Dealing with Pluralism Conceptual and Normative Dimensions of Political Theory

Transcription

1 Dealing with Pluralism Conceptual and Normative Dimensions of Political Theory Manon Westphal Introduction In this paper, I address the question: What implications do conceptions of pluralism have for a political theory s level of normativity? I take this question to be in need of closer investigation due to the following considerations. One of the most striking recent developments in political theory is the increasing number of approaches claiming a need to take pluralism more seriously than has been the case so far. What these pluralistic theories share is a certain critique of Rawlsian liberalism which, in a nutshell, amounts to the charge that Rawls and other liberals in his tradition go wrong in assuming that in contemporary societies there could actually be a consensus on fundamentals of justice. But, despite their agreement on the critique, pluralists are divided regarding its implications. What should a political theory look like if it takes seriously the notion that citizens also disagree on basics of justice? The answers are many: Some argue for a wide scope for majority decisions, others argue that the goal of politics should be compromises, and again others argue that the state should as far as possible refrain from normative judgments. This diversity demands clarification. If the shared critique of Rawlsian liberalism does not lead theorists to support the same implications on the political level then why is it? One possible explanation presents itself as a particularly plausible one. That is, there is good reason to assume that a theory s understanding of the nature of pluralism has a crucial impact on the consequences drawn for the political level. First, pluralists put a strong emphasis on different features of pluralism when developing their respective notions of adequate responses to pluralism and, thus, suggest that their arguments hinge on these features. In particular, this is the case with theorists referring to either value pluralism or poststructuralist identity pluralism. On the other hand, and independent of what the theorists themselves suggest, it appears plausible to assume that a conception of pluralism I take a conception of pluralism to signify the sum of features a theory ascribes to the phenomenon of pluralism has a significant impact on a theory s suggestions for political practice. A conception of pluralism implies, for example, certain notions about the nature of the units which constitute pluralism. That is, it tells us something about where, according to the theory in question, the phenomenon of pluralism appears. It could be a pluralism of values or interests, individuals or groups, cultures or social identities. Also, a conception of pluralism implies notions about other features such as pluralism s scope, its permanence, or its potential for conflict. Because different specifications of these aspects result in different 1

2 understandings of the nature of the political challenge posed by pluralism, it seems reasonable to assume that a political theory s conception of pluralism shapes the vision of politics it comes up with. The tentative idea resulting from these considerations, though, namely that an analysis of the theories conceptions of pluralism helps us to understand their differences, is confounded by one further observation: There are theorists who adhere to the same conception of pluralism but do not derive from it the same implications for the political level. As a consequence, we are left with a rather diffuse appraisal of the conceptions impact which raises a bunch of questions. Do the differences among pluralists referring to the same conception of pluralism result from the fact that one of them misunderstands the implications of the conception in question? Do they only seem to refer to the same conception because they use the same term but actually disagree about the features of pluralism? Does the very idea that conceptions of pluralism have an impact on political theory s normative arguments turn out to be mistaken? In this article, I contribute to the clarification these questions call for. I will take a closer look at the relation between conceptions of pluralism and political theories normative arguments and develop an account of the nature of this relationship. My core thesis will be that even though a conception of pluralism is not irrelevant, its impact is severely limited. The crucial differences among theories based on the same conception are neither rooted in diverging interpretations of pluralism nor one of the theorists making a logical mistake. Rather, the differences result from diverging evaluations that cannot be deduced from the respective conception but, instead, constitute independent normative arguments. My argument for this conclusion will be as follows. In the first section, I focus on political theories based on value pluralism. I compare the arguments developed by John Gray and William Galston, two theorists who claim to base their approaches on this particular conception of pluralism. In a first step, I reconstruct their notions of value pluralism and their respective normative arguments. In a second step, I identify what makes them part company when it comes to their respective guidelines for politics. In the second section, I deal with two theories based on poststructuralist identity pluralism. Here, I compare the approaches of Chantal Mouffe and William Connolly which are both based on poststructuralist identity pluralism. In line with the first section s structure, I lay out their interpretations of pluralism as well as their respective normative arguments, and identify the reason for their disagreement. In the third and last section, I explain how the two sections results lead to a specific understanding of the nature of the relationship between conceptions of pluralism and political theory s normative level, and demonstrate what, in the face of this understanding, a critical assessment of the diversity among pluralistic political theories requires. 2

