INLE ADVISORY GROUP. Myanmar Election 2015 Monitor

Transcription

1 INLE ADVISORY GROUP Myanmar Election 2015 Monitor

2 Table of Contents Myanmar s Political Transition Myanmar s Electoral History Myanmar s Constitution The Current Myanmar Parliament Key Political Players The Geography of Myanmar The 2015 Election 2015 Registered Parties Page 3 Page 7 Page 15 Page 28 Page 35 Page 52 Page 57 Page 64 Information current as of July 11, Further updates available through our Myanmar Election Monitor service. 2

3 MYANMAR S POLITICAL TRANSITION F ollowing the controversial 2008 constitutional referendum and muchpilloried 2010 election, Myanmar defied international expectations by transitioning from a despotic, military junta, to an increasingly democratic government. The international community has responded to the onceunthinkable steps taken by Myanmar s president and parliament by easing its most restrictive financial sanctions and encouraging foreign businesses to seek opportunities in Southeast Asia s frontier market. Yet the shine of Myanmar s initial success has dulled in the past year, with some critics labeling the country s recent 3

4 troubles backsliding. While Myanmar has its fair share of complex challenges, and will suffer setbacks on its road to democratization, its transition is in fact stumbling forward rather than stalling. Since taking office in March 2011, President Thein Sein, a former member of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government, has initiated a series of political and economic reforms resulting in a substantial opening of the longisolated country. The president initiated a dialogue with pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, paving the way for her and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party to contest and win 43 of 45 seats in the April 2012 by-elections. Further, Thein Sein suspended construction of the controversial Myitsone Dam in response to country-wide protests, released hundreds of political prisoners through sweeping general amnesties (most notably in January 2012), forged ceasefire agreements with 12 of 13 major non-state armed groups, pushed the country to embark on a nationwide national reconciliation process, insisted on transparency in conducting tenders for major infrastructure projects, and promoted greater personal and political freedoms. Parliament also has done its part by drafting and passing legislation to open the economy through foreign direct investment and sector-specific policies, and to protect freedoms of assembly and press as well as the right to peaceful protests. Under the leadership of ambitious Lower House Speaker, Shwe Mann, the parliament has transcended the rubber-stamping expected by many Myanmar observers, meeting regularly and conducting robust inquiry sessions and political debates. The parliament has increased legislative participation and brought about greater transparency in Myanmar s governance. In response to these and other reforms, the international community suspended or lifted major restrictive financial and trade sanctions. The opening also led to a flurry of high-level political visitors from around the world, with historic visits 4

5 by then-u.s. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. President Barack Obama, key leaders from the U.S. Congress, and top decision makers from the E.U., the U.K., and Japan. The U.S. restored full diplomatic relations, re-established a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission to Myanmar, began supporting assessment missions and technical assistance from international financial institutions, and eased its broad, country-wide restrictions on financial services, investment, and imports. Australia, Canada, and the U.K. all lifted sanctions; the E.U. lifted its restrictive measures as well, and expanded its bilateral donor programs. Japan s reengagement has been the most holistic and effective, implementing robust government donor assistance and supporting private investment in nearly all of Myanmar s major sectors, including power generation, telecommunications, and banking and finance, as well as building special economic zones. The IMF, World Bank, and The fruits of Myanmar s transition have improved ADB all have resumed lending, and are involved livelihoods across the country, but benefits in major technical assistance and infrastructure have concentrated in urban areas, where rising projects designed to help catalyze development. standards of living and closer integration into the global community are expected to yield a doubling The fruits of Myanmar s transition have improved of middle-class consumers by livelihoods across the country, but benefits have concentrated in urban areas, where rising standards of living and closer integration into the global community are expected to yield a doubling of middle-class consumers by The number of ATMs in the country has risen from zero in 2010 to 450 in Cell phone usage has skyrocketed: Myanmar has gone from being one of the world s least connected countries to having 3G networks in its largest cities with affordable SIM cards and cell phones. An underbanked and cash-based society without credit cards is slowly transforming: there now are more than 2,500 payment 5

6 terminals in the country. And with major new investors from dozens of countries entering the market, including Coca Cola, General Electric, Gap, Telenor, Ooredoo, ANZ, and other multinational firms, Myanmar s working age population has steadily increasing employment opportunities with decent wages. While the country has made notable progress, challenges remain. Ethnic and religious tensions run high, particularly with the Rohingya population in Rakhine State and ongoing issues between Myanmar s Buddhist and Muslim populations. National reconciliation will continue to be a work in progress; the Myanmar government on March 31 signed a draft ceasefire agreement with the country s major armed ethnic groups a significant step in the decades-long civil war that has scarred the country but the most difficult aspects of the agreement, including the political dialogue framework, have yet to be established. There still are questions about the country s relationship with North Korea, and policymaker statements, as well as additions to the U.S. sanctions list since 2012, suggest that bilateral military ties have yet to be severed. Myanmar s military also continues to dominate the country s political system, holding 25% of all parliamentary seats, and controlling three key ministries. It is unclear how much influence President Thein Sein or the executive branch has over the military, which has defied orders to stop attacking armed ethnic groups, in particular the Kachin Independence The momentum of the political transition will Army. The country also suffers from capacity not be locked in by the 2015 election, but issues that impact its ability to govern and meet its process and outcome will be key indicators high domestic and international expectations. of how the Myanmar story will continue to develop. The momentum of the political transition will not be locked in by the 2015 election, but its process and outcome will be key indicators of how the Myanmar story will continue to develop. The new leadership will face enormous challenges, and will require assistance, support, patience, and guidance, particularly from the international community, to maintain Myanmar s forward momentum. 6

7 MYANMAR S ELECTORAL HISTORY M yanmar s general election this year marks a milestone in the country s democratic transition. The current political environment is not Myanmar s first experiment with democracy; the country experienced parliamentary democracy following independence from the British, and undertook four elections from 1947 to 1960, and two more in 1990 and The three post-independence and pre-coup elections (in , 1956 and 1960) were defined by an increasing ability of the major blocs to exercise control over Myanmar s electoral structure, changing the rules to ensure subsequent elections 7

8 would favor the incumbents (or later, the military s) interests. These elections had low turnout due to unstable security environments, divided opposition, and boycotts by opposition parties and ethnic minorities. Despite some effective efforts to develop basic election infrastructure and undertake a credible electoral process, those elections were plagued by intimidation, falsification of records, bribery, and other fraudulent electoral activities. Many of the underlying challenges impacting Myanmar s political development in the past remain present today, and inform the likely difficulties and obstacles that the current government and incoming administration will have to overcome to maintain momentum in Myanmar s political and economic transition Myanmar s first general election in 1947 was billed as a step towards full independence, and was conducted as part of an agreement between withdrawing British colonial authorities and the Anti-Fascist People s Freedom League (AFPFL). The AFPFL was itself an incomplete political party, functioning as a politicized coalition of anti-japanese resistance fighters and communist forces held together by Aung San, who had fought with the Japanese during World War II (and is the father of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi), and later U Nu, the first prime minister of then-burma. To stabilize the former frontier areas and bring ethnic minority leaders support of the political process, the 1947 general election was marked by extensive military operations, some under the command of future junta leader, and former comrade of Aung San, Ne Win. The AFPFL, as a result of its wide coalition bolstered by the military s presence in opposition-dominated areas, won all but seven seats which were won by non-afpfl communist leaders. For 56 of the 91 seats contested by the AFPFL, AFPFL candidates were the only candidates. The Karen National Union (KNU), which stood to lose the privileges promised to them by the British, and the Burma Communist Party (BCP), which argued that any agreement 8

