By Alexandra Guáqueta Academic Director, Fundacion Ideas para la Paz 1 Visiting Fellow, FES New York, Summer 2006
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1 Colombia s Changing Challenges and Uribe s Second Term, presented at FES Roundtable Uribes s Second Term: Will More of the Same Solve Colombia s Security Problems?, June 19, New York. By Alexandra Guáqueta Academic Director, Fundacion Ideas para la Paz 1 Visiting Fellow, FES New York, Summer 2006 I. Introduction Colombia has been a democracy for most of the twentieth century, has no ethnic or religious divides and is ranked as a mid-level developing economy. Nevertheless, internal violence in the form of armed conflict has been a defining feature over the past four decades. Seven left-wing guerrilla organizations and multiple right-wing paramilitary squads, loosely grouped under the AUC moniker, emerged between the 1960s and the 1980s. During this period the guerrillas generally aimed at redressing socio-political grievances and installing a socialist regime by attacking the state, while paramilitary forces sought to repel guerrilla influence and occasionally served as natural allies of state security forces in the battlefield. Today the two oldest guerrilla groups FARC and the ELN still exist. And only last year did certain paramilitary groups begin to demobilize. Colombia therefore has an enduring armed conflict and continues the state-building process. I ve been asked to reflect on the conflict-related challenges for the next Uribe administration. The key exercise is to identify whether the nature of the challenges are the same now as 4 years ago and what seems to be the best way to tackle them. While a first term balance or evaluation is undoubtedly necessary in order to discuss the lessons learned, the necessary adjustments and future options, I would rather focus on the nature of the challenges: how have the problems changed over the past years, where is Colombia today in terms of conflict and peace, and what is the current state of politics surrounding conflict resolution. Only then can we have meaningful dialogue over possible courses of action for the Uribe administration. II. Colombia back in 2002 Let me take some time to give you a brief snapshot of Colombia back in 2002 and proceed to the present day. The following were four main features of the conflict and the politics of conflict resolution: First, all illegal armed groups were at their peak. There was a full-fledged confrontation between the guerrillas and the paramilitary, with increasing activity by state forces. Insecurity was widespread and extreme. The 40-year old conflict, which in the past had remained contained and usually took place in faraway low-populated rural areas, had taken a dramatic turn in the mid 1990s. Drug money catapulted guerrillas and paramilitaries into a revamped, gruesome competition for territorial control. Institutions had been besieged in many localities as each group attempted to buy off, win over or intimidate mayors, governors, judges, and even the police and military. Local economic transactions were also affected as the guerrillas and the paramilitary sought control over local legal and illegal businesses to make and launder money. In addition, Colombia had turned into the world s largest coca producer with around 160,000 hectares of cultivated coca bushes. Illegal crops had introduced 1 This presentation is the sole responsibility of the author and does not represent FIP s official position on these issues. 1
2 a key element to conflict: they altered peasant incentives and allowed illegal armed groups to hold stronger sway over local communities. The escalation of conflict had brought a heavy burden on a large number of people. Civilians were taking the toll of war. If you lived in the areas disputed by FARC, ELN and the AUC your chance of getting killed or displaced was high. Increasingly people from cities and small towns were not even safe outside their homes because they could be kidnapped. Small to medium entrepreneurs and any landowners were likely victims of systematic extortion. And everybody was affected by attacks on energy towers, armed blockades and bombed bridges. Intimidation ended up pushing peasants, farmers, merchants and basically anyone living in small towns into the arms of the paramilitary. Paramilitaries were the most egregious human rights abusers but were very capable of delivering political and economic benefits and protecting their supporters. Second, there was a growing sentiment among the public that conflict had to end. At the same time there were no open doors for political negotiations with the guerrillas, and no clarity regarding the treatment of paramilitaries either as criminals or as a politically-driven armed group. When Uribe first came to office in 2002 he was confronted by a nation no longer willing to ignore the conflict. Colombians were fed up with violence and disenchanted with the old guerrilla movements. People of all socio-economic backgrounds were willing to speak out and mobilize. Uribe s predecessor, Andreas Pastrana, had attempted to lull the FARC into a peace settlement, but failed, leaving many Colombians to blame the FARC for its unwillingness to compromise. Furthermore, the group s romantic image had been eroded due to public knowledge of the dark-side of their revolutionary activities: human rights abuses, deep connections to drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, arms-dealing and political corruption. This national fatigue and eagerness to do something materialized into a series of attitudes and responses: A majority supported tougher action against illegal armed groups: i.e. stepping up military pressure and judicial recourse to imprison and punish combatants for their illegal conduct (i.e. further criminalization of rebels and self-defense groups). At the same time, many reacted by forming opinions against violence and turning to human rights norms. Some were just average Colombians who had never