Chapter 3 INDIA-US DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION: THE POST COLD WAR SETTING

Transcription

1 Chapter 3 INDIA-US DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION: THE POST COLD WAR SETTING 3.1 INTRODUCTION US India relations entered a new phase in the post cold war era. This new face of U. S. -India engagement has been persistently deepening and fostering in a manner that the US vividly supports India s rise as a significant part of Asian security and stability. This chapter explains the shift within the U.S. policy establishment towards India in the post cold war era. The study additionally highlights the strategic importance of India from the American perspective. It also reviews the shared interests of the U.S. and India that turnedup a new page in U. S.-India relations. Consequently the United States began to classify India as an important partner to work with in the 21st century. The early nineties brought about vital changes in the international political and strategic scene. The soviet Union disposed of its political and ideological stance and terminated its military confrontation with the US. Finally, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe started tottering and collapsing. The Warsaw pact lost its value. The Berlin Wall fell, east embraced west. The US emerged as a unipolar actor and its role in the Gulf War in January-February 1991 added a new dimension in U.S. domination of the world. 29

2 Emerging as a unilateral power on the world scene, the United States introduced a new world order that was to build the post-cold War international political, economic and strategic milieu, on its own terms. The main aims of the future U.S. global agenda were: 1. New leadership role for the United States in the new emerging world. 2. Establishment of the collective security system, emphasising the multinational cooperation to deter aggression and achieve peace and prosperity. 3. Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by concluding and verifying new arms control agreements and non-proliferation regimes. 4. Promotion of concept of secular democracy. 5. Enhancement of the respect for human rights. 6. Development of market economies. 7. Growth of the U.S. economic potential to accelerate trade, investment, and implementation of effective principles of proportional gains. 8. Protection against international threats of narcotics, terrorism and environmental problems 1. The guiding principle for implementation and expansion of the new international order triggered the idea of establishment of a new regional alliance system in different parts of the world. It was presumed that the new regional power centres, likely Israel, Germany, Britain, France, India, South Korea, and 1 Joseph S. Nye Jr., What New World Order?, Foreign Affairs Published by: Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp

3 Japan, would support the U.S. foreign policy agenda and play a significant role on the political, military and economic fronts of international scenario in future 2. President George Bush ( ) described the scenario as follows We can help ensure future peace and defend our interests through a range of military arrangements bilateral alliances, access agreements, and structures. While we must adjust our force structure to reflect post Cold War realities, we also must protect our interests and allies 3. To promote the U.S. international policy goals, the American policy makers presented a three- pronged strategy of Shape, Respond and Prepare. This three-pronged strategy aimed at shaping up the environment to prevent or deter threats through diplomacy, international assistance, arms control programs, nonproliferation initiatives, and overseas military presence. This strategy retained the option to respond across the full spectrum of potential crisis, and maintained the ability to meet the new challenges of tomorrow s uncertain future 4. Such an approach presented both challenges and opportunities. 3.2 STRATEGIC DEFENCE COOPERATION From the U.S. perspective, the South Asia region, remained relatively significant to pursue its new world order 5. The new priorities of the Americans in the region were: 2 Tahir Amin, The Changing World Order and Pakistan, Strategic Perspective, Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, Vol.1, No.1, Summer 1991.pp.50-51; 3 G.Bush, The US and Asia: Building democracy and Freedom, US Department of State Dispatch 12, No.46., Mitchell Derek J., Special Assistant for Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of Defence, U.S. Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region, a chapter for the Stanley Foundation Conference in Seattle, July 21-23, Selig S. Harrison, South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start Current History, March1992, pp

4 1. Halting the trend towards nuclear proliferation. 2. Preserving peace and stability in the region 3. Strengthening the trend towards democratisation 4. Promoting the respect for human rights. 5. Pursuit of U.S. interests in trade and investment; and 6. Promote bilateral assistance to enhance economic development. The U.S. policy in South Asia focused on the reinvention of the region as a nuclear free and democratic area. The region was also underscored for enlargement of the U.S. economic interests, in course of the development of a free market economy 6. New policy orientations reversed the options in the past and set new trends in diplomacy. The new adjustments in U.S. South Asia policy were in accordance with the new international strategic order that changed the course of U.S. alignment of the Cold War period in the South Asian region. India was regarded as a regional power centre. Recommending an Indocentric policy in South Asia, many American experts underlined that India as the largest democracy and the dominant power in the region could play an important role to check future challenges 7. Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of state, quoted India in his article entitled New World Order, as a dominant power in the South Asian region. He said that the Indian nation has retained a finely-tuned 6 Ashley J. Tellis, A New Friendship: U.S.-India Relations, Global Ten, Retreived from 7 Jasjit Singh (ed.) Indo-US Relations in a Changing World, New Delhi: Lanca Publications, 1992, pp.4-10; 32