3 1 Value Pluralism The first conception of pluralism I deal with is value pluralism. John Gray and William Galston both ground the main lines of their political theories on the conception of value pluralism as initially formulated by Isaiah Berlin. As I am interested in the relation between a conception of pluralism and the normative outlook of a political theory, it is Gray s and Galston s interpretations of Berlinian value pluralism which are relevant here, and not Berlin s original argument and the question of whether Gray and Galston reflect it correctly. Thus, I will offer a brief reconstruction of their respective interpretations of value pluralism and, in doing so, show that the two theorists agree on what they consider the essentials of value pluralism. According to John Gray, value pluralism is a truth about human life (Gray 2000: 34). The reason why human life cannot dispense with pluralism is that the values underlying different ideas of the good constitute a plurality which by nature implies not only the incompatibility of some values but, crucially, the lack of a common currency or measure (Gray 1995: 116) to rank them (ibid., Gray 1998: 20). Absence of a common currency or measure means that in cases of conflict among values it will often be impossible to identify what a right decision would be. Conflicts of inherently rivalrous (Gray 1995: 116) values often lead to situations in which no rational choice is available and, instead, radical choices (Gray 1995: 121) involving a taking of sides with certain values are required. Like Gray, Galston understands value pluralism to be a theory about the nature of values in human life, an account of the actual structure of the normative universe (Galston 1999: 770). Its fundamental idea, according to Galston, is that values and goods are inherently heterogeneous and that there is neither a particular value overriding all others nor a common measure which could be applied in order to give values a certain ranking (ibid., Galston 2002: 30f). Equally, both theorists stress that the incommensurability of values must not be confused with moral relativism. Galston underlines the compatibility of value pluralism with the distinction between good and bad or good and evil (ibid.) and the idea that there is a floor of basic moral decency for individual lives and for societies (ibid.). In a similar vein, Gray argues that value pluralism, even though it necessarily implies a relativism about ideals of life (Gray 2006: 327), does not deny the existence of generically human goods and evils (Gray 2006: 328) among which certain basic goods amount to a universal moral minimum (Gray 2006: 329) constituting the prerequisite of any decent human life (ibid.). Thus, the features of value pluralism as endorsed by Gray and Galston are identical. And both of them develop guidelines for a political theory from it which is meant to achieve what they see Rawls failing to achieve, namely a proper acknowledgment of pluralism s political implications. But in the following sections we will see that their arguments differ significantly. 3

4 1.1 John Gray s argument for modus vivendi Gray states that a political theory in accordance with value pluralism has to accept that on the political level like in any other sphere of human life conflicts between values abound and that decisions prioritising particular values or principles are only changeable episodes in political conflict and the results of provisional political settlements (Gray 1995: 114). The telos of a political theory taking into account the insights of value pluralism thus cannot be liberalism as it is but one theory of the right settlements of conflicts competing with many others (ibid., Gray 1998: 27ff). Instead, its telos is a modus vivendi an ever provisional arrangement that allows for peaceful coexistence among different forms of life promoting different values (Gray 2000: 133ff). No particular modus vivendi can ever be qualified as right or rational and in principle always be better than any others. As the value systems underlying forms of life can be very different and no superior principle defining the only proper rules of coexistence between them is available, Gray argues, a modus vivendi in no way has to be expressive of liberal values. Its shape depends on the particular constellation of forms of life in a given context. Still, Gray emphasises that his theory of modus vivendi should not be misunderstood as a case for anything goes (Gray 2006: 329). There are requirements for political legitimacy. But these requirements are not bound to any superior value or set of moral principles but result from needs bound to human nature requirements without which no flourishing human life would be possible, be it liberal or not. Gray states that even if it is not possible to give a complete list of those requirements resulting from human needs, they nevertheless provide a foundation from which to criticise a modus vivendi as illegitimate due to it hindering human beings from realizing fundamental goods. For example, he says, [r]egimes in which genocide is practised, or torture institutionalized, that depend [ ] on the suppression of minorities, or of the majority, which humiliate their citizens [ ], which destroy the common environment, which sanction religious persecution, which fail to meet basic human needs in circumstances where that is practically feasible or which render impossible the search for peace among different ways of life such regimes are obstacles to the well-being of those whom they govern. Because their power depends on the infliction of the worst universal evils, they are illegitimate [ ]. (Gray 2000: 107) Gray admits that it will not always be easy to define whether a particular regime misses the requirements of legitimacy. But in any case, he stresses, they do not determine that a liberal modus vivendi will be generally superior to other political regimes. The goods that are essential for leading a flourishing human life can be realised by different political regimes in very different ways (Gray 1995: 130, 2000: 110). 4

