The presidentialization of politics concept: between parties and leaders

Transcription

1 The presidentialization of politics concept: between parties and leaders Gianluca Passarelli ABSTRACT The presidentialization of politics. A concept clearly defined but that can affect at the least three dimensions of politics. As Poguntke and Webb (2005) acutely indicated the presidentialization interested the executive face, the electoral face, and the party face. Presidentialization has had a strong impact on politics, and it seems been active in almost all advanced democracies. Even though with differentiate outcomes, mostly depending on the balance of powers of each political system, the presidentialization «appeared» in all the three institutional systems: presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary. Moreover, the presidentialization has quickly been (mis)understood as a flow that only (or primarily) interested - and that has been led by - political leaders (presidents and prime ministers). Nevertheless, leaders are not the only political actors of that «new» game. Political parties are at the core of at least two of the three faces of presidentialization. The «electoral campaign», and the «personalization of party leadership» are in fact strongly related to the changes which affected most the political parties in (at least) the last fifteen years. In addition, the control of their «own party» is the main political tool the heads of government have in all the three forms of government. So, we can look to presidentialization of parties as the main feature of presidentialization of politics. Three main elements contribute in defining the kind of presidentialization of parties. The institutional framework, and in particular the electoral system, the balance of power between the three faces of the party, and so the equilibrium in the dominant coalition, and, finally, the genetic model of party. We theoretically and empirically investigate how changes on the mix of these elements affected the process of presidentialization of parties in different systems. Introduction The presidentialization of politics. A concept clearly defined but that can affect at the least three dimensions of politics. As Poguntke and Webb (2005) acutely indicated the presidentialization interested the executive face, the electoral face, and the party face. Presidentialization has had a strong impact on politics, and it seems been active in almost all advanced democracies. Even though with differentiate outcomes, mostly depending on the balance of powers of each political system, the presidentialization «appeared» in all the three institutional systems: presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary. Moreover, the presidentialization has quickly been (mis)understood as a flow that only (or primarily) interested - and that has been led by - political leaders (presidents and prime ministers). Nevertheless, leaders are not the only political actors that directly play this «new» game. Political parties are at the core of at least two of the three faces of presidentialization. The «electoral campaign» and the «personalization of party leadership» are in fact strongly related 1

2 to the changes which affected most the political parties in (at least) the last fifteen years. In addition, the control of their «own party» is the main political tool the heads of government have in all the three forms of government. However, it seems that in all three different regime types the process of presidentialization affected more «one face», that is party. Political parties, and in particular the «presidential» one, seem having allowed the presidentialization process to strongly affect the formal politics. In addition, in the logic of the presidentialization of politics (and parties) process, it should be taken in account the role and the relevance of leaders. First of all, the importance of leaders in politics is growing both in general political arena, and in the parties. In the latter case, the function of the leader arises as crucial on a double meaning: the leader is (or should be) deep linked to a party in order to achieve his political goals. Vice versa, each party need a (strong) leader in order to better face the political and electoral races. Moreover, the control of the party organization strictly affects the leader s influence on the balance of power between the party s faces as well as on the equilibrium internal at the dominant coalition. Thus, the goal of this essay is to propose an analytical tool useful to depict paths in the processes of presidentialization of parties in various contexts/countries. Differences would arise, we suppose will mostly depend on parties «organizational» and «internal» characteristics rather than (or at the best not only) on exogenous factors, such as the institutional frameworks, which play a role but not a primary one. So we could expect to find out differences and similarities mostly among «types» of parties instead among countries and/or regime types. The concept of presidentialization of politics and personalization too The process of presidentialization has interested three faces of politics: the party, the executive, and the electoral campaign (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Thus, each element contributed to generate the presidentialization phenomenon. A general definition of presidentialization is offered by Poguntke and Webb: «presidentialization denominates a process by which regimes are becoming more 2

