An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU. December 2007

Transcription

1 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU December 2007

2 About this report This report has been produced by Crisis Management Initiative and is one of two reports produced under the project, Preventing Conflict and Building Sustainable Peace: Assessing and Improving EU Impact', a joint-initiative between International Alert and Crisis Management Initiative. The two organisations would like to extend their thanks to the Belgian Government, who provided financial support for the project through the Federal Public Service. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of Crisis Management Initiative. About Crisis Management Initiative Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is an independent, non-profit organisation that innovatively promotes and works for sustainable security. CMI works to strengthen the capacity of the international community in comprehensive crisis management and conflict resolution CMI was founded in 2000 by its Chairman President Martti Ahtisaari. The headquarters of the organisation are in Helsinki, Finland. Crisis Management Initiative 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Layout by D. R. Ink, info@d-r-ink.com Printed by Jason Print Cover photo far left Crisis Management Initiative; all others International Alert

3 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU Stine Heiselberg, Sangeeta Lama, Judith Large, Guy Banim, Riikka Marjamäki December 2007

4 2 Crisis Management Initiative Contents Foreword 3 Executive Summary Background of the study Context of the peace process in Nepal EU engagement in Nepal Methodology of the study Key themes of inclusive peace process in Nepal Democratization as peace building Conflict sensitivity meets social inclusion Findings and key messages Conclusions 16 Annex One 19 Annex Two 21 Annex Three 22 References 23 Endnotes 24

5 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 3 Foreword By CMI and International Alert The term conflict sensitivity has gained much currency in conflict prevention, crisis management and development circles over the past decade or so. At a rhetorical level, it is arguably one of the most widely recognised cross-cutting issues of recent times. While there is indeed a proliferation of writing and thinking on the concept, less clarity exists around what it entails in practice, including, most critically, how it can be effectively operationalised. Agencies and individuals working in conflict-affected and otherwise fragile environments need to understand both the actual and potential impacts of conflict on their individual work and the effectiveness of aid. Furthermore, they also must focus attention on their own impacts on the dynamics of conflict and peace, which can be positive or negative. Conflict-sensitive approaches should assist such actors to meaningfully take into account the context in which they are operating, and to continuously adapt programme design and implementation in a way that maximises positive impacts while mitigating potential harm. 1 An increasing number of NGOs working in, and on, conflict are offering their assistance in putting such conflict-sensitive approaches into practice. Among them are International Alert and Crisis Management Initiative. 2 As part of such efforts, and in order to contribute to the body of learning on this issue, each organisation has produced a report to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the way the European Union (as a set of institutions), supported by Member States, has been providing development aid and support for national peace processes in two conflict-affected countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nepal, respectively. This report, published alongside International Alert s paper on eastern DRC, is based on desk and field research analysing the impact and opportunities created by EU and Member States actions to contribute to building sustainable peace. The focus of each is on: Analysing the impact of different EU policies and programmes on peace and conflict dynamics and providing practical, institution- and country-specific recommendations for strengthening the EU s role in preventing conflict and building sustainable peace. Building better knowledge and capacity to incorporate conflict sensitivity in the formulation and implementation of EU policies. Highlighting national and local civil society partners perceptions of the role and impact of EU assistance in the field and, in so doing, developing the capacity of these partners to both understand EU engagement and connect with EU decision-making processes. The European Union in conflict and otherwise fragile contexts: existing efforts and remaining challenges The EU, as a set of institutions, has a broad range of policies and instruments that can positively affect the dynamics of conflict and peace at local, national and regional levels. These include human rights and democracy initiatives as well as large aid and trade packages, led by the Commission; and, under the 2nd (intergovernmental) pillar, EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiatives and interventions under the European Security and Defence Policy. 3 In addition, many EU Member States are operating in the same contexts as highly influential bilateral development, defence and trading partners.

