Globalization and Income Convergence
|
|
- Gladys Dalton
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Globalization and Income Convergence Kaitlyn R. Wolf College of Business and Economics West Virginia University Morgantown, WV em : Kaitlyn.Wolf@mail.wvu.edu Andrew T. Young College of Business and Economics West Virginia University Morgantown, WV ph: em : Andrew.Young@mail.wvu.edu JEL Codes: E02, O11, O43, O47 Keywords: globalization, institutions, income convergence This version: January
2 Globalization and Income Convergence Abstract: The income convergence literature suggests that poor countries can catch-up to rich ones conditional on sharing certain characteristics with rich countries. Good institutions such as strong property rights and rule-of-law are key amongst those characteristics. From a policy perspective this is disheartening because economists have little understanding of how to transplant those institutions to developing countries. Worse, good informal institutions seem to be a necessary condition for formal institutions to stick. However, to the extent that good institutions can arise as a spontaneous order from individuals interacting with one another, allowing for an open society may be an effective development policy. To evaluate this proposition we explore whether or not increased globalization fosters income convergence. Based on a panel of up to 184 countries covering the years 1970 to 2009 we conclude that it does. In particular, the social dimension (as opposed to the economic or political dimensions) of globalization is robustly related to income convergence. JEL Codes: E02, O11, O43, O47 Keywords: globalization, institutions, income convergence 2
3 1. Introduction According to the World Bank, an estimated 1.29 billion people lived on less than $1.25 a day in That is a marked improvement over the 1.94 billion who lived in extreme poverty in Given population growth, this represents a difference between 22 percent of the developing world s people in 2008 versus a staggering 52 percent in While the extent of poverty alleviation is impressive, the absolute number of people who are extremely poor remains very large. The stark contrast between per capita incomes in the developed versus the developing worlds has spawned a large empirical literature on convergence starting with Barro & Sala-i- Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer, & Weil (1992). 2 This literature asks whether poor economies tend to catch-up to richer ones. The consensus answer: yes, conditional on having characteristics similar to those of rich economies. The findings of early cross-country studies are consistent with what Barro (2012) calls the iron law of convergence : the gap between current and long-run income levels narrows at a rate of 2 percent annually. Given a 2 percent rate of convergence a country s income gap will be halved in about 35 years. Later studies using panel data and including country fixed effects in their estimations report considerably higher convergence rates between 4 and 10 percent per year (e.g., Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel, & Lefort (1996)). 3 But even based on the pessimistic iron law one may find it encouraging that substantial improvements in well-being can occur within a generation or less. 1 last accessed September 11, Sala-i-Martin (1996) provides a review of the early literature. 3 However, Barro (2012) argues that the inclusion of country fixed effects biases convergence rate estimates upwards and that this bias is likely as large as the downward omitted variable bias that fixed effects estimation attempts to alleviate. 3
4 However, one must keep in mind that cross-country convergence rates are conditional on poor countries being able to emulate the characteristics of rich countries. This reality can be disheartening, particularly in light of studies reporting that, among those characteristics, institutions rule (Rodrick, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Evidence suggests that institutions such as well-defined and enforced property rights (Knack & Keefer (1995), Hall & Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu & Johnson (2005)) and the rule-of-law (Barro (1996) and Rodrick et al. (2004)) are critical. Indeed, Knack (1997) argues that where income convergence is absent, a lack of good institutions is to blame. Economists and policymakers have little understanding of how to transplant such institutions to developing economies and it is unlikely that any given institution political or economic can be reformed independent of complementary institutions (Sobel & Coyne, 2011). In particular, informal institutions (such as trust and a belief in self-determination) may be necessary for formal institutional reforms to stick (Williamson, 2009). 4 If economists and policymakers have little understanding of how to transplant property rights and the rule-of-law, then they have next to no understanding of how to transplant norms such as trust. Hayek (1960, p. 27) observes that informal institutions consist in large measure of forms of conduct which [an individual] habitually follows without knowing why [and] uses because they are available to him as a product of cumulative growth without ever having been designed by one mind. Hayek s (1945) arguments regarding the price system and the use of knowledge in society are well-known; his later arguments concerning the growth of knowledge in the evolution 4 Based on a cross-country sample and data from the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, Williamson (2009) finds that formal institutions are only positively related to growth if they are grounded in strong informal institutions. Her results are consistent with the regression theorem argument of Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson (2008) that the likelihood of an institutional change succeeding is a function of that institution s relationship to individuals in the previous time period. In their terminology, informal institutions provide the mētis that (formal) institutional changes may or may not stick to. 4
5 of institutions receive somewhat less attention. Above all, claims Hayek (1960, p. 30), we should provide the maximum of opportunity for unknown individuals to learn of facts that we ourselves are yet unaware of and to make use of this knowledge in their actions. Given our ignorance of how to transplant institutions, an alternative is to increase the opportunities for individuals in poor economies to observe, experience, and experiment with the institutions of rich economies. This can foster a process of institutional change where endogenous institutions emerge spontaneously as the result of individuals actions, but are not formally designed (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008, p. 335). An open society may allow for piecemeal institutional change where individuals in developing countries adopt only the changes that are, at that time, compatible with their current institutional framework; but in doing so they modify that framework, setting the stage for future incremental adoptions. With this in mind, we employ a panel of data from up to 184 countries covering the 1970 to 2009 period to ask whether increased globalization is associated with a higher rate of income convergence. We estimate the horizontal convergence rate (i.e., the rate at which a country closes the gap between its per capita income level and that of the richest nation in the sample) as a function of the KOF globalization indices described in Dreher (2006). The definition of globalization in this context is the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas (Dreher, 2006, p. 1092). Separate indices are reported for the economic, political, and social dimensions of globalization. We find that increased globalization has a statistically significant and large effect on convergence. In particular, the results suggest that social globalization is associated with faster horizontal convergence. 5
