THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA

Transcription

1 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA? Thèse de doctorat Sous la direction du Professeur Jacques Forster Présentée à l'institut Universitaire d'etudes de Développement de l'université de Genève par Vanessa Barclay Neumann (-Peat) Genève 2004

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3 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents...I Illustrations... V List of Abbreviations and Acronyms... VII Acknowledgments...IX Introduction Checkmate: A Policy Doomed to Failure... 1 A. Main Criticism of Drug Control Policy...3 B. Main Questions...5 C. Why Do Colombia and the Drug Issue Matter?...6 D. Methodological Considerations...7 (1) Case Study: The Policy Cycle of the U.S. Aid Package to Plan Colombia, (2) Hypotheses... 8 E. Outline of the Dissertation...9 Chapter 1 Colombia: Drugs, Violence and Democracy A. Background on Colombia...12 (1) Historical Context (2) Political and Sociological Context in the 1990s (3) Broad Social and Economic Trends B. Colombian Illicit Drug Industry...19 (1) Evolution of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Colombia (2) Political Economy of Drug Trafficking (Mainly Cocaine) (3) Estimates on Coca and Opium Poppy Cultivation and the Production of Cocaine and Heroin C. Set of Interrelated Crises and "Ademocratic Governance"...36 (1) Crises in Governance (2) Armed Conflict, Main Actors and Link with Drug Trafficking (3) The Peace Process Appendices I -

4 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Chapter 2 U.S. Drug Control Policy : The Weight of Narcotics on U.S. - Colombian Relations A. U.S.-Colombian Relations: An Overview...62 (1) The Early History - Highlights (2) Post-World War II (WWII) Era (3) The Alliance for Progress (4) The Early Days of the "Narcotization" of U.S.-Colombian Relations B. Weight of the Narcotics Issue on U.S.-Colombian Relations...69 (1) From 1982 to 1994: Apogee of the War on Drugs and Counternarcotics Partnership (2) From 1994 to 1998: Reluctant Partners in the Drug War? Crises of Decertification C. Dimensions of the Drug Problem in the U.S (1) Broad Trends in Drug Use (2) Correlation Between Drug Use and the Purity Levels of Cocaine and Heroin and Market Prices? (3) Drug-Related Incarceration (4) The Treatment Gap D. Origins of U.S. Drug Control Policy...84 (1) The First Generation of U.S. Drug Control Policy (2) The Consolidation of the Drug War Under the Bush Administration (3) The Perpetuation of the Drug War Under the Clinton Administration E. From 1998 to 2001: Hope for a New Partnership, Plan Colombia to the Rescue...98 (1) U.S. Commercial and Financial Interests in Colombia (2) New Era of Cooperation (3) Presenting Plan Colombia (4) Overall Strategy and Components (5) Budgetary Breakdown F. Plan Colombia: Main Critiques (1) Criticism of Plan Colombia s Strategy (2) Problems Relating to the Lack of Resources and Financial Sustainability (3) Repercussions (4) U.S. Interventionism or Neo-Imperialism? Appendices II -

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 3 Theoretical Approach to Drug Policymaking A. Overview of Policymaking Models (1) Rational Actor Model (2) Alternative Decisionmaking Models B. Notion of Policy Coherence (1) Defining Policy Coherence: Internal and External Coherence (2) Why is Policy Coherence Important and For Whom? C. Constraints in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Models (1) Democracy as a Constraint? (2) Structure of the U.S. Government (3) The Policy Process as a Source of Policy Incoherence? D. The Policy Cycle Model (1) The Policy Cycle (2) Sharp's Comments on Kingdon's Model (3) Relevance of Kingdon's and Sharp's Frameworks E. Causes of Policy Incoherence (1) Domestic Breakdown Factors of the Policy Cycle (2) External Factors and Actors F. Main Hypotheses, Methodology and Synthetic Grid (1) Main Hypotheses (2) Methodological Approach: Some Considerations (3) Indicators Used in the Process Tracing (4) Synthetic Grid for Analyzing the Drug Policy Process Appendices Chapter 4 Case Study : The Policy Process of Plan Colombia A. Plan Colombia s Policy Process - Phase 1: August 1998-January (1) The Colombian Government: Pastrana Administration (2) The U.S. Government: Executive Branch (3) The U.S. Government: Legislative Branch (4) Analytical Remarks B. Phase 2: Agenda Setting in the U.S. Congress, From January 2000 to July (1) The Legislative Branch: Republican Members and Senators (2) The Legislative Branch: Democratic Members and Senators (3) Analytical Remarks Appendices III -

6 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Chapter 5 Plan Colombia: Multiple Causes of Policy Incoherence A. The Policy Cycle and Plan Colombia (1) Breach No. 1 Problem Definition / Problem Stream (2) Breach No. 2 Specification of Alternatives (3) Breach No. 3 Evaluative Feedback Information Loop (4) Comments on the Synthetic Grid B. Drug Policy s Lack of Effectiveness (1) Evidence of Drug Policy s Ineffectiveness and Inefficacy ) Problems in the Overall Approach ) Some Recommendations Regarding the Use of Indicators C. Domestic Politics (1) Presidential Elections (2) Congressional Politics of Drug Policy (3) Public Opinion on Drugs (4) Weight of Lobbying Groups (5) Counternarcotics Bureaucratic Politics D. Impact of External Factors / Actors E. Concluding Remarks on the Policy Cycle Appendices Conclusion Reflections on Drug Policy Continuity and Alternatives. 307 A. Continuity in Drug Policy? B. Recommendations: Alternative Approaches (1) Global Trends in Drug Trafficking and Illicit Drug Use (2) Some Recommendations (3) The European Approach to The Drug Problem References Introduction Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapters 4 and Conclusion IV -

7 ILLUSTRATIONS ILLUSTRATIONS Tables Table 1.1 Costs, Average Net Annual Income per Hectare (ha) and Harvesting Periods (Thousands of Colombian pesos): Department of Cauca, Table 1.2 Average Price of Coca, Cocaine Base, Opium Poppy and Heroin in U.S. dollars 28 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 1.5 Average Price and Purity of Cocaine and Heroin in the United States in U.S. dollars 28 Coca Cultivation (hectares), Seizures (metric tons) and Destruction of Laboratories in Colombia from 1990 to Global Illicit Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production, and Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Latin America, Table 1.6 Profile on the Main Structural and Economic Indicators for Colombia 57 Table 1.7 Main Social and Human Development Indicators for Colombia 58 Table 1.8 Colombia: Exports by Region of Destination and Imports by Region of Origin, from 1995 to Table 2.1 Trends in Selected Drug Use Indicators from 1979 to 1997, in Millions of Users 80 Table 2.2 Domestic Consumption of Cocaine, Heroin, Marijuana in Metric Tons, Table 2.3 Average Price of Cocaine at Retail Level and Purity Level 82 Table 2.4 Average Price of Heroin at Retail Level and Purity Level 82 Table 2.5 Overall Breakdown of U.S. Aid to Plan Colombia 110 Table 2.6 U.S. Assistance to Colombia Table 2.7 U.S. Assistance to Colombia, from FY 1981 to FY 1989 (US $ millions) 120 Table 2.8 U.S. Assistance to Colombia, from FY 1989 to FY 2001 (Obligations and Authorizations, US $ millions 121 Table 3.1 Main Indicators for the Synthetic Grid 171 Table 3.2 Presenting the Synthetic Grid on Plan Colombia's Policy Process 174 Table 4.1 Chronology of U.S. Legislation on Plan Colombia 176 Table 5.1 Analytical Grid of the Drug Policy Process 295 Figures Fig 1.1 Map of Colombia 54 Fig. 2.1 Evolution of Federal Drug Control Funding, Fig. 3.1 The Policy Cycle V -

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9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACI APTA APTEA ARI AUC FBI CIA CNP COG DEA DHHS DOD DOJ EMCDDA ELN EU FARC FY GAO Andean Counterdrug Initiative Andean Preferential Trade Agreement Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act Andean Regional Initiative Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia Federal Bureau of Investigations Central Intelligence Agency Colombian National Police Colombian government Drug Enforcement Agency U.S. Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Justice European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction Ejército de Liberación Nacional European Union Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Fiscal Year General Accounting Office - VII -

10 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA HA HCL NGO NSC OAS ONDCP STATE UK UNDCP UNODCCP UNDP USAID USG WIDA Hectares Hydrochloride cocaine Non-governmental organization National Security Council Organization of American States Office of the National Drug Control Policy U.S. Department of State United Kingdom United Nations Drug Control Program United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention United Nations Development Program United States Agency for International Development United States government Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act - VIII -

11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was undertaken under the auspices of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED). The committee was composed of Professor Jacques Forster IUED, University of Geneva -, Professor Bruce Bagley Faculty of International Studies, University of Miami -, Professor Claude Auroi IUED, University of Geneva -, Professor Paolo Urio Faculty of Economy and Social Science, University of Geneva -, Jean-Pierre Gontard IUED, University of Geneva. This research would not have been possible without the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation and the scholarship they granted me, which allowed me to go on several visits to Colombia and the United States. I owe much gratitude to the Director of the IUED, Professor Jean-Luc Maurer, for his support and confidence which enabled me to conduct my doctoral research. I am very grateful to my advisor, Professor Jacques Forster, for all of his support and commitment, during the past six years. Working with him was a very enriching experience, in terms of both academic and personal growth. I was privileged to work with Professor Bruce Bagley, during the last year of my research and I would like to thank him for his generosity, encouragement and insightful advice. I would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Milliken, whose astute guidance, during the first half of my research, helped me structure the dissertation and build an interesting theoretical framework. I would like to express my gratitude to my husband, Cédric, for his moral and logistic support, that gave me the courage and motivation to write my dissertation. Last, but not least, I would like to thank all of the persons (officials, professional and academic experts) I interviewed - in Colombia and the United States - for their candor and availability; they provided me with first-hand, invaluable information. - IX -

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13 INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE U.S. drug policy is flawed primarily in its extremism. A long-standing tradition of immoderate, unbalanced policy is the problem; and policy innovation is needed not in the sense of an explosion of new energy directed at the problem but in the sense of a major standing down from vociferous approaches to the problem. Elaine Sharp 1 During the past thirty years, the U.S. administration has waged a low-intensity war against illicit drug traffickers and crop growers in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, primarily against marijuana (during the 1970s) and cocaine production and trafficking. U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia has been driven by a plethora of political interests and motivations, increasingly tied to counternarcotics and national security, as exemplified by the U.S. aid package to Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative. From 1981 to 2002, the U.S. spent $237 billion on the Federal Drug Control Budget, including $87 billion since 1998, of which $14.9 billion for foreign interdiction and source country programs 2. Which results has the U.S. achieved, having invested over $65 billion, since 1981, in the international drug war? Drug policy analysts unanimously agree that the United States showcase is nothing less than dismal, with blatant failures and counterproductive results. The drug war should have decreased the quantity of narcotics available on the street as well as raise their prices which - according to its inherent logic of supply reduction 3 - should have reduced demand in the United States. By the same token, U.S. counternarcotics policy in South America has been aimed at drastically cutting down the production of cocaine and 1 E. B. Sharp, The Dilemma of Drug Policy in the United States, 1994, p ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2003 Budget Summary, p. 9-10, February 2002.The annual Federal Drug Control Budget has consistently been on the rise, particularly over the last six years. Since 1998, funding for international drug control and interdiction programs has ranged from 14 percent to 21 percent of total Federal spending. Since this research examines U.S. foreign and anti-drug policies in Colombia, the focus is placed on international drug control, that is on the international facet of the war on drugs. It should also be noted that the Federal Drug Control Budget provides funding for both international and domestic drug control programs. 3 Supply reduction efforts seek to eliminate the production of illicit crops (coca, opium poppy and marijuana) and the manufacturing of the final product (cocaine, heroin, marijuana) in source and transit countries, in order to reduce drug availability in the United States, raise retail prices and reduce purity levels. These should in turn act as disincentives for drug users thereby reducing the domestic demand for illicit drugs

14 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA the surface area of coca cultivation - the raw material for cocaine 4. However, U.S. international drug control has neither succeeded in reducing the availability of cocaine nor in raising street prices, except in short-term periods, directly following interdiction events. Furthermore, the surface area of coca cultivation has doubled in Colombia since U.S. drug control efforts have always been grounded in the principle of supply reduction, according to which illicit drug consumption and availability in the United States should decrease, following a decline in the production of illicit crops (cutting supply at the source), in the supply of precursor chemicals, and/or a decline in the amount transiting through U.S. borders (through interdiction at the level of transit and source countries). International drug control was originally aimed at curtailing the flow of narcotics in the transit zone (in the Caribbean), particularly since President Bush instigated the war on drugs in As argued by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), interdiction has the potential to significantly alter the cocaine price structure as long as the funding levels for interdiction (as part of the international drug control components of U.S. drug policy) remain sufficiently high. However, funding was short-lived due to the Gulf War in 1990, leading to immediate cuts in interdiction operations in South America. Nevertheless U.S.-supply reduction 5 efforts in the Andean region, aimed primarily at reducing the production and transportation of cocaine and, to a lesser degree, of heroin (since 1996), have failed to significantly: Decrease the surface areas of coca and poppy cultivation in Colombia (though coca cultivation has drastically decreased in Peru and Bolivia); Decrease purity levels (according to the logic of supply reduction, traffickers should increasingly dilute the final product to raise margin profits); Raise retail prices in the medium- and long-term (acting as an additional constraint for drug use). The ultimate result should have been a decrease in the demand for, and consumption of, illicit narcotics in the United States. Nevertheless, the demand for cocaine has remained relatively stable throughout the 1990s. 4 In addition to coca leaves, twenty-two precursor chemicals are used to produce hydrochloride cocaine (powder cocaine, HCL). 5 It should be mentioned that the supply/demand reduction ratio has remained stable since the early 1980s, averaging percent to percent. As defined by Robert Charles, supply reduction consists essentially of drug interdiction efforts, coordinated by the Defense Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, State Department, U.S. Border Patrol, and other supporting law enforcement agencies. R. Charles, Back to the Future: The Collapse of National Drug Control Policy and a Blueprint for Revitalizing the Nation's Counternarcotics Effort, 1996, p

