The PDS and Participation in Land Governments Dan Hough, Sussex, and Jonathan Olsen, Wisconsin

Transcription

1 Dan Hough, Sussex, and Jonathan Olsen, Wisconsin ISSN

2 117 The PDS and Participation in Eastern German Land Governments Dan Hough, Sussex, and Jonathan Olsen, Wisconsin Following unification, it was assumed that the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) would die a rapid death in unified Germany. Although the PDS is not currently represented in the federal legislature (Bundestag), it still enjoys Fraktionsstatus in each of the six eastern Bundesländer and is likely to continue to do so into the medium-term. It is also a party that has been brought into the coalition equation, forming governmental alliances with the SPD in Mecklenburg West-Pomerania (since 1998) and Berlin (since 2001). This article aims to throw some light on the PDS s behaviour in these governing coalitions: has the PDS been able to live up to its radical left-wing agenda? Has it been able to rectify any of the mistakes it so frequently accused the other major parties of making through the 1990s? We outline what the PDS has traditionally claimed it would do should it be offered the reins of power before assessing to what extent the party has been able to do this in the two states where it has governed. We conclude by offering some conclusions on what Regierungsbeteiligung might mean for the future of the PDS. 1. Introduction The stabilisation of the PDS in the German party system has been one of the most surprising outcomes of the unification process. Whereas the PDS was once perceived as unlikely to have any future at all in unified Germany, developments over the last fifteen years have seen the party stabilise itself in each of the six eastern German Landtage. The spectrum of political and academic opinion expressed on the PDS remains, however, broad and diverse. At the one extreme, notably in conservative circles, the PDS is viewed as an extremist, undemocratic and disruptive force that should be regarded as a pariah, and a threat to the democratic stability of the German state (Moreau and Neu 1994; Moreau 1998; Sturm 2000; Lang 2003). At the other, the PDS is regarded as a broad church of socialist opinion, aiming to alter fundamentally the economic inequalities in German society by reversing the trend towards neo-liberalism and social inequality (Unger 1995; Minnerup 1998). Any number of positions in between are, of course, also fervently espoused (Neugebauer and Stöss 1996; Hough 2001). The PDS s electoral successes have undoubtedly been facilitated by its anti-capitalist, overtly eastern German, political platform. The PDS has attempted to develop socialist alternatives to what it describes as the neo-liberal hegemonic discourse, basing its agenda

3 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 118 on a commitment to social justice (including a strong commitment to redistributive tax policies), a commitment to the international peace movement (including such things as the dissolution of NATO and forbidding German soldiers to be active overseas), and a strong defence of eastern German interests (Hough 2000). Regardless of its electoral successes, the PDS has thus far at least been able to consistently maintain the radical streak in its national programmatic appeals. Despite the uniqueness of the PDS s heritage, its radical policy agenda and the strong emotions that the party inevitably arouses, it is clear that the PDS is therefore no longer an irrelevant extra within the German party system (Jesse 1997; Scherer 1998; Hoffman and Neu 1998). It has undertaken a process of reform, even if this has not been as thorough and convincing as many would have liked, and it is slowly becoming an acceptable party of (regional) government. The PDS tentatively grasped at the reins of power as early as 1994 when it tolerated an SPD-Green coalition in Saxony Anhalt (Lees 1995). By 1998, the SPD in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania felt secure enough to enter into fully fledged coalition with the PDS, continuing this arrangement after the 2002 Landtagswahl (Gerner 2000; Probst 2000; Berg 2001). The SPD in the city state of Berlin brought the PDS into the coalition equation in 2001, and we may see yet more SPD-PDS alliances in the other eastern states of Thüringen, Brandenburg and even the CDU stronghold of Saxony in the years to come (Rueschemeyer 1999; Hough and Grix 2001). The PDS has therefore gone from being an outsider party, with an unpalatable history and values, ideals and policies that were seen as being beyond the democratic pale, to an insider party playing by much the same rules as everyone else. This is interesting both in terms of German politics (i.e. how has a party become so Salonfähig so quickly? Will there be any discernible differences in either behaviour or rhetoric now that the party is regularly in government?) and European politics more generally (how and when can radical parties in general enter the political mainstream and how do they behave once they become coalitionable actors?). The PDS therefore clearly provides a particularly good case study when studying the effects of government participation on (radical) parties and politicians. This paper aims to assess how the policies and rhetoric of the PDS have developed over time in the states of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Berlin. More specifically, we aim to

