SECURING THE PAST. Policing and the Contest over Truth in Northern Ireland

Transcription

1 doi: /bjc/azq018 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (2010) 50, SECURING THE PAST Policing and the Contest over Truth in Northern Ireland Cheryl Lawther* The question of whether Northern Ireland should have a formal truth recovery process has been amplified by the recent Report of the Consultative Group on the Past. Compared to the volume at which the truth recovery debate has been played out, relatively little is known about policing attitudes to this form of dealing with the past. This paper analyses the ways in which the history and context of policing in Northern Ireland have shaped attitudes towards truth recovery. It will be argued that differing opinions on the need for truth recovery are part of a debate over ownership of the past between the ardent supporters of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the new post-patten managers and modernizers. Keywords: truth recovery, policing, Northern Ireland Introduction The Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, published in January 2009, brought the issue of whether Northern Ireland should have a formal truth recovery process into the spotlight. Established in June 2007 by Peter Hain, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the objective of the Consultative Group on the Past was to explore how to deal with the legacy of Northern Ireland s past. Co-chaired by the former Church of Ireland Bishop of Armagh Robin Eames and the former vice-chair of the Policing Board Denis Bradley, the Group issued its report of over 30 recommendations in January As regards truth recovery, the Group has proposed a Legacy Commission. This body would be composed of three elements the Review and Investigation unit, which would review and investigate historical cases that resulted in death and establish whether there was a realistic chance of prosecution; an Information Recovery unit, which would use both formal and informal means to establish answers to unresolved questions of importance to victims families; and the Thematic Examination unit to explore themes emerging from historical cases and the conflict as a whole (Consultative Group on the Past, 2009). This paper addresses the views of one of the most underexplored stakeholder groups to this debate representatives of the police service. 1 To date, there has been no scholarly * Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, School of Law, Queen s University Belfast, 28 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK; clawther01@qub.ac.uk. 1 This paper is based on fieldwork with elite level representatives of the Police Federation for Northern Ireland (PFNI), the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) George Cross Foundation, the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA), the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Interviews with senior figures in these organizations were carried out in the wake of the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past between May and September This timely approach took advantage of the immediate political reaction to the Group s work and a time of greater reflection on the truth recovery debate. A form of purposive sampling was used whereby potential interviewees were approached on the basis of their relevancy to the research questions. In this case, this meant those who were both professionally placed to represent the views of their organization and who had articulated opinions on the issues at stake. These actors expertise meant they were ideally situated to offer valuable contributions to this work. The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (ISTD). All rights reserved. For permissions, please journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org 455

2 Lawther investigation of their position in the truth recovery debate. Given the backdrop of the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, such an exploration is imperative. As a sizeable and visible constituency of opinion in Northern Ireland, their views cannot be left at the margins of this debate. Moreover, as the debates, for example, over reform of policing and the early prisoner release scheme have shown, their concerns and role during the conflict have been central to many of the major conflict transformation initiatives in Northern Ireland. The truth recovery debate is a key component of the broader architecture of conflict transformation and their participation in any future truth process is inevitable. As I will demonstrate, their views both complicate and enrich this debate. This paper analyses the ways in which the history and context of policing in Northern Ireland have shaped police attitudes to dealing with the past. 2 It is organized into four overlapping areas. The first section deals with the notion of betrayal. I will argue that the idea of betrayal by the British government has been an intrinsic element of police culture in Northern Ireland. This theme has been key to structuring mindsets on the truth recovery debate. The second issue explored is the argument that practices of truth recovery provide a vehicle from which republican activists could re-write the history of the conflict. Third, it is suggested that truth recovery is opposed by some because of the challenge such a process poses to deeply embedded narratives of justification and legitimation that sustain the organizational memory of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In contrast, the final section deals with the more positive assessment of a formal truth process and commitment to doing truth recovery that can be found at the elite levels of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Policing Board. It will be argued that these differing views reflect broader tensions within the Northern Ireland policing family over the ownership of the past. This contest is between those who hold fast to the memory of the RUC and the new post-patten era managers and modernizers who are keen to transform the PSNI into a forward-looking twenty-first-century police service. In order to better understand the themes explored in this article, it is useful at this juncture to offer some background to the nature of policing in Northern Ireland, particularly the distinctive police state relationship. As Loader and Mulcahy (2003) argue, policing is a cultural institution and performance, producing and communicating meaning about the nature of order, authority, morality, normality and subjectivity. Doing so, policing institutions can structure and shape social identities, nations and national identities. This is due in no small part to the relation between citizens, security, the state and policing. Through their presence and voice, the police are therefore able to evoke, affirm, reinforce or undermine many of the prevailing cultural characteristics of particular political communities (Loader and Walker 2001). As a vehicle through which recognition is claimed or denied, the police provide a platform on which individuals and groups can make sense of their past, form judgments on the present and project imagined futures (Loader 1997). In this respect, the policing institution becomes an imagined version 2 For this reason, and those detailed above, this paper addresses the concerns of the representative bodies of the RUC and current policing institutions. While being of interest, access to current serving members of the PSNI would not be permitted for reasons of security. 456