5 sense of domination which causes it to insist on prominence over all territories controlled from New Delhi at the acme of British rule 8. Indian defence potentials, in particular, were viewed as very important. India s blue- water navy was rated as appropriate to meet the U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region. Indian military strength was also valued as a countervailing power against China. The Americans had viewed the rising tide of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asian republics as a more serious challenge to the new international order. Pakistan had been ranked as a main promoter of Islamic extremism in the region. India as a secular democracy was considered as effective to check Islamic extremism and terrorism 9. Under the different recommendations from U.S. study groups for evaluation of U. S. -India relations in the 21st century, India was assigned a central role in the new world order. The U.S. strategic concerns that prompted the U.S. government to form a strategic partnership with India were: 1. China s emergence with a huge military might in the Asia-Pacific which could eventually challenge the U.S. predominance in the region. 2. Russia s potential revival could alter the international security arrangements, inserting new role for Moscow in the European affairs, but more so in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East. 3. An emerging strategic partnership between Russia and China could complicate the strategic equation on the Western rim of the Pacific. 8 Mark Dice, The New World Order: Facts & Fiction, Mark Dice, Political Science pages 9 Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, India and America after the Cold War, Washington, D. C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993, pp

6 4. Challenges posed by the heady mix of Islamic terrorism, Afghanistan, Pakistan and some of the Central Asian Republics, and moreover, the Gulf poses grave challenges for the United States and India, on the whole. 5. Pakistan-sponsored potential Talibanization in Afghanistan could mess up with the South West Asia scene. 6. A politically and economically unstable nuclear Pakistan can be dangerous for world peace. Pakistan as a central Islamic state can most probably supply nuclear material to other Islamic countries. 7. In view of expanding Talibanization, Islamists can take control of Pakistani nukes 10. Looking at India s foreign policy in the post Cold War period, it seems obvious that New Delhi has kept its options open vis-à-vis relations with other countries and sharing of the global concerns. India moved swiftly to transform its relations with America in a partnership. The Indians had realised that strategic partnership with the unipolar world power would carry support in political, military, and economic terms and help build a suitable environment for the extension of Indian influence in the region. The downgrading of Pakistan s image as a promoter of Islamic terrorism and its incredibility in international politics had provided a great opportunity for the Indians to win the trust of the United States and filled the vacuum left by the uncertainties of the Pakistan-United States alliance. Times of India wrote: 10 Subhash Kapila, United States-India relations on glide path towards estrangement?, Chapter No. 1183, South Asia Analysis Group, Retreived from 34

7 The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Gulf war has created unprecedented opportunities for India to wean the US away from its traditional ally, Pakistan. The transformation of US-Pak relations are a major security gain for India. In fact, Pakistan is not likely to hand over a nuclear device to fellow Islamic countries, but the pan-islamic wave sweeping the region can hardly make the US comfortable on this score. US now sees militant Islam as one of the biggest threats (and) Pakistan simply cannot be a credible US ally against militant Islam. In sum, India has a golden opportunity to capitalize the US on the downgrading of Pakistan, (and) should not spoil this by knee-jerk anti-imperialist sentiment 11. From the Indian perspective, the factors which influenced India to build a strategic partnership with the United States were the following: 1. With its growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and military might, China poses a long range security threat to India. 2. Pakistan s nuclear capability and its exclusive missile armory have added a horrifying dimension to the South Asian security scenario. 3. The deepening China-Pakistan strategic nexus could create a security challenges which are entirely against the Indian interests. 4. Expanding Islamic militancy, sponsored and launched by Pakistan, has engendered the Indian security, externally and internally. India singly 11 Times of India, New Delhi, February 4,

8 cannot handle this threat of Islamic militancy, therefore it needs international collaboration. 5. Swiftly developing strategic relations between Russia and China are creating an equilibrium of power to checkmate the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. China s increasing activism is entirely against the Indian interests in the region 12. During the Gulf War, the new tendency in Indian policy appeared when the Indian government provided maximum logistic support to the U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. India provided refueling facilities to the U.S. aircrafts transiting from the Far East to the Gulf through India 13. It was a turning point in Indian policy towards the United States India strategic partnership. The U.S. government hailed the Indian stand during the Gulf war. This Indian gesture helped much to bring the two states closer. New Delhi also concluded an agreement with Washington to share valuable military intelligence INDIA-US DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP The Indo-U. S. Military collaboration began in Military cooperation grew so far that an India-U. S. Army Executive Steering Committee was set up. This was followed by the setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the two 12 Subhash Kapila, United States-India relations on glide path towards estrangement?, Chapter No. 1183, South Asia Analysis Group, Retreived from 13 Barbara Crossette, India in an Uproar Over Refueling of U.S. Aircraft, Article of The New York Times, U.S Monitoring world reaction, The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 22,1991; 36

