A Prescriptive Policy Paper on E-Governance Use of Wireless Technology in Electronic Voting Machine

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1 A Prescriptive Policy Paper on E-Governance Use of Wireless Technology in Electronic Voting Machine Achal Agarwal 1, Richa Agarwal 2, Kirtika Goel 3, 1 (Deptt. of Computer Science, Teerthankar Mahaveer University, Moradabad, India, achalagarwal3@gmail.com) 2 (Assistant Professor, Deptt. of Information Technology, SRMS college of Engg. & Technology, Bareilly, India, richamay3@gmail.com) 3 (Assistant Professor, Deptt. of Computer Science, Shanti Institute Of Technology, Meerut, India, kirtika.goel@gmail.com) ABSTRACT: Exercising one s vote is the power that lies with the people in a strong democratic system. Initially the voting system was synonymous with ballot papers for which a large amount of paper was utilized. As the time changed and with improvement in technology ballot papers and ballot boxes were replaced by an electronic medium. The system is comprised of a ballot unit and control unit called Direct Recording Electronic or electronic voting machine. From time to time, charges have been made, regarding the tampering of electronic voting machine to increase or decrease the vote count for a particular candidate. This accusation of tampering actually negates the idea behind the electronic voting machine which was to increase the efficiency and accuracy of voting system by easing the collecting and counting process of votes. The current proposed prescriptive paper is an effort towards finding whether it is possible to use an electronic voting machine using wireless technology. As wireless protocol is a globally accepted protocol for secure communication between wireless peers. Keywords: wireless EVM, wireless technology in EVM, wireless applications, EVM, Electronic voting. I. INTRODUCTION People choose their representatives and express their preferences for how they will be governed by election process. Naturally, the consistency of the election process is essential to the integrity of democracy itself. The election system must be adequately vigorous to endure a variety of fraudulent behaviours and must be adequately transparent and intelligible that voters and Candidates can accept the results of an election. Naturally, history is littered with examples of elections being manipulated in order to influence their outcome. The design of a good voting system, whether electronic or using traditional paper ballots or mechanical devices must satisfy a number of sometimes competing criteria. The secrecy of a voter s ballot must be preserved, both to guarantee the voter s safety when voting against a malicious candidate, and to guarantee that voters have no evidence that proves which candidates received their votes. The existence of such evidence would allow votes to be purchased by a candidate. The voting system must also be tamperresistant to prevent a wide range of attacks, including ballot stuffing by voters and incorrect tallying by insiders. Another factor, as shown by the so-called butterfly ballots in the Florida 2000 presidential election, is the importance of human factors[1,2]. A voting system must be graspable to and usable by the entire voting population, regardless of age, infirmity, or disability. Providing accessibility to such a diverse population is an important engineering problem and one where, if other security is done well, electronic voting could be a great improvement over current paper systems. Flaws in any of these aspects of a voting system, however, can lead to indecisive or incorrect election results. Despite opposition from advocates of paper ballot, many countries started using Direct Recording Electronic called DRE voting systems or electronic voting machine, completely replacing the traditional system. The

2 traditional system that involved time consuming process of casting the paper ballot, securing the ballot boxes till counting of votes, deputing manpower to physically count the paper ballots has now given way to a very fast process of getting the final tally of votes cast and also has to which candidate has secured how many votes. This is a direct result of using the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM). Over a period of time as the usage of EVM has increased, so has the complaints that the machines can be tampered in favour of one particular candidate by either increasing the votes received by him or by reducing the votes received by his opponents. This has been publicly demonstrated [3,4]. The requirement of the day is a secure EVM which is tamper resistant to the highest degree possible that can record votes with more accuracy and efficiency. An EVM (DRE) on wireless infrastructure is being proposed to avoid the tampering with the vote count. used to this day (see Figure 1), including the separate control and ballot units and the layout of both components. These first-generation EVMs were based on Hitachi 6305 microcontrollers and used firmware stored in external UV-erasable PROMs along with 64kb EEPROMs for storing votes. Second-generation models were introduced in 2000, moved the firmware into the central processing unit (CPU) and upgraded other components. In 2006, the manufacturers adopted a thirdgeneration design incorporating additional changes and suggestions. The first generation machines were are deemed too risky to use in national elections because their 15-year service life has expired, though they are apparently still used in certain state and local contests. In the 2009 parliamentary election, there were 417,037,606 valid votes cast, for an average of 302 votes per machine [5]. Other types and generations of machines have certain differences, but their overall operation is very similar. We believe that most of our security analysis is applicable to all EVMs now being used in India. The new proposed EVM, working with wireless infrastructure will be absolutely secure as votes will not be recorded with in the same unit of machine. Wireless protocols are globally accepted protocols for secure communication between the wireless peers. As with the time, trends in the technology advances, almost all the countries in the world having their own established wireless infrastructure, which can be used for a secured election process. As far as security is concerned, wireless first generation transmission protocols were said to be unsecured as in 1G analog data transmission was proposed. But with the time and advancement in wireless technology too, now we have 2G, 3G and 4G wireless technologies which are based on digital data transmission. One can easily encrypt digital data using any of the encryption technique available for secure transmission of data. II. ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)-DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC The Election Commission of India developed the country s EVMs in partnership with two governmentowned companies ECIL and BEL. The first Indian used by voters (Upper) and a CONTROL UNIT operated Figure 1: Indian EVMs consist of a BALLOT UNIT EVMs were developed in the early 1980s, which were by poll workers (lower) joined by a 5-meter cable. used in certain parts of the country, but were never adopted nationwide. They introduced the style of system