6 Our study is related to the growing empirical literature on cross-country institutional spillovers and their effects. For example, Seldadyo et al. (2010) and de Groot (2011) find that countries tend to cluster according to their institutional quality. Also, de Groot (2011) empirically identifies cross-country spillovers in political freedoms. Bosker and Garretsen (2009) report that economic growth in a country is positively linked to the institutional quality of its neighbors. Furthermore, Simmons and Elkins (2004) find that countries do not copy the policies of their neighbors indiscriminately; rather, they tend to copy only those associated with good economic outcomes. Given that institutional spillovers are important for economic outcomes, globalization ostensibly opens up the channels for those spillovers. 5 We have organized this paper as follows. Section 2 outlines our approach to estimating the horizontal convergence rate as a function of, among other things, the extent of globalization. The data that we employ is described in section 3. Results of our analysis reported and discussed in section 4. We then provide a concluding discussion in the 5 th and final section. 2. Empirical Model Our analysis follows Xu and Li (2008) in modeling changes in the relative incomes of countries across time. Specifically, we model what Xu and Li (2008) refer to as horizontal convergence the rate at which the gap narrows between any given country s income per capita and that of the richest country. 5 Sheehan and Young (2013) report that increased Internet access is generally associated with increases in economic freedom. Internet access is one sub-component of the KOF social globalization index. The exception that they document is countries that start from very high initial levels of economic freedom. In those cases, they argue, it is likely that the Internet fosters emotional contagion and an increased demand for collective action through political processes. 6
7 Horizontal convergence is different than, though related to, the conditional convergence analyzed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer, & Weil (1992). In a conditional convergence regression of income growth, the estimated coefficient on the initial income level is used to infer the rate at which an economy approaches its balanced growth path. The balanced growth path itself is estimated via the inclusion of additional controls (e.g., the investment ratio; the population growth rate). Our approach, alternatively, takes the richest country s income level as the point of comparison and estimates the rate of horizontal convergence as a function of various controls, in particular the globalization indices. Horizontal convergence has at least a couple of advantages over the conditional convergence concept. First, we can make statements about the rate at which a country s standard of living is improving relative to the highest standard that is actually observed (as opposed to the unobserved and potentially quite low balanced growth path of that country). Second, we can estimate which factors are important determinants of how quickly that actual gap narrows. The horizontal convergence ratio is measured by the ratio of a country s (i s) income per capita to that of the richest in the same time period. Define this ratio as Si and then assume that, (2.1) S it 1 1 exp f Z it, where f(βzit) is the horizontal rate of income convergence, Zit is a vector of that rate s determinants, and β is a vector of parameters representing the relationships between the elements of Zit and the convergence rate. Equation (2.1) can be transformed into the form, it (2.2) L exp f Z it S it. 1 S it Our empirical model is derived by taking the natural log of (2), assuming a linear form for f, and appending an error term: 7
8 (2.3) it 0 j it, j it N ln L Z. j 1 Equation (2.3) specifies the horizontal convergence rate as a function of Zit. We estimate (2.3) by OLS. In some specifications we also include period fixed effects. In all cases we report heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. 3. Data For the construction of Sit (a country s relative real per capita GDP level in period t) we draw annual data from the World Bank s World Development Indicators (WDIs) from 1970 through We define 1 as the upper bound of. GDP per capita (GDP_PC) is reported in constant 2000 US$. We then take five year averages ( , , , , , , , and ). The panel is unbalanced with up to 184 countries. In principle, the highest average income country for each period constitutes the denominator of Sit. However, the highest average income country in our sample is typically, depending on the time period, Monaco or Liechtenstein. We consider these to be extreme outliers. (For the former has a per capita GDP of $95, 885 while the latter has $80,388; by way of comparison the average US GDP per capita during that period is $37,905.) On a-priori grounds we are hesitant to use these countries as benchmarks. Therefore we instead take the highest average income OECD country as the benchmark for each period. The US provides this benchmark for ($19,358) and ($21,496); Switzerland for ($29,271) and ($31,761); and Japan for ($35,206). For the remaining four periods Luxembourg is the benchmark ($39,264-$52,076). We also check the robustness of our results to using the US as the benchmark in every period. 8
9 We utilize the KOF indices as measures of different dimensions of globalization (Dreher (2006); Dreher et al. (2008b)). Broadly defined, globalization is conceived of as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies, and governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence (Dreher 2006, p.3). More specifically, the KOF indices attempt to gauge the networks and flows of ideas, people, capital, information, and goods across country borders. This index of globalization has been used widely in empirical studies and has been positively linked to several types of good economic outcomes. These outcomes include economic growth (Dreher, 2006), life expectancies ((Bergh and Nilsson, 2010a), and people s subjective evaluations of their own well-being (Hessami, 2011). 6 KOF rates 207 countries on the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. The overall globalization index (GLOB) is a weighted-average of the three dimension sub-indices. All of the KOF data is annual and the overall globalization index (as well as each of the economic, social, and political subindices) is on a scale of 0 to 100. We take 5-year averages corresponding to the same periods as our GDP data ( ,..., , and ). The economic globalization index (E_GLOB) is designed to incorporate two components: economic flows and restrictions to trade and capital. Data on trade, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment are used to score economic flows; the index is increasing in these flows. Measures of hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, and taxes on international trade are used 6 While the KOF social globalization index, specifically, has been positively linked to income inequality, particularly in developing economies (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010b), it has been negatively linked to gender inequality (Potrafke and Ursprung, 2012).Increased globalization has also been hypothesized to fiscally constraint governments by subjecting them to increased budgetary pressures from without. Dreher et al. (2008A) report evidence based on the KOF index that fails to confirm this so-called disciplining hypothesis. Samimi et al. (2012) report a negative relationship between the KOF index and inflation; alternatively, there authors fail to find an independent link between a more conventional measure of trade openness and inflation. 9
10 along with an index of capital controls to score trade and capital restrictions. The index is, of course, decreasing in these restrictions. Flows of information, ideas, images and people across international borders are the basis for the social globalization index (S_GLOB). This index involves three components. The first is personal contacts: the direct interaction among people across international borders using measures such as telecom traffic, tourism, and international letter volume. Information flows is the second component and is based on measures of Internet and television usage, as well as subscriptions to international newspapers. The third component is cultural proximity: the extent to which cultural beliefs move across borders. This component is based on measures such as the number of books imported and exported and the number of McDonald s restaurants and IKEA stores in a country. The social globalization index is increasing in each of these three components. Political globalization (P_GLOB) is the most straightforward of the globalization indices. It is based on the number of embassies and high commissions within a country; the number of international organizations of which the country is a member; as well as the number of UN peace missions the country has participated in. Political globalization is increasing in all of these measures. We include additional control variables from the WDIs. These control variables include gross capital formation (K); gross rates of primary school, secondary school, and tertiary school enrollment (PRIM_EDU, SEC_EDU, and TER_EDU, respectively); life expectancy (LIFE_EXP); and the rate of population growth (POP). Gross capital formation (the primary driver of convergence in neoclassical growth theory) is measured by investment as a percent of GDP. School enrollments are percentages of countries populations enrolled at each level and 10
