Intervening from outside: the EU finance ministers and the Convention s work in the area of economic governance

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1 Uwe Puetter Intervening from outside: the EU finance ministers and the Convention s work in the area of economic governance Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, April 2005 work in progress please do note quote comments very welcome Author s address: Dr Uwe Puetter Assistant Professor Center for Policy Studies Central European University H-1051 Budapest, Hungary puetteru@ceu.hu Phone , ext 2335

2 Introduction As part of the Convention s comprehensive review of all areas of European Union (EU) policy-making particular attention was paid to the sector of economic governance. The importance of this policy area for the wider Convention process was also reflected in the creation of a specific working group on economic governance under the chairmanship of the member of the Convention s Presidium and former president of the European Parliament (EP) Klaus Hänsch. Several key actors in the Convention, among them the Commission and a large number of the representatives of the EP and national parliaments demanded greater competences for the Commission in the surveillance of national economic policies and notably the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. In addition, some had hoped that the Convention would bring about a breakthrough in the field of tax harmonization through introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) as the general decision-making mechanism. However, none of these demands were fulfilled. The actual modifications achieved by the Convention remained of a highly technical nature and require considerable reading between the lines in order to be identified. How did it happen that the Convention suggested only minor Treaty revisions in a field to which it devoted a considerable degree of its resources? In answering this question this paper pays particular attention to the interaction between the Convention process and the activities of EU finance ministers as regards the drafting of the relevant chapters on economic governance of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. EU finance ministers have always played an important role in constitutional politics at the EU level. For example, at the occasion of previous Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) they have been able to veto attempts of other actors to influence decision-making over provisions on economic and monetary policy even in the last minute. The Convention process challenged this role of finance ministers in EU constitutional politics by formally excluding them from the debate preparing the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Based on comprehensive empirical research and a series of interviews with the involved actors the paper shows how finance ministers were able to adapt step-by-step to the specific nature of the Convention process and intervened at several stages in the decision-making prior to the formal adoption of the Draft Treaty without 2

3 making much noise. In this respect the role of the chairman of the Convention s working group on economic governance is of particular relevance. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it seeks to explain why, what is called here, institutional conservatism prevailed within the Convention as regards the Treaty provisions on economic governance. It is argued that the absence of any significant institutional modifications is significantly linked to the role of EU finance ministers played during the Convention process. Second, the paper seeks to provide an overall assessment of the Convention model with regard to the drafting of the relevant provisions on economic governance. In essence, did the Convention process fulfil the expectations raised by the Laeken Declaration back in December 2001 (see European Council 2001)? Here, in particular two criteria are considered. First, did the Convention lead to a substantial review of the institutional framework of European economic governance with a view to enlargement? Second, did the Convention process itself increased the legitimacy of the decision-making process in connection with Treaty revisions and, therefore, the legitimacy of the EU s overall institutional framework. This paper suggests that there is no straightforward answer to these questions with a view to the area of economic governance. As it is demonstrated, the main effects of the Convention model on Treaty related decision-making in this policy area are mainly hidden, indirect and with regard to some of the concerned actors unexpected. Therefore, a closer look at the proceedings within and around the Convention concerning this particular policy area is necessary in order to better understand the potential future role of the Convention model in EU governance. 3

4 The conceptual framework: fora for policy deliberation in a predominantly intergovernmental negotiation setting The key assumption with regard to the case of the Convention s work in the area of economic governance is that decision-making mainly took place in a predominantly intergovernmental setting, in which key supranational actors most importantly the Commission were prevented from pushing through their ideas for institutional reform. The nature of this setting is partly related to the fact that the Convention was only part of a two-step decision-making process. The second step, the IGC, emphasised the role of national governments in the decision-making process as they enjoyed the right to veto decisions taken within the context of the Convention. In addition, the Convention model itself implied a crucial role for government representatives. Finally, it is assumed that the specific nature of the field of economic governance mattered. Traditionally, EU finance ministers have enjoyed a strong veto-position during IGCs. They repeatedly preferred to make decisions among themselves in the eleventh hour of negotiations excluding both other branches of national governments and the Commission. 1 However, deviating from traditional intergovernmentalist perspectives on EU negotiations (Hosli 2002, 2000; Moravcsik 1998) this paper sees the actual empirical and theoretical puzzle somewhere else. With regard to the question of what difference the Convention model could actually make compared to IGC-only decision-making the puzzle rather is whether it is possible to identify factors triggering processes other than standard intergovernmental bargaining. Here, the paper pays particular attention to process of policy deliberation. In such processes actors are thought to be engaging in substantial discussions on appropriate institutional or policy options, thus leading to deviations from previously established preferences. This could either be conceptualised through an arguing and bargaining dichotomy (Müller 1995; Risse 2000) or through approaches on the role of policy learning, mainly know from research on epistemic communities (see for an overview Hall 1993; Kissling-Näf and Knoepfel 1998). 1 An example is the rejection by finance ministers to apply the Treaty s enhanced cooperation procedures in the area of economic governance in Amsterdam and Nice. This is evident from what have involved negotiators at earlier occasions. So did Angus Lapsley of the UK s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Alexander Stubb, former member of Finland s Permanent Representation in Brussels, speaking at the UACES conference Nice and After in London, March

