The Politics of Extractive Industries in the Central Andes

Transcription

1 The Politics of Extractive Industries in the Central Andes John Crabtree and Isabel Crabtree-Condor 1. Introduction An idea that is central to this chapter is that not only does the legacy of extractive industries affect institutional development in the Andean countries, but that the success (or otherwise) of extractive industries hinges crucially on the historical and institutional context. In particular, we argue that the state plays a fundamental role in this regard. It is not the size or scope of the state that matters, but the efficacy with which it is able to reconcile competing claims and demands in such a way as to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. As we shall see, the record of the three Andean republics under review Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador is hardly encouraging in this respect, although it is arguable that recent conflicts are producing institutional developments that may in the future prove conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes. In order to compare and contrast the way in which extractive industries have developed in these three Andean countries and the impacts they have had, we here seek to highlight what we consider to be three key aspects: (i) the way in which state structures have developed over time, and in particular the way in which different actors (in the case of extractives) enjoy privileged access to the process by which decisions are made within the state; (ii) the way in which grass-roots social movements have evolved over time and the extent to which these are able to make themselves felt and influence decision making; and (iii) the way in which social and political conflict with particular reference to extractives is mediated and brokered by a variety of institutions. This provides a framework for understanding these problems and one which helps elucidate cross-country comparisons. The themes of state development, social movements and the politics of mediation lie at the core of unpacking the twin dilemmas of development and conflict around extractive industries and are recurrent in the cases discussed in this book. By examining the political systems in place in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, by explaining how extractive expansion has occurred and how conflict has been managed, we hope to lay out a contextual framework to examining the case studies in the chapters that follow. In examining the development of the state in these three countries, it becomes clear that these are three nations in formation, ones where the reach of the state is partial, uneven and incomplete. While the institutions of the state may work in some parts of the nation concerned, there are many others often where extractive industries operate where the state is precarious or even virtually absent. This not only refers just to geographical reach of the state, but to the way in which the state works in a variety of ambits: social, economic and political. In areas where there is limited state presence, extractive industries may exercise state-like functions themselves. This relates to a second question, the extent to which extractive industries or other social actors are able to capture the state, or at least exercise a degree of domination over it so as to ensure decisions are made which accord with their longer-term strategic interests. This in turn relates to a third issue, namely the ability of the state to protect and uphold the rights of citizens, not least those who find themselves in conflict with powerful vested interests. The extent to which these three republics exhibit such 1

2 characteristics, we would argue, reflects the way in which they evolved both during the colonial period and its republican aftermath. Social movements, to varying degrees, have emerged in recent times as powerful actors, not least in terms of their relationship to extractive industries. There have been instances of protest, frequently violent, against extractives in all three countries. Here we are primarily concerned with the extent to which historical traditions influence patterns of protest, and why in some instances these traditions are more powerful than in others. We are also interested in the way in which attitudes between social movements differ, with some more motivated by pragmatic considerations than others. This connects with the extent to which social movements form part of wider alliances or whether they operate largely on their own. In the case of the latter, they are arguably more exposed to cooptation or outright repression. Finally, we are concerned by the nature of the relationship between social movements and the state, and whether these are antagonistic, collaborative or simply non-committal. This brings us to our third area of investigation, the ways in which political intermediation takes place to channel demands within existing institutions, to enable the politics of protest to be heard at the level of the state, and in some instances at least -- for negotiation to take place between the parties involved. We suggest that the ways in which disputes are articulated and resolved can lead, in the longer term, to the build-up of new institutional capacities. Such mechanisms may be ad hoc and weakly institutionalised, and intermediation may take place at the margins of the state and even outside it altogether. Among other things, we examine here the workings of the party system, and the extent to which this provides a nexus that connects the state with society. As we shall see, in all three countries party systems have evolved in ways that have precluded the representation of interests on the ground, although in some case this may be changing. One of our key arguments is that the way in which mechanisms of political mediation work can contribute greatly to the legitimacy enjoyed by political regimes and thus to their ability to take decisions (including those around extraction) that command the respect of stakeholders of all colours. So, in what follows we seek to analyse how states have evolved in the region and the extent to which this has been influenced by the presence of extractive industries, how social movements have responded to the presence of such industries, and how institutions have developed (or not) capable of handling the conflicts that tend to arise. Within each broad theme, we analyse individual countries in turn. 2. State Development in the Andean Region. A. Bolivia Bolivia s political evolution from earliest times owes much to the primacy of extractive industries. 1 It was these that financed state development and which were long at the centre of conflicts over the distribution of rents. Mining rents, and subsequently those from oil, financed institutional development, both at the centre and in the regions (Barragán, 2008). In the period following the 1952 revolution, the distribution of the benefits from mining led to constant battles between the state and 1 Along with what today are Peru and Mexico, Bolivia was the lynchpin of the colonial silver trade (see Marichal, 2006). More than half the silver which crossed the ocean to Spain came from the Cerro Rico in Potosí, a point developed by Preston below. 2