9 countries. Subsequently, the two countries Navies carried out their first ever joint exercise in May The Clinton administration swiftly worked on the agenda for South Asia that centred on giving a real shape to the strategic engagement with India. Consequently, the new U.S. policy towards South Asia signified that the future ties of U.S. with India would no longer be a prisoner of U.S. relations with Pakistan. The following trends were discernible: 1. America discarded its policy of being evenhanded towards both India and Pakistan- a policy which equated the two countries. 2. A new policy was adopted in contrast to the past policy of pressurising India towards a solution of the Kashmir dispute. 3. A congruent approach appeared among the Americans over the Indian stand that Pakistan had been promoting cross-border terrorism in India generally and Kashmir in particular. The United States promised to join hands with India in the fight against terrorism. 4. Furthermore, the US stepped back from its policy of advising India on its matters with Pakistan, particularly Kashmir 16. The diplomatic maneuverings recurrently took place for the upward march towards the beginning of a new phase in India-U. S. Relations. The visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to the United States in May 1994 was historic in this regard. It marked the commencement of a new phase in U.S.-India relations. The Indian and American leaders discussed security related Tyoti Malhotra, Relations After Raphel, The Indian Express, July 8,

10 concession to make the strategic bargain workable and mutually advantageous for both sides. Both the sides agreed to expand official contacts, advance and improve on the 1984 understanding on high-technology transfer, boost defence cooperation, and commerce. In mid- January 1995, Defence Secretary William Perry visited India and he concluded a defence agreement with his Indian counterpart and established a Defence Policy Forum, to reevaluate the strategic interests of both the countries, promote links between officials of both sides and increase steadily the opportunities of training and joint exercises. This landmark agreement on military cooperation was a breakthrough in India- U.S. relations 17. The agreement provided for consultations between the Pentagon and India s Defence Ministry, as well as joint military exercises, military training, defence research, and weapons production. About the agreement, William Parry commented that the agreement would open a new era in our security relations 18. Immediately after the William Perry visit, Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown 19, went to New Delhi, where he agreed to establish a Commerce Forum to open new vistas for the promotion of economic relations between the two countries. U.S Secretary of Treasury Robert E Rubin 20 also visited India, and signed an agreement to increase investment in India. Now, heavy lobbying took place in Washington for the new, broader 17 David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 24-Apr History pages 18 David Cortright, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, Rowman & Littlefield, 01-Jan Political Science pages 19 Young Jeh Kim, The New Pacific Community in the 1990s, M.E. Sharpe, 01-Jan History pages 20 A.P. Thakur & Sunil Pandey, 21st Century India: View and Vision, Global Vision Publishing Ho, 01-Jan India pages 38

11 relationship between India and United States. On August 6, 1997, President Clinton, speaking at a White House press conference, referred to a stronger U.S. presence in South Asia and said that the U.S. presence should be heavily felt in South Asia because of the long relationship America had with India and because of the enormous potential of the region for good if things go well and for ill if things don t.... We can be an even better friend in the next 50 years, and a more constructive supporter of resolving these difficulties in the near term. The diplomatic move between India and United States received a further boost when Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral met President Clinton in New York on September 23, 1997 at the annual session of the UN General Assembly. Both the leaders agreed to press the strategic discussions to a decisive point by resuming the debate on nuclear proliferation and disarmament that had been stalled for about three years. The U.S. Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering arrived in New Delhi in October 1997 and initiated the broad-ranging strategic dialogue on the lines elucidated at the Gujral-Clinton meeting 21. Pickering s mission was successful in carrying forward the new beginning in India-United States relations. Strategic links between the two states swiftly expanded with the continuation of the various projects and supply of military equipments and technologies. In terms of economic plans, the India United States strategic partnership was also based on joint ventures. India offered large

