The Economic and Sociopolitical Factors of Minimal Democracy in Romania

Transcription

1 International Journal of Arts and Sciences 3(3): (2009) CD-ROM. ISSN: InternationalJournal.org The Economic and Sociopolitical Factors of Minimal Democracy in Romania Mihai Mutascu, West University of Timisoara, Romania Anne-Marie Fleischer, West University of Timisoara, Romania Abstract: Democracy is a very old and complex concept. The field literature shows generally that democracy has two categories of factors: exogenous and endogenous. On the one hand, the exogenous determinants of democracy include: the economic conditions; the ethnic structure of population; and the religious fragmentation of population. On the other hand, the endogenous determinants of democracy refer to the characteristics of political context, such as electoral rules, forms of government, stability and persistence of democratic institutions, degree of political election competition and degree of vote participation. The paper analyzes empirically, in Romania s case, the relationships between democracy (dependent variable) and its factors (independent variables). The analysis is based on the construction of a linear Logit Model and the data set is covering the period All of them have a significant impact on the level of democracy, but the field literature offers different points of view regarding the sign of this relationships. The most important factor is the degree of competition, followed, with a small difference, by the form of government (monarchy or republic). These two factors are followed in order of intensity by the economic development, ethnic homogeneity, participation and religious homogeneity. Based on the obtained forecast probability, we can observe two principal intervals of analysis. The first interval, from 1926 to 1989, has some strong negative shocks (the probability of minimal democracy is practically null) in the years: the authoritarian King Carol II has abdicated and was succeeded by the National Legionary State, in which power was taken by Ion Antonescu; Antonescu was toppled and arrested by King Michael I of Romania; the communists forced King Michael I to abdicate and proclaimed Romania a republic, in the context of military occupation and economic control of the USSR until 1958; and popular uprising against the Ceausescu regime and his fall. The second interval, from 1990 to 2007, comports a strong positive shock, beginning with 1992, the year of the first free democratic elections. The main results show that, in Romania s case, an increase in the level of economic development, an augmentation of ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity; and a decrease in competition and participation, on a monarchic base, increases the probability of a minimal level of democracy. This means that Romanian democracy can be accompanied by high levels of economic development, ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity, on monarchic base, even if the elections are not free and the political competition is illusory.

2 1. Introduction Democracy is a very old and complex concept. During the last years, the definitions of democracy were different, but in essence they reflect the same idea. In this context, Seymour Lipset, in 1959, following the idea of Joseph Schumpeter from 1945, considers that democracy is a political system which supplier regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible parte of the population to influence major decisions (Lipset, 1959, p.71). In the same note, Helena Catt sees the democracy such as a set of right or an entire way of organizing the political and economic life of a state (Catt, 1999, p.5). In 2006, in a modern vision, David Held defines democracy as form of government which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule [and] political community in which there is some form of political equality among people (Held, 2006, p.1). For Tatu Vanhanen, with a sociological vision, the democracy represents a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled for political power (Vanhanen, 2003, p.49). There are a set of factors that can influence the democracy s conditions and level. Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane identify tree factors or conditions with great impact on the probability of democracy: structural conditions, cultural conditions and institutional conditions (Ersson and Lane, 2003, p.82). The first factors are referring to economic and social dimensions; the second factors to ethnicity and religion; and the third factors to political, social and economic rule. Sylvia Chan groups the democracy s factors in five categories: (i) pre-transition legacies and broader socio-economic structural factors; (ii) new habits and institutions arising out of the transition itself ; (iii) the opportunities and limits arising from a particular international system during a particular historical period ; (iv) creative thinking about models of democracy; (v) economic performance (Chan, 2002, p.69). Torsten Persson and Guido Tabelini find that the democracy is strongly influenced by factors such as electoral rules, forms of government, stability and persistence of democratic institutions (Persson and Tabelini, 2006, pp. 1-2). More, in the same note, Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, in 2007, analyzing the hypothesis of the direct democracy determinants, consider that Such hypotheses fall into three broad categories: economic, institutional and cultural ones (Fiorino and Ricciuti, 2007, p5). In our opinion, all this scientific acquisitions bring to the remark that democracy has in fact two main categories of determinants: one exogenous and other endogenous. On the one hand, the exogenous determinants of democracy include: the economic conditions; the ethnic structure of population; and the religious fragmentation of population. On the other hand, the endogenous determinants of democracy refer to the characteristics of political context, such as electoral rules, forms of government, stability and persistence of democratic institutions, degree of political election competition and degree of vote participation.