3 presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure that is their regime type» (Ibidem, 1). So, there have been an «increasing leadership power resources and autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively and increasingly leadership centred electoral processes» (Ibidem, 5). So, the presidentialization goes across countries and regime type, as a general and generalized (ideal-typical) phenomenon of politics. After all, as had put in evidence Antony Mughan (2000) presidentialization has interested also parliamentary countries such as Great Britain in primis. And in fact, according to Mughan presidentialization (and the related role of the mass media) «implies a movement over time away from collective to personalized government [...] electoral politics dominated [...] by the party leader» (Ibidem, 7). In this respect it seems that Mughan overlaps the two analytical dimensions: on one side he stressed the institutional side of that process (which will «verge» parliamentarism to presidentialism), rather on the other side he (implicitly) confirms the presidentialization process independency by arguing that it implies a progressive concentration of power on the party leaders hands. So, it arises that as we argue presidentialization can be possible in various institutional regimes. Problems on definition of presidentialization have been stressed by Karvonen (2012) which put in evidence some incongruence in the work of Poguntke and Webb in particular in relation to the choice of cases analysed, and the lack even in a common analytical framework of the empirical research developed and (secondary) data collected by each contributor (Ibidem, 6 and 10). Moreover, if institutional context matters as claim Samuels (2002, 462), especially on the relationship between presidentialized parties and presidential regimes, Poguntke and Webb correctly note that presidentialization define an ideal-typical phenomena don t be confounded by the analyses on presidential systems (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 2). Beyond the goal to reach a shared definition, the most relevant innovation introduced by the presidentialization concept has to do with the ability to focus on the general process affected politics. The most important consequence, according to us, is that presidentialization as a defined and autonomous event can be analyzed in its origins and effects on different political actors. In any case, in particular, we 3

4 would advice that all three faces of politics related to «presidentialization» can be seen as directly or not strongly related to the political parties. Both the presidentialization of the executive and the electoral campaign are in fact possible only if the party is «presidentialized» in itself. In many contemporary democracies there has been a growing increase of the resources of the «head of the government» both in terms of financial funds and of organizational and human resources. Moreover, the electoral process, the candidature selection processes, and the increasingly tight relationship between voters and candidates as «head of government» have had a crucial role in centralizing politics. At the same time, the electoral campaign, due to many coherent factors, has more and more been focused on the candidate. So, all these factors contributed whereas with different level of intensity to the presidentialization of politics. Before to go through the analysis of the ways in which the presidentialization interested the structures and the balance of powers within political parties, a preliminary specification is needed. In fact, even though the personalization of politics (McAllister 2007; Karvonen 2010), and the centralization of some related political processes such as the rise of candidate-cantered politics (Wattenberg 1991), have been part of the general trend interested politics in almost all democracies, a conceptual distinction should be done with respect to presidentialization. Thus, a preliminary clarification and definition of what commonly personalization means it is required and opportune. Even though both personalization and personalization imply an increasing role of individual relevance in politics rather than of a collective dimension, some differences arise as well. A crucial distinction we think should be done referring to both the conceptual and the empirical dimensions. We assume that presidentialization is in fact a wider concept that in some way includes that of personalization. The latter can in effect be considered as an effect of the previous one. Presidentialization refers to a well defined political actor and not only to a person, so, we can have an individual subject affected by presidentialization as well as a «collective» actor such as the «party in public office» or the external party (the party in central office), and the single leader of course. Moreover, presidentialization can be measured through some indicators such as: 4

