Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy: National and Supranational Venues of Influences and Public Sector Organizations in the Netherlands

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1 Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy: National and Supranational Venues of Influences and Public Sector Organizations in the Netherlands Kutsal Yesilkagit (University of Utrecht) Sandra van Thiel (Erasmus University Rotterdam) Paper to be presented at the EGPA Conference Study Group 6 Governance of Public Sector Organizations, September 2007, INAP, Madrid Work-in-progress Contact details: Dr. Kutsal Yesilkagit Utrecht School of Governance University of Utrecht Bijlhouwerstraat ZC Utrecht The Netherlands Tel a.k.yesilkagit@uu.nl Dr. Sandra van Thiel Public Administration Erasmus University Rotterdam P.O. Box 1738, room M DR Rotterdam The Netherlands Tel vanthiel@fsw.eur.nl

2 1. Introduction The political control of public administration is one of the most central concerns of students of politics and administration since the days of Wilson and Weber. 1 On both sides of the Atlantic, fear of unresponsive and runaway bureaucracy has prompted many research endeavors in the past century. Since the 1970s, the work of Niskanen (1971) and the anti-bureaucratic mood that prevailed under neo-liberal ideologues have given a firm foundation for bureaucrat-bashing. Ironically, perhaps, the implementation of a neoliberal agenda within the public sector, i.e. privatizations, liberalization and New Public Management, has even deepened skepticism over responsive bureaucracy instead of bringing it under political control. Political reformers hived off departmental units from ministries, created highly specialized organizations, and delegated substantial degrees of autonomy to these (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004; Majone 1994; Levi-Faur 2005) As a consequence, the creation of autonomous and specialized bodies diminished leverage for political control and increased problems of coordination within the public sector (Christensen & Laegreid 2006). Today, the public administrations of the advanced capitalist economies offer a fragmented and multifaceted view: the public sector is inhabited by a multitude of organizations having different designs, created by different legal instruments, and have different financial and budgetary regimes (OECD 2002; Whethenhall 2003). The quest for political control has become even larger than it was several decades ago. Is the public administration now beyond the effective control of democratic institutions? Have politicians and, as their principals, citizens abdicated authority to a professional and expert bureaucracy? Are the chains of accountability definitively cut off? One type of answer that can be found within literature is that this is what actually has happened. Some refer to this as the hollowing out of the state (Rhodes 1994), others as the displacement of politics away from the democratic centers of powers (Bovens 1995). Politicians stand vis-à-vis with multiple centers of administrative authority that formally no longer fall under their direct control and responsibility. 1 Both scholars have looked different upon the issue however. Whereas Wilson feared the overpoliticization of the bureaucracy through the appointment of political executives and the spoils systems, Weber feared the democratically elected representatives failure to become the master the fourth estate. 2

3 Moreover, this problem is aggravated by other developments within the core of democratic governance: political parties are not only loosing their members but also their traditional roles as representatives of the electorate; as regards the electorate itself that has become highly volatile across Europe (Gallagher et al 2005). Another answer is that although government has declined, governance has risen (Peters & Pierre 2000; Kjaer 2004; Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004). In governance theory, government, i.e. the hierarchical steering of society through the hierarchical chain of command running form citizens to bureaucrats, has been complemented by policy networks of public and private actors (Kickert et al 1997). Instead of being steered and controlled by a single political master, public organizations now have to respond to a multitude of principals, such as their clients, interest groups and other public organizations, and in Europe the European Union. The influence of politicians has perhaps declined, the governance argument goes, but this decline has not resulted in more autonomy for the bureaucracy. Instead the retreat of government has created space for horizontal forms of governance. 2 In this paper we will examine political influence on public sector organizations in the Netherlands. We will present findings of our survey that we conducted under 219 semi-autonomous public sector organizations in this country. The majority of these organizations are fully or semi-independent from political oversight and have been created during the past twenty years. The reason for why we selected these organizations is that if government has declined in favor of governance, we should be able to see this with these organizations, as they are because of their formal position most liable to external non-governmental influence. We are particularly interested in the following three questions. How autonomous are public sector organizations de facto in the Netherlands? Which venues of influence do exist and to what extent do they affect these organizations policymaking? And, finally, does there exist a relationship between the perceived degree of influence exerted by these venues and the level of autonomy reported by these organizations? If the governance theorists are correct we should find that traditional political venues of influence in the Dutch parliamentary system are (1) just 2 However, Peters and Pierre (2000) warn against dismissing hierarchical governance as it is still the dominant over horizontal forms of governance; a recent comprehensive literature review of empirical studies in governance concludes that there is no substantive evidence for the decline of hierarchy in public governance (Hill & Lynn 2005). 3