stopped to think about conflict and the value of human life; others were more progressive-minded people (such as union members or leftwing intellectuals) who had passively or actively sympathized with the guerrilla cause, but were now parting ways and setting clearer boundaries on acceptable behavior. Third, Colombia was no longer alone in dealing with illegal armed groups; the international community had considerably stepped up its presence in the country. Uribe found a rather pro-active international community involved in conflict resolution, which again was a new feature of peace politics in Colombia. Never before had so many outsiders (foreign states, international organizations and NGOs) been present in Colombia. Not even the US, who had traditionally meddled in Latin America, had been involved in the armed conflict. But by 2002 the situation was different. The bureaucratic dynamics of a bigger and better war against drugs and Colombia s cry for assistance in the face of conflict escalation did away with the old prudent distance in US- 2
3 Colombian relations. So in 1998 Plan Colombia was born to combat guerrilla related drug trafficking. Then, after September 11, the US turned to help Colombia combat all its terrorists, FARC, ELN and the AUC. With this came US political intervention in Colombian conflict management. Not limited to state actors, intervening parties ran the entire gamut of beltway policy makers, from special interest groups and NGOs. Europe too had become an important donor. Its assistance and close relationship to the UN brought a wide network of NGOs giving them enough leverage to enter the politics of economic development, human rights and democracy. The clashes between Europe and the US on Plan Colombia occurred, forecasting the political complexities of having too many hands in the kitchen. The UN had previously become part of the peace and conflict diplomacy scene since Uribe s predecessor had asked the UN for good offices in the form of a Secretary General Special Representative Fourth, the Andean neighborhood had become somewhat anxious with the spill over from Colombian conflict and US military assistance. So, in summation, the challenges were about providing security, curbing the military and economic capacity of illegal armed groups, reducing drug cultivation and trafficking, managing international assistance and neighbor concerns. All this happened amidst a relatively favorable domestic political environment and relative national consensus that something had to be done. III. Colombia in 2006 Subsequently, during his first tenure, Uribe: Launched an all out military and judicial war against the guerrillas, resorted to a strong anti-terrorist rhetoric and promoted desertion. Increased anti-drug operations, especially eradication as a means to cut FARC financial resources and take away their peasant constituency. Stepped up the pressure against the paramilitary and agreed to strike a demobilization deal with them, which ended in the Justice and Peace Law. And strengthened the alliance with the US, while paying less attention to European and regional concerns. All these policies, coupled with the dynamics of conflict, resulted in changes to several aspects of the conflict and the politics of conflict resolution. Today, Colombia still has an ongoing armed conflict, but many things have changed. Since the dynamics in Colombia have shifted, it is obvious that a continuation of the status quo (that is more of the same medicine ) will not be sufficient to usher in a new era of sustainable peace and state-building. So let us look at the situation today. First, the guerrillas are weaker and the paramilitary have withdrawn from conflict. Security has improved, but FARC remains active. In all, the reduction of illegal armed groups and the absence of widespread competition for territorial control has led to improved security conditions. Massacres, kidnappings, displacement, terrorist attacks and road blockades have all considerably decreased. People face less conflictrelated risks, can travel around the country, and businesses can operate more normally. The ELN virtually imploded after being attacked by all sides, the paramilitary, the Armed Forces and even 3
4 FARC. The weakened guerrilla group now seems ready to begin peace talks. FARC no longer holds the same military strength and has retreated from different parts of its territory. It has lost troops in combat as well as key middle-ranking commanders. Other combatants have been imprisoned and a handful extradited to the US. However, FARC is not defeated. It is still active in several provinces and the vacuum left by the paramilitary is giving FARC an opportunity to re-conquer territories. Besides, it still has the rearguard of border terrains which constitute a barrier to Colombian military operations. FARC also has ample means to finance war. A not so widely distributed government report found that FARC was financed as much by extortion as by drug trafficking. In fact, something we have learned these past years is that systematic and extended extortion by guerrillas and the paramilitary had become a dominant feature of the war economy. FARC is predominantly a military structure driven by their goal to take over power and install a socialist government. It would be naïve to think that military pressure is not needed to achieve their withdrawal from conflict. Given the logic that guides their actions and their capacity to inflict damage on the population, Colombia s security forces still have much to do - especially in Putumayo, Nariño, Huila, Cauca, Arauca and Guaviare. However, to prevent FARC from entering former paramilitary-dominated areas, the administration will most likely have to combine military operations with campaigns to bring the state back in. This means making sure the population has the incentives possible to move beyond FARC as an attractive economic and political broker and that there are efficient police forces, judges, and prosecutors who can be protected