3 SECURING THE PAST of the state, reproducing meta narratives about the nature of power, authority, identity and morality. Anderson s (2006) work on imagined communities best captures the role played by the police in the formation and reproduction of sovereign states and national cultures. A number of elements associated with the imagined political community have been identified (Anderson 2006). These communities are both limited and sovereign, yet different from an actual community because it is not a community based on members everyday face-to-face interactions... it is imagined because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson 2006: 6). Further:... the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship... it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson 2006: 7) Anderson s (2006) arguments can be readily extrapolated to the symbolic capacity of police services to communicate social meanings as an imagined embodiment of the state. As his point about fraternity suggests, for those with a high level of emotional attachment to the police, they can become a force (of the imagination) that protects us from them and is believed to be capable of delivering order and security to a world experienced as changing, dangerous and unstable (Loader and Mulcahy 2003). It is under these conditions that the police are mobilized as a primal shelter for the insecure (Loader and Mulcahy 2003: 214). As discussed below, in Northern Ireland, the relationship between the RUC and unionist state provides a case study of policing as an imagined version of the state and ultimately informs much of the backdrop against which attitudes to truth recovery are structured. Established in the wake of partition, the RUC was formed in March From the outset, there was a repressive and intimate relation between the police and state. Driven by fears of incorporation into a Gaelic, Catholic Irish nation state and insurrection and expropriation by the Catholic minority, the protection of the unionist state by the RUC became a defensive necessity (Cochrane 1999). Senior RUC officers were subordinate to the political direction of the Stormont government and the RUC was closely supervised by the Ministry of Home Affairs, whose top officials were, according to Weitzer (1995: 34), strident defenders of Protestant interests and whose policies with regard to law and order were sometimes purely political and biased against Catholics. With considerable emphasis on loyalty to the crown and maintenance of the union, the RUC s duties consequently involved not only combating crime, but policing and maintaining partition (Brewer et al. 1988). A number of pieces of emergency legislation supported the quest to protect their state. The 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, later replaced by the 1973 Emergency Provisions Act, conferred wide powers of arrest, questioning and detention without trial (Boyle et al. 1980). In view of its largely partisan application, the police became the sharp end of a broader architecture of discrimination and exclusion. Acting as an embodiment of the unionist state, this imagined community and its capacity to provoke a deep visceral attachment on the part of those who regarded it as vital to the protection of their interests became a key site through which recognition was claimed, accorded or denied (Loader and Walker 2001; Loader and Mulcahy 2003). 457

4 Lawther Betraying the Best For those who are opposed to truth recovery, the notion of betrayal has been key to structuring their opposition. As the above discussion on the imagined community has demonstrated, among members of the RUC, there has historically been a sense of we-ness with the British state. Reflecting Restubog and Bordia (2006) and Koehler and Gershoff s (2003) work on social exchange theory and the notion of a social contract, the imagined return on their maintenance of the union by way of unerring sacrifice and service was commitment and protection. However, amongst representatives of the RUC, the argument that they have been betrayed in favour of a capitulation to republican demands has been rife. While beyond the scope of this article, this sense of sacrifice and betrayal parallels that of the dominant Ulster Protestant ideology. As Farrington (2006: 24), for example, argues, contemporary Unionist experiences are frequently set into their historically based self-image of sacrifice and loyalty to the British Empire and state, betrayal by the same and juxtaposed with Catholic disloyalty and their attempts to destroy the Protestant community in Ireland. This backdrop corresponds to Restubog and Bordia s (2006) work on the psychology of betrayal. They suggest, for example, that betrayal is often experienced when agents of protection, in this case the British state, cause the very harm that they are entrusted to guard against (the furthering of republicans demands), breaching the basic assumptions and expectations about the relationship or social contract (Restubog and Bordia 2006). While there has been a historical background to this narrative, the most modern manifestation of the discourse has focused on the Patten Report and reform of the RUC. 3 The reaction of RUC members and supporters to the Patten Report typifies Todd s (1987: 17) thesis that the experience of betrayal leads to a seething anger, defeat to an intense sense of humiliation. One of the most virulently expressed arguments was that the British government was more concerned with keeping republicans on board the peace process than recognizing the loyalty and service of the security forces. 4 A number of memorable statements denouncing reform proponents as propagandists, carpists and manufacturers of pseudo-history and as politically motivated, unrepresentative, dubious barometers of public opinion were indicative of these sentiments (Police Beat 1991 and Irish News, 2 January 1995, cited in Mulcahy 2006: 95). The perception that the RUC was being blamed for the conflict ran in tandem with these arguments. Not only was this deemed part of the republican propaganda war, but the British government s support for the reform programme was interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement of their responsibility. The remarks of the former PFNI chairman, Les Rodgers, at the Federation s Annual Conference, June 1997, illustrate this case: Over the years the RUC has held this community together when at times it would almost have disintegrated under the pressures of civil disorder. We have stood firm in an unenviable and isolated position 3 A key component of the 1998 Belfast Agreement was the establishment of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP). Chaired by Chris Patten, the Commission sought to provide a framework in which a police service with cross-community support could be developed. The Commission reported in September Key themes were the importance of effective and efficient policing that is free from partisan control, accountability to the law and community, representativeness and the importance of human rights (Mulcahy 2006). In light of these recommendations, significant changes were made to the RUC. This included changes to its name, uniform, insignia, accountability mechanisms, composition and recruitment patterns. 4 Police Beat, March

