Anatomy of grand corruption: A composite corruption risk index based on objective data
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1 Anatomy of grand corruption: A composite corruption risk index based on objective data Mihály Fazekas István János Tóth IE HAS Budapest, Budaőrsi út 45. March
2 Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire [Spinoza: Ethica; Axiomata VI.]
3 Staff: Staff & Support Czibik Ágnes Fazekas Mihály Fóra Gyula Orbán Júlia Tóth Bence Tóth István János economist Ph.D. student, University of Cambridge; student economist economist Ph.D, senior research fellow, IE HAS Experts: Dr. Kelemen Zoltán Gyenese Jenő Nagy Zoltán Uhrin Tamás Dr. Volford Anita Adrienn lawyer computer programmer ecomomist computer programmer clerk Data cleaning: Agárdy Balázs, Bak Mónika, Balla Mária, Bíró Eszter, Borbély Linda, Csizmás Eszter, Csizmás Kinga, Csukás Olivér, Farkas Eszter, Ferenczi Annamária, Gajdos Katalin, Gáspár János, Groszmann Diána, Heizer Tamás, Herbák Erik, Hoffman Erzsébet, Kádár Eszter, Koplányi Emese, Korom Gabriella, Kovács Balázs, Levendel Dávid, Magyar Máté, Markó Anna, Milibák Eszter, Nagy Ákos, Pacsa Laura, Pallagi Ilona, Pallagi Tibor, Parkot Ágnes, Révész Erika, Samu Flóra, Séd Levente, Simon Eszter, Somogyi Dóra, Staub Nóra, Süli Adrienn, Szabó Tímea, Szigili Adrienn, Teplán Győző, Vancsura Petra, Varga Attila, Varga Kinga Support: voluntary work, EU FP7, TAMOP, GVH
4 Outline Motivation Corruption & grand corruption Measurement Corruption Risk Index (CRI) & data First results
5 Motivation
6 Motivation Tools for measuring corruption Measurement of political effects (particularism) in public procurement Corruption & state capture Corruption & firm effectiveness
7 Corruption & grand corruption
8 Corruption & grand corruption abuse of power for private gain Corruption: Holistic vs. Individualistic (Makro vs. Micro) approach
9 Corruption & grand corruption tr k : number of k type transactions C = f (c 1 tr 1, c 2 tr 2, c k tr k,.,c n tr n ) C: aggregate weight of corruption c k : share of corrupt transactions at tr k 0 c k 1
10 Corruption & grand corruption Corruption: principal-agent-client model Corruption: Bribery Extortion Embezzlement Fraud
11 Corruption & grand corruption Mean areas of corruption: Inspections Licences Public procurement Regulation
12 Corruption & grand corruption Institutionalised grand corruption in public spending (~particularistic allocation of public resources) Institutionalised=recurrent, stable Grand=high-level politics and business Corruption=particularism Public spending=public procurement
13 Measurement
14 Measurement Perceptions (TI CPI, WB) Attitudes (EU ESS) Hypothetical situations and actions (EY & GVI)
15 Measurement Classical methods: Fuzzy (weak reliability) Inappropriate False Impossibility of causal analysis
16 Measurement Need for new indicators: objective data describing actor behaviour micro level consistent comparisons across countries, organisations, and time thorough understanding of corruption in its context
17 Corruption Risk Index
18 Corruption Risk Index (CRI) CRI observes the winner selection process in public procurement Risk of corruption instead of veritable cases of corruption Informations from actor behaviour A composit indicator Similar concept: Red Flags (OLAF, EU)
19 Probability of institutionalised grand corruption to occur 0 CRI t 1 where 0 = minimal corruption risk; 1 = maximal observed corruption risk Composite indicator of 13 elementary risk (CI) indicators CRI t = Σ j w j * CI j t
20 CRI construction 1. Wide set of potential components: 30 CIs 2. Narrowing down the list to the relevant components: 13 CIs Set of regressions on single bidder and winner contract share 3. CRI calculation: determining weights Stronger predictor higher weight Norming to 0-1 band
21 CRI initial Single bidder contract Call for tender not published in official journal Procedure type Length of eligibility criteria (in characters) Exceptionally short submission period Relative price of tender documentation