11 control for investments in human capital. As a measure of the health of the labor force, life expectancy is included. The population growth rate is another standard control variable from neoclassical growth theory. Our dependent variable is also constructed from WDI data. GDP per capita is stated in constant 2000 US dollars. To control for political and economic institutions, three measures are used. Economic institutions are measured using the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index from the Frasier Institute (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 2011). The EFW ranking uses larger numbers to indicate larger levels of economic freedom within a country, with a maximum score of 10. Political institutions are controlled for using two measures, a measure of political freedom from the Freedom House and a measure of democracy from the Polity IV index. Freedom House creates a political freedom score based on an individual s ability to participate in the political process within their country, with lower scores indicating more freedom (Freedom House, 2012). Democracy is measured using the Polity IV Project s democracy variable, with accounts for three elements of democracy; the presence of institutions that allow citizens to express preferences about policies and leaders, whether or not formal constraints on the executive, and the availability of civil liberties to all citizens (Polity IV, 2013). Larger values for democracy indicate more democracy within the country. Combining these data we arrive at an unbalanced panel that includes up to 184 countries and covers 5-year periods from 1970 to Table 1 reports descriptions, sources, and summary statistics for all of the variables included in our analysis. 4. Results 11
12 Results from regressions of the specification shown in equation (2.3) are presented in Table 2. Columns 1 to 3, and column 6 provide pooled OLS results while columns 4 to 5 and 7 to 8 provide results that include period fixed effects to control for unobservable differences across time. Column (1) reports results from our baseline specification, including a positive and significant (1% level) estimated relationship between GLOB and the rate of horizontal convergence. Column (2) reports on an expansion of the baseline specification that includes the standard controls associated with neoclassical growth theory, and the column (3) specification includes both the neoclassical controls and measures of institutional quality. The estimated relationship between globalization and the horizontal convergence rate is positive and significant in all cases, However, the coefficient point estimate does decrease moving from column (1) to column (2), and then from column (2) to column (3). Including both neoclassical and institutional controls results in a point estimate of 0.020, implying that an increase in GLOB of 19 points (about 1 standard deviation) is all else equal associated with an increase in the horizontal convergence rate of about 38 percentage points. This is a large effect. A difference of 19 points is comparable to the 2005 globalization index differential between the US (about 76) and either Trinidad and Tobago or the Philippines (each about 54). The estimate, then, implies that if those latter countries were to become as globalized as the US then, all else equal, they would close the gap between their income and the richest country by an additional 38% over a 5 year period (or about 6.6% annually). Column (4) reports the results of an estimation analogous to the one in column (3) except that now period fixed effects are included. The coefficient estimate on GLOB increases to about 0.030, implying that a standard deviation increase in the globalization index is associated with, all else equal, an increase in the horizontal convergence rate of about 57 percentage points over 5 years (or about 9.5 percentage points annually). For this estimation (and all subsequent estimations 12
13 including period fixed effects) the F-statistic associated with a test of joint insignificance of the period effects rejects the null at the 1% significance level. These tests results suggest that there is relevant unobserved time variation in horizontal convergence rates that is not captured by our explicit control variables. However, we also note that the R 2 reported in column (3) is and while the inclusion of period fixed effects results in an increase (to 0.844) is not particularly large. Therefore while the inclusion of period effects appears to be appropriate, our explicit control variables are accounting for about 68% of the variation in horizontal convergence rates. Focusing on column (4) (which we consider to be our preferred specification) most of the other control variables enter with the expected signs and are statistically significant (5% level or better). In particular, life expectancy and institutional quality are positively associated with horizontal convergence rates. (Recall that the POL_FREE measure is one where lower values correspond to more political freedoms.) Of the educational measures, only secondary enrollment enters significantly but the estimated effect is positive. The only result that is perhaps surprising is that population growth enters positively and significantly as a determinant of convergence rates. Standard neoclassical growth theory suggests a negative sign on this variable (e.g., Barro and Salai-Martin, 1992, p. 225). The estimated effect is fairly small: a standard deviation increase in a country s population growth rate (about 1.6%) is associated with an increase in the horizontal convergence rate of about 11 percentage points over five years (or more than 2 percentage points annually). Since this is only a control variable in our analysis we do not dwell on it any further. Columns (5) through (8) report various robustness checks. First, column (5) reports results that use the US as the benchmark per capita income level in each period (in place of the richest OECD country). The positive and significant relationship between globalization and the horizontal convergence rate is robust to this change in the benchmark. Quantitatively the coefficient estimate 13
14 on GLOB increases from (column 3) to (column 4). (Since this is a robustness check and the replacement of the US as the benchmark is somewhat arbitrary we do not put too much stock into this increase.) Then columns (6), (7), and (8) report results that are analogous to those reported in columns (3), (4) and (5) save for the fact that the Polity IV measure of democracy (DEMOC) replaces Freedom House s political freedom score (POL_FREE). This substitution of measures of the quality of political institutions does not change the results meaningfully. Table 3 presents the results of estimations that consider countries economic, social, and political globalization scores separately (E_GLOB, S_GLOB, and P_GLOB, respectively). All specifications in table 3 include period fixed effects. The estimations reported in columns (1) through (4) include the Freedom House measure of political institutions as a control; the estimations reported in columns (5) through (6) include the Polity democracy index. All estimations include investment, education, and population growth rate controls. When only economic globalization is included (columns (1) and (5)) it enters positively and significantly (5% level). The coefficient point estimates are both 0.011; considerably smaller than that associated with the overall globalization index in column (4) of table 2. The sample standard deviations on GLOB and E_GLOB are similar ( versus ) so the difference in coefficient estimates is meaningful. The coefficient estimates on the political globalization sub-index (columns (3) and (7)) are also small. The sample standard deviation of P_GLOB is larger than that of the other two sub-indices (26.458) but its effect is still roughly similar to that of economic globalization. Alternatively the estimated effects of social globalization (columns (2) and (6)) are comparable to that associated with the overall globalization index. These estimated effects are both statistically significant at the 1% level. Globalization, as measured by the KOF index, contributes to income convergence; in particular, the social dimension the flow 14