3 All of them have a significant impact on the level of democracy, but the field literature offers different points of view regarding the sign of this relationships. 2. Theoretical fundaments The field literature offers contradictory results about the sign of the relationship between democracy and its exogenous and endogenous determinants. a. The exogenous determinants refer to the economic conditions; the ethnic structure of population; and the religious fragmentation of population. a1. Regarding economic conditions, in 1959, Saymour Lipset argues that the economic development ensures the democratization, more precisely development first and democracy later (Lipset, 1959, pp.69). He considers that broadly based economic development is conducive to a democracy. Larry Jey Diamond believes that if regime durability varies with economic performance, and dictatorships are more able to channel resources to accumulation and the creation of wealth rather than consumption, democratic regimes are more vulnerable to economic performance setbacks and political turmoil than their authoritarian counterparts (Diamond, 1988, p.3). In the same note, Gabriel Almond reviews key works of some scholars and explains, statistically, the significant correlation between economic development and democratic institutions (Almond, 1991, pp ). With other words, the accentuation of economic development generates an increase of state democratization. Adam Przeworski considers, in the same year, that To evoke compliance and participation, democracy must generate substantive outcomes: it must offer all the relevant political forces real opportunities to improve their material welfare (Przeworski, 1991, p.32). Moreover, he suggests that economic development fosters democracy and promotes political stability. Tamara Resler and Roger Kanet consider, that democracies build their legitimacy on institutionalized procedures and constitutional guarantees of political rights and freedoms, while the primary means through which dictatorships establish their legitimacy is good economic performance (Resler and Kanet, 1993, pp.5-22). In this context, economic setbacks are more likely to create instability in dictatorships than in democracies. Six years later, Minxin Pei considers that the economic development will transform social structure and create a large enough middle class as the social basis of democracy (Pei, 1999, p.2). James Robinson, analyzing the economic effects of development on democracy, concludes that the application of techniques adopted from best-practice econometrics shows no evidence that economic development has a causal effect on democracy (Robinson, 2006, p.1). More, neither does it support the idea that economic development influences the probability of coups but not democratizations. Finally, in 2007, Liang - Chih Evans Chen, after she made a review of the field literature, explains that the states with high economic growth are strong democracies, having the

4 highest level of development (Chen, 2007, p.16). Moreover, he formalized the idea that the economic development is growing, as the democratization is increasing and vice-versa. a2. Regarding ethnic structure of population, the major parte of the field literature suggest that ethnicity has a great impact on democracy. More precisely, the ethnic diversity has a negative impact on democracy. In 1999, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, analyzing the ethnic groups and their impact on democracy, consider that An ethnic group or an ethno-linguistic group is a collection of people who share the same language or have a common culture based on language (Lane and Ersson, 1999, p.54). In the same year, Anthony Smith, identifies two types of ethnic groups: lateral ethnic groups and vertical ethnic groups. The lateral ethnic group is composed of aristocrats and higher clergy, thought it might from time to time include bureaucrats, high military officials and the richer merchants [and] the vertical ethic group are more compact and popular (Smith, 1991, p.53). For Smith, the first type of group is a bureaucratic, aristocratic and nondemocratic group, while the second type of ethnic group is native, domestic, homely and more democratic. More, Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane, argue that Ethnic cleavages in a country destabilize the polity and undermine the democracy. Ethnic homogeneity on the other hand promotes democracy and political stability (Ersson and Lane, 2003, p.100). For the same authors, If ethnic cleavages undermine political stability, then they would also constitute a threat to democracy (Ersson and Lane, 2003, p.104). In such conditions, the democracy is more viable in a country in which the cleavage between ethnic groups is low and the country has the tendency to be a states-nation. a3. Regarding religious fragmentation of population, the field literature treats two main perspectives. One is orientated on the ethnic fragmentations, but focused on the religious cleavage, and the other one on the dominant religion in the population. For the first perspective, Lipset, in 1959, illustrates that Democracy is founded upon universalistic belief system, meaning that it accepts various religions as long as strict separation between state and church is maintained, or between worldly and spiritual matters (Lipset, 1959, pp.69). More, Richard Rose and Derek Urwin affirm that religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of parties in West world (Rose and Urwin, 1969, p.12). With other words, the religious cleavage destructs the political stability and reduces the level of democracy. In the same note, Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane say that ethnicity or religion presents more problems for political stability, as one kind of community could be more compact then the other or one kind of belief would be more politically explosive than the another (Ersson and Lane, 2003, p.107). These means that the religious homogeneity promotes democracy and political stability and vice-versa (the religion diversity is destructives for democracy and political stability). For the second perspective, if the religion is characterized by toleration and it has a strong relationship with the power state authority, then the state is more democratic.