9 with the British could not yield a legitimate election, boycotted the election. Both the KNU and BCP would afterward launch insurgencies that engulfed the country for decades; the BCP fell into disarray in 1988, and the KNU entered into ceasefire negotiations with the current government in January Voter turnout in the 1947 elections averaged 46.7% across rural and urban districts, almost 30% higher than that in the first official post-independence elections in The elections were held in three The elections were held in three stages between June 1951 and April 1952 during a period of instability and significant security issues in the country s periphery areas. Despite the lengthened timeframe, voter turnout averaged under 20%, mostly due to an atmosphere of intimidation generated by the stages between June 1951 and April 1952 during a period of instability and significant security issues in the country s periphery areas. Despite the lengthened timeframe, voter turnout averaged under 20%, mostly due to an atmosphere of intimidation generated by the heavy presence of troops, as well as boycotts by communist groups and the KNU. heavy presence of troops, as well as boycotts by communist groups and the KNU. The AFPFL secured 147 of the 250 parliament seats through 60% of the votes, allowing it to form a government approved by only 12% of the electorate In 1956, improved security conditions and a more organized opposition drove turnout to twice the 1951 levels, resulting in a decline in AFPFL support to 48%. However, automatic decisions for uncontested AFPFL seats allowed the AFPFL to expand its majority to 173 parliament seats. The National United Front, a Marxist-Leninist opposition group formed by Aung San s brother just ahead of the elections, garnered more than 30% of the vote (translating into 48 seats) 9

10 by consolidating support from trade unions, peasant organizations, and voters seeking an alternative to the AFPFL. By 1958, the U Nu government s policies, particularly its reliance on communist support, created a split in the AFPFL that nearly cost U Nu the prime minister role from a no-confidence vote led by the rival AFPFL faction. The political instability sparked by the AFPFL divide, combined with the military s fears of communist participation in government and influence over U Nu, led General Ne Win to stage a coup and establish himself as the trustee interim prime minister of the U Nu government. Ne Win stated that he would hold power for two years and then hand it back to the democratic government Ne Win did relinquish power as promised, and the 1960 election then tested the military s tolerance for a democratic government that did not necessarily share the military s interests or concerns.. The election reduced the NUF s representation in government from 30% in 1956 to just 4.8% in However, the victory of U Nu s clean AFPFL over the army-backed stable AFPFL troubled the military. Two years later, Ne Win declared that parliamentary democracy was not suitable for Burma, dissolved the legislature, and ushered in decades of military rule After 26 years of one-party rule by Ne Win s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP, the sole legal party during this period of military rule), the 8888 Uprising, a student-led movement formed in the wake of Ne Win s disastrous demonetization policy that brought Aung San Suu Kyi to prominence, prompted the military to stage a second coup and install the new State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). A successor organization to the BSPP, the SLORC was formed with the promise that the military had no desire to wish to cling to State power for 10

11 long, and based its legitimacy and tenure on four goals: providing security, providing transportation, raising livings standards, and holding multiparty elections. Following the ostensible completion of the first three tasks, SLORC first secretary Major General Khin Nyunt announced an election to be held in May Of the over 200 political parties A successor organization to the BSPP, the SLORC born out of the 1988 uprisings, 93 survived was formed with the promise that the military the registration process to compete against the had no desire to wish to cling to State power SLORC-backed party, the National Unity Party for long, and based its legitimacy and tenure (NUP). The NUP s primary competitor was the on four goals: providing security, providing National League for Democracy (NLD), led by transportation, raising livings standards, and Aung San Suu Kyi and ex-general Tin Oo, who holding multiparty elections. were being punished by the military through house arrest and hard labor, respectively, and had the overwhelming support of those involved with or sympathetic to the 8888 Uprising. The SLORC worked to shape the election through tight restrictions on campaigning by non-nup parties, including on seemingly innocuous choices such as party symbols, continuous political attacks on the NLD as an agent of communist forces, and speeches by NUP leadership extolling the military s role as guardian of the country. Many NLD and opposition party candidates were imprisoned or placed under house arrest. These tactics were unsuccessful in impacting the outcome of the election, and the results were heavily lopsided: the NLD earned just under 60% of the total popular vote, translating to 80.8% of seats in parliament to the NUP s 2.1%. Myanmar watchers interpreted the election as a referendum on a fully democratic government or power-sharing with the military, due to similarities in the NUP and NLD s rhetoric on policy. However, the NLD intended to translate its electoral victory into a direct transfer of power. 11

12 The SLORC refused the NLD s demands, and after months of silence ultimately failed to recognize the election results based on the argument that the original election structure did not stipulate a date for parliament to convene. The SLORC announced the creation of a Roadmap to a Discipline-Flourishing Democracy, essentially a political do-over for the military regime to ensure that the next election would produce the result it desired Constitutional Referendum In 2008 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the successor entity to the SLORC, announced a constitutional referendum to be held that year, followed by elections in This was to be the first vote in Myanmar in 18 years, and the announcement was met by a mixed response from the international community. Myanmar s regional neighbors and ASEAN expressed support, while most western countries and NGOs voiced doubt over the legitimacy of the votes. Indeed, the referendum process was stage-managed by the government in order to minimize the opposition s voice and to build a foundation to avoid a repeat of the 1990 election. The nearly 200-page draft constitution was publicly released on April 9, just a month prior to the scheduled referendum vote on May 10, limiting the chance to comprehensively analyze the document. The NLD and other opposition groups strongly opposed the process, characterizing the referendum as an effort to preserve military control. The most objectionable terms concerned the allotment of 25% seats in both houses of the national parliament, as well as the region and state parliaments, to military delegates, lack of civilian oversight over military affairs, guaranteed military leadership of key ministries, and an article that would prohibit an Aung San Suu Kyi presidency. Opposition forces, spearheaded by the NLD, campaigned for a no vote, but were hamstrung by the continued imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi and activist leaders. In contrast, the government mobilized its 12

13 entire political apparatus to campaign for a yes vote, including through the arrest of demonstrators and activists. The impact of Cyclone Nargis further delegitimized the process. Despite calls to postpone the vote, the SPDC carried out polls in 278 townships, scheduling a second date only for those 47 townships most devastated by the cyclone. Turnouts of 99.06%, with 92.4% voting in favor, were announced against the backdrop of a natural disaster that left 84,537 dead, 53,836 missing and presumed dead, and over 800,000 citizens displaced Election In 2010, the SPDC established the Union Election Commission (UEC), led by the Chief Justice, as the central organization to oversee the election process. While similar to the body that oversaw the 1990 elections, the UEC commanded one additional power: the ability to regulate the campaign activities of political parties. This enabled the UEC to level extremely stringent regulations on party formation and entry into the election, most notably concerning the inadmissibility of parties that included former insurgent organizations or those that sought to cause societal conflict or undermine the constitution. Moreover, existing parties would be required to re-register and receive the UEC s blessing in order to contest the election. These restrictions, on top of existing concerns about the constitution and the fact that NLD chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest, were too much for the NLD, which refused to re-register. Other opposition groups, while agreeing that the elections served as a political tool for the military, argued that the UEC had left enough space to make opposition voices heard, potentially offering an opportunity to begin to transform the political system from the inside. The UEC qualified 37 of the 42 registered parties to run candidates for parliamentary bodies, yielding 3,071 contestants vying for 1,154 seats. Partly due to high registration fees leveled by the UEC, 54 constituencies saw single-candidate races. The military s representation was fielded through 13

14 the new Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which dominated all other parties in terms of finances, size, and organizational capacity. Other serious contenders included pro-democracy parties, including a breakaway NLD group, the National Democratic Force and the Democratic Party Myanmar (DP-M), as well as ethnic parties focusing on seats in regional and state bodies. Campaigning was muted by both the UEC s oversight of campaign materials and strict media controls, and election day was similarly calm. As expected, the USDP dominated the polls, winning 79.4% of the seats. Combined with the 25% bloc of additional parliamentary seats granted to the military, the party secured a supermajority enabling it to block legislative action by all other parties. Independent candidates did not fare well, winning only 6 of 82 contested seats, including just one in each of the national bodies. Opposition parties quickly cried foul after the elections, joining international human rights groups, lobby groups, and foreign governments to discredit the elections, while ASEAN governments struck a more hopeful tone. However, as voiced by some opposition parties on the eve of registration, the election may have provided at least token political opening: a stacked election is progress from no election at all. 14

15 MYANMAR S CONSTITUTION T he controversial 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, one of the final steps in the State Peace and Development Council s seven step Roadmap to a Disciplined and Flourishing Democracy, was passed in the wake of the devastating Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 and has since shaped the country s political environment. Though heavily criticized for establishing an outsized role of the military and preventing pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi from attaining the presidency, the document does provide increased freedoms and a foundation for a democratic transition. Its language can be vague, opening up the 15