12 opportunities for the American investors. The U.S. companies including General Motors Corp, Kellogg, Du Pont and Motorola Inc.,started projects in India 22. Over time, the nuclear issue appeared as central to all the strategic dialogues for upgrading the India-U. S. Partnership. The U.S. officials started to acknowledge the nuclear capabilities of India. They underlined the option of a grand bargain with India in the nuclear field. The American experts proposed a change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, emphasising a stable nuclear relationship with India that would help India in ending India s nuclear isolation and attaining the legitimacy as a nuclear weapon state. Selig S. Harrison, a renowned American expert on South Asian affairs, suggested a nuclear deal with India 23. He proposed that the United States should abandon its roll back policy and reconcile to India s acquisition of the nuclear weapons option. The United States, he argued, should lift ban on the sale of nuclear reactors to India and other restrictions on U.S. cooperation with India s civilian nuclear power programme. Sumit Ganguly, a leading American specialist on South Asian affairs, suggested that the United States should adopt a new approach towards India, conceding India the right to retain and pursue its nuclear option because of major security concerns 24. Consequently, the Clinton administration adopted a low key approach with regard to India on nuclear proliferation. The rollback approach was replaced by the policy of advanced technological cooperation with 22 Ashok Kapur, India and the United States in a changing world, Sage, Political Science pages 23 Nalini Kant Jha, Nuclear Synergy: Indo-US Strategic Cooperation and Beyond, Pentagon Press, India pages 24 Sumit Ganguly, Times for Candour in India-US nuclear dialogue, The Times of India, April 20,

13 India. This new policy focused on locating the nuclear issue in the broader context of the search for a comprehensive strategic deal with India. Sumit Ganguly commented that the nuclear stability with India had been the essential part of US-India strategic partnership, aspiring India as a legitimate nuclear power to create an equilibrium vis a-vis China s nuclear dominance. The Indian nuclear tests further consolidated the grounds for developing a nuclear understating between India and the United States. 3.4 BILATERAL LEVEL DEFENCE The United States-India strategic dialogue, which expanded over fourteen rounds in , was the longest series of negotiations at the bilateral level between the two countries. The talks focused on issues related to security, disarmament, and nonproliferation. They led to create more understanding on security concerns amongst the authorities of both sides 25. President Clinton s visit to India in March 2000 was crucial in starting a new era in India-U. S. Relations India-U. S. Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century signed by President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee was a unique, groundbreaking agreement that defined the agenda of the partnership between the two states in the 21st century. The statement expressed the shared belief that the relationship between the two countries could be a vital factor in shaping 25 Rajesh Kumar, US and South Asia in the New Millennium, Pakistan Horizon, Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, January p

14 international peace, prosperity and democratic freedom and for ensuring strategic stability in Asia and beyond. It reaffirmed: In the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in a complimentary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together and with others for strategic stability in Asia and beyond. We will bolster joint efforts to Counter Terrorismand meet other challenges to regional peace. We will strengthen the international security system, including in the United Nations and support the United Nations in its peacekeeping efforts, we acknowledge that tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia 26. The leaders of both sides agreed over various initiatives to speed up and integrate the process of forwarding the U.S. India relationship in depth. These steps included 27 : 1. Regular bilateral summits. 2. Constant meetings between the senior officials of both sides to discuss the mutual concerns in a broad range related to security, economy and non-proliferation Ram Narayanan, The Clinton Visit and After: A View from the U.S., Presentation made to SAPRA (Security and Political Risk Analysis) at the India International Center, New Delhi, April 29, 2000; 42

15 3. Regular meetings of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism to intensify cooperation and sharing information. 4. Bilateral economic discourse through a high rank coordinating panel, led by the U.S. Secretary of Treasury and Indian Finance Minister. 5. Commercial dialogue between the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and India's Minister of Commerce & Industry. 6. U. S. -India Working Group on Trade to boost understanding and cooperation on trade policy. 7. Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy and Environment would focus on collaborative projects, clean energy technologies, private and public sector investment and cooperation, climate change and other environmental issues. This constant dialogue process was given the name as Dialogue Architecture, and as a part of this Dialogue Architecture, Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a visit to the United States in September This visit helped to reaffirm the broader vision of relations. Clinton and Vajpayee stressed for the continuation of dialogue on security, non-proliferation and disarmament as well as on trade, and energy to open more doors for cooperation in these areas 28. Perhaps from New Delhi s perspective, for the first time India s security concerns,