3 the mining unions. The expansion of hydrocarbons in Santa Cruz also led to pressures from lowland elites to extract rents for local development, creating serious centrifugal tensions. The post-revolutionary government of the MNR and its military successors strove to build a centralised state able to resist what they saw as particularist demands. More recently, differences over the distribution of gas revenues generated mostly in Tarija and Santa Cruz -- have revived, with the local administrations of the so-called media luna demanding a bigger share in the national distribution of rents (see Chapter X by Humphreys Bebbington). 2 State formation is never a homogenous process of gradual development over a given geographical space, 3 and Bolivia is by no means an exception to this rule. The development of state institutions has been particularly uneven, both in its spatial and temporal dimensions. Spatially, Bolivia was a republic originally carved out of different colonial spheres of influence on either side of the South American land mass Peru on the Pacific and the River Plate on the Atlantic -- its main towns and cities far from the principal poles of colonial administration. Its political development since the foundation of the Republic in 1825 has been characterised by strong rivalries between regional elites: Sucre versus La Paz in the nineteenth century and La Paz versus Santa Cruz in the twentieth (Roca, 1999). Unlike Peru or Argentina, for example, its state development has been multipolar and not focused on just one city. The pattern of institutional development, emanating from urban centres into the rural hinterland, has also been notoriously patchy and disjointed, with the state having to negotiate and bargain with grass-roots structures. This is what has been called the Swiss-cheese state, a state with holes (UNDP, 2007). Historically, the extent of state interventionism has varied widely. Up until 1952, the state was dominated by a small landed and mining elite, the so-called rosca. The revolution brought an abrupt change. It was only in 1952 that a new sort of state came into being, with the nationalisation of the mining industry (the main source of foreign exchange), the use of mineral rents to develop the lowlands, the propagation of a sense of nationhood, and the creation of citizenship based on universal suffrage. But the response to protest in the mining industry was usually military repression (Dunkerley, 1984). In the mid-1980s, this model of state-led development was cast aside in favour of the adoption of a much more liberal model in which the private sector gained pride of place. Then, in view of the failure of neo-liberalism to benefit the mass of the population, Bolivia reverted in 2005 to a more state-centred strategy. The evolution of state institutions has therefore been deeply affected by this errant course, not least in the extractive sector; Bolivia, for example, is the only country in the world to have nationalised its hydrocarbons industry three times (Miranda, 2008). The government of Evo Morales has not abandoned the strategy of growth based on extractive industries, although it has revived proposals to industrialise these and diversify into new areas, like iron ore extraction and lithium. It does so, however, under the guise of greater state participation, while seeking to diversify investment away from traditional sources. 4 The problem it faces is how to manage the multiple 2 For more on this see Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington, 2010a and b. 3 On this point see Gupta and Ferguson (2002)in general; and for Peru, see Nugent (1997). 4 The policy of the Morales government has, basically, been to promote productive investment in export-oriented industries, while increasing the returns to the state (in taxation) and seeking to enhance the degree of processing that takes place within Bolivia. Arguably, this is a very traditional policy, 3

4 areas of conflict that such a model of development helps generate, not least from social groups and communities that lay claim to these resources and/or the rents they generate. As Humphreys-Bebbington shows in Chapter X, its stance towards foreign investment is an uneasy mix of seeking to attract this, but on terms that allay social and political conflict. As in the past, the state is poorly placed simply to impose its will on those who feel their interests are not properly catered for in this the latest chapter of resource-led development. But, as we shall see below, new structures have emerged to deal with localised protest. Negotiation and bargaining are complicated and arduous processes, and the results usually messy compromises. However, there is now greater recognition that this, rather than time-honoured practices like military repression, is the price that has to be paid if some sort of social peace is to be attained. B. Peru State development in Peru grew out of the legacy of Lima as the administrative hub of the Spanish empire, the heart of a far-flung agglomeration of colonies whose prime logic was the transfer of mineral wealth to the home country. But the Peruvian state contains a paradox: on the one hand it embodies an authoritarian tradition of government led by conservative local elites and largely impervious to social pressures from below; on the other hand it is a state which has shown itself unable to impose its will over large swathes of territory, particularly in the sierra and Amazon jungle (selva). Unlike Bolivia, it has always been highly centralised. The degree of territorial control achieved by Sendero Luminoso, as recently as the late 1980s, showed the limitations of state reach in a very graphic way. In mining enclaves in the sierra, the functions of the state have often been exercised not by the authorities in distant Lima but rather by companies or, more particularly in some cases, families owning those companies. The lack of a democratic tradition is notable in Peru. Attempts from the early 1930s onwards to involve the mass of the population in the political life of the nation were repeatedly frustrated (Stein, 1980). The political power of the limeño elite remained intact, and it took the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s to enact some of the social reforms that challenged that control, leading to the growth of a large, unwieldy and costly state apparatus. It was only in the 1980s that a party system of sorts emerged with the promise of building new levels of political participation within the state. Whereas all adult Bolivians were granted citizenship rights in 1952, it was only in 1979 that universal suffrage took effect in Peru. In spite of these moves towards the creation of a more participative state, its potential was effectively blocked by the twin crises of hyperinflation and insurgency that led, in turn, to the consolidation of the authoritarian Fujimori regime in the 1990s (Tanaka, 1998; Conaghan, 2005). Peru s incipient party system entered into crisis, thereby cutting off a key mechanism by which civil society could connect with the state. 5 Although Fujimori gave way to more pluralist systems of government under Toledo and Garcia in the new millennium, many of the features of top-down authoritarianism persisted; reminiscent of the strategy of the post-revolutionary governments in the 1950s through to the 1970s. The Morales government has tried to attract foreign investment in the hydrocarbons and mining sectors, but not with a great deal of success. 5 Under Fujimori, longstanding clientelistic mechanisms of social control replaced mechanisms of democratic participation, with state spending used to cultivate a political clientele. Clientelism and patrimonialism are deeply engrained features of the Peruvian political system (Cotler, 1978). 4