16 constitution to a variety of interpretations, including potential outcomes that favor democracy and outcomes that favor a return to a junta. The 2008 constitution establishes a set of new institutions, including an elected president, a bicameral national parliament, and, for the first time in the country s history, fourteen regional governments, as well as regular multiparty elections. The constitution provides for separation of powers, but this can be undermined by the president s ability to appoint, dismiss, or otherwise control legislative and judicial officials. The military controls the most powerful ministries, including Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs, has a strong presence on the National Defense and Security Council, and holds 25% of all parliamentary seats. It is under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Defense Services, not the president or the legislative branch. One dominant doctrine featured throughout the document, including as qualifying characteristics for political leaders and a critical responsibility of the armed forces, is safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty. These concerns define Myanmar and its political conscience, stemming from a colonial hangover and fear of external and internal threats. Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens The constitution outlines several rights for Myanmar citizens, including certain legal protections, freedoms of speech and assembly, and the principle of non- 16

17 discrimination on the basis of race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex, and wealth. The constitution even entitles women to the same rights and salaries as men for similar work. The document prohibits human trafficking and forced labor. While there currently is considerable tension surrounding this issue, the constitution guarantees the freedom of religious practice though it officially places Buddhism in a special position and recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism. Article 364 contains language that could potentially be employed to protect those being targeted by anti-muslim aggressors: Moreover, any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution. A law may be promulgated to punish such activity. Article 364 contains language that could potentially be employed to protect those being Executive the President Selecting the President The president is elected by the Presidential Electoral College, a constitutional body made up of representatives from the parliament and targeted by anti-muslim aggressors: Moreover, any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution. A law may be promulgated to punish such activity. the Defense Services. The two houses of parliament and the Defense Services each choose a vice president, and one of the three is selected as president. The president can serve up to two five-year terms. Article 59 (F) prohibits anyone with a foreign parent, spouse, or child from becoming president, and this provision has received significant attention as it affects Aung San Suu Kyi. 17

18 Should the president resign, be impeached, pass away, or be unable to perform the duties of the office, the vice president having garnered the second highest number of votes in the presidential election will serve as acting president. If the office of president becomes vacant when the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (parliament) is in session, the acting president will request that it fill the vacancy within seven days. Powers and Functions of the President The president has a broad range of executive authorities, though many need to be approved by or consulted with the parliament and/or the National Security and Defense Council, providing checks on executive power. According to the constitution, the president is responsible to the parliament as are the vice presidents. The president can appoint ministers (though for militarycontrolled ministries, the president must select from a list provided by the CINC), designate the number of ministers, select chief minister for States and Regions, choose the CINC (subject to proposal and approval by the National Defense and Security Council), grant pardons and amnesties (seen in general amnesties throughout Thein Sein s term), establish or sever diplomatic relations and appoint diplomats, enter into treaties, take appropriate military action, and declare war or make peace. The National Defense and Security Council, once viewed as a successor to the SPDC, contains Myanmar s most powerful political and military leaders. It has rarely been mentioned in public, and it is unclear how much power this council wields. Its members include the president, the two vice presidents, the speakers of both houses of parliament, the CINC, the Deputy CINC, and the ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, Border Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. 18

19 Legislature Hluttaw (Parliament) Myanmar has two houses of parliament Amyotha (the Upper House) and Pyithu (the Lower House). Taken together, they form the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. When the 2008 constitution was passed, Myanmar watchers assessed that the parliament would be a rubber-stamping institution that would meet once a year (as required by the constitution) to pass laws friendly to the military. The parliament has surprised many, convening regular sessions, holding vibrant question and answer periods, and pushing through progressive legislation. Members also have constitutionally protected freedom of speech and voting in parliament, and they have exercised these freedoms. Much of this is owed to the ambitious Lower House Speaker, Shwe Mann, who was a ranking member of the former SPDC and now is a key reformer in the new government. Aung San Suu Kyi s party, the National League of Democracy (NLD), has taken advantage of increased political freedom to promote legislation and participate in committees. The members of parliament take their check and balance role seriously, and at times have disagreed with the decrees and actions of President Thein Sein. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw The Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw supervises its sessions, invites the president to address the chamber, requests that certain organizations or individuals speak before the parliament (similar to U.S. Congressional hearings), as well as other duties. The speaker is required to convene a regular session of parliament at least once a year, and the maximum interval between two regular sessions is twelve months. The Pyindaungsu Hluttaw undertakes a number of functions during sessions, including submitting, discussing, and resolving bills and proposals. Additionally, 19

20 it has the authority to enact laws if the need arises for matters where authority would otherwise sit within regional parliaments and Self-Administered Zones. Pyithu Hluttaw The Lower House of parliament is made up of 440 members; 330 members are elected on the basis of townships and population, and 110 are selected by the CINC from the ranks of the military. Candidates for the parliament must meet the following criteria: have attained the age of 25 years; be a citizen whose parents are Myanmar citizens; and have resided in Myanmar for at least 10 consecutive years up to the time of the election (unless posted overseas for a government position). More importantly, members of parliament can be disqualified for among others the following reasons: serving a prison term or being convicted by Myanmar s courts; being of unsound mind; being an undischarged insolvent (similar to a feature in India s constitution, this means a person who has ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot pay debts as they become due); having allegiance to a foreign government, or being subject to a foreign government or to a citizen of a foreign country (with allegiance defined as having a passport or citizenship of another country); being entitled to the rights and privileges of a foreign government; being a member of an organization that obtains and utilizes directly or indirectly support in the form of money, land, housing, buildings, vehicles, property, etc, from the government or religious or other organizations of a foreign country; 20

21 being a member of an organization that for political purposes abets the act of inciting, giving speech, conversing, or issuing a declaration based on religion to influence the decisions to vote or not to vote; being a member of a religious order; and being a Civil Services personnel (except as selected and appointed according to the constitution). Amyotha Hluttaw The Upper House has similar functions as the Lower House. The Amyotha Hluttaw is made up of 224 representatives; each Region or State elects in an equal number of 12 representatives for a total of 168 members, there is one representative from each Self-Administered Division or Self-Administered Zone, and 56 representatives are members of the military. The qualifications to become a member of the Upper House are similar to those for the Lower House, with the exception of the requirement to be 30 years of age. Region and State Hluttaws The Region or State Hluttaws are made of up of two representatives from each township within the Region or State. As these areas include the bulk of Myanmar s ethnic minorities, additional representatives are elected from each national race whose population constitutes at least 0.1% of the population of the Union. The Region and State parliaments also include Defense Services members nominated by the CINC. Whether a nod to calls for a federal system, or an attempt to begin to decentralize power, the constitution established regional parliaments in the States, Divisions, and Special Autonomous Regions. This could provide a greater voice for Myanmar s ethnic minorities, should these parliaments exercise the full extent 21

22 of their authority. The chief minister in each State will be appointed by the president and is expected to be from the main ethnic group of that State. Throughout Myanmar, however, ethnic communities have potential for gaining a greater say over their own affairs, at least in soft fields such as culture, language, and education. They might also be better positioned to resist central government intervention, but their power is limited, as the chief minister of each State government is subject to appointment and the will of the president. Region and State Hluttaws can pass a wide range of laws, in accordance with the constitution, including but not limited to taxes, budgets, infrastructure planning, development, social welfare, and the extractives and energy sectors. That said, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw can override a Region or State Hluttaw s laws. Whether a nod to calls for a federal system, or an attempt to begin to decentralize power, the constitution established regional parliaments in the States, Divisions, and Special Autonomous Regions. This could provide a greater voice for Myanmar s ethnic minorities, should these parliaments exercise the full extent of their authority. Passing Laws The president must sign into law bills that are approved by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw within 14 days of receipt. The president, however, has the right to return bills with comments to the parliament. If the president does not return the bill or sign it, the bill technically becomes law. All laws passed by parliament are supposed to be published in a national gazette, though with the parliamentary frenzy in the last few years, or perhaps by deliberate effort, several laws have passed unnoticed. 22