5 With regard to the main objectives of the Convention institutional review and increasing legitimacy the occurrence of processes of policy deliberation is of utmost importance. In relation to the objective of institutional review policy deliberation is the only negotiation mode through which lowest common denominator solutions can be avoided. Equally important are processes of policy deliberation with a view to the aim to increase the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process through the introduction of the Convention model. Policy deliberation is the only mode of interaction in which actors seek to gain support through persuading their counterparts that certain decisions are rational and appropriate. Consequently, we should expect the Convention model being most successful where we can observe the occurrence of such processes. Vice versa, one should be sceptical towards the effectiveness of the Convention model in case that it is found to hinder and prevent the occurrence of policy deliberation. In this case the Convention model would make little difference in terms of increasing the effectiveness of the process of institutional review and the legitimacy of the decision-making process, as compared to the IGC-only model. Moreover, from previous research in the area of European economic governance (Puetter 2004, 2003) we know that processes of policy deliberation do occur even in this highly intergovernmental environment. Both at the level of expert committees and the level of finance ministers these processes have been observed and analysed. Two factors are of particular importance: the specific nature of the policy area and the character of the negation settings. Economic governance is a relatively young field of European integration and Treaty provisions where drafted at a time when policy-makers where not fully aware of the implications of a single European currency area with a supranational monetary policy for the coordination of national economic policies. Therefore, all involved actors regularly have to deal with situations which are new to them. A factor considered being conducive towards policy deliberation. In addition, economic governance involves debates on highly technical issues which favour the role of experts (Verdun 1999). Moreover, the nature of decisions on monetary and economic affairs requires a high degree of confidentiality. Thus, meetings are usually held in camera. Again, this is factor usually considered to be conducive towards policy deliberation (Checkel 2001, Zürn 2000). 5

6 Can we assume that the same factors are at play within the Convention setting and if so what does this imply for the relation between the Convention process and the activities of finance ministers, as we should expect the latter having a considerable interest in exercising influence over any potential amendment of Treaty provisions. If, indeed, policy deliberation is a feature of both the Convention setting and the debates among finance ministers should not we expect some modification of the classical veto-power role-play known from previous IGCs? In principle, the Convention setting should be conducive towards policy deliberation and problem-solving oriented negotiation behaviour. As the Convention process is more inclusive and forward-looking at the same time, actors are encouraged to consider alternative institutional options in more detail, as in comparison to the IGC-only framework. Within the latter setting many issues are off the table long before negotiations among the most senior decision-makers start in earnest. Therefore, new empirical research is needed that reconstructs the decisionmaking process with regard to specific Treaty provisions in order to establish more precisely to what extent the Convention lived up to its promises. As already indicated, one should be cautious to expect a sea-change in how the EU goes about the negotiation of Treaty provisions because the Convention was only part of a two-step process with an IGC concluding the Treaty revision. This is all the more important for the area of economic governance, which remains essentially elite driven and in which we cannot observe substantial public pressure for institutional reform. 6

7 As the Convention got under way: setting and actors This section looks at the specific nature of the field of European economic governance. It highlights which institutional issues were subject to challenge. In addition, the section introduces the different actors in the field and what their initial preferences were when the Convention got under way in February The mixed two-pillar institutional framework of European economic governance The existing constitutional framework for economic governance is of paradoxical nature. It is characterised by a highly integrated and supranational monetary policy pillar on the one hand, and a decentralised and essentially intergovernmental economic policy pillar on the other hand. Consequently, with regard to the field of monetary policy the question of more or less integration was not really up for discussion at the Convention. The supranational European Central Bank (ECB) enjoys already exclusive decision-making competences in this area and there is no room for a further transfer of sovereignty towards the Community level. Instead, issues such as the orientation of monetary policy, notably the emphasis on price stability versus demands for a greater role of monetary policy in stimulating growth, were of relevance here. Similarly the question of the accountability of the ECB always played a role in political and academic debates on the appropriate institutional framework for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Finally, the composition of the ECB s Governing Council needed to be redefined with a view to enlargement. It is currently composed of the members of the bank s so-called Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks of all EU member states (see Article 112, TEC). Here, the main concern was the drastic increase of membership as a result of enlargement and the potentially harmful consequences for the decision-making process within the Governing Council. In contrast to the case of monetary policy the debate about the further development of the decentralised institutional framework for economic policymaking also touched on the more fundamental question of strengthened supranational authority in this area. This debate mainly focused on the right balance between the preservation of national autonomy and stronger coordination of national economic policies at the EU level. In the current system member states 7