5 political parties conspicuously failed to fulfil the representative functions assigned to them in democratic theory (Crabtree, 2010). With popular participation largely absent, elite groups gained privileged access to the state under Fujimori and his successors, especially those linked to extractive industries (Durand, 2003). Fujimori s policies of privatisation led to a massive transfer of assets from the state to the private sector. Foreign investment in mining expanded rapidly during the course of the 1990s, encouraged by generous tax incentives, but Peruvian businessmen also benefitted from this shift to a more liberal economic dispensation. Through an array of lobby organisations, elites and corporate interests gained a strong position in shaping key economic policy decisions, an influence in no sense matched by the much debilitated left. 6 The policy of signing a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States and other countries both reflected and reinforced the political power of key private sector organisations. 7 Peru became a prime example of state capture by the business community, very different from the Bolivian story. The pronounced centralisation of the Peruvian political system has, however, given rise to a degree of decentralisation in recent years, not least in the distribution of rents. But this has done little to reduce the level of social conflict arising from mining. The state remains weakly constituted at the local level, and this has not only fed protest against extractive industries but (as Arellano-Yanguas shows in Chapter X) induced conflict within the state at the local level.. The geography of protest has been concentrated in the highlands, but has by no means been limited to this region since there have also been powerful protest movements erupting in coastal regions as well as in the jungle (as illustrated in Chapter 1). But, as this collection helps to show, many conflicts have erupted in areas where the state is conspicuous by its absence and where extractive industries take on quasi-statal roles, in direct confrontation with those who challenge their presence. C. Ecuador An agricultural-based economy (at least until the discovery of large reserves of oil in the Amazon in the 1960s), the state in Ecuador has tended to play a more modest role in the process of development than in Peru or Bolivia (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994). At the same time, unlike Peru, the development of the state has not been associated with the primacy of a single city over the rest of the country. All governments, whatever their ideological complexion, have had to deal with the balance between catering for the business elite, located mainly on the coast (in and around the city of Guayaquil) and the more traditional elites of the highlands and their influence over the government in Quito. Politically, as in Bolivia, regionalism has been a constant factor in Ecuadorean politics, although the conflicts between the coast and the sierra have arguably have been less bitter and destructive than in Bolivia. The issue of secession in Ecuador has not arisen as a serious possibility. 6 The economic crisis of the late 1980s undermined both the parties of the left (which entered into an internal crisis in ) and the union movement which provided them with social presence. As in other countries, it hastened the demise of class-based politics. 7 For a detailed example of how elite interests crowded out those of social organizations in the negotiation of the FTA, see Maria-Luisa Burneo s discussion of the negotiation of the agricultural components of this agreement (Burneo, 2008). 5