5 George Moyser, in 1991, considers that religion expressed in the domestic political area may spill over into cross-border disputes [or] entails the reconciliation of divergent opinions and interests in mechanisms of conflict resolution (Moyser, 1991, p.5). Moreover, for Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, the Religion is the source of some of the most remarkable political mobilization of our time (Jelen and Wilcox, 2002, p.1). For example, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson see the existence of a linkage between democratic instability and Catholicism, accounted for by the nature of Catholicism as a religion (Lane and Ersson, 1999, p.44). According to the same authors, in relationship with democracy, the Protestantism and Hinduism are today the religions that, perhaps, most endorse toleration (Ersson and Lane, 2003, p.108). Regarding orthodoxy, Aristotle Papanikolaou argues that there does not exist a "clash of civilizations" between Orthodoxy and democracy and that Orthodox support of communitarian forms of democracy is warranted on inner theological grounds (Papanikolaou, 2003, p.75). b. The endogenous determinants represent the characteristics of political context, such as electoral rules, forms of government, stability and persistence of democratic institutions, degree of political election competition or vote participation. This issue is more complex. Whatever, Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun treat the democracy trough the some coordinates: (1) Government leaders are chosen in competitive elections in which there are opposition political parties; (2) political parties, ; (3) governments defeated in an election step down, ; (4) elected governments are not figure-heads (Weiner and Özbudun, 1987, pp.4-5). Robert Dahl identifies two dimensions of democracy (polyarchy): contestation or competition and inclusiveness or participation. The contestation represents the idea that the citizens have the possibility: 1. To formulate their preferences; 2. To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; 3. To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government (Dahl, 1971, p.2). The inclusiveness is the variation in the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government (Dahl, 1971, p.4). Dahl sustains the idea that the countries with high level of contestation and low level of participation will democratize more easily those in the reverse condition and vice-versa. In other hand, Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin consider that It easier to increase participation - a legal matter - than to foster contestation - a matter of political culture (Lipset and Lakin, 2004, p.174). Therefore, the researches on the causal relationship s sign between democracy and its exogenous and endogenous determinants are not conclusive; some of them claim the connections of the same sign and other of the contrary sign.

6 This scientific approach is intended to analyze, in Romania s case, the relationships between democracy and its exogenous and endogenous determinants. According to the mentioned premise, all the theoretical elements presented allow us to formulate a series of theoretical working assumptions, which consider two of the factors of democracy: one exogenous and another endogenous one. The assumptions hypotheses are: H1: The level of democracy is growing as the economic development is higher. H2: The level of democracy is growing as the ethnic homogeneity is higher. H3: The level of democracy is growing as the religious homogeneity is higher. H4: The level of democracy is growing as the degree of contestation is higher. H5: The level of democracy is growing as the degree of participation is higher. In summary, the meanings of the hypothesis work relations are: Table no.1 - The sense ( the sings ) of the hypothesis work relations The trend of the level of democracy The main factors of democracy + Economic development + + Ethnic homogeneity + + Religious homogeneity + + Contestation + + Participation + The trend of determinant factors of democracy The fundamental assumption is that democracy represents a complex phenomenon determined by a couple of factors, such as: economic development, ethnic homogeneity, religious homogeneity, contestation and participation. 3. Methods and results Starting with the theoretical argues shown, the paper analyzes empirically, in Romania s case, the relationships between the level of democracy (dependent variable) and its exogenous and endogenous factors (independent variables). The analysis is based on the construction of a linear Logit Model and the data set is covering the period The measures of democracy and its determinants are presented in Table No.2. Moreover, I entered a dummy variable - T, which reflects the form of government (monarchy or republic). If the state is a monarchy, the dummy is 1, and if the state is a republic, dummy is 0 (in Romania, in the considered sample, the monarchic period covers the interval ). In a monarchy, in a democratic approach, the most important function is to sustain the legitimacy oh the state. Vernon Bogdanor considers that under modern conditions, a constitutional monarchy serves not to limit democracy but to underpin and indeed to sustain it (Bogdanor, 1997, p.64).

