Britain After Brexit: The Risk to Northern Ireland

Transcription

1 Britain After Brexit: The Risk to Northern Ireland Adrian Guelke Journal of Democracy, Volume 28, Number 1, January 2017, pp (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: For additional information about this article No institutional affiliation (1 Jul :35 GMT)

2 Britain After Brexit The Risk to Northern Ireland Adrian Guelke Adrian Guelke, professor emeritus in the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy, and Politics at Queen s University, Belfast, is attached to the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security, and Justice and is the editor of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. He was recently the Van Zyl Slabbert Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. The prospect of British withdrawal from the European Union presents immense challenges to Northern Ireland s hard-won but still fragile peace. Indeed, the implicit assumption of continuing British and Irish participation in Europe was woven into the terms of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, which brought an end to the thirty years of intercommunal violence between Protestants and Catholics known as the Troubles. European integration has exercised a profound influence both on Irish nationalism and on bilateral relations between Britain and Ireland since before the onset of the Troubles, and it has consistently provided a foundation for cooperation between the two governments in managing the conflict. Even before the June 2016 referendum on Britain s EU membership, the political institutions established by the Belfast Agreement (popularly known as the Good Friday Agreement) had proved tenuous, as demonstrated by their near collapse in 2014 and 2015 over budgetary matters and continuing paramilitary violence. Now the Brexit decision casts further doubt on the settlement s future. From the beginnings of postwar economic cooperation on the Continent, the process of European integration attracted the attention of politicians in the Republic of Ireland seeking a way out of sterile antipartitionism the practice of railing against the division of the island under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. This act had split off six Irish counties to create a British-controlled and heavily Protestant province in the north alongside the autonomous majority-catholic state in the south. For decades, bitter protests against the partition were ignored in Journal of Democracy Volume 28, Number 1 January National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press

3 Adrian Guelke 43 the United Kingdom, and some Irish statesmen began to recognize the role that Europe might play in transcending Irish divisions. Its potential contribution was foreseen in 1955 in a perceptive speech by Liam Cosgrave, then Irish minister for external affairs and later prime minister. Addressing fellow policy makers, Cosgrave asserted: Isolation or aggressive policies tend to divide us more and more fundamentally from the majority of our fellow-countrymen in the Six Counties. On the other hand, the more we direct our activities towards playing a part suitable to our means and geographical position in the solution of the great problems that confront Western Europe as a whole, the more it will be apparent to the people of the Six Counties also that their destiny is one with ours, just as ours is one with the peoples of Western Europe. 1 This statement purposely left open the question of whether European integration would lead to the border disappearing altogether in a reunited Ireland, or whether partition would simply come to matter less. Events would ultimately prove the latter to be the case. When the United Kingdom applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the European Union, in July 1961, the Republic of Ireland s application followed the next day. Yet the motivations behind the two bids could hardly have been more different. Britain s application was based on a grudging recognition that it had no alternatives, while Ireland saw membership as an opportunity to enhance its status and reduce its economic dependence on its neighbor. At the time of their initial applications, the Northern Ireland problem was dormant and did not impinge on either country s candidacy. But by the time the United Kingdom and Ireland finally became full members of the EEC more than a decade later after a delay caused by repeated vetoes from French president Charles de Gaulle the Troubles were at their height. In fact, the year 1972, when both states signed the treaty of accession, became the bloodiest in Northern Ireland s history. At this juncture, Britain s policy in Northern Ireland and its approach to European integration were entirely separate. Partitioning the island in the 1920s had provided Britain with a temporary way out of Irish entanglements, solving for the time being the Irish question that had bedeviled British politics during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Since then, Northern Ireland had been administered by a pro-britain Unionist government, to which Westminster was only too glad to delegate the problem of dealing with Irish nationalism. Britain s initial response to the onset of the Troubles was thus to encourage the Unionist government to find an internal resolution of the conflict. The Unionist strategy was to seek and secure Westminster s consent to introducing internment without trial in an effort to address rising violence, particularly from the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Britain