from guerrilla harassment. Second, with the demobilization of more than 40,000 combatants, Colombia has officially entered post-conflict, except that conflict has not ended. From 2002 until the present around 10,000 guerrillas and AUC members decided to desert their organizations. More than half of these are actually from FARC and ELN. The numbers are extremely significant if we consider that the peace processes of M-19, EPL, PRT, MAQL and CRS in the early 1990s produced only 5,000 reintegrated combatants combined. The government promoted these desertions by publicizing its Reintegration Program and offering attractive DDR packages. In addition, more than 30,000 paramilitary withdrew from conflict in a staggered calendar of demobilizations after negotiations with the Uribe administration. Colombia thus now faces the challenge of reintegrating more than 40,000. There are many reasons why this situation represents a huge risk as well as an opportunity depending on how it is managed. The sheer numbers are very high and require a great deal of coordination among state agencies and international donors. Reintegration, a typical post-conflict phenomenon, is occurring alongside remaining conflicts. There are thus higher security risks for former combatants, who can be targeted by their old organizations or those that have not withdrawn from conflict. Not all are free to return to their homes and as long as the war goes on it is hard to build national momentum in favor of reconciliation. Another problem is that conflict stimulates and necessitates criminality. At the same time, crime has benefits from the vacuums of state control created by illegal armed groups. So alongside the conflict, drug trafficking continued to flourish and sophisticated illegal industries developed in arms trading, money laundering, extortion, falsification of documents, counterfeiting, assassinations and kidnappings. All executed by well trained pandillas who sell goods and services to the highest bidder, be it guerrillas, paramilitaries or drug traffickers. This means that there is a large market for people skilled at using weapons who know their way around black markets, difficult terrains, and the underworld, i.e. former combatants. 4
5 Let me now focus on the demobilization of the AUC and three challenges specific to that group. The first challenge is maintaining the political terms of the deal which sustains demobilization. The gist of the agreement struck between the AUC and Uribe was that in return for demobilization, reparations and good behavior, the paramilitary would receive reduced sentences and pardons, along with a reintegration package and exemption from extradition to the US. The past month has witnessed yet another political crisis in the paramilitary demobilization: responding to appeals to the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) --the law that embodies the terms of the peace agreement-- the Colombian Constitutional Court reduced and eliminated some of the benefits for demobilized paramilitary. These were some of the main points: a. The clause that defined paramilitary activity as a political crime was eliminated. The effects of this legal provision are still uncertain, but this may ban future paramilitary participation in politics and make them more vulnerable to extradition. b. Another change is that paramilitary will now have to confess all their crimes at once if they want to receive all JPL benefits. There will be no second chances in case they forget to share information. c. Finally, paramilitary will have to fund reparations with their own money, be it assets that were illegally obtained or not. The paramilitary leadership reacted quickly and strongly. They would rather have themselves killed than spend 30 to 40 years in prison, they said --in other words a clear warning they would be willing to rearm. In addition to that, it seems extradition is still an unresolved issue or a somewhat unstable component of the deal. Being protected from extradition was never written down in the JPL, but we all know it was a key piece of the deal. Now, there is no guarantee that the US will refrain from insisting that Colombia extradites combatants to the US (usually on drug trafficking charges). The US may still be using this card as an instrument to make sure Uribe walks the talk with regards to implementing the Justice and Peace Law, and doesn t let the paramilitary off the hook on reparations and abstaining from illegal business. The challenge for Colombia here is twofold: making sure it has enough room to use extradition at its own discretion and in adequate doses, for too much stick can scare the paramilitary away from peace and too little would void its effect. The second main challenge is dealing with criminalized paramilitary and emerging mafias. The transformation of paramilitary groups into criminal networks was predictable, which is why it was frustrating and surprising that the government did not pay more attention to designing robust monitoring and reintegration mechanisms. It is also a pity that due to genuine concerns on legitimizing a potentially flawed peace process, the international community also reacted too late in providing useful guidance and assistance. Today, there is alarming evidence that dozens of paramilitary have re-activated to either contain FARC or take away their share of illegal business, evolving into criminal organizations which see extortion and drug trafficking as a means for personal profit. The latest OAS verification report as well as government sources have publicly confirmed these developments. According to Police General Castro there are at least 25 new, well armed criminal structures connected to drug trafficking and totaling about 4,000 men. This is why there has been so much attention focused on punishing and controlling the paramilitary through tough application of the JPL and the actions of an embryonic Reparations Commission. 5
