Democracy as threat for populism M.M.A.C. van Ostaijen MSc MA

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1 Populist versus Cosmopolitan Nationalism: Implications for a Liberal Europe The Impact of Migration on Populism in The Netherlands, Spain and Germany Barcelona, October 2012 Democracy as threat for populism M.M.A.C. van Ostaijen MSc MA We are not interested anymore in our heritage and our ancestors. We don t know anything about our history and common identity and we are unaware of our achievements, to which democracy is one of them This statement is from Pim Fortuyn, one of the most important Dutch populist politicians of the last decades, assassinated in By this statement he politicizes democracy, as populist politician, as something of us and our identity. For me, this questions: where does democracy ends and populism starts? This statement shows the tense issue connection of populism with democracy because I think the biggest challenge of populism seems its origin: democracy. I will elaborate on this tense and fragile relationship between populism and democracy, in two steps: 1) Firstly, I will empirically zoom in on populism and its relation with migration, to 2) Secondly, be able to reconfigure what consequences this has for our theoretical understanding of populism and democracy. I will first empirically zoom in on populism and its relation with migration by delivering some highlights of our study on populism in migration policies. Populism & Migration I consider populism as a distancing discourse. In a sense that it relates two concepts: a heartland of a certain ingroup in opposition of an outgroup of a certain Other. This can be a horizontal Other (the migrant) or a vertical Other (the elite). By relating antagonisms proximity of a heartland and distancing of an Other can take place. Therefore I conceptualize populism as a discursive distancing strategy of antagonistic relationships. This distancing discourse can therefore occur in every social playing field and is not allocated for politics only. And therefore, populism is not reserved for populists only. Populist discourse can be played out in politics, in public policy and administration, in mass media, arts, maybe even in sciences (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2012). In one study we studied populism in public policies as most likely case (van Ostaijen & Scholten, u.r.). To be specific; within migrant integration policies, since populism seem to have a niche for this issue. We studied this distancing discourse within the period of 2002 until 2010 in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. This study brings two major issues forward: 1) Policy populism is present without the need of political populism (as manifest political populist party). But when political populism is in charge, policy populism becomes more manifest. To exemplify this aspect of policy populism, this is a sentence of Rotterdam integration policy in 2002: 1

2 The situation arose, where new newcomers do still not feel welcome in the city, old newcomers are still not integrated and Rotterdam citizen do not feel at home anymore in their city (City of Rotterdam, 2002, p. 5). This shows a very manifest distancing discourse of ingroup people (Rotterdam citizens) opposing an outgroup (new and old newcomers, which means migrants) problematized towards each other. This is how populism, as distancing discourse, comes forward and can legitimize certain governmental interventions. The second issue our study showed is: 2) The presence of populism as distancing discours, changed the usage of ingroup and outgroup categories; and migration policy as topic has changed. The usage of ingroup and outgroup categories changed in such a way that the ingroup (people) became inclusive-civic (like everybody, Amsterdam citizens, the average Rotterdam citizen) and that the others became exclusive-ethnic (like Moroccans, criminal Antilleans). This development sharpened the demarcation line who is in and who is out of society on the basis of ethnicity. The usage of migration as policy topic also changed. In our study we showed that the migration problem has become a safety problem. This connects with literature on the securitization of migration (Huysmans, 2006). This shift can be exemplified: Social integration delivers an important contribution to the social cohesion, which is a premise for informal social control and for subjective and objective safety. Working on safety and social integration needs to go hand in hand (City of Rotterdam, 2003, p. 7). This hegemonic practice of safety is an overall strategy to discipline certain deviancies, mostly certain ethnicities, making migration first of all a safety issue. This can be an effect of populist emergence. However, as articulatory practice we found that there is no need for political populism to influence the existence of policy populism. Policy populism can exist even when there is no political populist party in charge. This shows the shift of populist significance from only a political towards a broad social phenomenon. For instance, in another study we showed that the mechanisms by which populism operates are also present in mass media (van Ostaijen & Jhagroe, 2012). Therefore, since populism has this major emergence within society in which politics is just a manifest case, its significance cannot be underestimated. But at the same time, a lot of liberals and democrats can feel inconvenient about this emergent reality. Do we just need to accept this new emerging reality or are there ways to resist? Thus, I question: to what extent are democracy and populism conflicting each other? And from a democratic point of view: in what way do we need to understand or justify the emergence of populism? This aspect considers the second part of my contribution. 2

3 Populism & Democracy How do we need to understand or justify the emergence of populism as social phenomenon? For answering this question, I need to start with an example. The picture next to this text refers to an artwork of Maurizio Cattelan. And however its family name suggests different, he is an Italian artist. This artwork is installed in the Dutch museum Boijmans van Beuningen in Rotterdam and is in my opinion, a striking artistic portrait of populism as social phenomenon. Next to the conceptualization of populism as distancing discourse, to study it as social or sociological development, populism can be seen as rebelling, provoking the status quo or breaking with the establishment. This is what Cattelan portraits: a man breaking through the ground floor and taking position within the established 17 th century Dutch masters. An artwork of a normal man, contrasted with paintings of famous Dutch masters, as the artistic elites. And it is not only a normal man, this sculpture represents Cattelan himself. He visualizes a personalized break with the establishment. Therefore, it is the literal breakthrough of the normal man claiming a position in the establishment of the museum. For me, this artistic creation is a very clever symbolic illustration of populism as social mechanism. Why do I show this artistic expression of Cattelan? Some consider populism as a syndrome, a virus or a modern problem (Taguieff, 1995; Urbinati, 1998; Taggart, 2000) or as anti-democratic or anti-parliamentary (Canovan, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2002, Houtman & Achterberg, 2010). With Cattelan I show a different mechanism which in politics makes that populism reminds democracy of itself (Schinkel, 2012). Political populism is a direct appeal to the real people. In that sense, it claims to be the authentic, pure and romantic version of democracy: a technique of government by and on the basis of the people. And by centralising the people as such, it reminds democracy of its own core constitution. And therefore it cannot be anti-democratic or a problem. There is only one main difference, which needs consideration. Populism tends to appeal to the people. The people (as heartland, ingroup) is an important rhetoric construction pretending that one appeals to the people as majority. But, democracy is constituted as collection of minorities, and on this specific part populism and democracy conflict. Political populism does appeal to the real people or the normal citizen. It pretends to represent a large popular movement. By neglecting its minority status, it fills in, what Lefort (1991) has called, the empty place of power. By doing that it is not a 3