4 44 Journal of Democracy agreed to the measure, in part due to its fear that Unionist prime minister Brian Faulkner might fall if the internment option were rejected, thus engulfing the province in further political instability. Once introduced, however, internment proved a total failure as a security measure, prompting a massive escalation of clashes between Northern Irish Protestants and the largely Irish-nationalist Catholic minority. The crisis deepened when British paratroopers killed fourteen Catholic demonstrators in Londonderry in January An abrupt change in British policy toward Northern Ireland followed that March. The government reimposed on the province direct rule from London, suspending its Unionist administration. In taking this step, Britain essentially recognized that securing the consent of the Catholic minority would require a radical overhaul of Northern Ireland s political institutions. The crisis also led the British government toward another important realization namely, that creating a new political dispensation would require that the Republic of Ireland be involved as a guarantor of the position of Northern Ireland s Catholic minority. But securing the Republic s participation in the peace process called for a deeper degree of collaboration between London and Dublin, which in turn presented a fresh problem: Political ties between the two countries prior to the 1970s had been practically nonexistent, with minimal contact at any level of government. Fortunately, the growing European dimension provided the critical impetus for changing this. In formulating its new approach to the Irish question, Britain s Conservative government made much of the fact that both the United Kingdom and the Republic were about to become members of the EEC. A government discussion paper published in October 1972, for example, pointed to the two countries imminent accession to the EEC as the reason why any new arrangements for Northern Ireland should, whilst meeting the wishes of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, be so far as possible acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of Ireland. 2 This argument, useful in justifying the step to Conservative backbenchers, helped to secure political support for the new strategy. It also represented a major change in British policy. Incentives for Cooperation Despite the absence of government dialogue between the two countries, their social and economic ties had remained very strong since the Republic of Ireland s formal establishment in The following year, Westminster passed the Ireland Act of 1949, whose most famous clause became known as the guarantee or, as nationalists pejoratively called it, the Unionist veto. It stipulated that any move toward Irish reunification would require a majority vote in the North, declaring, In no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His

5 Adrian Guelke 45 Majesty s dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. 3 The same piece of legislation, however, also asserted the following: [N]otwithstanding that the Republic of Ireland is not part of His Majesty s dominions, the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country for the purposes of any law in force in any part of the United Kingdom or in any colony, protectorate or United Kingdom trust territory, whether by virtue of a rule of law or of an Act of Parliament or any other enactment or instrument whatsoever, whether passed or made before or after the passing of this Act. 4 This provision underscored the British government s determination to prevent the change in Ireland s status from causing a fresh rupture between the two states a desire which was also reflected in the reinstatement of the Common Travel Area allowing free movement between the two countries. (It had been suspended during World War II, when Ireland pursued a policy of neutrality.) The British readiness to maintain close economic and social relations with Ireland did not extend to the political realm, however, until the move toward Europe and the escalation of intercommunal violence in the early 1970s. The two states accession to the EEC provided a fresh impetus for the establishment of closer political ties between London and Dublin, just when the failure of Northern Ireland s Unionist government had become apparent. On Ireland s side, membership in the EEC raised its status to that of a virtual equal of the United Kingdom, assuaging Irish grievances over partition and the treatment Northern Ireland s Catholic minority. Both states, moreover, regarded it as important to ensure that the Troubles did not jeopardize their cooperation in a wider European context. Out of that common interest grew the practice of external conflict management by the two countries. New incentives to cooperate quickly bore fruit, with British, Irish, and Northern Irish representatives signing the Sunningdale Agreement in December This settlement made provisions for establishing a power-sharing government in Belfast comprising both Unionists and nationalists along with a Council of Ireland that would give the arrangement an Irish dimension and further reassure nationalists. This second point, however, irked the Unionists, who were wary of giving the Republic any influence in the North s affairs, and the settlement ultimately foundered due to their hostility. Most Unionists also opposed any form of power-sharing with the nationalists, and so the British government persevered with direct rule as the least-unacceptable option for the province. That phase ended with the 1985 signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which provided the Irish government with a say regarding British policy in Northern Ireland while ensuring that nationalist grievances