6 4 Crisis Management Initiative Constructive steps have been taken in recent years to rationalise and simplify the number of legal bases, budget lines, and programmes used for such external assistance. Furthermore, the agreement of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001 and the publication of the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention in April 2001, put conflict prevention firmly on the EU s political agenda. Together, they provide a framework for future action: they set priorities for preventative activities, enhance relevant EU instruments and partnerships, contain proposals for improving early warning and establish a commitment for all relevant EU institutions to mainstream conflict prevention into their work. Such initiatives have been supplemented by the development of governance profiles for each partner country and governance incentive tranches that can be added to European Development Fund allocations on the basis of the governance analysis conducted. In addition, an emerging Fragile States and Situations agenda has been promoted under the Portuguese Presidency. 4 Meanwhile, efforts have been underway for some time, by the Interservice Quality Support Group and DG Relex s Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit, among others, to ensure that EC external assistance and policies are contributing towards tackling the root causes of the conflicts and that EC assistance does not have unintended negative impact on the conflict dynamic. 5 Despite this progress made, effective action to tackle root and evolving causes of conflict appear to be under threat due to internal tensions within the EU. This has been manifested in the failure to include explicit reference to peace, security and conflict prevention in all but one of the Financial Instruments This sends a worrying signal that important achievements will not be sustained, and will perhaps even be undone. These efforts by specialist units within the EU to address conflict are vital as all actors designing and implementing activities in conflict-affected and otherwise fragile contexts are faced with extremely complex, interlinked conflict dynamics. Reduced conflict and fragility in a state or society will not automatically flow from formal peace processes or poverty alleviation initiatives. Moreover, aid itself can represent a valuable resource with destabilising potential in weakly governed environments: as with measures to affect economic reform and alter trading relationships, aid can inadvertently fuel existing conflicts or be a factor driving (renewed) outbreaks of violence, depending on who benefits and who does not. The interaction between external assistance and local politics is particularly significant in conflict and otherwise fragile contexts. It often requires a shift away from the standard aid modalities for a number of reasons, including: The ways in which donor-sponsored policy reforms can inadvertently fuel resentment among certain groups, increasing social, political and economic exclusion, and thus risking that marginalised groups resort to violence to address their grievances. How adherence to recipient government-defined development priorities may actually exacerbate the problems of income disparities, exclusion and inequity that drive conflict and instability. As has been emphasised elsewhere, 6 questions and doubts remain about the EU s practice in unstable contexts. In many cases, it seems to remain unaffected by what has been learned about conflict and the various other factors causing state and societal fragility. The standard approach to external assistance in these contexts continues to be used even where persistent insecurity and its underlying causes risk rendering it ineffective or, at worst, counter-productive. Within the system, discrete conflict prevention and governance programmes remain separate from and are tacked on to an approach that, in one way or another, prioritises technical, quantifiable poverty reduction targets (evidenced by more children educated, reduced HIV incidence, increased rates of economic growth, etc.). The prevailing orthodoxy does not sufficiently recognise that often it is the inequity in the socio-economic and political system, and people s low expectations of that system, that prevent aid from achieving its goals. Nor does the orthodoxy properly account for or respond to the difficult truth that aid, like diamonds, often becomes a resource worth competing or fighting for.

7 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 5 As the cases of Nepal and DRC illustrate, the extent to which donor institutions such as the EU have been able to put policy commitments into practice remains a relevant and pressing concern. The two studies focus on different aspects of peacebuilding in the respective countries: peace processes in Nepal and economic recovery in eastern DRC. The analyses, however, both confirm that, despite increased engagement, there remains room to deepen the EU s and Member States responsiveness to conflict dynamics in order to better support peacebuilding processes. Given the critical junctures at which both DRC and Nepal currently stand with respect to peacebuilding, the continued actions of donors that are not sensitive to the dynamics of conflict and peace are in danger of missing important opportunities to support the consolidation of peace in both countries. Conflict sensitivity, therefore, needs to involve profound changes in the overall approach of international aid. For the EU, this means the Commission and the Council deploying all the levers at the EU s disposal to support the conditions necessary for inclusive peace processes and sustainable development around the world, avoiding negative effects and ensuring positive impacts on conflict dynamics. Much more is involved than just supporting time-bound actions during periods of instability. Both up-stream and down-stream of the period when tensions explode into widespread violence, building peace is about transforming structures, attitudes and behaviours that can promote or facilitate violence coming about. This can be supported through activities in the overlapping and interconnecting spheres of security, governance and the economy. Sensitivity to the gender dimensions of such conflictual contexts forms a critical element of the sustained efficacy of any action taken. Ultimately, such support for much needed social cohesion in countries affected by conflict involves tackling the gap between powerful elites and ordinary people. For donors, it requires a better balance between strengthening the state as the predominant partner in the negotiation of aid and society which itself reflects the strengths and problems of the context, regionally, nationally and locally. The EU needs to adapt its practice, its internal incentive structures, and its staff and programme performance criteria accordingly. Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), founded in 2000 by President Martti Ahtisaari, is an independent non-governmental organisation promoting sustainable security. It works to strengthen the capacity of the international community in the fields of crisis management and conflict resolution. CMI s approach is based on wide stakeholder networks and combines analysis, action and advocacy. It has particular expertise in conflict analysis as well as experience in implementing various conflict management and resolution initiatives, notably in Aceh, Indonesia. International Alert is an independent, international non-governmental organisation that has worked for over 20 years to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict. Its multifaceted approach focuses both in and across various regions; aiming to shape policies and practices that affect peacebuilding; and helping build skills and capacity through training. Alert s regional work is based in the African Great Lakes, West Africa, the South Caucasus, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Colombia. Its thematic projects work at local, regional and international levels, focusing on cross-cutting issues critical to building sustainable peace. These include business and economy, gender, governance, aid, security and justice. CMI and International Alert would like to extend their thanks to the Belgian Government who provided financial support for this research process. The following report on Nepal remains the sole responsibility of CMI.