4 one of the many venues of influence in the environment of the organization and (2) the level of the political influence of non-political venues is comparable to the level of influence exerted by political venues. We will show that in the case of the Netherlands, that we find neither support for the hollowing out metaphor nor for the governance thesis. Instead we conclude that hierarchical governance at the national level is still the most typical form of governance. 2. Analyzing Political Influence on Public Sector Organizations: Approaches and Findings within US Studies While there is no shortage of academic studies on the relationship between politicians and public bureaucracy in parliamentary systems, there exist relative few studies of political influence that use positive theories, causal models and that have systematically collected and analyzed data on political influence. The dominant line of research within the field of political-administrative relationships in parliamentary settings, whether it focuses the political influence of top level bureaucrats or political executive and independent agencies, is descriptive and institutional (Peters 1988; Pollit & Bouckaert 2000; Svara 1998; Hansen & Ejerbo 2002; t Hart et al 2006; Pollitt & Talbott 2004; Peters & Pierre 2004). It is for this reason that we turn to US studies of political influence. There, studies of political influence formed a reaction to the established but empirically ungrounded view within US scholarship that bureaucracy was out of control because only a small fraction of resources [were] going into congressional oversight, the haphazard nature of the oversight activities that did take place, the lack of expertise by members of Congress and their staffs, and the disregards of bureaucrats for their members (Miller 2005: 209). During the 1980s the congressional dominance theories of bureaucratic politics emerged (McCubbins 1985; Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989), showing that Congress exerted both ex post controls through the appropriation process, legislation and legislative changes, and oversight hearings (Weingast & Moran 1983; Bendor & Moe 1985; Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Epstein & O Halloran 1999) and ex ante controls through agency design, administrative procedures, audits and compulsory reporting 4

5 (McCubbins 1985; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast 1987; Macey 1992; Potoski & Woods 2001; Whitford 2002). Presidential influence theories of political control were a reaction to this school, demonstrating that Presidential influence over the bureaucracy flows through the authority to appoint agency directors, reorganization, and budgetary powers (Beck 1982; Moe 1982, 1985; Wood 1988; Bendor & Moe 1985; Howell & Lewis 2002; Lewis 2003). Both congressional dominance and presidential influence studies focused on just a single principal, and have been criticized by scholars arguing and applying a multiple principal approach to the study of bureaucratic control. Focusing on the President and Congress, then, Hammond and Knott (1996: 163) conclude that bureaucratic autonomy is a contingent matter depending on the strategies pursued by the President, the House and the Senate in a given circumstance. In some circumstances (e.g. events) some agencies may enjoy more autonomy than in other circumstances, but the systemic finding is that political control is a matter of joint custody of president, congress and the courts. These scholars have claimed, first, that there are no justifying grounds, neither theoretically nor empirically, that political influence can be conceived as a singular dyadic relationship only involving a single principal and an agent (Wood & Waterman 1991; Hammond & Knott 1996; Furlong 1998). Secondly, these studies have made a strong case for modelling political influence in terms of venues of influence, as bureaucratic agencies perceive influence to be exerted by differently perceived sets of principals (Waterman, Rouse & Wright 1998: 19). There are more venues than those composed of governmental principals alone. In reality bureaucratic agencies are surrounded by a number actors all with (different and competing) interests in influencing certain parts of the organization s policies. Using the survey method, Furlong (1998) mapped the environment of bureaucratic agencies and measured, through a survey, the relative influence of the president, Congress, the courts, interest groups and the general public on a group of twelve federal agencies, as this influence was perceived by the staff of these agencies. He found a clear distinction between Congress and president on the one hand and the courts, interest groups and the general public on the other. The federal governmental institutions were perceived as exerting significantly more influence than any other actor. Furlong has also tested the 5

6 perceived use and effectiveness of presidential, Congressional and interest groups methods of influence. He found differences between how often a method was used and to what extent it was perceived as effectively influencing the organization. For example, the use of advisory committees with interest group representations is relatively low, its perceived effectiveness however is high, indicating that public organizations are reluctant to bring interest groups into the policy process, but when they do, their influence is high. Overall, however, his study finds that Congress and president, the core political principals have the greatest influence on public organizations, a finding that questions the governance and hollowing out theses. Furlong s findings are supported by those of Waterman, Rouse, and Wright (1998). Waterman and his colleagues conducted two surveys, one including the employees of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the second the employees of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). In these surveys, they asked these employees to rate the degree of influence of a number of political and administrative actors in their environment on their agency. Using two statistical techniques, multidimensional scaling and factor analysis, Waterman et al examined the extent in which similarities existed in the in the respondents perceptions of influence of political principals. They hypothesized whether agents do not perceive that influence is exerted solely by each separate principal in a dyadic fashion; rather bureaucrats perceive that certain types of principals (e.g. interest groups, state-level actors, an agency s hierarchical masters, or political appointees) exert similar forms of influence (Waterman et 1998: 23) Their findings support their hypothesis as they find that [B]ureaucratic agents do not perceive principals solely as separate and distinct actors, as has been common modeling practice in the principal-agent literature. Agents also perceive that various principals exert similar characteristics (Waterman et al 1998:35). They draw clear distinctions between Congress and president, client groups and material interest groups. 6