6 Traditionally, then, the activities of the state have sought to strike a balance between different interests, often acting to mediate between them. 8 In the 1960s and 1970s there were attempts, under the aegis of the military, to tilt the balance away from agro-exporting towards a more developmental model geared to incipient industrialisation. However, the growth of state involvement in the running of the economy particularly under the Rodriguez Lara government in the 1970s was far more aligned to collaboration with the private sector than was the case in Peru or Bolivia. Although the development of the oil industry in the 1970s involved the expansion of the productive activities of the Ecuadorean state, many of the benefits accrued to the private sector. In Ecuador as in Peru, but unlike Bolivia the reach of the state into the social life of the country was extremely limited, at least until the 1970s. In the highlands, the state was a distant actor until the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973; social control in the sierra was effectively exercised by the Holy Trinity of Church, landowners and political bosses (tenientes políticos) (Casagrande and Piper, 1969). Even after the agrarian reform, unlike Peru at the same time, the military government did not seek to mobilise support for itself in rural areas. There was no imposition of a corporatist model of state-inspired cooperatives, as in Peru. In the Amazon region, the state hardly existed until the discovery of oil in the late 1960s. As of the late nineteenth century, the Amazon had been concessioned off to Catholic and protestant missionaries. State presence in this region was even less evident than in the case of Peru, where the early twentieth century rubber boom led to the development of urban centres like Iquitos and Pucallpa. The relative weakness of the Ecuadorean state was made clear during the 1980s and 1990s by the difficulties it faced in implementing neo-liberal policies (Pachano, 2009). This was the time when new social movements (above all indigenous ones) began to develop as powerful political actors, capable of blocking state initiatives (Yashar, 2005). Again, Ecuador stands in stark contrast to Peru and Bolivia which underwent drastic neoliberal transformations. Though Ecuador did not experience quite the same economic pressures, those who sought to pursue liberal economic agendas Presidents León Febres Cordero, Sixto Durán Ballén and Jamil Mahuad found this path effectively blocked by fractious parliaments and social movements. It remains to be seen whether Rafael Correa, having reinforced the power of the presidency and reduced that of his opponents, is capable of generating a new, more powerful state in Ecuador capable of striking a new balance between the interests of business and those of social movements. 3. Social movements A. Bolivia Partly because of the nature of state development, but also because of the way in which indigenous organisations (with their strong communitarian traditions) survived in Bolivia more than in most Latin American countries, it is a country long set apart by the strength of its social movements. The primacy of mining in its development 8 The bifurcated nature of the state between central government and local authorities created conflict which indigenous peoples learned to navigate, exploiting opportunities to pursue their own agendas. See Clark and Becker (2007). 6

7 led to the emergence of one of the hemisphere s most class-conscious and politically articulate union movements. For decades, until most of the state mines were closed in 1985 and 1986, the mineworkers federation (the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, FSTMB) provided the political underpinning of the powerful national workers confederation, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). The country s union traditions also permeated the rural sphere, with peasant unions providing an important social base to the governments that emerged from the 1952 revolution. By the 1980s, however, class was beginning to be accompanied by ethnicity in underpinning social movements. The closure of the state mining industry in 1986 and 1987 (with the loss of 27,000 jobs) was a mortal blow to the FSTMB, and by implication to the COB. Peasant unions began at this time to adopt a more indigenista guise. Having freed themselves from state tutelage in the 1970s, the CSUTCB (Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) peasant federation replaced the mineworkers as the leading group within the COB.. At the same time, new indigenous organisations emerged as political actors in the lowlands, especially in the 1990s. 9 However, just as the presence of the state was patchy and discontinuous, so too was the presence of community-based organisation. It tended to be stronger in the Andean part of the country than in the eastern lowlands where the power and influence of Bolivia s agrarian elite was far more marked, at least during the second half of the 20 th century. Although federations of social movements have emerged that bring together like-minded interests, these too were stronger and more influential in some parts of the country than others. The geographies of protest have also depended a great deal on the leverage that social movements can muster (Crabtree, 2005). Some movements are better placed to exert pressure than others 10 ; those in areas far from centres of state power or the lines of communication between them brought less influence to bear. As in most countries, social movements are defined by the immediate context in which they emerge; in Bolivia they reflect the cultural, regional and historical realities of a highly differentiated country, with some social movements drawing on a long history of indigenous resistance and protest. 11 As elsewhere, social movements in Bolivia vary greatly in their capacity for mobilisation and their willingness to negotiate with the state or with extractive industries. Even so, the political muscle exerted by social movements in Bolivia in recent times has been quite exceptional in Latin America. It was the 2000 water war in Cochabamba that turned the tide against privatisation in the country, and it was the 9 It was the 1990 march of indigenous peoples from Trinidad to La Paz that first put these on the national political map. Since that time indigenous organisations, particularly the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), a coordinating body between a large number of indigenous grouos, has become an important national force. 10 The fact that the main road linking eastern and western Bolivia passed through the Chapare, for instance, gave the cocaleros greater leverage than other groups, Blocking the highway would effectively bring intra-regional commerce to a halt. 11 Of the three countries, it would seem that probably Bolivia has proportionately the largest indigenous population. According to the 2001 census, 62% of the population described themselves as indigenous. However, it has been argued that this is a misleading statistic since there was no mestizo category in the census questionnaire (Toranzo, 2008). Similarly, tallies for the indigenous populations in Ecuador and Peru tend to vary quite widely according to the source used. See for instance, Yashar (2005), pp According to Albó (2008), Ecuadorean sources state that estimates vary between 6% and 45%, while in Peru the national household survey (Enaho) suggests that 37% of the population is indigenous. 7