5 SECURING THE PAST doing our best to keep communities from each other s throats. At all times we have worked to bring communities together in support of the rule of law. We are now being portrayed by our enemies as part of the problem of Northern Ireland rather than its essential protective binding. (Ryder 2000) The publication of the Patten Report did little to assuage this belief. Its requirement, for example, that new and serving officers take an oath expressing their commitment to human rights was seen to imply that officers behaviour had not respected human rights in the past (Hillyard and Tomlinson 2000). Conditioned by a historical narrative emphasizing the preservation of life and avoidance of conflict, the suggestion, real or perceived, that police officers bear some responsibility for the conflict has led to the construction of the myth of equivalency. According to this myth, the security forces and paramilitary organizations are one and the same a morally repugnant idea for RUC members and their supporters (NIRPOA 2008). As suggested above, the experience of betrayal is not isolated to one moment in time. Shackleford and Buss (1996) make the point that the attendant erosion of trust and relational dissolution not only alters understandings of the past, but shapes readings of the future. The backdrop of an ever present sense of betrayal by the British government has therefore influenced readings of the truth recovery debate. There are a number of elements to this discourse. A key oppositional narrative focuses on the perception that the British government has and will continue to prioritize republicans demands for truth concerning state abuses to the detriment of the security forces (NIRPOA 2008; PFNI 2008). This is despite the fact that the most recent set of proposals for an Independent International Truth Commission launched by Sinn Fein in October 2009 calls on republicans to participate and play a full role in any such body. 5 Some of the most visible instances of truth recovery to date, the public inquiries into allegations of security force collusion in the deaths of Robert Hamill, Rosemary Nelson and Pat Finucane, have been regarded as politically motivated and felt to be a huge betrayal of their work and sacrifice. The following statement by the PFNI (2008) well illustrates these concerns: The lack of activity regarding the murders of our colleagues is a sad indictment of this government who seem only too happy, for reasons of political expediency, to pump millions into the deaths of a select few. In my view, such concerns ultimately speak to the wider fear that the British government is embarrassed by its association with the RUC. 6 Procrastination over the investigation of members deaths is therefore regarded as part of the effort to downplay their relationship. For other representatives of the RUC, a discourse of sacrifice betrayed has been expressed in light of the burden placed upon former members to provide evidence to inquests and inquiries (Interview with representative of the RUC GC Foundation, 10 August 2009). The argument, for example, has been made by Raymond White, a representative of the NIRPOA, that these former members:... are now almost on call, as it were, as unpaid public servants to be at the beck and call of whoever wishes to revisit the past. This is our fear, that in respect of the Legacy Commission this is yet another imposition... when do retired police officers actually get retired in the same fashion as other members of the public? (NIAC 2008: Ev. 287) 5 An Phoblact, 8 October 2009, Adams Calls for Republicans Participation in Truth Process. 6 Speech by Irwin Montgomery, Chairman of The Police Federation for Northern Ireland, 31st Annual Conference,