6 46 Journal of Democracy received attention. Despite fresh Unionist protests, this new agreement held, institutionalizing the principle of bilateral cooperation in managing the conflict. It was also facilitated in practice by regular intergovernmental contacts on the margins of European Council meetings. When the two countries launched the peace process in December 1993, they underscored the importance of When the United Kingdom and Ireland launched the peace process in December 1993, they underscored the importance of the European context by emphasizing that they were now partners in the European Union. the European context by emphasizing that they were now partners in the European Union, adding: The development of Europe, will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland. 5 When ceasefires by the principal paramilitary organizations followed in 1994, the two countries published guidelines for negotiating a comprehensive settlement among the various parties in Northern Ireland. Known as the Framework Documents, these guidelines made explicit reference to the EU. Specifically, Article 26 stated that any EU matter relevant to the competence of either administration could be raised for consideration in the North/South body to promote cross-border cooperation. 6 This language once again led Unionists to fear that they would lose control over the growing scope of cooperation, and they made their opposition plain. As a consequence, the Belfast Agreement itself made relatively few direct references to the EU. Nonetheless, the continuing influence of the European dimension remained evident in Belfast. Reflecting on the negotiation process later on, prominent Irish economist Rory O Donnell noted that one of the agreement s most striking features was its clear echo of European norms. Anyone who knows the European Union, he said, immediately recognises that [the settlement] was written by people who also know the EU and have worked its systems quite extensively. 7 The resultant accord s multilayered structure was designed to satisfy the conflicting interests of both Unionists and nationalists. It sought to address Catholic demands by establishing a power-sharing legislative body, the Northern Ireland Assembly, to rule the province with cross-community consent and also created a North-South Ministerial Council to facilitate cooperation with Westminster and Dublin. At the same time, the agreement paid heed to a major Unionist objective namely, the safeguarding of Northern Ireland s status as part of the United Kingdom. To this end, the guarantee of 1949 was restated as a commitment by the two governments to the following two objectives: (i) Recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised

7 Adrian Guelke 47 by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; (ii) Recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. 8 This guarantee, which had become known as the principle of consent, had by this time been accepted by the nationalists. Indeed, their agreement with the principle formed an important building block of the whole accord. New Uncertainties The Belfast Agreement was not the first occasion on which both the Irish government and Northern Irish nationalists had acknowledged the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a political entity. But this time around, the recognition given to the island s partition was more complete and more comprehensive than ever before. It entailed substantial changes to the Irish constitution, eliminating from it the clauses that asserted a territorial claim on the North. And it enjoyed unprecedented public support. Underscoring the deal s popular mandate were two simultaneous referendums, held in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in May 1998, shortly after the signing of the accord. The idea behind them came from the Northern Irish nationalist leader John Hume, who suggested staging the votes as a way of undercutting any claims by the agreement s opponents that they were engaged in a fight for Irish selfdetermination. His strategy was quickly vindicated: The Belfast Agreement met with overwhelming support among both populations, getting 71.1 percent in favor in Northern Ireland and an even more enthusiastic 94.4 percent in the Republic. Some opposition to the settlement remains, however, including from a group of dissident Republicans including from a group of Republican dissidents, largely former members of the Provisional IRA, who continue to oppose its terms. One of the dangers that Brexit poses to peace in Northern Ireland is that it allows them to argue that the unanticipated change in circumstances created by Britain s withdrawal from the EU invalidates the Irish people s endorsement of the Belfast Agreement. This is far from the only element of the deal put at risk by Brexit. The

8 48 Journal of Democracy United Kingdom s departure from the EU would also threaten the crossborder cooperation that has been a powerful force for conciliation. The Belfast Agreement made provisions to institutionalize a diverse range of cross-border partnerships on issues ranging from transport infrastructure to education to health and established a North/South Ministerial Council to oversee the effort. Remarkably, this aspect of the agreement has proven almost entirely uncontroversial. One reason why is that cross-border cooperation could be presented as an entirely normal aspect of bilateral relations between EU member states. Another is that the EU provided funding for cross-border initiatives under its regional policy particularly through the successive phases of the PEACE program (known more formally as the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland). The benefits that the program has brought to Northern Irish borderlands cut across the province s sectarian divide, which helps explain why the Brexit referendum saw pro-eu majorities in every Northern Irish constituency bordering the Republic. Now, however, Brexit threatens both the rationale for cross-border schemes and their funding. Also in question is the permeability of the border between the two parts of the island, which has been a key factor behind increased Catholic contentment with partition. The Belfast Agreement includes elaborate provisions to ensure that no barrier be placed in the way of a united Ireland, should that be the wish of a majority of the people in the North. The likelihood of such a majority emerging has actually receded since 1998, despite the fact that the gap between the sizes of the Protestant and Catholic communities has shrunk to just 3 percentage points (a big change from 25 years ago, when Protestants outnumbered Catholics by more than 12 percentage points). In fact, the growing proportion of Catholics in Northern Ireland has been instrumental in reducing fears that the province might ever return to the conditions that prevailed under half a century of Unionist rule when nationalists were excluded from power and Catholics were treated as second-class citizens. The Belfast Agreement s provision for power-sharing has been a guarantee that representatives of the Catholic community will be included in government, regardless of the precise party composition of the Northern Ireland Executive. Catholics have not been forced to forswear their Irish identity in order to stake a claim for equal treatment. A key feature of the Belfast Agreement is its explicit guarantee that the people of Northern Ireland may freely choose to be either British or Irish citizens or both a freedom that it affirms as their birthright. 9 This measure s significance was not in introducing this right per se; even prior to the agreement, it had been easy for anyone born in the province to acquire either or both passports. Rather, the agreement s key contribution was to give legitimacy to the free exercise of that choice and to enshrine it in an in-