5 1.2 William Galston s argument for liberalism In contrast to Gray, Galston argues that value pluralism in fact provides the basis for a universal argument in favour of liberalism. To be sure, the kind of liberalism he takes to be the consequence of value pluralism differs from Rawls s which, according to Galston, fails to acknowledge the depth of pluralism as it implements a hierarchical relationship among values by installing the principles of justice serving as trumps (Galston 2005: 39). Value pluralism, Galston argues, suggests a liberalism whose primary purpose is the protection of legitimate diversity (Galston 2002: 23) and which, in line with this purpose, considers it the state s task to safeguard a sphere in which individuals and groups can act, without state interference, in ways that reflect their understanding of what gives meaning and value to their lives (Galston 2002: 15). The link between value pluralism and political liberalism (Galston 1999: 775) presupposed by his argument is as follows. Because there is no uniquely rational ordering or combination of such values, no one can provide a generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular ranking or combination. There is therefore no rational basis for restrictive policies whose justification includes the assertion that there is a unique rational ordering of value. If value pluralism is correct, then for the state to impose any single solution on some on its citizens is thus [ ] unreasonable [ ]. (Ibid., my italics) Thus, Galston s basic idea is that, given the truth of value pluralism, the state lacks sufficient reasons to justify the imposition of any way life on its citizens (Galston 1999: 776). At the same time, Galston sees individuals as inherently driven by an interest to realise a way of life that most adequately reflects their idea of the good. To identify with a conception of a way of life [ ], he states, is to do something more than to affirm its goodness. It is also to have a desire to live one s life in accordance with that conception that is, to express one s conception of the good life through one s words, deeds, and relationships (Galston 2004: 145). In the face of this human desire, on the one hand, and the absence of a justificatory basis for imposing a specific way of life, on the other, the state, according to Galston, should safeguard individuals and groups expressive liberty (Galston 2002: 28) by refraining from restrictive policies. Instead, it is meant to create spaces for individuals and groups in which they can lead their lives in ways consistent with their ideas of what gives meaning to life (Galston 2002: 29). This task implies that the state has a duty to realise the conditions that enable citizens, to regain their expressive liberty, for example, those of a particular cultural group, who cannot identify with the state s laws because they conflict with their ideas of the good life. This can be realised by either modifying the existing laws or granting the respective group a communal autonomy. At the very least, citizens must be granted the option to leave the state. The same applies and Galston accuses Gray particularly of ignoring this aspect 5

6 when formulating his critique of liberalism (Galston 1999: 774) to individuals who find their expressive liberty impeded by the group they are living in. Whereas the state must not prohibit illiberal practices within groups, it has a duty to intervene when individuals are forced to live against their own idea of what a valuable life means. 1.3 Why do Gray and Galston differ? After having sketched the arguments of both Gray and Galston the former deriving from value pluralism the need for a modus vivendi among different ways of life, the latter a case for the liberal state guarding citizens expressive liberty the crucial question is: What leads Gray and Galston to draw these different conclusions? Two explanations can be dismissed from the start. First, their dissent cannot be rooted in different understandings of value pluralism. As has been shown, the conceptions of value pluralism underlying the theories are basically the same. Second, it seems implausible that their approaches differ because at least one of them makes a logical mistake by incorrectly deducing something from value pluralism. Both theorists state that the theory of value pluralism does not necessarily lead to an affirmation of their respective theories. [V]alue-pluralism does not strictly entail modus vivendi. As a matter of logic, value-pluralism cannot entail any political project. (Gray 2000: 135) Similarly, Galston asserts: [I]t was not my intention to suggest that by itself, value pluralism entails any form of liberalism. From a purely formal standpoint, that claim would be bizarre. (Galston 2004: 144) In line with this idea, Carmen Pavel (2007) points out that between the sphere of metaethics to which the conception of value pluralism applies and the sphere of politics there is a gulf that needs to be bridged when a political theory nourished by value pluralism is developed. Drawing on this metaphor, when we aim to understand what leads Gray and Galston to arrive at their different conclusions, we have to look at their respective ways of bridging this gulf. What Pavel suggests is that the different consequences advocates of value pluralism draw are rooted in different understandings of the scope of value pluralism. It is, she argues, disagreements about the reality of different levels of pluralism (Pavel 2007: 211) that spill over into the authors positions with respect to its implications for politics. Whereas liberal pluralists understand pluralism to be a first-order phenomenon on the level of values within a particular cultural community, or [ ] political society (ibid.), non-liberal pluralists believe that pluralism [also] obtains at the second-order level of value systems (ibid.). Now, Pavel argues that the endorsement of a universal argument for liberalism reflects an understanding of pluralism of the first order kind, and that, by contrast, non-liberals criticise the argument in favour of liberalism because they take value pluralism to apply on the second-order level, encompassing conflicts between whole collective ways of life (Pavel 2007: 212). 6