4 119 throw light on how parties that clearly challenge the mainstream political consensus behave once elected to government. Has there been any evidence to suggest a de-radicalisation? Given that some watering down of radical programmatic positions would appear inevitable once radical parties take office, to what extent has the PDS remained true to the political agenda that helped get it elected in the first place? How does the participation of a radical party in a sub-national government affect the behaviour of politicians of the same party in other sub-national units? Is there a divergence in rhetoric and behaviour between parties across sub-national units or is the non-governing branch of the populist party able to maintain its populist line? Put another way, are the difficult compromises made in government transferred into other political/electoral arenas? Do the results of these hard choices appear to manifest themselves in party programmes across time and space? 2. The Pre-Power PDS: Aims and Objectives The PDS has never been scared of making expansive policy claims. Traditionally, these have centred on three key areas: social justice, pacifism and the defence of self-defined eastern German interests. This has been particularly evident since 1998 by which time the PDS bolstered by continued electoral successes had stabilised itself across eastern Germany. In the early 1990s, however, the PDS cut a somewhat forlorn figure, grasping as it was for a place in the new, alien all-german party system. Internal reforms such as the denunciation of democratic centralism and the introduction of transparent internal procedures could not prevent the party losing over two million members between mid-1989 and December 1991, with only SED ideological diehards remaining loyal to the party. A change of name could not disguise the fact that the PDS remained tied to much of the ideological rhetoric that the SED had espoused in the GDR and it had little idea what it wanted bar survival to achieve in a unified Germany. The party appeared unable to embrace wholeheartedly the democratic structures of the Federal Republic, and it experienced enormous difficulties in attempting to clarify its position towards the GDR. The 1993 programme which remained valid until October 2003 discussed in great detail why the real-existing socialism of the GDR had been a defendable attempt at creating a

5 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 120 new society, why this aim was still a legitimate one and how a state built on socialist principles would solve the many ills of the (capitalist) world. 1 Relatively little time was spent discussing what actually went wrong in the GDR, why this happened and what lessons socialist parties could and should take from this. Similarly, the PDS spent barely 5 pages explaining what it would do should it ever regain the reins of power: primarily as (1) the PDS was simply fighting to justify its existence and thoughts of government participation were nothing more than pipe dreams and (2) the PDS had neither the time nor the expertise to develop convincing policy preferences. The 1993 programme therefore contained vague claims that broadly fit in with socialist doctrine: Germany needs to undergo a radical democratisation of political and economic life, the rightward drift of German society needs to be halted, culture, education and science needs to be set free and the relationships between employers and employees need to be altered in favour of employees ( The only clear aim was the abolition of capitalism and the creation of some sort of vague socialist republic. Quite what this socialist republic would look like, the PDS was not sure, and the 1993 programme threw relatively little light on this. Hardline communists were in opposition to reforming socialists, while orthodox Marxists were in opposition with pragmatic realists and through the early 1990s the PDS s election manifestos and its 1993 programme remained necessarily broad documents in order to appeal to as wide a range of prospective anticapitalist voters as was possible. The PDS, as is widely known, was consequently written off as an anachronism that, over the course of time, would disappear from the party political map (Pulzer 1993: 325; Gerner 1994: 242). It had no coherent political agenda and appeared unable to influence the wider political environment around it. Yet, as is also well known, by 1992/1993, and increasingly thereafter, the fallout from unification began to disillusion many eastern Germans, and new and unexpected electoral potential was developing for the PDS. The PDS sensed that things might not be as bleak as was first believed, and sought to develop a new role for itself as the articulator of dissatisfied sections of the eastern German electorate. Those who 1 The old programme is still visible at while the new programme can be found at:

6 121 perceived themselves as being subjectively worse off, or were uneasy at the social and economic fallout from unification, consequently expressed themselves politically in increasing numbers with a vote for the PDS. The enduring material and psychological differences between eastern and western Germany ensured that the PDS was able to develop and expand electorally on its steady bedrock of former (SED) functionary support prompting the party to develop a set of wide-ranging and radical aims with which it hoped to cement itself as not just an eastern German regional party but also as an actor to the left of the SPD Eastern German Interests While the PDS naturally has a whole range of policy objectives, it would be impossible to review their success in implementing them (or not, as the case may be) in this short paper. For that reason we will concentrate on the core of the PDS s policy package namely the PDS s attempt to defend eastern German interests as defined by the PDS and its attempt to profile itself as Germany s party of social justice. Of course, these areas can incorporate a wide and varied set of policy preferences (as we illustrate below) but given the competencies that Land governments in Germany enjoy, it is in these broad areas where the PDS will if anywhere be able to have some impact on public policy (Jeffery 2003). One consistent trait has been the PDS s willingness to profile itself as the representative of eastern Germans in the political process. It has traditionally done this in two ways: first, it has tabled motions (that are nearly always rejected) and adopted policy approaches that seek recognition of lived existences in the GDR and, second, the PDS sought (and still seeks) a better deal in economic and political terms for the six eastern Länder in contemporary Germany. In practical terms, the first strategy has seen the PDS table initiatives aimed at securing, for example, more protection for officials who worked in the public sector in the GDR, the equal recognition of teachers from both East and West Germany, a right of state protection for companies that were to be revitalised and sold-off by the Treuhand holding agency, and an amnesty for spies (von Ditfurth, 1998: 238; Hough, 2001: ). The PDS has been active in defending specific groups within eastern German society against alleged discrimination at the hands of western Germans and the western German system. This has been done in direct, specialised attempts to revoke