5 elections (success or failure), political actors resources, concentration of power, etc. Vice versa, it seems that personalization would predominantly refer to the way in which the previous phenomena are implemented. After all, is quite evident on Karvonen definition of personalization, which refers to general changes affecting institutions, citizens perceptions of politics, people s electoral choices, etc. (Karvonen 2010, 5). So, thus personalization seems to be complementary to presidentialization. Thus, we will focus on presidentialization which represents a wider political phenomenon and that include also personalization, with the latter being just one aspect of the previous. In particular, as said, we would concentrate on the presidentialization of parties, and their related differences. First of all, we should consider that the reasons at the base of this trend are different and often interrelated. Nevertheless, the main factor should be researched on the evolution that affected the parties in the last twenty years at least. From «our» party to «my» party In the last twenty years the political parties, especially (but not only) in Europe have quickly and constantly evolved. The changes have been particularly evident in all their three organizational faces and they refer to a process started in the late Fifties of the last century. The evolution of the political parties and in particular of the mass «model» was primarily due to the deep innovation intervened in modern societies. The declining of social class divisions, the weakening of the blue collars workers, were basically the causes of the emergence of the so-called catch-all party. The new characteristics of those parties were well illustrated by Kirchheimer (1966): the decline of ideology, the weakening of a classe gardée, the growing importance of the leadership, the influence of lobbies, and the reduction of the weight of members and activists. The end of mass party, the related progressive weakening of bureaucrats gave more force and relevance to the typical traits of catch all parties. Moreover, the reduction of the intensity and force of the linkages between the political parties and the society has produced a growing relevance of the proximity between the parties and the state. The latter would particularly due to the possibility for the party to acquire 5

6 financial resources form the state, the so-called cartelization (Katz and Mair 1995), after the decline of economic aid coming from supporters. So, it was possible to detect general trend of reduction of the collective dimension of politics in parties, and the related «personalization». In sum, all these factors were indicating a «centralization» of the party organization and to some extent a personalization of the leadership, or better dynamics which facilitated the emergence of a centralized, presidentialized party. Paradoxically, all the changes that political parties have adopted in order to reduce their low legitimacy and appeal, have at the end reinforced the party «in central office», and the leadership at the expense of the party «on the ground» (Penning and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Van Biezen 2003; Ignazi 2004). In particular, looking at the process of centralization of powers in the party central leadership hands, Samuels (2002) refers to a cases of «presidentialized party»: however we must consider that the last one is different from the situations of «presidential party» or rather the «party of the president». The first case the presidentialized party con be considered as depending on presidentialism (as regime type), while the second the presidential party catch the internal process that involved the balance of powers of parties. Presidentialization of political parties: is the «presidential party» the key factor? Presidentialization of political parties is not (just) one face of the general process of presidentialization that affected politics, is rather the core of that dynamics. And in any case it represents its most relevant aspect. The personalization, the fact that the electoral campaign is mostly based on candidate(s), and the concentration of «powers» on the head of government are in fact basically been possible thanks to the presidentialization of political parties. Being the chief of a party can be considered as the key element (Passarelli 2010a,b) in allowing a political leader to lead not only the parliamentary group, but also - eventually - the national government. The so-called «presidential(ization of the) party» (Cole 1993) is the tool the politicians have to control (almost) all zones of uncertainty in their political organizations. Moreover, leading the party would allow leaders to affect both policies and political strategies. The control of the «own» party permits to the 6

7 leader to (easily) overcome internal opposition challenges, and to legitimize himself/herself as the main actor facing other parliamentary groups. Leading the party in a presidentialized way means to be the most probable candidate to the national government, and so to directly and «personally» organize the electoral campaign. In some way, the party is at the personal political «disposal» of the candidate/leader, and it often is the link between the apex and the party on the ground, that is activists, and voters. In such a way the leader can easily overcome the middle level party elite, especially those elected in public office (national Mps but also politicians locally elected). No matter what the regime system is, the presence of a «presidential» party represents the most noticeable factor in presidentializing politics, government or parliamentary groups. Without a «personal» party (Calise 2000) leaders cannot (easily) face internal and external challenges nor can they control the party in public office. The last point means the head of the government is not able in «passing» his bills in parliament without an extenuating negotiation with factions, minorities, and groups. Vice versa, in the case of a legitimated and strictly controlled «presidentialized party, the leader strengthen its majority both inside the party and in parliament. After all, this trend can be observed in almost all so-called advanced democracies without any significative differentiations between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. So, «presidential» parties represent the common factor in all systems/cases where the presidentialization process has been more evident. Even though some scholars (Samuels 2002) only refer to the influence of presidentialism in pushing trough more and more presidentialized parties, it is in fact evident that a similar trend is ongoing in countries with different regime type. In particular Samuels argues that presidentialism rely on «presidentialized» party, that is «emerged around the presidential race» (ivi). The main idea is in fact that presidentialism stresses the intensity of parties «vote seeking» incentives (Strøm 1990). (Not only in presidential systems) Party leaders have almost always tried explicitly or not, and successfully or not to create their own party. The idea is to consolidate the control over the party organization in order to have a powerful weapon to challenge rivals both in 7