7 3. Political influence analysis in a parliamentary context: The Netherlands We will follow a similar line of approach as that of Furlong and Waterman, Rouse and Wright. Our aim is to replicate to a certain extent these studies for parliamentary systems and map ad measure the multiple venues of influence that play a role in policymaking of public organizations in parliamentary systems. The Netherlands political system is a parliamentary democracy of the consociational type (as opposed to the Westminster type, see Moe & Caldwell 1994), among its basic political institutional features the consequent production of multiparty governments founded upon a stable, often oversized, parliamentary majority coalitions that usually form as a result of the country s proportional electoral system (Lijphart 1999; Andeweg & Irwin 2005). This system also differs sharply from the US system due to the ministerial portfolio system (Laver & Shepsle 1996). In contrast to the US presidential system where a clear separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches juxtaposes President and Congress on a relatively equal footing, within parliamentary systems the legislature and executive are more or less lined up with the latter being fully responsible and dependent upon the legislature through a vote of confidence. 3 There is a singular chain of delegation from voters to parliament, from parliament to cabinet, from cabinet leadership to individual minister, and from the individual minister to the bureaucracy the singularity principle (Strøm 2000). At the executive end of this chain, individual ministers are the relevant privileged actors. Their portfolio assigns to them an autonomous role for making policy proposals for within their portfolio. This system makes a minister an agent of parliament but at the same time a principal for the bureaucracy that is assigned to her portfolio. The autonomy of bureaucratic agencies is partially dependent on the formal powers of the minister (Christensen 2001). Within parliamentary systems, ministers are ultimately responsible for the decisions, actions and behaviour of bureaucrats residing 3 This is the case in the Netherlands. In other parliamentary democracies, e.g. where minority governments are the norm such as in Scandinavian countries, the relative balance between the executive and the legislature is more in favor of the latter than in the case of the Netherlands. Parliamentary systems also differ along a range of other more formal dimensions, such as the necessity of a formal vote of confident. For these variations please refer to Lijphart (1999), Müller and Strøm (2003) 7

8 under their authority. 4 Analyses of political influence in European parliamentary regimes requires an analysis of the European Union institutions notably, the Commission and the European Court of Justice influence on public sector organizations. Influence relationships within the context of the EU do not conform to formal hierarchical top-down principal-agent model: the singularity principle stops at the nation-state level (Curtin 2007; Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999). Political and administrative institutions within the member states both try to influence EU policies by uploading their preferred policies and at the same time get influenced when EU policies are downloaded within the member state. Throughout the entire cycle of the EU policy process, national civil servants and representatives of public sector organizations partake in various committees, working groups, and other formal and informal meetings (Laegreid et al 2004; Larsson 2003; Trondal & Veggeland 2003). Overstepping the individual networks of civil servants are the emerging multilevel networks of regulatory authorities in areas covering the by now classic regulatory EU areas of telecommunications, environment and electricity, but also newer areas in vogue within the EU such as food safety, maritime safety, financial services and equal treatment. Governance in these areas is characterized by a new form of experimentalist governance very different from the model of principal agent governance in classic models of democracy: relationships between authorities at the various levels of governance within the EU, it is argued, are more characterized by organizations seeking for solutions and learning about their implications by applying or testing them or discussing them with peers, rather than a relationships within which one actor, the hierarchically superior one, gives precise and clear instructions to the subordinate authority (Sabel & Zeitlin 2007). An allegedly third distinguishing feature between European parliamentary 4 In the Netherlands, one of the instruments to determine the degree of discretion is laid down in the Guidelines for legislation (Aanwijzingen voor regelgeving). Indirectly it prescribes to individual ministers what kind of powers they can delegate to independent bodies as well as the areas on which this discretion may be used. Article 124f (1) states that only on organizational and technical matters and in special cases provided that the ministers beholds his power to (dis)approve with the agency s decision. Further it prohibits through Article 124f (2) the delegation of advisory tasks with regard to the formulation of general binding rules in matters pertaining to central governmental policies. A minister may delimit the policy discretion of agencies by issuing general (article 124l, 5b); issue guidelines to the agency of how to execute their tasks (article 125l, 6). 8