7 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 122 or review laws, as well as within the broader strategy of representing eastern Germans per se. Lothar Bisky, the current party leader, chose to express this defence of eastern German interests thus: We are continuing to fight for fair recognition of eastern German biographies. The discrimination and defamation of eastern Germans has to be stopped, as does the totally unnecessary humiliation of hundreds of people in the eastern states. We demand that everybody be treated equally. We demand an end to the political isolation (Ausgrenzung) of Easterners (Bisky 1998: 11). The PDS has claimed that all of the western parties have disillusioned many Easterners including parts of their own electorates by dictating how the GDR should be perceived in popular discourse. The PDS has chosen to represent the defensive mentality of a broad swath of Easterners towards their lives in the GDR. The PDS represents a popular will to grant parts of everyday life in the GDR a form of legitimisation that Westerners are never likely to accept. The PDS subsequently voices complex feelings of collective memory towards the now defunct GDR something that only it, as a product of the eastern German political environment, is in a position to do Foreign Policy A further legacy of the PDS s eastern heritage is evident in its foreign policy stances. The PDS is clear and unambiguous in its call to demilitarise international relations and to insert a civilian dimension to global conflict prevention. The PDS argues that the weapons industry should be transformed into an industrial sector geared to improving civilian production capacity, while NATO should be abolished altogether and Russia incorporated into a new European security framework (PDS 1999a: 43). The PDS expressed particular dismay at NATO s willingness to unilaterally launch attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999, and the PDS was active in stressing that if NATO was going to continue to have any role, it must be under the auspices of the UN, acting clearly within the confines of international law (PDS 1999a: 42). The PDS also claims that the OSCE needs to be broadened into an organisation that fosters a non-military security structure across Europe, while the United Nations needs to be given much increased powers to enable it to effectively keep the global powers (principally the USA) in check (PDS 1999a: 43). The UN and the OSCE must, together, be at the root of

8 123 new European security structures (particularly in light of the proposed abolition of both NATO and the WEU), while expensive projects such as the Eurofighter and new attack helicopters should be rejected (Neues Deutschland, 2000b: 14). The role of the Bundeswehr should also be severely restricted: principally to one defending German and NATO territory, rather than as a part of an internationale Einsatztruppe (international rapidreaction force) (Neues Deutschland, 2000b: 14). The PDS envisages both the abolition of national service and a 65 per cent reduction in the number of Bundeswehr troops to around 100,000 (Neues Deutschland, 2000a: 1) Social Justice The PDS has linked its ideas on defending eastern German interests with ideas of creating a more socially just state. This became more pronounced after the 1998 federal election when Gerhard Schröder s SPD/Green government attempted to restructure and balance the federal books. This led the PDS to increasingly profile itself as the only German party that proposed to protect the socially disadvantaged from the excesses of both global capitalism and the creeping neo-liberalism (in the PDS s view) of the federal government. Eastern Germans also came to perceive and consciously appreciate this. The extent of this was shown by an Allensbach survey that was carried out in the eastern states in April 2000 which revealed that 56 per cent of Easterners perceived the PDS as the party of social justice, while only 23 per cent thought that the SPD was the party that would most effectively strive for this (albeit fuzzy) ideal (Straud, 2000). Despite the persistent refusal of the PDS to define what it understood by the term social justice 2, the issue of soziale Gerechtigkeit was given a high priority in all PDS literature 2 It is assumed that such calls for more social justice centre round a better working and social environment for the socially disadvantaged. An underlying presupposition that universal standards of social justice both exist, and are attainable, is evident within the PDS s political rhetoric. But it remains clear that such standards are by no means universally accepted and the means and methods that different actors propagate in an attempt to achieve social justice are therefore wide, diverse and often plain contradictory. The PDS remains skilled at articulating the worries of Easterners about their social and working environments, just as it is vociferous in its egalitarian, anti-capitalist rhetoric. Yet it (the PDS) is not willing to define its broad understanding of social justice over and above basic calls for equality and more fairness. But this is as it is not (yet) in a position where it is forced to as only when it is required to implement the policies that it espouses will it be forced to consider the constraints and contradictions of governmental responsibility and idealist policy positions. For an analysis on the theoretical underpinnings of social justice, see Harvey 1993.