3 Voters simply press the button corresponding to the candidate of their choice. III. EVM OPERATION AND ELECTION PROCEDURES India s EVMs have two main components, shown in Figure 1. There is a CONTROL UNIT, used by poll workers, which stores and accumulates votes, and a BALLOT UNIT, located in the election booth, which is used by voters. These units are connected by a 5 m cable, which has one end permanently fixed to the ballot unit. The system is powered by a battery pack inside the control unit. The EVMs are designed for one- or tworace elections. The ballot unit has 16 candidate buttons. If any are unused, they are covered with a plastic masking tab inside the unit. When there are more than 16 candidates, an additional ballot unit can be connected to a port on the underside of the first ballot unit. Up to four ballot units can be chained together in this way, for a maximum of 64 candidates. A four-position slide switch under the ballot unit door selects the unit s position in the chain. Election procedures are described in a number of public documents. Prior to the election, workers set up the ballot unit by attaching a paper label that shows the names of the candidates and their party symbols (to aid illiterate voters) next to the candidate buttons. After sealing the label under a plastic door, workers configure the number of candidates using a CAND SET button on the control unit. On the morning of the election, poll workers perform a small mock election to test the machine. They then publicly set the totals to zero by pressing the CLEAR button, after which the control unit display shows that a total of zero votes have been cast. Workers can check this count at any time by pressing the TOTAL button. Seals are then placed on various parts of the control unit to block access to counting and clearing functions until later in the election process. Figure 2: Counting Votes The EVM records votes in its internal memory. At a public counting session, workers remove a seal on the control unit and press the RESULT I button (left) to reveal the results. The machine sequentially outputs the number of votes received by each candidate using a bank of 7-segment LEDs (right). Here, candidate number 01 has received 7 votes. When a voter arrives, workers verify his or her identity and record the voter s presence by obtaining a signature or thumb print. To prevent double voting, they mark the voter s right index finger with indelible ink. Next, a poll worker presses the BALLOT button on the control unit to allow one vote. This causes a green READY light to glow on the ballot unit. The voter enters the polling booth and presses the button for the candidate of his or her choice. A red light next to the candidate button glows, the ready light turns off, and the control unit emits a loud beep to indicate that the vote has been cast. The red light then turns off automatically. This process repeats for each voter. At the end of the poll, the presiding officer removes a plastic cap on the control unit and presses the CLOSE button, which prevents the EVM from accepting further votes. The ballot unit is disconnected and the control unit is placed in storage until the public count, which may occur weeks later. On the counting day, the control units are delivered to a counting centre. In public view, an election official breaks a seal on the control unit and presses the RESULT I button, shown in Figure 2. The display on the control unit shows a sequence of outputs: the number of candidates, the total votes, and the number of votes

4 received by each candidate. Officials manually record the totals from each machine and add them together to determine the election result. The machines are then placed in storage until the next election. per records of election commission of India, there was a maximum of 1033 candidates registered of any assembly seat in election [6]. In such cases 7 digit service number can be used respectively. IV. DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM: After voting, if any technical problem or damage occurs with the machines it leads to re election. A. The corrupt officers may increase the count of the voting [4]. B. During transportation of the machines the person in charge can change the status of machines [3]. C. This system is not cost effective. We need to spend money on security, officers in charge, secured place for voting and counting. V. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED SYSTEM USING WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY: In the proposed system we wish to keep counting of votes to a remote secured system. In this system we are using a wireless circuit which enables the voter to vote and transfer this vote to the remote system by converting it to radio wave through the mobile towers using SMS. Number of votes to any candidate will be same as the number of SMSs received to the assigned number of the candidate. Here we need not to go for the re election even if the machine is damaged, as a backup of the messages received will simultaneously be taken on another system. In case one system fails, we can check the votes on the other system. In case of booth capturing, our system will be safe, as the SMSs from a particular sender after a particular time can be rejected in case of booth capturing. VI. USE OF WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY IN ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES: Most of the telecom organisations use 5 digit or 7digit service numbers for their personal use. Almost every country has their reserved bandwidth of telecom spectrum too, which can be used nationwide for the secured electronic voting. In case of 5 digits service numbers, initial three digits can be reserved for constituency seat number and rest of the two digits can be reserved for the candidate num. Most of the countries in world have bi party political system, while countries like India where many political parties exist and have their own candidate in election. As Each candidate can be assigned a 5 digit service number, in which initially three digits will represent the constituency seat num, and rest two digits for the candidate num for the assembly seat. As soon as any voter presses the vote button in the ballot unit, one SMS will be sent to the service number assigned to that particular candidate. As each candidate will have their unique service number so at the end of the day number of SMSs received for any particular candidate will constitute the final tally of votes received by him. For the voting, the country s reserved bandwidth of telecom spectrum and wide telecom infrastructure can be used. VII. E-VOTING SYSTEM USING MOBILE TERMINAL E-voting system includes a mobile terminal, a mobile communication server, and an e-voting device. A mobile communication server within mobile communication network connects a mobile terminal to an e-voting device for e-voting service. It is not allowed to authorize any change of data except for deleting ID of a mobile terminal along with votes casted. An e-voting device can be a secure system managed by national organization such as a Board of Elections or Election Commission of India or NIC. VII.1 E-Voting Device E-voting device consists of following units for its internal functionality. VII.1.1 CU(Control Unit) To prevent multiple voting, the machine will have same control as of current machine, until and unless polling officer presses the ballot button again, multiple votes can t be casted. VII.1.2 ES(Encryption System) This will create a secure encryption key to encrypt the voting data and transmits the key and voting data to a mobile terminal. VII.1.3 BU (Ballot Unit) It provides information about possible voting selections or a list of candidates to a mobile terminal.