15 INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE A. Main Criticism of Drug Control Policy Many analysts and critics of U.S. anti-drug policy have talked of a quagmire 6, making the allusion that U.S. officials are knee deep in the mud and cannot get themselves out of it. Why is it so difficult to curtail illicit drug trafficking, in particular the Colombian cocaine industry, and stem both production and demand? Among academics, independent researchers and experts, there is a widespread consensus with regards to the failure of U.S. international drug control, which they explain in terms of a panoply of factors ranging from: The policy s inherent flawed logic and its imbalance between supply reduction and demand reduction 7 : ( ) Supply reduction on a meaningful scale is a lost cause 8 ; The predominance of military assistance in contrast to economic assistance and alternative development militarization of the war on drugs 9 ; The fragmentation and poor coordination of policy implementation 10 ; Conflicting interests between, on the one hand, the Presidency and Executive branch and the drug control bureaucracy and on the other, between the Presidency and Congress (also tied to domestic politics); Problems tied to insufficient funds and misallocation of counternarcotics assistance; Unilateral and coercive approach of the United States in international drug control, mainly exemplified by the certification process 11 ; The lack of political will on behalf of Andean governments 12 ; 6 C. Youngers, The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking U.S. drug control efforts in the Andes, 1996, and D. Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, the War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure, Supply reduction has produced what critics call the balloon effect or hydra effects, such as M. Falco, Rethinking U.S. International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy, 1997, E. Bertram [et al], Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, 1996, K. Sharpe and E. Bertram, Memo for the New Drug Czar, 1996, C. Youngers, The Andean Quagmire, 1996 and P. Clawson-R. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, S. Wisostsky, Beyond the War on Drugs: Overcoming a Failed Public Policy, 1998, p See publications of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Going to the Source: Results and Prospects for the War on Drugs in the Andes, 1991; C. Youngers, 1996, op. cit; C. Youngers, The National Drug Control Strategy: A New Policy for the Andes?, 1994; C. Youngers, The War in the Andes: The Military Role in U.S. International Drug Policy, See E. Bertram [et al], Drug War Politics, The Price of Denial and B. Bagley, Hablando Duro. La Política Internacional Antinárcoticos de los Estados Unidos en Los Años Noventa, in J. Tokatlian, Ed., Colombia y Los Estados Unidos: Problemas y Perspectivas, 1998, B. M. Bagley, U.S. Foreign policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure, Summer/Fall As explained by M. Falco and the Independent Task Force, op. cit., the certification process is a source of great inconsistency, in both its unequal treatment vis-à-vis producer and transit countries and in its repercussions on relations between the U.S. and these countries. 12 According to S. Wisostky and WOLA (C. Youngers, op. cit and K. Sharpe, op. cit), Andean governments have lacked the political will to collaborate with the U.S. due to strong internal opposition, problems tied to corruption and economic instability as well as the overall weakening of the State

16 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Fragmentation between international and domestic drug control programs 13 ; International drug control programs have had adverse, unintended effects in source countries, destabilizing their democratic development, by contributing to human rights abuses, ecological damage, and corruption. Reducing drug trafficking is just one of many important interests we share with our Latin American neighbors and should not be pursued in a way that undermines other important policy goals, such as promoting human rights and democracy throughout the hemisphere. These goals, including drug control objectives, can best be advanced by promoting economic development and strengthening civilian judicial and law enforcement institutions in Latin America 14. There are nonetheless conservative critics of drug policy, such as Robert B. Charles, (former Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight), who have criticized U.S. drug control policy for being too heavily focused on the domestic front - on demand reduction (aimed at providing drug abuse treatment for regular users rather than at preventing a rise in casual use, particularly among the youth), and for neglecting international and interdiction programs (particularly in the transit zone). Robert Charles argues that since the beginning of Clinton's first administration -since the shift away from the transit zone in international programs, the sharp decline in Federal funding for interdiction and the focus on treatment programs for regular users (or hardcore addicts, in this case, the emphasis was placed on cocaine), have triggered an upsurge in domestic rates of youth drug use and violent crime 15. Indeed, this argument is upheld today by high-ranking, Republican House members - who support international drug control programs (particularly in source countries, such as Colombia). The most important factors brought up by critics are the flawed logic of supply reduction, underlying all counternarcotics law enforcement operations, and the resulting militarization of country source programs, because they have caused the greatest harm in country programs. As denounced by numerous critics of U.S. international drug control (such as C. Youngers, K. Sharpe, S. Wisostky, E. Bertram, and J. Tokatlian), U.S. assistance has exacerbated tensions between, on the one hand, Andean governments - particularly between Colombian authorities and the other, drug traffickers, guerrilla groups or illicit crop growers, thereby fueling drug-related violence and terrorism. Likewise, the U.S. has not behaved as a genuine friend or partner in helping them solve internal problems. On the contrary, the U.S. government has promoted the downfall of the State, particularly in Colombia, where democracy is jeopardized by internal strife among the State, influential 13 M. Falco, op. cit., p L. Freeman, WOLA, A Guide for Citizen Action, Executive Summary, R. Charles, op. cit., p

17 INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE drug trafficking organizations, the paramilitary, and guerrilla groups (mainly by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces - FARC 16 ). It could be argued that the illicit drug industry and U.S. military funds, equipment and training, have constituted additional resources to the illegal armed groups, involved in the armed conflict in Colombia. In sum, the shortcomings of U.S. drug policy, including international drug control policy in Colombia, can be attributed to a variety of explanations ranging from the dynamics of domestic and bureaucratic politics and Presidential and Congressional elections, to the incremental and fragmented nature of policymaking in the Executive branch and Congress and to the cognitive preferences of policymakers and elected officials regarding the drug issue (adherence to the dominant paradigm on counternarcotics, grounded in law enforcement and punitive action). Therefore, this research is conducted within the broader framework of domestic politics and analyzes U.S. policy in Plan Colombia according to the policy cycle model. Moreover, the decisionmaking processes of U.S. foreign and drug control policies towards Colombia have been influenced by a set of external factors and actors, ranging from the evolution of the situation in Colombia (regarding the illicit drug industry and security concerns), to the positions and interventions of the Colombian government, Colombian nongovernmental organizations and illegal armed groups, European countries and the European Union, and international financial institutions (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank), regarding the drug issue and Colombia. B. Main Questions Why has U.S. drug control policy (in general and particularly in Colombia) lacked efficacy and effectiveness, as demonstrated by the emergence of counterproductive results? Why have consecutive U.S. administrations - since President Nixon declared the war on drugs in continued to push the bandwagon of the drug war in light of such defeat, without ever calling into question the policy s underlying logic, approach, and means of implementation? To what extent can the policy cycle of drug control policy explain on the one hand, the lack of policy consistency or coherence and on the other, the continuity of drug policy over time? 16 In Colombia, there is a strong correlation between the regions where new coca plants have been planted and the territory that has come under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). According to the 1999 GAO report (op. cit., p. 8), two-thirds of FARC units and one-third of ELN units are implicated in drug trafficking, either by protecting small coca farmers or cocaineprocessing laboratories, or by providing support to drug-traffickers for cocaine storage and transport. However, the nature of the relationship between these guerrilla groups and paramilitary and drug-trafficking organizations remains unclear

18 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Which domestic and external factors contribute to a better understanding of drug policy s inconsistencies and to what extent is drug policy a by-product of these factors? What impact does domestic politics have on drug policy and its decisionmaking process? How does bureaucratic politics affect the drug policy cycle and/or its inefficacy and ineffectiveness? C. Why Do Colombia and the Drug Issue Matter? Understanding the dynamics of U.S. anti-drug policy, both on the domestic and international fronts, as well as the causes of its failures and inconsistencies, is a crucial issue for more reasons than one. First of all, since 1999, Colombia is the third most important recipient of U.S. foreign aid, following Israel and Egypt. On July 13, 2000, the Clinton administration passed a comprehensive aid package of $1.3 billion to Colombia over the following two years, of which $860 million was allocated to Colombia 17. Thus, the coherence of U.S. international drug control in Colombia, over the past twenty years, is a particularly topical issue. Secondly, U.S. anti-drug policy is an interesting example of an intermestic policy (with domestic and international components), particularly since the drug frenzy around cocaine and crack use in the mid-1980s. Moreover, the U.S. war on drugs has been a hot topic in Presidential campaigns, namely those of Presidents George Bush and Clinton. It is therefore worthwhile to further explore the interaction between foreign and domestic affairs, by looking at the decisionmaking processes and diverse interests and stakes. Thirdly, U.S. foreign policy in Colombia, dominated by counternarcotics policy, has become an increasingly important issue since the end of the Cold War, in terms of U.S. strategic and security interests. Finally, illicit drug trafficking (mainly in cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs) has become one of the main global problems to which the international community (comprised of states and non-state actors) is confronted. As the self-proclaimed leader of this community, it is the responsibility of the United States to help find a sustainable solution to illicit drug production and trafficking. 17 This aid package represents the U.S. contribution to the: Plan Colombia for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State (the official version of Plan Colombia, submitted by President Pastrana in October 1999)

19 INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE D. Methodological Considerations The formulation process of Plan Colombia is analyzed from the perspectives of the Colombian and U.S. administrations and focuses on the policy process in the United States. The latter is of particular interest for the purposes of this research because it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the counternarcotics process. Moreover, the formulation process in Colombia was relatively short - with a limited number of participants - whereas in the United States, it was a fairly long process, involving actors in the Executive and Legislative branches as well as non-governmental sectors (namely interest groups), for a period exceeding two years. President Pastrana s first version of Plan Colombia was proposed in 1998 whereas President Clinton s version dates back to January Finally, President G.W. Bush proposed the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) in April The policy process of the U.S. aid package to Colombia is analyzed from August 1998 (inauguration of Colombian President Pastrana) until July 2000 (final adoption of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (for Plan Colombia). (1) Case Study: The Policy Cycle of the U.S. Aid Package to Plan Colombia, It is argued that the process tracing of U.S. antidrug policy illustrates that the counternarcotics policy cycle is dysfunctional, thereby explaining problems in coherence, effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, drug control as an issue policy is an interesting and relevant case study for undertaking process tracing because the debate on the drug problem and policy agenda are made up of a broad array of items and has been receptive to changes in the political process and swings in public opinion since the mid-1980s. In addition, since drug policy is inherently intermestic, it is the by-product of a range of political dynamics and interests, stemming from domestic and bureaucratic politics. The case study is therefore placed within the broader theoretical context of domestic politics. The model used, for analyzing the counternarcotics policy process, is based on John Kingdon s model of public policy making 18, in a broader context of political pluralism. Kingdon defines public policy making as a set of processes, including at least: (1) the setting of the agenda 19, (2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an 18 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2 nd ed., J. Kingdon, op. cit, 3. Kingdon defines the agenda as: the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time

20 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, and (4) the implementation of the decision. Success in one process does not necessarily imply success in others. 20 The main method used consists in a qualitative analysis 21 of the evolution of anti-drug policy and the debate on drug control in the United States since the 1980s. The policy cycle of counternarcotics policy is examined through the lens of a case study: the genesis of the U.S. aid package to Plan Colombia - the formulation process in the United States of Plan Colombia, Most sources are drawn from interviews conducted in Washington, D.C., and Bogotá, Colombia, with policy actors in the Executive branch, Congress and non-governmental actors and academia (in the United States and Colombia) and from the examination of primary and secondary documents, policy papers, reports, Congressional testimonies and hearings, press articles, academic and advocacy papers. (2) Hypotheses Hypothesis no. 1 U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia has been characterized by deep-rooted problems of policy incoherence, due to breaches in the policy cycle, at three junctures: at the phases of problem definition, the specification of alternatives and the evaluative feedback loop. Hypothesis no. 2 U.S. drug control policy, both generally, and in Colombia, has lacked effectiveness and efficacy, as demonstrated by poor performance and counterproductive results, due largely to the predominance of a repressive, punitive counternarcotics paradigm, within successive U.S. administrations since the early 1980s. Counternarcotics policy has thus been incapable of adapting itself to the nature and dynamics of the drug problem particularly in the case of Andean cocaine trafficking, in a way which would have enabled the U.S. government to reach positive results from the counternarcotics, economic and military assistance deployed in the Andean region. 20 J. Kingdon, op. cit., p Most indicators are qualitative except those used for measuring the interests of actors/organizations in terms of the financial and human resources, tied to the aid package for Plan Colombia; or in terms of expanded authorities in their role to be played in the implementation of Plan Colombia. Qualitative indicators are used, as a means to identify key policy actors, dominant arguments used in coalition-building strategies and for following up on shifts in the debate and agenda setting of counternarcotics policy and Plan Colombia

21 INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE Hypothesis no. 3 Counternarcotics policy is the byproduct of a range of interdependent factors stemming from domestic politics, namely: Presidential elections, Congressional elections, interest groups, public opinion, and bureaucratic politics. They constitute not only the principal elements which shape U.S. drug control policy but also the primary source of the lack of policy coherence. Hypothesis no. 4 External factors and actors also affected the counternarcotics policy process, though to a lesser degree than domestic politics. However, the unwillingness of the U.S. government to adapt counternarcotics policy to the evolving circumstances in Colombia (regarding Colombian and Andean illicit drug trafficking and the growing insecurity) and to allow international actors to play an active role in the policy process of Plan Colombia, further contributed to widening the breaches in the policy process. Notwithstanding, Colombia and European countries, coupled with nongovernmental actors and inter-governmental organizations, exerted some influence on Plan Colombia s policy process. E. Outline of the Dissertation This dissertation is comprised of five chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. In the first two chapters, general background information is provided on Colombia (Chapter 1), the main dynamics of U.S-Colombian relations and the evolution of U.S. drug control policy (Chapter 2). The theoretical framework is laid out in Chapter 3, focusing on policy coherence and decisionmaking models, with an emphasis on the policy cycle model. Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to the case study, the policy process of Plan Colombia. In Chapter 4, a narrative on the decisionmaking process, of the U.S. aid package to support Plan Colombia, is provided. The narrative on Plan Colombia is analyzed in Chapter 5, within the framework of the policy cycle model, and the hypotheses are tested against evidence drawn from the narrative and a synthetic grid of Plan Colombia s policy process. Finally, Chapter 6 places the findings on Plan Colombia in a broader context, seeking to determine whether the United States support of Plan Colombia represents either a policy shift or continuity in counternarcotics policy and foreign policy towards Colombia

22 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Moreover, alternative approaches to the drug problem are examined in the second part of Conclusion, with a view to bringing forth recommendations for raising the policy coherence of U.S. counternarcotics policy and for adopting a new paradigm for dealing with the drug issue

23 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY The background information on Colombia, provided in this chapter, is intentionally succinct, leaving out numerous details, particularly with regards to historical, political and institutional developments. Only the events and facts, relative to the historical, sociological and economic development, which are relevant for understanding the context in which Plan Colombia emerged, are mentioned. It is deemed that the emphasis should be placed on understanding the crises in Colombia which pushed the Colombian administration to search for a solution, namely by adopting Plan Colombia. These crises have primarily four dimensions: political (democratic governance), economic (widespread poverty and sharp economic recession), security (armed conflict), and drug trafficking. The impact of drug trafficking on the political, economic and security dimensions of Colombia, focusing on the armed conflict, is the central theme of this chapter. This chapter is divided into three broad sections. Part I provides general background information on the history of Colombia, on the political and sociological context as well as on the overall economic situation. In Part II the origins and structure of the illicit drug industry in Colombia are laid out, focusing on the Colombian cocaine industry and the political economy of drug trafficking. The principal indicators on coca cultivation and the production of cocaine, as well as the varying methodologies used, are also presented. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to exploring these crises, by focusing on two of these factors, which are the focal point of Plan Colombia: the armed conflict (and related peace process), and the links between the illegal armed groups and drug trafficking