8 remain free to choose their economic policies as long as they comply with a limited set of rules, notably the 3% deficit ceiling (see Article 104, TEC). In addition, they commit themselves to coordinate their economic policies within the Council through drawing up so-called Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and engaging in a system of multilateral surveillance (see Article 99, TEC). Currently, the role of the Commission in this field is essentially the one of a watchdog and an expert body. It exercises its traditional right of initiative mainly through mere recommendations (see Articles 99 and 104, TEC) instead of proposals, as it is the rule in other policy areas. The right to issue a proposal would strengthen the role of the Commission in the surveillance and reprimand proceedings in the area of economic policy coordination as this would require the Council to reject Commission proposals on the basis of unanimity (Article 251, TEC). Currently, Commission recommendations can be modified in any way the Council deems necessary on the basis of qualified majority decision-making. In particular the failure of individual member states to stick to binding rules or non-binding commonly agreed policy guidelines have repeatedly triggered demands for a greater role of the Commission in policing and initiating coordination processes. Thus, the issue of an extension of Community competences in this policy area was a logical question to be addressed by the Convention. The actors When the Convention started its work in Brussels during the first half of 2002 the individual stakeholders in the area of economic governance were quite differently prepared with regard to the coming debates. Whereas comprehensive preparations were under way inside the Commission, EU finance ministers remained largely complacent. For the latter the Convention process and the idea of fundamental institutional review was a non-issue at the time. The Commission started its internal preference formation process at an early stage. Already by March 2002 all commissioners had outlined their ideas and positions with regard to the future Constitutional Treaty. This confidential reflection exercise within the wider Commission also included the area of economic governance. In addition, the Commission s Directorate General for 8

9 Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) had produced detailed internal reports on the potential repercussions of the enlargement process on EMU s institutional set-up. These thorough preparations enabled commissioner Pedro Solbes to open the debate on economic governance. He used a speech at the Brussels Economic Forum 2 on May 2, 2002 to spell out his preferences with regard to the future constitutional framework of economic governance (see Solbes 2002). The commissioner emphasised that the general idea of a decentralised economic policy framework, which essentially relies on persuasion and peer pressure, was still valid. Therefore, the envisaged changes to the institutional setup should be limited and focused on the specific challenges of the enlargement. Solbes grouped his considerations around four aspects, which indeed became the focal points of all following debates. Firstly, it should be considered to strengthen the role of the Commission as a watchdog in the context of the procedures related to the excessive deficit clause and the BEPGs. Here, the Commission should obtain the right to issue proposals instead of recommendations, thus making it more difficult for individual member states to fend off criticism within the Council. The second point on the commissioner s priority list was the work of the Eurogroup the informal monthly meeting of the euro area finance ministers, the Commission and the ECB. Solbes argued that the Eurogroup s informal and confidential nature has contributed to an improvement of the coordination through frank and open discussions. However, the question whether the current institutional set up remains appropriate for an EMU where a significant number of countries will not be members of the euro area for a period of time remains open. We should think about possibilities of different Council formats to respond to two objectives: to preserve the Community nature of the economic policy coordination and to respond to the different requirements of euro area/non euro area members. The need to have informal very restricted policy discussions should also be considered. (Solbes 2002) Thirdly, the commissioner raised the question of the fragile democratic legitimacy of the current governance system, which gives the European Parliament (EP) no formal role in the decision-making processes. Finally, Solbes warned that the external representation of EMU s economic policy in the international 2 The Brussels Economic Forum is a high profile conference for decision-makers and experts in the area of economic governance, which is sponsored by the Commission. 9