9 Adrian Guelke 49 ternational treaty. In the past, it was common for Catholics to opt for an Irish passport, while Protestants almost invariably chose a British one. The emblazoning of the words European Union on both passport covers added further assurance that no one from Northern Ireland would be disadvantaged by the choice of a British or an Irish identity. Another part of the Belfast deal that was bound up, if indirectly, with British and Irish membership in the EU was its emphasis on human rights. A major factor that had alienated Northern Ireland s Catholic minority and undermined support for the police in combatting violence had been the perception that the British government had failed to respect fundamental human-rights norms. The Belfast Agreement s detailed human rights provisions reflected London s recognition of this. Both Britain and Ireland also undertook to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. (Although the Convention predated the EU and was an initiative of the Council of Europe, it has become linked in the public mind with the EU, which has endorsed the Convention s principles in its treaties and required that all countries seeking membership adhere to them.) 10 Further echoing European norms were arrangements for devolution made by the United Kingdom, not just in Northern Ireland but also in Scotland and Wales. Yet resentment in Britain over the frequency with which courts found the British state to be in violation of the Convention, particularly in the context of combatting terrorism, has fueled political opposition to the U.K. Human Rights Act, which introduced the Convention into U.K. domestic law in The Conservative Party promised to repeal the act, among other pledges it made in its manifesto for Britain s 2015 general election. The government s intention to do so was reaffirmed after the Brexit vote and the formation of a new administration under Prime Minister Theresa May, notwithstanding the implications for the Belfast Agreement. 11 What Lies Ahead In the June 2016 referendum, the Leave proposition was supported by 51.9 percent of the electorate as a whole, but in Northern Ireland a majority 55.7 percent voted to remain in the EU. Notably, this majority was smaller than those in either Scotland or Gibraltar, which voted 62 percent and 95.9 percent, respectively, in favor of the EU. Yet it was larger than the Northern Irish majority of 52.1 percent that had voted to remain in the EEC in 1975, at a time when a far greater share of voters across the United Kingdom, 67.2 percent, favored continued membership. This divergence over Brexit has led many observers to ask whether the 2016 referendum might be implemented in a way that reflects the differing views on EU membership among the United Kingdom s con-

10 50 Journal of Democracy Although the precise terms and consequences of Britain s departure from the EU are still surrounded by uncertainty, one thing is clear: Brexit represents a major setback for Northern Ireland s peace process. stituent parts. Indeed, there is a precedent for one part of a country to pursue a different relationship to European institutions than the rest of that country. It was set in 1985, when Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, was permitted to leave the EEC, while Denmark itself remained inside. Given this example, might Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Gibraltar be allowed to remain in the EU, while England and Wales exit? Alternatively, might a special case be made for just Northern Ireland to remain in light of the Belfast Agreement? 12 The possibility of pursuing these options has quickly receded, as the sheer complexity of implementing the referendum s mandate has become apparent. Indeed, this complexity makes it unlikely that the peripheries will receive anything but the most cursory consideration in the whole process. So too does the domination of the ruling Conservative Party by English interests. In Scotland, these circumstances have already ignited calls for a new referendum on independence, after voters there had decided to remain inside the United Kingdom in 2014, in large part swayed by British membership in European institutions. Scotland might well come to see a second referendum as its only recourse as it faces the prospect of being forced out of the EU, against the wishes of most of its people and with scant consideration for its interests. For Northern Ireland, the significance of such a development would be difficult to overstate. After all, its Unionist connection to a British identity runs through immigration to Ireland from Scotland, not from England. This makes the Scottish question another variable that will affect Northern Ireland s political settlement under Brexit. These broad questions aside, Belfast faces two other, more concrete problems in the aftermath of the referendum. The first is replacing the EU funding that it now stands to lose. Unlike the United Kingdom as a whole, which has been a net contributor to the EU budget, Northern Ireland is a net beneficiary. 13 It receives EU assistance under a variety of programs, many of which are not specific to the province, even when they are administered through Northern Ireland s devolved government. Some anticipated post-brexit funding gaps such as shortfalls in agricultural subsidies will be covered by the British government, according to the assurances of Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond. No such clarity, however, surrounds projects under Phase IV of the PEACE program and other cross-border schemes. The possible shortfalls might run to 300 million in the estimate of Northern Ireland s Ministry of Finance. 14 Considering that the province is already operating