24 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA A. Background on Colombia (1) Historical Context Colombia has traditionally been one of the oldest and most stable democracies in Latin America. Since its independence from Spain, July 20, 1810, there have been only 5 coups d'état in Colombia which is relatively little compared to other Latin American countries. Since 1910, Colombia has maintained a pluralist and multiparty democracy excluding the period from 1953 to 1957 (military dictatorship under general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla). Colombia underwent the most violent period in its history in the aftermath of World War II, following the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (Liberal party leader), on April 9, 1948, which triggered intense civil strife, riots and political struggles between the two leading political parties. The confrontations between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties turned into a bloody rural civil war 22. This period of turmoil, which lasted five years, from 1948 to 1953, led to the death of over 200,000 people -which is why it is known as La Violencia. None can underestimate the legacy of La Violencia which set the stage for consolidating the culture of violence, inherent to Colombian society. The following quotation expresses this sentiment: The history of Colombia,, is the history of violence employed by some classes for the hegemonic conquest of power, and the occupation of the State, to the detriment of the rest of the strata. 23 The civil war ended with a five-year dictatorship, under General Rojas Pinilla (1953 to 1957). The establishment of a bipartite regime, the National Front, put an official end to this somber period in Colombian history, though it did not constitute a panacea. It was far from representing a sustainable and viable solution to Colombia's political and socio-economic ills. The National Front consisted in a repressive bipartite regime (Liberal and Conservative parties), in place from 1958 to 1974, which limited both personal liberties and the participation of popular parties and sectors in the management of public affairs. In 1958, both parties decided to create the Front by sharing control of the administration, alternating the Presidency, and by equally dividing up Congressional seats and ministerial positions. 22 Drugs, War and Democracy, A Survey of Colombia in: The Economist, April 21, 2001, p F.Palacios, Violencia, Derechos Humanos y Democracia en Colombia, 2001/2002, p. 253, translated from Spanish

25 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY The National Front was an elite pact whose legacy led to the perpetuation of two constitutional pacts (pact of autonomy and the pact of impunity for the Public Forces 24 ). Tuft justifies what she calls the Colombian paradox by pointing her finger to these pacts which, in her view, are responsible for fostering the high levels of impunity and violence over the past fifteen years in Colombia 25. Moreover Tuft argues that impunity has had severe repercussions on the consolidation of democratic governance for mainly two reasons. First of all, it allowed former authoritarian actors to retain sufficient political autonomy to condition the actions of democratically elected civilian regimes. Secondly, it placed the institutions and individuals responsible for past human rights violations above the rule of law, in effect providing a guarantee against accountability 26. During their sixteen-year reign (consisting in seven administrations), the Liberal and Conservative parties regularly used State of emergency powers as their principal means of political repression 27. In fact it is precisely this repression which fueled the emergence of guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s and the beginning of the armed conflict - still unresolved forty years later. Moreover, the National Front fostered the widespread practice of impunity which has, in turn, promoted administrative and judicial corruption and clientelism and has been one of the factors fueling terrorism (acts of violence committed by illicit drug cartels and armed groups) and disrespect for the rule of law. (2) Political and Sociological Context in the 1990s Political and Institutional Development Democracy in Colombia was reinforced by the 1991 Constitution which sought to uphold a set of economic, social, cultural, environmental and human rights, accompanied by large-scale decentralization measures. The Colombian territory is divided into thirty-two departments. There are about sixty political parties with formal recognition but most do not have legislative representation. There are four main political parties: the Conservative Party, Liberal Party, Patriotic Union (formed by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC and Communist Party during the first peace process with the FARC) and Movement- 24 E. I. Tuft, Democracy and Violence: The Colombian Paradox, p. 5. The pact of autonomy granted the Public Forces (Armed Forces, National Police and intelligence agencies) de facto freedom in establishing the ideological framework of policy related to public order and implementation of that policy. The primary formal mechanism for the pact is the extensive use of State of emergency powers to expand the authority and jurisdiction of the Public Forces. According to the pact of impunity (under article 221 of the 1886 Constitution and article 226 and of the 1991 constitution), any crime or human rights violation committed by a member of the Public Forces is considered an 'act of service' and prosecuted under the military penal code. It is estimated that the military system has a conviction rate of between one and three percent in cases of alleged human rights violations, meaning that impunity is effectively absolute. 25 E. I. Tuft, op. cit., p E. I. Tuft, op. cit., p J. B. Febres-Cordero, La Democracia en Colombia: Un Proyecto en Construcción, p

26 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA 19 (M-19, former guerrilla movement which gained political recognition with the 1991 constitution). More importantly, it should be noted that the Colombian population has traditionally been very active politically. Colombia s form of government can formally be characterized as a democratic regime with the following characteristics: a tripartite separation of powers, a regular electoral process, the guarantee of personal liberties and of freedom of the press. Nevertheless, numerous political scientists, such as Febres-Cordero, have pointed out that there are many distortions and malfunctions in the Colombian regime, which could be qualified as paradoxes. Among the most salient ones, are the constant rise in the percentage of the population living below the poverty line, the levels of violence, and the growing gap between the rich and the poor 28 (see Section 3 on the socio-economic indicators). In the words of Febres-Cordero, Colombian society suffers from a social endemic disease due to the growing breaches between social classes, particularly in terms of access to housing, health services, education and employment opportunities 29. The election of a Constituents Assembly 30 and the ensuing 1991 Constitution (adopted July 5, 1991), marked a turning point in Colombia s process of democratization. Although it has improved the representation of interests as part of democratic governance mainly by promoting large-scale decentralization and enhancing the participation of citizens, much remains to be done to strengthen governance in general and with regards to the management of specific public sectors at national, regional and municipal levels 31. Nonetheless analysts of democracy in Colombia typically refer to the political system as being a restrictive or excluding democracy. Tuft talks of the Colombian paradox because democracy is accompanied by high levels of violence and human rights violations 32. More generally, a restrictive democratic State may be defined as a representative democracy combined with authoritarian repressive measures 33. Colombia's sometimes difficult transition to democracy and long-term problems in governance have been reflected by periods of widespread violence, particularly since the period of civil strife, La Violencia. 28 J. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit., p. xix. 29 J.. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit, p. xx. 30 Asamblea constituyente : representatives were elected for the first time in order to revise fundamental norms in view of drafting the 1991 Constitution. 31 J. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit., p E. I. Tuft, Democracy and Violence : The Colombian Paradox, p G. Palacio, Globalizaciones, Estado y Narcotráfico, p

27 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY Moreover, considering the following definition, it can be argued that Colombia is far from having consolidated its process of democratization. Democratization is the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other non-democratic principles, or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subjected to citizen participation 34. At the dawn of the 21 st Century, the political regime in place continues to be profoundly affected by the National Front whose legacy of violence and repression persists in influencing democratic governance in Colombia. High Levels of Violence and Human Rights' Abuses Colombia is one the most violent countries in the world, averaging 30,000 homicides a year of which some ten percent stem directly from the armed conflict. According to the U.S. State Department, Colombia s per capita murder rate is 77.5 murders per 100,000 habitants, which is eight times that of the United States 35. As discussed earlier, Colombia has known a series of waves of violence throughout the 20 th Century, the most important one being the period of civil strife known as La Violencia. Such violence results from a combination of factors, namely drug trafficking, corruption, widespread delinquency (especially in the four largest cities: Santafé de Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla) and the armed conflict. In December 2000, the Colombian Ministry of National Defense reported that, since 1996, the paramilitaries may increasingly be held accountable for the massacres committed (in which at least three people are killed, at the same time and place), whereas the guerrilla groups share of responsibility for civilian massacres has been progressively decreasing. For instance, in 1995 and 1996, the guerrilla groups were responsible for 100 percent of the massacres whereas in the year 2000, 78 percent of massacres were perpetuated by the paramilitaries and 22 percent, by the insurgencies 36. In its 2003 World Report 37, Human Rights Watch (an international human rights nongovernmental organization) indicates that civilian casualties have risen dramatically in 2002, particularly since the end of formal negotiations between the government and the FARC in February. Civilians in rural areas have increasingly been caught in the crossfire between 34 O Donnell and Schmitter, cited by Tuft, op. cit., p U.S. State Department, Colombia- Information Sheet, February 29, Ministry of National Defense, Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia, December 2000, p Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, Chapter on Colombia,

28 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA paramilitaries 38 and insurgencies (see Section C). Human Rights Watch also documents the sharp rise in civilian casualties as well as cases of complicity between the Security Forces and paramilitaries, with regards to massacres of civilians and the impunity of officers, belonging to the Colombian military, by referring to the following incident. In April 2002, large groups of paramilitaries allegedly moved into the department of Chocó, in Boyajá, passing by military bases (17 th Brigade of the Armed Forces and the Navy's River Battalion no. 50). However, these bases did not alert their superiors of the paramilitary's growing presence which would have permitted them to detain them 39. Members of the Catholic Church, however, warned the military and national police of the imminent danger. This incident led to the death of 119 civilians, during confrontations between the paramilitaries and FARC (also present in the area of Boyajá), when the FARC threw a gas cylinder bomb which hit a church where numerous displaced persons had taken refuge (it remains to be seen whether or not the church was hit accidentally). This incident is a clear example of the growing number of civilian casualties as well as the complicity between the paramilitaries and certain sectors of the Security Forces. Moreover, the number of arbitrary executions and forced displacement, committed by the FARC and paramilitaries, has risen considerably during the year Both of these illegal armed groups have increasingly committed extrajudicial executions of individuals, suspected of being sympathizers of the opposite camp, or of having breached their respective behavior codes. Both groups have imposed a code with strict laws, with regards to the tolerated hair length, clothing and travel indications. Finally, local representatives, especially mayors, have increasingly been the target of guerrilla groups, particularly in times of municipal and regional elections. Furthermore, these high levels of violence are rooted in a deeply imbedded culture of violence (as opposed to a culture of civility or modus vivendi) whereby civilians resort to illegal and/or violent means to resolve problems and differences at all levels of society. According to Rafael Pardo, during the last twenty years, 200 bombs exploded in Colombian cities,, 4 Presidential candidates, 200 judges and researchers, 1,200 police officials, 151 journalists, and over 300,000 ordinary citizens have been assassinated 40. These numbers clearly demonstrate that violence has played an important role in diminishing the State's 38 The paramilitary movements regroups self-defense units in Colombia, which originated as decentralized, private armed groups, in the early 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is the largest, paramilitary umbrella organization, founded in 1997 by Carlos Castaño, when he regrouped his own organization (Autodefensa Campesinas de Córdoba and Urába, with other regional, paramilitary groups. 39 Only July 9, 2002, the Inspector General's Office (Procuradaría) began an investigation against the commanders of the Security Forces in that area. 40 R. Pardo, Colombia s Two-Front War

29 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY legitimacy and the credibility of its institutions which has undoubtedly affected democratic governance. (3) Broad Social and Economic Trends 41 Colombia has a population of approximately 42 million, with a labor force of over 18.3 million (in 1999). Colombian society is characterized by sharp disparities between the upper and lower classes, with regards to the distribution of wealth, access to basic services, education and healthcare. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), from 1987 to 1998, the top 20 percent (of population in terms of wealth) controlled 60 percent of national income or consumption 42 (refer to Appendix 5, on the Main Social and Human Development Indicators for Colombia). In the year 2000, 62 percent of the population in Colombia (of which 85 percent in rural areas, according to the poverty indicator measuring access to public services, primary schooling, economic dependence, housing and overcrowding) belonged to the lower classes whereas 5 percent controlled the country's wealth and political power 43. In the 2002 Human Development Report 44, the UNDP affirms that 36 percent of the Colombian population lives with $2 or less per day whereas 19.7 percent lives below the poverty line of $1 per day. The neoliberal policies, adopted in the early 1990s under the Gaviria administration, combined with the recession, have contributed to disintegrating the social fabric and to drastically raising the rates of poverty and unemployment in Colombia. Neoliberal policies such as those imposed by the IMF have been carried out to the detriment of guaranteeing the set of collective social, economic and cultural rights set forth in the 1991 Constitution 45. It is important to mention that the armed conflict has further aggravated the highly concentrated land tenure in Colombia and served as an additional obstacle to rural development. During the past fifteen years, the lack of land redistribution has been aggravated by the armed conflict. The increased, illegitimate concentration of land (in the hands of the illegal armed groups) has contributed to large-scale movements of rural exodus towards coca-growing areas in peripheral regions, and to fueling the problem of internal displacement. Moreover, the high degree of land concentration can be directly linked to the 41 The data in this section is drawn from four sources: The Economist's EIU Country Commerce, Colombia, Update, January 2002, The Economist's EIU Colombia Country Report, January 2001; UNDP's Human Development Report 2002, 2002; and CIA's World Factbook 2002, Section on Colombia, UNDP, World Report on Human Development 2000, p L. Sarmiento Anzola, Conflict, Intervención y Economía Política de Guerra, in Plan Colombia, Ensayos Críticos, p UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, 2002, Section on Human Development Indicators, Colombia. 45 F. Palacios, op. cit., p

30 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA widening income disparities between the wealthiest and poorest populations and to socioeconomic inequities and poverty in general. Since the mid-1990s, Colombia has been undergoing the worst economic recession since the beginning of the Cold War. In 1999, the unemployment rate reached 20 percent, up from 8 percent in the early 1990s. Economic growth has been progressively declining over the 1990s, economists estimate that GDP has been shrinking between 3 to 5 percent annually. The economic crisis has also been characterized by a decrease in domestic and foreign investment, and by the brain drain or emigration of professionals, primarily to the United States. Although Colombia's food industry has traditionally been highly competitive, it has experienced a shift from exporting to importing six million tons of food products 46 due to a large-scale rural exodus. The most important exports are oil, coal, coffee and ferro-nickel. Both oil and coffee exports declined sharply in 2001 (the former by percent, and the latter, by percent), whereas coal exports increased by 58 percent and ferro-nickel exports rose slightly, by 7.69 percent 47. It is estimated that during the next five years, Colombia will gradually stop exporting hydrocarbons (500,000 barrels a day) entirely and will be forced to begin importing (see Appendix 4, Profile on the Main Structural and Eonomic indicators for Colombia). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Colombia rose steadily from 1991 to 1994, reaching nearly 12 percent of GDP. From 1994 until 1999, FDI dropped drastically, reaching 4 percent of GDP in Such a drop in foreign investment can largely be explained by the intensification of the armed conflict in Colombia, dissuading investors. Nevertheless, FDI has been increasing since the year 2000, representing approximately 5 to 6 percent of GDP 48. In sum, the economic perspectives are mitigated 49. Colombia s economic health will depend on how long the armed conflict will last (on increases in military spending which averages 2.5 percent to 3 percent of GDP, with a share of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2000) and on the repercussions it will have on, for instance, GDP and exports (export revenues rose in 2000 due to high oil prices but are expected to drop, according to the EIU). The Economist fears that the armed conflict and related decline in consumer confidence, high unemployment and decreasing oil prices, are jeopardizing economic growth. In addition, the Colombian economy has been seriously affected by the world coffee crisis and falling coffee 46 Ibidem. 47 EIU, Country Commerce Colombia, Update 2002, op. cit. 48 Drugs, War and Democracy, A Survey of Colombia in: The Economist, April 21, 2001, p The EIU s economic policy outlook (Colombia Country Report, p. 8) claims that the macro-economic priority is reducing the fiscal deficit whereas the fiscal policy should be focused on passing legislation on pensions and regional transfers. The EIU predicts that, in 2002, all export markets will grow more slowly and that GDP growth will depend on the recovery of domestic demand

