Interactional Power in Colonial Yucatán. Benjamin J. Earwicker. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Transcription

1 Interactional Power in Colonial Yucatán Benjamin J. Earwicker A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

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3 iii Abstract In the present study, I articulate an interactionist model of power relations using the sociological framework of Symbolic Interactionism. After presenting a model of power relations, I identify instances of power in colonial and early postcolonial Yucatán, analyzing colonial and contemporary texts on Mexico s Yucatán Peninsula. I define power as a process, rather than a latent capacity or the mere possibility of action. Interactional power is demonstrated through 1) processes or interactions, such as discourse and communication, 2) negotiation, 3) the control or manipulation of resources, and 4) legal and social rule-setting, or the construction of systems within which interaction occurs. In the context of colonial Yucatán, Maya communities experienced the loss of physical and cultural resources, and the imposition of non-maya social, legal, economic, and religious systems. I argue that the interactions leading to this divestment and the replacement of indigenous Maya systems must be understood as interactions of power, or the manifestation of power vis-à-vis interaction. On occasion, Mayas in colonial Yucatán successfully negotiated legal contracts or other civil disputes, using non-maya legal systems to their own benefit and mitigating the impact of conquest and colonization. Nevertheless, non-maya colonials more frequently and more successfully demonstrated the use of power

4 iv through negotiation. With regard to resource use or appropriation, non-maya colonials utilized an array of methods to divest Maya individuals and communities of physical and cultural resources. Forced labor, religious and secular oversight of Maya community funds, tribute requirements, and ownership of commercial enterprises characterized the interactions between Mayas and non-mayas throughout the colonial period. Finally, regarding social, religious, legal, and economic structures, non-maya systems largely displaced those of the Mayas by the end of the colonial period. The inequalities evident between Mayas and non-mayas in colonial and early post-colonial Yucatán did not result from inherent differences or the superiority of non-mayas during the conquest and colonization of the Yucatán Peninsula. Rather, dynamic interactions between individuals and groups demonstrated varied expressions of power throughout the colonial period and beyond. Yucatec Mayas were not, at all times and in all places, disadvantaged by their interactions with non- Mayas, and neither were non-mayas always the beneficiaries of those interactions. Nonetheless, non-mayas did leverage resources and systems to their benefit more often than Mayas in both the colonial and post-colonial periods. Non-Mayas throughout the colonial period generally controlled or had greater access to resources, more successfully negotiated terms of contracts or disputes with Maya individuals and communities, and firmly established their own social, religious, economic, and legal systems over and above those of the Mayas.

5 v Preface Dedication To Michelle and Nyah Jazz Acknowledgements I would like to thank: My wife and daughter, for their love and support, My parents and siblings, extended family and friends, for their encouragement, The Mayas of Yucatán, for their hospitality and assistance, My supervisors at the University of Otago and the University of Adelaide, for their academic support and feedback throughout my project, Librarians and support staff at the University of Otago and Northwest Nazarene University, for their invaluable help tracking down materials, Faculty and staff at UNAM in Mexico City and Mérida, Yucatán, México, for direction and resources, Northwest Nazarene University and the School of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, for the material support and research leave I needed to complete my project.

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7 vii Contents Introduction 1 One: Methodology 7 Pragmatism: Theoretical Foundation of Symbolic Interactionism... 8 Pragmatism s Early Theoretical Influences... 9 Pragmatism: Context and Content Symbolic Interactionism: Individual Agency within Systems Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Pragmatism, Self, Identity, and Society Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Pragmatism Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Self and Identity Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Social Systems and Society Symbolic Interactionism: Micro and Macro Conceptions of Social Systems Outline of Symbolic Interactionism Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Objects and Symbolic Representations of Meaning Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Individual Action Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Joint Action Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Society and Structures Procedure and Method in Symbolic Interactionism Chapter Conclusion My Methodological Framework... 44

8 viii Two: Power Relations 49 Historical Development of Sociological Power Relations Theories General Theories of Power and Power Relations Structuralism and Foucault Exchange Theory Feminist Sociology and Power A Cultural Interactionist Framework of Power Power and Interactionism: General Considerations Agency and Structure in Relations of Power Power as Process and Interaction Power as Control and Manipulation of Resources Power as Negotiation Power as Legal and Social Rule-Setting Cultural Interactionist Framework of Power: Final Considerations Three: Colonial Symbols and Meaning 87 The Interactionist Approach in Colonial Maya Studies Geography of the Present Section Chronology of the Present Section Power, Identity, and Mayas in Colonial Yucatán Colonial Literature Contemporary Literature Symbols and Meaning in Colonial Yucatán Subjective Meaning and Symbolic Representations Maya Cosmology and Cultural Symbols Spanish Cosmology and Cultural Symbols Four: Negotiation and Discourse as Power 125 Interactions of Power in the Colonial Maya Context Negotiation as power Communication and discourse as power: Language and linguistic structures (or structuring) as power Discourse as an interactive form of power: non-mayas Discourse as an interactive form of power: Mayas Five: Resource Control as Power 141 The Control of, Access to, or Manipulation of Resources as Power

9 ix Non-Maya control of monetary resources Non-Maya control of labor and time Non-Maya control of land and other material resources Complex Interactions in Colonial Yucatán Maya control of land and other material resources Maya adaptation to, use, or subversion of Spanish systems and institutions Six: Defining Situations as Power 175 Legal and Social Rule-Setting or the Definition of Situations as Power Non-Maya development of legal systems and institutions Non-Maya development of economic systems and institutions Non-Maya development of civic or social systems and institutions Non-Maya development of religious and educational systems and institutions Conclusions: Interactional Power in Colonial Yucatán and Beyond 207 Works Cited 213

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11 xi List of Figures Figure 1.1: Symbolic Interactionist Framework Figure 2.1: Power Relations between Two Individuals and the Role of Perception... 67

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13 1 Introduction Interactions of power shaped the nature of relations between Mayas in Mexico s Yucat{n Peninsula and the Spanish conquerors, settlers, and other non- Mayas who inhabited the region during and immediately after the colonial period. Collective and individual interactions between Mayas and non-mayas in Yucatán cannot be understood apart from a discussion and analysis of power, as interactions between various groups invariably relate directly to power and its implementation. The exercise of power during and after colony was not unilateral, in the sense that the actions of both non-mayas and Mayas exhibited power at different times and places. Mayas were not always disadvantaged as a result of their interactions with non-mayas, though this was a distinct pattern of interaction and an important trend to note. How power is defined and operationalized will determine the methodological framework for understanding interactions of power in the colonial and post-colonial periods. In the present study, I use the sociological approach of symbolic interactionism to construct a working model of power, before identifying examples of colonial and post-colonial power relations in Yucatán. Interactionism proves useful in the colonial context of Yucatán because of its contextualized, bottom-up approach to human interaction and the construction, maintenance, or deconstruction of social systems or structures. Importantly, symbolic interactionism

14 2 incorporates analysis of symbolic meanings (ideological, religious, social, or other, be they personal or collective) that are associated with objects (anything that can be indicated ) as the basis for understanding the complex motivations for interaction and the construction of social systems. In the colonial context of Yucatán, this is particularly relevant, given the dramatic encounters between Spanish explorerconquerors and indigenous Mayas. The critical importance of understanding different symbolic frameworks that directed or informed individual and joint action during and after the colonial period should not be understated. I outline symbolic interactionism and its philosophical forerunner, pragmatism, in chapter one. The distinctly American school of pragmatism and the works of theorists like Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey led to the twentieth-century sociological explorations of George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer, and others, whose work was later expanded from a principally individual scope to include structural analysis, as well. Peirce, James, Dewey, and others addressed such concepts as truth, reality, meaning, and everyday experience from the basis of empirical inquiry and social scientific methods. Moving from esoteric and theological discussion, these early pragmatists shifted philosophically toward evidentiary research and empirical observation and documentation. In contrast to earlier notions of universality and the universal applicability of theory, pragmatists articulated the relative, contextually-oriented nature of truth and ideas. Their analysis of meaning, truth, and reality shifted toward common-sense approaches to social problems, to the exclusion of any debate not rooted in the observable experiences of individuals and groups. Pragmatists fostered a commitment to applied theory, promoted the contextualization of research, and emphasized the relative nature of social inquiry. Pragmatism is not positivism, the philosophical idea that only sensory experience may be considered true or valid. Any experience or perception that impacts personal or collective meaning and action is considered valid and useful for understanding social interactions between individuals and groups. In other words,

15 3 the validity of certain ideas is not the focus of a pragmatic approach. Rather, the social impact of such ideas becomes the central concern for pragmatists. Pragmatists have consistently argued for coherent models that explain and evaluate human experiences and interactions, emphasizing the rooted cultural and social context in which all experiences occur. Interactionists, beginning with Herbert Blumer, developed a pragmatic sociological framework of individual agency and action in society. Fundamentally devoid of structural systems analysis, early symbolic interactionism would be altered by later interactionists who broadened the approach to include all levels and interactions within social systems, from individual thought, perception, and action to joint action and the development of systems and social structures. I argue that interactionism provides a flexible, interdisciplinary framework from within which Maya and non-maya interactions may be analyzed and understood. The framework includes an emphasis on the symbolic representation of objects (physical objects, other people, groups, or institutions, ideas, or anything else that may be indicated ) as the basis of individual social interaction and the construction of social systems. Interactionists pragmatically approach common, everyday experience as the focal point of research, and have affirmed a bottom-up approach to the study of individuals, culture, and society. Most importantly, the epistemology of symbolic interactionism provides sound research methods for the analysis of power relations within various social systems and historical periods. In chapter two, I begin with a presentation of several important economic, political, and sociological models of power and power relations. Weber, Marx, Parsons, and others have variously identified components of power in society. Symbolic interactionists have drawn, in part, from these older models in presenting analyses of power; established models of power are a necessary starting point for an assessment of power structures in the Maya context. However, as interactionist theorists have pointed out, traditional models of power relations often fail to address all levels of social interaction, including individual, group, and institutional levels of