10 economic and financial institutions needed to be improved. Here, the existing Treaty provisions lack clarity. Solbes ideas reappeared in the official Commission communication to the Convention on May 22, in which the supranational administration set out its preferences for the debate on the future constitutional architecture of the EU (see European Convention 2002a, p. 10). Most importantly, the document emphasised the need for Treaty reform with regard to the existing framework of economic policy coordination. It saw a strengthened role for the Commission as essential for a further reinforcement of the pre-dominantly intergovernmental setting: The instruments of economic policy coordination, particularly the major economic policy guidelines and the opinions on the stability and convergence programmes should be drafted on the basis of proposals from the Commission rather than mere recommendations from which the Council may depart by qualified majority. The means available to the Commission should not be limited to a recommendation to be submitted to the Council when the economic policies pursued by a specific Member State deviate from the major guidelines approved or jeopardise the smooth running of economic and monetary union. When this happens, the Commission must be in a position to act effectively within the framework set out by the Treaty: through warnings, which it would address directly to the Member State concerned, and by means of proposals from which the Council could depart only by unanimity. (European Convention 2002a, p. 10) 3 Also from another point of view these suggestions seemed to be reasonable. To give the Commission the right to issue proposals instead of recommendations also would have brought EMU in line with other policy areas in the Community pillar. Reducing procedural diversity and simplifying decisionmaking procedures was another key objective of the Convention. Consequently, the Commission hoped to receive considerable support for this demand. In addition, the Commission recommendation was of great relevance to another controversial area of economic governance the field of tax harmonization. Under the heading Overhauling our methods and procedures the Commission argued that [t]he European Community has built up solidarity around common policies. The enlarged Union, with its new members, will need strong common policies for the political and economic links they create between the States and for the big advantages which will follow for the Union as a whole in terms of economic and social cohesion. 3 Emphasis as in original document; UP. 10

11 These policies must be overhauled in order to adapt them to the new context of the enlarged Union. They need to be refocused on the notion of the added value of Community action. Qualified majority voting must become the single procedural rule for decision-making in the Council. It no longer makes sense, for instance, for unanimity to apply to the fiscal and social dimension of the internal market, particularly as we look ahead to enlargement and the risk of blockages stemming from the increase in the number of Member States. (Ibid., p. 8) Despite these detailed and, in the light of the historic task of the Convention, quite proportionate demands the views of the Commission had little effect on the final outcome of the Convention s work in the area of economic governance. As it will be demonstrated below, the Commission became sidelined despite the fact that its thoroughly prepared proposals proved being influential with regard to the view of many individual members of the Convention and enjoyed a considerable degree of publicity. However, the Commission failed to lead the debate on Treaty reform among EU finance ministers. This became apparent for the first time when euro area finance ministers and Solbes gathered for a Eurogroup meeting in early May 2002 their first meeting after Solbes speech at the Brussels Economic Forum. As interviews with participants in this meeting suggest, ministers had been agitated by the speech. 4 Although presenting on a different institutional matter not related to the issue of Treaty reform the commissioner received a number of critical comments from ministers who disapproved his initiative. This marked the beginning of an essentially uneasy relationship between the ministers and the commissioner as regards the debate on Treaty reform, leaving the latter without much influence over the agenda. Despite the thorough preparations of Solbes Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) the commissioner was not able to rally support for the Commission s position in the Convention among the ministers. In fact, as the next section will show the action took place somewhere else. 4 Anonymous interviews with participants in Eurogroup meetings, carried out between May 2002 and May 2003; on file with author. 11

12 Parallel worlds the Convention s working group on economic governance and the debates on institutional reform among EU finance ministers Even if commissioner Solbes had not been able to rally support for the Commission s position he had finally drawn the attention of finance ministers to the issue of a review of the existing Treaty provisions on economic governance. However, it took a number of other steps to bring the ministers in tune with the Convention process. By this time the Convention had finished its initial round of plenary sessions and started to work in earnest on the Treaty provisions in the area of economic governance within the context of one of its special working groups. The following sub-sections will review the proceedings within the working group and the debate among finance ministers respectively. Most importantly, it will be demonstrated how the processes became even though indirectly interlinked and what implications this had for the drafting of the final provisions. The Convention s working group on economic governance On June 7, 2002 the working group on economic governance held its first meeting under the chairmanship of Klaus Hänsch, a member of the Convention s Praesidium and a former EP president. Until its last meeting on October 10, 2002 the group convened ten times. The group s mandate (see European Convention 2002b) essentially comprised the issue areas already outlined in the above mentioned Commission communication and the Solbes speech (see previous section of this paper). The working group itself comprised a number of important members of the Convention including parliamentarians and government representatives, both from the left and right of the political spectrum. Among them were several outspoken proponents of a greater role for the Commission in the area of economic policy coordination such as the commissioner Michael Barnier, the French minister for European affairs Pierre Moscovici, the former Commission president Jacques Santer or the French socialist MEP Pervenche Berès. Initially, the Convention s Praesidium had not foreseen a working group on economic governance. Many saw too little room for Treaty changes in this area in 12