15 of information and the ideas and images of individuals from other countries appears to have a particularly large effect. Finally, columns (4) and (8) present results with the inclusion of all three subcomponents together. Column (4) reports that, upon inclusion of E_GLOB, S_GLOB, and P_GLOB, only the social measure of globalization remains significant. In column (6), when the Polity IV index replaces the Freedom House measure of political freedoms, both social and political globalization enter significantly (1% level). However, again the estimated effect of S_GLOB is considerably larger than that associated with political globalization. Indeed, the point estimates on both variables (0.033 and 0.006) are virtually the same as when each variable in included separately; without the other. Column (6) provides some evidence that the political dimension of globalization is relevant to income convergence, but columns (4) and (6) both provide evidence that the significant and large estimated effect of social globalization is robust. Table 4 presents the results of estimations of the horizontal convergence rate when globalization is not controlled for but, as in Xu and Li (2008), political and economic institutions are. Column (1) presents results of estimates based on controlling for political institutions using POL_FREE whereas column (2) presents results of estimations using the DEMOC measure of political institutions. The results suggest that previous estimates of the relationship between economic and political institutions may be overstated. Column (1) in table 4 is analogous to column (4) in table 2 and column (4) in table 3, except that globalization controls are not included in table 4. The point estimates for ECON_FREE and POL_FREE are meaningfully larger in table 4 than in both specifications of interest in tables 2 and 3. In particular, the coefficient estimate on ECON_FREE increases from between and to (an increase of more than 51%). These results suggest that the importance of these institutional 15
16 variables as determinants of horizontal convergence rates is likely overestimated when globalization measures are omitted. Column (2) in table 4 is most similar to column (7) in table 2 and column (8) in table 3. Again, the point estimates for the institutional controls (ECON_FREE and DEMOC) are smaller in absolute value in tables 2 and 3 than in table 4. These results, again, suggest that estimates of the relationship between horizontal convergence and institutions may be overestimated when globalization measures are not controlled for. Economic and political freedoms are, of course, highly correlated with globalization. Indeed, these freedoms are what allow for the integration that constitutes globalization. Therefore, we do not interpret our results as discounting the importance of such institutions. Rather, globalization and, in particular, the social integration of countries with one another is likely an important channel through which economic and political freedoms lead to income convergence. Again, these freedoms provide the maximum of opportunity for unknown individuals to learn of facts that we ourselves are yet unaware of and to make use of this knowledge in their actions (Hayek, 1960, p. 30). Whereas economic and political freedoms allow for individuals to better use the knowledge available to their society, the globalization that those freedoms promote leads to the growth of knowledge that is there to be used. 5. Conclusions We explore whether increased globalization promotes income convergence. Based on a panel of up to 184 countries covering the years 1970 to 2009 we conclude that it does. In particular, the social dimension (as opposed to the economic or political dimensions) of globalization is robustly related to income convergence. 16
17 The implications of our results are twofold. First, the estimated impact of economic and political freedoms on income convergence from previous research (e.g., Xu and Li (2008)) is overestimated given that the effects on convergence from globalization have yet to be accounted for. In particular, the promotion of globalization is likely a channel through which the positive correlation between such freedoms and income convergence (in part) manifests itself. Our research adds to the literature by presenting estimates of the association between globalization and income convergence, while controlling for institutional factors. Specifically, our results suggest that social globalization may be of particular importance for increasing the rate of horizontal convergence. Additionally, our results present evidence that increases in globalization may allow for the spread of beneficial institutions and policies across country borders, and in turn may positively impact living standards in globalized countries. Future research in this area may look at the channels through with globalization promotes convergence, and how globalization spreads institutions. 17
18 References Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91, Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J Reversal of fortune: geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S Unbundling institutions. Journal of Political Economy 113, Barro, R Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth1, Barro, R Convergence and modernization revisited ( Barro, R.J., Sala-i-Martin, X Convergence. Journal of Political Economy 100, Bergh, A., Nilsson, T. 2010a. Good for living? On the relationship between globalization and life expectancy. World Development, 38(9), Bergh, A., Nilsson, T. 2010b. Do liberalization and globalization increase income inequality? European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), Boettke, P.J., Coyne, C.J., Leeson, P.T Institutional stickiness and the new development economics. American journal of economics and sociology 67, Bosker, M., Garretsen, H Economic development and the geography of institutions. Journal of Economic Geography 9, Caselli, F., Esquivel, G., Lefort, F Reopening the convergence debate: a new look at cross-country growth empirics. Journal of Economic Growth 1,
19 De Groot, O Spillovers of Institutional Change in Africa. Kyklos 64, Dreher, A Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization. Applied Economics 38, Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., Ursprung, H.W. 2008a. The Impact of Globalization on the Composition of Government Expenditure. Public Choice 134, Dreher, A., Gatson, N., Martens, P. 2008b. Measuring Globalisation- Gauging its Consequences. New York. Springer. Evans, P How fast do economies converge? Review of Economics and Statistics 36, Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., Hall, J. C Economic Freedom of the World: 2011 Annual Report. The Frasier Institute. Hayek, F. A The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hessami, Z Globalization s winners and losers-evidence from life satisfaction data, Economics Letters 112(3), Islam, N Growth empirics: a panel data approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, Knack, S Institutions and the convergence hypothesis: the cross-national evidence. Public Choice 87, Knack, S., Keefer, P Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative measures. Economics and Politics 7, Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D., Weil, D A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, Miller, T., Holmes, K. R Index of Economic Freedom (2011). Washington, D.C.: The 19
20 Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones and Company, Inc. Potrafke, N., Ursprung, H.W Globalization and gender equality in the course of development. European Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming. Rodrick, D., Subramanian, A., Trebbi, F Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth 9, Sala-i-Martin, X Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence. European Economic Review 40, Samimi, A. J., Ghaderi, S., Hosseinzadeh, R., Nademi, Y Openness and inflation: New empirical panel data evidence. Economics Letters 117(3), Seldadyo, H., Elhorst, P.J., and De Haan, J Geography and Governance: Does Space Matter?, Papers in Regional Science. 89, Sheehan, K. M., Young, A. T It s a small world after all: Internet access and institutional quality. Working Paper. Simmons, B.A., Elkins, Z The globalization of liberalization: policy diffusion in the international political economy. American Political Science Review 98, Sobel, R. S., Coyne, C. J The time-series properties of country institutional measures. Journal of Law and Economics 54, Williamson, C.R Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance. Public Choice 139, Xu, Z., Li, H Political freedom, economic freedom, and income convergence. Public Choice 135,
21 Table 1. Descriptions, sources, and summary statistics for variables. Variable Description Source Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. GDP_PC GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank WDIs , , , S Ratio of GDP to Highest Income Country GDP Xu and Li (2008),WDIs S US Ratio of GDP to US GDP Xu and Li (2008),WDIs L Logistic Transformation of S equal to S/(1-S) Logistic Transformation of S L US equal to S US /(1- US S US ) LN(L) Natural Log of Logistic Transformation of S LN(L US ) Natural Log of Logistic Transformation of S US LN(S US ) Natural Log of Ratio of GDP to US GDP GLOB Overall Globalization Index KOF E_GLOB Economic Globalization Index KOF S_GLOB Social Globalization Index KOF P_GLOB Political Globalization Index KOF DEMOC Polity IV Democracy Score Polity IV Project ECON_FREE Economic Freedom of the World Score Fraser Institute POL_FREE Freedom House Political Freedom Score Freedom House K Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) World Bank WDIs PRIM_EDU Primary School Enrollment Rate (Gross) World Bank WDIs SEC_EDU Secondary School Enrollment Rate (Gross) World Bank WDIs TER_EDU Tertiary School Enrollment Rate (Gross) World Bank WDIs LIFE_EXP Life Expectancy at Birth World Bank WDIs POP Population Growth Rate World Bank WDIs