16 4 interaction. Older disciplinary models of power generally emphasize macro-level, structural components of society, but often neglect the individual, interpersonal nature of societal interaction and power dynamics. Due to their structural focus, many models fail to adequately reflect the complexities of power dynamics in everyday life for individuals or small groups and the variety of ways in which power is expressed, demonstrated, or exercised. Accordingly, power relations theories will more effectively represent social interaction if cultural components are also considered at the individual and group levels. All of these aspects of power relations must be assessed in order to produce comprehensive and representative models of social realities. The methodological approach of interactionism comprehensively assesses power at the individual and societal levels; a symbolic interactionist framework is therefore adequate for assessing power and power relations at all levels in culture and society. After a brief synopsis of structuralist, exchange, and feminist interpretations of power, I turn to the few available interactionist definitions of power in the social context. I then present my own interactionist framework of power, in which I argue that power may be demonstrated through 1) process or interaction, such as discourse and communication, 2) the control or manipulation of resources, 3) negotiation, and 4) legal and social rule-setting, or the construction of systems within which interaction occurs. According to my interactionist interpretation of power, power is a process, not a latent capacity or ability, independent of action and interaction. The active processes and interactions through which Mayas of Yucat{n were divested of resources, cultural text, and the ability to create social systems or contexts for their own interaction demonstrate the active use of power by non-mayas in the colonial and post-colonial periods. In chapters three to six, I utilize the interactionist framework of power outlined in chapters one and two to identify specific interactions of power and inequality in colonial Yucatán. I examine entrenched patterns of power relations that began during Spanish conquest and colonization of Yucatán, many of which

17 5 continued well into the post-colonial period, after the success of the independence movement in Mexico in the early nineteenth century. Though the language and ideas of interactionism permeate the existing literature, nothing approximating an interactionist evaluation of power in colonial and post-colonial Yucatán has yet been attempted. In chapter three, I note that the language and methods used by early-twentieth century researchers reinforced early colonial models of power, contrasted with latetwentieth century authors who tended to more sympathetically portray the Mayas of Yucatán, emphasizing their disenfranchisement or relative lack of resource control. I continue with a presentation of symbolic representations during the colonial period, representations by both Maya and non-maya individuals and communities. These representations form the basis of interaction and the exercise of power. I argue that although the Mayas of Yucatán were not always and at all times victims of power relations, the dynamic relations between Mayas and non-mayas most frequently advantaged the latter at the expense of the former. In chapter four, I emphasize discourse and negotiated interactions as examples of colonial-era power relations. Despite the occasional example of Maya success through negotiation over land use or ownership, non-mayas consistently demonstrated a more effective use of power through negotiation throughout the colonial period. At the same time, Maya mitigation of the non-maya exercise of power through negotiation and discourse lessened the negative impact of power relations on indigenous communities, reducing the overall impact of conquest and colonization through the negotiation of meaning and the intentional use of interaction. Regarding the various forms of colonial discourse available in the written record of Yucatán, I identify examples of both Maya and non-maya discourse-aspower, demonstrating the effective use of language and discourse to alter relations between various groups. I use chapter five to emphasize the clearest form of interactional power, namely the control of, access to, or manipulation of resources. The dramatic and

18 6 unprecedented shift of resources from indigenous Maya communities to non-maya colonists and communities provides a striking example of the interactional basis of power in Yucatán, beginning in the colonial period and continuing well beyond. The methods of resource appropriation were varied and broad, ranging from outright control of commercial production and trade and the oversight and management of community funds, donations, and tribute, to forced labor requirements imposed on Maya communities throughout Yucatán. I present multiple perspectives of resource control, including cases where Maya individuals or groups maintained or re-gained access to land or other resources through legal action or intentional self-assertion during the colonial period. Maya control of, access to, or manipulation of resources notwithstanding, non-mayas of colonial Yucatán overwhelmingly exhibited greater power throughout the colonial period as evidenced by the use of various resources. The final component of interactional power, legal and social rule-setting or the definition of systems, comprises my final chapter on colonial interactions of power in Yucatán. In chapter six, I argue that despite a relatively complex and fluid exchange of cultural and social structures between Mayas and non-mayas in Yucatán, non- Maya systems predominated by the end of the colonial period and into the postcolonial period, as well. At the start of the colonial period, largely out of necessity, Maya social systems and communities remained intact, and non-maya colonials largely adapted to the indigenous landscape, inasmuch as it provided needed raw materials, labor, and other resources for the burgeoning colonial infrastructure. As the colonial era progressed, however, non-maya systems and structures displaced those of the Mayas, and Maya communities became increasingly dependent upon non-maya legal, social, political, and religious systems. In my conclusions, I revisit the interactionist framework of power as a method of inquiry in research of colonial Yucatán. Ultimately, the framework that I present here and its application to the colonial period provide avenues of future research, and I argue for potential applications of the present model of interactional power in colonial Yucatán, contemporary Yucatán, and beyond.

19 7 One: Methodology Human society is complex, made up of innumerable interfacing systems and exchanges of communication. Any social theory or framework must be capable of representing that complexity while also minimizing distortion in the representation of social systems. The sociological framework of symbolic interactionism is capable of producing theoretical models that satisfy both of these demands. Symbolic interactionist researchers espouse a pragmatic and all-encompassing approach to everyday human interaction and social systems or structures. Beginning with the work of George Herbert Mead and continuing with Herbert Blumer and subsequent theorists, interactionists developed their approach out of the distinctly American philosophical tradition of pragmatism. The pragmatic school of thought focused philosophical debate more on practical effects of human action and experience than esoteric schema. Herbert Blumer coined the term symbolic interactionism, though he disliked the clumsy wording of the phrase that he never thought would come to define the approach. For brevity, I alternate between symbolic interactionism and interactionism when discussing the approach. In the present chapter, I aim to situate my research within a symbolic interactionist framework, to identify my strategy in reading and interpreting contemporary Mayan text, and to acknowledge various theoretical influences in my work. (Here and elsewhere, I use the term text to refer not only to materials in

20 8 written form, but also any document, object, or source of information that is related to the culture or cultures in question. Anything that indicates meaning or meaningful symbols in a particular culture or society may be considered text ). In the present section, I articulate my research methods within the context of symbolic interactionist, pragmatist and sociological theory and methodology. I begin the chapter with an overview of symbolic interactionism and its historical pragmatic roots. I conclude the chapter with an outline of my chosen methods for analyzing power and power relations in colonial Maya contexts. Pragmatism: Theoretical Foundation of Symbolic Interactionism Symbolic interactionists take a bottom-up approach to the study of culture. This emphasis on everyday experience distinguishes interactionism from traditional historical and social scientific approaches to society and culture, with the exception, perhaps, of the contemporary field of Cultural Studies. Interactionists approach culture and the study of human behavior in society pragmatically, and with sensitivity to subtle nuances that differentiate lived experiences from culture to culture, and from society to society. The overwhelming emphasis on the social construction of meaning and the use of symbols to convey meaning also distinguishes interactionism from alternative frameworks. In the final section of chapter 1, I outline the major tenets of symbolic interactionism, including its early formulation by Herbert Blumer and subsequent revisions that include additional attention to social systems or structures extending beyond the individual and smallgroup interactions. Before looking at interactionism in detail, it is important to understand the pragmatic roots of the approach. Interactionism cannot be understood apart from its pragmatic foundations. Peirce, Dewey, James, and other pragmatic philosophers pioneered what is considered to be the only philosophical school originating in

21 North America. It is from this uniquely North American school of thought that interactionism arose. 9 Pragmatism s Early Theoretical Influences Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey influenced pragmatism more than any other philosophers. These philosopher-theorists addressed the ideas of truth, reality, meaning, and everyday experience. Their common-sense approach to problem-solving and lived experience resonated with later theorists like George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer, who would shape sociological theory using the perspectives and tools of pragmatic philosophy. Charles Peirce approached the question of truth from the basis of inquiry. Peirce coined the term pragmatism, and was interested primarily in clarifying philosophical ideas and making them more scientifically verifiable. To do this, he focused on the use of language and relationships in language, and is considered by some to be a forerunner of semiotics. Like Dewey, Peirce saw inquiry as a collective process in society, in which ideas were to be rigorously tested in order to prove their worth (Putnam 71). For Peirce, authority or belief would not determine the value of ideas. Rather, the merits of ideas based on their applicability to human experience and social interaction would determine the value of each idea or truth. William James popularized the ideas of pragmatism, delving into questions of belief, faith, and truth in community. James is perhaps best known for his focus on the cash value of beliefs, though his arguments are often misunderstood and misconstrued to support a conservative argument for supporting only those ideas that prove profitable. James pragmatism has been criticized for its use to defend any belief, perspective, or idea that can be logically defended, and for its apparent support of the conservative business class in the United States. James was both criticized and praised by Bertrand Russell for his approaches to truth and empiricism, though Hilary Putnam points out that many criticisms of James