13 order to justify a separate working group. However, the later chairman of the working group, Klaus Hänsch, finally convinced his colleagues in the Praesidium to set up such a forum for in-depth discussion on the area of economic governance. Prior to the start of the Convention and during its initial round of plenary debates Hänsch had gained the impression that several aspects of the existing economic governance framework were subject to contestation by a number of Convention members. Given the clear proposals from the Commission and the record of public debate on the features of the economic governance framework prior to the Convention the impression that the set of existing Treaty provisions was by far not uncontested seems to be justified. However, Hänsch shared the view of the other members of the Praesidium that there was not much room for any significant changes to the existing institutional framework. Nevertheless, the former EP president saw a need for the justification of the existing provisions through the Convention. 5 Therefore, he wanted to convene a high-profile working group, which finally would be able to pave the way for a reconfirmation of the existing parameters in the final draft of the Constitutional Treaty. The working group followed a mixed-model of common debate, expert hearings and written contributions (see European Convention 2002c). The working group agreed to hold expert hearings in camera in order to stimulate debate also on economically and politically sensitive issues, such as the 3% deficit criterion or the orientation of the ECB s decisions over monetary policy. The list of invitees comprised the commissioners for economic and financial affairs and for social affairs, Pedro Solbes and Anna Diamantopolou, the ECB president Wim Duisenberg, the chairman of the EU s Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Jonny Åkerholm, former Commission president Jacques Delors and the academic and former adviser of the Portuguese EU presidency in 2000 Maria João Rodrigues. The schedule of the working group foresaw a first round of meetings before the summer break reserved to the common discussion of the individual issues outlined in the group s mandate. Most importantly, these initial meetings saw a great majority of the working group members falling into line with the Commission proposals on a strengthened role of the supranational authority in the 5 Interview with Klaus Hänsch, March 2005; on file with author. 13

14 area of economic policy coordination. This concerned notably the suggestion to replace the existing right to issue mere recommendations with the right to issue proposals with regard to decisions on the BEPGs, multilateral surveillance and the policing of the deficit criterion (see European Convention 2002d, 2002e). In contrast, there was relatively little support for any significant reinforcement of the coordination regime in the area of tax harmonisation. However, differing from the debate on economic policy coordination the exact formulation of the respective constitutional provisions was more controversial. Some members did not want to see any changes, whereas others wanted to see at least some progress with regard to the use of qualified majority voting (see European Convention 2002f). The last meeting before the summer break on July 25, 2002 confirmed that the group backed the fundamental division of institutional competences within the existing governance framework. However, a majority of members not only wished a greater role for the Commission in the area of economic policy coordination but also wanted more involvement of the EP in the process of drafting the BEPGs. No conclusion was reached with regard to the future of the informal Eurogroup. In legal terms the monthly gatherings of the finance ministers of the euro area countries currently take place outside the regular Council framework. Consequently, the Eurogroup is not a formal decision-making body and is thus unable to formulate binding decisions. Therefore, some members of the working group demanded its formalisation in order to strengthen its role in the coordination process. Others favoured the status quo (see European Convention 2002g). Immediately after the summer break the working group started its confidential expert hearings. It is difficult to establish how exactly individual members of the working group reacted to the contributions of the different experts as the hearings took place in camera and the group did not vote on the following conclusions by the chairman. Nevertheless, interviews with participants clearly suggest that overall the expert hearings reinforced the view of group members that the role of the Commission in the area of economic policy coordination needed to be strengthened through granting it the right to issue proposals instead of recommendations. With the exception of EFC president Jonny Åkerholm, whose contribution reflected the then prevailing consensus among EU finance ministers (see below), all experts had endorsed a strengthened role of the Commission in the 14