8 the party and outside 1. So, as said, it is relevant especially to detect the entity of centralization, to distinguish cases between presidentialized party (Samuels 2002) and party of the leader (Cole 1993). In sum, in the case of a «presidentialized» party it is neither clear nor automatically detectable which face of parties is concerned. That is, is not evident if that process concerns «only» or mostly a person, or better the leader. A comparison between presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism could be interesting at the electoral stage that is in terms of political parties. We can in fact assume that exist differences (and similarities) between parties, and the related presidentialization paths, not only between systems, but also in the same system. Moreover, in some (not frequent and widespread) cases the party leaders (formally or informally) have also contemporarily been executive chief. Nevertheless, the trend is a positive one even in contexts where the party organization historically had a big influence, but, again, the most relevant factor is the «nature» of party, the genetic model and its internal balance of power. These are constitutive elements which are often resilient to quick changes. In Italy in (only) four times the head of the government have contemporary been the secretary of his own party: it has been the case of Bettino Craxi ( ), Ciriaco De Mita ( ), Giovanni Spadolini ( ), Silvio Berlusconi (1994; ; ). In France, during the Fifth Republic, we should separately consider the cases of the prime ministers, and those of the Presidents of the Republic. In the first category, even though not formally secretary or their parties but certainly their political chiefs 2, we found Charles De Gaulle ( ), Valery Giscard d Estaing ( ), François Mitterrand ( ), Jacques Chirac ( ), and Nicolas Sarkozy ( ); vice versa, the group of prime minister sharing both charges and «functions» is as a consequence less numerous than the first. The prime minister that led a party while exercising the governmental functions have been: Jacques Chirac ( ), Lionel Jospin ( The cases that can potentially be included in the research we would further develop are all «relevant» parties of democratic regimes. From an institutional point of view, as said, we consider all three regime types such as presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential. The latter choice allow us in stressing similarities and differences among parties, and to eventually detect patterns of parties presidentialization even following paths across regime types. 2 Of course there have been periods of political difficulties for each president in controlling over the parties, but here we would indicate a general trend. 8

9 2002), and Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2002). In Spain, the prime minister was the charge of the general secretary of their own party for the terms of Felipe González ( ), José Aznar ( ), and José Luis Zapatero ( ). In Germany, Konrad Adenauer (149-63), Willy Brandt ( ), Helmut Schmidt ( ), Helmut Kohl ( ), (Gerhard Schröder ( ). In Great Britain are noticeable the cases of Clement Attle ( ), Harold Wilson ( ; ; ), James Callaghan ( ), Margareth Theatcher ( ), Toni Blair ( ), Gordon Brown ( ). Finally, in Portugal four cases are remarkable: Cavaco Silva ( ), Antόnio Guterres ( ), and José Socrates ( ); Pedro Passos Coelho (2011- ). Outside Europe, we mostly face (semi) presidential cases. As is well known in the USA the president as chief of the government is not the leader of his own party, also due to the typical characteristics of American political parties. So, if we consider three Latin American cases, such as Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can observe the overlapping of the two functions in a few circumstances: in Chile (Michelle Bachelet, ), in Argentina (Carlos Menem, ), in Brazil (Luiz Lula, ). Then we can found a situation of (almost) systematic overlapping of the two functions in the case of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party. Only party leaders matter? Some (other) evidences Therefore presidentialization of politics has found a great ally in leaders. In fact, party leaders with their «own/personal» parties have accelerated a process that interested many countries. Theory and literature tell us as seen that the presidentialization of politics interested three faces of politics: executives, electoral campaign, and parties. The leader has been the main actor in beneficing of this trend and at the same time in increasing and pushing in that direction. However, as said, is the control of the party which allows leaders to have a leader-centred electoral campaign, to benefit of greater autonomy and power in executive branch, and to promote rules and procedures which strengthen and confirm the central control of parties. The presence of «party/parties of the 9