9 systems and the US is the structure of pressure group-bureaucracy interactions. Idealtypically the pressure group politics in the US are characterized by pluralism in which the interest groups compete with one another to secure a monopoly access to governmental decision-making centers. This stands in sharp contrast to the ideal-typical representation of interests within the European context, namely through neo-corporatism in which politicians delegate formal authority to representatives of the major interest organizations in socio-economic policy sectors. Representatives of interest organizations are given seats within extra-parliamentary representative or executive bodies and hence co-produce the formulation and implementation of public policies in areas of their interest. Of course, in reality neither system can be characterized as either pluralist or corporatist there are much more flavors than these two (Van Waarden 1992) and interest group-politics relationships are not static and change over time (Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999; M. Molina & Rhodes 2002). Whatever the shape of pressure group politics, interest groups are expected to exert influence on public sector organizations. Next to these three major venues of influence we need to include the following sets of actors: consultants, citizens as public opinion, citizens as clients or target group of public organizations policy programs, and the media. The influence of consultants on public sector organizations is rarely studied, although in the Netherlands alone is spend on external advise (xxxx). Consultants advises focus on organizational reforms as well as policy evaluations; this may have influence on public sector organizations. The relationship between media and political influence is extensively known, including the impacts of the media on public sector organizations (Carpenter 2002). Citizens, then, have regularly contact with public sector organizations as clients or as target group of certain agencies and public organizations with large client groups will expectedly be affected by their clients (Wilson 1989). Finally, seemingly indirect and deluded, but nevertheless influential is the influence exerted by public opinion (Kingdon 2003; Baumgartner and Jones 1993) 9

10 4. Methodology Survey administration In May-June 2006 we carried out a survey among Dutch public sector organisations. The questionnaire consisted of 50 questions on different topics regarding for example discretionary authority to select target groups and policy instruments; the financial system in use; third party influence, participation in EU policy process; audit and accountability; organizational culture; influence on the development of new policies; position and role of the board; and the use of a large number of management techniques like performance indicators, HRM and quality care. 5 In this paper we only use the data that pertain to autonomy and external influence. Data were analysed using SPSS We send the survey to the entire population of public sector organizations in the Netherlands organisations were identified using earlier research and government documents and websites. 7 Of 47 organizations the addresses were wrong (29) or declined to cooperate (8). In the end, then, the survey was send to 574 organizations. The survey was placed on the Internet and filled out by respondents from 219 organizations, of which 14 returned the questionnaire by mail (response rate 38%). 8 For the purposes of this paper, we filtered a group of organizations, Statutory Trade Associations and Water Boards because of their special constitutional position. Since this group comprised of only 13 respondents the response rate drops to 36%. As the response rate for the different types of public sector organisations was not statistically significantly different from their proportion in the population, the sample is considered representative. The survey raises some potential concerns. First, the response rate per question varies. For example, the question concerning the autonomy of the organization in selecting the target group was returned by 143 respondents (25%) and the same question 5 This questionnaire is part of an international comparative study into the autonomy and steering of public sector organizations (PSOs). The survey had been carried out before in Belgium, Norway, and Ireland (see The survey focuses on PSOs at national level only. 6 Of course, some minor organizations may well have been overlooked. The dataset, however, contains the most comprehensive overview of these bodies in the Netherlands for the period under research (2006) 7 The list of organizations can be obtained from the authors. 8 As the response rate for the different types of public sector organisations was not statistically significantly different from their proportion in the population, the sample is considered representative. 10

11 with regard to the choice of policy instrument by only 108 organizations (19%). This may cause some bias in favor of the type of organizations that responded most. For each question we weighted the responses per type of organization and thus simulated the proportionate responses from each type of organization. We found no differences in means between the simulated and sample, so that we believe that bias will be limited. Second, 85 organizations (39%) belonged to a cluster of organizations. 9 In order to account for clustering we calculated aggregated values for the cluster organizations. However, when compared with the outcomes with the non-aggregated values we found no significant difference. Third, we send our survey to the directors of the organizations. 46% of the surveys were answered by the director himself. Some of the answers required specific knowledge of financial and personnel issues and were answered by persons within the organization best suited for answering these questions (4%). In some cases, we learned that directors delegated the survey to the secretary of the board of directors (23%). Some of the organizations are headed by a chairperson and in these cases the questionnaire was filled in by them (12%). Of course, what you see depends on where you sit and the identity of the respondent may have caused a bias in the survey. On the other hand, these persons are the most informed about the questions we asked and hence best suited to answer the survey. The organizations in the survey With the Statutory Trade Associations and Water Boards dropped from the dataset, the organisations that participated in the survey can be grouped into four categories based on their legal statutes. This division coincides with an increasing degree of formal (legal) autonomy (cf. Christensen & Yesilkagit, 2006:208): contract agencies, independent administrative bodies, legal entities with a statutory task and government foundations (see table 1). Contract Agencies (in Dutch: agentschappen) have no legal personality and all their decisions are subject to full ministerial accountability. They are former directorates of ministries. Their autonomy is restricted to managerial decisions, within legal and financial boundaries. For example, they can use an accrual accounting system 9 Land commissions, universities, chambers of commerce, police regions, museums, food quality control agencies, and adult and vocal training centers. 11