22 10 including those by Russell, for instance are based on flawed readings of James writing that distort and overly simplify his work (8-9). Putnam emphasizes the difference between thematic and dogmatic usage, in which the former indicates a trend or speculation and the latter, an iron-clad belief or way of thinking. James and Wittgenstein, he proposes, presented thematic philosophical statements, not iron-clad statements of belief and universality. In fact, James developed the idea of the cash value of ideas during the years of the gold standard, when gold reserves backed the value of printed currency. He created a simile in philosophy, arguing that theories ought to be similarly backed by their empirical grounding in everyday, practical realities. James explained truth as what works, but not in the sense of what is true for one individual or another. James centered his definition of truth in the context of community, where ideas, beliefs, and truths must be rigorously tested in order to determine what is best for the community in the long term. Truth, *James+ insists, is a notion which presupposes a community, and, like Peirce, he held that the widest possible community, the community of all persons (and possibly even all sentient beings) in the long run, is the relevant one (Putnam 24). For pragmatists, then, the value of ideas and the value of truth are decided, in part, in the context of community. James pragmatism allows for the negotiation of meaning in the context of community. Ideas and truths are no longer valued for their universality, but only in relation to the community or culture in question. That is, truth is humanized, defined by the social setting in which ideas are formed and acted out. According to Thayer, James understood pragmatism <as a way of mediating claims and determining the legitimate scope and expression of preferences among individuals (17). In terms of cultural study and interactionism, James pragmatism allows for diversity of thought and expression, with the ultimate goal of negotiating meaning and building culturally-relevant truth. John Dewey emphasized the situated or contextualized nature of inquiry, and expanded pragmatism in the areas of critical thought and social progress. Though

23 11 considered part of the pragmatic tradition, Dewey referred to his thinking as instrumentalism. J. E. Tiles writes that Dewey <abandoned the notion of truth in favour of warranted assertability. Influenced by science and scientific methods, Dewey chose not to focus on the idea of ultimate truth, focusing instead on present and future reality, meaning in society, and common-sense approaches to social problem-solving. In John McDermott s estimation, Dewey and the pragmatic philosophy represent the possibility of an ameliorative social philosophy, one that helps avoid cynicism while simultaneously cautioning us against the seductions of ideology and final solutions (70, 77). As an educator, activist, and philosopher, Dewey pioneered a philosophy that linked theory to practice and concrete action. James, Peirce, and Dewey developed pragmatism early on, but other theorists shaped pragmatism well into the twentieth century, as well. At the turn of the century, F. C. S. Schiller s pragmatic humanism promoted the doctrine that our cognitive efforts and human needs actually transform the reality we seek to describe ( pragmatism, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). In the 1960s, Thomas Kuhn s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions created a focus on paradigm shifts in the natural sciences that pragmatists saw as useful to pragmatic thinking and the implementation of practical solutions to social problems. Hilary Putnam, a renowned late-twentieth century philosopher and logician with wide-ranging interests in mind-body research and pragmatism, has outlined his vision of pluralism and holism in the pragmatic context. Putnam suggests that pragmatism addresses whether an enlightened society can avoid a corrosive moral skepticism without tumbling back into moral authoritarianism in light of contemporary notions of tolerance and plurality (2). He strongly argues that pragmatism holds great promise of moving beyond philosophical and political logjams. He disagrees with neo-pragmatist Rorty on the subjectivist approach to pragmatism, while supporting an emphasis within pragmatism on pluralism in society.

24 12 Contemporary philosophers and legal theorists Richard J. Bernstein, Cornell West, and Joan Williams emphasize early pragmatists, in order to re-discover and expand early visions of pragmatism in the present context (Kloppenberg). For Bernstein, West, and Williams, this approach leads to provisional agreements, rather than truth. Provisional agreements are negotiated agreements, based on discussion and debate, equality, and mutual respect, rather than authoritarian pronouncements or enshrined truth. Pragmatism: Context and Content John McDermott has proposed that the context of pragmatism be limited to the period between 1870 and 1920, when the original theorists were most actively developing pragmatism and its foundational tenets. Pragmatists, though, like later symbolic interactionists, did not operate in a theoretical or philosophical vacuum. They observed and incorporated historical and cultural trends in the pragmatic approach. In fact, according to Ernest Gellner, pragmatism drew heavily on biology and intellectual history of the nineteenth century. In the midst of developments in transcendentalism, idealism, British empiricism, and others, pragmatism emerged in response to the need for greater technical clarification, as a broker between various schools of thought in late-nineteenth century (Thayer 6). Thayer goes on to write that the conditions of intellectual uncertainty and *a+ predicament in competing norms and demands of conduct are among the formative dispositions and historical origins of pragmatism (14). Intellectual uncertainty, together with the academic history of thought, informed the early pragmatists. Pragmatism thus became a bridge between philosophy and science, with utilitarian currents. Robert Mulvaney and Phillip Zeltner suggest that the values-oriented, pragmatic approach should not be confused with the popular use of the term pragmatic on the one hand, or armchair philosophy on the other. Rather, it is a rigorous and particularly American branch of philosophy. Pragmatists earnestly

25 13 challenged the notion that truth claims represent a logically consistent reflection of reality ( Pragmatism, Dictionary of Social Sciences). Accordingly, what is real or true must be understood according to linguistic, interpretative, and attributive conventions in use at a particular time and place. Meaning and its contextualized importance, clarification or interpretation, verification, and continuity are all central themes of the pragmatic approach. In Peirce s tradition, pragmatists value the process of negotiation and logical argument; Peirce argued for inquiry leading to truth, defined as consensus in scientific terms. Ernest Gellner has written elsewhere that pragmatists generally exhibit optimism and cheerfulness, as opposed to a sense of crisis and gloom, in spite of an awareness of human fallibility and the variability of meaning and knowledge. Awareness for the pragmatist, rather than leading to pessimism and cynicism, allows for the formation of logical, negotiated, and contextualized solutions to social and cultural conflicts. The pragmatist is thus focused on human action and experience, rather than esoteric philosophy or unapplied theory. For the pragmatist, theory abstracted is irrelevant to the practical application of knowledge in a situated context. In terms of moral philosophy, pragmatists drawing from Dewey s work emphasize quality enhancement in the social context. Morality and values are thus related to quality of life and ethical approaches to inquiry. Gouinlock reflects on the process of constructing values in society when he argues that the pragmatic approach to moral philosophy allows individuals and groups to systematically address their interests in an attempt to create inclusive, secure social systems that enhance quality of life (101). Pragmatic moral theory or philosophy does not proscribe, but informs the decision-making process in the social and cultural settings. Ultimate choices are left for discussion, debate, and disagreement. Dewey, in particular, defined social intelligence as moral method. He advocated the transformation of strife and social conflict into fulfillment and positive experiences or integrated activity that engages and fulfills human potential

26 14 (Gouinlock 106). The moral method is a social or collective rather than individualistic process, in which conflict may be reconciled through communication and the awareness of disagreement. Finally, the methods derived from Dewey s work depend on the exercise of plurality and tolerance and the eschewing of moral absolutism. On the rejection of moral absolutism, Gouinlock writes that moral situations are often too problematic to be settled without ambiguity, doubt, and conflict (116). For the pragmatist, then, conflict resolution in society and culture may progress tentatively from initial discussions and recognition of legitimate claims toward more substantive action and change. Pragmatists generally reject claims to absolute certainty, or avoid them all together. In James view, though, there is room for belief and truth, so long as belief is workable or can be demonstrated to be useful in the widest social context. From a pragmatic perspective, knowledge and truth shift and are not fixed, depending on a number of contextual variables. The practical effects of a truth claim are the measure of said truth s value. In this way, all competing claims may be tested according to their practical effects, leaving room for negotiation in the social and cultural contexts. In the philosophical context, pragmatism provides a situational, contextualized approach to theory, recognizing subjective meanings in the definition of truth and moral philosophy. Interactionists later came to understand this to mean that ideas (objects, people, situations, concepts) and the subjective meanings attached to them inform behavior and action. Putnam has written on the topic of truth and empirical testing in pragmatism. He limits the extent to which the pragmatic approach to value-based truth should be carried, arguing for its use in specific social contexts. On truth, value, and reality, Putnam says that it is the final opinion that must be used to judge the value of truth, not merely what may presently be deduced regarding a truth claim. In other words, long-term empirical study and analysis must be taken into consideration when evaluating competing claims, in addition to the present assessment of the value of ideas, beliefs, and truths in question. Deciding what is true, for Putnam, is not a

27 15 metaphysical process, but an active approach to evaluating and testing truth claims. Truth is not defined solely by verification, but the two are closely related, dependent upon one another. According to Putnam, What *James+ believed was that, since our claims get their substance from the roles they play in our lives, an account of truth will gain its substance from the accompanying account of how to get to truth (12). Ultimately, all members of a particular culture or society contribute to and participate in the creation, formation, and preservation or destruction of truth claims, whether they be inclusive and negotiated or fractured and contradictory. As with competing notions of truth, pragmatism also deals with coherence and holism. Again, pragmatism is not positivism, or the assertion that only what can be sensed is true or valid. However, coherence or a coherent system of thought, value, etc. is important for the pragmatist. According to Putnam, meaning and the creation of meaning are important in the process of developing coherence, and both are socially-constructed and culturally-based. Pragmatism relates to the present study in a number of ways. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, pragmatism is the foundation of symbolic interactionism, the framework I use to examine power in the Maya cultural context. Secondly, pragmatism anticipates the relative nature of inquiry necessary in symbolic interactionism. That is, pragmatists recognize that knowledge and meaning are culturally situated, contextualized in time and space. Thirdly, when evaluating the historical record and the experiences of Maya, non-maya, colonizing, and colonized groups, competing narratives inevitably arise, begging questions of veracity and objectivity. Pragmatism provides a context for evaluating competing narratives and truth claims based on rigorous evaluation and empirical study, rather than an appeal to ideological or dogmatic criteria.