10 president» could in fact be an epiphenomenon, and also a contextual consequence. Vice versa, the «presidentialization» of political parties is strongly related to a general process of change in politics. Nevertheless, in order to go further in investigation I propose to deeper analyse only the party face of the presidentialization. Given the both theoretical and empirical problems that this procedure can implies, we suggest adopting a few specific indicators for each country. In such a way, it will be possible to empirically confirm the acute interpretation and definition of Poguntke and Webb (2005). After all, the same two authors clearly and frankly admit that their report and analysis «does not in itself constitute a truly systematic and independent quantitative test of [their] hypothesis» (Ibidem, 19 and 351). Presidentialization effects on political parties, and the presidentialization of political parties Which party face has been presidentialized (more)? And in which way and why parties reacted differently to the presidentialization process? What are the factors that inhibit or rather emphasize the presidentialization of political parties? The answer to these questions is not easy to give. In any case the best way to advance is deeply analyzing the variables which affect the presidentialization process in political parties. We need to choose some good indicators to detail processes interested parties and their presidentialization. Parties as organizations are complex structures, and so far way from a neither monolithic view nor interpretation. As Panebianco reminds, «the leader, even if he leads because he controls crucial zones of uncertainty, must (more often than not) negotiate with other organizational actors: he is at center of a coalition of internal party forces with which he must at least to a certain degree negotiate» (1988, 37). Moreover, literature has shown differentiated paths in organizational parties developments. It has been put in evidence the progressive process of de-organization of parties. The latter development, started with the «end» of mass parties have followed a (no always linear) trend of deep organizational and ideological changes which characterized different dimensions. The most remarkable innovations were detectable on the ideological identity, in members role and in the 10

11 centralization of control over the organization, as well as in the increasing professionalization of party personnel and the growing invasive influence of public financial resources coming from the state. So, this process (would be) culminated in many contexts with the emergence of a «cartelization» of political parties. Moreover, on one side on terms of balance power it has been clearly put in evidence a growing influence of the party in central office (Pco) coherently with the previous predominance of the extra parliamentary face in presence of strong organizational structures of mass parties. On the other side, consistently, the presidentialization of politics process for what concern the party face it has been described as a trend mainly concerning the party leader. It is fact the leader that control the party organization, led the electoral campaign, and it is the «real» chief of government once his get power. Nevertheless, the increasing influence of Pco it is not so extensively widespread as have been detailed demonstrated. In fact, in many countries of «recent» democratization in both Western and Eastern Europe at least (van Biezen 2003) the Ppo is, for many reasons, the party face which get powerful. This argument rely on the party adaptation process, but of course also the contexts of party. So, this latter discrepancy between the presidentialization process that stress the role of the leadership (and the related centralization), and the organizational development which emphasizes the grown importance of Ppo sounds a bit «strange». Nevertheless, a conceptual misleading could arise, and so a deeper clarification should be tried. How we can keep together the increasing power of party in public office together with the dynamics of centralization of power in the hands of the party in central office, and especially of its leader? Does this contradiction derive from an intrinsic problem in one or both analyses of party evolution? Or vice versa, as we think, it depends mostly on a lack of in-depth examination on presidentialization of parties that will consider different cases in various countries? The presidentialization of parties in fact is not as after all is not either in the case of «politics» a monolithic phenomenon. Rather it adopts differentiates characteristics depending on 11