5 VII.2 Mobile Terminal A mobile terminal includes VRS and ES. VII.2.1 VRS (Vote Receiving System) VRS receives vote in form of SMS and an encryption key from an e-voting device. VII.2.2 ES (Encryption System) This unit encrypts voter s decision using the encryption key stored in VRS and sends the encrypted vote content to the e-voting device. VII.3 Mobile Communication Server A mobile communication server including SRS connects a mobile terminal to an e-voting device over a mobile communication network. VII.3.1 SRS (Sending and Receiving System) This unit receives an encryption key and vote information from the e-voting device and transfers it to the mobile terminal. Also, SRS receives encrypted vote receiving information from the mobile terminal and sends it to the e-voting device. VIII. OPERATION OF WIRELESS BASED ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE Figure-3 shows the Wireless Receiver Module, which receives votes from each voter in terms of SMS. For this purpose the information of candidates are predefined to voter s modem. It has all number s that is assigned to every candidate. When voter cast their votes on the Election Day, for this purpose voter presses the vote button corresponding to the candidate of their choice, then the wireless electronic voting machine send a message to the number assigned to that particular candidate. Wireless modem will receive the votes, which is coming from wireless electronic voting machine. For example, a voter had cast the vote for a candidate with serial id After the vote is cast an auto generated SMS will be send to wireless modem/central control unit corresponding to the number assigned. At the end of the day, when voting is over, votes can be counted easily as the total messages received for a particular number is equal to the number of votes casted in favour of a particular candidate, as each number is assigned to a particular political candidate. Simply put, the person getting the highest number of SMSs will be declared elected. Fig.3 shows the wireless Receiver Module IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK: This paper details the specifications, design and implementation of a generic e-voting technique using wireless System as a most basic application of wireless based EVM or DRE, where voters can cast their votes. Our proposal enables a voter to cast his vote without affecting the accuracy and efficiency of current voting system. Here the Mobile service provider authentication infrastructure is used to provide candidate authentication and improve candidate s mobility. Authentication is always a difficult requirement to full fill for remote voting schemes, most of which apply a public-key based signature scheme for candidate authentication. In our scheme, we are using the existing authentication infrastructure. Our scheme also enhances the security and provides more mobility and convenience to voters. Where the voters privacy is protected. In addition, proxy vote or double voting is not possible. Any entities included for an e-voting cannot know the voting result. However, further work is needed to address the importance that we place in the trust on the Authentication Centre (AC) and to ensure that there doesn t exist any virus and intruders attack. In future work, we will discuss more on security of machine as well as of the votes casted. In this paper, our concern is to present e-voting system using a Mobile Equipment (ME) and to explain its process as a basic application of wireless based EVM. In future the whole system will be exchanging data with the government of India s AADHAAR scheme, in which the biometric data

6 of every citizen in India is stored to ensure the authenticity of the voter. Furthermore more typical cryptographic algorithms can be applied in wireless transmission to save it from the intruder s attack. REFRENCES 1. Jonathan N. Wand, Kenneth W. Shotts, Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Walter R. Mebane, Michael C. Herron, Henry E. Brady The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, In American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 4 December Jonathan N Wand, Kenneth W. Shotts, Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Michael C. Herron, Henry E. Brady. The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida On July 2, Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, Dan S. Wallach Analysis of an Electronic Voting System appeared as Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute Technical Report TR , July 23, Hari K. Prasad, J. Alex Halderman, Rop Gonggrijp, Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, Arun Kankipati, Sai Krishna Sakhamuri, Vasavya Yagati, Security Analysis of India s Electronic Voting Machines Released April 29, 2010 Revised July 29, 2010, 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 10), Oct web reference as on Kindly refer to the fact sheet for general election for VOLI/08_VotersInformation.pdf 6. web reference as on , Plz refer to Q. No.18 in FAQ-CONTESTING FOR ELECTIONS SECTION, web link as on is