6 Immediately after re-election the Uribe administration announced at least three key measures to manage both paramilitary compliance with the peace deal and improve reintegration. First, he finally created an Alta Conserjería para la Reintegración. It will be managed at the cabinet-level with hopefully enough authority to induce better coordination among state agencies (i.e. have the ears of Ministers, Vice-ministers and agency directors), interact at a more equal standing with Ambassadors and international organization, lead a national reconciliation strategy, get big business to support reintegration programs and prepare the way for FARC and ELN members should their withdrawal from conflict materialize. Second, he ordered the police to monitor whether demobilized paramilitary were actually complying with the Justice and Peace Law and issue a monthly report. The armed forces were also instructed to focus on anti-drug operations related to the paramilitary. Third, he created a new Rural Police Directorate to be deployed in demobilization zones. And the National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission is also meant to have peacebuilding responsibilities. So far, though, it seems focused on assisting victims to use the available legal and institutional instruments to access reparations. Less attention, however, has been paid to what I believe is a key issue of Colombia s state-building puzzle: Dealing with high and mid-level leaders who have economic power and exercise political leadership over local constituents. As one former guerrilla leader pointed out to me in a conversation, the fact is that the paramilitary never lost in the war. They won. They actually managed to gain political, economic and territorial control over at least 11 Colombian provinces. This means they are entitled to a share of power in our country whether we like it or not. So the problem here is deeper and far more complex than just making sure paramilitary are punished. Of these paramilitary with power some will want to convert their war profits into legal wealth and perhaps, only perhaps, retire to peacefully enjoy the comfort of wealth while evading extradition. Ensuring legal participation in the market economy, considering their record of intimidation, is part of the puzzle. Others will want to participate in politics. Several AUC members have local appeal in certain regions of Colombia and are recognized as authority figures. They are obeyed, people vote for them or for whom ever they anoint as their collaborators. People also look to them to solve all kinds of problems, from family feuds, to land disputes. They look to them for help them in recovering debts, etc. Paramilitary forces may not be legitimate in the cultural mainstream, but they are in local subculture, even if such legitimacy was constructed with the use of force. It is interesting to compare this situation with the case of M-19 and other guerrillas. Whereas M-19 enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of Bogotá, enough to enter legal and electoral competition, it never exercised as much power in as many regions. Also, ironically, crime and brutality notwithstanding, the paramilitary may be well equipped to survive in politics since, unlike the more orthodox guerrillas, they were always connected to the cities and active in legal politics, even if using illegal means, so they know how political machineries work. They understand pork barrel politics, manage articulation between local and national politics well and know how to mobilize constituents during elections. Above all they have more access to funding through their legal businesses. This begs the question, how do you turn Mafiosi thugs with power into good citizens? Is it possible at all? Now, going back to our main picture of Colombia today, there is a third element that is different. The relative consensus on the need to do something about the conflict has transformed into deep polarization. 6
7 The tone and content of Uribe s security policies polarized the domestic political environment. Elections have led most observers to focus on the conservative swing political landscape has taken in Colombia evidenced by Uribe s overwhelming triumph with 62% of the votes in the first round coupled with a 60% majority in Congress. More skeptical observers call this the paramilitarization of politics. However, it is important to look at the other side of the story, at those who didn t vote for Uribe. Around 35% are staunchly against Uribe. What are the manifestations of this polarization, and what is the disagreement about? One fundamental point of contention is the interpretation of conflict. Uribe opponents point at poverty, inequality, social discrimination, political exclusion and state authoritarianism as the root causes of conflict. Therefore, the solution to conflict cannot be anything but a renewed social contract that redistributes wealth. In addition, opponents have had a typical backlash to Uribe s security policies. The natural consequence has been to condemn the use of force as an instrument to exert pressure on the FARC and ELN. In general, public security forces are seen as the enemy. In fact, anything that has to do with security is sees as dirty. Also, as expected, left-wing sectors have strongly rejected the JPL and the paramilitary demobilization asking instead for full punishment and public acknowledgement of the state s historical record of human rights abuses and collusion with paramilitary forces. For the other side of the political spectrum, the right, democracy and civil society have become a difficult monster to manage. The monster is embodied by NGOs, unions, the Polo Democrático and intellectuals. Anyone who dares criticize Uribe and Colombia is unpatriotic, or a Communist traitor. And anyone who speaks in favor of human rights is also labeled as a Communist, terrorist-guerrilla sympathizer. Rhetoric aside, polarization has had tangible effects. Just some days ago, the OAS, the UN and the EU reported how NGO and human rights advocates were being threatened and