31 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY prices 50. The degree to which Colombia will be able to meet favorable commercial conditions with the U.S. through the expansion of the Andean Preferential Trade Agreement will also have an impact. B. Colombian Illicit Drug Industry (1) Evolution of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Colombia 51 The Tradition of Coca Cultivation and Consumption, in Indigenous Communities, of the High Plains in Peru and Bolivia American Indians of the Andes have consumed and used coca leaves for over 4500 years for their medicinal, spiritual and symbolic qualities. Today, Indians living in the high plains of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, such as the Aruacos, Aymara and Quechua, have been growing coca for thousands of years. The word coca comes from the aymara term, kkoka, which means a shrub. Coca is a very sturdy plant which can grow almost anywhere in tropical climates, up to 1800 meters. It calls for very little maintenance and can grow under very severe conditions. It has a lifespan of about twenty years and is harvested three to six times a year, depending on the variety and density of coca. There are over two hundred different varieties of coca which make up the Erythroxilacae family. Primarily three types of coca are cultivated for exporting purposes: in Colombia (mainly the Caucana ), in Peru ( Tingo Maria ) and Bolivia, ( La Dulce ). The principal Colombian variety is known to yield three harvests annually whereas the predominant coca plants in the latter two Andean countries may be harvested six times a year 52. However, only three kinds of coca shrubs have leaves which contain the cocaine alkaloid. It should be noted that the alkaloid was isolated and purified, in Western countries, during the mid-1800s and became a commonly used remedy in the late 1800s 53 stimulant and anesthetic), until it was prohibited in the early 1900s. (as a The consumption and symbolic use of coca is inherent to everyday life in Indian communities. Farmers, coal and mineral miners are those who, on a daily basis, chew coca leaves the most, up to six times a day. It helps them fight against the cold, hunger, fatigue and high altitude. Offering coca leaves and sharing them with a group of people is the cohesive element of social relations, as can be alcohol in Western societies. According to a 50 EIU, Country Commerce, Colombia Update 2002, January This section is largely drawn from V. Peat's, The Andean Cocaine Industry, A Maze With No Way Out?, March UNDCP, Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, Colombia, March 2002, p CIA, Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), Latin American Narcotics Cultivation and Production, Estimates 2001,

32 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA survey carried out in the high plains in Bolivia, 92 percent of men and 89 percent of women made use of coca; on this basis, it can be assumed that there are three to five million people who consume coca in Peru and Bolivia 54. Coca is at the center of every spiritual and religious ceremony: coca leaves may be offered as a gift or consumed symbolically, as is the case during all of the important events of one s life, such as the birth of a child, a wedding or funeral. In sum, offering and chewing coca leaves is the essence of the Amerindian identity which serves as a unifying element, bringing people together and maintaining the cohesion of Indian communities. The cultivation of coca is therefore part of the Andean tradition which they defend as their fundamental right. In Peru and Bolivia, coca cultivation, that which is intended solely for local (Indian) consumption, is legal and institutionalized. However, in Colombia, coca consumption has always been illegal. Coca farmers, especially in Peru (the world s largest producer of coca up until 1996), formed national unions to commercialize products (legal), made out of coca leaves, such as tea, toothpaste, and so on. It is important to be aware of the tradition of coca cultivation and consumption in order to understand what is at stake for these Indians when international efforts (funded mainly the U.S. government) are carried out to eradicate coca. Coca cultivation for local, traditional purposes, must be differentiated from that which is solely intended for exporting cocaine production and trafficking. Evolution of Andean Illicit Drug Trafficking The illicit drug industry began in Colombia in the mid-1970's with the cultivation of marijuana (or cannabis). Coca leaves were grown in Peru and Bolivia, but at this stage, they were primarily used for local consumption. Unlike coca leaves, which have been grown by Amerindians for over 4000 years, cannabis was introduced by the Spanish colonizers; up until the 1960's, only small amounts of cannabis were grown in Colombia. During this period, Mexico was the greatest grower of cannabis most of which was exported to the United States. U.S. repression of drug cultivation began at this time: the U.S. sent airplanes, loaded with insecticides, to eradicate all of the cannabis crops in Mexico. The operation was indeed successful; however, the U.S. did not focus on long-term eradication. A decade or so later, cannabis cultivation in Mexico gained renewed momentum. Nonetheless, during the 1970's when Mexico was temporarily out of the cannabis business, Colombian traffickers took advantage of this opportunity to increase Colombia s own cannabis production. Needless to say, cannabis production is far less profitable than that of hard drugs, namely cocaine and heroin. 54 Cited by A. Delpirou and A. Labrousse in Coca Coke, p

33 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY In light of the staggering rise in demand (rise of cocaine consumption) in the United States, during the end of the 1970's and early 1980's, due to its growing popularity (as the drug of choice) and to the widespread belief in its harmlessness 55, Colombian drug traffickers urged coca growers to increase coca production and established a vast system of cocaine production on a large-scale. They began to use aircrafts to carry 400 to 1000 kilograms of cocaine. In order to guarantee the safety of these shipments, they set up a transport insurance mechanism, which established cooperation between different drug trafficking organizations for the transport and export of cocaine. Coca production, in Peru and Bolivia, underwent an amazing and unprecedented boom from 1980 to By the 1990 s, drug trafficking syndicates were using merchant shipping, cargo jet aircrafts, semisubmersible vessels, to transport cocaine. During the 1980s, global coca production more than tripled, thereby implying that the amount of cocaine produced reached unprecedented levels. Considering the magnitude of the cocaine industry in the Andean region and its revenue, which exceeds that of any other drug production in this area, this chapter focuses on the cocaine industry. There are three major steps 56 to manufacturing cocaine from coca leaves (there are only three varieties of coca, out of 200, which contain the cocaine alkaloid). The first two steps, which primarily took place in Peru and Bolivia up until the mid-1990's, are carried out in rural areas. Cocaine paste is usually processed near coca fields, because it is difficult to carry the bulk of coca leaves. One needs, for instance, 500 kilograms (kg) of coca leaves to produce 2.5 kg of cocaine paste; which produces 1 kg of cocaine base and 0.85 kilogram of hydrochloride cocaine (HCL) 57. One therefore requires 500 kg of coca leaves in order to produce 1 kg of cocaine. It is important to keep this mind because coca leaves should not mistaken for cocaine: only a very small amount of the cocaine alkaloid is present in coca leaves. 55 M. Massing, The Fix, p The first step consists in gathering coca leaves and drying them on a flat surface. In the second step, coca leaves are crushed and mixed with a first batch of chemicals to form cocaine base. Finally, cocaine base is further amalgated with precursor chemicals to form powder cocaine. Over twenty precursor chemicals are used throughout the cocaine refining process. 57 Conversion statistics found in G. Fonseca s Economie de la drogue, p. 501, in Revue Tiers Monde: Drogues et Développement

34 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Structure of the Andean and Colombian Cocaine Industry The Andean cocaine industry emerged during the mid-1970's. Over the years, its structure has become increasingly hierarchical and specialized. Up until the early 1990s - when Colombia became the largest producer of coca and cocaine- the structure of the cocaine business, according to CIA analyst, Sidney Zabludoff 58, had the form of a pyramid, dominated by 500 entrepreneurs, who supervised each stage of cocaine production and distribution. Below them, there were some 8000 specialists (pilots, chemists, shippers,...) and 10,000 semi-professionals and unskilled workers. At the bottom of the pyramid, there were about 120,000 to 135,000 coca growers, coca paste processors and other agricultural workers. Coca cultivation in Colombia amounted to 40,000 hectares in 1990 and 50,900 hectares in 1995, and about 500,000 people were employed for cultivating coca and processing cocaine paste. The Andean and Colombian cocaine industries, by the mid-1980's, were dominated by two rival coalitions, or cartels, of criminal drug organizations: the Medellin cartel (led by Pablo Escobar, until his death in December 1993) and the Cali trafficking organization. According to CIA analyst, Zabludoff 59, there were about 16,000 to 20,000 Colombian cocaine traffickers, or entrepreneurs, who set up distribution cells in the United States. The two leading organizations, the Medellin and Cali cartels, had a tremendous impact on Andean societies and economies, due to their practice of terrorism, intimidation and corruption. There were three main differences between these two organizations: in their structure, involvement in politics and methods of intimidation, and in their use of violence. First of all, the Medellin organization had an established structure of authority, where Escobar was the kingpin. The Cali organization, on the contrary, was an association of several drug trafficking organizations, with three main core organizations. Secondly, the Medellin group used its money and influence to bribe the political elite, political movements and to seek political office. Pablo Escobar, for instance, was elected, June 1992, to the Colombian Congress, as an alternate deputy. He also supported and funded many high profile community, housing and school projects, in order to improve his image vis-a-vis the Colombian people. The Cali cartel on the contrary usually stayed out of politics except when they sought to protect their own, in case of arrests and judiciary pursuits, by bribing politicians, judges and court officials. Whereas Medellin s main working method was centered on violence and 58 P. L. Clawson, Patrick L. and R. W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p Cited by P. L. Clawson, Patrick L. and R. W. Lee III, op. cit., p

35 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY terrorism, the Cali cartel promoted their interests through corruption (bribing), legal manipulation and intimidation. Thirdly, the Medellin-based syndicate used violence as a political tool, aimed towards State institutions and the political elite whereas the Cali organization did not usually resort to violence. Escobar's main target was the criminal justice and political system: from the 1980's to the early 1990's, 40 judges and 500 policemen were assassinated. The Medellin cartel also targeted the revolutionary left, mainly the FARC. As was expected, following the death of kingpin Escobar, the Cali cartel (comprised of five independent syndicates) took over the networks of the Medellin cartel and has dominated the cocaine industry up until In 1995, the Colombian government launched a major crackdown on the Cali cartel which led to the arrests of six major Cali kingpins, such as Gilberto Rodriguez and the Orejuela brothers. However, the United States is convinced that they still run the cocaine business from jail. Even if the main leaders of drug cartels have been eliminated, they have left many scars on the government and society: the Cali cartel completely institutionalized corruption, throughout the government, in order to protect themselves. The dismantling of the Cali cartel accelerated the decentralization process of the illicit drug trade. Counternarcotics intelligence experts, including at the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), believe that the illicit drug industry is controlled by dozens of small drug trafficking syndicates (over a hundred), under the supervision of a handful of regional organizations, based in Bogotá, Cali and Medellin. The Norte del Valle cartel (North of Cali) is one of the most influential ones. Nevertheless, the DEA affirms that no single syndicate controls the entire cocaine and heroin industry, at all levels. Each syndicate specializes in one aspect of the production and transportation chain. 60 The late 1990s was also characterized by the necessity for Colombian traffickers to forge alliances with organizations throughout Latin America, most importantly with Mexican cartels (three principal cartels), in order to ensure the safety of cocaine shipments (to the U.S. and Europe). According to sources of the U.S. government, namely the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Colombian drug syndicates provide 40 percent of the value of cocaine shipments to Mexican traffickers as payment for smuggling the remaining 60 percent into the United States DEA, The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat Assessment, March ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy 2003, February 2003, p

36 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Since the 1990 s, the structure of the Andean cocaine industry has changed in various ways, primarily in response to U.S. repression and to large-scale eradication campaigns (supported by the U.S.) in Peru and Bolivia. Up until the 1990 s, Peru and Bolivia were the world s greatest producers of coca leaves, which were then transformed, on location (near coca fields), into cocaine paste (the second step towards producing cocaine). Colombia, during this period, served primarily as the base for transforming cocaine paste into powder cocaine and as the coordinating center for its distribution and smuggling to, primarily, the United States. During the 1990s, Colombia became the world's most important source of coca cultivation, cocaine paste and cocaine. Traffickers and coca growers in Peru and Bolivia have thus been relegated to second and third place, and have suffered from drastic cuts in income. They have thus resorted to producing a larger share of cocaine paste and cocaine in order to maximize their revenue and profits. Such a strategy also seeks to compensate for the fall in the price of coca leaves since Finally, it should be noted that other countries have taken on a role in the cocaine industry, such as Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, in cocaine production and, most importantly, in drug-trafficking (by serving as a base for cocaine distribution). Drug Trafficking Routes for Cocaine and Heroin Colombia is the distribution center for cocaine in the world. Though Colombia reigns as the most important source of coca cultivation, cocaine paste is also imported from Peru and Bolivia. The distribution of narcotics is organized by numerous drug trafficking syndicates throughout the country, though the most influential ones are based in Cali (the Norte del Valle cartel ), Medellin and Bogota. As reported by the ONDCP, in the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy 62, over 700 metric tons of cocaine are exported annually from Latin America to the U.S. and Europe, in the form of 500 maritime shipments, of which less than half is shipped to the United States: 335 metric tons in 1999 and 318 metric tons in The ONDCP affirms that these shipments originate from Colombia, headed towards Mexico and the Caribbean. Cocaine is mostly transported in maritime shipments from Colombian coastal regions, either in fishing vessels (then loaded onto go-fast boats at sea) or in commercial cargo ships. In the case of the former, the vessels transport narcotics to Mexico and other Latin American 62 The White House, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy 2003, p The White House, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy 2003, see Table 40 Trends in Cocaine Supply, , p

37 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY countries, on their way to the U.S. destinations. Go-fast boats either pick up shipments from the vessels or directly transport cocaine from Colombia to Central America and the Caribbean. Cocaine shipments in commercial cargo ships are destined directly for the United States or Europe. They are usually concealed in compartments built into the ship, or placed in cargo containers. As for the supply of heroin originating from Colombia, the ONDCP estimates that, in 1999, 12.9 metric tons were available for consumption in the U.S 64. The most important method for transporting heroin to the U.S. consists in smuggling very small pouches either by concealing them on human carriers (who inject 8 to 10-grams of heroin wrapped in latex or wax) or in their pieces of luggage and clothing, as they make their way to U.S. ports of entry 65. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), trafficking syndicates have recently begun to transport heroin via air and maritime cargo, often with cocaine shipments, by passing through Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, Panama and Mexico. (2) Political Economy of Drug Trafficking (Mainly Cocaine) Incomes and Costs of the Illicit Drug Industry for Coca Growers and Cocaine Traffickers Though illicit drug trafficking generates high levels of income, it does not constitute a vehicle for fostering economic development. The illicit drug economy, quite on the contrary, has a negative impact on economic growth, drug producing countries, and on society in general, by fueling high levels of drug-related crime, violence, and corruption as well as by inducing ecological damage in illicit crop-growing areas and raising drug abuse. In the case of Colombia, the effect of drug trafficking on political stability and security has been highly visible, as seen by the vast infiltration of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the political system (up until the early 1990s) and, more recently, by the growing link between the armed conflict, illegal armed groups and drug trafficking. Illicit crop farmers in Colombia resort to cultivating coca and opium poppy crops, as a means to generate income in the short- and medium-term, mainly because they allow farmers to earn more money than any other licit crop. As seen in the following table, presented in a study conducted on UNDCP alternative development programs in the Department of Cauca (Colombia), in , coca cultivation yields a higher net income (although it also entails the highest production costs) than do opium poppy and licit crops, such as coffee and lulo (a tropical fruit). 64 The White House, ONDCP, op. cit., see Table 48 Trends in Heroin Supply, , p U.S. Department of State, INSCR 2001 Report, Section on Colombia, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime Guidelines, Alternative Development in the Andean Area: The UNDCP Experience, July