16 economic strength, and capabilities in information technology were recognised at the highest level in Washington NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP POST COLD WAR A broader strategic alliance with India could not take a compact shape unless India s nuclear option was not protected. As part of the U.S. grand strategy to contain a rising China, the Americans had depicted India s nuclear capability as a counterbalance to China s nuclearisation. According to Joseph Cirincione 30, America s best known weapons expert and former Director for Nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, dealing with China in the future, India would be more valuable as a nuclear power, rather than as a non nuclear country 31." Eventually, the Americans maintained a high-handed approach towards the nuclearisation in South Asia. Thus, the Americans wilfully kept mum on the Indian nuclear programme. They decided to broaden India s access to nuclear technology. While, Pakistan s nuclear programme comparatively was dealt with in a rigid way and pressure was put on Pakistan to stop its efforts for nuclearisation. The U.S. coercive diplomacy against Pakistan s nuclear programme revolved around military and economic sanctions and restrictions in presidential clearance certificate, aiming at halting the process of developing the nuclear capability. The nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan radically Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, 13-Aug History pages 31 Howard LaFranchi, Why US is shifting nuclear stand with India, Article of The Christian Science Monitor,

17 shifted the South Asian security environment. After the nuclear tests, the US government immediately imposed sanctions under the auspices of the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of However, as the U.S. strategy for re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region had focused on improving bilateral relations with India, the Americans embarked on the policy of cultivating India as a strategic and nuclear partner. The Americans argued that a nuclear India could be a better option to be an equilibrium vis a-vis China s nuclear dominance 32. The strategic dialogue conducted by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister of India Jaswant Singh held in led to elaborate discussions on the security perceptions of both states. Both sides were determined to develop broad-based bilateral security relations in the 21st century 33. The Clinton administration started to treat India as a nuclear democracy. While on the other hand, Pakistan was considered as a dangerous proliferating state 34. According to Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow at The Saban Centre for Middle East Policy, Washington, Pakistan s acquisition of nuclear bomb had enhanced the confidence of terrorists linked with Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups who had been engaged in terrorist activities in India 35.The Kargil conflict provided ground to the Americans. The Kargil Heights overlooking the 32 B. Muralidhar Reddy, Islamabad will not accept discriminatory treatment, Article of The Hindu, 20 March, Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bombs, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004, pp ; 34 Amit Gupta, The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complimentary Interests?, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2005, p.4, 35 Bruce Riedel, Pakistan and the Bomb, Article of The Wall Street Journal, 30 may,

18 nation's highway that connected Leh to Srinagar in Kargil and Drass sectors along the Line of Control (LOC) were captured by Pakistan-backed militants, in 1999, created a dire situation for Pakistan. Bruce Riedel commented that if conflict dragged on, there was the probability of use of nuclear weapons from the Pakistani side. The Kargil crisis was staved off by the U.S. Pakistan came under fire for initiating this conflict through a secret military operation in the area with the help of Islamic militants, belonging to the Taliban militia and other Islamic militant groups fighting in Kashmir 36. The Americans were of the view that a Kargil like situation could any time intensify the religious extremism that finally lead to the Talibanisation of Pakistan. The Kargil episode exposed the scope and scale of Pakistan s engagement with militant groups. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, gave a new twist to Washington s Pakistan policy. Thereafter Pakistan willfully and unconditionally came on the U.S. side to join the military campaign against terrorism, as a front line state, The U.S. Government removed economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan since the 1998 nuclear tests and took further initiatives to support the Pakistan s derailing economy by rescheduling $ 3 billion in Pakistan s debt, launching a five-year $100 million aid programme and providing $73 million in equipment and aid to secure Pakistan s border with Afghanistan. However, despite all collaborations with Pakistan in the war against terror, the Americans perceived Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism. 36 Ahmad Ejaz, United States Policy on Terrorism, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, National security pages 46

19 Washington supported New Delhi s policy of portraying the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir as purely a matter of cross-border terrorism from the Pakistan side. Washington constantly exerted pressure on Islamabad to reduce its policy of supporting and backing infiltration into the Indian side of Kashmir 37. The terrorist attacks on the Srinagar Assembly on October 1, 2001, and on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 brought further the Indians and Americans on the same page that these attacks were masterminded and operated by the Pakistan-based militant groups fighting in Kashmir. Despite being partners in the war against terror, Pakistan and United States were deeply divided on issues of terrorism and nuclearization 38. The Bush administration 39 ( ) further accelerated the transformation process of India-United States strategic relationship and enlarged the prospect of nuclear engagement with India. Its Indo-centric agenda aimed at: 1. Putting off the pressure on India to roll back the nuclear program or sign CTBT. 2. Wavering the sanctions and resuming the economic interaction with India. 3. Easing the labour and environmental restrictions in trade pacts and opening more channels for trade from traditional goods of agriculture to the virtual links of ecommerce and a further cut in the tariffs. 37 Sridhar Krishnaswami, Musharraf has promised to dismantle terrorist camps, Article from The Hindu, 12-july, Zia Mian, Sharon K. Weiner, America's Pakistan, Article from Middle East Research and Information Project, March, Richard L. Kugler, New Directions in U. S. National Security; Strategy, Defence Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents, NDU Press, 11-Aug