9 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 124 published in the late 1990s. The 1999 local election Wahlprogramm in Leipzig urged citizens on its front cover to Zukunft sozial gestalten (shape the future socially) while the PDS in Bad Doberan (Mecklenburg-West Pomerania) called its local election programme For Social Justice and Human Rights (PDS Stadtvorstand Leipzig, 1999; PDS Kreisverband Bad Doberan 1999). These are representative of the numerous election programmes that the PDS produced in the eastern states in The PDS is adamant that... (in view of)... the dominant political discourse, we have developed suggestions, proposals and campaigns with the aim of increasing the amount of social justice in Germany today and that it is the only party that can be trusted to look after the interests of pensioners, the ill and infirm, the unemployed, those on social security benefits, those on lower incomes, those not in a position to defend themselves and those who feel anxious about the capitalist world around them (PDS Sachsen, 1999). The PDS executive explicitly called for discussions to take place on the issue of social justice between the DGB, individual trade unions, the farmers associations, the Christian churches and even the Central Consistory of Jews (Zentralrat der Juden) all under the leadership of PDS politicians (PDS 1999b). Regional and local politicians are encouraged to work with other societal actors, explicitly trade unions and works councils to introduce new models of employment and to exert responsibility in providing the fundamentals of a socially secure existence for citizens (PDS 1997: 8). This centres on issues such as guaranteeing lower rents and housing, labour market policies that aim to maximise employment through the creation of more jobs in the areas of care work and social assistance and active support for single parents, the unemployed and the working classes. Indeed, it appears that PDS voters supported the party because they believed this rhetoric: in the October 1999 state elections in Berlin 77 per cent of Easterners who voted for the PDS did so in the hope that the PDS would be able create a more socially just society (Infratest Dimap 1999: 12). The PDS s policies for achieving these aims were naturally developed in much greater detail in the late 1990s than they were in the early part of the decade. Over time the party created working groups looking at specific issues and problems and as and when they reported back the PDS was able to build up a broader spectrum of hard and fast policy proposals. Post-1998 the PDS perceived its role as putting the centre-left coalition under pressure to remember its social conscience (it termed this Druck von Links (pressure from

10 125 the left)). The PDS broadly takes on Keynesian doctrines of economic demand management, with the state having a fundamental responsibility both in stimulating demand and providing its citizens with employment that enables demand to rise. Like a number of socialist parties across Europe the PDS aims to counter high levels of unemployment by advocating policies such as legally enforceable reductions in the number of hours that employees are allowed to work, a reduction in the length of time that citizens are allowed to work throughout their lifetimes and drastic reductions in the amount of overtime that is presently worked in both Germany and the European Union (PDS 1997: 8). In concrete terms, this has been conceptualised in a maximum working week of 35 hours and, in the long-term, a five day week of just 30 hours (PDS 1993: 17). The PDS also claims that drastic reductions in the 1.8bn hours of overtime that are worked yearly in Germany could create a further 600,000 jobs (Bundestagsdrucksache 13/10015). Helmut Holter, the PDS leader in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, has described this basic economic concoction as being not only beneficial in terms of employment levels, but also in generating demand within the economy and of setting off a virtuous cycle of economic prosperity (Holter 1997). The PDS makes no qualms about demanding the return of full employment. 3 Through the late 1990s the PDS argued that government participation in the economy was vital in achieving this aim, following the principle that the government has to actively help to create as much employment as is possible. The SPD/PDS government in Mecklenburg- West Pomerania remained under no doubt about this, claiming on taking power that: (Active) [...] unemployment policies and the programme Work and Qualification for Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (AQMV) are, in the current period of mass unemployment, indispensable. Job-creation schemes, further and re-education as well as the wage costs subsidy programme are going to form the backbone of our active unemployment policy in the future (SPD and PDS, 1998). The PDS had very specific ideas on how to encourage increased employment within the public sector. These include the creation of the non-profit sector (the so-called öffentlich geförderter Beschäftigungssektor (publicly subsidised employment sector)) and 3 Even André Brie, widely perceived as being on the reforming wing of the PDS, has concluded that full employment is both a legitimate and necessary goal. See Brie 1999.

11 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 126 programmes to support the expansion of the industrial and service base (Bundestagsdrucksache 13/7417). Christa Luft, the main force behind the PDS s economic policy, described the logic and principles behind the PDS s non-profit sector as thus: [... ] communal service agencies hive socially, culturally and ecologically worthwhile tasks into the public sector at the market price (my emphasis), in order to distribute them to public bodies and private actors. The service agencies would buy up the tasks in order to sell them on to the consumers, who would take advantage of these services at politically (my emphasis) set prices. The prices for the people or organisations who make use of these services would be orientated towards their ability to pay. The state would make up the difference between the price at which the service is sold and the price at which it has been bought. This will prove more cost-effective than funding mass-unemployment and crippling social security benefits [...] the intention is to create a regular employment sector alongside the normal profitorientated private economy and the publicly run companies and services that exist for the well-being of the community as a whole (Luft 1998: ). The ÖBS (Non-Profit Sector) was intended to be an approach offering the opportunity of bypassing the profit-making imperative. The SPD/PDS coalition in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania was the first state government that was faced with putting the PDS s employment policies into practice (see below) and, unsurprisingly, implementing these ideas in practice proved highly problematic. None the less, Helmut Holter was still insistent that 8000 extra jobs could be created (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags- Nachrichten 1999: 5). Holter stressed that the process of reducing unemployment was going to be a long-one, but he still predicted that the non-profit sector would be able to promote 3,500 jobs in the medium term (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags-Nachrichten 1999: 5). Methods of financing the ÖBS none the less seem fanciful at best: but this has not (yet) stopped the PDS from attempting to push the project through. The financial basis of the ÖBS rests on attaining levels of full employment that have not been seen in western countries for a number of years. In concrete terms the PDS claimed it would fund the ÖBS through: A one-off tax (Vermögensabgabe) on large sums of money, as well as on private wealth (Grundvermögen). This would apply to both private capital and to capital owned by insurance institutes and banks.