38 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Table 1.1 Costs, Average Net Annual Income per Hectare (ha) and Harvesting Periods (Thousands of Colombian pesos): Department of Cauca, Coca Opium Poppy Organic Coffee Lulo (fruit) Production Cost per ha Average Net Annual Income per ha Harvesting Period 17,100 12,280 1,380 3,872 10,100 8,520 2,460 5, days 90 days Twice per year Every 15 days for 6 months Farmers typically grow sustenance crops along with coca and opium poppy. Moreover, they are faced with poor access to export markets and low prices (especially for coffee) and insufficient infrastructure (roads, storage facilities), which pose additional constraints for the licit markets of cash crops. The repercussions of the illicit drug economy are felt in numerous ways in source countries 68. Overall, the effects of drug trafficking can be summarized as jeopardizing longterm development and generating the destabilization of the economy. In sum, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reports that the economic impact of illicit drugs is felt in numerous ways 69: Reduction of legitimate investments; Preference for investments in non-productive sectors (particularly by drug trafficking groups); Setting obstacles to macro-economic management; Creating inflationary pressures which induce policymakers to adopt severe monetary policies, leading to decreased money supply and higher interest rates; Purchasing weapons and contributing to higher levels of violence; Widening income disparities. 67 ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime Guidelines, op. cit., Table 2, Costs, Average Net Annual Income and Harvesting Periods, p For further reading, see the following books and articles on the economy of the cocaine industry on Andean countries: J. Painter, Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency, Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade, Vol. 1, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1994; F. E. Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia: Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade, Vol. 2, Lynne Rienner Publ., Boulder and London, 1992; A. Labrousse, Bolivie: Economie Politique de la Coca-Cocaïne, in: Problèmes d Amérique Latine, no. 7, 1er trimester 1988, p ; R. Laserna, Bolivie: L économie de la Drogue, in: Problèmes d Amérique Latine, no. 18, July-September 1995, p ; F. E. Thoumi, Los Efectos Económicos de la Industria de Drogas Ilegales y las Agendas de Política en Bolivia, Colombia y Perú in: Colombia Internacional, no. 29, January-March, 1995, p INCB, Annual Report 2002, Chapter 1, Illicit Drugs and Economic Development, p

39 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY According to the 2003 Annual Report of the INCB, coca growers earn only one percent of the total amount of money spent by drug users. The INCB further reports that coca farmers earned $1.1 billion in 2001, compared to the income of drug traffickers, amounting to $2.7 billion 70. Moreover, the ONDCP estimates that the total retail value of cocaine sold in the U.S., in 1999, was $35.6 billion (for 271 metric tons of cocaine available for consumption), and $35.3 billion (projected value), in 2000, (for 259 metric tons of cocaine available for consumption) 71. As for the retail value of heroin sold in the United States, the ONDCP reports that it amounted to $10.08 billion in 1999 (for 12.9 metric tons of heroin available for consumption) and $10.04 billion in 2000 (projected value, for 12.9 metric tons of heroin) 72. The economic structure of the illicit drug industry can be compared to that of an agricultural industry. The main characteristic that differentiates the drug industry from an agricultural one, is its illegality which, in turn, affects: the market structure, the behavior and strategies of the producers, sellers and consumers, and, of course, the price of cocaine. The retail price of cocaine rises tremendously at each production stage. Being as most of the profits go to the ones who control the last production stage and the distribution of cocaine, coca growers, who are at the bottom of the production pyramid, gain barely nothing compared to cocaine retailers. UNDCP s 2001 Survey on Colombia 73 estimates that the cost for the set up and upkeep of 1 hectare of coca is equivalent (in U.S. dollars) to $8,680 annually (19,967,000 pesos, a slightly higher estimate than that presented in Table 1.1). Thus the annual income of a coca farmer would amount to $1,060 (2,443,000 pesos) per hectare, or $92 a month per hectare (203,000 pesos). The price of cocaine paste has been increasing by 21 percent since 2000, particularly in the Departments of Meta, Caquetá and Putumayo. The UNDCP 74 reports that 1 kilogram of cocaine paste was worth approximately $1000 (2,230,000 pesos), January 2002 and that the average price of 1 kilogram of opium poppy latex (intermediate stage between opium poppy and heroin) was worth 600,000 pesos. Tables 1.2 and 1.3, on the Average Prices of Coca, Cocaine, Opium Poppy and Heroin, clearly demonstrate the degree to which prices escalate, as the production process of cocaine and heroin advances. 70 INCB, op. cit., p The White House, ONDCP, The National Drug Control Strategy 2003, Table 40, Trends in Cocaine Supply, , p The White House, ONDCP, op. cit., Table 48, Trends in Heroin Supply, , p UNDCP, Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, Colombia, March 2002, p. 10. The estimates provided in pesos are also found in this survey. 74 UNDCP, Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, op. cit., p

40 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Table 1.2 Average Price of Coca, Cocaine Base, Opium Poppy and Heroin in U.S. dollars 75 Price in $ Percent of Final Price Opium Poppy Wholesale Heroin 80, Retail Price of Heroin 290, Coca Leaves (quantity needed to 1 kg of HCL) Cocaine Paste Wholesale HCL Cocaine 25, Retail Price of HCL Cocaine 50, Retail Price of HCL Powder Cocaine (higher level of purity, 65%) 110, Table 1.3 Average Price and Purity of Cocaine and Heroin in the United States in U.S. dollars 76 Year Cocaine: Price Per Pure Gram for Purchase of 1 Gram or Less Cocaine: Price Per Pure Gram for Purchase of Pure Grams Heroin: Price Per Pure Gram for Purchase of 0.1 Gram or Less Heroin: Price Per Pure Gram for Purchase of 1-10 Pure Grams ,295 1, , , , Moreover, it is estimated 77 that drug traffickers earn approximately $4,500 per kg of cocaine, out of the average sale price of $15,000 per kg of cocaine (at U.S. borders). In addition to paying a high commission fee to Mexican traffickers, the entire process of cocaine trafficking entails numerous costs, from the production of cocaine base and cocaine 75 N. Lalam, Les Drogues Illicites : La 'Mondialisation' Avant L'heure : Note sur le Rapport Mondial sur les Drogues-UNDCP, in: Mondes en développement, p. 94. The data on coca, cocaine paste and cocaine was taken from Bolivia, in 1995, whereas the prices of opium poppy and heroin refer to Pakistan, in a study conducted by the UNDCP, in ONDCP, op. cit., Table 41, Average Price and Purity of Cocaine and Heroin in the United States, , p The estimations on the income and costs of trafficking in cocaine were established by the ONDCP. ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy 2003, p

41 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY hydrochloride (precursor chemicals, laboratories), and transportation (smuggling fees, expensive boats), to the laundering of final profits. Traffickers must also plan on spending money (in the form of bribes and commissions) to protect the production and transport of narcotics. According to the ONDCP, traffickers have to pay a certain number of charges, distributed as follows 78 : Overhead: 20 % Transportation: 12 % Cost of Seizures: 15 % Cost of Goods: 12 % Money Laundering: 11 % It is important to realize the extent to which the industry s illegality has contributed to boosting its revenue and spreading violence throughout society. The price of illicit drugs is proportional to the perceived level of risk and the degree of monopoly 79. Illegality generates tremendous amounts of violence, determines the risk-minimizing behavior of every actor involved and the high-added value of cocaine. As for the size of the cocaine industry, it is very difficult to establish an accurate and reliable estimate since there are no official sources and statistics. Diverging estimates are provided below. Several economists have estimated that the overall revenue of the cocaine trade is roughly $300 to $500 billion a year. Former U.N. Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, claimed that the illicit drug trade generates annually $500 billion 80 whereas the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODDCP, formerly known as the United Nations Drug Control Program -UNDCP, until October 2002), in a 1998 study, estimated that the total annual revenue of the illicit drug industry ranges from $360 to $400 billion, divided up as follows: $100 to $110 billion for heroin, $110 to $130 billion for cocaine, $75 billion for cannabis and $60 billion for synthetic drugs. The study also refers to other calculations, which estimate that the annual turnover approximates $550 billion, based on the minimum and maximum prices of narcotics in the U.S. market ONDCP, op. cit., p UNDCP, 1998, op. cit., p Quoted by G. Delbrel, Géopolitique de la Drogue, p UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, Technical Series no. 8, 1998, p

42 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA It is also interesting to note that, during the year 2000, according to the INCB 82, drug trafficking in cocaine and heroin generated $36 billion in profits in the U.S. alone ($27 billion for cocaine and $9 billion for heroin). This represents a significant amount of money that transits through the money laundering circuits in the United States. (3) Estimates on Coca and Opium Poppy Cultivation and the Production of Cocaine and Heroin Colombia is the world's most important producer and supplier of cocaine and is estimated to supply 90 percent of the cocaine found in the U.S. and a significant source of heroin found on the Eastern market of the United States. Colombia's heroin production represents only 2 percent of world supply though most of it is destined for the United States 83. The most important producers of opium poppy and opium are Myanmar and Afghanistan, which together accounted for 86 percent of global opium poppy cultivation in 2000 and 78 percent in The cultivation of opium poppy is recent in Colombia, dating back to 1991 and does not have any origins in traditional, indigenous customs. Opium poppy cultivation grew from 1,160 hectares (ha) in 1991 to 15,091 ha (highest level in Colombia) in 1994, and back down to 6,500 ha in It should further be noted that Mexico began to cultivate opium poppy as early as 1989 (with 6,600 ha) and has continued to grow similar quantities of opium poppy (1,900 ha in 2000 and 4,400 ha in 2001) 85. The CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center 86 and the U.S. State Department estimate that Colombia s heroin production has remained relatively stable, ranging from 6.5 to 8 metric tons. The Department of State, in the 2003 Annual Report on the International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCSR), estimated that coca cultivation in Colombia covered an area of 67,200 ha in 1996, which rose to 136,200 ha in 2000 and 169,800 ha in 2001 (See Appendix 2, Coca Cultivation (hectares), Seizures (metric tons) and Destruction of Laboratories in Colombia from 1990 to 2001). The 2003 INCRS reports a decline in coca cultivation from 2002 to 2003, with 144,450 ha in 2002 and 113, 859 ha in INCB, op. cit., p State Department, INCSR 2001 Report, Section on Colombia. 84 UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, p. 51. In 2000, Afghanistan grew 37 percent of global opium poppy cultivation whereas in 2001, cultivation decreased drastically, down to 5 percent. Myanmar's share of opium poppy cultivation therefore rose from 49 percent, in 2000, to 73 percent in Statistics for the year 2001 and 2002 were drawn from the 2003 report on Global Illicit Drug Trends. 85 UNODCCP, op. cit., Table on Global Illicit Cultivation of Opium Poppy and Production of Opium, 1989 to 2001, p CIA, World Factbook 2002,

43 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY On the other hand, according to the UNODCCP 87, the surface area of coca cultivation went from 67,200 hectares (ha) in 1996, to 163,289 ha in In the 2003 Global Illicit Drug Trends, it is reported that coca cultivation declined to 145,000 ha, as of November 2001, and 102,000 ha by the end of December The total surface area of coca cultivation, in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, has decreased slightly over the course of the 1990s but has remained by and large stable (refer to Appendix 3, Global Illicit Coca Cultivation, UNODCCP). In 1989, the combined coca cultivation in these three Andean countries was 215,700 ha and decreased to 173,100 ha in The decline in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia is offset by both the increase of coca cultivation in Colombia (in terms of hectares) during the 1990s and the rise in productivity of cocaine production. Indeed, the production of cocaine in terms of metric tons has actually increased despite the decrease in the total surface area of coca. The total Andean production of cocaine, measured in metric tons, rose from 604 metric tons in 1989 to 879 metric tons in 2002 (as reported by the UNODCCP). The decrease in coca cultivation (hectares) is offset by the rise in yield of cocaine production. Though the UNODCCP has reported a steady increase in coca cultivation in Colombia, from 1992 (37,100 ha in Colombia) until 2000 (highest coca cultivation reported, 164,289 ha), coca cultivation decreased drastically in both Peru and Bolivia up until In 2002, the UNODCCP reports a slight increase in both Peru and Bolivia. Coca cultivation in Peru has declined progressively, particularly since 1996, with an estimated surface of 94,400 ha of coca cultivation, and reached its lowest level, in 1999, with 38,700. Since 1999, however, coca cultivation has begun to increase, with a reported 46,700 ha in 2002 (according to the UNODCCP). Coca eradication in Bolivia is referred to, by U.S. policymakers, as one of the most visible and positive results of U.S. international drug control policy. Coca cultivation for trafficking purposes has nearly disappeared in Bolivia. The UNODCCP reports that, in 2001, there remained only 19,000 ha of coca in Bolivia, down from 45,800 ha in However, Bolivian coca cultivation has risen progressively, reaching 24,400 ha in 2002 (according to both UNODDCP and INCRS 2003 reports). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the federations of coca farmers, in both Peru and Bolivia, have been radically opposed the massive eradication campaigns, imposed and largely funded by the United States, resulting in violent protests. Coca cultivation in Colombia is concentrated in the Departments of Putumayo and Guaviare whereas most opium poppy crops can be found in the Huila, Cauca, Cesar and 87 UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, Table on Global Illicit Cultivation of Coca Bush and Production of Coca Leaf and Cocaine, , p

44 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Nariño departments. The ineffectiveness of coca eradication is illustrated by the fact that the total surface area of coca rose in 2000 by 13,700 hectares (122,500 hectares in 1999, according to the Department of State and CIA) despite the fact that 47,000 hectares of coca were eradicated in Moreover, in 2003, 132,000 hectares of coca were fumigated (using glyphosate), by U.S.-funded operations, undertaken by Colombian National Police's Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN). Similarly poppy crops grew from 6,100 hectares in 2000 to 7,500 hectares in 2001 although 1,819 hectares of poppy were eradicated 88. In 2002, the U.S. State Department reported a total of 4,900 ha of poppy, following the aerial fumigation of 3,820 ha in It is important to underline the problem of sustainability of the decline in coca cultivation and the reliability of results. Coca farmers have adopted new strategies to protect their coca plants from the aerial spraying of glyphosate, when they are forewarned of impending fumigation campaigns. They either coat coca leaves with sugar molasses which protects them from the harmful effects of glyphosate, or they cut off the leaves, leaving only the roots and a single stem. As a result of self-defense strategies, large surfaces of coca cultivation remain intact following aerial fumigation, while they appear to be eradicated in monitoring systems. Moreover, fumigation may not even take place when coca plants are voluntarily reduced to roots and stems because it is deemed that they are already unproductive. Methodologies Used for Measuring Coca Cultivation The estimations, on the cultivation and eradication of illicit crops, used by U.S. Federal agencies and departments (mainly by the Department of State and the Office of the National Drug Control Policy - ONDCP), are elaborated primarily by the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) on an annual basis and by the UNODCCP. The CNC's statistics are complemented by estimates of the Office of Aviation regarding the number of eradicated hectares of coca fields. CNC's statistics, published in the annual World Factbook (CIA) and the State Department's annual report on the International Narcotics Strategy (INCSR), serve as the USG's main source for assessing the effectiveness of U.S. drug control efforts in source and transit countries. Nevertheless, there seems to be some controversy over the total surface area of coca and opium poppy cultivation, in Colombia, in 2000 and 2001, due to variations in the methodologies used by, on the one hand, the U.S. and the other, by the UNODCCP and the 88 U.S. Department of State, INCSR 2001 Report, Section on Colombia