23 Judiciary Perhaps the most forgotten branch of Myanmar s government, the judicial branch has not achieved close to the level of reform that the executive and legislative branches have attained. The court system maintains vestiges of its colonial past, but also grapples with statutes from each different governing period in Myanmar s history, including the British colonial period, Japanese occupation, parliamentary democracy, socialist regime, and military junta. Most of these laws and statutory authorities have been neither revoked nor amended. Myanmar s court system includes the Supreme Court of the Union, High Courts of the Region, High Courts of the State, Courts of the Self-Administered Division, Courts of the Self- Administered Zone, District Courts, Township Courts, Courts- Martial, and the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union. The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and is the court of final appeal. It also has the authority to weigh in on bilateral treaty issues, as well as disputes between the Union and the State and Region governments. Including the Chief Justice, there are a minimum of seven and a maximum of 11 Judges of the Supreme Court, and Judges can serve until the age of 70. Defense Services Myanmar s most powerful institution the military, or Defense Services occupies a sole page of the constitution. While its role appears throughout the document, the constitution remains vague on specific responsibilities. The constitution provides that all armed forces in Myanmar, which would include armed ethnic and insurgent groups, are under the command of the Defense Services. Additionally, with the approval of the National Defense and Security 23

24 Council, the military has the authority to conscript all citizens to secure and defend Myanmar. Constitutional Amendments The constitution can be amended once a proposal in the form of a bill is submitted to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Further, if 20% of the total Pyidaungsu Hluttaw representatives submit such a bill to amend the constitution, it will be considered by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Aung San Suu Kyi and pro-democracy activists, including the 88 Generation Students, had focused on amending Article 436, which states: If it is necessary to amend the provisions of Sections 1 to 48 in Chapter I, Sections 49 to 56 in Chapter II, Sections 59 and 60 in Chapter III, Sections 74, 109, 141 and 161 in Chapter IV, Sections 200, 201, 248 and 276 in Chapter V, Sections 293, 294, 305, 314 and 320 in Chapter VI, Sections 410 to 432 in Chapter XI and Sections 436 in Chapter XII of this Constitution, it shall be amended with the prior approval of more than seventy-five percent of all the representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, after which in a nation-wide referendum only with the votes of more than half of those who are eligible to vote. Without military support, amending the constitution, particularly the most controversial articles such as those bearing on an Aung San Suu Kyi presidency, states of emergency, the role of the military in governance, as well as Article 436 itself, would require the votes of all non-military members of parliament plus one military vote. While the CINC has publicly stated in the past that military members can vote their consciences, it is unclear if there would in fact be a break in the ranks 24

25 of the military members of parliament in future votes. On June 25, the parliament failed to pass six proposed amendments to the constitution, including to Article 436. It appears the military voted as a bloc, particularly as military members expressed concerns during a debate that changes to the constitution could impact stability and the sanctity of the document. Without military support, amending the constitution, particularly the most controversial Political Parties The constitution provides broad guidelines on the formation of political parties, leaving the bulk of the work to the Union Election Commission (UEC). Parties are required to support the non-disintegration of the Union, articles such as those bearing on an Aung San Suu Kyi presidency, states of emergency, the role of the military in governance, as well as Article 436 itself, would require the votes of all non-military members of parliament plus one military vote. national solidarity, and preservation of sovereignty, and to be loyal to the state and abide by the constitution. The NLD previously had issues in supporting the constitution, but has and will continue to participate in the political process. The constitution provides potentially concerning bases that could revoke a party s status, including: being declared an unlawful association; directly or indirectly aiding insurgent armed groups; and directly or indirectly receiving and expending financial, material, or other assistance from a foreign government or foreigner or religious association. There are no clear guidelines indicating how the UEC would deem a party unlawful, 25

26 but there likely are a set of vague laws and rules to make it possible. The second criteria pertains more to ethnic minority political parties, some of which could be viewed as the political wing of an armed group. Finally, nearly all parties could technically be disqualified by the last criteria, as the government could direct this provision against political training provided by international NGOs and other election assistance or raise concerns that foreign governments may financially support the pro-democracy opposition. State of Emergency Contingencies for a state of emergency appear throughout the constitution, but are dealt with in detail in Articles 417 and 418. A state of emergency is generally defined as an event or trajectory that may result in the disintegration of the country and/or national solidarity, or the loss of sovereignty due to acts or attempts to overtake Myanmar though insurgency, violence, or other forcible means. When such a situation arises, the president may, after coordinating with the National Defense and Security Council, promulgate an ordinance and declare a state of emergency. However, a few paragraphs later, the CINC is granted the right to take over and exercise sovereign power in accord with the provisions of the constitution. Once the president confers authority to the CINC (or once the CINC takes power), the CINC commands all aspects of government, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in order to carry out necessary measures to speedily restore law and order. This potentially results in up to two years of military rule one year for the initial state of emergency, and two six-month extensions. 26

27 The CINC can exercise the powers of all branches of government, or establish a parliament that includes the CINC s participation. Executive and judicial powers may be transferred to and exercised by an appropriate body that has been formed or by a suitable person. The CINC also has the authority to restrict or suspend, as required, one or more fundamental rights of citizens. The president can declare an annulment of the state of emergency based on a report submitted by the CINC recognizing that the threat has passed. The National Defense and Security Council must hold a general election within six months of the annulment of a state of emergency. The type of state of emergency that would hand power back to the military is unclear. President Thein Sein has exercised states of emergency during his tenure, including in February 2015 in the Kokang Region in Shan State following clashes between rebels and government soldiers. Thein Sein made the announcement on state television, saying that effective immediately, martial law would be imposed in the Kokang Self-Administered Region for three months. He also declared a state of emergency in Rakhine State in June 2012 following violence between Buddhists and Muslims. These actions have not resulted in military rule. The coups of 1958 and 1962 may shed some light on how the CINC and the military could interpret the roles they believe it should play in national emergencies; the parliament in those years suffered from gridlock and little political cooperation, resulting in few laws being passed and the practical aspects of governance not being undertaken. At the same time, multiple armed insurgencies, including battles with the Burma Communist Party and the Karen National Union, threatened Myanmar s largest cities and population centers. Though Myanmar has not reached the same levels of political intransigence and violent insurgency as during the 50s and 60s, the same underlying tensions and issues remain and could trigger a state of emergency, particularly if Myanmar s next government is unable to govern. 27

28 THE CURRENT MYANMAR PARLIAMENT The Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaws, the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, comprise pro-government, pro-democracy, and ethnic minority political parties. The Union Solidarity and Development Party, made up of former ruling junta and military officials, commands an ultra-majority through the seats it holds combined with the support of military parliamentarians. Myanmar s legislative branch has surprised many, and dispelled concerns that it would act as a rubber stamp, through active engagement and debate as well as by passing many new progressive laws. 28

29 223 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (AMYOTHA HLUTTAW) NAME PARTY SEATS Union Solidarity and Development Party USDP 123 Wa Democratic Party WDP 1 Taaung (Palaung) National Party TNP 1 Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State UDKPS 1 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party RNDP 7 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party SNDP 4 National Unity Party NUP 5 PaO National Organization PNO 1 Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party PSDP 3 National League for Democracy NLD 5 New National Democratic Party NNDP 1 Military Military 56 National Democratic Force NDF 2 Chin National Party CNP 2 Chin Progressive Party CPP 4 Independent Independent 1 Kayin People's Party KPP 1 Kayin State Democracy and Development Party KSDDP 1 All Mon Region Democratic Party AMRDP 4 29

30 431 PEOPLE S ASSEMBLY (PYITHU HLUTTAW) NAME PARTY SEATS Military Military 110 Kayin People's Party KPP 1 Independent Independent 1 Inn National Democratic Party INDP 1 Chin Progressive Party CPP 2 Chin National Party CNP 2 All Mon Region Democratic Party AMRDP 3 National Democratic Force NDF 6 National League for Democracy NLD 37 New National Democratic Party NNDP 2 National Unity Party NUP 12 PaO National Organization PNO 3 Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party PSDP 2 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party* RNDP 7 Shan Nationalities League for Democracy SNDP 18 Taaung (Palaung) National Party TNP 1 Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State UDPKS 1 Union Solidarity and Development Party USDP 220 Wa Democratic Party WDP 2 30