7 More, Rebecca Stefoff principally assimilates the republic with democracy or aristocracy. According to the author, The complex government of the republic blended elements of democracy, aristocracy, and even monarchy (Stefoff, 2007, p.33). Table no.2 - The variables description and its sources Variable Measure and description Source Level of democracy - L Index of Democratization, illustrates the rank of democracy s level Vanhanen (2007) Economic development - GC Ethnic homogeneity - E Religious homogeneity - O Competition - CT Participation - PR Form of government - T GDP per capita, suggests the level of economic development as GDP per capita (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars). Index of Ethnic Homogeneity, calculate as a percent of Romanian ethnic population in total population Index of Religious Homogeneity, calculate as a percent of orthodox population in total population Degree of Competition, illustrates the percentage share of the smaller parties and independents of the votes cast in parliamentary elections, or of the seats in parliament. Degree of Participation, illustrates the percentage of the adult population that voted in elections. Dummy variables, reflects the form of government (monarchy - 1 or republic - 0). Maddison (2003) and International Monetary Fund (2009) Calculate in base on the dates published by the Statistical Yearbook of Romania, National Institute of Statistics, Calculate in base on the dates published by the Statistical Yearbook of Romania, National Institute of Statistics, (Vanhanen, 2007) (Vanhanen, 2007) Dummy methodology Because some of the considered independent factors (GC, E, O, CT and PR) have different scales of measurement, for a comparative analysis, the levels of variables were normalized: IF Normalized IF IFMin. = (1) IF IF Max. Min.

8 where IF represents the independent variables GC, E, O, CT and PR. [ 0,1] IF (2) Normalized In this case, GC, E, O, CT and PR become GCN, EN, ON, CTN and PRNV, where 0 corresponds to the minimum intensity level of indicators and 1 indicates the maximum intensity level. Index of Democratization (L) has a different ranking. According to Tatu Vanhanen, It is reasonable to assume that countries with high index values are democracies and countries with low index values non-democracies [and] 5.0 index points as the minimum threshold of democracy (Vanhanen, 2007, pp.20-21). In our logit approach, the Index of Democratization becomes the Probability of Minimal Democracy - PMD: 0, if PMD = 1,if L < 3 L 3 (3) The level 3 has been selected because the value 3 is produced by the minimum threshold values of Competition and Participation. In this context, we consider that the level 3 is the border between democracy and autocracy. Based on the theoretical assumptions made above and on the normalized illustrated variables, the sense of the relationship between Probability of Minimal Democracy and its determinant factors is as follows: Table no.3 - The expected sense ( the sings ) of the relations between PMD - GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV and T Probability of Minimal Democracy The main factors of democracy The trend of determinant factors of democracy + GCN + + EN + + ON + + CTN + + PRNV + + T + or - According to Christopher Dougherty, in logit estimation one hypothesizes that the probability p of the occurrence of the event is determined by the function (Dougherty, 2007, p.294): 1 p i = F( Z i ) = (4) Z 1+ e i where Z is a linear function of the explanatory variables.

9 The marginal effect of Z on the probability, which will be denoted f(z), is given by the derivative of this function with respect to Z: Z dp e f ( Z) = = (5) Z 2 dz (1 + e ) As with logit analysis, the marginal effect of any variable is not constant. It depends on the value of f(z), which in turn depends on the values of each of the explanatory variables. To obtain a summary statistic for the marginal effect, the usual procedure is parallel to that used in logit analysis, basing of the mean values of the explanatory variables. In the considered case, the Z is: Z = 5 i α + β1 xgcni + β 2xENi + β3xoni + β 4xCTNi + β 4xPRNVi + β xt + ε (6) where α are the intercept term and i is the period of time (years ). From 82 included PMD observations, 68% are 0 (Probability of Minimal Democracy is null) and 26% are 1 (Probability of Minimal Democracy is positive): Table no.4 - The PMD frequencies, in Romania, in periods Dependent Variable: PMD Method: ML - Binary Logit (BHHH) Date: 06/28/09 Time: 13:31 Sample: Included observations: 82 Frequencies for dependent variable Cumulative Value Count Percent Count Percent