11 Adrian Guelke 51 under severe budgetary constraints and that financial strain came close to toppling its political institutions in 2014 and 2015, any shortfall is likely to cause considerable political difficulty. Northern Ireland s second concrete problem is what to do about the border with the Republic of Ireland once the United Kingdom leaves the EU. In recent times, particularly since the province s political settlement was consolidated under the St Andrews Agreement of 2006, the border has become virtually invisible and free-flowing. For a traveling motorist, the only indication of its existence is slightly different styles of road signs. There is some discreet video monitoring of traffic, via cameras that can identify license plates, but with nearly three-hundred formal crossing points along a border that is only 499 kilometers long, this system is far from comprehensive. 15 Given that immigration control was a major objective of the Brexit campaign, however, it is difficult to see how the two neighbors can avoid imposing border checks and limiting the number of crossing points; the Republic s obligations to other EU members will trump old special bilateral arrangements. One proposed solution introducing passport checks for all people traveling between the island and the U.K. mainland would be difficult to justify politically or constitutionally, since it would interfere with the right of citizens to travel freely within their own country. At the same time, any hardening of the border between the two Irish jurisdictions would diminish the quality of life of people in the borderlands, bring economic pain, and be seen as a reversal of a critical achievement of the peace process. Although the precise terms and consequences of Britain s departure from the EU are still surrounded by uncertainty, one thing is clear: Brexit represents a major setback for Northern Ireland s peace process. That a political settlement nearly two decades old is still so central to the maintenance of peace reflects just how fragile the resolution of the conflict remains. Ever since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the settlement has depended on active conflict management by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (with, on some occasions, an assisting role by the United States). At each step of the way, EU membership provided powerful incentives to both partners to devote time and money to solving the problem. It remains to be seen how capable the British and Irish governments will be of overcoming future difficulties, especially when the two countries are no longer partners in the European Union. NOTES 1. Liam Cosgrave, Address Before the Dáil Éireann Committee on Finance, (Dublin, 12 July 1955),

12 52 Journal of Democracy 2. The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion (London: HMSO, 1972), Ireland Act 1949, 12 and 13 Geo. 6, ch. 41 (2 June 1949), Section 1 (2), 4. Ireland Act 1949, Section 2 (1). 5. See Paragraph 3 of Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration (London, 15 December 1993), 6. The Framework Documents: A New Framework for Agreement (Belfast: HMSO, 1995), Article 26, 7. Rory O Donnell, Fixing the Institutions in Robin Wilson, ed., No Frontiers: North-South Integration in Ireland (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 1999), 70. The comment has been widely quoted. See, for example, Elizabeth Meehan, Bringing in Europe: The Peace Process and the Europeanisation of the Irish Question, Irish Studies in International Affairs 11 (2000): The Agreement: Text of the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations on Northern Ireland, 10 April 1998, 3, attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf. 9. The Agreement, See Conor Gearty, Brexit 2: Why UK s Human Rights Act Should Not Be Repealed, Irish Times, 8 September 2016, Gearty, Brexit See, for example, Niall Holohan, The Last Thing This Country Needs as Brexit Looms Is Further Division, Irish Independent, 25 August 2016, opinion/comment/the-last-thing-this-country-needs-as-brexit-looms-is-further-division html. 13. See Preliminary Analysis on the Impact of a UK Referendum on Its Membership of the European Union (Belfast: European Policy and Co-ordination Unit for the Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, May 2015), 9. This report, which details Brexit s negative consequences for Northern Ireland, only came to light in September 2016 after a Freedom of Information request. 14. Jim Fitzpatrick, What Does Brexit Actually Mean for Northern Ireland? The Irish News, 13 September 2016, news/platform-what-does-brexit-actually-mean-for-northern-ireland Number given in House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Northern Ireland and the EU Referendum: First Report of Session , London, HC 48, 26 May 2016, 27,