20 4. Improving the cooperation against all forms of cross-border terrorism 40. The visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the United States in July 2005 coincided with the completion of the NSSP. Both leaders declared their resolve to transform this strategic relationship to a global partnership. In the Joint Statement, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush underlined the new significance of India-U. S. Partnership and vowed to work together to promote the shared security vision in the world. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Initiative programme initiated in January 2004 was a major development in the U.S. strategic orientation towards India that led to a full civil nuclear cooperation. Both the leaders expressed satisfaction for the successful completion of the NSSP that provided base for expanding bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclear energy and dual-use technology 41. President Bush declared India as responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, and said that India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. He announced the U.S. commitment to go forward to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realises its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President assured to seek an agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies, and that the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. The Indian Prime Minister on his part declared: 40 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Indo US relations in the Bush White House, Strategic Analysis Volume 25, Issue 4, Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, From Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, July

21 India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency 42 (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for the first time announced their intentions to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington. The decision of the

22 two countries to move to obtain full civil nuclear energy cooperation was a huge step to broadening the scope of strategic partnership. The agenda for nuclear cooperation set in the joint statement of July 18, 2005 was further carried out during the first visit of President Bush to India in March, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached a mutual understanding with regard to the implementation of a process that was outlined in the July 18, 2005 joint statement 43. The important development took place during the President Bush s visit to India was the preparation and acceptance of a separation plan that separated the civilian nuclear programme from the military programme. Under the Separation Plan, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs over the next eight years in order to gain US expertise and nuclear fuel to meet its rapidly rising energy needs. India's civilian facilities would be open for the first time to permanent international inspections. The joint statement of March 2, 2006 by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh also hailed the successful preparation and acceptance of Separation Plan and determined to move on for the full implementation of the commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. The Joint Statement also stated: This historic accomplishment will permit both countries to move forward towards the common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States and between India and the international community as a whole. 43 Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, From Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, July

23 President Bush described the understanding on civilian nuclear cooperation as a "necessary" agreement. The Obama administration fully endorsed the U. S. -India nuclear deal 44. President Barak Obama himself recognized India as an important strategic partner and described India-U. S. Civil nuclear agreement as a landmark achievement. The Obama administration has determined to go beyond the civil nuclear deal to make the U. S. -India strategic partnership more productive and durable. The Indo-Centric policy of the Obama administration had focused on: 1. Upgrading the status of India as a global power. 2. Expediting the implementation of the U. S. -India nuclear agreement. 3. Expanding the military to military contacts, which includes defence trade and more joint operations, training and building compatibility between the two militaries. 4. Enhancing counterterrorism cooperation. 5. Sharing a common commitment to stability in Afghanistan that is important for combating terrorism and enhancing regional stability and prosperity. 6. Sustaining economic relations. Opening up markets. Expanding bilateral economic engagement, including two-way trade and investment. Working more cooperatively in the World Trade Organization and intensifying collaboration on multilateral trade issues; and 7. Expanding partnership in education, agriculture and public health nd April, Zee news 51

24 3.6 POST COLD WAR DEFENCE MEASURES The 9/11 attacks passed the first test for deepening U.S.-India Counter terrorism cooperation. The attacks brought into stark relief the common security interests and vulnerabilities that Washington and New Delhi shared. On the other hand, Pakistan reemerged as a key geopolitical facilitator of militarised U.S. policies in Afghanistan. Islamabad had more immediate benefits to offer the United States and it, too, pivoted (under pressure) toward cooperating with Washington, albeit with arguably less pure motives. The key question in New Delhi was which geostrategic facilitator the Americans would choose. Early signals emanating from both Washington and New Delhi, suggested that India was well positioned for the role; India s was the first government to offer unconditional support to the United States in dealing with the Afghan Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. New Delhi offered intelligence on terrorist networks, overflight rights, refueling and renovates of the U.S. military airplane, seaport conveniences in Mumbai and Kochi for U.S. naval vessels, and hunts and save missions. President Bush and then-prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee immediately began regular telephone consultations. Yet within days it became clear that a renewed U.S. embrace of Pakistan and its military regime with a record of supporting Islamist militant groups was unfolding. New Delhi was frustrated by this development, but there was no lack of understanding Washington s motives. As India s discomfort diffused, the two governments pushed ahead with building their own bilateral Counter Terrorism ties. Some early milestones included the October 2001 signing of a U. S. -India Mutual Legal 52

