Approval Voting. Simple, Effective Voting Method Reform. Neal McBurnett. for the League of Women Voters, Boulder County Revised
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1 Approval Voting Simple, Effective Voting Method Reform Neal McBurnett for the League of Women Voters, Boulder County Revised
2 Center for Election Science 501(c)(3) founded in 2011 Research into improved voting methods and systems Disseminate voting best practices Build and support a community of voting theorists, activists, and users Software development to meet needs of groups that vote Consulting: assist organizations to plan, prepare, conduct, tally, and report their elections
3 Overview Consensus: Bad voting method causes problems with US elections Approval voting: "Vote for one or more" Big improvement Simple to understand The only really easy-to-implement alternative Allow Approval Voting in Colorado and elsewhere! Other worthy alternative single-winner methods Use Proportional Representation for multi-winner!
4 Voting Method Issues in a Nutshell Democracy requires the election of candidates that reflect the will of the people Our current system doesn't even let the people effectively express their will So we need more expressive ballots, and voting methods that consistently yield good outcomes
5 US Voting Method Problems We use Plurality Voting, AKA Choose-One Plurality Voting, "First Past the Post", which causes many problems: Spoiler effect: getting mad at good candidates... Accusations "You're wasting your vote, helping enemy" Negative campaigning Good candidates avoid running Disillusioned voters disengage, low turnout Learn very little from the electorate
6 Approval Voting Intro Our introductory video on Youtube: What Is Approval Voting? Plantsville Vote for one or more
7 Approval Voting Advantages Familiar ballots, just change the directions No changes to standard voting systems in wide use Voters can show support for all of their preferred candidates More positive elections Increases participation from candidates and voters Generally better outcomes for the electorate as a whole More likely to achieve majority approval Easy to audit
8 Approval Voting History One box per candidate, "No (Oxi)" / "Yes (Nai)". Voters privately drop a marble in no/yes side of each box. Used for parliamentary elections in Greece,
9 Approval Voting Recent History Re-invented independently several times in 1960's and '70's: Otteweil; Kellett & Mott; Brams & Fishburn; Weber Used in straw polls for United Nations Secretary General Used by professional societies like the American Mathematical Society, American Statistical Association Used to elect University of Colorado student government twice each year
10 There is No Perfect Voting Method Mathematically proven But not by "Arrow's Theorem": Only applies to ranked-choice methods like IRV Doesn't apply to Approval Voting, other rating methods Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem does apply Strategic voting inevitable outside of dictatorship
11 The Best Voting Method What if we could read voter's minds, know their positions on issues, their honest assessments of the candidates? In theory, could evaluate all the options and pick the candidate that represents the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Next approximation: very expressive ballot, completely honest voters, very intricate algorithm
12 Evaluating Voting Methods Jameson Quinn's research on practical ballots, voter strategies, range of algorithms: Computer simulation of voters, candidates, outcomes Calculate how happy voters are with outcomes Evaluate impact of strategic voting, including one-sided strategy (e.g. if the voters who support the frontrunner vote honestly, but those who support the runner-up vote strategically) Also a "media model": what voters know about candidates
13 Effectiveness of Different Voting Systems 15. V Srv0to2 13. Srv0to Score0to Score0to Score0to2 9. IdealApproval BulletyApproval60 7. Rp 6. Schulze 5. Irv 4. Mj 3. Mav 2. Borda 1. Plurality method vse strategy a.100% honest b.50% 1-sided strategy c.50% strategic d.smart 1-sided strat. e.100% 1-sided strateg f.100% strategic Voter Satisfaction Efficiency: Jameson Quinn simulations, 2017 V321: voting Srv0to2: Score runoff voting, scale of 0 to 2 Score Voting
14 Approval Voting Opportunities Start with local elections Great for primaries Choose the best candidate More post-primary party unity Usable now by vacancy committees and other straw polls
15 Colorado a Leader in Election Innovation Proportional Representation in early 20th century Bucklin voting method very popular, invented in Grand Junction Risk-Limiting Audits Many other innovations; doing well in state comparisions And next: Approval voting?
16 Approval Voting Bill - Jonathan Singer Modest but important bill HB : defines rules for using Approval Voting Voluntary use by cities, school districts, special districts
17 Even Better Methods with Modified Ballots Score voting, AKA Range voting Like in the Olympics, Internet Movie Database Voters rate candidates on a scale Candidate with the highest rating wins Approval Voting is Score with just two possible ratings Score runoff voting (SRV) Starts like score voting Choose the top 2 candidates based on scores Virtual runoff for winner: which one is rated higher on more ballots
18 3-2-1 Voting - Highly Robust Give each candidate one of 3 ratings: Good, OK, or Bad Find the winner in 3 steps: First, the 3 semifinalists are the candidates rated good the most Second, the 2 finalists are the semifinalists rated bad the least Third, the winner is the finalist who s rated higher on more ballots (ie, the winner of a virtual runoff)
19 Proportional representation For city council, legislature etc, widespread agreement: use proportional representation. Several good methods: Single Transferrable Vote: widespread Proportional Approval Voting: Sweden, Reweighted Range Voting (PAV with Score voting): Berkeley project prioritization
20 Approval voting criticisms What if people "bullet vote" (vote for just one) anyway? Experience from November, from France and Germany, suggest not a problem Simulations suggest that if up to 70% of the electorate bullet votes, it actually improves the outcomes Voting for 2nd choice can help achieve unifying compromises In IRV, voting for 1st choice can hurt them! In IRV, 2nd choices sometimes completely ignored until they are eliminated
21 Approving Multiple Candidates CES and GfK: major poll in November using Approval, IRV, Plurality, Score etc
22 Summary Approval voting: good, simple fix Use with current ballots, current equipment With bigger ballots: or Score Runoff Voting Instant-Runoff voting is better than Choose-One Plurality Use Proportional Representation for council, legislature For more information Center for Election Science: electology.org Approval Voting for Colorado
23 Supplemental slides
24 Approval Voting over Instant-Runoff Voting Better Voter Satisfaction Less confusing Always makes sense to support your favorite Easy to use with current equipment Transparent Easy to tally Efficient to audit
25 Instant-Runoff Voting Beware variety of terminology Ranked Choice Voting Alternative vote Transferable vote Ballot design complications Many of people's preferences are never considered Most voter preferences aren't reported, or reflected in even the complicated run-off round details Hard to understand Maine s Ranked Choice Voting: It s Not Plurality The Center for Election Science Hard to audit IRV
26 Instant-Runoff has been Rejected or Repealed Fort Collins (2011) Aspen (2010) Burlington, Vermont (2010) Cary, North Carolina (2009) Pierce County, Washington (2009) Ann Arbor, Michigan (1976)
27 Other Ranked Choice Voting methods Any Condorcet method Ranked Pairs Schulze, aka Beatpath Game Theory (Rivest and Shen) Bucklin: accumulate top ranks until majority Invented in Grand Junction CO
28 Effectiveness of Different Voting Systems Warren Smith simulations, 2000
29 "One Person One Vote" The phrase "one person one vote" is about franchise to vote, and voter registration, not about method of voting History is different in Europe vs US In Europe: refers to goal: involve everyone in election - not just property owners Don't allow people with property in multiple places to vote multiple times In US: refers to redistricting Supreme Court requires redistricting to achieve one person one vote in state and local elections Note: President and US Senate are not one person one vote. Voters in small states have more influence
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