8 6 Crisis Management Initiative Executive Summary In supporting sustainable peace and enhancing long-term and coherent peace-building, Crisis Management Initiative advocates for conflict sensitive policy and decision-making procedures. In the field of peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity can be understood as a tool to be used to ensure and to promote the quality of national peace processes. This work is an on-going, self-reflective process and includes: advocating for the importance of conflict sensitivity of all actors, including international, national and local, when working in conditions of unsustainable peace. This is pivotal in order to understand that every action has an impact on the local context and that preserving national peace should always be the first priority of every action. facilitating the co-operation and communication between different stakeholders working in conflict-prone and conflict-affected situations. It is crucial to have common policies and practices in order to minimise the negative and maximise the positive impacts of each action. enhancing the inclusion of local civil society and excluded groups in recruiting and choosing local partners in order to not to create local tensions. developing a conflict analysis tool to ensure the conflict sensitivity of CMI s own projects in their planning, implementation and evaluation. Against this background and to promote a strategic and synergistic approach to peace-building in Nepal, a research on the inclusiveness of the peace process in Nepal was carried out. The project was conducted at two levels. First the issue of inclusion was discussed separately at policy and grassroots levels in Brussels and in Nepal. On the basis of the initial findings, a roundtable discussion was organized to bring together a group of Nepalese organisations to discuss the results. In the second phase, the series of consultation was enlargened and a dialogue between the donors and Nepalese organizations was facilitated. Both donors and local organizations were encouraged to identify concrete proposals to improve the donors awareness on the issue of marginalisation in Nepal. The key findings of this consultation process form the basis for this report. 1.0 Background of the study 1.1 Context of the peace process in Nepal Nepal, long known to outsiders as a peaceful Shangri-La and the world s only Hindu monarchy, has suffered more than a decade of violent conflict. Although the nation s first election was held in 1959, the following year King Mahendra dismissed the cabinet, dissolved the parliament, and banned political parties. The 1962 constitution created a nonparty panchayat (council) system of government. A new constitution creating a constitutional monarchy and a bicameral legislature became effective on Nov. 9, 1990 largely in response to popular demand for democratization through the mass movement known as Janandolan I. Multiparty legislative elections were held in May 1991, but subsequent failures or inability of the government and elected leaders to deliver to the population (in particular the reduction of poverty and inequality), led to a nascent Maoist insurgency which gradually developed into a bitter protracted conflict. Many analysts point to a historically embedded caste system, and elite hierarchical structures as a socio-cultural underpinning of the problems experienced in Nepal s young democracy. Nearly all of the country s 75 districts were affected by the fighting between the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and the forces of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist) over the past