6 Lawther This sentiment is indicative of the view that to ask former officers to revisit the past is to betray the service they have provided and erodes what should be a well earned retirement (Interview with representative of the NIRPOA, 19 May 2009; Interview with representative of the RUC GC Foundation, 10 August 2009). Whether this is because retired officers have genuinely left the past behind or because a degree of culpability is involved remains to be seen. The potential for re-traumatization from revisiting the past has also been mooted as a point of concern (Interview with representative of the RUC GC Foundation, 10 August 2009). These arguments have reinforced the perception that current and prospective practices of truth recovery provide a tool by which the security forces could continue to be blamed for the conflict and by which the myth of equivalency could continue to be pedalled. Writing in respect to public inquiries, the NIRPOA (2008) submission to the Consultative Group on the Past clearly expresses this argument:... their remits unfortunately, are strongly reflective of the agendas of certain pseudo human/legal rights groups intent on pedalling theories of alleged State conspiracies and institutionalised collusion as being a major causal factor in the deaths of many victims of the troubles.... the most likely outcome being that they will create a new raft of scapegoats to be further victimised, or worse still, held vicariously liable for the political, administrative and organisational failures surrounding matters over which they had little or no influence. The prospect of the Troubles being designated as a war, amnesty/immunity proposals and the now disregarded Recognition Payment associated with the work of the Consultative Group on the Past have become a further focus of attention for these arguments (PFNI 2008; NIRPOA 2008). 7 While only the offer of limited immunity remains a possibility, these issues form part of the broader perception that the British government is implicitly supporting republican claims that the security forces were protagonists in the conflict. The belief that while the British state could absolve itself from participation, investigation into the conduct of the security forces would be offered as a panacea, their accountability aided by the existence of regimental numbers and documents has amplified this fear (NIAC 2005b: Ev ). For representatives of the RUC, this backdrop raises significant questions over the basis of their identity, given that the state to which they have acted loyally towards and made sacrifices in the name of appears to regard them as a distasteful and shameful association. In terms of trust, it also invokes the question of whether they could count on the support of the state if a truth recovery process was to be put in place. A Trojan Horse in Motion One of the strongest objections to truth recovery amongst the security forces is the argument that such a process would provide a vehicle from which republican politicians 7 The Recognition Payment was a 12,000 payment proposed by the Consultative Group on the Past. Based upon the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, the group recommended that the payment be made to all those who fall within its definition of a victim or survivor. This definition encompasses both the direct and indirect victims of the conflict and therefore both victims, ex-combatants and their families. Perceived to imply parity between the actions of the law-abiding security forces and terrorist organizations, representatives of the RUC strongly opposed this recommendation. Reflecting the weight of public opinion, the proposal was formally scrapped by the Secretary of State, Shaun Woodward, on 25 February

7 SECURING THE PAST and former combatants could rewrite the history of the conflict. Truth recovery has consequently been variously described as a political device to justify past atrocities and portray terrorists as gallant freedom fighters and an opportunity to rewrite history, to prove that they were soldiers engaged in a war. 8 Perpetuating these arguments is the fear that the volume of official documentation on the activities of the security forces and comparable lack of paper trial within paramilitary organizations would ensure that only the security forces would be held to account (Interview with representative of the NIRPOA, 19 May 2009). This is not, however, to suggest that concern with modifying narratives of the past is the sole preserve of republican politicians and ex-combatants. Loyalist paramilitaries and their communities had a complex relationship with the police throughout the conflict. On the one hand, there is symmetry between the notions of loyalty and protection espoused by both groupings. Yet, as Mulcahy (2006) reports, loyalist areas were often subject to excessive and inappropriate styles of policing. While criticism of such practices was traditionally muted in deference to the RUC s campaign against republican violence, the ceasefires removed this barrier. Concerns about heavy-handed policing of loyalist areas were, for example, subsequently put to a senior RUC officer by a number of loyalist councillors (Irish News, 9 September 1994, cited in Mulcahy 2006: 91). It is therefore likely that loyalist ex-combatants would be keen to vocalize these grievances in a truth process. There is also a sense amongst former loyalist ex-combatants of having been unfairly blamed for much of the responsibility for the conflict (Spencer 2008). A truth process could provide an opportunity to affirm their narratives of the past on this point and redress their resultant treatment by the RUC. It would also provide a platform from which they could emphasize their status as ex-combatants and the vital leadership role many play in their communities towards desisting cultures of violence (McEvoy and Shirlow 2009). The prospect of a truth process being used in this way by loyalist ex-combatants has not, however, in the author s view, troubled representatives of the police. This distinction has therefore structured the discussion below. The argument that a truth process would work to the advantage of nationalists and republicans is grounded in a wider disillusionment with the peace process and out workings of the Belfast Agreement (Hayes et al. 2005). Reflecting an intense fear of a republican master-plan at work, it has been argued that the peace process and Agreement are structurally predisposed towards a nationalist interpretation of why Northern Ireland experienced 30 years of violence (Southern 2007: 175). This opinion is embedded in the perceived power of republican propaganda and considered to be illustrated by the British government s acquiescence in the early prisoner release scheme, reduced troop numbers and the recommendations of the Patten Report (Mulcahy 2006). For many members of the security forces, such concessions engendered a sense of political unfairness on the part of the government. Moreover, they were seen to imply acceptance of republicans argument that the conflict was political in origin rather than criminal (McEvoy 2001). A more nuanced perspective has been provided by a senior scholar of Northern Irish politics who argued that such initiatives merely reflected the political realities of what the British state thought necessary to keep the peace process on track (Interview, 22 April 2009). However, the perception that republicans, at times aided by the actions and inactions of the British government, have 8 PFNI Press Release, 20 June 2003; Police Beat, April