15 area of economic policy coordination. They either were acting or former representatives of the Commission or were outspoken proponents of greater Commission involvement, such as Maria João Rodrigues whose hearing reportedly made a lasting impression on many group members. Whereas support for a strengthened role of the Commission in the area of economic policy coordination was unambiguous there were no clear results in other areas which had been repeatedly discussed within the working group. These controversies concerned the role of the EP in the process of drafting the BEPGs and notably the policy orientation of the ECB. Some working group members insisted that the Treaty should place greater emphasis on the ECB s responsibility for growth in comparison to the banks commitment to price stability. There were also demands to strengthen the accountability of the ECB by revising the rules for the transparency of its internal decision-making process. Here, the idea was discussed to make the voting behaviour of the members of the bank s Governing Council on interest rate policy public. Another issue was the possible integration of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) into the Constitution. Currently, the embattled pact has the status of secondary legislation and European Council resolutions. The pact sets out the procedures and policy objectives necessary for the smooth implementation of the Treaty s provisions on the avoidance of excessive deficits. The fact that these implementation procedures had remained fragile and subject to potential change through individual member states before many members of the working group wanted to back up the pact through granting it constitutional status. Here, again it is difficult to establish how strong the support for such a step was. According to the group s chairman Klaus Hänsch, who himself thought that such a step was redundant and the issue not something to be regulated by a constitution, a majority could have emerged in this area. However, a final vote on this was never taken. 6 The debate among finance ministers Even if commissioner Pedro Solbes had failed to win the support of finance ministers for his ideas on institutional reform his intervention at the Brussels Economic Forum clearly had ignited debate among them. So far, the ministers had 6 Interview with Klaus Hänsch, March 2005; on file with author. 15

16 remained complacent with regard to the issue of institutional review. In contrast to the Commission they saw no need to prepare in advance for the Convention proceedings. There was little understanding to what extend the Convention might affect EMU s institutional framework. Moreover, based on their experiences with the previous IGCs of Amsterdam and Nice finance ministers could be confident that their voice would be heard once the final round of negotiations at the intergovernmental level would start. Slowly this perception started to change as the creation of the special working group on economic governance within the Convention signalled that the issue of changes of EMU related Treaty provisions was actually on the table. The meeting of the Eurogroup on May 6, 2002, marked the beginning of a series of informal discussions. Ministers urged to further investigate the issues raised within the Convention and by Solbes. They asked the EFC as the responsible expert committee to prepare the discussion on these issues. The involvement of this expert body was in many ways crucial as it prepares, mirrors and complements the debate among finance ministers. The EFC is one of the most influential expert committees in Brussels. It is a strange animal in the committee scene of the European capital. Apart from providing expertise it is also in charge with pre-discussing and pre-negotiating issues for the ECOFIN Council and the informal Eurogroup meetings. This implies that the committee often takes on functions which are usually dealt with by COREPER in other policy areas. It is composed of the most senior civil servants dealing with EU affairs at the national level. Many of them are deputy ministers. In addition, the director general of the Commission s DG ECFIN and a member of the ECB s executive board attend the meetings. The committee also has its own independent secretariat which is headed by a senior Commission official who, however, works entirely independently from Commission orders and only reports to the EFC president and the committee. Nevertheless, this official is part of the Commission hierarchy and participates in the regular meetings of the DG s directors. Consequently, the EFC secretary is well aware of developments inside the Commission, entertains close working relationships with the different branches of the DG and enjoys full access to the Commission s internal documents. When the ministers for the first time reacted to the debate triggered off by the Convention the then EFC secretary Günter Grosche and EFC president Jonny 16

17 Åkerholm were not unprepared. Most importantly, they had realised that the Convention would sooner or later force the ministers to react and that a close monitoring of the events there would be necessary. They were anxious to avoid a situation where decisions would be made, which later could not be so easily reversed. This was a view also shared in some of the national finance ministries which also had started to draft background papers. So far, this process just had not been activated through the ministers. Now this had happened. 7 Over the following months the preparations within the EFC and its secretariat were crucial in keeping the process on track and in actually achieving a unified position among the ministers, which then could actually be used for reacting to the events within the Convention. Most importantly, this involved the preparation of a catalogue of key issues which the Convention was likely to raise and to which ministers needed to have answers. In addition, the EFC and its secretariat were decisive in providing channels and links between the two debates, which were formally conducted in to parallel worlds: the Convention and its working group, from which the finance ministers were excluded, and the debate among ministers, which was conducted in a highly secretive manner. At its next meeting in June the Eurogroup held a first orientation debate. First concerns were raised that Solbes idea of a formal euro area Council formation with decision-making competences would be counterproductive. 8 It was feared that such a forum could undermine the informal character of the Eurogroup s informal working method and would question the unity of the Council. The Council s monopoly for formal decision-making had so far been the basis of a viable working consensus with the non-euro area countries. As in the context of the two previous IGCs the finance ministers quickly opted for a conservative approach with regard to the question of Treaty amendments in the area of EMU. There were no intentions to change the nature of the existing system of decentralised decision-making. This also implied that ministers were very reluctant to consider any strengthening of the Commission s right of initiative with regard to decision-making procedures related to the excessive deficit clause and the BEPGs. 7 Anonymous interviews with EFC members, carried out between May 2002 and May 2003; on file with author. 8 Anonymous interviews with participants in ECOFIN Council and Eurogroup meetings, carried out between May 2002 and May 2003; on file with author. 17