12 127 The introduction of a Wealth Tax (Vermögenssteuer). 4 The PDS estimates that a Wealth Tax will enable the state to raise between DM 9 Billion and DM 30 Million (Knake- Werner 1999: 3). This would be complemented by a reform of inheritance taxes (Erbschaftssteuer). A closure of tax loopholes. Increased tax revenues as more people are employed, and more people pay into the tax system. Increases in the social contributions of companies. This will be based on profits made (PDS 1998). The practicality of implementing these policies is not something that the PDS worried about unduly. Even the most cursory of glances at the wish list above reveals that the such money-making schemes are only viable if the PDS enters national government and even then the PDS would have to be remarkably successful in its negotiations with one would presume the SPD if it were to achieve even a modicum of those aims. 3. The PDS in Power in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Given this impressive wish-list, the first Land government involving the PDS clearly had a lot to live up to. Yet what is perhaps most remarkable about the SPD-PDS government in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania the first red-red government to have come to power since German reunification and the model for the later red-red government in Berlin is its lack of remarkability. Indeed, both initial critics as well as supporters of the coalition government in 1998 have been proven wrong: while critics of the coalition feared that the new government would somehow legitimise a radical party espousing radical policies (with 4 The question of the (re)introduction of a wealth tax arises periodically in political discourse, even though the Federal Court declared such a tax to be illegal in Hence, since the 1997 party congress in Schwerin, the PDS has talked more (although not exclusively) of a Vermögensabgabe, where one-off payments are demanded on large sums of property and wealth. In December 1997 the PDS conceptualised this in the Bundestag by bringing a motion calling for the introduction of a capital transactions tax. See PDS Ingolstadt 1998: 6.

13 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 128 a corresponding rise in voter support) and that the PDS s participation would tilt policy decidedly towards the left (something supporters believed as well), many in favour of the coalition thought that the red-red government would herald a decisive paradigm shift in German politics and mark a first step in the PDS s inevitable march toward power at the national level. Yet none of these things has happened, not at least in any fundamental way: the PDS today remains marginalised at the federal level, its participation in the coalition in M-V has signalled no dramatic shift in state government policies in eastern Germany (not to mention politics at the national level), its vote total in M-V fell dramatically in the 2002 state election, and a radical policy turn to the left in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has failed to materialise. Beyond its effect in contributing to more normalisation of the PDS in German politics then, it would not be too overstated to suggest that the SPD-PDS government s signal achievement is simply that it came to power, and has stayed in power. To be able to come to any conclusion about the effects, if any, that regime participation has had on the PDS it is useful to look at the dynamics surrounding the PDS s ascent to power in M-V in At the outset it should be noted that the current coalition s endurance can be largely traced to both parties lack of viable political options and to the PDS s willingness to play a decidedly subordinate role to the SPD. An improvement in the political climate between the PDS and SPD coincided in M-V with the worsening of the relationship between the SPD and CDU, much of this being a direct result of frictions between Harald Ringstorff and CDU party leaders, most especially Eckhardt Rehberg (Olsen 2000). And given the PDS s desire in M-V to escape the political wilderness to which it had been consigned since reunification, it was no surprise that both the SPD and PDS felt that there was simply no option beyond finding a way to bridge their policy differences so that a coalition government might be formed. Nevertheless, the PDS s 1998 Landtag campaign raised expectations considerably for what the party would try, and be able, to achieve if it came to power. The slogan of the campaign was With the PDS for Social Justice and Humanity in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. What social justice meant (and means) for the PDS was, as ever, difficult to pin down, but most supporters of the party identified this with an emphasis on cutting unemployment rates dramatically, reducing income inequalities, and financing public spending projects. With regard to the last of these, the PDS election manifesto explicitly identified several

14 129 projects such as a guarantee for short-term employment for graduates of apprentice programmes, increased state aid to financially-strapped local and communal governments, the hiring of new public sector workers, a reform of the educational system at the primary level aimed at helping more economically disadvantaged students, and the creation of the above-mentioned non-profit jobs sector which the party said it would pursue if elected to power. Befitting its oppositional status and populist appeal (and perhaps reflecting the PDS s expectation that it might be passed over once again as the SPD s coalition partner), how these projects were to be paid for at the Land level was left unmentioned (Hough 2001: ). Yet the party s surprisingly good showing in the election (24.4 per cent, up 1.7 per cent from the previous election) as well as the quick collapse of initial coalition discussions between the SPD and CDU meant that the PDS would be faced with how to square its campaign wish list with the sobering financial situation of the state. At the end of the two-week coalition negotiations between the two parties the PDS compromised considerably on its minimal requirements for regime participation that had been worked out by a special commission of the state PDS leadership in March 1998 (Berg and Koch 2000: 29). Thus, for example, because the SPD refused to be pinned down concerning the PDS s proposal for a guarantee of short-term employment for apprentices, the PDS agreed with the SPD proposal to simply attempt to find positions for graduates of apprentice programmes. Similarly, the two parties agreed to try the OBS on a pilot programme basis (i.e. with a limited number of jobs) and agreed that new spending and public debt would be the first priority of the new government, with the goal being the reduction of the DM 400 million debt over the 4-year term of the coalition despite the ramifications of debt reduction for the PDS wish list. The coalition s time in office during the first few years was marked by periods of genuine co-operation, with some concrete legislative achievements, as well as by tensions between the two coalition partners. With regard to the former, the new coalition passed a law proposed by the PDS to lower the voting age in local/communal elections to 16, put through a change in the regulations concerning background checks of parliamentarians by the Gauck Commission (another idea put forward by the PDS), and, most controversially, agreed on yearly budgets that sharply curtailed government spending. Especially contentious were cuts affecting old-peoples homes and families (Erziehungsgeld) and a