28 Symbolic Interactionism: Individual Agency within Systems 16 <Symbolic Interactionism is a perspective that offers generalizations about how the individual develops a self and a mind, and the dialectical relationship of the individual who possesses a self and a mind to the society in which he or she lives (Musolf 3). Symbolic interactionism developed out of the work of James, Peirce, Mead, and other pragmatic philosophers into a distinct sociological approach. Drawing heavily on George Herbert Mead, Herbert Blumer laid out the framework of interactionism in the mid-twentieth century, focusing on individual action and agency in the social context. Later theorists (Stryker and Musolf, in particular) expanded Blumer s vision of SI to incorporate larger social systems into the interactionist perspective. Contemporary interactionists note that interactionism continues to evolve, arguing for further exploration and development of the framework and its application to social contexts (Charmaz). In the final section of the present chapter, I outline my conception of symbolic interactionism, linking it to pragmatism and the various theorists who have contributed to the interactionist approach. I present the key concepts in interactionism that I think are most relevant to the study of Maya culture and society, and I argue for a holistic approach to the study of social systems. I conclude the present chapter with a summary of my own methods for the study of Maya colonial experience and power relations, methods that draw from pragmatism and symbolic interactionism to create a methodology that is at once flexible, yet empirically valid. Symbolic interactionists begin the study of individuals and society inductively, without appeals to grand narratives or universalism. The components of interactionism are relevant to the study of culture (generally) and the Mayas of Yucatán (particularly) because of the ways in which they uniquely frame the self and identity, human interaction, society, and culture. I now turn to symbolic interactionism its tenets, methods, and philosophical foundations in order to

29 frame my own methods for the study of Maya colonial experiences, with regard to interaction and systems of power. 17 Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Pragmatism, Self, Identity, and Society Symbolic interactionism is a framework or approach within sociology and social psychology. Models of interactionism developed primarily in the United States, under both the Chicago and Iowa schools of thought. Like pragmatism and cultural studies, symbolic interactionism did not develop in a theoretical vacuum. Musolf describes the historical context in which sociology and interactionism originated at a time of industrialization, massive immigration into the United States, and rapid urbanization during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Industrial growth led to the development and expansion of capitalist structures, and an early division developed between industry leaders and social reformers like Dorothy Day and others who advocated for and represented the poor, laborers, and other non-business interests. Conflict ensued between the proponents of unrestrained industrial growth and development, on the one hand, and proponents of social reconstruction, on the other. Most importantly, though, interactionists responded to nineteenth and twentieth century questions of self and human nature, rejecting determinism generally, and social Darwinism, in particular. Interactionists reacted to the hegemony of biological determinism, arguing that behavior is largely determining, not determined (Musolf 15). They acknowledged social influences on behavior, rather than purely biological determinants. Early interactionists opposed the view that so-called natural inequalities need not be remedied, challenging hereditarianism and discriminatory practices in immigration, unequal civil status in the U. S. South, and segregation based on biological determinism and eugenics. Interactionists and social reformers argued for intervention and change in situations of unjust inequality. They argued that if culture and context are largely responsible for shaping or cueing behavior, then one may

30 18 view inequalities not as biologically determined, but as unfair disadvantages to some due to historical, socially-constructed realities. Pragmatists first laid out an approach that later symbolic interactionists developed further. Their pragmatic, interactionist approach challenged determinism, highlighting the socially constructed nature of behavior, interaction, and social structures. Musolf refers to this as the social basis and indeterminate nature of behavior and human nature (23). Pragmatists emphasized the unique evolutionary development that led to specialized use of symbols and language, as well as the ability to adapt and modify meaning and language. Mead focused more on behavior than the mental processes underlying behavior, but he did not agree with social Darwinists that human experience may be explained through primarily biological analysis. 1 In addition to specific social realities, sociology and interactionist models developed in the United States in response to the perceived need for scientifically valid interpretive or subjective approaches to the study of social behavior. Drawing from pragmatic principles and ideas, symbolic interactionists thus created an empirical and inductive model of society, based on observation, introspection, and analysis of human behavior in the social context. Interactionists have acknowledged parallels between interactionism and pragmatism, and also between interactionism and other philosophical, literary, and sociological schools. Scottish moral philosophy foreshadowed interactionism, in that Adam Smith, David Hume, and others discussed individuality and collectivity, looking at human activity empirically (Stryker). The Scottish philosophers viewed individuals within the social context, and contextualized their discussions of habit, 1 As Turner notes, *Mead+ took from behaviorism the principle of reinforcement, but he rejected behaviorism s denial of the possibility of investigating scientifically the internal dynamics of the mind; he took from pragmatism the notion that organisms are practical creatures who adapt to conditions of their worlds; and he took from Darwinism the argument that behaviors facilitating survival are retained, applying that argument not only to Man as a species but to individual human beings (Stryker, Symbolic 34-35).

31 19 custom, and mind. Denzin also associates symbolic interactionism with the Left romanticism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Karl Marx and William James, suggesting that interactionism exudes a type of cultural romanticism (83-4). Functionalism, itself influenced by pragmatic thought and derived from the work of Dewey, also impacted symbolic interactionism. Beginning in the 1950s and 60s, though, symbolic interactionists reacted to Talcott Parsons presentation of functionalism based on shared values and norms, arguing that volition and agency played a much greater role in social systems than the degree to which Parsons allowed. Critics within interactionism argued that Parson s AGIL model of social systems (Adaptation; Goal-attainment; Integration; and Latency) used an overly theoretical approach to human behavior in the social system. Specifically, the model emphasized social coherence and order, rather than power structures or conflicts readily evident in the social context. 2 Nevertheless, functionalism and systems theory influenced later developments within interactionism that expanded the scope of analysis to include larger social systems. In spite of evident disagreements, some of the Parsonian concepts are manifest in the interactionist framework. Parson s unit act (an individual actor with a goal) and action systems made up of organized collections of unit acts are mirrored in the interactionist conception of the individual and joint action, as outlined in the following sections. Pragmatism is the largest single influence on the interactionist perspective. Moral philosophy, cultural romanticism, and functionalism are only a few of the additional varied influences on symbolic interactionism. Nevertheless, many other theorists and theories have contributed to present-day symbolic interactionism, lending concepts, methods, and perspectives to what has become a major branch of sociology and social psychology. With regard to the origins of symbolic interaction, I 2 Neo-functionalists have revitalized Parsonian structuralism by addressing conflict and social change. For Niklas Luhman, systems are reductionist and merely symbolic; communication is, for Luhman, the locus of study, and coding or decoding are of utmost importance ( systems theory n.p.).

32 20 believe there are three main areas of influence and development that are relevant to Herbert Blumer s work and subsequent revisions to interactionism: i) Pragmatism; ii) iii) Theories of self and identity formation; and Theories of social systems and society. All of these categories overlap, and leading theorists like George Herbert Mead and William James dealt with more than one single area. I will now briefly introduce each of these areas of development before outlining the major components of symbolic interactionism. Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Pragmatism Pragmatism is the definitive, early influence on symbolic interactionism. Pragmatism in the context of interactionism refers not to the common definition of pragmatic (expedient or practical), but to the situation and contextualization of philosophical and social issues. Skidmore defines the pragmatic contribution in this way: <pragmatism was a movement which used the traditional concerns of philosophy as a point of departure from which to defend a somewhat novel way of looking at these problems (in Holstein and Gubrium 21). Pragmatism, as a forerunner of symbolic interactionism, situated philosophical questions in the lived experience of individuals in the social context. Truth, values, historical interpretation, and knowledge are defined and understood not according to universal narrative, but relative to specific social and cultural contexts, situations in which the meaning of knowledge, values, and cultural narrative arose. In the context of symbolic interactionism, pragmatism does not only represent a shift toward greater contextualization of theory. Within interactionism, pragmatism also represents a shift from transcendental philosophical ideas of self (and thus, of morality, values, and so on) to an empirically supported account of human lives, values, and experiences. Prior to pragmatism, mistaken ideas of shared identity and