4 representation of the people, it pretends to be its presentation. This aspect is what liberals and democrats fear the most as the totalitarian temptation of populist emergence. Also in Belgium, liberals and democrats feared the populist rise of Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block), later called: Vlaams Belang, Flemish Interest. In the beginning, the Flemish Interest had huge election victories for the Flemish as well as the Belgian parliament. But all parties in Belgium put up a cordon sanitaire: the overall agreement that every political party will exclude cooperation with Flemish Interest. The effect? Flemish Interest diminished in every election with a rock bottom at the latest municipality elections, 10% in Antwerp, once their main seat. Some politicians and political scientists see in this case the best example for a cordon sanitaire: it stimulates the steady fall of populist parties. But, the Belgian case shows a truly different reality. At the time of the cordon sanitaire, a new political party was established: the N-VA (New Flemish Alliance), now led by frontman Bart de Wever. This N-VA positioned itself as the acceptable variant of Flemish Interest, with no racist or extreme right insinuations, but instead being a nationalist, separatist and populist political party. And while Flemish Interest diminished, the N-VA raised. And even in bigger amounts, N-VA now even has a stronger populist voice. Recently that large that Bart de Wever can become the major of Antwerp. Ironically, this cordon sanitaire made populism in Flanders stronger than ever before 1. By marginalizing populism, it expanded. In the Netherlands, liberals and democrats also feared the emergence of Geert Wilders Freedom Party. With his provocative political style and rebelling agenda, he presented unconventional politics. For instance, he wanted to restrict further immigration, restrict further European integration and stop subsidies for the cultural elites. In the former national elections of 2010 his party was with 24 seats (of 150) the 3th largest party in the Netherlands. The negotiations constructed a minority government in which the liberals and christen-democrats gave him a tolerance position (gedogen) in this minority government. This meant that he supported the government on his policy issues like migration, foreign policy and culture, but he could distance himself from policy in which he was not in favour. For these latter issues, this minority government needed to gain support at other parties in parliament. In this Dutch case, the manifest political populist party was accommodated. They gave him indirect governmental power, but on issues of government as such, he was directly responsible. Therefore, when he stepped out and quitted the last negotiations on large governmental reductions, he was blamed for its immoral performance, taking no responsibilities for the country. Accommodating new or populist parties directly in the seat of power is a wellknown Dutch strategy of pacification: if you can t beat them, join them. By connecting the provocative strains of this populist party within Dutch consensus democracy, 1 In the Chamber of Representatives: FI: 2007: 17 and 2010: 12 N-VA: 2007: 7 and 2010: 27 4

5 populism becomes toothless. The last national elections of some months ago, Geert Wilders PVV diminished to 15 seats, now convicted to the opposition. Summing up, what do both cases learn us? Between accommodation and aversion, as democratic answer, the Dutch case shows that populism, but any kind of new political movement, can at best be accommodated. That means: within the rule of law and by means of democratic conflict. The emergence of populism shows a need of conflict, a need to repoliticize politics. In that sense, populism reminds democracy of itself. And therefore populism reminds all other politicians to (re)politicize certain issues again. By democratic conflict liberals and democrats can distance themselves on populist issues by further politicizing it. It opens the opportunity to take a stance on those issues, of which the establishment thought that were solved or finished. Like how Cattelan reminds museum visitors of the normal people in the face of the artistic elite. Cattelan s art sculpture enables to revalue the old Dutch masters from a provocative perspective. Confronting sculpture, but an artistic contribution. Like populism: confronting politics, but a democratic contribution. The Belgian aversion case of the cordon sanitaire shows that democracy can threaten itself if it does not fully accept its own constitution of minorities. By a cordon sanitaire a certain majority within democracy pass a certain minority by neglecting it as such. This illustrates that democracy has the largest incapability to handle with minorities in times of populist politics. At this point democracy can become a totalitarian value even at the point that some minorities can be excluded. Democracy is build upon the thesis: we agree to disagree. Exclusion cannot be legitimate on the basis of content, its size or its persons. In this way we can reverse the argument that populism is a threat for democracy in the argument that democracy can be a threat for populism, since democracy has the largest incapability to cope with minorities in times of populist politics, see the cordon sanitaire. In this way, democracy can be a threat for itself. The Belgian and Dutch examples show Lacanianly that you can only understand yourself in the face of the other. Populism faces democracy with its own mirror. Liberals and democrats can only face populism by not denying its mirror image. I wish you good luck. 5

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