45 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY Colombian government 89. There are considerable disparities in estimations of the hectarage of illicit coca crops cultivated and eradicated, between the USG (CNC) and the Colombian government/unodccp, as seen in the tables presented in Appendices 2 and 3 on coca cultivation. It should be noted that various sources from the Colombian government (primarily the Directorate on Narcotics and the Colombian National Police) refer to the same statistics as does the UNODCCP, since their estimations are based on the results of the Illicit Crop Monitoring System in Colombia (set up by the Colombian government, with the technical and financial assistance of the UNODCCP, since 1999). The U.S. State Department, in the 2001 INCSR Report 90, acknowledged that there were numerous difficulties in determining the number of hectares of illicit crops and in estimating the potential production of cocaine and heroin. Such constraints range from: Poor accessibility of certain crop-growing areas: creating difficulties to obtain data. Estimates are made on the basis of the amount of potential crops, without accounting for losses suffered in harvests, which could result in losses of one third of the harvest. Estimates of the harvests refer to the potential rather than the final amount of crops. Methodology also suffers from a large degree of variation regarding the estimated quantity (in metric tons) of cocaine and heroin processing, due to variations in harvests, in the precursor chemicals used, the size of processing laboratories and technologies applied, the skills of workers, and the response of traffickers to law enforcement. Moreover, divergences even exist within the U.S. government, more specifically between the CNC and the Office of Aviation (headquartered at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida). A study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO), in January 2003, entitled Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, explored the methodologies and purposes of both organisms in order to comprehend why their estimations differ. According to the CNC, in its report, Latin American Narcotics Cultivation and Production, Estimates 2001, coca cultivation rose by 25 percent from 2000 to 2001, from 136,200 to 169,800 hectares, despite large-scale eradication efforts, whereas the Office of Aviation estimated that cultivation rose by 33 percent in Statement by M. Grossman, UnderSecretary for Political Affairs, before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, "U.S. Assistance to Colombia and the Andean Region, April 10, 2002, p State Department, 2001 INCSR Report, Section on Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

46 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA The GAO 91 explains differences in the estimations made by the CNC and Office of Aviation by examining the purposes they attribute to these estimations and the methodologies used. On the one hand, CNC s primary mission consists in determining annually how much coca is available for cocaine processing, as a means to enable U.S. policymakers: to determine whether the source country should be certified for having cooperated satisfactorily with U.S. authorities (the President declares March 1 st, of every year, whether source and transit countries, are certified); and to decide on appropriate measures to take regarding drug control policy. The Office of Aviation is, on the other hand, mandated to support the Colombian National Police (CNP) by calculating the number of successfully eradicated hectares of illicit crops. The main purpose of the Office is to assess the effectiveness of U.S.-funded eradication efforts 92. These differences also explain why they have adopted divergent methodologies for assessing coca cultivation. The CNC prepares its estimates on an annual basis by studying black and white highresolution photographs, taken from satellites, once a year, between November and January. Pictures are taken of a representative sample of Colombia s drug-growing areas (already known or suspected areas) 93. The CNC considers only healthy coca plants with potentially harvestable coca leaves whereas the Office of Aviation counts all kinds of coca plants (damaged, all ages) as well as coca seedlings, which leads to higher estimations of coca cultivation. It uses airborne digital cameras which take photographs of coca fields, which the CNP has targeted for aerial eradication. These photographs are analyzed with computers in order to calculate the number of hectares by examining the light which reflects off the crops. According to this GAO study, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, further explains the differences in estimates of the eradicated surface of coca, by claiming that CNC's analysis did not take into consideration the eradication campaign in Southern Colombia, late The Office of Aviation further explains that CNC's photographs were taken before, or less than 45 days, after the eradication effort, which did not leave enough time for all the coca plants to die 94 (since it takes at least 45 days for coca plants to die after the time of fumigation). Finally, this section delves into the methodology used by the Colombian government and UNODCCP, in the Illicit Crop Monitory System in Colombia (ICMS). In a report, entitled Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, Colombia, concluded March 2002, the UNODCCP 91 General Accounting Office (GAO), Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, January GAO, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia, January 2003, p GAO, op. cit., 2003, p GAO, op. cit., 2003, p

47 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY indicates that the ICMS is ninety percent reliable, covering one hundred percent of Colombian territory. This system uses digital satellite images and aerial photography, by conducting an annual, nationwide census, and reportedly possesses a transparent and reliable methodology for illicit crop interpretation. All types of crops and vegetation are identified, as well as types of infrastructure, using four types of satellite images (SPOT, LANDSAT, IKONOS and ERS). Among the main steps in the monitoring process of illicit crops, the following are highlighted 95 : Identification of medium-resolution images, over the entire area; Converting the images into maps; Visual evaluation and enhancement of images; Identification of the set of colors to best differentiate varying types of vegetation; Elaboration of a map of coca crops, based on the interpretation of a set of experts and on data drawn from aerial photographs; Precise identification, location and measurements of coca fields; Superimposing the data over an administrative map of Colombia, with the help of a Geographical Information System (GIS). In sum, the differences in the hectarage of coca cultivation, between U.S. agencies on the one hand (mainly the CIA's CNC and State Department) and the UNODDCP and Colombian government on the other, emerged in The CNC and State Department reported that the surface of coca cultivation amounted to 122,500 ha in 1999, 136,200 ha in 2000, and 169,800 ha in 2001 (see Appendix 2). However, the UNODDCP estimates of coca cultivation in Colombia (also used by the Colombian government) were radically different: 160,119 ha in 1999, 164,289 ha in 2000 and 144,807 ha in 2001 (see Appendix 3). How can these differences be explained and why did they emerge only after 1998? It is difficult to find a categorical answer. Nonetheless, it would appear that the fact that the UNODDCP applied a new methodology in 1999, based on the ICMS, represents a key explanatory factor. Moreover, the question of whether or not U.S. agencies had political stakes, in keeping their old methodology rather than adopting that of the UNODDCP, should be considered. Given that the drug issue is highly politicized in the United States, it would be surprising if there were no political stakes. However, it would require a separate, thorough analysis to elucidate this matter and it is not the purpose of this research to do so. Notwithstanding it may be recalled that U.S. agencies in general seek to maintain their autonomy, including by using their own methodologies for estimating drug production and 95 UNODCCP, Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, Colombia, March The methodology is detailed in pages

48 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA drug use, to demonstrate the effectiveness of their programs, and to preserve a positive image before public opinion. Unfortunately the statistics and other data are not sufficient at this time to determine which of these interests may have motivated policymakers to apply a certain methodology for assessing coca cultivation. C. Set of Interrelated Crises and "Ademocratic Governance" (1) Crises in Governance Since the early 1990s, the Colombian State and society have been confronted to growing crises in governance, exemplified by the armed conflict (term commonly used to refer to the multiple conflicts between the government, guerrilla groups and paramilitaries), sharp economic recession, and large scale emigration of members of the upper class and professionals to the United States and Europe. It is posited that such crises derive from a range of interrelated factors, such as the widespread culture of violence, distorted socioeconomic development (unequal distribution of wealth and widening income gaps between the rich and the poor, between rural and urban areas, poor distribution of property, ), drug trafficking and systemic corruption and impunity. Crises in governance is understood on the one hand as the set of interrelated (and sometimes mutually reinforcing) crises weakening, or even disabling, the State from complying with its responsibilities in accordance with the notion of democratic governance. On the other hand, problems in governance refer to conflicting relations (or interaction) between the State and all sectors of society in which either the State s authority is not respected or the rights and obligations of the social contract are not upheld. As a result, public authorities or civil society 96 resort(s) to violent or illegal means to influence public decisionmaking. In short, democratic governance represents a type of contract - political, social and economic- between public elected officials (representing the government), groups of the mass population (representing the majority) and interest groups (private sector, corporations, military, the church and elite), who interact in the management of resources in various fields (namely public, economic and social resources). As mentioned in Section A, governance in Colombia has been undermined by what many critics call a restrictive and excluding (excluyente) democracy which has led to the exclusion of large sectors of society from economic growth and political representation. 96 Civil society is interpreted as constituting all organizations, known by some as civil society organizations (CSOs), occupying the space between the government and the family, including the private sector. Harry Blair, in Civil Society and Building Democracy: Lessons from International Donor Experience, in: Civil Society and International Development, 1998, p , also argues that they serve three main democratic functions. First of all, CSOs increase citizens' participation in the policymaking process; secondly, they raise the state's accountability; and finally, they provide education on civic rights

49 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY Over the past twenty years and particularly since the mid-1990s, the Colombian State has been struggling with numerous obstacles which have prevented it from fulfilling its democratic duties. According to Eva Irene Tuft, these obstacles can be put into five main groups 97 : (1) the restrictive nature of the political system and exclusion of large sectors of the Colombian population from participating in the democratic process; (2) widening economic gap between rich and poor sectors in Colombian society; (3) breakdown of the rule of law; (4) poor civilian control over armed forces, particularly in matters related to public order and counterinsurgency; (5) widespread impunity of public forces for human rights violations 98. Some Colombian analysts, such as Germán Palacio, also refer to an institutional crisis in Colombia where the State appears to have a democratic regime that is dominated by repressive authoritarian mechanisms. Moreover, Germán Palacio argues that the Colombian political system is fundamentally flawed because it serves primarily to justify political and social repression rather than search for ways to improve the participation and influence of popular sectors, poor communities, farmers and indigenous populations 99. Thus, both the short- and long-term factors - from institutional, sociological, systemic and economic perspectives - which have contributed to the institutional crises in Colombia, should be analyzed. Others, such as Javier Sanín 100, claim that Colombia is facing a problem of governance and a crisis of representation at several levels: between rural and urban sectors; between social classes; electoral process and informal power of armed groups over municipal and regional elections (as was the case in the latest municipal elections, October 2000). He therefore concludes that the way to peace is through political reform as the main mechanism for strengthening governance. Pedro Medellin 101 claims that Colombia is currently experiencing a phase where the State is undergoing a series of crises of legitimacy thereby loosing its capacity for conducting politics. Medellin argues that the crises in legitimacy, which worsened throughout the Pastrana administration (from August 1998 to August 2002), were triggered by the State s inability to resolve the economic crisis, followed by the State s failure to deal appropriately with internal affairs and finally, by the State s failure to successfully conduct the peace process. In this light the Colombian State is eroding while the armed conflict persists and worsens. 97 H. Blair, op. cit., p The question of impunity pertains not only to public forces but also to the illegal armed groups (AUC, FARC, ELN) who regularly violate international humanitarian conventions and human rights. 99 G. Palacio, op. cit., p. 162 ; translated from Spanish. 100 Intervention by J. Sanín, political scientist, Universidad Pontificia Javeriana, at the 4 th Conference on Colombia, Democracy and Peace, Madrid, February 6, He defines governance as the social capacity for producing goods and services; and as the formal and informal set of norms for resolving current and future problems. 101 Intervention by P. Medellin Torres, political scientist and journalist from the Ortega and Gasset Foundation, at the 4 th Conference on Colombia, Democracy and Peace, Madrid, February 5,

50 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA In the words of Francisco Palacios, the Colombian State has breached the new social pact, established in the 1991 Constitution, resulting in the State s progressive loss of legitimacy due to the lack of political dynamism and institutionalized social. Moreover, the poor level of political dynamism reflects the incapacity of civil society to counterbalance the State s powers through the daily and systematic implementation of collective rights. 102 Palacios goes even further claiming that: The State in Colombia is in the process of no longer existing, that it merely figures as an administrative framework for the management of specific services and procures an incomplete order, incapable -or lacking the willingness to do so- to protect the most fundamental rights 103. Furthermore, the State s loss of legitimacy is extremely serious as it may generate legitimate and open violence, as predicted by Hobbes. Some Colombian analysts believe that Colombia is undergoing a profound crisis of governance, a societal crisis. In the words of Luis Jorge Garay 104, Colombia has never experienced neither the rule of law nor civility (convivencia or modus vivendi, the informal capacity for citizens to live together without resorting to violent or illegal means) which has led to the severe fragmentation of society. Moreover, the intensification of drug trafficking (and related organized crime) has been detrimental to the social fabric of society key to ensuring governance. In this light, Garay argues that one must first and foremost lay down the grounds for creating a new social order as a means to resolve the armed conflict and bring peace. Problems in democratic governance, in their political, social and territorial (or military) dimensions, lead to the debate on whether it is best - more appropriate and effective - to adopt political reforms or apply military measures in order to put an end to the armed conflict. There is an absolute consensus among analysts that resolving the conflict is the first step towards strengthening governance and/or raising the State s legitimacy. How this can be done remains an issue of much debate. Four factors have exacerbated current crises in Colombia : Economic recession and poverty Systemic violence Drug trafficking and link with armed groups Armed conflict 102 F. Palacios, op. cit., p F. Palacios, op. cit., p. 284, translated from Spanish. 104 L. J. Garay, economist and former adviser of the World Bank, intervention at the 4 th Conference on Colombia, Democracy and Peace, Madrid, February 5,

51 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY The first two factors have already been examined in this chapter. The latter two are developed below, focusing on the evolution of the armed conflict and its ties to drug trafficking. It is essential to lay down the factual basis for this relationship, referred by numerous U.S. policymakers and analysts as the drugs-guerrilla nexus, because it served as the main justification for the Clinton administration to provide military assistance to Plan Colombia. Impact of Drug Trafficking on Governance Since the mid-1980s, democratic governance has been challenged by drug trafficking which, apart from being the primary cause of institutionalized corruption, serves as the main fuel of the armed conflict. Drug trafficking in Colombia was, until the early 1990s, controlled by the Medellin and Cali cartels, which exerted considerable influence on regional and local governance by not only exerting most authority but also by investing large sums of money in building infrastructures, in investing in real estate and social welfare programs (particularly true in the case of Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin cartel, who sought to gain more legitimacy vis-a-vis the Medellin population and as a means to launder narcodollars). During the late 1980s, at the apex of the Medellin and Cali cartels, analysts such as Germán Palacio talked of a para-state, governed by these cartels. Through territorial control and aided by popular support, the cartels practiced their own kind of government in areas under their influence. For instance, the Medellin cartel provided social welfare in a village near Medellin, that included unemployment benefits. They also contributed to the urbanization of the outskirts of Medellin 105. Many more examples could be given. Suffice it to say that, in their days of glory, the drug trafficking syndicates filled in some of the gaps, caused by the inefficiency of State institutions and the government s inability to provide for a comprehensive economic development. Finally it should also be noted that the cartels were successfully integrated into the country s economy, society and political system, which was facilitated by their control (real estate investments) of over three million hectares of the country's wealthiest land 106. As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that drug trafficking is the cause of a significant share of the 30,000 homicides per annum in Colombia. Moreover, these cartels proved to be destabilizing factors by generating high levels of violence, terrorism and corruption which naturally affected democratic governance by altering the nature of the interaction and pacts amongst the actors (who resorted more to coercive means). Drug-related violence originated 105 G. Palacio, op. cit. p R. Vargas, Colombia : Usos y Abusos de la 'Guerra a Las Drogas, p. 119, in: Democracias Bajo Fuego, ed. M. Jelsma and T. Roncken, May