8 gas war in 2003 which ended ousting the main architect of economic liberalisation, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Perreault, 2006). Beyond registering protest, social movements thus showed they could take on the state, and win. 12 The electoral victory of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), as much an umbrella organisation of social movements as a political party, enabled the social movements to take state power in 2005 The MAS managed to coordinate the activities of disparate social movements, provide a unifying logic to their demands, and channel these into the political system. Since 2005, of course, both directly and indirectly, Bolivia s social movements have exerted strong and direct pressure over decision making, but the climate of protest -- which reached a peak in 2003 with the ouster of Sánchez de Lozada -- has dissipated as a result. However, this has not led Morales into abandoning the development of extractive industries. Bolivia s economic reliance on mining and gas for its export and tax revenues means that investment in these sectors has strategic importance. Moves to push ahead with such investment necessarily involve generating conflicting interests. The government has had to balance this against the demands of those with contrary agendas. 13 One of the most difficult problems that Morales has had to cope with from this point of view are the many conflicts between social movements, usually for the control of natural resources of one sort or another or the rents arising thereby. The struggle between the unionised workers of Huanuni and the informal miners also working there ended in many deaths in Similarly, there have been numerous conflicts between indigenous groups and migrant peasant workers (colonizadores) over access to land in the lowlands. Rural peasant groups have also clashed in Tarija, keen to exert control over the land under which such plentiful gas supplies are found. Furthermore, Morales has had to confront social movements of a rather different type in the cities of Santa Cruz and Tarija, where groups of right-wing students and others involved in the politics of direct action, and using tactics not dissimilar from those used by those who helped bring down Sánchez de Lozada in Social movements are not necessarily left-wing or inspired by particularly democratic ideals. B. Peru Just as in Bolivia, Peru s heritage is one of strong peasant communities and a powerful communal culture. Peru shares many social features with both Bolivia and Ecuador, with high degrees of inequality and marginalisation underscored by ethnic discrimination. Its indigenous population is large by Latin American standards, though rather less than in Bolivia and roughly the same as in Ecuador, and the extent of mestizaje is probably higher. In recent times, however, it has been a country where social mobilisation has been weaker and more fragmented than in its Andean neighbours. The severity of the economic dislocation of the 1980s, combined with 12 Sudden changes to the status quo to the tangible detriment of local populations were particularly likely to spark resistance. The privatisation of water in Cochabamba, coupled with sharp rises in consumer prices, brought about unexpected alliances against a common enemy. As Preston (Chapter X) shows, where people have grown accustomed to environmental problems over long periods of time, they are less likely to respond in anger to such a situation. 13 Bolivia has not experienced the number of new start-up extractive projects as has Peru in recent years. More attention has been focused on hydrocarbons and the rights of indigenous groups in the lowlands than protests against new mining projects in the highlands which have been few and have contributed to much-needed employment in places like Potosi. Partly because of its long history and its importance as a source of employment, mining development has not proved as contentious in the Bolivian highlands as in Peru. 8

9 the destructive force of Sendero Luminoso, had a deeply detrimental effect on popular organisation, especially among trade unions. Patterns of migration have also weakened traditional communities, with people migrating long distances from their places of origin in search of employment and a better life. Migration to Lima and the coast has helped erode indigenous identities, helping create a new mestizo culture in ways that have been more socially transformative than in Bolivia and Ecuador. Although class identities are probably weaker than 30 years ago, ethnic identities have not taken root in the same way as in Bolivia and Ecuador. They have played a less conspicuous role in Peru in underscoring and helping to forge disparate and fragmented movements into wider communities of interest. 14 Still, social movements have gained in significance as political actors in civil society over recent years, particularly since the collapse of the Fujimori regime in The clearest examples of this have been among those peasant communities in conflict with extractive industries and amid coca farming communities. In both cases, people have mobilised in opposition to the activities of the state, in the former against land concessions on community lands and, in the latter, against the forcible eradication of coca plantations. The anti-mining movement, in particular, has created a community of interest between people living in widely different circumstances, not all of them in the highlands around notions of defence of territory. In some instances, particularly where Conacami has been involved, these have expressed themselves in overtly ethnic terms. There have been some conspicuous victories, notably the decision to abort the Tambogrande gold mining project in Piura, a proposal that not only threatened the rural economy and lifestyle but also the demolition of a whole town. 15 Indigenousbased social movements in the Peruvian selva have also made their mark, challenging government policies in a number of ways, particularly the sale of concessions to oil and gas companies. The Asociación Interetnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) has a long history of coordinating such movements. The success of social mobilisation in Peru has depended greatly on the ability to build wider alliances at the local level and to connect with organisations with leverage in national politics. The process of decentralisation, which began in 2001, has provided spaces in which individual grievances can be linked to other regional complaints. The involvement of international NGOs has also helped build an awareness beyond Peru s frontiers that can be harnessed politically. 16 However, it remains the case that especially in comparison with Bolivia most social movements are fragmented forces that lack the power to influence state policy in any fundamental way. Peru has not 14 The reasons why ethnic identities have not been so prominent in Peru are multiple and complex. They have to do, amongst other things (and not necessarily in this order), with the strength of classbased political legacies in rural politics, patterns of rural-urban migration to Lima and the coast, the nature of the agrarian reform in Peru and the extent to which Sendero Luminoso (and the repression that followed) destroyed all sorts of popular organisation in the countryside. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to rally opposition to extractives around ethnic claims to territory, particularly in the Amazon. For a comparative analysis of Peru and Ecuador in this respect, see Lucero and García (2007) 15 As Arellano argues in Chapter X, Tambogrande became an emblematic case of community resistance to a mining project, ending in a referendum in which the overwhelming majority of community members voted against the project going ahead. In doing so, they countered the arguments of important civic groups in the city and elsewhere in the department of Piura who saw Tambogrande as a significant economic opportunity. See Haarstad and Fløysand (2007). 16 In some instances, as Pratt shows in Chapter X, this awareness can end up distorting the concerns of those on the ground. For more positive experiences see Bebbington et al. (2007). 9