12 various factors, such as: the genetic model of party, the institutional context (electoral systems among others), the ability of party leader, the dominant coalition features. It is in fact evident that parties faced the presidentialization in different ways, following paths mostly indicated by their own genetic characteristic. It is mean that presidentialization do not concerned parties in the same way and in all time. Vice versa, presidentialization mostly depends on the internal balance of power among the three faces of the parties. So, the equilibrium among the different components of each party will determine the «presidentialized» outcomes. We propose a focus on the balance of power of political parties. This analysis would help in depicting the different patterns the presidentialization of parties followed in different cases. Before introducing the study of the dominant coalition it is relevant to concentrate on the genetic model. In fact, the genetic model matters. «A party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor» (Panebianco 1988, 50). Parties can be distinguished in two categories referring to as many as kinds of origins: External origin; Internal origin. The first refers the presence of a «sponsoring organization [which] generally results in a weak institution. In fact, the external organization has no interest in strengthening the party [ ] for this would inevitably reduce the party s dependence upon it» (63). On the other hand, «it is easier for an internally legitimated party (i.e. a party not sponsored by another organization) to become a strong institution» (ivi). In «new [European] democracies» they have mostly been internally created, that is after reaching the right to representation in democratic assemblies. They have so institutional rather societal origins, and as a consequence they tried to focus on electoral mobilization rather than on partisan mobilization. Despite the fact that the official rules of Southern European parties put the party in the parliament under the strict control of the extra-parliamentary party [ ], the party in public office would be the predominant face of political parties in newly democratizing systems (Van Biezen 2003, 164 and 175). 12

13 Moreover, it should be take into account the differentiation between parties which had an organizational development through penetration and those which developed via diffusion. The first «tends to produce a strong institution, [and a] a cohesive elite, able to set in motion a strong developmental process in the nascent organization, is present by definition from the start». Vice versa, a party which developed through diffusion «tends to produce a weak institution because of the presence of many competing elites controlling conspicuous organizational resources; the organization is thus forced to develop through federation, compromise, and negotiation among a plurality of groups» (Panebianco, 1988, 63) 3. That said, it arise as evident enough that the future «presidentialization» of a party mostly will depend to some organizational characteristics, due to its genetic model, such as the degree of its unity and homogeneity, and the balance of power in the dominant coalition. In particular the equilibrium established between two of the three faces of the party: the extra parliamentary party, and the party in public office, both generally definable as the «party leadership». Nevertheless, the expression «dominant coalition» does not at all imply that only national party leaders take part in such a coalition: a dominant coalition includes the national leaders (or some of them) as well as a certain number of local or intermediate leaders (p. 37). This analysis implies to consider both the degree of internal cohesion and the degree of degree of stability in the dominant coalition. The degree of cohesion refers to the fact that the control over zones of uncertainty is either dispersed or concentrated. So, we must consider the presence of parties divided into factions (strongly organized groups) and parties divided into factions (loosely organized groups) (Ibidem, 38) vice versa, the degree of stability depends on horizontal exchanges (elite-elite exchanges), and, in particular, to the character of compromises (whether stable or precarious) at the organization upper echelon (Ibidem, 39). From these previous factors it is arise the possibility to define an «organizational power map» which concerns [ ] both relations the party s various organizational units (e.g. the predominance of the parliamentary group, the internal 3 It is possible to also have a mix kind of organizational development in which are present both elements of diffusion and penetration (Panebianco 1988). 13