8 Lawther been attempting to fashion a partial narrative of the conflict has been rife. As argued by the then chairman of the PFNI Les Rodgers: The purpose of this campaign is to destroy the credibility of the RUC, to achieve that dangerous objective by influencing the Patten Commission to the extent that members of the Commission lose their perspective on what is really happening in Northern Ireland. 9 The natural extension of this thought process has led many former members of the RUC and the heads of its representative bodies to argue that efforts at truth recovery provide an ideal platform from which republicans can engage in revisionist activity. 10 While Republican agitation for public inquiries is frequently located in a revisionist framework, a brief examination of the low regard with which many representatives of the RUC hold the OPONI is useful at this juncture to illustrate the depth of these concerns. 11 As this analysis will demonstrate, clear evidence of a dovetailing of their attitudes towards the OPONI and wider narratives on truth recovery can be discerned. In the absence of a formal truth process, Ellison (2007: 261) has argued that the OPONI has assumed a dual mandate, taking on the role of a surrogate truth recovery vehicle by launching a number of investigations into past RUC activities, alongside dealing with day-to-day complaints against the PSNI. The high profile of a number of investigations and, in Mulcahy s (2006: 177) opinion, its previous incumbent Nuala O Loan s apparent willingness to hold the police to account irrespective of any embarrassment it might cause them has been a source of particular consternation for members and supporters of the RUC. As would be expected of any formal truth body, retrospective investigations into allegations of police collusion with loyalist paramilitaries during the conflict have been among the most visible aspects of the Office s work. There have been a number of less than comfortable results for the forces supporters. The investigation into the death of Raymond McCord Jr, initiated by Raymond McCord senior s allegation that the police, over a number of years, acted in such a way as to protect informants from being held fully accountable to the law, is one such instance (OPONI 2007). Following initial enquiries in relation to the above complaint, the Police Ombudsman estimated that there was intelligence strongly indicating the involvement of informants, mostly from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), in several murders and serious crimes (OPONI 2007). The terms of the investigation were subsequently widened. Concluding in January 2007, the report found clear evidence of collusion between loyalist paramilitary informers and members of the RUC, in the McCord Jr case and a number of other instances (OPONI 2007). Grave concerns about the practices of some police officers that were uncovered included the arresting of informants suspected of murder, subjecting them to lengthy sham interviews at which they were not challenged about 9 Police Beat, March Concerns as to the effect of a truth process on the police have also been expressed in other transitional environments. The perception that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa would be unfairly biased against former members of the police force has been documented by Rauch (2004). Amongst the concerns recorded by Rauch (2004) is included the argument that the TRC would be a witch hunt and that unpalatable revelations about the conduct of some officers would unfairly taint the entire image of the police force. 11 The OPONI was established in 2000 in response to Maurice Hayes (1997) report, A Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland? In line with Hayes (1997) recommendations, the principal function of the Office is to secure an efficient, effective and independent police complaints system and to ensure the confidence of the public and police in it. 462

9 SECURING THE PAST their alleged crime, releasing them without charge and withholding intelligence from police colleagues, including the names of alleged suspects, which could have been used to prevent or detect crime (OPONI 2007). That evidence suggesting collusion has been found by the Ombudsman contrasts starkly with the argument that the conduct of the RUC was never anything less than of the highest integrity and has been interpreted as belying sympathy towards republicans claims. Central to critics concerns has therefore been a perception of an overzealous and politically motivated search for evidence of collusion and corruption (NIAC 2005a: Ev. 63). A memorandum submitted by the NIRPOA to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee provides some useful detail on this argument: There seems to be a culture within the Office of shopping for cases to further increase the workload of the Office, also as part of the denigration process of past RUC operations.... We have the perception that the Office is engaged in a witch-hunt against former members of the RUC in order to discredit them. (NIAC 2005a: Ev. 88) As a highly visible form of truth recovery, the view that police officers went through and... still are going through a horrific experience at the hands of the Police Ombudsman s Office has therefore had a direct impact on perceptions of how a formal truth recovery process would operate. 12 Corresponding to the above critiques of the OPONI, representatives of the NIRPOA (Interview, 19 May 2009) and the RUC GC Foundation (Interview, 10 August 2009) have therefore argued that the Legacy Commission proposed by the Consultative Group on the Past, particularly due to the fact collusion is signposted as a potential area of thematic investigation, is structurally predisposed towards believing allegations of collusion and would hence provide a vehicle for the re-writing of history. Perpetuating these arguments is the claim that there would be a great disparity in how a truth process would operate when comparing the participation of state services and paramilitaries. For representatives of the RUC, their attitudes towards this point have been shaped by the creation of two iconographic reference points. On the one hand, the citation of republican codes of honour as a prohibition on truth telling by Martin McGuinness, the Deputy First Minister, at the Bloody Sunday Tribunal has been held as an example par excellence of republicans duplicity around calls for truth recovery. Providing evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, the remarks of Ann Boal, a representative of the Disabled Police Officers Association, well illustrate this point: All you have to do is look at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.... I listened to statements made by Mr McGuiness.... He made it clear that the IRA take an oath of allegiance which forbids them from telling. Who are going to be the truth tellers and who are going to be the truth demanders? (NIAC 2005b: Ev. 141) The suggestion that the early release scheme has removed any incentive for former combatants to come forward with information is often allied to this argument (Interview with representative of the NIRPOA, 19 May 2009). The continued denial of Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams that he was a member of the IRA despite compelling evidence 12 Evidence given by Mr Chris Albiston, NIRPOA, to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on the Consultative Group on the Past, 29 April 2009, uncorrected evidence