15 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 130 freeze on spending increases on state moneys for the blind and handicapped. The determination of PDS legislative leaders to adhere to strict budget discipline despite criticism from the party base was especially noteworthy (Olsen 2000: ). With regard to the latter, tensions between the coalition partners first surfaced over a PDS proposal concerning the introduction of an Orientation Phase in primary school that would allow parents and educators additional time in which to decide on which school track students would follow after the sixth year of schooling. Indeed, isolated calls for the PDS to leave the coalition unless the SPD backed down from its opposition to the new law were heard within PDS party ranks. Nevertheless, a compromise on the issue was reached. More serious to the coalition s stability was the dispute that erupted between the two parties over Germany s participation in military action during the Kosovo war. While the M-V SPD firmly backed Chancellor Schröder s position on the war, various PDS legislators and party activists denounced NATO military involvement. Indeed, the rhetoric was often heated from the PDS, with one PDS parliamentarian denouncing NATO s action as a crime against humanity while accusing Minister-President Ringstorff of being a war-monger. Although this crisis too was eventually defused, both sides were left with some bruised feelings. Finally, tensions between the two parties reached something of a crescendo in 2001 when Harald Ringstorff, representing M-V in the Bundesrat during a discussion and vote on a new law on pension reform, cast a vote for the new law despite opposition from his coalition partner and in violation of the 1998 Coalition Agreement guaranteeing Mecklenburg-West Pomerania s abstaining when the two coalition partners could not agree. The PDS was furious, and calls to leave the coalition were frequent and shrill. In a special party congress called to debate this development, however, Helmut Holter and other party leaders argued that leaving the coalition would ultimately hurt, rather than help, the PDS. After Ringstorff offered an apology for his actions and promised not to take such a step again, PDS leaders were able to secure their party s consent to continue in the coalition. Nevertheless, relations between the SPD and PDS had been damaged and, perhaps more importantly, many supporters of the PDS clearly lost faith in the party to exert its will within the coalition. Along with a more general, nationwide malaise affecting the PDS, the disappointments engendered by PDS regime participation had clear consequences for the party at the next

16 131 state election in September of In this election the PDS was only able to garner 16.4 per cent, down a substantial 8 per cent from its 1998 result. Meanwhile, the SPD was able to increase its share of the vote 6.3 per cent to 40.6 per cent, a figure that, while clearly benefiting from the last-minute upsurge in the fortunes of the Schröder government, was nevertheless surprising given the growing disenchantment with the lack of achievement by both the national coalition and the coalition in M-V. Indeed, although a September, 2002 Infratest Dimap poll showed that the coalition government continued to have high unfavourable ratings (58 per cent of respondents indicated they were dissatisfied with the work of the government), the election results clearly indicated that the PDS was blamed for this lack of satisfaction more than the SPD. Moreover, in another Infratest Dimap poll on party competence in solving particular political problems the PDS scored in single digits in every category (behind, in some cases, the FDP, Greens, and the Schill party!) except for education policy and achieving Social Justice (Neu and Eisel 2002). Not surprisingly then, although the PDS clearly lost voters to the SPD (some 45,000), it also suffered disproportionately from a drop in voter turnout (down 8.3 per cent), much of which could be traced to disappointed former PDS voters who decided to stay home on election day (some 17,000) (Neu and Eisel 2002). That the precipitate drop in voter turnout for the PDS could almost certainly be traced to voter disillusionment with the party s participation in government is bolstered by the fact that PDS losses in the federal election were highest in those states M-V, Berlin, and Saxony-Anhalt where the party was a regime participant. Thus the PDS returned to the coalition government in M-V as a chastened party. Although the new coalition agreement between the two parties did not contain much that was new continuing many of the same economic, labour, and education policies, for example the two parties could not agree on several substantive items, such as a reintroduction of the wealth tax (Vermögenssteuer), more money for local governments in M-V, or an expansion of the OBS programme (PDS 2002b). Still, the party was able to persuade the SPD not to set a ceiling on future new indebtedness in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and, given the crisis that emerged in 2001, committed both parties to a strict interpretation of voting procedures in the Bundesrat (SPD-PDS, 1998). Although a good political climate still exists between the two parties, opinion polls suggest support for the coalition has decreased even more since 2002, much of this at the expense of the PDS. Moreover, the party