33 21 universal experience emerged from philosophical perspectives. Pragmatism challenged this trend, allowing for variance and multiplicity at both the individual and societal levels. According to Joel Charon, pragmatism influenced interactionism with the following four foundational concepts: i) Humans interpret their environment, rather than passively reacting to it; ii) The usefulness of human belief in situational context is important in understanding behavior; iii) iv) Humans selectively pay attention; and Human action ought to be the ultimate focus of study for the social scientist. Pragmatists re-centered the focus of study on the individual in context, and interactionists refined the approach further, emphasizing the social construction of self, meaning, and joint action in society. The collective works of William James, Charles Horton Cooley, James Mark Baldwin, William Isaac Thomas, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead shaped the direction of symbolic interactionism from its inception to the present day. Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Self and Identity Early pragmatists and interactionists spent considerable time discussing various concepts of self and identity. Just as cultural studies shifted the focus of research from elites to common individuals, the focus of study for interactionists shifted from overarching structures toward the individual. For pragmatists and interactionists, the individual, rather than the social system, became the primary unit of investigation. For these new theorists, social structures emerged from interpersonal relations between individuals and meaning derived in the social context. Given the person-centered approach of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, it is not surprising to find that the way in which the self is understood

34 22 relates directly to one s conception of social systems and cultural structures. Most of the forerunners of interactionism dealt with notions of self, and the concepts of self and self-identity are crucial components of interactionism today. Prior to pragmatism, Max Weber focused on human actors, de-emphasizing an historical approach to the study of behavior. For Weber, action, behavior, and motivation were interwoven. Behavior is a result of the complex interplay between motivation, non-motivated factors, and conditions. Most importantly in the present context, Weber understood social behavior (or social action) as behavior guided or affected by subjective meaning (Stryker 44). This connection between meaning and action would become a central tenet of interactionism as outlined by Herbert Blumer. James Mark Baldwin influenced both Cooley and Dewey with his social analysis of self, arguing that self derives from social relations or self-other relationships (Stryker). His stages of the development of self included: awareness of others, imitation of others, and awareness of the feelings of others. Charles Horton Cooley looked at the origins of self in the familial and social contexts, emphasizing introspection and imagination in his analysis. His most important contribution to formulations of self is undoubtedly his Looking-Glass Self, in which he understands the self only in the social context. Self in the social context is derived from others perceptions and how one imagines others perceive him or her. Cooley s definition is solipsistic, in that it requires thinking about thought, or reflecting on the ways in which one imagines others perceive one s actions and behaviors. William James understood the self as an object at the center of one s consciousness. According to James, as many selves exist as the number of one s social relationships. James empirical self further clarified his notion of various selves, looking at the interactive process of self-in-society (Denzin; Holstein and Gubrium; Stryker). Building on Cooley s initial conception of the self, James posited that the self is defined by the recognition of others. The self is an empirical object of reference, changing, shifting, and developing in relation to others. Self is more than a

35 23 cognitive or even physical distinction. It has to do with a broad array of social interactions, objects, and others with whom one interacts. Self-esteem and self-worth are made up of both external recognition and internal motivations or subjective interpretations (Stryker). Widely considered the most important influence on interactionism, George Herbert Mead spent considerable time working on the concept of self. His extensive teaching and research focused on the individual in society, even as he pioneered theories of social psychology. He examined the emergence of self in society and conceived of the self and mind as processes, contextualized in social realms. Thus, Mead outlined the social nature of human behavior; for Mead, self is created in and defined by social interaction. Furthermore, the self and society are not static, but malleable, and they can be re-constituted. Because the nature of human experience is social, consciousness arises out of human group life. The self is based in experience and socially constructed. It is grounded in the routine social interactions that arise in society. William Isaac Thomas, an early sociologist at the University of Chicago, formulated a re-definition of the adult self, focusing on subjectivity in social settings. According to Thomas, individual subjectivity and assigned meanings explain variations in behavior when other factors are held constant. Another Chicago researcher and student of Herbert Blumer, Erving Goffman, developed labeling theory and the socially-situated self. For his concept of the self, Goffman used the analogy of theater and stage to illustrate the ways in which individuals act, using scripts, scenes, performances, etc. in their everyday lives and interactions (Holstein and Gubrium). Like Thomas, Goffman operationalized the self, though he emphasized the social, empirical, and circumstantial aspects of self more than subjective interpretation of self. As the University of Chicago interactionists developed their understanding of the self based on Cooley, James, and others, Manford H. Kuhn and George McCall similarly advanced their own conceptions of self, based on the Iowa school of

36 24 interactionism. Kuhn defined self and role-taking in his self-theory, defining the self as a set of attitudes and a structure of various components. Though certainly less influential in SI than Blumer, Kuhn looked at meaning attached to one s core self, and identified complex links between conceptions of self and behavior. He measured self-attitudes using a combination of SI frameworks and conventional social scientific methodology (Stryker, Symbolic). George McCall expanded on Kuhn s work on the self, discussing the dualism of ideals and deterministic realities that affect behavior. Like Goffman, he discussed the phenomenal aspects of self, looking at self as character, actor, and audience. He also included a systems focus in his analysis of the self, arguing that systems define parameters and options for self-definition. Ultimately, Herbert Blumer adamantly challenged Kuhn s assertion that the self could be defined as a set of attitudes (Symbolic). Blumer considered this a weak premise that could not be reasonably defended, one that would not hold up to rigorous scientific scrutiny. Blumer s own conception of the self, individuals, action, and joint action will be explored further in the present section. In summary, pragmatists and early sociologists (including later interactionists) shifted the study of society from a structural emphasis toward individuals and the subjective definition of self that affects behavior in society. Self is seen as a social construction, and subjective meaning is helpful in understanding behavior. Working from this definition of self, interactionists built a comprehensive model of society that is inductive and person-centered, rather than a top-down structural model that incorporates individuals as secondary components of a larger system. I include conceptions of self and identity in my approach to Yucatec Maya culture and experiences, because self-identification and internalized group narratives about the self shape interactions within and between individuals and groups. Identity and self in the cultural context are much more than individualistic notions of introspection and reflection. Self and identity shape inter-group relations, and impact the structuring of social systems and society at large.

37 25 Origins of Symbolic Interactionism: Social Systems and Society Although a comprehensive outline of social structures is a relatively recent development in symbolic interactionism, interactionists have always drawn on social theory that emphasizes macro structures. The interactionist approach to society, though, always begins with the individual before enlarging the scope of research to include groups, institutions, and society as a whole. Regarding society, Cooley emphasized the interconnectedness of organic units, individuals who together made up the social system. According to his organic view of society, social life may be seen as <a vast tissue of reciprocal activity, made of innumerable differentiated systems, all interwoven and unified so that what takes place in one affects all the rest (Stryker 28). Accordingly, the individual and society are mutually-reinforcing; society is made up of individuals interacting, yet individual action is influenced by the totality of the system. Mead, like Cooley, described social interaction, the social act, as the basic unit of society. Unlike Parsons, who focused on shared values, Mead insisted that society was made up of diverse acts that did not necessarily fit together because of their commonality or homogeneity. Cooperation not shared values is necessary for survival. Cooperation forms the basis for ongoing social interaction and society. Society is therefore made up of individuals coping with, reacting to, and integrating themselves into various social situations. At the same time, cooperation is not without struggle and conflict. Herbert Blumer agreed that society is one built on the play of power, interest, group position, collective action, and protest (Denzin 84). Thus, action, interaction, and struggle are all integral parts of the social system. Actions or individual acts are constructed out of what is observed and taken into account by the individual, even as what is taken into account defines personality and behavior patterns in the social setting. Blumer also points out that uncertainty, contingency, and transformation are all aspects of society ( Symbolic 72).

38 26 John Dewey suggested that habits, personality, and society are intimately connected, that customs are merely a form of collective habit (Stryker 24). Dewey understood social systems to be made up of associations and shared actions, and these formed the basis of society. Georg Simmel likewise interpreted the study of society and social systems as the study of interaction and collective actions. Concessions, active engagement, and association framed for Simmel the creative, dynamic flow and exchange between the individual and society (Stryker 41). Though he tended to rely more heavily that other interactionists on deterministic arguments, Manford H. Kuhn evaluated social structure as networks of positions and roles, examining the ways in which interaction may be constrained within social networks (Stryker 101). Anselm Strauss is another in a long list of theorists who viewed society as a process, rather than a static set of institutions or concepts. For Strauss, interpersonal negotiation produced social organization. Emergence, change, power relations, and fragmentation all were important terms Strauss used to describe society and social organization ( Negotiated ). Similarly, Eugene Weinstein conceived of social structure as something that happens, rather than simply being. Accordingly, society could be understood as an unending stream of interaction process (Stryker 124). Sheldon Stryker, an influential theorist in structural interactionism, suggests that society may best be defined as an ongoing social process, rather than a static or stable construct (35). Stryker s conception of social structure, along with that of Gil Richard Musolf, will shape the remainder of the present section on methodology. Combined with Blumer s formulation of interactionism at the individual level, the social structural components of interactionism as laid out by Stryker and Musolf developed from the early work of Mead, Cooley, Dewey, Kuhn, and other interactionists.