52 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA primarily from either the opposition of drug traffickers to the Colombian government s policy of extradition, of persons prosecuted for drug offenses, to the U.S.), or clashes within or between cartels. The most violent of these clashes occurred in 1993, between Pablo Escobar (Medellin cartel) and a rival vigilante group, los pepes 107. The set of interrelated crises in governance and democratic governance consists mainly in: the loss of legitimacy, the State s loss of territorial control and the loss of the monopoly over the use of force (all interrelated), widespread and systemic impunity (of drug traffickers and paramilitaries), narco-corruption (infiltration of narco-dollars through society, government and the Armed Forces) and clientelism (especially in the electoral process). Cases of narco-corruption arose during the Samper administration ( ) beginning with accusations that former President Samper allegedly accepted money from the Cali cartel during the 1994 presidential elections 108. Moreover, during his administration, there were numerous accusations of corruption between the Armed Forces and the National Police and drug trafficking syndicates. For instance, a scandal arose in July 1995 when detained drug trafficker, Jorge Eduardo Cruz Rojas, was supposed to be moved to a new jail in order to stand trial. However he never arrived at the new detention center, calling into question the integrity of the police officials in charge of the transfer. Needless to say that there have been numerous other cases of narco-corruption but they are not addressed in this chapter. As an illustration of the interdependence between these causality factors, Germán Palacio argues that the State s loss of legitimacy has obliged it to resort to the use of force through the military apparatus which has, in turn, exposed the State to corruption, delegitimization, inefficiency, and to bitter confrontation with other institutional apparatus 109. Finally, researchers (from the RAND corporation) Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, argue that the sources of instability in Colombia stem from drug trafficking and the armed conflict, which have, in turn, worsened deeper political, social and economic problems. The current instability in Colombia derives from the interaction and resulting synergies of an underground criminal drug economy and the growth of armed challenges to the state s authority. The first source of instability is reflected in the pervasive influence of drug networks and their infiltration of key societal institutions; the second lies in the growth of guerrilla armies, paramilitaries, and privatized security forces. The confluence of these 107 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p These accusations led to the decertification of Colombia in 1995, 1996 and 1997 (that Colombia was not fully cooperating with the U.S. in counternarcotics operations), leading to drastic cuts in U.S. assistance to Colombia (except for assistance to the Colombian National Police). 109 G. Palacio, op. cit., p

53 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY factors has exacerbated even deeper problems in Colombian society, including the loss of central government authority, economic deterioration, and social disintegration, and may be creating the conditions for a 'failed state 110. Thus drug trafficking is considered to be one of the most important stumbling blocks to the peace process and democratization in Colombia (especially by the United States government). (2) Armed Conflict, Main Actors and Link with Drug Trafficking The armed conflict and insurgent and paramilitary movements take place in a highly complex context but it is not the purpose of this chapter to develop these dynamics in detail. This section highlights the main characteristics of the conflict, its evolution, and presents the illegal armed groups, in order to have a better understanding of the crises in Colombia. The armed conflict in Colombia is nothing new; it has been going on for nearly forty years, more specifically since 1964 when the largest left-wing insurgency was created, the FARC. Numerous other insurgent movements have joined the fight against the government, some have been dissolved whereas others, namely the M-19 (Movement-19), have become integrated into the political system. The demands of insurgencies and the stakes of the conflict have evolved over the years as well the role of civil society. The main groups involved in the armed conflict can be summarized as followed: the Colombian Security Forces (mainly the Armed Forces and Colombian National Police); primarily two left-wing guerrilla groups (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional - ELN) and a smaller group, Ejército Popular de Liberaci n (EPL, with approximately 500 members), and the paramilitary movement (centralized in the self-defense units of Colombia, the Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia - AUC). The Colombian Security Forces The Security Forces in Colombia are comprised of the Colombian Armed Forces (146,000 members), the Air Force (10,000), the Navy (5,000) and the Colombian National Police (120,000). It is primarily the Armed Forces which have been accused of rampant narco-corruption and of committing systematic human rights violations, particularly up until the early 1990s. However, significant efforts, deemed successful by both the Colombian 110 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Omplications for Regional Stability, p. 1. The notion of a failed State has been largely promulgated by advocates of U.S. support to Plan Colombia, both in the Executive branch and Congress. The authors characterize a failed State as a: severe political crisis in which the institutions of the central government are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or political order beyond the major cities and sometimes not even there

54 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA and U.S. governments, have been undertaken to reform the military in Colombia as well as to reduce practices of impunity and raise transparency. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 111 The FARC were founded in May, 1964, by a peasant guerrilla leader, active since 1949 (during La Violencia): Manuel Marulanda (known as Tirofijo). According to Marulanda's version, he created the FARC following a military raid of 16,000 soldiers, in a peasant community, North of Tolima. The Colombian administration, under the presidency of Guillermo Leon Valencia, ordered the Marquetalia Operation with a view to eliminating communist hubs in this region. According to the Armed Forces, they sent 975 soldiers, rather than the 16,000 reported by Marulanda. The peasant resistance movement then adopted an agrarian program (Programa Agrario de las Guerrillas), July 20, 1964, calling for an agrarian reform, aimed at dissolving the properties of wealthy landowners (latifundistas) 112. A growing trend of urbanization, during the forty years of FARC's territorial expansion, can be discerned. During the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC preferred to occupy areas of colonization (rural areas, mainly in the Amazon) where migrants came with the sole purpose of cultivating coca in order to earn a living), far away from important administrative centers, where agrarian conflicts persisted. Since the 1980s, the FARC have increasingly sought to settle in economically strategic and developed municipalities while approaching urban centers. By the end of the 1990s, the FARC- as well as the ELN- sought to increasingly urbanize the armed conflict 113. A study conducted by Maria Alejandra Vélez 114, in 2000, sought to discern patterns in, and establish a model for, the territorial expansion of both the FARC and ELN. A set of criteria was established to ascertain which are the determinant factors in the guerrilla groups selection of the municipalities which they seek to control. The study 115 considered a total of 974 municipalities. With regards to the FARC, Vélez concluded that the probability of their presence increased by: percent if the municipality cultivates coca or opium poppy; by percent if there is oil exploitation; by percent if the municipality has gold mines. Thus the study demonstrated that the FARC prefer to settle down in municipalities which are economically strategic. 111 This section, regarding the links between the insurgencies and drug trafficking, is largely drawn from A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p Other sources include CIP's Information on Combatants and the Ministry of National Defenses study on the Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia, December M. A. Vélez, FARC-ELN Evolución y Expansión Territorial, June 2000, p M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p

55 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY The FARC as well as the ELN seek to yield political influence in rural areas - at the local level - in municipalities. The presence of guerrilla groups has expanded rapidly, going from 173 municipalities in 1985 to 622 municipalities in 1995 (out of a total of 1050). 116 The FARC also created a political party, in 1985, during the first peace process ( ): the Patriotic Union. However, 3,000 out of 6,000 candidates have been assassinated, from 1985 through the early 1990s. Selective homicides of members of the Patriotic Union continue to take place: according to the Patriotic Union, approximately 70 were assassinated in The number of FARC combatants has grown steadily since the 1960s: from 350 combatants in 1996, to 3600 in 1986 and, 32 fronts, 7000 in 1995, 60 fronts and 15,000-20,000 in 2000, in over 70 fronts (with a growing proportion of minors and women) 118. The Center for International Policy estimates total FARC membership at 18,000 and considers that the FARC control forty to sixty percent of Colombian territory 119. It is largely agreed that the FARC earn income from various sources: kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and involvement in drug trafficking. The FARC s role in the drug trade is very controversial. However, there is evidence that the FARC seek to regulate and control the market for coca and opium poppy in regions under their influence, namely by setting the sale prices of coca and poppy crops, cocaine paste and HCL and by charging a commission fee on all crops (legal and illicit) and narcotics sold. However, it is interesting to note that when peasants first began to grow coca, in the 1970s, as was the case in the Caguán (which became the zona de despeje during the last peace process -see section below on the peace process), the FARC strictly forbade coca cultivation along with the consumption of alcohol (as part of a strict code of behavior imposed on all FARC members and on the population of the areas under their influence). According to the Colombian government (Colombian Ministry of Defense), Colombian and U.S. analysts (see estimates by Rangel, Vargas, and CIP) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), it is believed that drug trafficking provides the largest share of FARC's total revenue. Various estimates are provided below. It is believed that the FARC control or regulate local cocaine paste markets, levy fees from coca and poppy growers as well as drug traffickers (see estimated fees below, by Rabasa and Chalk), collaborate with drug traffickers in the transport and storage of cocaine, and protect clandestine airstrips in Southern Colombia. In a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Drug Policy, Criminal Justice and 116 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p This information was provided orally, be members of the Patriotic Union, during the session of March 2004, of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, in Geneva. 118 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p CIP, Information on Combatants :

56 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Human Resources, on March 2, 2001, DEA Administrator Donny Marshall, also confirmed the information aforementioned. However, Marshall testified that there is no evidence that the ELN is directly involved in the international transportation of cocaine or in setting up international money laundering circuits 120. The FARC have set up an elaborate system with a detailed schedule of fees (gramaje) for services and protection they offer to illicit crop growers and drug traffickers. It is acknowledged that the FARC levy a tax of 10 percent on the sale of coca and opium poppy crops. It is reported by the Colombian Armed Forces that the fees (in U.S. dollars) were established as follows, as of October 1999: $15.7 per kilo of cocaine paste; $52.6 per kilo of hydrochloride cocaine (HCL); $5263 per laboratory (for protection); $52.60 per hectare of coca (for protection); $4210 per hectare of poppy fields (for protection); $2631 per landing strip (for protection); $10.50 per kilo of HCL shipments; 20 percent of the value of precursor chemicals shipment (river transportation); $5263 per international drug flight; and $2631 per domestic drug flight. 121 There are very few estimates which specify the amount of income derived from drug trafficking activities for each of the three groups (separately), due of course to the illegality of the insurgencies, paramilitaries and drug trafficking. Most estimates of the drug-related income of the FARC, ELN and AUC are lumped together. The only estimates on the income, derived from drug-related activities, that single out the FARC, have been established by the Colombian Armed Forces, which have determined that roughly fifty percent of their total income comes from the illicit narcotics trade. This would represent an annual revenue of $200 to $400 million. However, estimates are very broad and range from $100 million to $1 billion. 122 The Colombian Armed Forces estimates that 32 out of 61 FARC units, are linked to drug trafficking. Moreover they have calculated that, in 1998, both insurgencies and the AUC received a total of 620 billion pesos from drug trafficking (about $551 million), 350 billion pesos ($311 million) from extortion, billion pesos ($236 million) from kidnapping Testimony of Donny Marshall, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Plan Colombia: An Assessment of Successes and Challenges, Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources. 121 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p CIP, Information on Combatants. 123 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 32 and Table 3.1, p

57 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY According to Alfredo Rangel, both the FARC and AUC derive some 60 percent of their income from the trafficking of cocaine and heroin (they control different stages of the process) 124. In its June 1999 report, the General Accounting Office (GAO, conducts investigations for the U.S. Congress) refers to U.S. estimates that two-thirds of FARC units and one-third of ELN units are implicated in drug-trafficking 125, either in protecting the cocaine-processing laboratories of drug-traffickers, in providing support for cocaine storage and transport or in protecting small coca farmers (in exchange of a remuneration). Ricardo Vargas 126 who conducted studies on this matter in 1999, concluded that, between 1991 and 1996, the FARC and ELN earned 1.6 billion pesos - roughly US$ million - from drug trafficking, representing percent of total earnings 127. Thus, Rangel and Vargas further confirm that the FARC earn most of their income from the cultivation of coca whereas it is believed that the paramilitaries have formed alliances with drug trafficking syndicates and therefore earn their income from the sales of coca paste, cocaine and heroin. Similar estimates have been reported in Colombian periodicals and newspapers. For instance, Semana (weekly periodical), in its issue of March 8-15, 1999, estimated that the FARC's annual income amounted to million pesos (considerably below Vargas' calculations) while El Tiempo (daily newspaper), January 6, 1999, posited that the FARC earned annually 700 billion pesos (including revenue drawn from drug trafficking) 128. According to these estimates, drug trafficking would account for about fifty percent of total earnings. It would thus be legitimate to conclude that the illicit drug industry is, to a large extent, fueling the armed conflict in Colombia. Nevertheless, it is primordial to recall that the armed conflict has existed for forty years, long before Colombia became the world s hub for trafficking in cocaine. It is therefore too simplistic to postulate that the armed conflict would cease if Colombian and U.S. drug control efforts succeeded in dismantling the illicit drug industry. 124 Intervention by Alfredo Rangel, economist, political scientist and consultant, at the 4 th Conference on Colombia, Democracy and Peace, Madrid, February 6, GAO, Drug Control, Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow, 1999, p For further information, see chapter of R. Vargas in: Chapter entitled Colombia: Usos y Abusos de la Guerra a la Drogas', Ed. M. Jelsma and T. Roncken, Democracias bajo Fuego, Drogas y Poder en América Latina, p Vargas (Ricardo), Drogas, Máscaras y Juegos: Narcotráfico y Conflicto Armado en Colombia, p Cited by A. M. Vélez, op. cit., p