18 The informal debates among the ministers were continued on the basis of EFC input in the context of the regular informal ECOFIN Council luncheons in order to involve all 15 EU finance ministers. Besides the informal Eurogroup meetings the so-called ECOFIN luncheons are the most confidential framework for discussion. Only the minister and one adviser per country are present. Usually, there is no reporting on these debates at the regular ECOFIN press conference afterwards. Very soon it became clear that the ministers were determined to preserve the informal framework of Eurogroup meetings. Moreover, they sought to disentangle the question of formal euro area decision-making competences and the one of the status of the Eurogroup. Instead of a separate euro area Council formation the ministers preferred to consider the extension of the list of suspended voting rights of non-euro countries in the ECOFIN Council. This solution allowed keeping the Eurogroup as it was and preserved the unity of the Council. The discussions also focused on possible improvements of the Eurogroup s working method. This notably involved the idea of the introduction of an elected Eurogroup president who would serve for a longer period of time. Here, the general considerations within the Convention on the alteration of the EU s rotating presidency were welcomed. Finally, ministers and members of the EFC thought aloud about adjusting the rules for membership in the two expert committees in the area of economic governance in order to preserve the effectiveness of the discussion process after the enlargement. Besides the EFC this concerned the so-called Economic Policy Committee (EPC). However, the latter adjustments did not necessarily require any changes in the Treaty provisions as these aspects are regulated by secondary legislation. Reconnecting the debates Before the summer break EFC president Åkerholm got in touch with the chairman of the Convention s working group on economic governance Klaus Hänsch. Åkerholm wanted to brief the latter on the evolving consensus among ministers in order to establish closer ties between the Convention process and the debate among ministers. In addition, Åkerholm invited Hänsch on behalf of the ministers for the informal ECOFIN Council meeting in Copenhagen on September 7 to report on the outcome of the debates within the working group and to engage 18

19 in a dialog with the ministers. Only shortly afterwards, Åkerholm had his hearing at one of the last meetings of the working group. This was the time when the final report of the group was drafted. The EFC president used the opportunity to advocate the then prevailing consensus among ministers. He argued that it was essential not to introduce any significant changes to the current institutional framework, as this would undermine trust in the overall system (see European Convention 2002h). However, the activities launched by the EFC president and the secretariat were not the only ways through which venues for influencing the Convention process were opened up to the ministers. As chairman of the working group on economic governance Hänsch himself played a crucial role in this process. As a member of the Convention s Praesidium he wanted to make the Convention a success 9. In his view close contacts with national governments were essential because governments had a second shoot during the IGC 10 meaning that he anticipated them vetoing unacceptable proposals. Hänsch openly admits that he saw his mission in exploring which institutional options would be possible without having a majority of member states rejecting the Convention s view. Therefore, the chairman was open to and actively sought contacts with the relevant government representatives. These exchanges were conducted often on a very senior level and included the most influential veto players. For example, Hänsch met the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and had extensive consultations with the prime minister s EU adviser. Later he also met the Chancellor Gordon Brown for bilateral talks. In these conversations the issue of revisions in the area of tax harmonisation was in particular relevant to the economic governance working group. The United Kingdom traditionally had opposed any progress in the area of tax harmonisation with Gordon Brown being a key figure in the relevant debates among EU finance ministers. Hänsch stresses the constant interest of the British government in the Convention proceedings at all stages of the process: I had Blair s EU adviser on my couch even before I had floated the idea of a working group on economic governance within the Praesidium. The British thought that such a working would be one of the most important ones within the Convention. 11 Hänsch also entertained close links with German 9 Personal interview with Klaus Hänsch, March 2005; on file with author. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 19