14 national leadership, or the peripheral leadership, etc.) and relations (of predominance, subordination, and/or cooperation) between the party and other organizations. (p. 39). As said, we can assume to have different types of presidentialization of parties, that is a balanced presidentialization between the central and the public office faces of the party, or, vice versa, an overwhelming dominance of one of them. In particular, we can indicate different path by looking at the way in which leaders get and/or lost their power and control of parties. Following this line of thinking it is so clearer why for example due to organizational balance of power in the dominant coalition - some leaders kept control over parties after electoral defeats, and vice versa some others lost that control (Table 1). So we argue that the presidentialization of politics, in terms of political parties, affected each organization in various ways. Put differently, we can have a high centralized party, with a presidentialized electoral campaign «in the leader s hands» but with the same leader that can that can easily loose the control over the party. This dismissal on the organizational control can derive from peculiar characteristic of such a party. So, the presidentialization of party in that case would mean a mere presidentialization of the electoral momentum. Moreover, the presidentialization of party would be easily detectable looking at other level of party organization, such as the parliamentary group and other organizations and/or factions (more or less organized). Vice versa, we can have parties in which even after a big electoral defeat the leader continue in keeping (strong) control over the party organization. In the case in point, the presidentialization of party would effectively mean also «a personalization» around the most eminent and important party representative. At this point I would try to depict better the way to go deeper in defining the schema that each party (or some of them) has followed in «presidentializing» their leadership. So, it will be possible also to indicate the most influent factors in affecting the process of presidentialization of parties. The question that quickly arises is thus on how to measure presidentialization in political 14

15 parties? In each context we suggest to take in account systematically the following criteria, trying where possible to standardise those variables. In the case of the leader we will consider the role inside the party, in the executive, and in parliament. Do the party leader is at the same time the party chief (formally or informally)? Do the party leader is at the same time also the executive chief? Do the party leader is also the chief of the parliamentary majority? (Or of the opposition?) From the organizational point of view, the following criteria related to the balance of powers between different faces of the party: Do exist formal rules in the party chart which empower (mostly) the party in central office? Which party's face gets more financial and organizational/human resources? Internal party division (dominant coalition) and the presence of «separated» groups, such as factions or tendencies (Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988) Party personnel overlap between the two main organizational faces (Pco, and Ppo) Leadership force «is not based on organizational control of the party [...] it is contingent upon electoral success» (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 5). So, as a consequence we shall have a presidentialization of both politics and party around the leader. However, in terms of political party we can analyse different patterns, or better consider that trend has not fill all kind of parties. Basing the power on electoral success would in fact make the leader s position much more precarious if not related and supported by a conspicuous control and power inside the party (from which they have tried to move away and became «independent»). The fact is that the electoral (in) success would increase or, vice versa, reduce the leader power on the basis of the kind of party to which he belongs to. 15

16 Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes in the «nature» of presidentialization of parties leadership in political parties. The vertical axis considers the style of party leadership (that is the kind of dominant coalition); rather on the horizontal axis we found the «balance of power» between the three faces of parties. The main indicators I have adopted are the following: the electoral process; the party control; the executive (government) control; the structure of tendencies. The presence on 2 or 3 elements it depends on whether the party won the elections to consider also the variable «executive») = MAX score on vertical axis; none or 1 of such indicators. + Personalized + Leader (es: Outsider ) + Group (es: PPO) Personalized Fig. 1. The nature of presidentialization of leadership in political parties Hypothesis H1: to be «presidentialized» the leader should control (at least) the parliamentary group (for example in 2012 the Italian Lega Nord, Maroni, a close allied of the leader/secretary Bossi, tried successfully at least to oppose an own candidature for the parliamentary group leadership to that in charge) Figure 2 illustrates the typology we propose in order to «measure» the kind of presidentialization process each party has followed. The first dimension refers to the electoral result: the electoral 16