22 Table 2. Regressions of the horizontal convergence rate on globalization indices and other controls, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (Pooled OLS) (Pooled OLS) (Pooled OLS) (Period Effects) (Pooled OLS) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (L US ) (Period Effects) (L US ) GLOB 0.076*** 0.046*** 0.020** 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.053*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) K * * (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) PRIM_EDU ** *** * *** (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) SEC_EDU 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) TER_EDU *** *** *** 0.006** (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) LIFE_EXP 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.053*** 0.047*** (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) POP 0.084** 0.117** 0.068** 0.108*** * (0.036) (0.052) (0.034) (0.037) (0.056) (0.040) (0.042) ECON_FREE * 0.219*** 0.123** *** 0.138*** (0.060) (0.048) (0.049) (0.060) (0.047) (0.046) POL_FREE *** *** *** (0.037) (0.025) (0.030) DEMOC 0.057*** 0.028** 0.021* (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) Countries Observations 1, F-stat. (redundant effects) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) Adj. R Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. HAC standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(l it ), where. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Period Effects are fixed period effects. The null hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. L US indicates that dependent variable relative per capita GDP was calculated using US GDP at the benchmark for all periods. Panel is unbalanced and based on 5-year periods ( , , , , , , , and ). 22
23 Table 3. Regressions of the horizontal convergence rate on economic, social, and political globalization indices and other controls, , using period fixed effects. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) E_GLOB 0.011** ** (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) S_GLOB 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.033*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) P_GLOB 0.004* *** 0.006*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) K ** ** ** ** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) PRIM_EDU * * (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) SEC_EDU 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.016*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) TER_EDU 0.005* *** 0.005* 0.007*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) LIFE_EXP 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.064*** 0.049*** 0.062*** 0.046*** (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) POP * ** (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036) ECON_FREE 0.269*** 0.203*** 0.329*** 0.215*** 0.292*** 0.219*** 0.344*** 0.232*** (0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.049) (0.042) (0.039) (0.049) POL_FREE *** *** *** *** (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) DEMOC 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.029*** (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) Countries Observations F-stat. (redundant effects) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) Adj. R Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. HAC standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(l it ), where. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Period Effects are fixed period effects. The null hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. L US indicates that dependent variable, relative per capita GDP, was calculated using US GDP at the benchmark for all periods. Panel is unbalanced and based on 5-year periods ( , , , , , , , and ). 23
24 Table 4. Regressions of the horizontal convergence rate on economic and political institutional measures and other controls, , using period fixed effects. (1) (2) (Period Effects) (Period Effects) K ** ** (0.006) (0.006) PRIM_EDU * (0.002) (0.002) SEC_EDU 0.024*** 0.022*** (0.002) (0.002) TER_EDU *** (0.003) (0.003) LIFE_EXP 0.069*** 0.065*** (0.007) (0.008) POP (0.036) (0.039) ECON_FREE 0.332*** 0.356*** (0.046) (0.039) POL_FREE *** (0.024) DEMOC 0.040*** (0.011) Countries Observations F-stat *** *** (redundant effects) (0.000) (0.000) Adj. R Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. HAC standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(lit), where. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Period Effects are fixed period effects. The null hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. GDP at the benchmark for all periods. Panel is unbalanced and based on 5-year periods ( , , , , , , , and ). 24
Globalization, Institutions, and Income Convergence
JRAP 47(2): 110-125. 2017 MCRSA. All rights reserved. Globalization, Institutions, and Income Convergence Kaitlyn Harger *, Andrew T. Young #, and Joshua Hall * Florida Gulf Coast University USA, # Texas
More information2017 KOF Index of Globalization
2017 KOF Index of Globalization The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (Dreher, published in 2006) and is updated and described in detail in Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008). The overall
More informationHappiness and economic freedom: Are they related?
Happiness and economic freedom: Are they related? Ilkay Yilmaz 1,a, and Mehmet Nasih Tag 2 1 Mersin University, Department of Economics, Mersin University, 33342 Mersin, Turkey 2 Mersin University, Department
More informationInstitutional Tension
Institutional Tension Dan Damico Department of Economics George Mason University Diana Weinert Department of Economics George Mason University Abstract Acemoglu et all (2001/2002) use an instrumental variable
More informationDoes Government Ideology affect Personal Happiness? A Test
Does Government Ideology affect Personal Happiness? A Test Axel Dreher a and Hannes Öhler b January 2010 Economics Letters, forthcoming We investigate the impact of government ideology on left-wing as
More informationCorruption and Economic Growth
Corruption and Economic Growth by Min Jung Kim 1 Abstract This study investigates the direct and indirect impact of corruption on economic growth. Recent empirical studies have examined that human capital,
More informationEconomists have long posited that institutions matter for economic success,
Culture and Freedom 83 Culture and Freedom Claudia R. Williamson and Rachel L. Coyne 1 1. Introduction Economists have long posited that institutions matter for economic success, but how they matter is
More informationImmigration and Its Effect on Economic Freedom: An Empirical Approach
Immigration and Its Effect on Economic Freedom: An Empirical Approach Ryan H. Murphy Many concerns regarding immigration have arisen over time. The typical worry is that immigrants will displace native
More informationEconomic Freedom and Economic Performance: The Case MENA Countries
The Journal of Middle East and North Africa Sciences 016; () Economic Freedom and Economic Performance: The Case Countries Noha Emara Economics Department, utgers University, United States Noha.emara@rutgers.edu
More informationThe Impact of the Interaction between Economic Growth and Democracy on Human Development: Cross-National Analysis
Edith Cowan University Research Online ECU Publications 2012 2012 The Impact of the Interaction between Economic Growth and Democracy on Human Development: Cross-National Analysis Shrabani Saha Edith Cowan
More informationReal Convergence in the European Union
Real Convergence in the European Union Francisco José Veiga * Universidade do Minho - Portugal Abstract: This essay deals with real convergence in the European Union (EU). Real convergence is here defined
More informationDoes government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test
Does government decentralization reduce domestic terror? An empirical test Axel Dreher a Justina A. V. Fischer b November 2010 Economics Letters, forthcoming Abstract Using a country panel of domestic
More informationA Comment on Measuring Economic Freedom: A Comparison of Two Major Sources
The Journal of Private Enterprise 31(3), 2016, 69 91 A Comment on Measuring Economic Freedom: A Comparison of Two Major Sources Ryan H. Murphy Southern Methodist University Abstract Do social scientists
More informationMatthew A. Cole and Eric Neumayer. The pitfalls of convergence analysis : is the income gap really widening?