17 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 132 leadership continues to often be in conflict with the party base, with party leaders such as Helmut Holter, Peter Ritter, and Wolfgang Methling meeting intense criticism over coalition policies. Thus, for example, the government s decision to implement a new daycare law governing the amount of financial support available for financially strapped parents was greeted with hostility at the PDS s Landesparteitag in March 2004 (Ostseezeitung 2004a; Ostseezeitung 2004b). 4. The PDS in Power in Berlin For the first time in its history, the PDS entered the Berlin election campaign in 2001 with great hopes to be a potential party of government. The reason for its optimism was the dramatic change in Berlin politics. Since reunification Berlin had been ruled by a Grand Coalition. Although both the SPD and CDU were clearly unhappy with this state of affairs, there seemed to be little choice for the two parties: with the FDP out as a possible coalition partner since the 1995 election, the Greens unable to provide enough votes for a red-green government, and the Greens and SPD s refusal to enter into a coalition with the PDS, it appeared that elections would continue to have but little effect on the make-up of the Berlin government. All of this changed with the mounting financial scandal of the CDU-led coalition. The leader of the CDU parliamentary group, Klaus Landowsky, was implicated in the shady doings of the Berlin Hypo Bank, of which the Land Berlin was the majority shareholder and which would have to bear the financial burden. Since the Land Berlin was itself already in a deep financial hole by 2001 its total debt exceeded its annual budget by 150 per cent, with 15 per cent of that earmarked for interest payments alone this new financial scandal brought forth calls for new elections from all parties save the CDU. Despite Landowsky s resignation, the SPD withdrew its support for the Grand Coalition and called for new elections. The PDS waged its election campaign in Berlin with the desire and real possibility of joining a future governing coalition. As in past campaigns, the PDS presented itself once again as an outsider that would renew government in the city, a message which carried much more credibility given the recent financial scandal. Yet in contrast to previous

18 133 campaigns, the party tried hard to present itself as well as a responsible and mature possible coalition partner and stressed its insider competence at the local level in Berlin, where the PDS already held a number of seats. Moreover, it tried to mute its traditional welfare-state demands through a recognition of the precarious financial state of Berlin, calling for painful budget cuts in its campaign platform chiefly in the number of personnel in the city-state government. Indeed, trying to square its traditional politics and voter demands with the realities of the budget and its desire to prove its political maturity, the PDS s election manifesto argued that a flight into debt is itself unsocial. It really only benefits the banks and erodes our state s political flexibility (PDS 2001a: Section 2: 3). Thus the PDS indicated that the health of the city s finances was a precondition for any further economic help from central government. In order to demonstrate its democratic credentials, the PDS also addressed the party s history in divided Berlin. Although it stopped short of a full apology for the Berlin Wall on the 40 th anniversary of the building of the Wall (arguing that to apologise would be to claim full responsibility for, and full continuity with, the old regime, something the party has always refused to do), the PDS did issue a statement of regret and expressed its sorrow regarding the victims of the Wall, this despite some opposition within the party which continued to see the Wall as a regrettable but necessary measure undertaken by the East German state (PDS 2001b). Just as, if not more, important to the party s campaign than the PDS s policy positions and its statement about the Wall, however, was the candidature of Gregor Gysi. Gysi s candidature for mayor aroused inordinate media attention and became one of the main foci of the entire election. After September 11, however, both Gysi s candidacy as well as the Berlin PDS s policy positions were overshadowed by foreign policy issues. Although all parties, including the PDS, expressed their solidarity with the United States and their profound sorrow for the victims of the terrorist attack, the PDS staked out an anti-war position, insisting that the international criminal justice system in combination with economic development and UN-backed diplomacy were better tools for fighting terrorism than military strikes which would only lead to a spiral of violence (Fassenden 2002: 180). In the immediate aftermath of September 11, when empathy for the United States ran high, it seemed that the PDS s position might hurt it with voters. Yet as it became clear that the

19 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 134 United States was committed to military action, perhaps provoking further terrorist attacks against not only the United States but its allies in Europe, including Germany, the PDS s position became more sympathetic to voters. Consequently the PDS was rewarded on election night with its highest vote ever in a Berlin election, with an 8 per cent gain in East Berlin over its 1999 Berlin state election result. The party s result in West Berlin was perhaps even more impressive: if viewed separately, the 6.9 per cent the PDS scored in West Berlin put it far above the 5 per cent hurdle necessary for representation in most German elections, the first time the PDS was able to achieve this in West Berlin. The party made gains among all groups of voters but won a disproportionate share of young voters (under 25 years of age) of any party, with 10 per cent of these voters coming from West Berlin. Thus the PDS had every reason to celebrate the outcome of the Berlin election and hope that this election would provide an inspiration or model for future elections, especially in the old states of Germany. And despite initial reluctance by the federal SPD, the breakdown of coalition negotiations between the SPD on the one hand, and the Greens and FDP on the other, allowed serious negotiations by the SPD with the PDS on the building of a government coalition in Berlin The coalition agreement reached between the SPD and PDS is a very lengthy document of over 100 pages. Despite the length, however, many policy proposals are left vague, with the simple comment that a specific point will be negotiated later or reviewed by the two parties (see especially Section 19 on Finances). Nevertheless, some key points emerge. First, the preamble to the agreement deals with the legacy of the SED and GDR. Here the two parties state that the Berlin Wall became a symbol not only of the Cold War but also of totalitarianism. Despite the goodwill of many SED members, the SED leadership turned the GDR into an inhuman and illegitimate state (Unrechtsstaat), from which the PDS wished to distance itself. (SPD and PDS 2001: 4-5) Some observers, of course, found things to criticise in the preamble, specifically the omission of the word dictatorship in a description of the GDR as well as a more contrite acknowledgement of the complicity of the party as a whole (rather than just the leadership) in the construction of the GDR (Neu and Eisel 2002: 19). Nevertheless, for the PDS such a statement marked an important, and very controversial, step towards a recognition of the true nature of the GDR.