killed by right-wing organizations. The greatest danger of this polarization is the inability to actually end conflict. While conflict had been allegedly losing some of its ideological drivers and following more the rationale of profit, it seems that conflict resolution brought ideology back in and is threatening to re-politicize conflict, giving it new life, and new motives. So, in sum, despite electoral triumph, this time around Uribe is not encountering a nation willing to back him completely, but rather a divided nation with a good number of embittered opponents. On the other hand, there seems to be a more favorable mood for peace negotiations with the ELN and FARC. Those that felt cheated by FARC back in 2000 trust Uribe is better positioned to negotiate with the guerrillas. Besides, the relative weakness of the guerrillas today makes negotiation appear less threatening. Uribe has already taken steps in favor of possible negotiations by softening his discourse and conceding important points to both groups. Fourth, as before, the international community is still present in Colombia, but tensions have clouded relations between Colombia, the EU and the UN. As much as domestic polarization emerged in the past 4 years, disagreements between Uribe on the one hand and Europe and the UN on the other became stronger and gained visibility. Like domestic critics of Uribe, many in the international community also disagreed with his security policies (the so called rehabilitation zones, using informants, aerial eradication, promoting desertion from illegal armed groups, dismantling guerrilla support networks, using peasant soldiers, etc.); the use of force to drive the FARC and the ELN into a peace process; his unwillingness to participate in a humanitarian prisoner swap with FARC; the alleged lack of attention to IDPs; and above all the 7
8 terms of the paramilitary demobilization. Colombia s closeness to the US only reinforced their sentiments against Uribe. Meanwhile Uribe resented the international community s undiscerning protection of NGOs, some which were clearly being used by the FARC and the ELN; their over-eagerness to condemn human rights violations by state security forces and the paramilitary while being more lenient towards the guerrillas, their unwillingness to support the reintegration of former combatants, even those former members of FARC and the ELN on the grounds that their desertion had been induced by a war policy not a peace policy; and the desire of some European states and UN agencies to position themselves as peace-brokers following their own agenda. As of now it seems that the UN/Colombia relationship is on the mend and I understand there are new directives and efforts to better coordinate the work of different agencies in the country, but many deep disagreements remain. For instance, the UN still refuses to support DDR. Regarding the US, Uribe has learned that friendship is not unconditional. Since the beginning Uribe took a pragmatic stance towards the US. He was convinced Colombia couldn t fight the FARC on its own; it needed political and material support. The US was willing to help out and so Uribe worked hard to strengthen US-Colombian cooperation. One cost has been greater US influence over the politics of peace-making. Some US conditions on aid to Colombia mean well, like those related to human rights. Still, Colombia s challenge is to deal with an increasingly intrusive friend. It is possible that America s internal divisions over Iraq and US global leadership may spill over into Colombia, undermining the so called bipartisan consensus. I ll let Michael speak to that. But basically, what this means is that US response to paramilitary demobilization is unpredictable. It could swing depending on domestic politics. Complete US withdrawal from isolationist backlash is unlikely, but we could see changes on emphasis and strategy. And last but not least is the region. Relations between Colombia and the neighborhood have severely deteriorated. Relations with Ecuador have soured. Various crises triggered by the trespassing of Colombian military into Ecuadorian territory chasing FARC, coca fumigation on the border (which Ecuador has argued affects peasants and crops), and Ecuador s refusal to combat FARC or provide useful intelligence. The relationship with Venezuela seems to have reached a precarious stability, but only after acute diplomatic rows over FARC using Venezuela as a shelter. Still, the differences between Uribe and Chavez are stark. So were does that leave Uribe? He will need to sustain military operations while bringing to life to the ELN peace process. For this Uribe will need the help of the Polo Democrático party, his more vociferous enemy, because Polo holds the key to ELN political reintegration. Then he can politically approach FARC with the humanitarian exchange. To prevent FARC from entering former paramilitary areas, the administration will have to combine military operations with campaigns to bring the state back in. That is, making sure the population has the lowest incentive possible to find FARC an attractive economic and political broker. Strengthening state presence and efficacy at the local level, is also part of the formula for a more robust reintegration policy. To win additional maneuvering room Uribe will need to work very hard at making the paramilitary demobilization process more acceptable at the domestic and international levels. 8
9 He will need to improve relations with the UN, the EU and the region to gain support for law enforcement, DDR and above all a future peace process with the ELN and FARC. Aligning agendas will be the key to make sure that too much international presence doesn t complicate a peace a process. And finally, Colombia will have to prepare for a change in US politics. Uribe should plan to work closer with the Democrats to formulate a Colombia policy that is acceptable to them while sustaining US military aid. 9
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