12 and save profits from one year for investments in the next year to a maximum of 5% of total revenues. Contract agencies cannot however borrow money or participate in a limited company. Independent Administrative Bodies (in Dutch: ZBOs) have more managerial freedom than contract agencies. Almost all ZBOs have legal personality, which can be based on public (about 60% of cases) or private law (about 40%). Their performance is only in part subject to ministerial accountability; the Minister of the parent department is responsible for the policy that is implemented by the ZBO, the decision to charge a ZBO with this task and the supervision of the ZBO. All other aspects of performance like customer service and target setting are up to the ZBO. Performance agreements are laid down in annual contracts or other documents (note that the term contract is used, but only in name; it has no or little legal binding effect). Legal Entities with a Statutory Task (in Dutch: RWT) are statutory bodies with legal personality, either based on public or private law. In practice, most of these bodies are school boards. We have not included boards of primary and secondary schools into our survey because their huge numbers would complicate statistical analyses too much (about 2500 boards exist in The Netherlands). All higher education RWTs were included though. Other examples of RWTs are museums and university hospitals. RWTs are independent organisations, which are appointed by law to carry out a particular public task for which they receive funding from the government. There is no clear description yet of their level of autonomy and ministerial accountability. Finally, government foundations (in Dutch: overheidsstichtingen) are foundations established by or on behalf of the government, and involved in some sort of public task. Foundations have legal personality based on private law, and are managed by a board. The Dutch government hardly ever delegates government representatives for these boards. Foundations in our sample are on average small organisations, partly run by volunteers. They include examples like organisations of military veterans, and supporters of a museum. Several ZBOs and RWTs are also government foundations; in case of overlap foundations have been listed only in the ZBO or RWT category. Recently the Dutch government has published a charter document for the establishment of government foundations. 12

13 Table 1. Size and budget of four types of public sector organizations (2006) Type of organization Response (% of sample) Size in fte (mean, min-max) Budget in Euro *1000 (mean, min-max) Contract agency 16 (7%) 3053 ( ) n= ( ) n=12 Independent administrative body Legal entity with a statutory task 84 (38%) 537 (2-6800) n=54 39 (18%) 1129 ( ) n=26 Government foundation 67 (31%) 61 (2-312) n=28 Total 206 (36%) ( ) n= ( ) n= ( ) n=43 Measuring autonomy and political influence Of the various dimensions of autonomy, e.g. policy, financial, structural, personnel, and legal (see Christensen 2001; Verhoest et al 2004), we concentrate in this paper on only policy and financial autonomy. We measured the following attributes of policy and financial autonomy (table 2). Organizations were ranked high on policy autonomy the more they can choose their target groups and policy instruments independently from the minister of their parent department, and when they were more (pro)actively involved in the policymaking process. The financial autonomy of organizations was measured with regard to the level of discretion they enjoyed in obtaining loans from the capital market and set the tariffs for their products and/or services; were free to join partnerships with other entities under private law and to shift between running costs and program costs on their budgets as well as to shift their budget over time, i.e. budget years. We asked respondents to estimate the influence of potential venues of influence on their organizational by rating them on a 3-point scale ( To what extent is your organization s policies influenced by [venue s name]?, scale 1 = not, 2 = to some degree, 3 = to a large degree). We group the venues of influence in three categories: national governmental, supranational, and non-governmental venues of influence (see table 3). 13

14 Table 2. Description and operationalisation of policy and financial autonomy variables Dimension of autonomy Operationalisation Survey question Policy autonomy Discretion to choose target group Influence of organization on choice of target groups (scale 1 = Ministry chooses independently 5 = Organization chooses independently) Discretion to choose policy instrument Involvement in policymaking process Influence of organization on choice of policy instrument (scale 1 = Ministry chooses independently 5 = Organization chooses independently) To which extent is organization involved in policy making? (scale 1= not at all 5 = always, we take often initiative) Financial autonomy Obtaining loans from capital market Setting tariffs for products & services Participation in private entities Shifting running & program cost budgets Shifting budgets over time Can the organization obtain loans independently? (scale 1 = no, 2 = after approval of ministry, 3 = yes) Can the organization set tariffs for products and services independently? (scale 1 = no Can the organization participate in private entities independently? (scale 1 = no2 = after approval of ministry, 3 = yes) Can the organization shift its budget between running and program costs independently? (scale 1 = no2 = after approval of ministry, 3 = yes) Can the organization shift its budget over time independently? (scale 1 = no2 = after approval of ministry, 3 = yes) The influence of the EU, we already argued, cannot be captured by a dyadic principalagent model. 10 In order to account for that we asked our respondents to rate their organization s involvement in designated activities during the input or uploading and during the output or downloading of EU policies. As for the input side we asked our respondents to what extent they participated in the preparation of the Dutch position at the national level (before going to Brussels), and the frequency with which their organization s member participated in Council, respectively, Commission working groups. On the output side we asked our respondents to rate their organization s degree of involvement in the transposition and execution of EU policies or the extent in which their organization was affected by the conditions of (other) EU policies. 10 The scale applied here was developed for the project The Europeanization of the Civil Craft of which Yesilkagit was a member. The research team further consists of Karin Geuijen, Sebastiaan Princen, and Paul t Hart (University of Utrecht) and Ellen Mastenbroek (Radboud University Nijmegen). The scale was applied in a survey directed at individual civil servants. For the purpose of this survey the questions have been adapted to public sector organizations. 14