31 People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw) Logo Party Seats Seats All Mon Region Democracies Party 3 4 The AMRDP, an ethnic Mon party, was formed by former New Mon State Party members who disagreed with the NMSP's boycott of the 2010 election. The party is led by Ngwe Thein and other former civil servants. As the only Mon party contesting the election, the AMRDP's platform centers on promoting equal rights for ethnic groups, but also promotes democratic and economic ideals, including increasing foreign investment, utilizing modern and advanced technologies, progress on labor and women's rights, and developing Myanmar's agriculture sector. Chin Progressive Party 2 4 The CPP is one of two ethnic Chin parties. The party is led by Pu No Than Kap. The CPP wants to bring more authority and power to the Region and State parliaments, and supports general democratic and economic development, but does not cite any specific policies. The Chin National Party 2 2 The CNP, now known as the Chin National Democratic Party (CNDP), is one of two ethnic Chin parties. The two parties have attempted to merge into a single party, but have failed to do so. The CNDP is focused on Chin constituencies and has called for a peaceful solution to ethnic armed conflict, respect for rule of law, and presentation of arbitrary taxation, arrest, torture, and forced labor. Independent 1 1 Kayin People's Party 1 1 The KPP is an ethnic minority party representing the Kayin and Karen people. The party is led by Tun Aung Myint and Simon Tha, a neurosurgeon who previously worked to broker a peace accord between Karen factions and the former junta. The party aims to promote good relations and trust among the different races in the country, to preserve the culture, literature, religion, and heritage of each ethnic minority group, particularly the Karen. Military Military legislators are appointed by the Commanderin-Chief and occupy 25% of parliamentary seats in each legislative chamber. The military, pursuant to the constitution, chooses one candidate to contest the presidency. 31

32 People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw) Logo Party Seats Seats National Democratic Force 6 2 The NDF, a pro-democracy party, was formed by former National League for Democracy (NLD) members who disagreed with the NLD's boycott of the 2010 election. The NDF has focused on amnesty for political prisoners, a new competition law for businesses, and a new law concerning rights to agricultural land, income inequality, human rights, and national reconciliation efforts. National League for Democracy 37 5 The NLD, the overwhelming winner of the quashed 1990 election, boycotted the 2010 election but reentered the political system to contest the 2012 election. The party is led by Aung San Suu Kyi and promotes democratic ideals and economic development. The NLD lacks specific policy priorities, but has generally discussed pursuing anticorruption efforts and social welfare programs. New National Democratic Party 2 1 The NNDP, a pro-democracy party, was formed by members of the NDF that split from the party after the 2010 elections, including the former NDF Vice Chairman Thein Nyunt. National Unity Party 12 5 The NUP was originally created to represent the political wing of the former SLORC government in the 1990 election. The party lost to the NLD in 1990, but was expected to once again be the SPDC's party for the 2010 elections, however in a surprise the USDP was formed to take that role. The NUP has focused on land reform and rural workers rights, and sees its core constituency as "peasants, workers, youths and women." PaO National Organization 3 1 The PNO, an ethnic PaO party, represents the interests of PaO organizations including the Union PaO Organization and the PaO National Organization. The PaO govern a Self-Administered Zone granted by the constitution. The PNO is a pro-government party and its platform centers on promoting the culture and interests of the PaO ethnicity but also includes a strong emphasis on education reform. 32

33 People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw) Logo Party Seats Seats Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party 2 3 The PSDP is an ethnic Kayin party. The PSDP platform focuses on promoting the culture and interests of the Kayin ethnicity, national unity, protection of human rights, and world peace. Shan National Democratic Party 18 4 The SNDP is an ethnic Shan party. The SNDP supports the preservation and promotion of ethnic culture and the national reconciliation process, developing Myanmar's economy, particularly the agriculture sector, strengthening education and health programs, and protecting worker rights. Taaung (Palaung) National Party 1 1 The TNP is an ethnic Taaung party. The TNP platform supports the preservation and promotion of ethnic culture and general economic and political development of Myanmar. Unity and Democracy Party (Kachin State) 1 1 The UDP is an ethnic Kachin party. The party is rumored to be associated with the military, USDP, and business enterprises in Kachin State. The UDP platform focuses on national reconciliation, democratic rights and development in Kachin State, counternarcotics efforts, and improving health and education. Union Solidarity and Development Party The USDP, a pro-government party that includes former SPDC members and junta officials, including President Thein Sein and Speaker of parliament Shwe Mann, is the parliament's current ultramjaority party. The USDP formed out of the SPDC's mass member organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, and was the chosen party of the junta in 2010 instead of the NUP. The USDP has surprised many with key leaders promoting prodemocracy policies. The USDP platform centers on market-based economics, freedom of religion, and general political and economic development policies. Kayin State Democracy and Development Party 0 1 The KSDDP is an ethnic Kayin Party. The party focuses on the development of Kayin State and its ethnic minority population, with an emphasis on infrastructure development and job growth. 33

34 People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw) Logo Party Seats Seats Rakhine National Party 7* 7 The RNP is an ethnic Rakhine Party formed by a 2014 merger between the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party and Arakan League for Democracy. The new party is creating its structure, policies, and framework, but has publicly stated that a true federal union should be a union based on national race and democracy, and it will promote national reconciliation and the interests of the Rakhine ethnic minority. Wa Democratic Party 2 1 The WDP is an ethnic Wa party. The party platform promotes the interests of the Wa, Kokang, Shan, and Kachin people and the development of the Wa Self-Administered Zone. The party also supports a strong and modern Myanmar military and general development ideals. Inn National Development Party 1 0 The INDP is an ethnic Intha party. The party has a more specific platform, focusing on labor issues and farmer's rights, as well as general policies on education, health, and support for a free press. The INDP supports a strong and modern Myanmar military. Total *These seven seats were won by the former Rakhine Nationalities Development Party prior to the merger. 34

35 MYANMAR S KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS M yanmar s diverse political landscape includes a myriad of actors that will shape the future of the country. These individuals and groups have had varying levels of influence in Myanmar to date, and their fortunes could either rise or fall after the 2015 election, even if not in any official capacity. The country s top government leaders, including President Thein Sein, Speaker Shwe Mann, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, and Aung San Suu Kyi, wield considerable power and influence in their respective roles in government. However, members of civil society and Myanmar s web of ethnic 35

36 groups can also hold significant sway, solidifying support or playing spoiler to the government s agenda. The international community maintains an important role in the development of the country whether desired or not and will be a lesser, but potentially influential, factor in Myanmar s political trajectory. President Thein Sein An unexpected reform leader, President Thein Sein has guided his government and the country through its nascent democratic transition since assuming the presidency in March Thein Sein rose through the Myanmar Army ranks, becoming a member of the ruling junta s State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in He held several positions in the SPDC over the years, assuming his last office as Prime Minister in 2007; that position took him overseas and presented him as the public face of the junta. He was appointed Chairman of National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee in May 2008, and coordinated relief efforts following Cyclone Nargis; he was born and raised in the Ayeyarwady Delta, the area most devastated by the cyclone. After assuming the presidency in 2011 as a member of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Thein Sein surprised the domestic and international communities by reaching out to longtime adversary and potential political rival Aung San Suu Kyi, releasing hundreds of political prisoners, engaging in serious national reconciliation efforts, and pushing through important economic and political reforms beginning democratization in the country. 36