LSE Research Online Article (refereed) Matthew A. Cole and Eric Neumayer The pitfalls of convergence analysis : is the income gap really widening? Originally published in Applied economics letters, 10
More informationAll democracies are not the same: Identifying the institutions that matter for growth and convergence
All democracies are not the same: Identifying the institutions that matter for growth and convergence Philip Keefer All democracies are not the same: Identifying the institutions that matter for growth
More informationDo We See Convergence in Institutions? A Cross- Country Analysis
InstituteforDevelopmentPolicyand Management(IDPM) Development Economics and Public Policy Working Paper Series WP No. 33/2012 Do We See Convergence in Institutions? A Cross- Country Analysis Antonio Savoia
More informationVolume 35, Issue 1. An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach
Volume 35, Issue 1 An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach Brian Hibbs Indiana University South Bend Gihoon Hong Indiana University South Bend Abstract This
More informationLecture 1 Economic Growth and Income Differences: A Look at the Data
Lecture 1 Economic Growth and Income Differences: A Look at the Data Rahul Giri Contact Address: Centro de Investigacion Economica, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM). E-mail: rahul.giri@itam.mx
More informationThe First Draft. Globalization and international migration in Asian countries (Testing of competition measurement models)
The First Draft Globalization and international migration in Asian countries (Testing of competition measurement models) Mahmoud Moshfegh: Population studies and Research Center for Asian and the pacific
More informationAUTHOR ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AUTHOR ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT FINAL PUBLICATION INFORMATION Does Fiscal Decentralization Result in a Better Business Climate? The definitive version of the text was subsequently published in Applied Economics
More informationImmigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B. Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results
Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B by Michel Beine and Serge Coulombe This version: February 2016 Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results
More informationCorruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation
Corruption and business procedures: an empirical investigation S. Roy*, Department of Economics, High Point University, High Point, NC - 27262, USA. Email: sroy@highpoint.edu Abstract We implement OLS,
More informationA REPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AT THE STATE LEVEL (PUBLIC CHOICE, 2005) Stratford Douglas* and W.
A REPLICATION OF THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AT THE STATE LEVEL (PUBLIC CHOICE, 2005) by Stratford Douglas* and W. Robert Reed Revised, 26 December 2013 * Stratford Douglas, Department
More informationDivision of Economics. A.J. Palumbo School of Business Administration. Duquesne University. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Division of Economics A.J. Palumbo School of Business Administration Duquesne University Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA Kaitlyn
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM US STATES. Giovanni Peri
NBER WKG PER SEES THE EFFE OF IMGRATION ON PRODUIVITY: EVEE FROM US STATES Giovanni Peri Working Paper 15507 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15507 NATION BUREAU OF ENOC RESECH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge,
More informationThe Effect of Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Aid and International Remittance on Economic Growth in South Asian Countries
St. Cloud State University therepository at St. Cloud State Culminating Projects in Economics Department of Economics 12-2016 The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Aid and International Remittance
More informationNatural Resources & Income Inequality: The Role of Ethnic Divisions
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS OxCarre (Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies) Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ Tel: +44(0)1865 281281 Fax: +44(0)1865 281163 reception@economics.ox.ac.uk
More informationGender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US
Gender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US Ben Ost a and Eva Dziadula b a Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan UH718 M/C144 Chicago,
More informationThe interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis
The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis Author Saha, Shrabani, Gounder, Rukmani, Su, Jen-Je Published 2009 Journal Title Economics Letters
More informationDemographic Changes and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Asia
Illinois Wesleyan University Digital Commons @ IWU Honors Projects Economics Department 2013 Demographic Changes and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Asia Sijia Song Illinois Wesleyan University,
More informationDemocracy and government spending
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Democracy and government Pavlos Balamatsias 6 March 2018 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86905/ MPRA Paper No. 86905, posted 23 May 2018 19:21 UTC Democracy
More informationLABOUR-MARKET INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN OECD-COUNTRIES: WHAT EXPLANATIONS FIT THE DATA?
LABOUR-MARKET INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN OECD-COUNTRIES: WHAT EXPLANATIONS FIT THE DATA? By Andreas Bergh (PhD) Associate Professor in Economics at Lund University and the Research Institute of Industrial
More informationBrain drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries. Are there Really Winners?
Brain drain and Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries. Are there Really Winners? José Luis Groizard Universitat de les Illes Balears Ctra de Valldemossa km. 7,5 07122 Palma de Mallorca Spain
More informationCultural Context: The Productivity of Capitalism
Cultural Context: The Productivity of Capitalism Claudia R. Williamson and Rachel L. Mathers* Abstract Does capitalism perform better when embedded in certain cultures? Given the wide range of economic
More informationSupplementary Material for Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset.
Supplementary Material for Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset. World Politics, vol. 68, no. 2, April 2016.* David E. Cunningham University of
More informationRemittances and Poverty. in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group (DECRG) MSN MC World Bank.
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group
More informationRelative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China
Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China Ye Chen Hongbin Li Li-An Zhou May 1, 2005 Abstract Using data from China, this paper examines the role of relative performance
More informationEconomic Cost of Gender Gaps: Africa s Missing Growth Reserve. Amarakoon Bandara 1. Abstract
Economic Cost of Gender Gaps: Africa s Missing Growth Reserve By Amarakoon Bandara 1 Abstract In this paper we apply the dynamic GMM estimator for an endogenous growth model to analyze the impact of gender
More informationRemittances and the Brain Drain: Evidence from Microdata for Sub-Saharan Africa
Remittances and the Brain Drain: Evidence from Microdata for Sub-Saharan Africa Julia Bredtmann 1, Fernanda Martinez Flores 1,2, and Sebastian Otten 1,2,3 1 RWI, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
More informationDo People Pay More Attention to Earthquakes in Western Countries?
2nd International Conference on Advanced Research Methods and Analytics (CARMA2018) Universitat Politècnica de València, València, 2018 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/carma2018.2018.8315 Do People Pay
More informationthe notion that poverty causes terrorism. Certainly, economic theory suggests that it would be
he Nonlinear Relationship Between errorism and Poverty Byline: Poverty and errorism Walter Enders and Gary A. Hoover 1 he fact that most terrorist attacks are staged in low income countries seems to support
More informationFigure 2: Proportion of countries with an active civil war or civil conflict,
Figure 2: Proportion of countries with an active civil war or civil conflict, 1960-2006 Sources: Data based on UCDP/PRIO armed conflict database (N. P. Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007).
More informationVOTER PREFERENCES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM
VOTER PREFERENCES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM GEORGE R. CROWLEY, JOHN A. DOVE and DANIEL SUTTER The enormous impact that economic freedom can have on economic outcomes makes an understanding of
More informationGENDER EQUALITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
THE STUDENT ECONOMIC REVIEWVOL. XXIX GENDER EQUALITY IN THE LABOUR MARKET AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CIÁN MC LEOD Senior Sophister With Southeast Asia attracting more foreign direct investment than
More informationEndogenous antitrust: cross-country evidence on the impact of competition-enhancing policies on productivity
Preliminary version Do not cite without authors permission Comments welcome Endogenous antitrust: cross-country evidence on the impact of competition-enhancing policies on productivity Joan-Ramon Borrell
More informationRemittances and Taxation in Developing Countries
Remittances and Taxation in Developing Countries Biniam Bedasso Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University July 2017 Biniam Bedasso (Princeton) Remittances & Taxation - UNU-WIDER 07/2017 1 / 1 Introduction
More informationEconomic Freedom Research: Some Comments and Suggestions
Economic Freedom Research: Some Comments and Suggestions Jamie Bologna Tom and Sharon DeWitt Fellow College of Business and Economics West Virginia University Morgantown, WV 26505-6025 jamie.bologna@mail.wvu.edu
More informationUniversity of Groningen. Corruption and governance around the world Seldadyo, H.