15 Table 3. Category and identity of venues of influence with potential influence on organizational policies (scale 1 = not, 2 = to some degree, 3 = to a large degree) Stakeholder category Identity of stakeholder National governmental Parliament (Second Chamber) Cabinet Minister of parent department Minister of finance Other ministers Supranational governmental European Union* mode of involvement: a. input: preparation of Dutch position, participation in EU working groups, participation in EC committees b. output: transposition of EU policies, execution of EU policies, reckoning with conditions set by EU policies Non-governmental stakeholders Clients Interest groups Consultants Media Public opinion * the influence of the EU is further refined as we asked to the nature of relationship with the EU, i.e. participation in working groups, EU committees, transposition of EU legislation etc. See below. 5. Results We first present findings for policy and financial autonomy. We will show the mean s for each dimension of autonomy as they are given by the four types of organizations in our survey. We then present our findings for the perceived degrees of external influence by external actors at the national level. We will distinguish the perceived influences of governmental and non-governmental venues of influence. Finally, we will examine the extent of supranational influence. Does the EU have any influence on the functioning of public sector organizations and how can we qualify that influence? For each step we produce the means, anova results, and also correlations between autonomy and venues of influence. Policy and Financial Autonomy Table 4 presents the means and ANOVA statistics for policy autonomy. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test shows that only levels of involvement in departmental 15

16 policymaking and discretion to select policy instruments significantly differs between the various types of organizations, albeit it that this is stronger for the latter than the former given the size of the F-statistic and significance level. What is further interesting is that although the four types of organizations can be ordinally ranked from formally residing under the minister to formally independent from the minister, this is not reflected in the mean rank scores. As for involvement, contract agencies are more involved in the departmental policymaking than governmental foundations, and independent administrative bodies more than any other type of organization. We would have expected that the closer an organization is to the minister, the less autonomy it would enjoy in setting policies. However, the findings for involvement suggest that closeness to the policymaking centre is of more importance than autonomy. 11 The difference in mean ranks for discretion to select target groups is not significant between the groups. Still we can see that organizations located further from the ministerial department have reported higher levels of autonomy in selecting target groups than those located closer to the ministerial department. We can see that there is a divide between contract agencies on the one hand and the others on the other hand. Being located at arms length, these results suggest, have at least an effect on the perception of autonomy of the respondents. Our findings, by contrast, does reveal a significant difference between the group means. 12 These findings show that location as a measure of bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. distance from the ministerial department, as such is not reflected in the levels of policy autonomy A multiple comparisons test shows that two groups differ from each other, i.e. independent administrative bodies and legal entities with a statutory task, albeit in a very weak sense as p = This is confirmed by a t-test: t = 2.963, p = A multiple comparison test shows that the mean differences between contract agencies and independent administrative bodies (p = 0.010) and between the latter and government foundations (p = 0.017) differ significantly for each other. If we relax the level of significance we also find that the mean differences between contract agencies and legal entities with a statutory task (p = 0.059) significantly differ from each other. 13 Not reported here, but we also have executed ANOVA tests whereby we compared organizations performing regulatory tasks as against those performing other tasks. Organizations that performed regulatory tasks are those that reported in the survey as primary task of their organization the following: monitoring, quality control, inspection, licensing and permits, registration, adjudication, and drafting general binding rules. We found that organizations performing regulatory tasks were significantly more involved in policymaking than other organizations (p = 0.017). For the other two dimensions of policy autonomy we found the same ranking, but different levels of significance: for selecting target groups p = and for selecting policy instruments p =