10 seen the emergence of a strong sense of ethnic solidarity that binds people and social movements together in community of purpose. Social movements also lack, as we shall see, articulation with political parties that can exert influence over government decisions while bringing together overlapping issues in the way achieved, for example, by the MAS in Bolivia. 17 C. Ecuador Social movements in Ecuador, unlike Bolivia and Peru, are unable to look back for inspiration to a history of rebellion against Spanish or republican rule. Their history is one of relative quiescence (although not passivity), at least up until well into the second half of the twentieth century. Until the 1970s, popular protest tended to be limited to union agitation (itself weakly constituted) or the activities of students and other groups. Since the 1980s, however, Ecuador has become well-known for its indigenous movement which, through the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), appeared to speak with a single, authoritative voice and proved itself capable of bringing down governments, as it was instrumental in doing in 2000 with the ouster of President Jamil Mahuad. Social movements particularly indigenous ones also learned to navigate tensions within the state (particularly between central and regional authorities) to their advantage (Clark and Becker, 2007). CONAIE successfully brought together the two main strands of indigenismo highland indigenous groups and lowland equivalents -- in a way that has not happened so far in Peru and Bolivia. 18 Indigenismo in the highlands had its origins in the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973 which helped break the political power of the old agrarian elites (Waters, 2007). Designed to incorporate and control indigenous communities, the reforms had the opposite effect, creating spaces for cultural autonomy and political contention. As in Bolivia, the language of dissent changed (during the course of the 1980s) from one of class to one of ethnicity, in part due to the influence of the radical Catholic Church, a key force behind the establishment of ECUARUNARI in the highlands. Mobilisation began around such issues as education, literacy and culture, but changed in time towards questions of identity, land rights and territoriality. Mobilisation around extractive industries is a new departure. In the Amazon, ethnic organisation began in response to colonisation. The Shuar federation, established in the 1960s, was the first such grouping to come into existence in the Americas, Subsequently, indigenous organisation took root following the discovery of oil in 1967 which prompted ethnic groups to make demands on the state in the defence of their territories. Indigenous groups proved themselves adept, with the help of outside allies, in taking on the oil companies. As in the highlands, Church organisations were important in providing an organisational platform. followed thereafter by many others. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorean Amazon (CONFENIAE), formed in 1980 (mainly Shuar and Quichua), helped open up the space for the discussion of indigenous issues at the national level, forging links with politicians, human rights activists and environmentalists. CONFENIAE became a key actor, able to negotiate titles for large tracts of land in the Amazon. 17 For an analysis of how the Bolivian MAS was able to create a national movement that went far beyond the sum of is constituent parts, see Harten, For an account of the development of indigenous politics in both the Amazon and the highlands, see Selverton (1995). 10