University of Groningen Corruption and governance around the world Seldadyo, H. IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please
More informationIs Corruption Anti Labor?
Is Corruption Anti Labor? Suryadipta Roy Lawrence University Department of Economics PO Box- 599, Appleton, WI- 54911. Abstract This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income
More informationThe Correlates of Wealth Disparity Between the Global North & the Global South. Noelle Enguidanos
The Correlates of Wealth Disparity Between the Global North & the Global South Noelle Enguidanos RESEARCH QUESTION/PURPOSE STATEMENT: What explains the economic disparity between the global North and the
More informationQuality of Institutions : Does Intelligence Matter?
Quality of Institutions : Does Intelligence Matter? Isaac Kalonda-Kanyama 1,2,3 and Oasis Kodila-Tedika 3 1 Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 2 Department
More informationThe Supporting Role of Democracy in Reducing Global Poverty
The Supporting Role of Democracy in Reducing Global Poverty Joseph Connors Working Paper no. 16 Department of Economics Wake Forest University connorjs@wfu.edu November 10, 2011 Abstract The Washington
More informationTHE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INCOME INEQUALITY IN ASEAN-5
THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INCOME INEQUALITY IN ASEAN-5 ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between globalization and income inequality as well as economic growth for
More informationCivil liberties and economic development
Journal of Institutional Economics (2010), 6: 3, 281 304 C The JOIE Foundation 2010 doi:10.1017/s1744137410000081 Civil liberties and economic development ARIEL BENYISHAY AND ROGER R. BETANCOURT University
More informationCorruption and Trade Protection: Evidence from Panel Data
Corruption and Trade Protection: Evidence from Panel Data Subhayu Bandyopadhyay* & Suryadipta Roy** September 2006 Abstract We complement the existing literature on corruption and trade policy by providing
More informationEconomic Growth, Economic Freedom, and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data
International Research Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2319 3565 Economic Growth, Economic Freedom, and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data Abstract Islam A.N.M. M. Department of Economics, Asian University
More informationImpact of Human Rights Abuses on Economic Outlook
Digital Commons @ George Fox University Student Scholarship - School of Business School of Business 1-1-2016 Impact of Human Rights Abuses on Economic Outlook Benjamin Antony George Fox University, bantony13@georgefox.edu
More informationMeasuring the Shadow Economy of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka ( )
Measuring the Shadow Economy of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (1995-2014) M. Kabir Hassan Blake Rayfield Makeen Huda Corresponding Author M. Kabir Hassan, Ph.D. 2016 IDB Laureate in Islamic
More informationEnglish Deficiency and the Native-Immigrant Wage Gap in the UK
English Deficiency and the Native-Immigrant Wage Gap in the UK Alfonso Miranda a Yu Zhu b,* a Department of Quantitative Social Science, Institute of Education, University of London, UK. Email: A.Miranda@ioe.ac.uk.
More informationEnglish Deficiency and the Native-Immigrant Wage Gap
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 7019 English Deficiency and the Native-Immigrant Wage Gap Alfonso Miranda Yu Zhu November 2012 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor
More informationWorking Paper Series Department of Economics Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics University of Delaware
Working Paper Series Department of Economics Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics University of Delaware Working Paper No. 2004-03 Institutional Quality and Economic Growth: Maintenance of the
More informationAbdurohman Ali Hussien,,et.al.,Int. J. Eco. Res., 2012, v3i3, 44-51
THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON TRADE SHARE AND PER CAPITA GDP: EVIDENCE FROM SUB SAHARAN AFRICA Abdurohman Ali Hussien, Terrasserne 14, 2-256, Brønshøj 2700; Denmark ; abdurohman.ali.hussien@gmail.com
More informationPoverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr
Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr Abstract. The Asian experience of poverty reduction has varied widely. Over recent decades the economies of East and Southeast Asia
More informationUCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES. Open For Business? Institutions, Business Environment and Economic Development
UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES 2010 Open For Business? Institutions, Business Environment and Economic Development Robert Gillanders and Karl Whelan, University College Dublin WP10/40
More informationFemale parliamentarians and economic growth: Evidence from a large panel
Female parliamentarians and economic growth: Evidence from a large panel Dinuk Jayasuriya and Paul J. Burke Abstract This article investigates whether female political representation affects economic growth.
More informationGlobalization, Inequality and Corruption
Department of Economics Working Paper No. 139 Globalization, Inequality and Corruption Harald Badinger Elisabeth Nindl April 2012 Globalization, Inequality, and Corruption Harald Badinger Elisabeth Nindl
More informationDavid Stasavage. Private investment and political institutions
LSE Research Online Article (refereed) David Stasavage Private investment and political institutions Originally published in Economics and politics, 14 (1). pp. 41-63 2002 Blackwell Publishing. You may
More informationSkill Classification Does Matter: Estimating the Relationship Between Trade Flows and Wage Inequality
Skill Classification Does Matter: Estimating the Relationship Between Trade Flows and Wage Inequality By Kristin Forbes* M.I.T.-Sloan School of Management and NBER First version: April 1998 This version:
More informationTrade and the Spillovers of Transnational Terrorism
Trade and the Spillovers of Transnational Terrorism José de Sousa a, Daniel Mirza b and Thierry Verdier c JEL-Classification: F12, F13 Keywords: terrorism, trade, security 1. Introduction Terrorist organizations,
More informationCommission on Growth and Development Cognitive Skills and Economic Development
Commission on Growth and Development Cognitive Skills and Economic Development Eric A. Hanushek Stanford University in conjunction with Ludger Wößmann University of Munich and Ifo Institute Overview 1.
More informationMigration and Tourism Flows to New Zealand
Migration and Tourism Flows to New Zealand Murat Genç University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Email address for correspondence: murat.genc@otago.ac.nz 30 April 2010 PRELIMINARY WORK IN PROGRESS NOT FOR
More informationCorruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions. Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University. August 2018
Corruption, Political Instability and Firm-Level Export Decisions Kul Kapri 1 Rowan University August 2018 Abstract In this paper I use South Asian firm-level data to examine whether the impact of corruption
More informationHandle with care: Is foreign aid less effective in fragile states?
Handle with care: Is foreign aid less effective in fragile states? Ines A. Ferreira School of International Development, University of East Anglia (UEA) ines.afonso.rferreira@gmail.com Overview Motivation
More informationHOW ECONOMIES GROW AND DEVELOP Macroeconomics In Context (Goodwin, et al.)