17 outcome can be affect the leadership s role in the party; the second dimension stresses the role of the control of the party organization: keeping or losing the leadership of the party organization can be both dependent and independent from the electoral result (so, it means that the consequences are mostly related to the «genetic» features of the party examined. Some empirical evidences are illustrated in table 1. For example Ségolène Royal: become the presidential candidate for the French socialists in 2007, but then after her electoral defeat she failed in keeping or consolidating the control over the party organization. As it was happened before (in a quite different context) to Lionel Jospin in Table 1. Leaders, electoral results, and the control of party organization outcome Kept control of the party Lost the control of the party Sarkozy (Ump France) W Royal (Ps France) D Berlusconi (Fi and Pdl Italy) W Veltroni (Pd Italy) D-Party Bayrou (Udf France) D Blair (New Labour GB) Party Di Pietro (Idv Italy) D Brown (New Labour GB) D Merkel (Ccd-Cdu Germany) W Zapatero (Psoe - Spain) Party Socrates (Ps Portugal) D Sarkozy (Ump France) D Berlusconi (Fi and Pdl Italy) D Other countries/cases (to be continued) Other countries/cases (to be continued) Legend: D: electoral defeat Party: parliamentary group defeat W: winning elections + Keeping control of the party + Positive electoral result negative electoral result Losing control of the party 17

18 Fig. 2. Outcomes in political parties control Finally, figure 3 shows the main factors that affect the path of presidentialization a leader/party follow due to some characteristics of both the institutional system, and of the «nature» of the party itself. It is evident that each case/party can follow a peculiar process, and that we can found probably many «mix» of elements of both the left pillar (less presidentialized) as well as many other of the right pillar (more presidentialized). For example, the regime type can theoretically affect the kind and level of presidentialization as follow: in a parliamentary system we can expect less presidentialization in a situation of strong coalitions, whilst we could hypothesize a more presidentialized track in one party governments contexts. Similarly, the electoral system would affect the presidentialization towards a strengthening or weakening effect according to the nature of the system itself: proportional (closed or open list), majoritarian, that is emphasizing or not factions and tendencies in parties. The combination of such factors will determine, or at the least strongly affect, the nature of the presidentialization a party (and its leadership) will follow. 18

19 Less presidentialized PARTIES More presidentialized Diffusion Genetic model Penetration Factions Dominant coalition Tendencies Party in public office Balance of power Party in central office PR (open list) Electoral system PR (closed list) Majoritarian (plurality, double ballot, etc.) Parliamentary Semi-presidential (PM) Regime type Presidential Semi-presidential (PR) "Autonomous parliamentary group" "Personal" party "Presidential" party Primary (closed) Party appointment Candidature selection Primary (open) Party appointment Other(s) Official rules (endorsment) Party leader Electoral failure Electoral performance Electoral success "Normal" profile Context "Strong" profile Fig. 3. Factors affecting the presidentialization of party process 19

20 On Going Conclusions As seen the presidentialization of politics can be referred to (at least) three major dimensions of politics. The first concerns the executive, the second refers to the electoral campaign, and the third implies a presidentialization of political parties. We argued that presidentialization as general phenomenon can be better not only understood, but also explained by referring to the process which (in some cases) invested political parties. It is in fact the political party s presidentialization that at the end allows in presidentializing the executive/government through the control of the parliamentary group, of the party. The latter party can be both the majoritarian one, or at least of one of the parties composing the majoritarian coalition. Moreover, the parties can be affected (or not) by a process of presidentialization which interest the candidature selection process, the role of the party on central office, as well as through a centralized electoral campaign (primaries, catch-all attitudes, de-ideologization of voters, role of mass media, etc.). Generally speaking, presidentialization can be seen as a general concept affecting politics which may assume a «collective» dimension or rather a «personal» one. Presidentialization can thus be «implemented» through a personal process, or vice versa thanks to a collective tool, for example a group. In addition, and it is the main point we would stress, the presidentialization of politics can be measured looking at the three faces of political parties. In some cases will be the «party in public office» the most presidentialized, in some other circumstances is the «the party in central office», and the single leader of course that led that process. The main «finding» we would share, and discuss is the analytical framework we suggested in order to go deeper in analyzing the presidentialization of politics. Starting from the concept of presidentialization of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), we would introduced some specification as useful tool to measure that phenomenon especially in political parties. The latter are, according to us, the true vessels which carry the main effects of presidentialization. In order to do so, we softly propose the use of some indicators such as: elections (success or failure), political actors resources, concentration of power, etc. Each case/party followed a different (or new) pattern of 20

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