7 Although Pavel s analysis may provide a fruitful tool in certain cases, and it surely is a fruitful one in indicating that the relationship between value pluralism and the level of politics is not an unambiguous one, I doubt that in the particular cases of Gray and Galston it actually helps to get a clearer picture of why these authors arrive at the different conclusions they do. Here, I suggest a sceptical view of the applicability of her analysis for the following reasons. First, it does not seem to be the case that Gray and Galston oppose each other with regard to the level of value pluralism they endorse. By explicitly stating that value pluralism requires acceptance of non-liberal ways of life, Galston, like Gray, conceives of value pluralism as not only implying conflicts within one value system but also between different value systems. Second, taking into account the debate on pluralist political theory, we see that it is disputed how genuinely non-liberal Gray s modus vivendi-solution and how genuinely liberal Galston s expressive liberty-solution actually are. On the one hand, some critics argue that through qualifying a legitimate modus vivendi by reference to certain normative requirements, like avoidance of universal evils or safeguarding political criteria like the protection of minorities or the possibility to remove a government without violence, Gray actually enriches his account in a way that brings it close to liberalism (e.g., Curtis 2007: 94ff; Talisse 2000: 454ff). On the other hand, as Pavel claims, with regard to Galston s account a lot depends on what his case for expressive liberty actually amounts to. If, in the end, it requires only a guarantee of freedom of exit which Galston at least indicates when asserting that illiberal associations with full exit rights are consistent with value pluralism (Galston 2004: 146), then it is unclear whether this account is a genuinely liberal one. Surely, Pavel argues, non-liberal societies can guarantee this freedom just as liberal ones (Pavel 2007: 214). What I want to point out is that the categories value pluralism on the first or second level and maybe also those of liberal and non-liberal in the cases of Gray and Galston do not get us very far when aiming to understand their different ways of bridging the gulf between value pluralism and their normative arguments. Instead, I suggest that what plays a crucial role here is that Gray and Galston see value pluralism and the conflicts of values it implies to have different consequences for an adequate understanding of the political. Because what is striking is that Galston s case for a state promoting citizens expressive liberty leaving aside for now the question of how genuinely liberal its implications are is first and foremost a case for limited government. The state is supposed to safeguard basic rights, prominently the freedom of exit, and to provide spaces enabling different groups to live their lives as they see fit, undisturbed by others to the highest possible degree. That is, in Galston s view, the realm of the political, which I understand to be the realm where citizens articulate dissent and engage with their conflicts to arrive at collectively binding decisions, is reduced to a minimum. Gray s approach lacks this tendency. The starting point of Gray s reflections in defence of modus vivendi is a situation in which different groups advocating 7

8 incommensurable values act together politically by confronting their differences in order to find terms enabling their peaceful coexistence. In other words, Gray considers the reversal of Galston s solution to conflicts of value as the task for a political theory taking value pluralism seriously, namely to provide a conception applying to situations in which groups need to act politically despite their differences. Whereas Galston argues for downsizing the realm of the political, Gray s argument for modus vivendi fundamentally relies on the premise that cases requiring political cooperation across differences abound. In relation to this difference, the criteria for legitimacy which, according to both Gray and Galston, result from basic universal goods and the duty to prevent worst human evils fulfil different roles in their theories. In Galston s liberal pluralism, such criteria define the limits of the state s legitimate scope of action. In Gray s theory of modus vivendi, by contrast, they define requirements which any modus vivendi, in addition to what it may imply beyond these requirements, must not neglect. 2 Poststructuralist identity pluralism At this point, I turn to pluralists who propose a different conception of pluralism on which to found post-rawlsian political theory, namely an account of identity pluralism that is informed by poststructuralism. The two theories I focus on here are those of Chantal Mouffe and William Connolly, who advocate agonistic approaches to politics. My starting point will be the same as in the previous section: I will show that Mouffe and Connolly share a similar conception of pluralism but draw different conclusions from it for the political level. The very fact that there are significant differences is commonly neglected and agonistic democracy taken to label a single perspective on democracy characterised by an affirmation of conflict. This perception blurs the theories substantial differences and is thus in need of revision. I will set out what the differences are and argue that as with Gray and Galston they are rooted in different evaluations of something the conception of pluralism itself does not determine. When Mouffe and Connolly speak of pluralism, they refer to a characteristic they consider to be deeply interwoven with the very conditions of social existence. This notion derives from their account of identity formation rooted in the poststructuralist tradition. Basically, the main lines of this account can be summarised as follows. First, the social is taken to lack any positive essence (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 96; Connolly 2004: 1ff). That is, there is no form of society or identity whose characteristics result from something that could be called its nature or substance. Second, every identity owes its existence to others as it is the differentiation from other identities that brings it into being. Connolly asserts: Any identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not exist as differences, it would not exist in its 8