37 Thein Sein is also viewed as less corrupt than the other USDP and former junta members in that he has no business interests or involvement in business. He consistently claims to govern in line with the will of the people, and has suspended major infrastructure projects and called for formation of investigatory committees in response to public outcry. It is still unclear if President Thein Sein will contest the 2015 election or retire from politics, but if there is significant popular support for another term and strong encouragement from members of parliament, he likely will participate. Though public polling in Myanmar is far from accurate, there is a general sense that the president is likable and that he has done good things for the country. His deteriorating relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi may damage his trustworthiness, particularly as she recently publicly questioned his character. A second Thein Sein term would likely see a continuation of reforms, though the pace would be considerably slower than the first. He may be concerned with his legacy and be more cautious in considering bold steps. It is unlikely that the current relationship between the executive and legislative branches would improve should he remain on for a second term. Career Highlights President, March 2011 present Prime Minister, SPDC, October 2007 February 2011 Secretary 1, SPDC, October 2004 October 2007 Secretary 2, SPDC, August 2003 October 2004 Adjutant General of the War Office, November 2001 August 2003 Commander of the Triangle Regional Command (Shan State), Military Operations Command 4 (Yangon), 1995 General Staff Officer at the War Office, Commander of Infantry Battalion 89 (Sagaing Division), 1990 Graduate of the Command and General Staff College (Shan State), 1989 Light Infantry Division 55 (Shan State), 1988 Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 9th intake,

38 Speaker Shwe Mann Myanmar watchers considered Thura Shwe Mann most likely to be elected president in the 2010 election. His position instead as Speaker of the House of Representatives came as a surprise, and was viewed as a demotion from his previous role, but he has managed to strengthen and transform the parliament from an institution perceived to be a rubber stamp to a platform for tangible reform efforts. Shwe Mann rose through the military ranks, earning the respect from fellow soldiers for his abilities and leadership, and became a member of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in He earned the military title Thura in 1989 as a result of his military bravery in fighting the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union. Shwe Mann reportedly enjoyed close ties to the former junta leader Senior General Than Shwe. Shwe Mann s son Aung Thet Mann is considered to be a crony who financially benefited from ties to the military regime; Aung Thet Mann received lucrative contracts in Ayeyarwady Division where his father was regional commander, and also was authorized by the government to export rice. Aung Thet Mann is on the U.S. sanctions list of Specially Designated Nationals; Shwe Mann was removed from that list in September 2012 in recognition of his support for reform efforts. Shwe Mann s ties to business and his role in the SPDC have caused mistrust among the pro-democracy cadre, but he has built a record as a reformer in the past four years. According to Inle Advisory Group contacts, 38

39 ethnic minority groups, including the armed groups involved in national reconciliation negotiations, like Shwe Mann because he listens rather than dictates to them. He has been prolific in outreach to fellow members of parliament, and has included ethnic minority parties in overseas delegations as well as high-level meetings with foreign officials. Should he have the support of the parliament or military, he almost certainly will be a presidential contender, and then likely become leader of the country after A Shwe Mann presidency would bring a continuation of reforms, cooperation with opposition parties, and focus on national reconciliation efforts. Career Highlights Speaker, House of Representatives, March 2011 present Member, SPDC, Chief of General Staff of the Armed Services, 2003 Joint Chief of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force, Southwest Region Commander (Ayeyarwady Division), Commander, Light Infantry Division 11 (Yangon), 1996 Tactical Operations Commander, Light Infantry Division 66 (Bago), Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 11th intake,

40 Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar Military The military remains Myanmar s dominant and most powerful institution. The Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, was formed to overcome British colonial rule in the advent of World War II. Aung San, father of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, along with his Thirty Comrades created the Burma Independence Army (BIA), and were trained by the Japanese on Hainan Island. Following Myanmar s independence in 1948, the military played a critical part in guaranteeing the country s sovereignty and protecting the new government from dozens of ethnic and anti-government militias threatening secession or coup. It established principles that are still in effect today and appear throughout the 2008 Constitution: preservation of the union, national solidarity, and defense of sovereignty. General Ne Win, a member of the Thirty Comrades, took power in 1958 to settle a political stalemate and to quash uprisings, and then again in 1962, this time staying in power. Myanmar has been in the throes of war since its independence, fighting against multiple ethnic militias some numbering between 20,000-40,000 troops and other anti-government armies. Waging counterinsurgency operations became the foundation of Myanmar s military, shaping its doctrine and institutions ever since. In the 1970s, Ne Win developed the four cuts strategy, which cuts off access to food and shelter, funds, intelligence, and recruitment, often resulting in a scorched earth policy in its implementation. The four cuts strategy remains the guiding 40

41 principal behind the military s operations, resulting in ongoing human rights violations that include forced labor, child soldiers, land seizures, displacement, sexual violence, and human trafficking. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was first formed in the wake of the 1988 uprising and later transformed into the SPDC, established a seven step Roadmap to a Flourishing Disciplined Democracy that ostensibly set the path to permanently institutionalize military governance under the guise of a democracy. The roadmap, which took decades to complete, included the following steps: 1. Establishment of a National Convention to draft a new constitution 2. Proposal of steps needed to establish a democracy following the conclusion of the National Convention 3. Drafting of a constitution 4. Holding a national constitutional referendum 5. Holding a national election 6. Convening of parliament 7. Building of a modern and disciplined democratic nation by the newly elected parliamentarians The junta probably did not envision the evolution of the seventh step in the roadmap bringing about as much political change as it has. However, despite progressive legislation, the constitution continues to institutionalize a military role in all aspects of government, awarding it prominent ministerial positions, including Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs, control over the armed forces, 25% of all parliamentary seats, and a major presence in the National Defense and Security Council. The military almost certainly will in the short term refuse any pressure to limit its political prowess, including to change Article 436 of the constitution that requires a supermajority to 41

42 amend the constitution, and effectively gives the military veto power. While many on the civilian side, including in the USDP, would like to see the military eventually withdraw from politics, most agree that a staged reduction of its direct influence and parliamentary seats over the course of several years is the most stable and viable option. Min Aung Hlaing was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the military in 2011, and holds the coveted title of Senior General, a position last held by former SPDC leader Than Shwe. He almost certainly will be the military parliamentarian nominee for the presidency, and likely will attain one of the vice presidential slots. Min Aung Hlaing is expected to retire this year, per the mandatory military retirement age of sixty. Min Aung Hlaing is a virtual unknown relative to the other likely presidential nominees, and his views on topics such as political development and national reconciliation must be divined from his public speeches, recent interviews, and actions. He comes across as a political hardliner who favors a strong military and stable country, suggesting he would use force should insurgencies or protests rage out of control. Min Aung Hlaing has become more open to interviews and, according to local journalists, is fairly charismatic. Min Aung Hlaing has spent his formative years in the military in Shan State, including involvement in actions in 2009 targeting the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group. The MNDAA in 2015 has been involved in heavy skirmishes with the military, resulting in internally displaced persons, Myanmar military deaths, and bombings across the Chinese border. Min Aung Hlaing s attitude toward Myanmar s political transition has been questioned, particularly as he defied President Thein Sein s order to halt military offensives in Kachin State. He reportedly is close to Than Shwe, and would almost certainly be less progressive than his USDP and NLD colleagues and seek to protect military interests. 42

43 Career Highlights Commander-in-Chief, March 2011 present Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Services, June 2010 March 2011 Chief, Bureau of Special Operations 2, 2008 Commander, Triangle Regional Command, 2002 Commander, Light Infantry Division 44 Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 19th intake, 1974 National League for Democracy Chairwoman Aung San Suu Kyi National icon and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi rejoined the political and prodemocracy scene following her release from house arrest in November She is the daughter of the founder of independent Myanmar and its military, Aung San, who was 43

44 assassinated when she was two years old. After years of study and work abroad, Aung San Suu Kyi returned to Myanmar in 1988 to nurse her dying mother, and soon became engaged in the country s democratic uprising. When former head of state Ne Win stepped down and called for a multi-party election, Aung San Suu Kyi formed the National League for Democracy (NLD) party to contest the 1990 election. Despite the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi and more than half of the other NLD candidates, the party won more than 80% of the vote. The junta refused to recognize the election results, and embarked instead on the seven-step Roadmap to a Flourishing Disciplined Democracy, ostensibly to ensure a democracy on its terms. Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest three times from During each period of house arrest her freedom increasingly became more restricted. Aung San Suu Kyi s husband died of cancer in London in 1999; government authorities rejected his request to visit her before his death. The junta urged Aung San Suu Kyi to join her family abroad, but she refused, believing she would not be allowed to return to Myanmar if she did. In what became known as the Depayin Massacre, tensions with the government came to a head in May 2003 when an unidentified group of assailants attacked Aung San Suu Kyi s convoy. Dozens of NLD members and supporters were reported killed or missing, yet the true figure likely stands at around one dozen. Following the attack, Aung San Suu Kyi was held in detention and then placed back under house arrest. In May 2009, just days before her period of detention was due to expire, Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested and charged with breaking the terms of her house arrest after a U.S. citizen entered her house and refused to leave. She was sentenced to three years imprisonment, but the sentence was reduced to 18 months of additional house arrest. The SLORC and later the SPDC met with Aung San Suu Kyi only a handful of times during her periods of house arrest; under pressure from the international community and former UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari, the SPDC in 2007 assigned former Minister of Labor Aung Kyi to be its liaison. Upon release in November 2010, she began to reshape and reinvigorate the NLD through youth outreach and adding new members to the NLD s Central Executive Committee. With some 44