9 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 7 decade. Estimates vary between 11,000 and 13,000 people killed in violence in Nepal since the insurgency began - many of them civilians caught in crossfire with security forces. Both sides in the conflict have frequently been accused of carrying out human rights abuses. Moreover, the overall human rights situation in Nepal further deteriorated when King Gyanendra assumed absolute executive authority on February 1, The King subjected critical political activists, journalists, and human rights monitors to arbitrary arrests and censorship, only releasing detainees and relaxing restrictions under intense international pressure. 7 Although the king justified his coup d état by citing the inability of the political parties to end the armed conflict, negotiations between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoists) brought about a broad based alliance for reform. The April 2006 popular uprising (Janandolan II) proved to be a watershed, resulting in the monarchy being stripped of official powers and special privileges. This was followed by the historical entry into the government of the CPN (M), the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006; the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in January 2007; and the formation of the interim legislature and interim government in March-April 2007, both of which included representatives of the CPN (M). The government announced that Constituent Assembly (CA) elections would be held on 22 November This date has now been collectively rescheduled. Nepal s peace negotiations and peace process are internally driven, with assistance (rather than interim formal direction) by UN agencies and a donor presence which pre-dates the cease-fire. There is popular concern that Nepal could once again have an oligarchy of party leaders rather than a popular democracy. Party leaders have shown little appetite for pluralism : the interim legislature will have no official opposition, royalist parties may be excluded from the CA, new parties will find it very hard to register for elections, and in any case, consensus decisions will leave most power in the hands of party leaders. Ad-hoc pre-negotiation of important issues threatens to undermine the constitutional process. For example, the SPA-Maoist response to the recent rise of Tarai discontent was to push forward proposals for federalism, thus potentially preempting any meaningful discussion of one of the CA s central concerns. 8 In the current conflict transformation phase, Nepal is faced with a lack of unity and political consensus. Efficient implementation of the commitments made in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement cannot be carried out without finding solutions to the issue of inclusion in Nepal. During the consultations of this project, the following questions were raised by all parties involved: how to make the Maoists to become part of efficient decision-making powers; how to address the dissatisfaction among marginalized communities about their exclusion from political processes and State structures and how to democratize the peace process. 1.2 EU engagement in Nepal The assistance of the European Commission to Nepal dates back to 1977, largely through development assistance in such areas as irrigation and watershed management, animal health, reproductive health, primary education, refugees, and institutional capacity building. The EC strategy supported development efforts as defined in the Agenda of Priority Reform Actions and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) Five Year Plan ( ). This addresses Nepal s foremost objective of poverty reduction including: broad-based economic growth (development of agriculture), social sector development, targeted programmes, good governance and decentralisation. Several EU Member States are long-standing development partners of Nepal and five of them have established individual diplomatic missions in Kathmandu: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The EU Presidency in Nepal rotates among these five Member States and currently the Presidency is held by the United Kingdom. The European Commission opened a

10 8 Crisis Management Initiative Technical Office in Nepal in 1992, which was upgraded as the Delegation of the European Commission to Nepal in During this research process interviews were held both with the Member States present in Kathmandu and EC representatives both in Brussels and in Kathmandu. Just as there is a major political transition and peace process going on at this moment in Nepal, so donors and agencies also undergo transitions in terms of their operating environments and the roles they play within them. Part of the rationale for this study was to assist in this process. From 1996, development donors and NGOs in Nepal faced increasing challenges of how to position themselves, with respect to formal state (royal) permission for internal access and for operating in rural areas increasingly governed by de facto Maoist authorities. After the breakdown of a ceasefire in August 2003, the European Commission, together with other bilateral donor agencies, adopted a set of Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG) to emphasize the importance and responsibility of all parties to the conflict to maintain development space and provide access to beneficiaries in Nepal. The BOGs relied strongly on internationally recognized Humanitarian Law principles and reflect the specific conflict situation in Nepal. The BOGs were agreed among the donors in autumn 2003 and they were intended as operational guidelines or aspirations for development and humanitarian activities, project partners and their staff to operate in Nepal. The BOGs were drafted and made public to state how donors operate in Nepal and to appeal the parties in the conflict not to interfere in project activities. Within the BOGs framework the European Commission participated in regular informal coordination meetings where BOGs signatories shared information on operational issues. The group jointly sought to promote the BOGs on national, regional and district level to ensure effective delivery of development and humanitarian assistance and security for development workers in the field. This was done through regional and district level dissemination meetings, by issuing the BOGs in national newspapers and by bringing up the issue in discussions with project partners. (See Annex One) In the past few years there has been increasing donor concern with engagement in Nepal; the intended or unintended impact of development or governance assistance on the very dynamics of the conflict. Most of the international development actors operating in Nepal have conducted their own conflict analyses. While they ve primarily focused on the implications for continued development assistance the studies provide descriptive overviews of the trajectory of the conflict and the roles of the actors as well as analysis of the root causes of the conflict. The broad conclusion is that economic deprivation and inequality have at least an indirect link to the conflict and that further efforts to promote development are warranted both to ameliorate the effects of the conflict and tackle the causes. There is, however, also recognition that providing development assistance in itself does not necessarily contribute towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that any efforts need to be assessed on their individual merits. 9 Janandolan II was followed by negotiations and agreement of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, establishment of the interim government and preparations (ongoing) for elections for the constituent assembly. Subsequently different groups have started to voice their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs; some by taking up arms in order to ensure that their voices are heard and that equal and proportional representation is ensured in the future political process. The issues of inclusion, participation and representation have become major, often heated discussion topics; the extent to which structures will be changed to include a wider segment of the society will be a determining factor for the success of the peace process. In this respect many are looking at the contributions of the international community and the extent to which it can contribute to the ongoing peace process.