20 135 In terms of specific policies, several items stand out. First, the two parties agreed to put forward a referendum on the fusion of Berlin and Brandenburg by 2006 at the latest, reversing earlier PDS policy. Second (again a reversal of the PDS s position), the two parties agreed to go forward with the construction of a new airport, despite the city s financial woes, and the closing of the two existing airports. Third, the SPD, under pressure from the PDS, agreed not to let Berlin compete for the Olympic games, which if successful, would have incurred tremendous costs for the new government. Fourth, while the agreement suggests that the implementation of a local Coalition for the Economy and Labour (bezirkliche Bündnisse für Wirtschaft und Arbeit) remains under discussion, no mention is made of a specific PDS proposal (similar to the programme in Mecklenburg- West Pomerania) for a city-wide ÖBS programme (referred to in the PDS election manifesto as BBB, Bezirkliche Beschäftigungsbündnisse (local employment alliances)). Fifth, the new coalition committed itself to increasing the opportunities for referenda while reviewing the existing rules governing such referenda; meanwhile, the PDS s election manifesto proposal to significantly lower the 5 per cent hurdle for representation in the state legislature was quietly dropped. Finally, and clearly most importantly, the two parties came to broad agreement in the coalition document on the issue of the city s finances. Thus, for example, the agreement outlines a goal to eliminate Berlin s indebtedness (with the exception of debts previously accumulated) by the year In order to reach this goal, the two parties agreed to a reduction in personnel costs through job attrition and early retirement (some 15,000 out of its 140,000 city jobs), as well as a reduction in support for a variety of programmes. Given public resistance to severe budget cuts this was probably as far as the coalition could go in its coalition agreement. Yet such spending cuts were undoubtedly not deep enough to come close to curing the city s indebtedness, especially given the SPD s rejection of a PDS plan to increase certain taxes. Foreseeing the continuation of the city s financial crisis, the coalition agreement therefore emphatically underscored the significance of Berlin to the Federal Republic, which, as Joanna McKay notes, appeared to be a thinly disguised appeal to the federal government for financial support (Mckay, 2002: 34). Indeed, the coalition agreement even suggested that, should negotiations over financial support to the city between the Federal government and Berlin

21 Dan Hough and Jonathan Olsen 136 fail, Berlin would consider taking the matter to the federal constitutional court (SPD and PDS, 2001: 8). Negotiated separately at a meeting of the two parties after the conclusion of the coalition agreement in the late Autumn of 2001, the 2002 yearly budget instituted cuts in spending for youth employment projects, sport clubs, and public transportation; reduced funding for support of the disabled and unemployed; cuts in efforts to promote tourism and business development; the closing of ten public swimming pools; and finally significant reductions in state monies given to museums and (especially) the various opera and theatre companies in Berlin (Der Spiegel 2002). These cuts were deep and profound, yet both the CDU and FDP found plenty to criticise, such as the continued, if reduced, funding of the city s three opera houses, the failure to reduce government spending on wages and non-wage employee costs, the lack of tax breaks for business, and the cutting of money earmarked to promote Berlin as a business centre. Even those within the SPD, such as finance Senator Thilo Sarrazin, argued that the new government s budget cuts did not go nearly far enough (Berliner Zeitung 2002: 2). Yet the two parties most especially the PDS found many more within their parties, as well as among the general public, who were enraged at the scope and depth of the cuts. Among many PDS voters there was a growing perception that the PDS leadership had kowtowed to the SPD and cut the budget precisely in those areas that would hurt the more vulnerable in the city the most. This feeling intensified as the coalition revised its estimate of the city s budget deficit figures in February 2002 (PDS 2002a). Moreover, unions in Berlin whose members would be especially hurt by the budget cuts, held a series of protests against the coalition s proposed budget measures (Neues Deutschland 2002: 1). Not surprisingly, drop in public support for the new government came quickly. A mere six months after the coalition took office, an Emnid poll found that support for the government had fallen from 52 per cent in October, 2001 to 47 per cent in July. Almost all of the drop in support, moreover, came at the expense of the PDS, which fell from its election vote of 22.6 per cent to 16 per cent (Die Welt 2002). Things became even worse for the party in the federal election. The failure of the PDS to clear the 5 per cent barrier, as noted above, could almost certainly be traced to its disappointing electoral performance in those states where it