9 distinctness and solidity. (Connolly 2002: 64) Similarly, in making use of Derrida s notion of the constitutive outside Mouffe states that every object has inscribed in its very being something other than itself and that as a result, everything is constructed as difference [ ] (Mouffe 2000: 21). The third assumption Mouffe and Connolly share is that there is no higher order principle determining the proper shape of social relations. What gives society its shape is a particular (and always unequal) distribution of power which means that, in principle, it can always be different (Connolly 2004: xvi; Mouffe 2005: 78). [E]very order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. Things could always be otherwise and every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities. Any order is always the expression of a particular configuration of power relations. What is at a given moment [ ] is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices. (Mouffe 2013: 2) Both Mouffe and Connolly derive from these ideas the view that the social not only necessarily implies pluralism but that a permanent potential for conflict is inherent to social relations. But, despite their agreement as to the political challenge thus resulting from the conditions of pluralism, they advocate different ideas about what a politics properly dealing with conflicts would be. 2.1 Chantal Mouffe s argument for tamed hegemonic struggles According to Mouffe, any political theory that understands the potential for conflict inherent in the social must acknowledge that any aspect of the established social order can become the locus of a political confrontation. Such a confrontation necessarily presents itself as an us/them opposition (Mouffe 2000: 101) because, in politics, the differentiation from an other that is necessary for an identity to exist unfolds into an opposition between collective identities whose adherents are respectively joined by projects which, due to the constitutive difference, prove incompatible with each other. On Mouffe s view, the task of democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition which is an impossibility but [ ] to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy (ibid). The us/them relation is compatible with democracy, Mouffe argues, if it does not take the form of an antagonism, a confrontation among opponents considering each other as enem[ies] to be destroyed (Mouffe 2000: 102), but is transformed into an adversarial relation, a confrontation among parties conceiving of each other as legitimate opponents whose ideas are rejected but fought against only with political means (ibid.; Mouffe 2013: 7). How is this kind of adversarial relationship obtained? The key to the required transformation is a form of an overarching identification among all members of the political community. And in liberal democracies, Mouffe argues, this overarching identification can be found in a 9

10 shared adherence to the political principles [ ] of liberty and equality (Mouffe 2005: 130). As these principles give rise to multiple interpretations (ibid.), this shared adherence presents itself as a conflictual consensus (Mouffe 2000: 103) whose content is not a consensus on the meaning and adequate implementation of these principles but a consensus on positions that represent negations of freedom and equality. It is thus the exclusion of a shared other which provides citizens with a collective identity that prevents their conflicts from turning into violent ones threatening the existence of the political community. Given, first, the presence of such a consensus and, second, political procedures and institutions that safeguard democracy s acknowledgment of a range of different interpretations of the principles through ensuring that counter-hegemonic projects have the opportunity to effectively challenge the hegemony in place, the ongoing confrontation among political identities fighting each other is far from dangerous as a well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions (Mouffe 2000: 104). 2.2 William Connolly s argument for pluralisation Connolly puts forward the notion that possessing an identity is closely interwoven with an inclination to conceive of others as threats to one s own identity. This inclination which, according to Connolly, is rooted in a human disposition to interpret experiences of the own identity s fragility as deficiencies, drives agents to constitute a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, mad [ ] as other (Connolly 2002: 65). And it is this hostility towards others that Connolly sees as constituting the major challenge for a pluralistic democracy. Connecting to the idea that every social order is characterised by power asymmetries, Connolly argues that constellations under which political conflicts occur look as follows. On the one hand, there is a range of recognised identities occupying established social positions and, on the other, there is a range of identities that are either not recognised by those in power or only just emerging and striving for a place on the register of cultural recognition (Connolly 2007: 123). Under such conditions, Connolly asserts, the established identities inclination to interpret differences as threats to their own being has significant effects because, given their powerful position, established actors can translate their rejection into successfully preventing new social actors attempts to achieve a place on the register of recognition. In Connolly s view, a political theory that truly acknowledges the pluralistic character of the social has to take into account not only the established plurality but also the plurality existing beyond it (Connolly 2004: xiv). That is, it must adopt a critical stance towards the established actors inclination to fend off attempts to modify existing social relations for which Connolly coins the term a politics of becoming (Connolly 2010: 226) and point to ways through which 10