45 internal debate and controversy, the NLD decided to contest the 2012 by-election, and won 43 of 44 seats. Aung San Suu Kyi would like to assume the presidency in the next administration, but is constitutionally barred from doing so because her sons hold foreign citizenship. She has forged a strong relationship with Shwe Mann, and there are rumors that a power sharing agreement between them already is in place. Beyond the legal obstacles, Aung San Suu Kyi also has come under fire for her silence on ethnic and sectarian violence and land confiscation issues. An Aung San Suu Kyi or NLD-led government likely would focus on social welfare issues and popular issues such as anti-corruption and education. There would be a continuation of reform efforts, most certainly on expanding personal freedoms. She will be pressured to address job creation and employment prospects for Myanmar s large youth population, but it is unclear exactly where her and her party s policies on economic reforms lie. Career Highlights Wins a parliamentary seat in by-election, April, 2012 Meeting with President Thein Sein, August, 2011 Released from house arrest, November 2010 Depayin Massacre, third house arrest, May 2003 Released from house arrest, 2002 Second house arrest, September 2000 Released from house arrest, July 1995 Publishes Freedom from Fear, December 1991 NLD wins election, May 1990 First house arrest, July 1989 General Secretary and Founder, NLD, September 1988 Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla, 1987 Visiting Scholar, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Research Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan, 1972 Assistant Secretary, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, United Nations Secretariat, Graduates from St. Hugh s College, Oxford University,

46 Civil Society Since Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the sitting of parliament in March 2011, the space for civil society in Myanmar has expanded significantly from its lowest points during the SLORC and SPDC eras. The interests of Myanmar civil society, which for these purposes does not include government NGOS (or GONGOs) or non-state armed groups, range from pro-democracy efforts, to supporting land tenure and students rights, to national reconciliation efforts. The 88 Generation Students (88 GS) group, taking its name from the 1988 uprising, is synonymous with the democratic struggle and civil society movement in Myanmar. The group s key members were at the forefront of the 1988, and later the 2007, protests. The pro-democracy group spent much of the last 25 years in prison; in November 2008, the 88 GS members were sentenced to 65 years in prison apiece, but were released in a general amnesty in January The 88 GS includes some of the most prominent dissidents in the country; the best-known member of the group is Min Ko Naing, who was the unofficial leader of the underground student union in Originally named Paw U Tun, his nom-de-guerre Min Ko Naing means conqueror of kings, and he has won numerous human rights awards for his nonviolent campaign for democracy. He was arrested a year after the 1988 protests, 46

47 released in November 2004, and then rearrested in Other key members include Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe, Pone Cho, Min Zeya, and Jimmy and Nilar, who had to leave their fourmonth-old daughter with relatives while unsuccessfully evading arrest. Upon release from prison in the January 2012 amnesty, the 88 GS immediately returned to the pro-democracy cause. They traveled throughout the country to meet with ethnic minority groups, promoting national reconciliation and development in minority areas. 88 GS members also have met with the government, discussing ways to continue reform efforts and make progress on national reconciliation efforts. With the government opening in 2011, other sections of civil society shifted from health and cyclone-recovery activities to greater engagement in social and environmental issues; the Save the Irrawaddy campaign resulted in the government suspension of the Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam project. Civil society organizations have also focused on rule of law issues, and have protested against land seizures and other political and civil rights violations. Civil society is a growing voice in Myanmar, and will directly and indirectly impact the political reform trajectory. These communities provide individuals and otherwise marginalized groups with a stake in the country s transition. However, as Myanmar experts Charles Petrie and Ashley South noted in their paper on Myanmar s civil society [1], civil society is not inherently progressive, but can be both reactionary and repressive, or at least, unaccountable. Many of these groups have had little to no experience in negotiating, and come to the table with a zero sum mentality, making consensus more difficult to reach. [1] 47

48 Ethnic Minorities National reconciliation is Myanmar s defining issue Myanmar has been in prolonged throes of war since its independence in 1948, with continual fighting between the government and ethnic, politically ideological, and anti-government armies. Decades of war and military rule have resulted in local populations being subjected to land grabs, questionable labor practices, environmental degradation, and other human rights abuses. The junta government in the 1990s forged ceasefire agreements with more than a dozen armed ethnic groups, halting the civil war, but failing to reach a political solution. The current government, populated with many generals from the former junta, has defied expectations on national reconciliation with both the executive and legislative branches committed to seeking resolution. Thein Sein and his government since 2011 have made significant efforts towards a durable peace and a political dialogue with armed ethnic groups and Myanmar s 135 officially recognized ethnic nationalities. Ethnic nationalities, for their part, also have actively participated in the negotiations, and are working to overcome decades of mistrust to achieve a lasting and stable peace. In March 2015, a draft framework for national reconciliation was signed between the government and several of the armed ethnic groups. While the final details of the agreement are far from complete, it represented a critical step forward in bringing ethnic minorities into politics to end Myanmar s civil wars. 48

49 Despite positive steps toward national reconciliation, the situation remains tenuous and fraught with miscalculation. Skirmishes continue to flare in Shan State, particularly in the Kokang area, and tensions with the Kachin Independence Army and the United Wa State Army loom over the negotiations. Difficult issues such as resource sharing and federalism will dominate political discussions, with no easy solutions readily available. The bulk of Myanmar s natural resources, including gems and precious stones, minerals, timber, hydropower potential, and tourism are located in the ethnic areas, presenting a challenge both to the government and any prospective investors seeking to engage in those regions. The ethnic minorities are politically active, and will to the best of their abilities contest both the national and state and regional elections. Their best chance for increasing representation is in the state and regional parliaments. According to Inle Advisory Group contacts, the NLD will likely choose not to contest certain state and regional seats in order to build a cooperative relationship with these groups and avoid tensions, with an eye toward coalition building to pursue the NLD agenda. The ethnic minorities will increasingly be a factor in Myanmar politics, whether through membership in parliament or their role in the national reconciliation efforts. 49

50 Myanmar Political Elite Though not key influencers on Myanmar s political trajectory, individuals such as Tin Aye, the chair of the Union Election Commission (UEC), Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of the Upper House, and members of Thein Sein s office, including Soe Thane, the coordinating minister of economic affairs, and Aung Min, the lead government negotiator for the peace process, play an important role. Tin Aye, a former member of the SPDC, and the UEC will enforce the way the lead up to and day of the election is conducted, including, but not limited to, voter lists, political party registration, campaign rules, and participation of international election observers. The UEC has been open to and has received technical assistance, and has continually made public statements supporting its intent to hold a credible election. Khin Aung Myint, a rumored dark horse candidate for the presidency, participates in several influential political groupings, including the National Defense and Security Council and six party talks related to national reconciliation. His parliamentary position allows him to direct how the institution operates as well as what bills are up for draft, debate, or passage. The members of the Office of the President have been key advisors to Thein Sein throughout his administration and are credited with assisting the president craft and enact his reform agenda. These members, particularly Soe Thane and Aung Min, will almost certainly be involved with Thein Sein s critical decision of seeking a second presidential term. 50