11 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 9 This research project aimed to look at the current peace process and how the EU (European Commission and the EU Member States) 10 in Nepal could impact and take advantage of the opportunities available. Secondly, the project analysed the utilized approaches to increase the involvement of traditionally marginalised groups in the peace process; and lastly, the conflict sensitivity and coherence of the EU and member states peace building activities in Nepal was assessed. The factors influencing the peace process in Nepal are not completely unique for the Nepalese context, but can be observed in other countries. During the consultations with the marginalised groups in Nepal, it was noticed that the distinction between the EU and other donors in Nepal is not obvious for the Nepalese organisations. Taking the considerable influence of other international actors like India, USA and the UN in Nepal, it was decided to use term donor instead of the EU or EC in the discussions with Nepalese organisations. Therefore the key findings of this study do not apply only to the EU and Member States, but can be seen to serve the overall donor community in Nepal. 1.3 Methodology of the study It is important to distinguish between the methodology of conflict sensitivity for operating in complex environments, and the methodology used in this particular study. The essence of conflict sensitivity lies in the awareness of intervening actors that their programmes and actions will impact in some way on the very dynamics which fuel the broader conflict and violence in the host society. It means accepting that context matters and that by being present, an agency or organisation is part of that context. The what and how have been articulated by International Alert in the following ways: What to Do: Understand the context in which you operate Understand the interaction between your intervention and the context Use this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts How to Do It: Carry out a conflict analysis and update it regularly Link the conflict analysis with the programming cycle of your intervention Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate your intervention in a conflict sensitive fashion (including redesign when necessary) 11 When this project was devised there was an interest in the importance of social inclusion to the dynamics of war and peace in Nepal; how or whether this was reflected in international policy and behaviours. Subsequently this concern has proved to be central in the political dynamics of transition in Nepal. The methodology for this research project (using representative sampling) has been four-fold: Identifying the situation analysis or context understanding which has informed interventions (interviews) Probing the interaction between intervention and context (dialogue with international agencies and Nepali intended beneficiaries) Reflecting on how to avoid or reduce negative impact and maximise positive effects; Presenting and refining findings with local/national actors involved in the Peace Process (group work and day workshop) Integrating findings and feed-back for institutional learning

12 10 Crisis Management Initiative An interactive and participative approach was used throughout. 12 The researchers initially held interviews with a wide spectrum of representatives of the traditionally marginalised groups in order to identify the issues pertinent to the research topics. The findings from these interviews were subsequently raised in discussions with representatives from the international community and organisations working in the area of peace building, and situated in relation to their own understanding of conflict context. (See Annex Two). During a field trip the research team observed practical implementation methods of development organisations and matched these with the already extensive literature available on conflict sensitivity and inclusion in Nepal. The critical issue areas identified were then discussed with representatives from the traditionally marginalised groups during the first half of a one-day workshop. During the second half of the workshop the findings and recommendations from the morning session were discussed with representatives of the international community. (See Annex Three). The analysis and recommendations from these discussions form the basis for this report. 2.0 Key themes of inclusive peace process in Nepal 2.1 Democratization as peace building The demise of the 1990 Constitution in Nepal vividly illustrated that no new constitutional order will gain legitimacy unless it demonstrably incorporates public input and is able to deliver on that basis. Diverse education efforts, including both local initiatives and internationally-funded projects, have already begun; expectations of significant changes have been raised. However, institutional structures to channel, process and consider the results of consultation are slow in emerging. The Interim Constitution Drafting Commission invited public input but it lacked a clear mandate or adequate mechanisms to deal with submissions. The result was public frustration and dissatisfaction with the end product. The CA process will need to do better if it is to deliver greater legitimacy. Some observers suggest that the mainstream parties are paying insufficient consideration to the difficult questions of the procedure involved in constitutional reform. Few have embarked on internal changes to tackle their own problems of corruption, patronage and exclusion that fuelled support for the Maoists. Strengthening the parties internal democracy and accountability would directly benefit the constitution-making process. The Maoists first agreed to join multiparty politics in November They need to use the transitional period and the CA elections to justify this strategy to their cadres. This could encourage them to democratise and make the most of open political campaigning on their populist agenda but it will also tempt them to retain their tried and tested tactics of intimidation and coercion. To date, the picture is mixed: while they have not given up all illegitimate means, they are working to present a moderate, compromising image. Successful constitution making will depend on two related but distinct processes: building a new consensus among the political elite that incorporates the Maoists into the democratic mainstream and recognizing the Nepali people s right to have a say through structured public consultation that is incorporated into the constitutional drafting. 13