39 27 Symbolic Interactionism: Micro and Macro Conceptions of Social Systems Symbolic interactionism is a pragmatic sociological approach to the study of society, in which the practical applicability of ideas determines the framework s success. Sheldon Stryker and others caution against a dogmatic approach to interactionism, advancing instead a perspective that encourages change, revision, and adaptation of the framework and interactionist approaches. Symbolic interactionism is varied in its application, tailored to the unique situations, groups, and individuals studied. As with pragmatism, interactionists also implement methods and perspectives judged to be expedient or practical in the contextualization of social research, discarding those that are not useful in a given study. Although interactionism allows for a great deal of flexibility in terms of the framework s application, there are, nonetheless, central concepts, ideas, and guiding images that are common among interactionists. Generally speaking, interactionists are concerned with the symbolic meanings attached to the so-called facts of a situation, as well as subsequent behavior, behavioral choices, and how individual behavior affects (and is affected by) society as a whole. According to Denzin, symbolic Interactionism offers a generic theory of action, meaning, motives, emotion, gender, the person and social structure (86). In other words, the interactionist framework provides analysis of everyday interactions and human relations that build to form social systems. In an interactionist framework, culture, organizations, and other groups create parameters for acceptable or normal behavior, but individuals act in the context of situations and not necessarily within the established parameters. For Blumer, actions carried out by individuals are different from though components of culture, but they are not one and the same. Furthermore, impersonal forces do not determine behavior. Acting units construct systems that are determined by the interpretative action of the acting units themselves ( Symbolic 76). Later

40 28 interactionists have emphasized cultural and societal restraints that do, in fact, limit behavioral choices or options available to individuals. When viewed alongside the structural formulation of interactionism, Blumer s behavioral argument is neither deterministic nor entirely non-deterministic. In the present interactionist framework, behavior is seen in society and culture as determining, yet constrained at the same time by the very system that individual action helps to create. Outline of Symbolic Interactionism Manis and Meltzer have outlined a number of core components common to most interactionist approaches (in Stryker 88). They identify seven critical aspects of any interactionist framework, including: i) The central focus on meaning in the social context; ii) iii) iv) An understanding of humanity as derived from social sources; A process-oriented approach to society; A non-deterministic philosophy of behavior; v) A logically-constructed and socially-situated conception of mind ; vi) vii) The notion that human behavior is fluid, constructed, and creative; and The necessity of sympathy and reflective attitudes in research. According to Manis and Meltzer, then, symbolic interactionism is a bottom-up approach to the study of social systems that focuses on individual contributions to the formation of meaning and groups, cultures, and societies. Denzin accurately points out that *c+ontemporary symbolic interactionists emphasize the reflexive, gendered, situated nature of human experience (85). Most importantly, interactionism consists of a set of ideas that direct attention to particular experiences or expressions within society, what Stryker labels a frame of reference (9). Much like Manis and Meltzer, Norman K. Denzin has outlined the key assumptions of Blumer s version of interactionism (82). According to Denzin, the following assumptions are integral components of an interactionist approach:

41 29 i) Agents (individuals) act based on meanings associated with objects of action; ii) iii) iv) Social interaction creates meaning; Self-reflection and interaction modify meaning; Experienced worlds are created by agents; v) Experienced worlds are created and modeled by interaction and reflection; vi) vii) viii) Self-interaction and social interaction are in constant flux together; Joint acts make up a society, including various stages of interaction; Meanings are shaped by complex, evolving interactions in society; and finally, ix) The consequences of truth define its value; there is no final or authorized version of the truth (85). Herbert Blumer provided the definitive introduction to symbolic interactionism in his 1969 text, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. In what has become a foundational text in symbolic interactionism, Blumer outlined three principles of interactionism that continue to frame the perspective today. As will be seen, Stryker and Musolf have expanded these three basic arguments to include a structural approach to interactionism, but Blumer s basic premises remain intact. In the first place, Blumer argued that <human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them (Symbolic 2). Meaning, therefore, is central when looking at human activity and behavior. Humans create and manipulate symbols, and actions provide clues as to intentions or thoughts underlying behavior. Individuals communicate feelings, thoughts, beliefs, and values via symbolic representations. Symbols are not merely words, but also include commonly understood forms of nonverbal communication, such as facial and body gestures, sounds, or other communications. In the second place, Blumer posited that <the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one s fellows

42 30 (Symbolic 2). In other words, the source of meaning is important, and meaning originates in the social setting. Meaning is socially constructed and defined. It is not intrinsic to the object, or an individualized cognitive or psychological response to an object. The creation and transmission of culture and history stem from this symbolic world that is a direct result of social interaction and the creation and maintenance of meaning. Meaning, in Blumer s view, shifts, changes, and develops in context. Thirdly, Blumer proffered that <these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters (2). Blumer explains interpretation further, conceptualizing the interpretation of meaning as an evolving process that is useful in guiding and forming action. Process and emergence relate closely to Blumer s definition of interpretation, principally due to the dynamic web of social interactions that impact the decoding of socially-constructed meaning. The creation of social meaning and symbolic representations, together with their interpretation, involve constant fluidity, meaning negotiation, and change. Negotiation, fluidity, and streams of activity define the interpretative process in the social setting ( Symbolic, Dictionary of Sociology). These three premises underlie all symbolic interactionist frameworks, in spite of the plethora of perspectives that use the interactionist label. Blumer expanded his foundational work to explain a number of root images or central concepts that are increasingly important to interactionism. The following section includes elaboration of each of the root images developed by Blumer, Stryker, and Musolf. I begin with interactionist definitions of objects, symbolic meaning, individual action and joint action, social structures, and society. In terms of Maya colonial and post-colonial experiences, each of the interactionist concepts will be useful in my investigation of social interactions, demonstrations of power, and the varied interpretation of historical and contemporary events. Symbolic interactionism provides useful operationalized definitions of social processes that I use in my reading and evaluation of Maya texts.

43 31 Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Objects and Symbolic Representations of Meaning For the interactionist, an object is defined as anything that can be indicated or referred to, whether concrete and physical or abstract and theoretical. Objects may include physical, social, or other abstract objects or thoughts. Blumer wrote that *t+he meaning of objects for a person arises fundamentally out of the way they are defined to him by others with whom he interacts (Symbolic 11). Meaning and its attribution are negotiated and defined through social interaction, and socially constructed meanings for objects guide behavior toward those objects. Objects are social creations, in that the meaning and symbols used to identify meaning are socially defined. Social interaction changes or perpetuates particular meanings, and society is a process in which objects are being created, affirmed, transformed, and cast aside (Blumer, Symbolic 12). Blumer addressed the conceptual flaw of some philosophers by identifying an object as anything that can be indicated, rather than anything that can be sensed or observed using sensory data. In this way, he makes the conceptual bridge from physical objects to non-physical ideas or abstractions as relevant to the process of meaning formation for individuals in the social world (Putnam 57-81). Concerning meaning and symbols, Blumer suggested in his 1969 work that meaning is negotiated, constructed, and acted upon. Furthermore, objects and their meanings are human constructs and not self-existing entities with intrinsic natures (Symbolic 68). Therefore, selective attention and human interaction in the social environment create meaning; the meaning or significance of objects does not exist independently of one s ability to create and recognize meaning. With regard to objects and the symbolic representation of meaning, symbolic interaction is closely related to semiology and the related structural linguistic work of Charles Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure, and French structuralist Roland Barthes. Semiologists may investigate signs, symbols, and related systems in language usage.

44 32 In some cases, semiologists address socially negotiated meaning associated with particular signs or symbols, and how language is used to interpret, create, reinforce, or alter meaning. In this context, speech refers to speech acts, such as vocalization, whereas language refers in this context to the structure of signs underlying speech. Most importantly, symbols and meanings attached to objects can be assessed to interpret and understand social patterns. Similarly, George Herbert Mead also looked at the use of symbolism in language within the social context. He tied the use of language and associated meanings to agency and individual action, all key components of interactionism today. According to Mead s formulation, individuals create and respond to meaning in the social realm. Individuals are both influenced by and influencing culture, society, and the meanings attributed to language, experiences, and objects. Symbolic in this context refers to conceptual representations of meaning in reference to objects. Language and usage are critical components of the interactionist understanding of the meaning and symbolism attached to objects. The social environment consists only of objects that can be referred to or indicated. Importantly, though, as illustrated in the hypothetical case of the rural school project, individual perception and meaning attribution is often varied. This is due, in part, to the fact that symbolic representations of meaning focus attention on important, salient features of an object. Some individuals and groups may focus on a particular aspect of an object, while selectively ignoring other aspects. In this way, individuals inhabiting the same space, indicating or referring to the same objects, will often interpret objects differently. Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Individual Action Action more generally describes the manifestation of self based on symbolic representations and meanings that individuals create for objects. Actors (individuals) do not act solely as determined by internal or external forces. Rather, they construct

45 33 action based on a combination of meanings, needs, motives, and other influences. Habitual behavior does not necessarily require active reflection and construction based on meaning, but changing situations require dynamic definitions and meaning attribution. This is not to suggest, however, that there are no constraints to behavior and behavioral repertoires. Socially-constructed restraints and systems of power often restrict the behavioral options available to actors. At the same time, variance in meaning attribution explains variation in behavior under similar circumstances. Agency and interpretation relate directly to the interactionist conception of action, in that the interpretation of meaning and agency drive the social act. Denzin describes agency as the locus of action, whether it be located in the individual, structures of language, or other processes (82). With the inclusion of agency, interactionists signal their understanding of individuals as selves, and not merely passive actors moved upon by external forces (Blumer, Symbolic 73). The person in society is not a passive component of a larger system that shifts and moves predictably under specific circumstances. On the contrary, individuals with agency, acting on the basis of the meaning they hold for objects, demonstrate a wide range of behaviors in similar situations. Blumer points out that agency is the key to understanding variation in human systems. Again, this does not necessarily reject or ignore other factors that may, in fact, limit behavioral choice or agency. Interactionists do, however, acknowledge the presence of human agency and interpretative behavior in society. Musolf recognizes the dichotomy between agency and limits to behavior when he discusses <the fact that we make culture, history, and policy though not under conditions of our own choosing (8). Though action generally arises from a combination of individual agency and the interpretation of meaning (admittedly within certain boundaries or constraints), there are instances in which action is almost entirely restricted or controlled. When evaluating the self in the social context and limits to action, Stryker points out that if the social person is shaped by interaction, it is social structure that shapes the possibilities for interaction and so, ultimately, the person (66). Erving Goffman