22 CRI initial Call for tenders modification Exclusion of all but one bid Weight of non-price evaluation criteria Annulled procedure re-launched subsequently Length of decision period
23 CRI initial Contract modification Contract lengthening Contract value increase Winner's market share
24 CRI Number of bids Call for tender not published in official journal Procedure type Length of eligibility criteria Exceptionally short submission period Relative price of tender documentation Call for tenders modification Weight of non-price evaluation criteria Annulled procedure re-launched subsequently Length of decision period Contract modification Contract value increase Winner's market share
25 Data Only official sources: administrative data (from HPPA) period: Initial database: N = Cleaned database: N = Characteristics: Important: data cleaning is crutial Low random measurement error: official records, fine attached to errors, many people checking quality (still there are surprising data errors!) High systematic error as publications are often gamed for corrupt purposes: we track and analyse errors
26 Data:
27 Data:
28 Database
29 What kind of CRI distributions arise? average CRI Per winning bidder Hungary N=4.430
30 Indicator validity 1. Our corruption indicators co-vary For example: CRI + PCI, HU, (PCI: political control indicator, company level [0,1], N = 4.349) Group N Mean CRI Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf.Interval 0=no political connection =politically connected combined difference (CRI1-CRI0) *** Important: corruption without political connection political connection without corruption
31 Indicator validity 2. Our indicators relate to external variables as expected: money laundering, diversion of funds Financial Secrecy Index + CRI in HU, mean CRI Financial Secrecy Index<58.5 Financial Secrecy Index>58.5*** Missing(Financial Secrecy Index)*** N= 414 winners; FSI source: Tax Justice Network, 2013
32 Indicator validity 3. Our indicators relate to external variables as expected: rent extraction Mean profitmargin + CRI in HU, low CRI medium CRI*** high CRI*** mean profitmargin N= 3.097
33 Limitations You get what you measure: no general indicator of corruption! Reflexivity Two essential requirements Scope: transparency is a preprequisite: if governments fiddle with it, measurement breaks down Variance: we need to compare corrupt to non-corrupt: Sweden and Russia might not work
34 Results
35 Since 2004: disturbitive effect of EU funds [EU funds: higher CRI] EU funds: destructive effect to actor s behavior outline motivation corruption measurement CRI results Number of PP in Hungary by Month
36 EU structural funds impact on corruption in CEE, In Hungary: EU funds have higher CRI EU funds: destructive effect to actor s behavior Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia non-eu funded public procurement EU funded public prurement
37 Important element of CRI: Restriction on Competition [Share of PP with One Bidder, , ] EU accession [2004]: disturbative effects
38 Type of Issuers: Share of PP with One Bidder, [ , N = ]
39 Type of Issuers: Share of PP with One Bidder, [ , only open procedures, N=4.779]
40 outline motivation corruption measurement CRI results CRI in Hungary, , N= gov't change upper-bound CRI (per contract)
41 Corruption with rent seeking Profitability and turnover growth of winners,
42 Transparency & Change of government
43 State Capture
44 State Capture
45 State Capture [CRI: upper 1/5; green nodes: bidders, red nodes: issuers]
46 State Capture [CRI: upper 1/5; green nodes: bidders, red nodes: issuers]
47 Corruption : toward centralization [CRI: upper 1/5; green nodes: bidders, red nodes: issuers]
48 Netherlands vs. Russia? [ ; min. 3 contracts; nodes bidders & issuers]
49 Netherlands vs. Russia? [ ; min. 3 contracts; nodes bidders & issuers]
50 Netherlands vs. Russia? [ , CRI: upper 1/5; issuers: square, bidders: circle]
51 Thank you for your attention!
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