11 this inclination can be overcome or, at least, mitigated. As the hostile attitude towards new identities, claims or moral perspectives which unsettle the already recognised identities, claims, perspectives is closely related to the desire to protect the illusionary unity of the self, Connolly argues, such a mitigation can only be brought about by the established actors recognising the need to work to overcome resentment of the existential condition (Connolly 2010: 228). Through working on their entrenched self-understanding, actors may come to accept that identity simply cannot be but a slippery, insecure experience (Connolly 2002: 64) and, as a consequence, recognise their hostile attitude towards other identities as pathological. Having undergone this process, Connolly argues, established actors may translate their newly gained openness towards others into a political ethos expressive of an affirmative attitude towards pluralism. By acting in accordance with the virtues of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, they enter negotiations with the actors challenging the established social order and, because this openness spills over into an enhanced generosity towards the new, support attempts to pluralise society (Connolly 2005: 123ff). 2.3 Why do Mouffe and Connolly differ? Having delineated the main lines of argument constituting these agonistic theories, we arrive at a situation similar to that resulting from the comparison of the theories based on value pluralism. The normative conceptions of a pluralistic politics differ significantly. As has been shown, Mouffe argues that a democracy that properly takes into account the pluralism of the social has to guarantee the possibility of transitions in power, so that no particular group is able to install its hegemony on a long-term basis. In Connolly s view, this suggestion misses the point because the acknowledgment of pluralism does not only require the guarantee that hegemonies can rotate but allow that the array of recognised identities may become constantly broader. What leads Mouffe and Connolly to draw these diverging conclusions? Several commentators critically dealing with agonistic theories express a certain uneasiness with the strong emphasis that agonists put on their respective analysis of pluralism because they doubt that these analyses can account for agonism s normative arguments. Thomas Fossen, in pointing to this discrepancy, concludes that the argument from pluralism as a motivation for an agonistic account of politics is misleading (Fossen 2008: 383). In order to justify their normative arguments, Fossen asserts, agonists would be required to expose their commitment to emancipation which does not result from their understanding of pluralism but, instead, grounds ideas underlying their critiques of liberalism (Fossen 2008: 383ff). Fossen is certainly right to identify a commitment to emancipation in the agonistic theories, and in this his critique points to something crucial: As in the case of the political theories based on value pluralism, there is no immediate road from poststructuralist identity pluralism to the 11

12 consequences drawn for the political level but, again, a gap that requires some kind of bridging by considerations which are external to the conception. Nevertheless, in order to understand why Mouffe and Connolly disagree in their characterisation of a pluralistic politics, it is important to go beyond Fossen s interpretation because a shared commitment to emancipation, obviously, cannot explain the differences. The interpretation I want to put forward is that the diverging consequences drawn by Mouffe and Connolly are, first and foremost, rooted in different evaluations of the rejection of the other implied in the oppositional relationships which, due to the social s inherent potential for conflict, emerge on a regular basis. Mouffe takes confrontations to be the driving force of politics. First, it is the shared rejection of an other which provides for the kind of overarching identity citizens are in need of to tame their antagonistic conflicts in a way that renders them compatible with democratic politics. Second, conflicts among groups rejecting each other s perspectives provide what a pluralistic politics requires in order to have an integrating force the continuous rivalry among alternative hegemonies assures what the conflictual consensus promises, namely that the rules of the community are open to many conflicting interpretations and that the question which is the right one cannot be decided once and for all. In contrast, Connolly takes the rejection of the other released by the nature of the social not to have an integrating but an exclusionary effect. If unquestioned, the rejection results in a resistance against new political demands and becomes expressive of a hostility towards pluralism. That is why, according to Connolly, democratic politics should not just ensure that conflicts can be negotiated without the rejection of the other turning into a violent confrontation which poses a threat to the very idea of political cooperation but, instead, work towards its overcoming. Without taking into account these diverging evaluations of what the rejection of the other means potential for integration vs danger of exclusion it seems impossible to explain why Mouffe considers the requirements of a pluralistic democratic politics satisfied when the conditions enabling a challenge to the existing hegemonies are in place whereas, according to Connolly, it requires the continuous effort to pluralise society. 3 What the analysis contributes to the debate I began this discussion with the question of whether understanding the nature of conceptions of pluralism helps to clarify why theorists united by their critical stance towards the Rawlsian solution to the challenge of pluralism, diverge when it comes to the alternatives they suggest. Regarding both conceptions of pluralism, I argued that the reasons why theorists adhering to the same conceptions depart in their normative ideas are not rooted in different understandings of the basic assumptions of the conceptions but, instead, are to be found in their respective ways of bridging the gap that always exists between a particular 12