46 34 demonstrated this interaction between the self, action, and social structure. He studied psychiatric patients as examples of individuals in a total institution, where self is imposed by others (in this case, doctors and staff) (Musolf 128). In his 1963 case study, Asylums, Goffman illustrated the struggle of individual actors against what Musolf calls an oppressive social situation (128). Goffman effectively demonstrated how institutions and power structures can dramatically alter social exchanges and communication through a lack of empathy, rigid structures, rules, norms, and divergent narratives in which meaning is neither agreed upon nor negotiated. In instances such as the one evaluated by Goffman, institutional structures, norms, and systems of power may block action, preventing the expression of agency and interpretation in the social setting. However, this type of total institution is not limited to the controlled setting of an in-patient psychiatric hospital. Particularly in the colonial period, Yucatec Maya communities found their options for action and agency severely curtailed as a result of non-maya dominance and control. I contend that the Mayas experienced the type of oppressive social situation that Goffman identified in a 1960s psychiatric hospital, one in which rigidity, control of resources by non-mayas and long-established norms disenfranchised Maya groups, leaving them impoverished and in a state of dependence that persists today. In the present study of colonial and post-colonial Maya experience, the intersection of agency and its constraints will be of particular interest. I look specifically at instances in which non-maya colonial authorities limited behavioral choices and individual agency. I also examine scenarios that demonstrate agency and action in the service of productive change. In this context, the interactionist interpretation of individual action provides a clear framework for evaluating action and agency among the Mayas of Yucatán.

47 35 Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Joint Action Within an interactionist framework, humans are socially connected, not operating or acting independently. Like objects, the self exists in relation to other selves, and is defined in the social context. Joint action is made up of the combined actions of individuals, yet it is greater than the sum of individual actions. Joint action, writes Blumer, refers to more than a random collection of individual acts, and must undergo a formative process in order to be considered joint in the interactionist sense (Symbolic 17). Joint actions, then, are cohesive, integrated, and purposeful. Moreover, new joint actions always arise out of past actions. They are situated and dependent, not spontaneously emerging apart from their social contexts. Mead described two types of interaction in the social setting. Symbolic interactions include an interpretation of others actions, whereas non-symbolic actions consist of non-interpreted response to the actions of others, or reflex actions. Similarly, social interaction may be divided into unfocused v. focused action, or casual and unintentional v. intentional action. Joint social interactions are fluid, changing, and sensitive to the actions of others. Joel Charon outlines four aspects of joint action (social interaction) in the context of interactionism. He surmises that social interaction creates and defines human qualities, affects individual responses to situations, creates identity, and builds society. For Charon, cooperation characterizes social interaction. Joint action that is repetitive and stable includes action that is expected and based on agreed-upon meaning (Blumer Symbolic 19). This suggests the expectation of certain behavioral patterns, together with potential change and negotiation. Thus, social interactions renew or alter repeated joint action. For example, many rural Mayas base agricultural practices on predictable, established patterns of interaction between families, non-mayas, and other individuals. Planting schedules, harvesting methods, the storage and processing of maíz, and other subsistence practices continue

48 36 with minor adaptations to seasonal weather patterns, availability of land and other resources, and changing family needs. Rapid cultural change due to assimilation, depletion of arable land, loss of acreage, and conflict with non-maya neighbors all pressure Maya groups to re-negotiate joint actions, often to their detriment. As resources become scarcer because of population growth and extended periods of drought, individuals and their joint action must adapt to changing realities. As Maya individuals and families in the social setting assess their changing situation, socialstructural constraints and the subjective meanings attached to objects (situations, resources, and other factors influencing change) will determine future joint action. A definition of joint action is critical to a formulation of symbolic interactionism because it expands the individualistic, person-centered approach into structural and social systems analysis. Much of my analysis of Maya experiences will evaluate joint action and its effects, historically and presently. I understand joint action as the intermediate-level unit of analysis that bridges individual experience with society as a whole. When evaluating Maya texts, I identify subjective meaning attached to objects that led to joint action during colony and the period immediately following independence. As I identify joint action, I also analyze the impact of that joint action on larger social structures and society as a whole. Root Images in Symbolic Interactionism: Society and Structures Traditional models in the social sciences often depicted society as either structural (external and imposed) or dynamic (dynamic, individualized, and changing). Early symbolic interactionism, for its part, took a dynamic view of society, neglecting its structural components. Into the 1970s, Blumer and other interactionists faced increasing criticism for symbolic interactionism s failure to address systems of power and other social structures. In the post-1970s context, this led to a renewed focus in interactionism on both agency or action and structure, including interest in

49 37 such concepts as cultural domination, resistance, agency, the reproduction of power and inequality, and so on (Musolf 97). The addition of a structural focus is the most important addition to SI since Blumer first outlined the approach between the 1930s and 1960s. Critical to present conceptions of symbolic interactionism is a comprehensive framework that allows for both individual and structural analysis. As Stryker points out, <a focus on the person without a correlative focus on social structure, or vice-versa, is necessarily partial and incomplete (53). Interactionists presently focus on individual and joint action, as well as macro-level structures, in order to understand and examine power, hierarchies, and other systems that disenfranchise or oppress. System is defined by interactionists as the interactive relationship between mutually dependent parts or units (Stryker). Differentiated relationships exist between various parts of the system, and all groups in society are considered systems of interaction. However, not all systems of interaction are necessarily groups, and the system as a whole is made up of more than the sum total of all groups. Political institutions, religions, and other institutions also contribute to the whole, as well as the interaction between groups. Musolf identifies limits to agency within systems of power when he defines structure as <the innumerable social facts over which the individual qua individual, does not have much control and which he or she cannot escape (6). He goes on to discuss meta-power, identifying powerful actors who make political, religious, or other decisions that affect other actors more dynamically than in normal, person-to-person interaction. In this way, Musolf begins to outline a theory of power relations in the social setting. He frames change and justice in terms of collective struggle rooted in the agency of the individual, suggesting that individual agency often defies structure, through negotiation and power struggle (99). They are not opposites, he claims, but intertwined aspects of society, in which agency is constrained by structures and structures are affected and shaped by individual agency. Constraint is facilitated through roles and rules, and encoding helps

50 38 maintain power. Social reproduction what Musolf labels stability stands in stark contrast to social transformation or change. Regarding the question of determinism, Musolf recognizes that external factors and structures are critical and provide meaning and constrain actions, but they do not determine final outcomes. Most importantly, though, structure and agency interplay constantly, and the tension between them shapes the social system. Sheldon Stryker has also outlined a leading structural theory for interactionism, building on Blumer s work, yet departing from Blumer s vision on several key points. Specifically, Stryker writes that Blumer s version of interactionism could not be adequately operationalized, could not be tested empirically, and lacked a clear focus on structures beyond the individual and basic groups in society. Nevertheless, Stryker s expansion of interactionism is just that: he builds on the foundational work of Blumer to create a more comprehensive and complete model of society and social interaction based on a pragmatic, person-centered approach to the study of social systems. He addresses self and mind in the social context vis-à-vis Mead, and he defines structure as patterned regularities that make up most social interactions (65). Society creates self, and self organizes social behavior. Like Musolf, Stryker identifies the interplay between individuals and structures, arguing that society, individual, and person are abstractions that depend on each other for definition. The individual and structure or society are both necessary to understand social interaction. Structural themes are actually an integral part of interactionism and organically derive from Blumer s work, writes Stryker. They simply must be identified and developed further. In his enlargement of Blumer s work, Stryker has outlined a more complete interactionist framework that includes both individual and structural components. According to Stryker, interactionism ought to include the following premises: i) Behavior depends on named, classified, and meaning-laden objects (these are all aspects of the environment);

51 39 ii) Symbols indicate positions, which are social structural components. Shared behavioral expectations (roles) are derived from these positions; iii) People in social systems identify one another and have expectations of behavior because of positions; iv) People also reflexively identify themselves, and this creates expectations for one s own behavior; v) People label other individuals, situations, and themselves in order to organize behavior; vi) All of this does not determine behavior, but it may constrain behavior. Behavior emerges in the role-making process, in which individuals engage in subtle, tentative, and probing exchanges; vii) Open and closed structures may allow for behavioral flexibility (or not), but all pose some limits on definitions of behavior; and viii) When roles are flexible and made rather than only played, changes in behavior can lead to wider social change (55). The emphasis in Stryker s outline of an interactionist framework still overwhelmingly emphasizes the individual and agency, yet it also contains the formulation of social systems and structural components as they interact with and impact individual experience, interaction, roles, and behavior. Interactionist definitions of society are equally symbolic, also emphasizing the symbolic nature of interaction and communication. Unlike Talcott Parsons, interactionists assert that society does not cohere because of shared core values or values systems. Musolf points out that *o+n the surface it may appear that people must share values to interact, but power, convenience, self-interest, and the like may be the magnet rather than a presupposed value consensus (117). Strife and antagonism are part of complex systems, and joint action constitutes society. Joel Charon defines society more positively, as social interaction that is symbolic, that is characterized by cooperation, and that develops culture (162). For Charon,