11 It was the joining of the activities of CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI that led to the formation of CONAIE in 1986 It was the first time in the Americas that jungle and highland Indians joined together in a single campaign. CONAIE placed itself squarely on the political map through its nationwide mobilisation in June 1990, forcing the Borja government to give into many of its demands. The influence of CONAIE also made itself felt in the 1998 constitution which recognised Ecuador officially as a pluri-national republic. The discussion of the idea of indigenous nations proved much less contentious in Ecuador than was the case in Bolivia, for example, during the constituent assembly (Pallares, 2007). In 2002, CONAIE made what seemed to be a crucial breakthrough in its political projection at the national level when Pachakutik entered into the Gutiérrez government. It was the first time that indigenous actors had reached what seemed to be the pinnacle of political power anywhere in Latin America. However, in reality, it proved otherwise. Its involvement in a government which rapidly switched to adopting neo-liberal policies at the behest of the IMF rapidly undercut its social and political support. This involvement in national politics contrasts with the experience of the MAS in Bolivia after The scale of the MAS victory ruled out any need for coalitions, and the discourse of the MAS was markedly critical of neo-liberalism. The erosion of electoral support for Pachakutik brought with it a decline in the standing of CONAIE. In 2007, the Correa government felt no need to work with indigenous organisations, preferring to rally other non-indigenous sectors within Correa s Alianza Pais (AP) party. 19 The decision not to make Quichwa an official language in the 2009 constitution was a particular snub to the indigenista movement. It remains to be seen if pro-indigenous social movements will successfully reassert themselves in opposition to the Correa government s policies, particularly in opposing the expansion of mining activities on indigenous lands in southern Ecuador. At the beginning of 2010, there were signs of CONAIE beginning to flex its muscles against the government s policies to promote extractive industries in both the highlands and jungle. 4. The politics of mediation A. Bolivia Bolivia is renowned internationally for the confrontational nature of its politics and the brinkmanship involved in political bargaining. This has much to do with the inability of the state to impose itself on contending groups in society. In past decades, the main political actors were the labour unions (especially the miners) and the armed forces which, at various junctures, sought to impose their own agendas on the state at the expense of the other. However, as we shall see, there is a long tradition of social and political mediation that has emerged precisely because of the inability of the state to orchestrate dialogue and to impose mutually-acceptable compromise settlements. 19 Indigenous movements, particularly in the Amazon, tended to support Gutiérrez s Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) whose electoral base is largely in the jungle region. 11

12 Representative political parties provide one such channel for the institutionalised resolution of disputes, but they have done little in recent Bolivian history to fulfil this function. Although it led the 1952 revolution to victory, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) provided a very imperfect channel for the articulation of grass-roots pressure; rather it was a top-down party that sought to mobilise support in favour of the post-revolutionary regime (Malloy, 1971; Dunkerley, 1994). The military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s perpetuated and accentuated the authoritarian traditions of the MNR. It was only in 1980s and 1990s that a party system of sorts emerged, organised on a logic of electoral competition; but even this turned more into a mechanism for the distribution of jobs and favours than the articulation of popular demands (Domingo, 2001). Nevertheless, there is a fairly long history of mediation and negotiation, albeit from positions beyond the institutional boundaries of the state. The Catholic Church and Church-backed NGOs have played an important role here, but so too have protestant churches and non-religious intermediaries. Possibly the most important institution in this respect has been the Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos (APDH), established to defend human rights during the Banzer dictatorship in the 1970s. Frequent clashes between antagonistic groups often involving institutions of the state were resolved by the APDH, although usually after protracted periods of confrontation (Reference to come). NGOs, some of them international, have helped at various points in brokering agreements, although usually behind the scenes. 20 The creation of the office of Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) as a result of constitutional reforms in the 1990s also led to the development of an agency within the state dedicated to the resolution of political and social conflicts. 21 Its efficacy in this respect has frequently been applauded. Since 2005, however, it has been the office of the presidency that has become the main locus for resolving conflicts both between social movements and the state as well as between the social movements themselves. To some degree this parallels the situation in Peru where the Presidency of the Council of Ministers rivals the Defensoría as an arena for addressing conflict. However, the main confrontation resolved with the help of mediation by foreign governments was between the government and the elite-based civic committees of the eastern departments, aided and abetted by the shock troops of the far right. These governments helped broker a deal that enabled a compromise to be reached between the Morales government and the opposition over the constitution. 22 Confrontation, sometimes violent, is therefore part of Bolivian political culture, but so too is the search for negotiated settlements that avoid systemic breakdown. Violence sometimes occurs, but not often on a large scale. The worst episode of blood-letting was the denouement of the gas war in October 2003 when some 70 people lost their lives after the government of the day ordered troops to fire on demonstrators in El Alto, and even this gave way to a negotiated outcome that defused the violence that 20 NGOs play an important role in Bolivian politics from the late 1970s onwards, often in conjunction with Church-based institutions. However, as in Peru and Ecuador, NGOs have often pursued agendas rather different from the social organisations they purport to support. Many NGOs have come in for criticism from the Morales government for this reason. 21 For a personal view of the role of the Defensoría by the first person to hold the post of Defensor, see Romero (2006). 22 The Union of South American Republics (UNASUR) played a key role here, supported by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the representatives of the European Union (EU). 12