58 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) The ELN was founded, on July 4, 1964, by a small group of students (mainly from the University of Santander), led by Fabio Vasquez Castaño, inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban government offered scholarships to Latin American students to study in Cuba. The ELN was thus created by such a group of Colombian students, who created, in Cuba, the Brigada pro Liberación Nacional Jose Antonio Galán, November 11, In 1964, the Brigada set up the first guerrilla front (with 16 combatants), with the support of urban and academic adherents, in the municipality of San Vicente de Chuchuri, Department of Santander 129. In 1965, ELN's principal strategic objective was to: empower popular classes and vanquish the national oligarchy and the Armed Forces which support them, as well as the economic, political and military interests of North American imperialism 130. Numerous radical priests also adhered to the ELN, notably Father Camilo Torres, (from late 1965 to early 1966) and Father Manual Pérez (who led the ELN in the 1980s). The ELN is led by a five-member central command, under the leadership of Nicolás Rodríguez, known as Gabino. According to the Center for International Policy, current membership approximates 3,500 members. It is the only armed group whose membership has been decreasing: membership rose up to 5,000 in the late 1990s 131. There are few estimates which specifically indicate how much revenue the ELN draws from drug-related activities and clearly identify their links with drug trafficking. The ELN's Central Command has declared that they are not involved in any phase of drug trafficking. The Colombian Armed Forces have estimated that 7 out 41 ELN units can be linked to drug trafficking, which is considerably less than the FARC and AUC 132. As mentioned earlier, Colombian and U.S. authorities do not have evidence that the ELN is involved in the international dimensions of drug trafficking. However, there is evidence of coca and opium poppy crops in areas under their control, such as in the Súr of Bolivar. The ELN draws most of its income from ransom (kidnapping), extortion, and from the control of areas rich in minerals. Moreover, the ELN has singled itself out by targeting the oil and energy industries, by carrying out numerous bombings of pipelines and energy infrastructures. 129 M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p Translated from Spanish. M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p CIP, Information on Combatants and A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 33. Table 3.1, Links of Illegal Armed Groups to the Illicit Trade

59 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY According to the study aforementioned 133, regarding the patterns of guerrilla territorial expansion, the probability that the ELN are present in any given municipality increases by: percent in cases of oil exploitation; by percent with gold mines; percent with coal mines; and 68.6 percent in the presence of displaced persons (primarily persons who have been caught in the crossfire between the AUC and ELN). This study concluded that the primary differences, between the models of territorial expansion of the FARC and ELN, reside in the importance attributed to coca and poppy cultivation, to coal mines, and to the treatment of persons displaced by the armed conflict. Unlike the FARC, the ELN attribute much importance to controlling coal mines (one of the most important exports of Colombia) and to providing assistance to displaced persons (there have been more clashes between the AUC and ELN than between the AUC and the FARC). Moreover, coca and poppy cultivation is not a criteria which appears to be taken into consideration by the ELN in choosing their municipalities. Nevertheless, this does not imply that there is no coca or poppy cultivation in areas under ELN influence. Nevertheless, Vélez s study does not take into account geo-strategic considerations of the guerrillas. Their choice of municipalities is not solely dependent on the availability of exploitable resources. Many of their fronts are therefore very poor municipalities, offering no financial possibilities, but serve as tactical locations to either retreat from their enemies or protect their corridors. In the sixties and seventies, the FARC and ELN enjoyed strong support from their respective constituencies ; for the former, it consisted mainly in peasant movements and the latter, in left-wing, middle-class, intellectuals and academia. However, both the FARC and ELN are today faced with a growing loss of legitimacy vis-à-vis society at large due to the growing number of attacks, extortion and kidnappings, they have committed against civilians. According to the 2000 Amnesty International Report (Chapter on Colombia), at least 1000 people were kidnapped by armed groups, namely the ELN known for committing mass kidnappings 134. This number has more than doubled during the first half of Paramilitarism and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) The current paramilitary movement arose as a reaction to the State s incapacity to guarantee security against drug traffickers as well as a response to the guerrilla movement. 133 M. A. Vélez, op. cit., p April 1999, ELN took control of a domestic flight in Colombia and kidnapped the entire crew and passengers. Most were released shortly but a dozen were held captive until end of 2000; May 1999, ELN kidnapped a group of 180 churchgoers during a mass held in Cali. The latest large kidnapping took place in September 2000 when ELN kidnapped a group of 80 people in a restaurant in the outskirts of Cali

60 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Some self-defense groups were set up by the government in the 1960s in order to support military counterinsurgency operations, 135 whereas others were funded on the one hand, by landowners and the business sector (constituting private defense groups), and on the other, by drug traffickers. The current paramilitary movement has been growing since the early 1980s throughout the country and was decentralized into thousands of private armed groups, financed by leading businesses, the middle-class and right-wing, Conservative political leaders. Self-defense groups have been illegal since Carlos Castaño, who founded the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba and Urabá in 1981 with his deceased brother, Fidel Castaño (who died in 1996, in combat against the FARC), set up the AUC, in 1997, in an attempt to centralize the self-defense units in Colombia, as a means to better ensure the security of wealthy landowners and drug traffickers, primarily against possible attacks by guerrilla groups. The AUC is an umbrella organization which regroups several regional organizations, including the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba and Urabá, the Autodefensas Casanare, Autodefensas de Santander y Sur del César, and the Autodefensas del Putumayo Bloque Sur 136. There are numerous documented cases of complicity between certain sections of the Armed Forces and the AUC (paramilitaries), as reported by Colombian and U.S. authorities. Such collaboration may be illustrated by the massacres, perpetrated by the AUC, simultaneously in various villages and towns, in six departments, January 16, 1999, of 150 persons alleged to be guerrilla sympathizers. In one of these villages, El Tigre, it was alleged that the AUC combatants arrived in four military trucks, belonging to the 24 th Brigade 137. This dubious complicity constitutes a great challenge for both governments alike, due to the fact that it is not possible to fight against drug trafficking and the guerrilla movement without the help of the paramilitaries. The Colombian government thus finds itself in a very difficult and paradoxical situation because it must rely on the paramilitaries who control strategic and important areas of the Colombian territory, which implies that the authorities and Armed Forces are forced to tolerate many of the human rights and humanitarian violations committed by the paramilitaries. Human rights groups, on the one hand, such as Amnesty International, and the U.S. State Department on the other, have repeatedly accused the AUC of being responsible for committing human rights violations against entire villages throughout the country. As of the year 2000, the AUC are responsible for nearly eighty percent of human rights abuses 135 A law, adopted in 1964, set up civil defense groups. A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p

61 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY committed in Colombia 138. Over the course of the 1990s, the paramilitary movement has increasingly resorted to extreme measures of terror, consisting in forced disappearances and displacement of persons, massacres, assassinations, especially of persons suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers. It is estimated by the Colombian government that AUC's membership, in 2000, exceeded 8,000 members. Their membership, which cannot be corroborated with hard evidence, has grown nearly tenfold since 1992 (membership of 850 members) 139. One of the reasons why the AUC's membership has been growing at a faster rate than that of both the FARC and ELN consists in the growing support of the Colombian population for the paramilitaries, grown weary of the atrocities and abuses committed by the guerrilla groups 140, and in the fact that AUC soldiers are better paid and equipped than their guerrilla counterparts as well as soldiers. As confirmed by Mr. Castaño, former leader of the AUC, their soldiers earn $300 to $400 monthly; this partially explains why over 800 guerrilla fighters and 1,000 soldiers have joined the ranks of the AUC 141. The AUC s income is derived from two principal sources: private donations (mainly from landowners and drug traffickers) and drug trafficking. However, it is difficult to estimate with certainty the amount of resources drawn directly from drug trafficking -as is the case with the FARC and ELN. The links between the AUC and drug trafficking are not well documented. Nevertheless, it has been confirmed that they have adopted the same approach as that of the FARC with regards to the taxation of coca- and poppy- growers, in addition to acting as the buyers themselves of illicit crops (compared to the FARC, who set the prices but do not directly buy them). According to the CIP and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense 142, the AUC have set up a system of taxation, similar to that of the FARC, imposed on coca and opium poppy growers, as well as drug traffickers. It is also postulated that some AUC units are involved in the processing and exporting of cocaine, as well as in the protection of laboratories (cocaine base and hydrochloride cocaine) for drug trafficking syndicates. There is also a relationship of complicity between the AUC and drug traffickers for the protection of their land and laboratories. The Colombian Ministry of National Defense estimates that the AUC maintain control over 400 municipalities in Colombia. Their involvement in the illicit drug trade is reportedly 138 According to 2000 Amnesty International Report, in 1999, the AUC were responsible for the massacre of at least 350 civilians in villages throughout the country, namely in the Catatumbo region of North Santander. 139 Ministry of National Defense, Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia, December 2000, p Ministry of National Defense, op. cit., p Drugs, War and Democracy, A Survey of Colombia, in: The Economist, April 21, 2001, p Center for International Policy, CIP, Information on Combatants ; Ministry of National Defense, Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia, December 2000, p

62 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA concentrated in the following departments: in the Súr of Bolivar, Valle del Catatumbo, Meta. Guaviare, Caquetá, and Putumayo. As do the FARC and ELN, the AUC have been seeking to expand their control of, and political influence over, municipalities, by intimidating local authorities. There is some overlapping between the territorial control exerted by the AUC and the FARC and ELN. There have been violent territorial disputes between these groups over the control of areas of coca and opium poppy cultivation, which have resulted in grave human rights violations for local populations. It is interesting to note that when the AUC succeed in winning over a territory, previously controlled by guerrilla groups, they lower the taxation rate imposed on coca and poppy growers, from 10 percent (standard tax levied by guerrilla groups) to 6 percent as a means to gain sympathy from the local population. 143 Moreover, a direct correlation can be drawn between the strengthening of the AUC and the growing share of income derived from drug trafficking, as confirmed by the Colombian Ministry of National Defense. Though the exact amount of income from drug trafficking in unknown, Castaño has confirmed that approximately 70 percent of their resources come from narcotics 144. Likewise, the Colombian government believes that 8 out of 19 AUC squads, thus 50 percent of the paramilitaries, are involved in drug trafficking 145. In sum, drug trafficking is considered to be one of the most important stumbling blocks to the peace process and democracy in Colombia. It is further complicated considering that the zones of coca and opium poppy cultivation are controlled by the armed groups, mainly the FARC, and that both the FARC and AUC derive a significant portion of their income from drug-related activities, enabling them to enhance their power, to purchase more, and higher quality weapons, and to be better equipped for war. (3) The Peace Process From January 1999 until January 2002, the Colombian government (under Pastrana administration) has been formally negotiating with the FARC thereby marking the beginning of the peace process while talks with the ELN have been handled separately. The peace process has been a non-stop roller coaster ride with highs and lows (marked by frequent breaks in the peace talks). It should also be noted that the Pastrana administration has enjoyed little support of its peace policy from the general population. According to a poll conducted in August 2000, 71 percent disapproved of Pastrana s strategy in the peace process 146. A year later, such distrust of the peace process continued to grow and the majority 143 Ministry of National Defense, op. cit., p Ministry of National Defense, op. cit., p A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., Table 3.1, p The poll was cited by A. Rabasa and P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 3, footnote

63 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY of the population was waiting for the next administration to jump start the peace negotiations and/or bring an end to the armed conflict through a heightened militaristic strategy (the following administration came into office August 7, 2002, under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe). The government had granted the FARC a demilitarized zone (zona de despeje) in South- East Colombia (Department, El Caguán) the size of Switzerland, to serve as a neutral area for conducting talks aimed at reaching an agreement over a certain number of issues, such as: a cease of hostilities, exchange of prisoners (el canje, FARC and ELN allegedly held 527 prisoners of war, soldiers and policemen, as of the end of ), voluntary eradication and substitution of coca and opium poppy crops; role of paramilitaries in the conflict; and over a series of reforms (land and socio-economic reforms). On November 14, 2000, the FARC pulled out of peace negotiations with the Colombian government claiming that it lacked the will to fight against the paramilitary movement which allegedly had ties with some sectors of the government (talks froze for the first time in January 1999). ELN has also criticized the State for failing to meet past promises that they would guarantee the end of paramilitary attacks against ELN fronts during talks (such as was the case in July 2000, during the meeting in Geneva between representatives of the government, ELN and civil society). From February 4, 2001 until January 20, 2002, the government and FARC had taken up talks once again through the signing of the Los Pozos Agreement. Nonetheless the FARC failed to meet their end of the bargain and President Pastrana suspended indefinitely the zona de despeje (for the first time, on January 20, 2002 and the second, February 21, 2002) and ordered the Armed Forces to carry out military operations against the FARC in order to gain control over the former zona. As for the ELN, talks with the government were moving ahead up until August 8, 2001, when talks were officially frozen. These talks had been accompanied by representatives from civil society (businesses, academia and NGOs) and five friendly countries (países amigos: Switzerland, France, Spain, Norway and Cuba). They had agreed on setting up a demilitarized zone in the Department of Súr de Bolivar and had been proceeding to getting agreements from all parties involved and civil society (especially in municipalities of the area to be demilitarized) and to determining items on the agenda (revolving around ELN's proposal for the National Convención) and mechanisms for international monitoring. Nonetheless, negotiations continue to take place, during the Uribe administration, in Cuba. 147 For further information, see the latest Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the U.S. State Department, Chapter on Colombia

64 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA The Uribe administration has begun to negotiate with the AUC. They reached, in 2003, a gradual demobilization agreement with the AUC, expected to be completed by the end of However, there is much skepticism regarding the genuine political will of both parties to respect demobilization and a ceasefire. What are the main stakes in the conflict and obstacles to the peace process? Each actor of course claims to have its own stake in the conflict and criticizes its opponents for having diverging stakes in accordance with ideological differences. Generally, it could be assumed that the FARC and ELN seek to advance their political autonomy through territorial control (mainly in the case of FARC which controls more land than does the ELN), or economic weight, (by drawing on income for illicit activities and by controlling key resources such as mining and petroleum). It is also important to recall that - according to Marco Palacio illegal armed groups control 42,000 square kilometers out of total 1,038,700 square kilometers of land area. The Colombian government s and Armed Forces main stake in the peace process consists in strengthening national security by arriving at a cease fire (politically negotiated solution) or military victory, as a means to reinforce national institutions, improve governance and security. As for the paramilitaries, they seek to restore peace and security by annihilating all guerrilla groups as well as all civilians who allegedly support them. Finally, the stakes of the United States in the conflict, revolving around illicit drug trafficking, are examined in Chapter 2, with regards to Plan Colombia. * * * Colombia has been experiencing a set of profound crises throughout the 1990s in terms of national security (due to the armed conflict, drug trafficking and high levels of violence in general); loss of the State s legitimacy and weakening of the credibility enjoyed by its institutions (fueled by practices of impunity and corruption); loss of territorial control and monopoly over the use of force; and in terms of a breakdown in social cohesion and governance, due in part to the growing disparities in income distribution between the upper and lower social classes and urban and rural populations. Suffice it to say that the Colombian situation is highly complex. This chapter has merely sought to highlight core elements of the various facets of the crises in Colombia which are called, by some analysts, a crisis of democratic governance or governance, a crisis of legitimacy, a security crisis, or a societal crisis. No matter which perspective is taken, it is 148 M. Palacio, op. cit

65 CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY necessary to find a way out of this conundrum which is precisely what Plan Colombia aims to do. Considering that the armed conflict, the dynamics of drug trafficking, and problems of governance in Colombia are highly complex, prospects are mitigated neither black nor white- and will evolve over a relatively long period of time (at least ten years). Although there is no universal recipe for strengthening democratic governance, in the case of Colombia, it appears logical that the first step to be taken is the resolution of the armed conflict through either militaristic or political means, though preference should be given to finding a politically negotiated solution. It is still too soon to determine whether the militaristic strategy, chosen by the Pastrana administration and funded by the United States, will enable the State to consolidate the process of governance-building and to steer its way out of the multifaceted crises it has been facing since the early 1990s

66 THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA? Appendix 1 Fig 1.1 Map of Colombia