10 Lawther provided by Coogan (2002) and Bishop and Mallie (1987), for example, has similarly become a basis against which all the faults of truth recovery are predicated (Interview with representative of the PFNI, 30 June 2009). These points have been contrasted with the arguments that the existence of police and army regimental numbers and documentation would ensure a full and through investigation into all aspects of their conduct during the troubles and the presupposition that the participation of representatives of the police would be of an entirely honest and willing nature (Interview with representative of the PFNI, 30 June 2009). It is, however, pertinent to note that there is something of a culture of obfuscation within the RUC. The memoirs of Sir John Stalker (1988), appointed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths of six men who were shot by the RUC in three separate incidents in November and December 1982, illustrate this case. Stalker (1988) has, for example, recorded his belief that throughout the inquiry period, his work was obstructed by the then RUC Chief Constable Sir Jack Hermon and other senior RUC officers. Likewise, Stalker (1988) claimed that his removal from the inquiry became politically expedient as he neared the uncomfortable truth. More recently, the former Police Ombudsman Nuala O Loan s (2007) report on police collusion with loyalist paramilitaries exposed instances of the destruction of evidence, falsification of notes and the blocking of searches for paramilitary arms dumps. 13 As this discussion has demonstrated, opposition to existing and prospective practices of truth recovery on the grounds that it would facilitate the re-writing of the history of the conflict is grounded in historical narratives and readings of the peace process. A lack of trust of the motives and integrity of republican paramilitaries, borne out of their experience of the conflict, is a decisive influence. There is, however, circularity in the argument that republican ex-combatants would neither participate nor do so in an honest and open manner. The experiences of Sir John Stalker and Nuala O Loan are illustrative. The powerful drive to protect the preferred organizational image, discussed below, may underpin this point. Tarnishing and Mythologizing The third factor that, in my view, impacts upon attitudes to truth recovery is the perceived challenge such a process would pose to deeply embedded narratives of justification and legitimation that surround the nomenclature of the RUC. The use of narratives or storylines to legitimate the nature of police work is not exclusive to Northern Ireland. As McLaughlin and Murji (1998) have illustrated by way of reference to the Police Federation of England and Wales, storylines are frequently used to aid recognition of their legitimacy and preferred version of social reality. Common themes structuring these narratives include loyalty, solidarity, betrayal, service, impartiality and independence (McLaughlin and Murji 1998). As cultural anthropologists and oral historians point out, this creates a circuit of meaning, marking out symbolically who we are, where we come from, what our destiny is and why (McLaughlin and Murji 1998: 369). 13 Again, these themes are not uncommon internationally. In South Africa, for example, security force officials, backed by extensive legal personnel, produced tightly interlocking submissions and testimonies that were designed to minimise fallout (Stanley 2005: 590). The destruction of documents and their vetting before release also compromised the work of the Commissions Investigative Unit (Stanley 2005). 464