13 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 11 Interviewees for this study indicate that high change aspirations for a new and democratic Nepal will be critical to achieving long term peace in the country. A nascent political order might be identified based on the following characteristics: A Nepalese led peace process based on internal bargaining and agreement The use of political rather than violent means to resolve political issues Agreement between the key actors on the broad future contours of the country A secular state apparatus, with the issue of the monarchy as secondary to other concerns An inclusive multiparty political system 14 However, these remain aspirations rather than realities and there is still ground left to be covered for an inclusive multiparty political system to exist not only in form but also in substance. While the political bargaining is going on, there is an increased understanding of the need to focus on the process. Simultaneously, there has been a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of social inclusion, which has become a shift from politics of ideology to politics of ethnicity. 15 Despite the people s movement; and the general optimism after Janandolan 2, there has been widespread disappointment in the process which has followed, as old power structures have remained intact. There is an increasing realization that the organisational culture and leadership composition of the political parties is not easily conducive to change. 16 The political parties together with the Maoists claim to represent the people s movement. However, not all groups of the society feel they are represented and heard in the current political process and this leads to renewed conflict over exclusion. The issue of empowerment of marginalised groups has been firmly on the political agenda since the democratisation of Nepal in Civil society organisations supported the empowerment of many different groups and the international community also rendered their financial contributions to this process. 2.2 Conflict sensitivity meets social inclusion Nepal has moved from a situation of protracted violence and repression, from monarchical versus Maoist stances as polar extremes, and a weak, even failing democracy. Now former enemies join around a table with increasing consensus on building a new constitution, and even considering prospects for a future republic. The stakes are high for groups not directly represented in the configuration at high table, and violence in outlying regions of Kathmandu (notably Tarai region) has become a political message demanding access to both decision making and to resources. The notion of a peace dividend has different meanings for the people(s) of Nepal. In the urban, often activist setting of Kathmandu, it is articulated as democracy, constituent elections and multiparty government. For many of the rural poor it will mean the absence of fear, and provision for sustained livelihoods and functioning government services. 17 The demands of traditionally marginalised groups cannot be achieved by proportional representation alone - there has to be genuine participation at the decision-making level and ability to set the agenda. Moreover, historical regional disparities have spilled over into new, identity based divisions between the traditional ruling society of the hills and the people of the plains along the border with India. Conflict sensitivity in Nepal is relevant on three levels: The need for high awareness and continuing analysis (of intent and consequences) for internationals, nationals and locals, when working in conditions of volatility. This is to understand that every action has an impact on the local context and that enabling violence reduction and sustainable peace should always be the first priority of every action; Co-operation and co-ordination between different stakeholders working in conflict-prone and

14 12 Crisis Management Initiative conflict-affected situations. It is crucial to have common policies and practices in order to minimise the negative and maximise the positive impacts of actions; Enhancing the inclusion of local civil society and excluded groups (for instance in recruiting and choosing local partners) in order to not to create local tensions and to ensure the quality of the peace processes. By ignoring the local structures and power relationships of exclusion, the international community is actually supporting and maintaining them. Transformations in power and social relationships need to be recognised and sustained by all actors. The latter is both contested and highly politicised. Inclusion has been defined as the removal of institutional barriers and the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of diverse individuals and groups to development opportunities. 18 It finds resonance today in the aspiration of democratic political equality and rights. Among the traditionally marginalised groups in Nepal the following can be identified: Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesi, women and youth, but this list is not exhaustive. The dimensions of exclusion in Nepal are: gender, language, caste, ethnicity/ race, language, religion and geographical location. 19 A study undertaken in Nepal prior to the peace process indicated that 90% of the respondents think that social marginalisation is a problem, but only 8% identified exclusion as one of the main problems faced by the country at the time. 20 The study also revealed an increase in the number of people who identified themselves with the national identity rather than their ethnic/ regional identity or both. Through open-ended questions it was also clear that people knew who they thought belonged to the excluded groups. 21 The current application of conflict sensitivity is considered in the framework of policy, decisionmaking and implementation procedures of the international community. When working in conflict-affected areas this framework is seen as a key in supporting sustainable peace and enhancing long-term and coherent peace-building locally. Thus in the current setting of Nepali society, conflict sensitivity may be understood as a tool to ensure and promote the quality of national peace process Findings and key messages The issue of social inclusion is a central and vocal theme for groups who have not traditionally been involved in the political structure in Nepal. Whereas the Maoists initially brought the issue forward, many different groups are now making demands on behalf of a specific ethnic group. In an ironic spin-off of the rapid political (even revolutionary) change, claims are made to Maoists who now find themselves in power. Radical Voices and Action: the risk of return to violence Given that the peace process is seen as a window for change (which may close, given historical experience and mistrust) diverse groups are vying for influence with increasing activism and radicalisation. The Ministry of Interior has identified nine armed groups, which are currently active, seemingly a process which emulates the Maoists use of armed struggle for successful advancement of a political agenda. 23 The past has shown how staging demonstrations and adopting violent means get messages across. The critical challenge is how to build awareness and empower these communities without spurring further radicalism. Democracy is both perceived and needed not only in relation to elections but also for participation/representation in the daily administration and allocation of development and government resources.