17 Table 4. Actual involvement in policy-making and use of policy-making discretionary power to select target groups and policy instruments vis-à-vis own ministry, measured per type of organization. For involvement: 0 = Not at all and 5 = Always, because we often take initiative ourselves. For both policy autonomy measures: 0 = Ministry takes most decisions, independent from us, and 6 = We take all decisions, no involvement ministry. 14 Involvement in Discretion to select target Discretion to select policymaking: groups: policy instruments: Type of organization Mean mean Contract agencies 3.27 (0.65) 3.55 (1.21) 3.90 (1.37) Independent administrative bodies 3.72 (0.97) 4.40 (1.43) 5.09 (0.99) Legal entities with statutory tasks (1.06) Government foundations 3.19 (1.26) (0.85) 4.43 (1.10) (0.57) 4.32 (1.22) F = p = F = p = F = p = 0.01 Total (N) *Means, standard deviations in brackets Table 5 presents the means for financial autonomy. 15 In this table the discretion to obtain loans, the set tariffs, participate with other (e.g. private) parties in private law entities, to shift moneys from (parts of) their budget from running to program costs, and to shift budget over time (i.e. years). Except for setting tariffs and shifting budgets over time, contract agencies enjoy the least autonomy from their parent department than the other groups of organizations. Contract agencies have lesser degrees of autonomy than independent administrative bodies, legal entities with a statutory task and government foundations as regards obtaining loans from capital markets, the discretion to participate in private entities such public-private partnerships, and the shifting between running and program costs within their own budget without prior consent of the parent department. With regard to the autonomy to shift budgets over time, contract agencies have been 14 Organizations belonging to a cluster have been ascribed the mean value of their cluster (note: none of the contract agencies belongs to a cluster). There are no significant differences in the scores. For example, before aggregation of the clusters, the means for involvement of organizational types within which certain bodies were part of a cluster are exactly the same as before, but the standard deviations have somewhat increased: independent administrative bodies = 3.72 (1.04), legal entities with statutory tasks = 3.00 (1.38) and government foundations = 3.19 (1.41). Given the non-response, we have weighted the four categories of organizations. We found no significant differences between the mean rank scores. For example, after weighting for types of organizations, the means, std. dev. and counts (N = 114) for Discretion to select target groups became contract agencies = 3.55 (1.24), independent administrative bodies = 4.40 (1.43), legal entities with statutory task = 4.48 (0.85) and government foundation = 4.43 (1.10). 15 ANOVA tests with weighted cases as well as analyses without aggregating for clusters produced similar results. 17

18 explicitly designed so as to be freed from the input line-item budgets (Smullen et al XXX). The most remarkable finding in this table is therefore perhaps the observation that as regards the discretion to set tariffs contract agencies enjoy substantially more autonomy than independent administrative bodies (2.08 versus 1.86). The majority of legal entities with statutory tasks and government foundations are institutes of higher learning that set their tariffs for academic years and other courses, which explains these categories high ranking. A multiple comparison test, however, reveals that for the mean rankings of the autonomy of tariff setting, that the means rankings of contract agencies and independent administrative bodies does not significantly differ. We were able to reject the null hypothesis that the population means are equal because of the significant levels of the differences of means between independent administrative bodies and legal entities with statutory tasks and government foundations. Table 5. Mean rankings of degrees of various measures of financial autonomy. Can you 1 = No, 2 = Only after approval of ministry, 3 = Yes. Obtaining loans Participation in for investment private entities Type of organization Contract agencies Independent administrative bodies Legal entities with statutory tasks Government foundations 2.17 (0.83) 2.42 (0.78) 2.80 (0.17) 2.67 (0.73) Setting tariffs for products & services 2.08 (0.49) 1.86 (0.73) 2.40 (0.15) 2.70 (0.66) 1.69 (0.75) 2.00 (0.72) 2.76 (0.28) 2.50 (0.81) Shifting running & program cost budgets 1.83 (0.72) 2.36 (0.76) 2.83 (0.05) 2.63 (0.67) Shifting budgets over time 2.38 (0.65) 2.34 (0.75) 2.84 (0.27) 2.35 (0.79) F = p = F = p = F = p = F = p = F = p = Total (N) Means, standard deviations in brackets Finally, we were interested in whether levels of financial autonomy may be affected by levels of policy autonomy. There are no theoretical nor empirical reasons to assume that both dimensions of autonomy are independent. That is when designing agencies, policymakers may consider the level of financial autonomy that she wants to delegate to public organizations in conjunction with the level of policy autonomy. The 18

19 Pearson correlations given in table 6 confirm this for two dimensions of policy autonomy (selecting target groups and policy instruments) and two dimensions of financial autonomy (setting tariffs and shifting running costs and program costs). The findings suggest that the freedom to set tariffs for the organization s products and services is traded off for its autonomy to select target groups and policy instruments. Table 6. Pearson correlations for levels of financial autonomy and policy autonomy Involvement in Discretion to select target Discretion to select policymaking groups policy instruments Obtaining loans for - - investment Setting tariffs for * ** products & services Participation in private entities Shifting running & ** 0.230* program cost budgets Shifting budgets over time * p < 0.05, p < 0.01 (one-tailed) This seems to make sense: the organization could impose high tariffs on a self-selected target group, which may be electoral harmful; and when an organization is given the autonomy to set its own tariffs, the legislature apparently wants to control the type of policy instruments the organization will choose to implement its policies. By contrast, if an organization is given autonomy to select target groups and policy instruments, it would become a burden for an organization if it lacked the autonomy to shift its available budget between running and program costs. The positive correlation between the autonomy to shift between running and program cost budgets and the autonomy to select target groups and policy instruments seems to be a logically connected National Venues of Influences and Public Sector Organizations Above we examined the levels of autonomy for each type of public organization. In this section we will examine the respondents perception of the amount of influence that external political actors within the domestic arena exert on their organization. We asked respondents to rate the perceived influence of the Second Chamber (the Dutch lower house), cabinet (as a collegiate decision-making body), the minister of the parent 19