20 finance minister Hans Eichel and his ministry. Eichel was a major critique of a strengthening of the role of the Commission in economic governance. He instead favoured closer intergovernmental coordination. The German finance minister did not reveal his intention to veto a possible attempt to grant the right to issue proposals to the Commission in the above mentioned areas. Hänsch clearly saw that this view of the German minister had consequences for the envisaged introduction of the Commission s right to issue proposals in decision-making over the BEPGs and the deficit procedure. Finally, Hänsch describes his visit at the informal ECOFIN Council in Copenhagen as crucial. The meeting gave him an opportunity to sound out the ministers on what was possible within the Convention. 12 The meeting confirmed the institutional conservatism of ministers who were reluctant to introduce any significant changes. The debate with the ministers also was crucial in understanding what they really wanted to do with the Eurogroup. 13 The outcome The work of the Convention s working group on economic governance was concluded with the submission of a final report to the Convention in preparation for the final round of plenary discussions on the Draft Constitutional Treaty. During its last two meetings the working group had discussed draft chapters of the report which was edited by Hänsch. The latter also composed the final version after the group s last meeting which was then submitted to the Convention without further discussion. The report summarises the results of the group s work in a differentiated manner. It mentions diverging views of different groups within the working group and outlines where there was unanimous agreement. Interestingly, the paragraph on the Commission s role in the decision-making on the BEPGs carefully differentiates between two different views prevailing within the group: The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines are considered by the Group to be the principal instrument for supporting economic policy co-ordination, based on the fact that economic policies are considered a matter of common concern. Some members of the Group suggest that this could be better ensured by giving the Commission the 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 20

21 right to make a formal proposal rather than a recommendation. Others consider that this would have the effect of reducing Member States' ownership of the Guidelines, and therefore wish to maintain the existing procedures. (European Convention 2002i, p. 5) The concept of Member States ownership of the Guidelines was an integral part of the debate among ministers and within the EFC where exactly the same language was used. The main idea was that EMU essentially relies on decentralised system of economic governance in which coordination is based on self-commitment rather than common rules solely defined at the supranational level (see Wicks 1997). Therefore, the ministers wanted the member states to play an active and decisive role in the drafting of the BEPGs. Consequently, the idea to give the Commission the right to issue proposals in this area was quickly rejected within the debates among finance ministers. However, in the hearings of the working group EFC president Jonny Åkerholm was the only expert defending this model while the others had demanded a greater role for the Commission. With regard to the question of the future status of the Eurogroup the final report was unambiguous and opened the way for the implementation of the model preferred by the ministers. There was no mentioning of earlier debates during which the formalisation of the group had been demanded. The report just stated: The Working Group considers that the Eurogroup has an important role to play in facilitating discussions between participating countries, and that this will increase after enlargement given that, for a transitional period, its membership will no longer represent a large majority of Member States. The Group therefore considers that no measures should be taken which would prevent the possibility of informal discussions amongst finance ministers of the Eurogroup, the ECB and the Commission. (European Convention 2002i, p. 7) The recommendations of the working group did not contain any Treaty language. The issue of translating the Convention s debates into a Draft Treaty was nearly exclusively resolved among the members of the Convention s Praesidium. The wording of the individual articles was not debated in detail again although during a final round of plenary sessions draft chapters of the Treaty were discussed. Most importantly, the recommendations of the working group on economic governance left a number of options open when it came to the (re-) formulation of Treaty articles. Again, this can be most strikingly demonstrated with regard to the issue of a strengthened role for the Commission in the area of economic policy coordination. The existing Article 99, TEC on economic policy 21

22 coordination remains nearly unchanged. However, with regard to one aspect the competences of the Commission are extended. Paragraph 4 now grants the Commission the right to directly warn a member state deviating from the commonly agreed rulebook without having to ask the Council first. However, as before, the specific recommendation for policy correction the actual reprimand tool in this process is issued by the Council: Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a warning to the Member State concerned. The Council of Ministers, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide to make its recommendations public. (Article III-72.4, Draft Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union 2003; emphasis added by the author) More progress was made with regard to the implementation of the deficit rule. Firstly, the Commission once more obtains the right to warn the relevant member state directly and no longer has to address the Council in the first place, as required by the current Treaty (Article 104.5, TEC). The paragraph now reads: If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it shall address an opinion to the Member State concerned. (Article III- 76.5, Draft Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union 2003) Secondly, the Commission now has the right to issue a proposal instead of recommendation when it comes to the decision whether an excessive government deficit exists. Most importantly, the Convention s Draft Treaty also extends this right to the formulation of the policy adjustments, which are requested from a member state in such a situation. This makes it more difficult for the Council to water down the corrective measures: The Council of Ministers shall, on a proposal from the Commission, having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make and after an overall assessment, decide whether an excessive deficit exists. In that case it shall adopt, according to the same procedures, recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to paragraph 8, those recommendations shall not be made public. (Article III-76.6, Draft Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union 2003; emphasis added by the author) 22

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