13 had built up. It is hard to imagine, for example, the scale of killings taking place in Bolivia that took place in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s or the scale of human rights abuse that has been characteristic of Colombia. Confrontation therefore normally results in some sort of accommodation, and time-honoured institutions albeit informal ones help create a climate in which this can take place. 23 Indeed, confrontation which can emerge quickly and without prior notice has arguably become one of a repertoire of negotiating tactics though which adversaries ultimately are prepared to accept (what for them are) sub-optimal solutions. B. Peru As we have seen, the growth of the state in Peru was not paralleled by the development of spaces for political participation or the articulation of grass-roots interests. Government has long had a strong top-down, highly centralised quality, and dissidence from below has been forcibly repressed or bought off rather than brought within the political system. The main mechanism of political mediation has been through clientelistic practices by which political loyalty has been acquired in return for the rewards of public or private largesse. In the rural sphere, for instance, this traditionally worked through the institution of gamonalismo, local agrarian elites that provided a top-down linkage between the state and society. However, there has been no real tradition of political bargaining or intermediation at the sub-national level, nor the building of institutional mechanisms to enable this to happen. The lack of a party system in Peru has further limited the channels of communication. A system of mass-based parties emerged only in the 1980s, but as we have seen it was of only short duration. At that time, the various parties of the left rooted in social movements and trade unions emerged with a potential to act as a channel for representation, but in retrospect the extent to which they were socially rooted now seems somewhat exaggerated. 24 Its influence over state policy was also very limited. The speed at which the parties of the left were reduced to an ineffectual rump during the course of the 1990s suggested that they had not been institutionalised in any lasting way. Parties fell victim to the rapid growth of the informal sector and the retreat from class-based politics (Cameron, 1994). During the Fujimori period, and indeed afterwards, they became simply electoral vehicles for the political aspirations of personalities (Taylor, 2006). With the exception of APRA, whose strength is in any case regional, they lacked the permanent organisation needed to engage in political bargaining at the local level. Any connection which had once existed between civil society and the state had been effectively broken. In the absence of channels of representation, political disputes quickly turn violent (Grompone, 2005). This is not to say that there is no mediation, only that no political movement has been able to establish itself to articulate or aggregate demands at the local level and represent these at the level of the state. NGOs in Peru have acted in a mediatory role, as well as helping to finance social movements and publicising the reasons for particular protests, not least those concerning extractive industries. 25 Many people 23 It may be the case that the violent confrontation in the media luna in 2008 exposed a paucity of domestic mediating institutions, forcing recourse to international mediation to reach a negotiated settlement. 24 The extent to which this is the case is a topic that requires further research. 25 A particularly good example of the way in which an NGO can be effective in its dealings with a large mining multinational is the story of Labor in Ilo. Not only did Labor manage to put the issue of 13

14 previously active in left-wing politics have ended up working within NGOs, although arguably NGOs are now finding it harder to defend the interests of social movements. In some cases, NGOs would talk in the name of social movements but adopt stances clearly at variance from the agendas of those they ostensibly supported. 26 In some instances, communities have turned against the NGOs who claim to represent them. The Catholic Church has also played an intermediary role, often in conjunction with NGOs, although the church hierarchy is increasingly opposed to the pursuit of the sort of social objectives which it had stood for in previous decades. Finally, institutions within the state as in Bolivia have been active in mediating conflict. The Ombudsman s office (Defensoría del Pueblo) has developed an impressive decentralised infrastructure in all 25 regions disposed to involve itself in investigating, mediating and responding to grievances at the local level (Pegram, 2008). Ultimately, though, there are limits to the extent to which the Defensoría is able to pursue a course of action that contradicts the policy of the government as a whole, while the government would adopt a more hands-on style of mediation through the prime minister s office. In view of the difficulties experienced in mediating conflicts -- particularly those over extractive industries -- it is hardly surprising that a large number of these swiftly turn into violent confrontations. The conflicts over extractives dealt with in this book demonstrate the fragility of the mechanisms in place to negotiate and resolve conflict, indicating the imbalance in relations of power between social movements and the state when it comes to negotiating terms of concessions or implementing the ways in which concessions are developed. As Budds makes clear in Chapter X, such problems are heightened by the ways in which scarce resources (especially water) are distributed between mining companies and surrounding communities and how issues of contamination are dealt with. In most (but not all) cases, institutional capacities are wholly lacking at the local level to deal with such problems in ways that command the confidence of the actors involved. The problem of intermediation is thus compounded by a deep lack of confidence over the motives of some of those most closely involved in mediation. It is perhaps remarkable that the Defensoría seems to command the respect that it does, but even this appears relatively powerless when, as in the case of Bagua in 2009, indigenous communities in the northern jungle confronted head-on the policies of land concessions espoused by the president of the republic himself. Peru therefore presents a contrasting picture to that of Bolivia where social movements have managed to advance on the state and play a central role in the direction of policy. This is far from the reality of the situation in Peru, where powerful elites have the ear of the state at the highest level, where social movements remain fragmented and disunited, and where the institutions that might otherwise negotiate on behalf of some of the agendas raised by social movements are themselves finding this an uphill struggle. C. Ecuador One of the key characteristics of the Ecuadorean political system has been the inchoate nature of its political parties, at least since the country returned to democracy contamination from SPCC s operations squarely on the policy agenda at the local, national and even international level, but it developed a close rapport with local governance, helping to develop institutional capacities at the local level. See Crabtree (2002). 26 This is also the case of international NGOs, as Pratt shows in Chapter X. 14