Global Common Resources How to Manage Shared Properties

Transcription

1 Global Common Resources How to Manage Shared Properties Jesper Larsson Agrarian history, Department of Urban and Rural Development, SLU The Global Economy Environment, Development and Globalization CEMUS Education/Uppsala Centre for Sustainable Development Fall Semester 2015

2 The Tragedy of the Commons Garrett Hardin ( ) seminal article 1968 coined the term Hardin an ecologist but were writing about ecology A time when people realized that resources were not infinite Problem at the time was the threat of over population, pollution,environmental degradation, etc.

3 The Tragedy of the Commons Nothing new in the article. Fisheries economics said the same. Main argument goes back to Aristotle. But delivered a powerful story with a memorable name. Aristotle: What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own; they care less for what is common Enclosure in the seventeenth to nineteenth century. Everybody s property is nobody s property and wealth that is free for all is valued by none. Gordon (1954, 135)

4 The Tragedy of the Commons The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. (Hardin 1968)

5 The Tragedy of the Commons As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain., the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. Hardin 1968

6 The Tragedy of the Commons What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. Hardin 1968 The Solution: Private Property or Public Property In later articles Hardin favors State intervention, a Leviathan to use Hobbes term (Hardin 1978, 314)

7 The Tragedy of the Commons Hobbes: Leviathan argues for a social contract and rule by an absolute sovereign. Top - down society Conclusion: Environmental problem can not be solved by cooperation Impact:The tragedy of the commons became a metaphor for a lot of problems in the 60s and 70s: overpopulation, firewood crises around the world, acid rain, urban crime, etc. An image of helpless individuals destroying their own resources.

8 The Tragedy of the Commons Are the only solutions on environmental problems privatization or state intervention? Adam Smith or Karl Marx? Is it impossible for people to cooperate? Does collective action always lead to depletion of resources? In the 80s scholars started to question these assumptions in systematic scientific way. Most prominent Elinor Ostrom

9 Elinor (Lin) Ostrom Born in Beverly Hills, CA PhD UCLA 1965 Indiana University

10 Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom) Workshop for Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 1973 An inter-disciplinary research group focused on the study of institutions, development, and governance.

11 Elinor Ostrom Governing the Commons th Edition 2011 Modern Classics Cited by 22,791 according to Google Scholar (October 5, 2015) (compare citation January 18, 2013 and 19,670 citations October 17, 2014) Translated to at least 13 different languages. Self-Governing is possible

12 Governing the Commons Describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. An explains why they are wrong. Tragedy of the commons The free rider problem Prisoners dilemma

13 Governing the Commons Tragedy of the commons. An pasture open to all.. Most obvious flaw: The metaphor is wrong, the pastures were not open to all. Not Open access User groups that could decide management rules

14 Governing the Commons The free rider problem Mancur Olson 1965: The Logic of Collective Action A self-interested individual will not act to achieve their common interest. Their is always a temptation to free-ride. With monitoring and sanctions by a user group it is possible to stop free riding.

15 Free-riding Open Access

16 Governing the Commons Prisoner s Dilemma A noncooperative game Shows the difficulty for individuals to pursue their joint welfare as contrast to individual welfare. By choosing the best for the individual they end up with the third best result for both.

17 Governing the Commons The paradox: individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes. Challenge a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational outcomes. Basic problem: People talk to each other in many management situation with commons.

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19 Other use cars They use public transportation I take my car Comfort and traffic jam Comfort and no traffic jam I travel by public transportation Less comfort and traffic jam Less comfort and no traffic jam Peterson 2009

20 Driving a car gives more comfort and more comfort is better than less It is rational for every one to take their own car. However it creates huge traffic jams. Alternativ outcome better for all: accepting the slightly lower comfort in public transportation and avoid all traffic jam (only if most people do).

21 Source:

22 Four different Goods Subtractability of use Difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries Low Easy to Exclude Low (one person s use doesn t reduce what is left for others) Toll Goods cinemas, private parks, satellite television High (use by any person reduces what is left for others) Private Goods food, clothing, cars, personal electronics High Difficult to Exclude Public Goods free-to-air television, air, national defense Common-pool resources fish stocks, timber, coal

23 Governing the Commons Design principles for Robust Governance of common-pool resources (CPRs). Studied long enduring CPRs: High Mountain Meadows in Töblen, Switzerland, Irrigation in Spain and The Philippines, Villages in Japan Governing Forests and Mountains Commons, Inshore Fisheries in Turkey, etc. Similarities between them. 8 Design principles.

24 Design Principles 1. Well-Defined Boundaries 1 A. User boundaries: Clear boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers must be clearly defined. 1 A. Resource boundaries: Clear boundaries are present that define a resource system and separate it from the larger biophysical environment.

25 Design Principles 2 A. Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions. 2 B Appropriation and provision: The benefits obtained by users from a common-pool resource (CPR), as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provision rules. Fairness is a crucial attribute.

26 Design Principles 3 Collective-Choice Arrangements Most people that are affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying their rules.

27 Design Principles 4 Monitoring Most long-surviving resource regimes select their own monitors, who are accountable to the appropriators or are appropriators themselves and keep an eye on resource conditions well as on harvesting activities.

28 Design Principles 5 Graduated Sanctions Users who violates rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions. The initial sanction needs to be considered more as information to the person who is caught.

29 Design Principles 6 Conflict resolution mechanisms Users had rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.

30 Design Principles 7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. Users have long-term tenure rights to the resources.

31 Design Principles 8 Nested Enterprises For larger common-pool resources, like irrigation systems. The presence of governing activities organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

32 Institutions Rule of the Game, Do s and Don ts Formal and informal Douglass C. North Institutional Diversity No blue prints No Panaceas

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34 IAD-Framework Institutional Analysis and Development Framework Ostrom 2010

35 SES-Framework

36 Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2013

37 Polycentrism A system where citizens are able to organize not just one but multiple governing authorities at different scales. An example: A farmer could be member of many governing authorities for fisheries, hay-making, making fence (Horisontal) as well as vertical, villige meetings, parish meetings etc.

38 Trust Crucial to build trust between users For small as well as large commons No one wants to be a sucker, keeping a promise that everyone else i breaking Ostrom 1990:44

39 Impact Not only market and state Self-Governing is possible Empower people Collective action can make change Institutional Diversity

40 Impact Large commons: Air, Oceans, Fresh Water The Globe as a Common Knowledge as commons: Cities as commons Activist like David Bollier and Silke Helfrich

41 Common property regimes Often, but not always successful But private property regimes and state property regimes has also failed many times

42 Anti-Commons Heller 2013 The Tragedy of the anti-commons Fragmentation leads to wasteful underuse Patents - two many owner hard make new drugs

43 Climate Change The largest commons Climate change is a global public bad No one can be excluded Everyone has an incentive not to take costly action to avoid negative externalities. Accept the theories of Olson and Hardin

44 Climate Change Is it possible to use the design principle for global commons, to scale up. Neighborhood Comparison, compare your consumption with your neighbors Is a polycentric approach possible Complexity of causes: polycentric solutions Multiple units can be strong not chaotic

45 Climate Change Instead of ONE Global remedy local knowledge and local commitments are important parts. Local level must be involved. If your not involved less likely you will comply (design principle 3) Lin would say that we can t wait for a global solution

46 We CAN, so we MUST. Elinor Ostrom