25 Assistance Treaty, which provides certain legal privileges related to terrorismrelated investigations. Months later, a new U. S. -India Cyber Security Forum was established to safeguard critical infrastructures from cyber attack. It may be recalled that in middle 2004, a high-level U.S. Army delegation visited India s 15 Corps Battle School (CBS) in Jammu And Kashmir State with an attention in adopting new training techniques on anti-militancy and unconventional operations for U.S. troops being deployed in Iraq 45. Counter Terrorism cooperation also expanded to include mutual maritime security efforts for ports and container vessels, as well as the prevention of WMD terrorism. The U. S.-India defence relationship specifically mentioned terrorism as a shared threat. Bilateral initiatives since then have included exchanges of enforcement best practices, reciprocal visits of senior-level officers, joint grooming exercises, and joint approaches. The FBI s Quantico laboratory has hosted various visits by senior Indian forensics specialists, and therefore the agency often shares best-practices with senior Indian enforcement officers. The State Department s Anti-Terrorism (ATA) Country help with India emphasised essential incident response; post-incident investigation; human rights; border security; international threat finance; surrender and prosecution; and therefore the protection of essential infrastructure, together with port, rail, and flying field security as strategic objectives. Through the ATA program, the State has 45 K. Alan Kronstadt, Sonia Pinto, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service,

26 conducted various coaching courses for over two thousand Indian enforcement officers.. The U.S and India are incrementally striving to overcome institutional obstacles for access to legal detainees. Hence in 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice after many delays granted Indian investigators access to David Headley 46, the U.S national of Pakistani descent who had confessed to taking part in designing and facilitating the 2008 Mumbai assault. Then U. S. Ambassador to India Tim Roemer termed the development as historic within the nature of security cooperation and expressed optimism concerning multiple U. S. -India partnerships in future. During his visit to India in 2010, President Obama inaugurated the new independent agency Dialogue between the U.S. Department for independent agency and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. This initiative replaced the Joint social unit on strategy begun a decade earlier. The Independent agency Secretary Janet Napolitano later travelled to India in mid-2011 and met with Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram. Agency-to-agency contacts are being fostered on a good array of relevant problems, as well as to counter narcotics trade, counterfeit currency, illicit finance and international crime. Later, the U.S also signaled its commitment to supporting India s counterterrorism efforts by, formally designating the Indian mujahedeen the India-based militant cluster with links to Pakistan, as a foreign terrorist group. 46 Ginger Thompson, David Headley's transformation as a terrorist, Article from Deccan Herald, 24th Aug,

27 As of mid-2012, the State Department reported air, sea port, and law enforcement exchange visits to multiple cities in the United States and India The goal is to share best practices, preparation, strategy and techniques to address terrorist threats. Through the State Department s Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs, courses ranging from bomb blast studies, critical event management, and strategic commanders training to cyber investigations and forensics have been conducted. Fresh meetings on cyber security collaboration have discussed the global norms in cyberspace, as well as internet supremacy. 3.7 BILATERAL DEFENCE TRADE U.S. arms sales to India has taken a far higher profile.. New Delhi is endeavouring a serious military modernisation program in the range of $100 billion over the next ten years to update its largely Soviet-era arsenal 47. U.S. weapons manufacturers are desperate to gain a slice of this moneymaking pie, and U.S. firms conjointly see in India a doubtless large new marketplace. Enlarged defence trade could also be a way of revitalising and sustaining what some have perceived as stagnant U.S.-India relations. Still, several Indians are cautious of getting too close to the U.S. as it could constrain New Delhi s strategic autonomy in times of conflict. However, the worth of recent defence sales with India has continued to grow at around $8 billion in deals since 2001 with the U.S. willing to sell India a number of its most recent military hardware. 47 Michael Kugelman, India s Contemporary Security Challenges, Woodrows International Center for Scholars,