15 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 13 Social inclusion is being perceived as a zero-sum game, where access and representation of one group is seen as blocking the representation of other groups. 24 Some interviews highlighted that the Pahadi were getting tired of the discussion on social inclusion and saw it as a threat against their position though they, through their education, have often been the best qualified to undertake certain assignments. Indeed, a full scale backlash against them would not be in the interest of a more democratic Nepal; it would simply change the pattern of discrimination. A Much Repeated Mantra/Message The increased interest in social inclusion on behalf of the international community has led to a mushrooming of organisations working on social inclusion; many NGOs and INGOs are working on the issues and applying for funds to address the problems. Among the marginalised groups there were suspicions against the traditionally dominant groups and NGOs to be intermediaries when working on these issues. Within the INGOs some expressed a general fatigue towards discussing the issue of social inclusion. Social inclusion has been identified as one of the root causes of the conflict and it may need to be addressed not only through directly targeting the marginalised communities, but also through internationalisation of policies at all levels. However, national stakeholders observe that the international community may have consolidated or exacerbated certain power structures, but these were already in place when they started the projects. In certain areas the development space has increased as a result of the peace agreement, which in areas such as Jumla has meant that work is now being carried out outside the district headquarters and reaching a wider segment of the population in the rural areas. In other areas such as Central and Eastern development regions the development space has diminished. 25 The key to being conflict sensitive and being able to contribute to the ongoing peace process is to understand the Nepali society and its complex caste, ethnical, linguistic, cultural, religious and geographical structures. Representatives from the traditionally marginalised groups pointed to the cultural diversity of Nepal; there are about one hundred caste and ethnic groups living in Nepal, speaking over a hundred languages and dialects with a rich and diverse culture. 26 International Recruitment of Local Staff Traditionally, the international community has recruited the well-educated and English-speaking Nepali from the high-caste groups; a logical response to the need for shared language and conventions of professional competencies. Interviewees critical of this recruitment policy claim that it has led to limited contextual understanding and analysis, as information comes primarily through gatekeepers representing very few high castes. In some cases these groups have not had an interest and in others they have not had the knowledge to present the complexity of Nepal. There is a perception that people working with the offices of the international community have, in effect, acted as filters for the understanding of the Nepalese situation. A more balanced view might say that populist feelings are currently running extremely high in the wake of the peace agreement, and the long pent up voices of the rural majorities are calling for more immediate participation in meeting their own needs, through their own agency and language. Thus voices from the rural regions claim that the international community in their pro-poor policies have often relied on higher-caste organisations and people to analyse and understand the situation of the marginalised groups. This view holds that using them as implementing organisations has resulted in a large proportion of funding being kept by the high-caste organisations and the traditionally marginalised groups not benefiting fully from the projects. In the present context, where the traditionally marginalised groups are intent on having their share in the initiatives of the international community, it is imperative that the peace support and development activities have a comprehensive situation assessment, and that their recruitment or