11 SECURING THE PAST The forthcoming paragraphs will demonstrate that for supporters of the RUC, the production of such narratives forms a veritable protective ring against which calls for reform and investigation are buffered (Savage 2003). Reflecting general trends in policing meta narratives, much of the literature on the organizational history of the RUC draws attention to officers belief in a glorious past of trouble-free and consensual policing prior to the onset of the troubles (Boyce 1979). Conveying the ideologically satisfying view of police officers as ordinary people doing an ordinary job, the issue of dealing with unnecessary and unjustified terrorist activity was presented as a regrettable necessity. Hence, according to this view, once the terrorist blip had been dealt with, the RUC could return to their historically civic policing duties, rather than distinctly unnatural military operations (Weitzer 1995). As illustrated by the former Chief Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan s, statement we are no more, we are no less, than public servants delivering a public good that of the policing service, this discourse presented the image of a police force upholding the service ideal of British policing standards and corresponding to Loader and Walker s (2001) conceptualization of policing as a public good (Mulcahy 2006: 151). The attributes of public acceptability, political neutrality and a primary concern with enforcing ordinary criminal law rather than exceptional security measures formed the basis for the other tenets of the RUC s legitimation discourse (McGarry and O Leary 2004). The implicit objective of such narratives was to establish a binary opposition in terms of a battle between good (themselves) and evil (republican paramilitaries). The then Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan s remark that there is a real risk of people being taken in by the cleverly constructed myth that what s been going on for the last 30 years is some sort of struggle between two sides of equal validity, when what s actually been going on is a struggle between right and wrong, between good and evil conveys this point. 14 Reflecting the broader objective of police storylines discussed above, this approach enabled the RUC to advance a number of self-serving narratives that attempted to insulate the force from criticism and formed a protective barrier against calls for reform (McLaughlin and Murji 1998). However, as will be discussed below, these narratives were also articulated strategically and were intimately connected with ideological struggles over the nature of state legitimacy. As a key element in shaping public understanding of the conflict, articulating such narratives was thus also part of the policing of the acceptable bounds of normality and part of the denial of conflict, particularly the role of the security forces (Mulcahy 1999). Set against this ideological background, the implications of both existing and prospective practices of truth recovery have been deeply troubling for representatives of the RUC. The fact that their activities have been subject to investigation and that their participation will be required in any future process challenges the cherished idea of the glorious past of policing. Alluding to this idealized image, the PFNI memorandum submitted to the NIAC (2005b: Ev. 352), for example, states: The wider community held the view that during the Troubles, the RUC held the line against the most ruthless and professional terrorist organisation in the world, so successfully that eventually the violence was judged to be fruitless. 14 The Times, 13 May 1999, Embattled RUC Faces Death by Propaganda. 465

12 Lawther As argued elsewhere in this paper, the suggestion that the security forces have in some way contributed to the wrongs of the conflict is, in the main, completely refuted. The very existence of truth and justice issues therefore calls into question the narrative of the conflict in which republican culpability for terrorism explains all (Lundy and McGovern 2008). In doing so, the myth of blamelessness that pervades much of the organizational memory of the RUC is compromised (McEvoy 2006: 98). Drawing on Cohen s (2001) work on denial, it is apparent that a number of practical and rhetorical devices of denial underpin attempts at deflecting organizational criticism. Literal and interpretative denials are the most readily recognizable and have been employed, for example, in response to allegations of police sectarianism, shoot-to-kill policies, collusion and inhumane and degrading treatment of paramilitary suspects (Cohen 2001). The normalization variant of denial in which an undesirable situation is unrecognized, ignored or made to seem normal also falls within these approaches (Cohen 2001: 51). In addition, denials of injury and of the victim and a condemnation of the condemners can also be identified (Cohen 2001). Investigations into allegations of collusion between the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries provide an interesting case study of these concerns. Conforming to Cohen s (2001) concept of literal denial, allegations of collusion have been vehemently rejected by members of the security forces. The statement made by the NIRPOA (2008) that The bottom line however still remains that there never was, even at the darkest time of the troubles, any hint of what is often referred to as institutionalised collusion on the part of the State or its agencies with any of the paramilitary organisations whereby such criminal relationships as did exist were ever condoned, authorised or encouraged as a matter of policy or practice conveys this point and resonates throughout the policing family. Allegations of collusion are typically deflected by way of a four-pronged defence outright denial, ascription to a tiny percentage of bad apples who were immediately dealt with, the argument that the conditions of the time means their actions cannot be judged retrospectively and by way of reference to the role of the RUC in upholding the law and defeating terrorism (Interview with representatives of the RUC GC Foundation, 10 August 2009; PFNI, 20 June 2009, and NIRPOA, 19 May 2009). To challenge this web of denial as public inquiries and the work of the OPONI have done is to project the image of a force that is the antithesis of these values and that bears some culpability for events of the conflict. When combined with the perception that claims of and investigations into allegations of collusion are part of a republican propaganda campaign, these concerns undoubtedly provide a further dissuadant against participation in a formal truth process. A number of issues related to the truth recovery debate have also been interpreted as implying a myth equivalence between the actions of the security forces and paramilitaries. Reactions to the recent work of the Consultative Group on the Past have largely coalesced around this point. A number of the report s recommendations and speculation as to what it would propose during the consultation period, including the prospect of re-designating the conflict as a war, the recognition payment, recommendation of limited immunity in return for truth recovery and the open-ended nature of the question of amnesty, have been perceived in this light. Having been played out in the media at various junctures with a considerable degree of volume, it has been argued that support for these measures affords legitimacy to the actions of republican 466