Chapter 17 HOW ECONOMIES GROW AND DEVELOP Macroeconomics In Context (Goodwin, et al.) Chapter Overview This chapter presents material on economic growth, such as the theory behind it, how it is calculated,
More informationGLOBALIZATION AND THE GREAT U-TURN: INCOME INEQUALITY TRENDS IN 16 OECD COUNTRIES. Arthur S. Alderson
GLOBALIZATION AND THE GREAT U-TURN: INCOME INEQUALITY TRENDS IN 16 OECD COUNTRIES by Arthur S. Alderson Department of Sociology Indiana University Bloomington Email aralders@indiana.edu & François Nielsen
More informationThe Impact of Foreign Workers on the Labour Market of Cyprus
Cyprus Economic Policy Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 37-49 (2007) 1450-4561 The Impact of Foreign Workers on the Labour Market of Cyprus Louis N. Christofides, Sofronis Clerides, Costas Hadjiyiannis and Michel
More informationTrends in the Income Gap Between. Developed Countries and Developing Countries,
Trends in the Income Gap Between Developed Countries and Developing Countries, 1960-1995 Donghyun Park Assistant Professor Room No. S3 B1A 10 Nanyang Business School Nanyang Technological University Singapore
More informationInternational Migration and Gender Discrimination among Children Left Behind. Francisca M. Antman* University of Colorado at Boulder
International Migration and Gender Discrimination among Children Left Behind Francisca M. Antman* University of Colorado at Boulder ABSTRACT: This paper considers how international migration of the head
More informationIndustrial & Labor Relations Review
Industrial & Labor Relations Review Volume 60, Issue 3 2007 Article 5 Labor Market Institutions and Wage Inequality Winfried Koeniger Marco Leonardi Luca Nunziata IZA, University of Bonn, University of
More informationThe Evolutionary Effects of Democracy: In the long run, we are all trading?
The Evolutionary Effects of Democracy: In the long run, we are all trading? CHRISTOPHER J. BOUDREAUX * AR Sanchez, Jr. School of Business, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, Texas, USA Please
More informationResearch Report. How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa
International Affairs Program Research Report How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa Report Prepared by Bilge Erten Assistant
More informationInformal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance
Public Choice (2009) 139: 371 387 DOI 10.1007/s11127-009-9399-x Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance Claudia R. Williamson Received: 19 July 2008 / Accepted:
More informationIs neoliberalism to blame for Orbàn and Le Pen? A statistical analysis of populism and economic freedom Alexander Fritz Englund i ii
Is neoliberalism to blame for Orbàn and Le Pen? A statistical analysis of populism and economic freedom Alexander Fritz Englund i ii Populism is on the rise, especially in Europe. Determining the causes
More informationInvestigating the Effects of Migration on Economic Growth in Aging OECD Countries from
Bowdoin College Bowdoin Digital Commons Honors Projects Student Scholarship and Creative Work 5-2017 Investigating the Effects of Migration on Economic Growth in Aging OECD Countries from 1975-2015 Michael
More informationCommuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island. Raden M Purnagunawan
Commuting and Minimum wages in Decentralized Era Case Study from Java Island Raden M Purnagunawan Outline 1. Introduction 2. Brief Literature review 3. Data Source and Construction 4. The aggregate commuting
More informationErrata Summary. Comparison of the Original Results with the New Results
Errata for Karim and Beardsley (2016), Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries, Journal of Peace
More informationCross-Country Intergenerational Status Mobility: Is There a Great Gatsby Curve?
Cross-Country Intergenerational Status Mobility: Is There a Great Gatsby Curve? John A. Bishop Haiyong Liu East Carolina University Juan Gabriel Rodríguez Universidad Complutense de Madrid Abstract Countries
More informationECON 450 Development Economics
ECON 450 Development Economics Long-Run Causes of Comparative Economic Development Institutions University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Summer 2017 Outline 1 Introduction 2 3 The Korean Case The Korean
More informationLONG RUN GROWTH, CONVERGENCE AND FACTOR PRICES
LONG RUN GROWTH, CONVERGENCE AND FACTOR PRICES By Bart Verspagen* Second draft, July 1998 * Eindhoven University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Management, and MERIT, University of Maastricht. Email:
More informationIs the Internet an Effective Mechanism for Reducing Corruption Experience? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries
Is the Internet an Effective Mechanism for Reducing Corruption Experience? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries Jamie Bologna College of Business and Economics West Virginia University Morgantown,
More informationCorruption and quality of public institutions: evidence from Generalized Method of Moment
Document de travail de la série Etudes et Documents E 2008.13 Corruption and quality of public institutions: evidence from Generalized Method of Moment Gbewopo Attila 1 University Clermont I, CERDI-CNRS
More informationInclusive Growth in Bangladesh: A Critical Assessment
2 ND SANEM ANNUAL ECONOMISTS CONFERENCE MANAGING GROWTH FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION Inclusive Growth in Bangladesh: A Critical Assessment Towfiqul Islam Khan Research Fellow, CPD Dhaka:
More informationChapter 2 Comparative Economic Development
Chapter 2 Comparative Economic Development Common characteristics of developing countries These features in common are on average and with great diversity, in comparison with developed countries: Lower
More informationHas the War between the Rent Seekers Escalated?
Has the War between the Rent Seekers Escalated? Russell S. Sobel School of Business The Citadel 171 Moultrie Street Charleston, SC 29409 Russell.Sobel@citadel.edu Joshua C. Hall Department of Economics
More informationDifferences Lead to Differences: Diversity and Income Inequality Across Countries
Illinois State University ISU ReD: Research and edata Master's Theses - Economics Economics 6-2008 Differences Lead to Differences: Diversity and Income Inequality Across Countries Michael Hotard Illinois
More informationImmigration and property prices: Evidence from England and Wales
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Immigration and property prices: Evidence from England and Wales Nils Braakmann Newcastle University 29. August 2013 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49423/ MPRA
More informationImmigrant-native wage gaps in time series: Complementarities or composition effects?
Immigrant-native wage gaps in time series: Complementarities or composition effects? Joakim Ruist Department of Economics University of Gothenburg Box 640 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden joakim.ruist@economics.gu.se
More informationThe effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach Keisuke Okada and Sovannroeun Samreth Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Japan 8.
More informationVolume 36, Issue 1. Impact of remittances on poverty: an analysis of data from a set of developing countries
Volume 6, Issue 1 Impact of remittances on poverty: an analysis of data from a set of developing countries Basanta K Pradhan Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi Malvika Mahesh Institute of Economic Growth,
More informationTable A.2 reports the complete set of estimates of equation (1). We distinguish between personal
Akay, Bargain and Zimmermann Online Appendix 40 A. Online Appendix A.1. Descriptive Statistics Figure A.1 about here Table A.1 about here A.2. Detailed SWB Estimates Table A.2 reports the complete set
More information