16 14 Crisis Management Initiative language support policies are examined, allowing for field staff to understand the context and frame new responses. There is ultra-sensitivity on the issue of elite replication. This does not mean that previous English-speaking staff was not competent. It does mean, however, that there is a groundswell of demand for grass-roots ownership. It may be possible to review recruitment criteria, and to consider innovative ways of working which allow for more diverse composition of employees, and/or to engage increased local language assistance and recognition. A reminder on Centre-Periphery Considerations In most developing countries there are big socio-economic and cultural differences between the centre and the periphery. Nepal is no exception; there is a big difference between the environment in Kathmandu and outside the Valley. The international community was criticised for not managing to overcome the barriers and actually reach outside the capital. There is a view that this gives rise to discrepancies in information, and that the international community s understanding of the national overview and complexities could be improved for better engagement. Though many projects are intended to benefit people located outside Kathmandu Valley, a disproportionate amount of the allocated funds are being invested in NGOs and INGOs based in Kathmandu and a considerable amount of money is spent before even reaching the intended project sites or the intended beneficiaries. It is suggested that such projects have been designed and are implemented by the dominant groups, who are also recruited to implement through their own agencies, thereby not spending the money in a way that would benefit the marginalised communities the most. The international community could increase its outreach and be more flexible when formulating and identifying projects; to some extent umbrella organisations such as NEFIN, Dalit NGO Federation can help provide the linkage between Kathmandu and the district and community based organisations. The practical difficulties of being Inclusive : Tendencies towards elite replication and what to do about it Caste and gender based hierarchy remain a central characteristic of Nepali society and political culture; this power structure remains influential in the national social, political and development process. The pervasiveness of these structures was illustrated in the proportion of Brahmin, Chetri and Newari represented in the different government bodies 27 and there is concern that this is currently replicated in the interim governing structure. The general perspective (donors influence aside) has been that there is still an enormous lack of dialogue culture in the discussions and communications between the government and all the marginalised sectors of Nepal. Processes of Dialogue and Consultation need to be continually supported and reinforced: notions of citizenship are still embryonic in thinking and in action There is general consensus that both in the contextual analysis and in the project design, donors and agencies have shown willingness to understand the situation better. At the moment, however, the groups representing the traditionally marginalised communities are themselves polarised. The umbrella organisations are representing the views of the marginalised groups to the international community and as far as possible in the on-going peace process. This also leads to some discrepancy, as there is a clear gap between the first level leaders of the marginalised groups, (who are travelling around representing the views both nationally and internationally) and their constituents.

17 An Inclusive Peace Process in Nepal and the Role of the EU 15 Thought must be given to bridging and representation between the district based organisations, their interests and the Kathmandu based policy makers. There was awareness among interviewees that even though many organizations have been established by the marginalized groups in different districts of Nepal, the organizational structures are often still the same as in traditional organizations. The marginalized groups' organizations have been following a structural hierarchy similar to the traditional norm. The general trend is that the founding members establish the organisations and the modus operandi for them. Over time, gender sensitivity among the marginalised groups and their organisations could become an issue, as the organisations preaching inclusiveness and proportional representation have an added value in their advocacy when having internalised inclusive policies. The real danger is that the organisations are recreating the same hierarchical structures which they are criticising. The challenge is that Dalit, women, Janjati, Madhesi and youth organisations need to be supported through education and capacity building to create organisations, which are democratic, participatory, transparent, and credible. One of the dichotomies identified during the research project was that whereas representatives of traditionally marginalised groups often emphasized the lack of access to the international community, in reality everyone had been able to contact and have meetings with different delegations of the international community even a small organisation from Jumla. The confusion seemed to be that access to discussions, dialogue and agenda setting was equated with access to resources. The organisations have had access through the former, but for a variety of reasons not always to the latter. In the nervous and often highly charged climate of expectations (and relative scarcity) it is understandable, if not realistic, that groups expected something to be delivered immediately. Long term confidence in agenda setting and institution building is needed, so that representatives can further the issues and values at heart; and not dilute and confuse these for access to resources. Learning by Doing The Basic Operating Guidelines, which have been agreed among a large group of donors, 28 are based on Do-No-Harm, but these are only the minimum threshold and are not in themselves sufficient to be conflict sensitive. The BOGs were developed during the conflict between the Maoists and the security forces in the present context with several groups halting development work in the Tarai, their application is more complicated; as using BOGs as a bargaining tool is a way of giving these groups recognition. The positive aspects of the donor and agency work in Nepal have been in classic development terms and in the empowerment of various groups. However, in the current climate and volatility development projects are widely criticised for their lack of sustainability and also the dependency created by donor-funding. This in itself could be seen as an expression of the need and desire to build a new state. Civil Society roles during the conflict have not been limited to NGO formations. While the more activist-oriented organisations were conscious of the engagement opportunities available without donor funding; other organisations focused solely on donor funding this as the main motivator for undertaking work. In the development process one obstacle has been the language barrier and particularly the fact that the international community focus on receiving proposals in English is barring many organisations from applying. The international community has recognised this as a problem and some donors have adapted their regulations to be more flexible and in some cases help develop the proposals on the basis of concept-notes.