13 understanding of pluralism and a theory s normative arguments. And this bridging is realised by certain kinds of evaluations rather than anything like a deduction. In the case of Gray and Galston, I argued that their approaches indicate different evaluations of the extent to which value pluralism and the conflicts it implies constitute challenges that need to be dealt with politically. It is the scope of the political which is in question here. In the case of Mouffe and Connolly, the differences of approach are effected by diverging evaluations of whether confrontations among parties who reject each other s perspectives constitute either a threat to or the very source of a pluralistic democracy. What do these conclusions tell us about the overall significance of conceptions of pluralism? If it is the particular evaluations that explain why theorists adhering to the same conception of pluralism arrive at significantly different conclusions regarding their orientations for a pluralistic democratic politics, is it irrelevant which conception of pluralism a political theory is founded on? In other words, is it a consequence of this discussion that pluralists should recognise their elaborations on the nature of pluralism as dispensable and, instead, present their arguments as purely normative ones? An affirmative answer to this question, though, would be a step too far. What, after all, should not be neglected is that a conception of pluralism, by providing a particular interpretation of the nature of the social, prepares the ground for a political theory in a meaningful way. It does not determine its arguments; but what it certainly does, is rule out certain conclusions. That is, adherence to value pluralism could hardly be the foundation of a political theory claiming the superiority of certain values, moral principles or ways of life. Similarly, adherence to identity pluralism informed by poststructuralism rules out approaches that consider the identification of a consensus about justice to be either the precondition or the goal of politics. Thus, conceptions of pluralism are important. They provide arguments supporting the critique of Rawls s liberalism because it is in the face of these conceptions premises that the idea that everybody can agree on the fundamentals of justice becomes deeply problematic. This role should not be underestimated as theorists who claim it is necessary to reach beyond the Rawlsian solution to the challenge of pluralism are in need of arguments sustaining this thesis. To be clear at this point, I neither claim that conceptions of pluralism are the only arguments available to justify the need to reach beyond Rawls s liberal solution, nor that the particular conceptions I have considered are the only conceptions able to support such a claim. But they do offer such arguments and, consequently, it would be too hasty to conclude that conceptions of pluralism, because they do not explain the normative differences between pluralistic political theories, do not play an important role. To be sure, conceptions of pluralism and the arguments they provide are not free of pitfalls. Most prominently, critics claim that they contain contestable and controversial ideas about the nature of social life. In pointing to this problem as well as other weaknesses of value pluralism, John Horton (2006) suggests the uncoupling of the theory of modus 13

14 vivendi from value pluralism. I will not go into detail at this point but only stress that suggestions like Horton s bring with them at least the challenge to fill the gap in the argumentation that opens up once conceptions of pluralism which, despite their problematic implications, provide forceful arguments against Rawlsian accounts of politics, are jettisoned. Thus, whereas my discussion does not imply that the conceptions are irrelevant, it does show that the prominent status attributed to them by the pluralist theorists themselves and especially the manner in which they, at least occasionally, present their arguments as conclusions arising from their conceptions to be problematic. As taking a closer look at the conceptions of pluralism underlying pluralistic political theories does not suffice to explain the theories differences, the impact the conceptions have on the kind of normative arguments advanced is limited. I thus suggest that any attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the theories differences requires an exploration of the more complex chains of argumentation in which a conception of pluralism is combined with other considerations. Without making any claims to comprehensiveness, my discussion has shown that, at least in the cases of Gray/Galston and Mouffe/Connolly, what does play a crucial role here is the substantive evaluations the theorists make when bridging the gap between the metaethical notions of their conceptions of pluralism and the political level. As such, this discussion helps to disclose the nature of the challenge commentators are facing in attempts to critically assess the diversity of approaches within the field of post-rawlsian political theory. That is, as these substantive evaluations play a significant role in their respective arguments, any endeavour critically to assess the diversity of the approaches has to address these evaluations. What I will do in the remaining part of the section is illustrate what this insight implies concerning the nature of any such challenge. The fact that what accounts for the differences among the approaches are evaluations which do not immediately result from the conceptions of pluralism means that a critical assessment of the approaches cannot be realised simply by comparing the coherence of the arguments through testing whether or not they are in line with the respective conception of pluralism. At the same time, though, the relevant evaluations normativity does not leave us facing sheer arbitrariness, in the sense that it should be accepted as nothing more than just a matter of taste which kind of evaluation to make and, consequently, which conclusion to draw from the conception of pluralism in question. What a critical assessment of the approaches requires us to do is, rather, to define certain criteria a pluralistic political theory would have to meet in order to count as a plausible theory providing helpful recommendations for a democracy s dealing with pluralism. Whereas there may be a range of useful criteria available, I suggest two that seem to be particularly important if we endorse the idea that the merits of a pluralistic political theory hinges on its sensitivity towards the conditions under which politics 14

