A matinee of cryptographic topics

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Lynne Phelps
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1 A matinee of cryptographic topics 3 and 4 November A matinee of cryptographic topics

2 Questions How can you prove yourself? How can you shuffle a deck of cards in public? Is it possible to generate a ElGamal key pair such that nobody has any information about the public key, but still be able to find it without solving DLOG? How can Danish sugar beet farmers and buyers place bids in an auction and decide the answer but without revealing any info? Is it possible to flip a coin over the electric telephone? How many citations can you get from a two-page paper?

3 Oversikt 1 Final zero knowledge remarks 2 An application 3 Identification 4 Commitments 5 Secret sharing 3 A matinee of cryptographic topics

4 Final zero knowledge remarks Recap: Schnorr Public input: G = (g), G = q and h. Private input to P: a such that h = g a. Prover Verifier u r Z q α g u e r Z q r ae + u r g r =? αh e Question Can we use this for identification? Can we do it in a single round? α e 4 A matinee of cryptographic topics

5 Final zero knowledge remarks Fiat-Shamir heuristic Enter the random oracle model. Then any zero knowledge proof where the verifier only asks random questions can be turned into a non-interactive proof. Technique: Whenever the verifier should send a random value In theory: Ask the oracle for a value based on all previous data in the protocol. In practice: Use a hash function on all previous data 5 A matinee of cryptographic topics

6 Final zero knowledge remarks Fiat-Shamir(Schnorr) Let H be a cryptographic hash function. 1 u r Z q 2 α g u 3 e H(α) 4 r ae + u 5 Output (α, r) Verification: Check g r = αh H(α) Idea If H does just as good a job of selection something random, then it could just as well have been chosen by the verifier. Hence, the prover must know a such that g a = h. Key difference: The transcript cannot be simulated, hence it can be verified at any time. 6 A matinee of cryptographic topics

7 Let s get sidetracked for a moment... Prover γ r Zq ui wi ai Λ1 Λ2 r Zq r Zq r Zq k x ui i i=1 k z wi i y ui i i=1 bi ρi ui σi wi + b π(i) Γ g γ Ui g ui Wi Γ wi Ai g ai Ci Γ a π(i) Verifier r Λ1, Λ2, {Ai}, {Ci}, {Ui}, {Wi}, Γ ρi {0, 1} l {ρi} Bi g ρi U 1 i Di Γ b π(i) ri ai + λbi si a π(i) + λb π(i) {Di} λ {σi} λ r {0, 1} l Ri AiB λ i Si CiD λ i Φ1 Φ2 Γ σi k x ρi i i=1 k z σi i y ρi i i=1? = WiDi CP(log g h = log Φ1Λ1 Φ2Λ2) SS(Si = R γ π(i) )

8 M. Blum, 1986 An application Theorem Any theorem can be proven in zero knowledge ocr.pdf 8 A matinee of cryptographic topics

9 Identification How to prove yourself Authentication scheme Alice can prove to Bob that she is Alice, but someone else (Eve) cannot prove to Bob that she is Alice. Identification scheme Alice can prove to Bob that she is Alice, but Bob cannot prove to someone else that he is Alice. Signature scheme Alice can prove to Bob that she is Alice, but Bob cannot prove even to himself that he is Alice. (Further reading: Fiat, Shamir: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems) 9 A matinee of cryptographic topics

10 Commitments Section 4 Commitments 10 A matinee of cryptographic topics

11 Who gets the car? Commitments Alice chooses large primes p and q, both congruent to 3 modulo 4. b is chosen at random from {0, 1} Alice Bob p, q, n = pq n, x y y x 2 (mod n) a 2 0 a2 1 y a b (p, q) or If a b ±x, Alice wins. If a b ±x, Bob wins. Idea: gcd(x a b, n) will compute a nontrivial factor of n. 10 A matinee of cryptographic topics

12 Commitments More elegant solution Principles Bob must make a choice, and commit to it Alice flips the coin, announcing the result without knowing Bob s choice. Bob reveals his choice 11 A matinee of cryptographic topics

13 Examples Commitments We want to commit to x. g x Computationally hiding, unconditionally binding g x h r Unconditionally hiding, computationally binding (Pedersen) g x+r, h r ) Computationally hiding, unconditionally binding Question Can a scheme be both unconditionally hiding and binding? 12 A matinee of cryptographic topics

14 Secret sharing Section 5 Secret sharing 13 A matinee of cryptographic topics

15 Secret sharing http: //cs.jhu.edu/~sdoshi/crypto/papers/shamirturing.pdf 13 A matinee of cryptographic topics

An untraceable, universally verifiable voting scheme

An untraceable, universally verifiable voting scheme Michael J. Radwin December 12, 1995 Seminar in Cryptology Professor Phil Klein Abstract Recent electronic voting schemes have shown the ability to protect