10 The econometric tests of the Logit model are: Table no.5 - The econometric tests of the Logit model PMD - GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV and T Dependent Variable: PMD Method: ML - Binary Logit (BHHH) Date: 06/28/09 Time: 13:31 Sample: Included observations: 82 Failure to improve Likelihood after 3 iterations QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-statistic Prob. GCN EN ON CTN PRNV T Mean dependent var S.D. dependent var S.E. of regression Akaike info criterion Sum squared resid Schwarz criterion Log likelihood Hannan-Quinn criter Avg. log likelihood Obs with Dep=0 56 Total obs. 82 Obs with Dep=1 26 The tests of model show that the absolute values of the standard errors corresponding to the coefficients of the function are lower than the values of the coefficients; witch sustains the correct estimation of these coefficients (a conclusion reinforced by the low values of the probabilities). Based on the model, the expectation-prediction values are:

11 Table no.6 - The expectation-prediction values of Logit model PMD - GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV and T Dependent Variable: PMD Method: ML - Binary Logit (BHHH) Date: 06/28/09 Time: 13:31 Sample: Included observations: 82 Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5) Estimated Equation Constant Probability Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total P(Dep=1)<=C P(Dep=1)>C Total Correct % Correct % Incorrect Total Gain* Percent Gain** NA Estimated Equation Constant Probability Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total E(# of Dep=0) E(# of Dep=1) Total Correct % Correct % Incorrect Total Gain* Percent Gain** *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification **Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation The estimated model correctly predicts 100% of the observations (100% of the Dep=0 and 100% of the Dep=1 observations). Among the 56 individuals with y=0, the expected number

12 of y=0 observations in the estimated model is Moreover, among the 26 observations with y=1, the expected number of y=1 observations is These numbers represent roughly a 43.1% improvement over the constant probability model. The correlograme of standardized residuals is presented in Table no.7. Table no.7 - Correlograme of standardized residuals Date: 06/28/09 Time: 13:57 Sample: Included observations: 21 Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob.. ***. *** * *.. * *.. * * **.. * ** *.. * *.. * * *.. * * The tests show that there are some low autocorrelations and partial correlations of standardized residuals for inferior legs. In conclusion, the model may be considered representative to describe, in Romania, the connection between PMD and GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV & T. 4. Conclusions The method for identifying the effect of the GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV & T on the PMD consists in calculating the marginal effect at the mean value of the explanatory variables. The next table shows the marginal effects, calculated by multiplying f(z) with the estimated coefficients of the logit regression.

13 Table no.8 - The marginal effects of the Logit model PMD - GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV and T Variable Mean β Mean β f(z) β x f(z) GCN EN ON CTN PRNV T Total Starting from the marginal effects measured on the logit model built, we can identify the following remarks: - an one-point increase in the GCN, decreases with % and increases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania; - an one-point increase in the EN, decreases with % and increases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania; - an one-point increase in the ON, decreases with % and increases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania; - an one-point increase in the CTN, increases with % and decreases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania; - an one-point increase in the PRNV, increases with % and decreases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania; - an one-point increase in the T, decreases with % and increases with 99.9% the probability of the existence of minimal democracy in Romania. We can observe that the results confirm four of six assumptions hypotheses. In such conditions, the model disaffirms the acquisitions of Dahl (1971), Weiner and Özbudun (1987) and Lipset and Lakin (2004). For the analyzed period, in Romania, an increase in the level of economic development, an augmentation of ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity; and a decrease in competition and participation, on a monarchic base, increases the probability of a minimal level of democracy. Per a contrario, a diminution in the level of economic development, a decrease of ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity; and an augmentation of competition and participation, on a republican base, decreases the probability for existence of a minimal level of democracy. Between the six determinants factors (GCN, EN, ON, CTN, PRNV and T), the most important is the degree of competition, followed, with a small difference, by the form of government (monarchy or republic). These two factors are followed in order of intensity by the economic development, ethnic homogeneity, participation and religious homogeneity.