15 takes place in the societies it is meant to provide with helpful orientations. The first criterion I suggest is the way in which the assumptions underlying the normative argument fit the structure of society; the second criterion is that the normative argument should imply a notion of political conduct that the citizens can reasonably be expected to realise. In order to demonstrate how these criteria can be applied to guide a critical assessment of pluralistic political theories, I sketch two cases illustrating the direction such a discussion may take. As to the first criterion, let us consider Galston s approach and his argument in favour of expressive liberty and limited government. As such, the notion that different groups should be provided with spaces in which they can realise their ideas of the good seems to be convincing in its own terms and, by representing one possible way of bridging the gap between the conception and the normative claims, fully compatible with value pluralism and its premise that there is no common measure enabling us to identify one way of life as superior to others. But, if we take into consideration the structure of pluralistic societies, then we have reasons to become sceptical with regard to the feasibility of this approach. A crucial feature of contemporary societies is that citizens are only very rarely members of one closed community but, instead, feel different and changing affiliations to various social groups. In view of this fragmentation of social identities, Galston s suggestion that the task of democracy should be more or less limited to creating spaces within which groups live their lives as they see fit, so far as possible undisturbed by others, seems to be already thwarted by the social conditions it faces. As to the second criterion, let us consider Connolly s notion that a rejection of the other implied in conflictual relations hinders the unfolding of pluralism. Although Connolly rightly draws attention to the impact of asymmetrical power relations as well as to the idea that an existing plurality should not be taken to set the limits of the range of identities worthy of recognition, his making citizens successful overcoming of the rejection of other identities the precondition of pluralistic politics brings with it an excessive limitation of political theory. In fact, the most serious challenges to democratic politics are those in which parties that strongly oppose one another advance different moral ideas and clearly reject those of their opponent. In these cases, procedures that help to deal with these conflicts without requiring an overcoming of the rejection might be what is practically needed. Of course, both criteria as well as the suggested ways to apply them serve only an indicative purpose at this point. They illustrate how a critical assessment of the differences between the pluralistic political theories can be realised and, thus, represent possible contributions to a debate that opens up before the background of this discussion s results. 15

16 References Connolly, William E. (2002) [1991]: Identity\Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Expanded Edition. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. Connolly, William E. (2004) [1995]: The Ethos of Pluralization. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press. Connolly, William E. (2007) [2005]: Pluralism. Durham; London: Duke University Press. Connolly, William E. (2010): A world of becoming. In: Finlayson, Alan (Ed.): Democracy and Pluralism. The political thought of William E. Connolly. London; New York: Routledge, Curtis, William M. (2007): Liberals and Pluralists. Charles Taylor vs John Gray. In: Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 6 (1), Fossen, Thomas (2008): Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation. In: Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 7 (4), Galston, William A. (1999): Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory. In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 (4), Galston, William A. (2002): Liberal Pluralism. The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Galston, William (2004): Liberal Pluralism: A Reply to Talisse. In: Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 3 (2), Galston, William A. (2005): The Practice of Liberal Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gray, John (1995): Agonistic Liberalism. In: Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 12 (1), Gray, John (1998): Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company. In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6 (1), Gray, John (2000): Two Faces of Liberalism. New York: Polity Press. Gray, John (2006): Reply to Critics. In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 9 (2), Horton, John (2006): John Gray and the Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 9 (2), Laclau, Ernesto/Mouffe, Chantal (2001) [1985]: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Second Edition. London; New York: Verso. Mouffe, Chantal (2000): The Democratic Paradox. London; New York: Verso. Mouffe, Chantal (2005) [1993]: The Return of the Political. London; New York: Verso. Mouffe, Chantal (2013): Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically. London; New York: Verso. 16

17 Pavel, Carmen (2007): Pluralism and the Moral Grounds of Liberal Theory. In: Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 33 (2), Talisse, Robert B. (2000): Two faced liberalism: John Gray's pluralist politics and the reinstatement of enlightenment liberalism. In: Critical Review, Vol. 14 (4),