20 department, the minister of finance, other ministries, client groups, interest groups, consultants, and the media. The results of an analysis of variance test are displayed in table 7. Except for the means for cabinet and interest groups influence, none of the F- statistics is significant (at the 90% level). Table 7. Perceptions of influence by domestic political actors by various types of organizations (1 = no influence, 2= to some degree, and 3 = to a large degree). Type of Second Cabinet Minister Minister Other Client Interest Consultants Media organization Chamber parent of ministers groups groups department finance Contract agencies Independent administrative bodies Legal entities with statutory tasks Government foundations (0.72) 1.77 (0.64) 2.10 (0.55) 1.86 (0.74) (0.72) 1.85 (0.72) 2.38 (0.59) 1.82 (0.77) (0.65) 2.36 (0.68) 2.45 (0.60) 2.30 (0.60) (0.70) 1.44 (0.58) 1.65 (0.67) 1.56 (0.71) (0.87) 1.53 (0.65) 1.75 (0.64) 1.67 (0.56) (0.75) 2.15 (0.60) 2.55 (0.60) 2.28 (0.73) (0.52) 2.00 (0.59) 2.15 (0.75) 2.13 (0.67) (0.47) 1.60 (0.57) 1.76 (0.54) 1.90 (0.56) (0.52) 1.57 (0.65) 1.81 (0.60) 1.76 (0.66) Public 1.82 (.87) 1.49 (0.58) 1.68 (.67) 2.00 (0.73) Overall means per political actor 1.86 (0.66) 1.97 (0.73) 2.39 (0.64) 1.56 (0.65) 1.64 (0.65) 2.27 (0.66) 2.02 (0.65) 1.72 (0.56) 1.65 (0.63) 1.69 (0.70) Total (N) F =1.184 F=3.568 F=1.054 p=0.319 p=0.016 p=0.372 Means, standard deviations in brackets F=1.788 p=0.154 F=0.841 p=0.424 F=1.902 p=0.133 F=2.624 p=0.054 F=1.813 p=0.149 F=1.308 p=0.276 F=3.504 p=0.018 We can still draw the following observations. First, the findings show that the minister of the parent department is considered overall the most influential political actor. This is what we could expect on the basis of the formal power structure within parliamentary systems. If we look at the means for each type of organizations, we see that ministerial influence is reported highest, again as expected, by contract agencies followed by legal entities with a statutory task, independent administrative bodies and government foundations. Second, the political actor that is overall rated as having the lowest level of influence is, surprisingly, the minister of finance (1.59). This is unexpected as the minister of finance has generally been considered as one of the main veto players, next to the prime minister, throughout classical as well as recent studies of finance and treasury departments (Heclo & Wildavsky xxxxx; Wanna et al xxxx). Still, and as expected, of the different types of organizations, contract agencies have reported the minister of finance 20

21 as most influential as compared to the other types. One explanation for the low ranking of the finance minister may be caused by the fact that it is equated with cabinet (2.39) in which the minister of finance plays a pivotal role in general governmental decisionmaking. Finally, the overall mean rankings then show that the most influential actors on organizational policymaking are the clients which the organizations policies serve and interest groups within their environment (2.27 and 2.06, respectively). Overall, this picture gives the idea that the public sector organizations in this survey operate within an arena that is demarcated by forces within the realm of their policy sector. The organizations ministers of their parent department, their clients and their interest groups are considered to be more influential than parliament, the cabinet and other ministers, consultants and the media. It confirms the existence of pockets of policymaking, i.e. policy communities, whose members have a large say in the policies of the organizations. If we look at the organizations individual mean scores we can rank per organization the political actors that are perceived as most influential. For various dimensions of influence, the picture is different from when we look at the overall means. For contract agencies, the minister of the parent minister is by the far the most influential actor. Given the fact that contract agencies structurally fall under the direct hierarchical supervision of the minister, this is no surprise. This perhaps also explains why interest groups, and the media for that matter, are perceived as less influential as compared to the overall score. As contract agencies are directly accountable to the minister interest groups and the media will direct their efforts at the central department or the minister. This is partly confirmed by the high ranking of the hierarchical principals, i.e. cabinet, minister of finance, other ministers and cabinet, as compared to other organizations. Client groups, however, remain highly influential. Some of the agencies are indeed providers of services, such as the Tax Service, Prison Service and the Patent Office. For independent administrative bodies, ministers of the parent department too are the most influential actors, but the influence of the cabinet, parliament, the finance minister and other ministers is substantially lower than those reported for contract agencies. These weaker formal hierarchical ties are underlined by the score for interest group influence. As the minister is only responsible for the policy outcomes of the 21

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