14 Why, in Romania, a high level of democracy is accompanied by low levels of participation and competition? Apparently, it is impossible that a high level of democracy has low levels of participation and competition. The answer is offered by Vanhanen (2000, pp.17-18): democratization gets high values only if the levels of both basic variables (participation and competition) are high. In the same time, a high level of competition cannot compensate the lack of participation, or vice versa. The same author says that there are countries where the level of electoral participation is low but the level of democracy is high, because elections are not free and competitive. Moreover, in our opinion, it is plausible to find a high democratization, with not free election and low competition. We talk about a simulated competition, which has an official high value, but a low level in reality. In this case, the political competitors simulate a visible and illusory hard play, but in reality all of them play the same role and have de same vector of interest. The forecast of the probability of minimal democracy, in the periods, in Romania, is illustrated in the follow graphic: The Probability of Minimal Democracy Graphic 1 The forecast of the Probability of Minimal Democracy, in Romania, in periods Based on the obtained forecast probability, we can observe two principal intervals of analysis. The first interval, from 1926 to 1989, has some strong negative shocks (the probability of minimal democracy is practically null) in the years: the authoritarian King Carol II has abdicated and was succeeded by the National Legionary State, in which power was taken by Ion Antonescu; Antonescu was toppled and arrested by King Michael I of

15 Romania; the communists forced King Michael I to abdicate and proclaimed Romania a republic, in the context of military occupation and economic control of the USSR until 1958; and popular uprising against the Ceausescu regime and his fall. The second interval, from 1990 to 2007, comports a strong positive shock, beginning with 1992, the year of the first free democratic elections. The main results show that, in Romania s case, an increase in the level of economic development, an augmentation of ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity; and a decrease in competition and participation, on a monarchic base, increases the probability of a minimal level of democracy. This means that Romanian democracy can be accompanied by high levels of economic development, ethnic homogeneity and religious homogeneity, on monarchic base, even if the elections are not free and the political competition is illusory. References Books Bogdanor, V. (1997), The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford University Press, p.64. Catt, H. (1999). Democracy in Practice, Routledge Publisher, p.5. Chan, S. (2002). Liberalism, democracy, and development, Cambridge University Press, p.69. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.2 & p.4. Diamond, L. (1988). Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic, London: Macmillan, p.3. Dougherty, C. (2007). Introduction to Econometrics, Oxford University Press, p.294. Ersson, S., Lane, J.E. (2003). Democracy. A Comparative Approach, Routledge Publisher, p.82, p.100, p.104, p.107 & p.108. Held, D. (2006). Models of democracy, Third Edition, Stanford University Press, p.1. Jelen, T., Wilcox, C. (2002). Religion and politics in comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press, p.1. Lane, J.E, Ersson, S. (1999). Politics and Society in Western Europe, Sage Publications Ltd., p.44 & p.54.

16 Lipset, S., Lakin, S. (2004). The democratic century, University of Oklahoma Press, p.174. Moyser, G. (1991). Politics and Religion in the Modern World, Routledge Publisher, p.5. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, p.32. Smith, A. (1991). National identity, London Penguin Books, p.53. Stefoff, R. (1997). Monarchy, Marshall Cavendish, p.33. Vanhanen, T. (2003). Democratization: A comparative analysis of 170 countries, Routledge Publisher, p.49. Weiner, M., Özbudun, E. (1987). Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, Duke University Press, pp.4-5. Articles Almond, G.A. (1991). Capitalism and Democracy, Political Science and Politics, 24(3), pp Lipset, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, p.69 & 71. Papanikolaou, A. (2003). Byzantium, Orthodoxy, and Democracy, Journal of the American Academy of Religion (1), p.75. Robinson, J. (2006). Economic Development and Democracy, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9, p.1. Rose, R., Urwin, D. (1969). Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes, Comparative Political Studies, No.2, p.12. Newspaper articles Chen, L. (2007). Development First, Democracy Later? Or Democracy First, Development Later? The Controversy over Development and Democracy, The annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, p.16. Fiorino, N., Ricciuti, R. (2007). Determinants of Direct Democracy, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper No. 2035, p.5.

17 Maddison, A. (2009). Historical Statistics for the World Economy: AD, Horizontal file, Copyright Angus Maddison. Pei, M. (1999). Economic Institutions, Democracy, and Development, Conference on Democracy, Market Economy, and Development, p.2. Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2006). Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details, Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper n. 302, p.5. Resler, T. J., Kanet, R. E. (1993). Democratization: The National-Subnational Linkages, In Depth No. 3, pp Vanhanen, T. (2007). Introduction: Measures of Democratization, Finnish Social Science Data Archive. Vanhanen, T. (2000). Introduction: Measures of Democratization, Finnish Social Science Data Manual, pp Documents of international organizations *** International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April National Official Documents *** Statistical Yearbook of Romania, National Institute of Statistics, Internet (url) Hofstede, G., Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions, hofstede_ dimensions.php