51 The International Community The international community, through foreign governments, business communities, and human rights organizations, also will continue to play a role in the political trajectory of the country. Since the 2011 opening, Western governments have lifted or suspended major financial restrictions, allowing business and money into the country for the first time in decades. The reestablishment of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies has pumped millions of dollars into infrastructure projects, technical assistance programs, and education efforts on electoral and political reforms. While this renewed engagement is aimed to improve the environment for political and economic reforms to flourish, some human rights groups contend that the country is insincere in its transition and that restrictive measures should be reimposed. Foreign governments have been pressuring the Myanmar government to conduct a credible election, allow for full participation of political parties, and ensure transparent conduct leading up to and on the day of the election. Governments and international NGOs have offered technical and monetary assistance to provide election and democracy training to both the Union Election Commission and the various political parties. Should election day not appear credible, or should the next administration stall reform efforts or slide back toward the former junta governing principles, human rights groups 51

52 almost certainly will demand more restrictive policies, including the reimposition of sanctions, and divestment from major investment projects. Should the opposite occur, foreign governments will work to fully normalize bilateral ties, increase assistance programs, and further encourage businesses to engage in the Myanmar market. 52

53 THE GEOGRAPHY OF MYANMAR Myanmar geographically comprises seven states and seven regions, divisions, and territories. The state names reflect Myanmar s largest ethnic groups, and they are located around the country s periphery. The regions, divisions, and territories run through the center of the country and house Myanmar s largest urban areas, including the administrative capital, Nay Pyi Taw, as well as Mandalay and Yangon. The 2008 Constitution also recognizes five Self Administered Zones and a Self Administered Division. The zones and division are overseen by governments known as leading bodies which have executive and legislative control over development affairs, public health, water, and electricity. Members of these leading bodies have said they have had little authority to enact laws in practice, and that the state governments intervene to influence local affairs. 53

54 MYANMAR States, Divisions & Self Administered Zones Naga SAZ Sagaing Division Kachin State Pa Laung SAZ Kokang SAZ Chin State Mandalay Division Shan State Wa SAD Rakhine State Nay Pyi Taw Magway Division Bago Division Kayah State Kayin State PaO SAZ Danu SAZ Ayeyarwaddy Division Yangon Division Mon State Tanintharyi Division Self Administered Zones 54

55 THE 2015 ELECTION T he Myanmar government announced on July 8 that the first general election since 2010 will take place on November 8. The election represents another critical milestone in Myanmar s transition toward democracy. The election itself will not however be the ultimate determinant of whether Myanmar will progress ahead democratically or slide back into a more militaristic or disciplined governing structure. The real test for those who win seats in November will be to ensure that all stakeholders are empowered to work within the system and cooperate, despite differing views, to maintain the country s 55

56 political and economic trajectory, and the military s tolerance level for continued political development. The government, particularly the Union Election Commission (UEC), has worked to make the election as credible as possible. The UEC set the end of April as the deadline for political party registration, announced the election date, and announced constituencies and registration of candidates. The campaign period will start in September. Unless there is a major event on the scale of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 or the 2007 Saffron Uprising, or a major While many would concede that Myanmar ethnic conflict emerges and spills into urban politics will remain problematic regardless areas, the election day is unlikely to be delayed. of the conduct of election day due to the continued role of the military and a While many would concede that Myanmar controversial constitution, the outcome of the politics will remain problematic regardless of vote will serve to preview how the next five the conduct of election day due to the continued years might proceed. role of the military and a controversial constitution, the outcome of the vote will serve to preview how the next five years might proceed. The UEC has received technical assistance from international organizations and governments, improving the chances for a credible election. The government announced in March that it had invited the Carter Center and the European Union to monitor this year s election, the first time in at least 65 years that the country will permit Western poll observers. The 2010 election did not include foreign election monitors. This election will be closely watched as, at the time of this writing, 73 parties will throw their hats in the electoral ring to seek entry into the local and national 56

57 Myanmar legislative bodies that are growing in political influence and importance. Some of these political parties will be newly formed, while others will be familiar from previous elections, including in 1990 and Several ethnic minority parties will contest for national level as well as region and state parliaments to increase their voice in politics. However, the two parties that will be the focal point of the election remain the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and Aung San Suu Kyi s National League for Democracy (NLD). The USDP has been a surprise to many Myanmar watchers who had concluded prior to the seating of government in March 2011 that it would continue the oppressive policies of the former junta. The USDP is made up of many top members of the State Peace and Development Council and related ministries, as well as members of the mass civilian wing of the junta, the Union Solidarity and Development Association. The USDP, however, dispelled most preconceptions by passing progressive legislation to allow for greater personal freedoms, conducting outreach to former political enemies, releasing of hundreds of political prisoners, and making efforts to reach a nationwide ceasefire with Myanmar s armed ethnic and student groups. The party has learned to politick as well; it has cultivated relationships with ethnic minority members of parliament and approved development projects in periphery areas. The USDP could potentially field a few candidates for the presidency and vice presidencies the upper and lower houses of parliament and the military each choose candidates to compete for these roles including current president Thein Sein and parliament speaker Shwe Mann. It is still unclear if President Thein Sein will contest the 2015 election or retire from politics; he has made recent indications that he will not seek a second term. In late 2013, Thein Sein suggested that he would not seek a second term unless the will of the people otherwise compelled him. If there is significant popular support for another term, and strong encouragement from members of parliament, he probably will do so. Thein 57

58 Sein thus far has managed to grow and maintain his popularity in Myanmar. Additionally, Shwe Mann, once seen as the probable president in 2010, stated in April that he will consider the presidency if nominated, and in that role is willing to cooperate with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and anyone working in the interests of the country. Though the USDP has impressed many in the country with its political record, there still remains suspicion that the party could stall reform or slowly allow the previous junta policies to come back into effect. There also is lingering mistrust directed at the former senior junta generals, including Thein Sein, Shwe Mann, and current government ministers. It is unclear if the new administration, likely to be a coalition government, will reverse policies implemented in the past four years, causing further uncertainty and potentially slowing reform. The USDP will face stiff competition from the NLD, a party that will almost certainly run a candidate in each constituency. Some Myanmar watchers contend that the USDP has an incumbent advantage, however, Myanmar s politics still run on name recognition, history, and personal appeal factors that are unlikely to work in favor of the USDP. The NLD in 1990 won more than 80% of the seats in that year s general election, and won 43 of the 44 seats it contested in the 2012 by-elections. Iconic figure Aung San Suu Kyi is a household name, and the NLD and its fighting peacock symbol are revered across the country. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party are viewed as a force for democracy, and she has had an uncanny ability to bring together Myanmar s traditionally fractious political forces under a united banner. Results of any opinion polling will be extraordinarily vague and unreliable the country is inexperienced in the practice of opinion polling, and after decades of coercion and threats, the public remains quite wary about openly sharing views. Despite Aung San Suu Kyi s current position in parliament and the government s acceptance of her significance to the country, many are still concerned about publicly expressing 58

59 support for her or the NLD simply possessing photos of Aung San Suu Kyi was once an offense that could result in fines or jail time. That said, the NLD will almost certainly win a majority of seats, but likely will not achieve the same level of success it saw in The party lacks a platform though reportedly has been working on a strategy and has increasingly been pressured to provide clarity on the specific efforts it would pursue in government. Aung San Suu Kyi has stated that anti-corruption will be a centerpiece of the agenda, but the party s thoughts on combatting corruption and its definition of corrupt practices remain Despite the recent criticism, Aung San unclear. Additionally, the NLD is hierarchical Suu Kyi is still highly respected, especially and concerns regarding the lack of youth in rural areas, and though she is remains participation, cultivation of future party constitutionally barred from being president, leaders, and transparency within the party she can still play a significant role in structure have bubbled to the surface. There Myanmar s political institutions. have also been more serious concerns about Aung San Suu Kyi s leadership potential and her ability to govern. She has failed to speak out on land tenure issues, ethnic conflict, and most notably, the Rohingya issue. One Inle Advisory Group contact commented, she feels that she can solve a problem just by walking into a room. Aung San Suu Kyi has dismissed such thinking, stating, if you have the support of the people, you can be the leader of the country. Despite the recent criticism, Aung San Suu Kyi is still highly respected, especially in rural areas, and though she remains constitutionally barred from being president, she can still play a significant role in Myanmar s political institutions. In May, 59