52 40 cooperation, not conflict, binds individuals in the collective act of society. Whether one views society as fundamentally cooperative or conflicting, interactionists claim that society is, nonetheless, made up of individual interaction and agency and the systems that emerge from those interactions. Society and social interactions are not random, but patterned. Blumer reiterated the non-deterministic stance of interactionism when he suggested that society is the frame for action, but does not ultimately determine action. He postulated that <such organization and changes in it are the product of the activity of acting units and not of forces which leave such acting units out of account (Symbolic 87). Consequently, interactionism emphasizes the constructed nature of social systems and society, basing analysis of society on individual meaning, communication, and interaction. Structures and systems in society may constrain individual behavior, but they are the creation and result of human interaction and agency. The expanded interactionist approach has allowed interactionists to re-assess the question of agency in the dichotomous social setting, a setting in which one encounters both individual agency and structural constraints on behavior. Denzin, for instance, has asked whether agency and meaning should be localized in individuals, experience, or in the social structure itself (82). Questions of which came first? aside, the expansion of symbolic interactionism and subsequent focus on power and social change provide the cultural studies researcher with a comprehensive framework from which to assess social dynamics at any and every level. In my presentation and reading of Maya experiences and interactions with non-mayas, I utilize a dual focus on micro- and macro-level social interaction based on the meanings that individuals create and assign to objects. Using case study and individual perspectives alongside structural analysis, I show patterns of interaction, communication, and symbolic interaction that link colonial experiences with postcolonial conditions for Yucatec Mayas. Finally, I use the comprehensive framework of symbolic interactionism to analyze systems of power, hierarchies, and systems

53 that have historically disenfranchised and detrimentally affected various Maya groups in Yucatán. 41 Procedure and Method in Symbolic Interactionism Herbert Blumer, though he opposed traditional quantitative research methods in social science, outlined a number of methodological positions for interactionism in Symbolic Interactionism. For Blumer, interactionist research falls either into the category of exploration or inspection. Exploratory research, narrative accounts, openended questioning, and conversations all ground research in the empirical social world, while also refining and narrowing the scope, purpose, and questions of study. Inspection, on the other hand, widens exploration in the sense that the exploratory material may be developed further using any number of qualitative (or quantitative) methods available to the social scientist. The difference between exploration and inspection is the difference between descriptive and analytical research. Blumer also insisted on the selection and adaptation of methods to suit the empirical world (Symbolic 60). Accordingly, *s+ymbolic interactionism recognizes that the genuine mark of an empirical science is to respect the nature of its empirical world to fit its problems, its guiding conceptions, its procedures of inquiry, its techniques of study, its concepts, and its theories to that world (48). Abstract, theoretical models would not substitute for the practical, concrete analysis of lived interaction that Blumer sought for interactionism. As a result, symbolic interactionists embed themselves in the social world, engaged, present, and observational in their methods of data collection and analysis. Blumer introduced a number of if/then scenarios to consider for interactionist research. Firstly, if individuals act on the basis of the meaning of their objects, then one must view objects as the people in the social context see them (50). Doing this avoids the creation of a fictitious world that does not reflect the cultural perspectives of the individuals and societies in question. The perspective of the

54 42 acting individual or unit matters for effective and accurate analysis. Secondly, if society is made up of people acting toward one another and interpreting one another s actions, then one s approach to behavior and society must be carefully developed to assess the construction of meaning and its interpretation. Multiple forms of assessment may be necessary, as the process of social interaction is not constrained to any single form (Symbolic 54). Thirdly, if social action consists of individual and collective actions, then joint action becomes the focal point of research. Action is constructed, not passive. External factors influence action but do not determine behavior, and action is a fluid, interpretive, and reflexive process by individuals. Because of this nature of action, its formation and development are of interest to the interactionist. Fourthly and finally, if large social complexes are made up of individual actors and the interactions between them, then large complexes cannot be seen as entirely separate entities or forces beyond the scope of action. Stability and stable forms of joint action are not fixed, but depend on continued assent and support by individual actions and actors. Hence, <large-scale organization has to be seen, studied, and explained in terms of the process of interpretation engaged in by the acting participants as they handle the situations at their respective positions in the organization (Symbolic 58). Like Blumer, Denzin argues that descriptive accounts or narratives are the most effective and useful ways to get at the perspectives of the people and groups being studied. Narrative and contextualization are paramount, what Denzin calls the narrative turn (85). Narrative represents experience, while coherence and meaning may be extracted from narratives and other cultural text. Denzin describes narrative in interactionism as various stories about the social world, stories people tell themselves about their lives and the worlds they live in, stories that may or may not work (85). Discourse often relates to power, truth, and whose version of truth will predominate. Narrative is clearly of central importance as a method in symbolic interactionism.

55 43 Stryker criticized Blumer s rejection of quantitative methods in favor of qualitative ones; dogmatic refusal to consider particular methods is not a necessary component of interactionism. Stryker and other interactionists have advocated a broad array of both quantitative and qualitative methods, chosen to suit the research question. In selecting methods to suit the empirical social world, interactionists avoid the forced use of methods from the physical sciences in the social context. Interactionist questions, approach, and methods come from familiarity with the group being studied, rather than from a pre-conceived model or theoretical scheme. This is perhaps one of interactionism s clearest uses of a pragmatic approach, in which the researcher relies on the reading of text, observation, and empirical validation, rather than on abstracted theories or models. Later criticism notwithstanding, Blumer argued not for standardization of research methods, but for an improvement of their capacity as instruments for discovering what is taking place in actual group life ( Symbolic 69). Regardless of the specific methods chosen for investigation, interactionist research methods must be capable of accurately reflecting social conditions as much as possible. Generally speaking, interactionists limit general theories and generalized theories of the whole. Interactionists also limit theories that remove the experiences of people interacting, or those that focus entirely on macro systems. Theorists also dislike disembodied experience, what Denzin calls objectif*ied+ and quantif*ied+ human experience (83). The creation and application of progressive, positive solutions to complex social problems is also an abiding concern of symbolic interactionists (Musolf 113). Thus, interactionism does not necessitate a rejection of all scientific methodology, but does impede the imposition of one particular type or method. Interactionists attempt to allow diverse methods of inquiry within a comprehensive frame of study.

56 44 Conclusion Symbolic interactionism rejects biological determinism while recognizing social structural constraints to behavior and individual action. Interactionism focuses principally on symbols and the construction of meaning, including the use of language and other communication to indicate meaning. Meaning is negotiated, created, maintained, or altered through an interpretive, interactive process. Therefore, interactionism centers on both individual and joint action, and includes social systems as emergent processes originating in action. That is, society is seen as a process, rather than a fixed institution or structure. Social systems begin with organic units (individuals and interpersonal relations) before expanding to larger systems, structures, and society as a whole. Current definitions of interactionism include emphases on individual actors and social structures, though the interactionist approach begins with the individual and moves toward progressively larger systems. Cooperation and joint action form the basis of society, and the self for the interactionist exists as a social construction, based on interaction with others. The methods and approaches used in interactionism allow for subjectivity and the de-construction of universalism, yet interactionists typically emphasize power and power structures, providing a response to perceived inequality in the social system. Interactionists select methods based on their usefulness, choosing methods that are best suited to the research questions at hand. Multiple forms of assessment focus on joint action and systems as the creation of individual and joint action. Regardless of the methods chosen for an interactionist approach, the selection process advances pragmatically, rather than dogmatically or ideologically. My Methodological Framework For my analysis of colonial and post-colonial interactions between Mayas and non-mayas in Yucatán, I have developed a comprehensive interactionist matrix of social systems (see figure 1.1 below). I use the symbolic interactionist framework, in

57 45 particular, to approach and evaluate power and power structures in the Maya context. I focus on subjective meaning and interpretation of events, experiences, and situations, and how meaning varies from Maya to non-maya groups. I evaluate the ways in which language, symbols, and joint action have linked colonial and postcolonial Maya experiences, and how subjective frames of reference have perpetuated the status quo for the Mayas of Yucatán. Finally, I explore systems of power that have disenfranchised the Maya, based on the active exercise of power by non-mayas through their interaction with Maya individuals and communities across the peninsula. As I survey these and other issues in the present study, I evaluate my results using the interactionist matrix (figure 1.1), also using the methodology matrix as an instrument of analysis. In terms of other research methods, I use a combination of case study and narrative analysis. I also use techniques from Critical Discourse Analysis to evaluate the construction of meaning in text, as it relates to Maya experience and power structures. The following figure further illustrates my methodological approach in the present study. Figure 1.1 illustrates a symbolic interactionist framework. The upper half of the diagram illustrates the variable scale of cultural studies, including the three-fold interactionist focus on individuals (actors), joint action (groups), and structure (society). Within interactionism, social systems begin with the individual (and Cooley s organic units ) before expanding to systems and structures. Interactionists eschew universalism, and some reject the relativism of neopragmatists. This leads one to a contextualized approach that is culturally-relative. The matrix emphasizes the bottom-up materiality of social interaction, as well as marginalized individuals or groups. Structures that have emerged as a result of interactions of power or power relations, inequality, and hierarchical structures that affect peripheral groups are likewise of interest to the interactionist.

58 46 Figure 1.1: Symbolic Interactionist Framework