Re-grouping by Militants According to newspaper reports, militants are resorting to alternative strategies to ensure their existence under effective counter-terrorism operations taken by the current government. In order to retain their existence, the Islamist militants are trying to unite under a common platform keeping Hizbut Tahrir in the forefront, as its members are educated in the modern education system. According to intelligence sources, international terrorist groups are also keeping an eye on Hizbut Tahrir. 15 Evidence shows that JMB and Hizbut Tahrir are trying to form joint collaborations. They are also trying to establish liaisons with other terrorist and political groups at home and abroad. It has also been revealed in a media report that those who had been arrested during a hartal were HUJI and JMB militants who were being reorganized slowly under the banners of various Islamist groups. 16 Sources of Financing for Militant Groups International terrorist groups were the top source of funding, according to the majority (65.4 percent) of the people surveyed. Another major source of fund collection for these groups was the subscription from dedicated activists residing in different developed countries. About 53 percent of the selected participants for this survey mentioned about this source of funding. Over 51 percent people were of the view that different wealthy Muslim countries nurtured these militant groups activities by providing funds to some NGOs. Local people also unintentionally finance these groups by giving donations in the name of Islam. This was realized by 21.3 percent of the respondents. Money collection The Independent: 5 May 2011 Janakantha, Protham Alo, The Daily Star, of 5 October The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011 The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011 The Daily Janakantha: 7 April,

27 by force from local people, such as extortion, murder, looting, highjacking or creating fear was mentioned by 24 percent of the survey participants. (Figure: 2.3) Figure 2.3: Source of financing to the militant activists/groups (%) From their activists living in different wealthy countries in the name of Islam Donation from Muslim countries for NGOs International Terrorist groups Forcibly collect money from local people Religious donation from local people Male Female Total Expatriates in Saudi Arabia and England, foreign madrasas, Muslim countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and non- Muslim countries such as China, various Islamic NGOs and INGOs were sources of funding as mentioned by KII respondents from Pabna, Daulatpur of Kushtia, Dhaka, Rajshahi, Sirajganj, Jamalpur, Sherpur and Sylhet. A senior official in law enforcement disclosed a HUJI leader s confession during interrogation that HUJI had received financial aid from around 3,000-4,000 associates working in different Middle Eastern countries. 17 The HUJI leader also stated that an organization named Rashid Trust in Pakistan had been providing HUJI with financial aid. 18 According to another newspaper, Islamist extremists receive huge financial resources from different local and international NGOs, banks, insurance companies, private clinics, real estate companies and other business organizations. 19 Involvement of Women in Militancy Regarding women activists in militant groups, 32 percent of the survey respondents were aware of it. When asked about the reasons for women joining extremist groups, a few factors were mentioned by the respondents. Over 48 percent noted that women activists were mostly the family members of the militants. Financial problems in the family were another reason given by 32.1 percent of the surveyed people (Figure: 2.4). Being family The Daily Star: 28 April 2011; The Daily Janakantha: 30 April 2011 The Daily Janakantha: 29 April 2011 The Independent: 19 June