28 However, Indian defence purchases from the U.S represent solely a tiny, low proportion of the country s overall purchases over the past decade.. The 2005 New Framework for Defence Cooperation 48 was meant to step up defence trade between the U.S. and India. Nonetheless, defence trade between the two countries remains complicated by myriad legal, political, strategic, historical, and functional obstacles. Arms sales by U.S. companies to foreign countries are heavily regulated by Washington s strategic and national security calculations. Among these broader constraints, Washington seeks to enhance bilateral military-to-military relations by enhancing interchangeability through shared defence platforms, increasing operational capabilities, military-to-military contacts and knowledge exchanges on instrumentation usage and ways. The U.S is additionally resolutely protective about its most advanced defence technology from being non inheritable by competitors, particularly rivals like Russia and China. Defence, trade calculations of the U.S are also deeply embedded within the country s strategic outlook. Indian defence imports are influenced by additional immediate considerations: protecting the country s policy autonomy, enhancing its power projection capabilities, the cost factor and procurement procedures. Policy autonomy, a high priority among New Delhi s defence import concerns, involves procuring reliable defence platforms that don't seem to be subject to rigorous 48 Reetika Sharma, Ramvir Goria, Vivek Mishra, Sharma Reetika, India and the Dynamics of World Politics: A book on Indian Foreign Policy, Related events and International Organizations, Pearson Education India,

29 user needs that may limit the country s operational selections.of late, India has stepped up efforts to extend its domestic defence production capabilities. The focus is on co-production with foreign defence corporations 49. As New Delhi safeguards its autonomy, it's at the same time making an attempt to create an arsenal that affords it a reliable land, air and ocean based mostly defensive posture. India s budget tends to place pressing domestic development connected allocations over defence. Therefore, the cost factor, formalised through the L1 or lowest bidder system is a crucial factor in the country s foreign defence procurement. A weak, upset, and often corrupt procedural method further tends to complicate India s defence trade choices. 3.8 SUMMARY Indo-US relations have seen a qualitative change since the end of the Cold War because of greater strategic convergence between the two countries. Bilateral cooperation has expanded to areas as wide ranging as defence, education, health and agriculture. The US approach to supply of arms is rather different from that of some other powers. The US sees the arms relationship as an integral part of its diplomatic effort; it has to fit into a certain diplomatic political paradigm. In the US, it represents a certain level of political relationship and congruence in thinking and policies. This can be in the nature of an alliance relationship or a defence treaty or a country seen as being under its sphere of influence. Also, the US has very stringent end-user monitoring requirements that 49 Karthikeyan Sundaram, India to Reduce Defence Budget, Boost Local Weapons Production, Article from Bloomberg 7 th Feb,

30 can operate without problem in a situation of defence dependence and alliance partnership, but in a different situation they can be seen as unduly intrusive and infringing the sovereignty of its partners. There is no problem with end-user agreements as they constitute a standard practice. But if there is insistence on end user monitoring, that creates a political reaction, because whatever the intention on the US side, the underlying basis of this requirement is that of mistrust. An unequal relationship is created because then the receiving side has to produce periodically equipment bought to make sure that it is not being used for purposes for which it was not intended. The US, even more than others, is extremely protective of technology. It has elaborate technology denial regimes and highly restrictive and complicated export control regulations. There is a lot of fear in US society and the Congress about unauthorised transfers of technology. The US even wants the recipients of its technology to achieve the same or similar levels of technology protection or export control regimes. This results in various hurdles, because all countries do not have the requisite skills and systems to be able to replicate the highly elaborate and complex export controls of the US. The US Congress, in turn, is very watchful about any infractions and there is always a fear of being penalised. The US has a history of imposing sanctions and embargoes, as that is part of its policy as well as laws. 58

31 After the Indo-US nuclear deal, the level of distrust has, of course, started diminishing very rapidly. Despite the fact that the deal was born with a great deal of political pain in India and there were several non-proliferation conditions attached, it did represent a very important change in US strategic thinking about India. The US now supports a larger Indian role in international affairs and has backed in principle India s permanent membership of the Security Council. An integral part of this new strategic relationship has to do with the defence relationship with India. The U. S. India strategic partnership will hinge on defence industry collaboration fulfilling India s long-term goal of improving its capacity to design, manufacture, and develop arms. This will also depend on the economic viability of transfer of technology and its applicability to India s defence industry requirements. The package offered by the United States ought to be attractive enough to give the Indian government leverage to overcome domestic political and institutional opposition to the U. S. -India relationship. The increased U.S. investment in the Indian defence sector, dual use technology transfer, and a partnership based on mutual interest ought to be the hallmarks of U. S. -India defence industry collaboration. The U. S -India strategic partnership has become especially significant in the context of the United States rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific region. From the wider geostrategic perspective of the American troops exit from Afghanistan in 2014, the U.S. stance on Pakistan in the context of its inability to address India s concerns of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism will be 59