13 SECURING THE PAST paramilitaries. 15 Doing so thus blurs the line between innocence and intent that has been crucial in their self-legitimizing narratives a morally repugnant prospect. The NIRPOA (2008) comments on the prospect of an amnesty well illustrate this case: Such a move may please the paramilitary principals but it immediately invites the legitimate state forces to review their own status during the conflict.... An amnesty would be a betrayal of the professional service of over 30,000 police officers, their families and every citizen all of whom were capable of distinguishing between the legitimate institutions and instruments of a democratically elected Government and the ruthless terrorist organisations lacking a democratic, legal, moral or even historical mandate. While only the recommendation on limited immunity and the prospect of an amnesty remain possibilities, the mere existence of the other issues has heavily coloured many representatives view of the entire report and thus their vision of what a truth recovery process would entail the concretization of the myth of equivalence. The tenuous relationship between the security forces and the British state further complicates these factors. Paralleling readings of the reform debate, any suggestion of British governmental support for a formal truth process is felt to signify a belief that the police force must share some responsibility for the conflict. As illustrated by the above discussion on betrayal, for many representatives of the RUC, this opens challenging questions over their relationship with the state, including whether they could expect a return on their loyalty or would such a process be utilized to further the separation of the RUC and British state? The prospect of a formal truth process therefore not only challenges the ideals of a normal professional police service, but touches upon questions of identity and belonging. While written specifically in respect to the Police Federation of England and Wales, McLaughlin and Murji s (1998: 397) closing comments are equally applicable to this quest to protect their sense of being: The Federation is the storylines because it has made them part of its own lived history. There is an indissoluble link because the storylines are the Federation s raison d être, its core values and its totem. Thus any challenge to the storylines or any part of them, is tantamount to a challenge or an attack on the Federation itself and the police as a whole... it sets in motion a domino effect, where the calling into question of any of the storylines will inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire cultural-symbolic representation. As this analysis has demonstrated, a protective wall has therefore been established against which calls for truth recovery are deflected. Divergent Voices As detailed above, opinions in and around the police service are not unanimous on the issue of truth recovery. A commitment to doing truth recovery and to the establishment of a formal process has been pressed heavily at various junctures throughout the peace process at the elite levels of the PSNI and NIPB (Orde 2005). 16 The former Chairman of the NIPB, Professor Sir Desmond Rea, has, for example, 15 PFNI Press Release, 8 January Irish News, 22 February 2007, Strong Case for a Truth Commission. 467

14 Lawther argued that the call for a truth commission must be given the priority it deserves. 17 The Police Ombudsman, Al Hutchinson, has also advocated the need for a pastfocused mechanism separate from the OPONI (NIAC 2008: Ev ). The following discussion will argue that alongside advocating the cathartic potential of truth recovery, these arguments are also couched within the broader ethos of the Patten Report and are part of the United Kingdom-wide project of increasing efficiency and effectiveness in policing. Hence, they seek to allow the PSNI to become a modern and effective force that is forward-looking rather than burdened by or dependent on constructions of the past to legitimize its conduct. Energized by the former Chief Constable of the PSNI, Sir Hugh Orde, the unique Historical Enquiries Team illustrates the commitment of the PSNI to doing truth recovery. Aiming to provide as much information as possible to those who have engaged with the process, much of the language surrounding the HET reiterates the ideals of closure, resolution and a family focus (HET undated). The emphasis on these objectives reflects one of the most lauded values of truth recovery in the aftermath of violent conflict the ability to bring victims families much needed information (Hayner 2002). In some cases, this may be the difference between knowledge and acknowledgement; in others, it may be a simple detail that family members have spent years searching for (Hayner 2002). For other victims and survivors, the fact that there is an interest in their case may, in itself, be enough. Orde s argument success for me is not the number of prosecutions; success for me is have we allowed some people to move on in their lives to a degree that they would not have been able to move on if HET had not existed and given them that interaction and opportunity to ask questions they have never had before is clearly founded upon these points (NIAC 2008: Ev. 82). This commitment to truth recovery extends to a more positive attitude to the work of public inquiries and inquests than is generally associated with the representative bodies of the RUC. To recap on some of the points made above, resistance to such investigatory work is predicated on allegations of betrayal, that it provides a vehicle for republicans to reshape the history of the conflict and that it undermines and erodes the legitimacy of the RUC and its memory. This view has been challenged by a senior member of the PSNI who argued that inquiries are a necessary and welcome part of the accountability mechanisms and an opportunity for the government to be open and acknowledge or refute allegations of past wrongs as appropriate (Interview with senior representative of the PSNI, 4 August 2009). These arguments therefore not only mark a radical transition from the approach of the RUC and its supporters, but also involve a tacit acknowledgement that the history of policing in Northern Ireland is not as wholesome as many would like to suggest. Pragmatism over the question of former officers having to provide evidence to inquests and inquiries has also been associated with this standpoint (Interview with senior representative of the PSNI, 4 August 2009). Despite this commitment to existing practices of truth recovery, senior representatives of the PSNI, NIPB and OPONI have, however, maintained that a formal truth process is required. In part, their arguments are couched within 17 BBC News Online, 18 February 2004, NI Commission Could Heal Wounds. 468